So I understand the idea of 'pure maths' but I'm finding the idea of 'pure physics' pretty hard to get my head around.....

From the Introduction to the CPR:

"V. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical Judgements “a priori” are contained as Principles.

1. Mathematical judgements are always synthetical [a priori]. Hitherto this fact, though incontestably true and very important in its consequences, seems to have escaped the analysts of the human mind, nay, to be in complete opposition to all their conjectures. ...
...

2. The science of natural philosophy (physics) contains in itself synthetical judgements a priori, as principles. I shall adduce two propositions. For instance, the proposition, “In all changes of the material world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged”; or, that, “In all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be equal.” In both of these, not only is the necessity, and therefore their origin a priori clear, but also that they are synthetical propositions. For in the conception of matter, I do not cogitate its permanency, but merely its presence in space, which it fills. I therefore really go out of and beyond the conception of matter, in order to think on to it something a priori, which I did not think in it. The proposition is therefore not analytical, but synthetical, and nevertheless conceived a priori; and so it is with regard to the other propositions of the pure part of natural philosophy."

B14,B15 Boldings, underlines added

And "synthetic" (a priori) means that there is the self consciousness or apperception involved. That is, active combining of appearances into an unified object within the self identical self consciousness. In contrast to this, "analytic" means that thinking happens "merely" according to the "traditional" or "formal" logical forms. Logical thinking is applied "from without" to empirical material (not conceived as constituting the object itself). Subject and object are separate or empirical and accidental (and thus remaining something "subjective") instead of being necessarily unified (into something objective in apperception).

A good point.

I'd guess that his point was to "modernize" the philosophy. To make it compatible with the modern scientific world view.

I could imagine that Kant's philosophy could make stupid people at least a little bit smarter.

:up: I think there is good ideas in his philosophy. His basic natural scientific standpoint is not mine though.

In theoretical philosophy, a Kantian maintains a view that there is necessary apriori structures of thought or understanding which order or form our experience of the sensuous world. And that these apriori structures or conceptual schemes are real only when they function in this way i.e. are conditioning the empirical or spatial-temporal experience. This means that a Kantian is a transcendental idealist who is also an empirical realist :)

... of the following argument: Since the deconstructionist (which is to say, isn't it, the skeptic-relativist-nihilist!) is supposed not to believe in truth, stability, or the unity of meaning, in intention or "meaning-to-say, " how can he demand of us that we read him with pertinence, precision, rigor? How can he demand that his own text be interpreted correctly? How can he accuse anyone else of having misunderstood ..., — Joshs

So Derrida after all believes somehow in "meaning-to-say"? Interesting. But in what sense Derrida's texts make sense? (I , for my part, have had many experiences where they make sense.)

Husserl makes a distinction between bound and free idealities. Spoken and written language, and all other sorts of gestures and markings which intend meaning, exemplify bound idealities.Even as it is designed to be immortal, repeatable as the same apart from any actual occurrence made at some point, — Joshs

This is an interesting distinction. Bound idealities are context differentiated meanings and which persists as long as the context persists?

Last few pages of the section 16 of the 1925/26 lectures contain interesting thoughts about "p u r e presencing". (Rational, axiomatic, mathematical, theoretical) logic is based on the care about pure presencing? It is based on a (non psychological) act of temporizing. It tries to preserve or maintain ( = is cared about) a certain ("rational") order in which the temporizing act of presencing (making present, Gegenwärtigen) dominates.

Presencing is necessary in order to have something as encountered or discovered but logical activity transforms this presencing into a pure presencing. It locates itself into a pure present where "units" are fully present as themselves. Other temporal ecstasies, hasbeen and futurity, are completely subordinated to the present.

Then dasein is defined by dasein. That is okay because he already made ‘clear’ :D how what he says isn’t ‘circular’ though right. — I like sushi

Fixed i.e. reliable definitions are needed as parts when constructing reliable or persisting machines. Heidegger's discourse is not a machine. :wink:

The difference I see with Heidegger is that Heidegger takes pragmatic awareness as a totality of relevance that unifies our total past as background ‘framing’ of every disclosure of a ready to hand thing. Husserl begins instead with the perceptual object that only indirectly links back to a larger totality of our past experience. — Joshs

For Heidegger there is no perception of the corporeal things at all? Everything is "had" as significations in circumspection (Umsicht). Dasein is in relations i.e references and "sees" only these i.e. the as-articulations that make up or compose the world.

For Husserl the live experience of the perceived thing was the basic foundation. For example, a valued thing (cultural artifact) had always the basic layer of being perceived which founded the layer of being valued, willed etc.

Did you already say the idea came from Heidegger via Husserl? If so, my apologies I missed it. I'm not aware of that idea deriving from Husserl, but in any case it is abundantly clear in Heidegger.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Always_already — Janus

In Logical Investigations (1901) Husserl notices that when we hear a word we are i n the meaning i.e. we are living in the meaning and not in the hearing the sound of the word. We are always already (i.e. a priori) interpreting (Deuten) or apperceiving the physical. Similarly, we are always already interpreting the sensually given things around us. Sensations' function is to present to us something that is understood. They serve the intentionality, as the active directedness, of the experience. For Husserl these significations or noemas were more like given ideal ("logical") senses, he didn't examine their "worldhood" like Heidegger did. In fact, for Heidegger the a priori structure of the experience is "always-already-ahead" (note the temporality). Through this structure Dasein as a signifying comportment returns or comes back and encounters the being as something. The moment of returning in or from the "always-already-ahead" is "disclosing" (Erschlossenheit). (cf. Heidegger's 1925/26 lectures to which referred to in one of his posts). I think that Heidegger tries to here give an original sense of the "(transcendental) a priori"?

Very well said. Our secular age, with its scientism and capitalism is ultimately based on "naturalism" and "materialism," or even "physicalism." Two other -isms branch off from these: hedonism and consumerism. That's a lot of -isms. But if we look around, this explains a large part of our world. It shows up in the "American Dream" of basically aspiring to be nothing more than a wage slave who can maybe one day own a house and a little land (property, assets -- "stuff"). It shows up in our addictions to technology, the most obvious being smart phones. — Xtrix

In this line Herbert Marcuse's Heideggerian Marxism from the 20's and 30's is interesting reading. Marcuse was more like an active communist than mere a critic of capitalist society though. For Marcuse Marxism represents a historical project to which one has to "resolutely" (Heidegger's Entschossenheit) commit oneself. The view is that the disclosedness of the modern world is characteristically a capitalistic one. The production of commodities or exchange values determine our "free" transcendence. Being = capitalistic society and its life form.

https://www.amazon.com/Heideggerian-Marxism-European-Horizons-Herbert/dp/0803283121


"The Frankfurt School philosopher Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979) studied with Martin Heidegger at Freiburg University from 1928 to 1932 and completed a dissertation on Hegel’s theory of historicity under Heidegger’s supervision. During these years, Marcuse wrote a number of provocative philosophical essays experimenting with the possibilities of Heideggerian Marxism. For a time he believed that Heidegger’s ideas could revitalize Marxism, providing a dimension of experiential concreteness that was sorely lacking in the German Idealist tradition. Ultimately, two events deterred Marcuse from completing this program: the 1932 publication of Marx’s early economic and philosophical manuscripts, and Heidegger’s conversion to Nazism a year later. Heideggerian Marxism offers rich and fascinating testimony concerning the first attempt to fuse Marxism and existentialism.

These essays offer invaluable insight concerning Marcuse’s early philosophical evolution. They document one of the century’s most important Marxist philosophers attempting to respond to the “crisis of Marxism”: the failure of the European revolution coupled with the growing repression in the USSR. In response, Marcuse contrived an imaginative and original theoretical synthesis: “existential Marxism.”"

For Heidegger we are never conscious to ourselves , because reflection is transformation. So absence for Heidegger makes its way into the heart of experiencing every moment, in that the self is never present to itself as consciousness, self-reflexivity and self-awareness. We are fundamentally absent to ourselves. — Joshs

Dasein has always a certain "sight" (not just a "feel") of itself in its interaction with beings. It can also attain a "Durchsichtigkeit" (transparency, literally a "see-through-ness") of itself or its hermeneutical situation. For normal everyday Dasein his state doesn't appear as hermeneutical situation, as a situation, where Dasein is more or less "conscious" of the context of the interpretation. Transparent grasp of one's situation means "reflecting" or explicating its "formal structure", that is, its fore-having (Vorhabe), fore-sight (Vorsicht) and fore-conception (Vorgriff) i.e the sense implied in one's understanding or interpretation of the current situation (cf. Being and Time Chapter 32. Understanding and Interpretation). Making the situation more transparent means going beyond the immediate understanding of the "ready-to-hand" we are currently dealing with. The disclosedness (Erschlossenheit), which opens up the truth of the situation, is reflected or made more explicite in itself. Heidegger's own literal existence, his philosophical reflection, means to make more transparent his (and at the same time ours) situation. In the end it is a certain historical situation which we have to try to elucidate.

I think that for Heidegger we are absent to ourselves when we are completely identifying ourselves with the "things" or entities we are dealing with. That is, in "normal" everyday "falling" (Verfallenheit) we are basically absent to ourselves. But then we are in a danger to interpret ourselves as mere things or tools i.e. as something present-of-hand or ready-to-hand and not as an human historical existence.

What I have in mind specifically is his analysis of what he calls the statement in B&T. He refers to this as an extreme of interpretation and of the present to hand. He derives the ‘is’ from the ‘as’ structure, in which we take something as something. I consider the following analysis to inextricably link the ‘is’ to the ‘as’ , the ‘as’ to temporality, and temporality to being ( the ‘is’). — Joshs

This has of course to do with Heidegger's concept of truth and his critique of the traditional conception of truth i.e. that the truth is "situated" in the logical judgment or statement. Husserl could be an influence here. Husserl tried to "ontologize" the logical judgment as a part of his scheme consisting of an act of judgment, the content of the judgment and the object of the judgment. Logical judging happens i n the "reality" or Being where it expresses some experience. It (or logicality in general) is not just a separate given form but it presupposes certain phenomenological-ontological structures. Logical relations or forms presuppose phenomenologically described ontological relations of "foundations" (phenomena are founded in each other essentially = philosophical logic). Heidegger however transfers Husserl's position from the "consciousness" into an "hermeneutical situation". "World" as hermeneutical situation.

"as" is precisely that what is called "transcending"? Experiencing something as "as" is to be "in" the world of "relevant" references. Judgement is an particular expression for this experience. But it, or its form, tends to somehow distort the original experience. Is the language in itself already a "distortion" of an experience? Language should express as closely as possible (truly) the articulations of the as-structures? Language or discourse expresses and stores more or less confidently these original articulations. To be in the truth means, according to Heidegger, that the discourse and being are one.

Being and Time chapter 33 "Assertion [statement, judgment] as a Derivative Mode of Interpretation" is essential reading in this connection. (Following chapter 34 is entitled "Being-there and Discourse. Language".)


Interesting quotes and comments. Is the Heidegger 2010b his 1925 lectures?

This sounds a lot more like Kant than Heidegger (Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind). Understood most primordially, there is no presence of something objective, no — Joshs

"If what the term "idealism" says, amounts to the understanding that Being can never be explained by entities but is already that which is 'transcendental' for every entity, then idealism affords the only correct possibility for a philosophical problematic. If so, Aristotle was no less an idealist than Kant." B&T p. 208

Heidegger doesn't of course mean with transcendental something that makes the scientifical objects possible. It is not anything logical or theoretical but the structures of existence through which the beings manifest themselves as significations in the world (= in the whole of references).

If one reads closely how H. "argues" in B&T it is always through "essential judgements". That is, he describes what kind of Being makes some ontical phenomenon possible. For example, he argues that there is not Dasein as "being-with" because there is many people gathered together but that there is many people gathered together because Dasein is essentially a being-with. There is not made generalizations from the observed data and then theoretically deduced something but instead there are essential characteristics of phenomena which make possible in the first place to access something and observe it and make generalizations. Instead of Kantian categorical, logical functions ordering the natural world there are essential characteristics of the human historical existence and which can differ from case or phenomena to other. They don't make any rigid system (for logical deductions). For Heidegger to intuite essentialities behind facticities or what is empirically given is a genuine philosophical way to address these phenomena, that is, it is his phenomenological method. Essentialities doesn't mean here platonic eternal ideas but something pertaining to "normal" philosophical reflection. Philosophy operates with essentialities not with empirical generalizations.

Xtrix edited away the reference to Kant and temporality?

In connection with the "ecstasies" (hasbeen, present, forthcoming) of temporality H. talks about "schemas" which is of course a Kantian term. For Kant the temporality or temporal schemes were mediating between "Being" or categories and beings or empirical. Through the temporality the categories or concepts of understanding received intuitional content and were linked to the empirical world. For Heidegger temporality provides a "dynamic horizontality" through which the Being as ontological constitutes the ontical beings. Hereby the traditional ontology is related to the (empirical) historicity and receives a new meaning. Later "Heydegger" doesn't no more use the term ontology. On the other hand, he does use the expression "ontological difference" (which, the difference between Being and beings, is still a central idea for him.)

:)

Being for Heidegger (Of Being and Time) is the meaningful presence of something. Ontical aspect here is that there is something concretely, there is some concrete being, and ontological aspect is the Being of that being, which gives sense to that being so that it can manifest as something. Being is the transcendental dimension that makes particular empirical beings possible. But it is not anything logical or theoretical as with Kant and to some extent with Husserl. Being is the complicated relations of the "live" significations making a "world" as well as the understanding, emotional subjectivity carrying these relations. "Irrational" (personal-historical) "dynamics" are involved there too unlike with Kant or Husserl.

Transcendental point of view is a good, more traditional way to gain access to Heidegger. That is, Being is the transcendental "worlding" (a verb) that makes beings possible. In Being and Time are described the structures of that transcendental complex of relations (not tr. logic) that makes existence or living (not theoretical knowing) in the world possible.

Temporality is the sense of the Being or truth of the Being (mentioned above). When questioned what "is" (the world and the existence in it constituting) Being itself or as such, answer is that Being "is" time or that Being "yields" ("zeitigt", Time = Zeit) or "produces" (more or less transient or enduring presences making up the Being of the world). Temporality is a kind of a pure becoming or nothingness only that the moment of present produces certain stability or persistence or actual beingness to it. Selfhood is not possible without the presence. If temporality were pure becoming there would be no presence at all, only past and future? Heidegger's relation to presence is somewhat ambiguous. "Historical presence" as the world (relative stability of the being-there-ness of the various references or significations; the problem of the selfhood) is something positive or necessary whereas ideal presence or abstract repetition is derivative and negative?

0. In the Introduction, Kant says that the Critique is not a doctrine; yet here he calls part of it the Doctrine of Elements (and later the Doctrine of Method). Why? — darthbarracuda

0. "Lehre" vs. "Doktrine" (Transzendentale Elementar l e h r e in German). Both are translated as doctrine. "Lehre" can also mean something like "teaching", "(basic) lesson" or "basic knowledge" (I'm not a native speaker of German).


The following excerpt is from the "Jäsche Logic", Kant's lectures on Logic which were published in 1800 (Kant was still alive then). It can help to clarify the basic terms and distinctions:

"Of concepts

§1

The concept in general and its distinction from intuition

All cognitions, that is, all representations related with consciousness to an object, are either intuitions or concepts. An intuition is a singular(1) representation (repraesentatio singularis), a concept a universal (repraesentatio per notas communes) or reflected(2) representation (repraesentatio discursiva).
Cognition through concepts is called thought (cognitio discursiva).

Note 1. A concept is opposed to intuition, for it is a universal representation, or a
representation of what is common to several objects, hence a representation insofar as it can be contained in various ones.

2. It is a mere tautology to speak of universal or common concepts - a mistake that is grounded in an incorrect division of concepts into universal, particular, and singular. Concepts themselves cannot be so divided, but only their use."

https://cdchester.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Lectures-on-Logic-The-Cambridge-Edition-of-the-Works-of-Immanuel-Kant-in-Translation-Immanuel-Kant.pdf p.589

Derrida's interest in Freud has not been mentioned yet. I found this when googled Derrida + Freud:

"There is no way to overlook the complicity between Psychoanalysis and the metaphysical tradition of the presence in the substantiation of its metapsychological instances. Many Freudian concepts fall within the logocentric repression system that are organized in an exclusion of the body of the written trace and are constructed supported by internal-external and subjective-objective oppositions, among others. However, the interest of Derrida is not focused on the 'great Freudian conceptuality', although he admits that this conceptuality has been necessary to break with Psychology in a given context of the history of sciences. The great machines such as 'self', 'ideal self', 'id', 'superego', states Derrida, are nothing but "provisional weapons, rhetorical utensils assembled against a philosophy of consciousness, of the transparent and fully responsible intentionality" (Derrida & Roudinesco, 2004, p. 207)."

Claudia Braga Andrade: Derrida's writing: Notes on the Freudian model of language

https://www.scielo.br/j/pusp/a/rgk6NQkYL9D8DDccKGw6yWR/?lang=en

Good description of Care from Joshs and good points from Xtrix.

Citation from B&T from Section VI (Care as the Being of Dasein) subchapter 41. "Dasein's Being as Care" (the preceding chapter 40 has the title: "The basic state of mind of anxiety as distinctive way in which Dasein is disclosed") :

"The formally existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole must therefore be grasped in the following structure: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). This Being fills in the significa­tion of the term "care" [Sorge], which is used in a purely ontologico­-existential manner. From this signification every tendency of Being which one might have in mind ontically, such as worry [Besorgnis] or carefreeness [Sorglosigkeit], is ruled out."

So, Care (as the Being of Dasein) is the temporally stretched structural whole: ahead = future = existentiality, already = past = facticity, alongside = present = falling.

Interesting, that little later Heidegger has to specifically stress that Care is not just existentiality (future aspect) but also facticity (past) and falling (present):

"Care does not characterize just existentiality, let us say, as detached from facticity and falling ; on the contrary, it embraces the unity of these ways in which Being may be characterized."

For the most part the "subject" of this Care is the "They" (i.e. the current society and its ways of thinking, its norms).

More:

"Care, as a primordial structural totality, lies 'before' ["vor"] every factical 'attitude' and 'situation' of Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori; this means that it always lies in them. So this phenomenon by no means expresses a priority of the 'practical' attitude over the theoretical. When we ascertain something present-at-hand by merely beholding it, this activity has the character of care just as much as does a 'political action' or taking a rest and enjoying oneself. 'Theory' and 'practice' are possibilities of Being for an entity whose Being must be defined as "care".

The phenomenon of care in its totality is essentially something that cannot be tom asunder; so any attempts to trace it back to special acts or drives like willing and wishing or urge and addiction, or to construct it out of these, will be unsuccessful. " p.193-194

Care is an a priori structural totality cf. Heidegger's "methodology" as "phenomenological ontology".

Husserl actually began in vol. 1 of Logical Investigations as a "realist" or even as an "objectivist". Namely as an "ideal-realist" (not as a physicalist of course). In vol. 2 he then investigated how the objective idealities are given (appearing to us) in an experience (ontology became thus related to "phenomenology". Or something like that.)

Yes, but I think Husserl wouldn't have used terms like "refer" or "world" here. We don't have any knowledge how these, what appear for us like "signals", are constituted in animal minds i.e. in their "world". There is more causality than "intelligible" motivations involved here. In this sense, visually sensed "possible obstacles" would be "only" signals for animals.

Ah. Then the question would be where does intentionality not arise in our mental life for Husserl? — Manuel

The "purely" material aspect of the experience is without intentionality. When you perceive a table, all the stimulus entering your eye is without intentionality. All these sensations are non-intentional material for intentions. Through these material something presents itself as something, in this case the table. There is no "table" in those sensations. Sensations has to be organized in such a manner that they'll (re)present something (if there shall be an "lived experience"). (Material world provides "limits" within which something can "emerge" as a meaningful formation?) So, intentionality doesn't arise when there is only mechanical or physical reactions. When physical objects interact "mechanically" there is no intentionality. For human consciousness there is always intentionality involved? On the other hand, animal wandering in the woods tries to evade all objects in its way. A walking moose in the woods doesn't hit the tree and bounce from it to some direction, but he/she experiences the visual tree as an "obstacle" and accordingly orients itself. Is there some kind of "instinctual intentionality" involved even here, in this animal's behavior?

(All this relates to Husserl's distinction between hyle (matter) and morphe (form), which I think is an interesting distinction.)

In that paragraph Heidegger doesn't use the verb "destroy" but noun "Destruktion". Stambaugh translates this correctly "destructuring". Somewhere else Heidegger uses the verb "abbauen" which means dismantling (a construction) and which Derrida later for his own purposes translated as "deconstructing".

The passage continues like this. Bold added. (unfortunately I can't copy and paste from the PDF file that contains the Stambaugh translation) :

"In thus demonstrating the origin of our basic ontological concepts by an investigation in which their 'birth certificate' is displayed, we have nothing to do with a vicious relativizing of ontological standpoints. But this destruction is just as far from having the negative sense of shaking off the ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary, stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within its limits; these in turn are given factically in the way the question is for­mulated at the time, and in the way the possible field for investigation is thus bounded off. On its negative side, this destruction does not relate itself towards the past; its criticism is aimed at 'today' and at the prevalent way of treating the history of ontology, whether it is headed towards doxography, towards intellectual history, or towards a history of problems. But to bury the past in nullity [Nichtigkeit) is not the purpose of this destruction ; its aim is positive; its negative function remains unexpressed and indirect."

In Being and Time H. is only vaguely referring to the task of the historical destruction of metaphysics. It would have been carried out in later volumes which were never written. It is no use to try to analyse that paragraph because it only consists of general remarks.

Here is the whole plan for the (series of) book(s):

"Part One : The interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality, and the
explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of
Being.

Part Two : Basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the
history of ontology, with the problematic of Temporality as our clue.

Part One has three divisions:

1. the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein
2. Dasein and temporality
3· time and Being

Part Two likewise has three divisions :

1. Kant's doctrine of schematism and time, as a preliminary stage in a problematic of Temporality
2. the ontological foundation of Descartes' 'cogito sum' , and how the medieval ontology has been taken over into the problematic of the 'res cogitans'
3· Aristotle's essay on time, as providing a way of discriminating the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology." p. 39-40


Being and Time consists of Part One divisions 1. and 2. Note the expression "a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology."

I'm afraid you still haven't explained what the terms existence and essence in Heidegger mean. You vaguely allude to the meanings in traditional metaphysics such as what and that. That can mean anything — David Mo

For Heidegger essence/existence is an historical distinction which has to be "destructed". Destruction means the critical presentation of the historical genesis and evolution of this distinction.

As an extremely general context for Heidegger's approach to this here follows a sketch that I wrote for this thread about a month ago (I added emphasis in bold):

Just read a treatise from Heidegger entitled "Metaphysics as the History of being" (1941) published in Nietzsche II (1961). Good, fairly short exposition of H:s view on the history of metaphysics.

Timeline of the history (of the transformations) of Being: Beginning of metaphysics (Platon - Idea, Aristoteles - Energeia). Medieval metaphysics (Energeia becomes Actuality, existence; idea becomes essence). Beginning of the modern metaphysics (Descartes - Re-presentation; "Subietity" (Hypokeimenon) becomes subjectivity and appears as human subjectivity which replaces medieval god. Truth becomes certainity for subject). Beginning of the completion of metaphysics (Leibniz - Perception, appetition, force, will). (Heidegger dedicates many pages of this treatise to Leibniz.) Completion of metaphysics (Hegel, System). Ultimate completion (= "self-destruction"?) of metaphysics (Nietzsche - Will to power). (Kant was mentioned as "discovering" the concept of object as the "counterpart" to subject. Heidegger discusses Kant more thoroughly in a treatise called "Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics" (1941) which can be found also in "Nietzsche"; Key term there is reflection.)

So, quite a story i.e. Being is a complex historical "phenomenon". Being has various ways of be-ing or "essencing" (Wesen, be-ing as verb). Basic distinction in metaphysics is between "whatness-being" ("appearance", idea, eidos) and "thatness-being" (existence, energeia). Being as metaphysics is various combinations of existence and essence or this originally "misunderstood" distinction. However both in relation to hypokeimenon as "subietity" (Heidegger constructs a new term). Before that distinction Being was physis and aletheia (Parmenides - Noein; Heraclit - Logos). Being was something primary and beings something secondary. Truth was still unconcealedness (aletheia). Being was not relative (constitutively) to beings. Was there "beings" at all in the original Being? Heidegger also uses the expression "Bergung" of beings. Beings "are" "recovered" in aletheia (in original Being). - Metaphysics can't think Being because the distinction essence-existence and all constructions based on it "hides" Being (through/in these constructions). Being remains evasive for metaphysics. Only thinking metaphysics as a whole in its historical becoming makes it possible to go beyond metaphysics.

Being is an historically variable complex structure. For example, Enframing (Gestell) is the Being of our modern time. And it should be not forgotten that certain being has always its own truth.

I had mentioned the problem of the various verbal games with the concept of "existence" and "essence" and you don't even mention them. Where are we going? — David Mo

Commenting Heidegger's "verbal games" (p. 42): In the traditional metaphysics there is an important basic distinction between essence (what) and existence ("that"). This distinction can't be applied to Dasein (living subject). Dasein's "essence" is its "to be"* i.e. its essence seems to be its existence. But here existence can't be understood traditionally as present-at-hand because this type of being doesn't apply to Dasein's (living subject) being. So, Dasein's existence is Existence and non-Dasein's existence is present-at-hand. Now, Dasein's essence lies in this kind of being i.e. in Existence (not in existence i.e. in present-at-hand). Dasein's ("essential") characteristics are not (perceived and contemplated) properties of the existence or some existing "thing". (Essential) characteristics of the Existence are its possible ways "to be". So, with regard to Dasein there is no "static" distinction between properties (essence) and existence (thing) but instead "ways to be" which somehow "dynamically" "unifies" essence and existence.

* Translation in Macquarrie: "The 'essence' ["Wesen"] of this entity lies in its "to be" [Zu-sein] ."
Original German text "Zu-sein" is translated as "to be". "To be" would actually be in German "zu sein"? "Zu-sein" stresses the preposition "zu" which has certain directness or the sense of towardness or preposition "to". So, "to be" would have certain "intentionality" (or "ways"). Zu-sein is "to be t o (= preposition)".

The whole passage which is in question here (Stambaugh translation would be better):

"The 'essence' ["Wesen"] of this entity lies in its "to be" [Zu-sein] . Its Being-what-it-is [Was-sein] (essentia) must, so far as we can speak of it at all, be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia) . But here our ontological task is to show that when we choose to designate the Being of this entity as "existence" [Existenz], this term does not and cannot have the onto­logical signification of the traditional term "existentia" ; ontologically, existentia is tantamount to Being-present-at-hand, a kind of Being which is essentially inappropriate to entities of Dasein's character. To avoid getting bewildered, we shall always use the Interpretative expression "presence-at-hand" for the term "existentia", while the term "existence", as a designation of Being, will be allotted solely to Dasein.

The essence of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself present-at-hand ; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that. All the Being-as-it-is [So-sein] which this entity possesses is primarily Being. So when we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein', we are expressing not its "what" (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being. " p.42

At the beginning of section #9 of Being and Time, Heidegger makes a nice word game between essentia, existenze, existentia, being, being-present-hand and others that may end your patience. If you resist — David Mo

"2. That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine. Thus Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand. To entities such as these, their Being is 'a matter of indifference'; or more precisely, they 'are' such that their Being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite. Because Dasein has in each case mineness [Jemeinigkeit], one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it : 'I am', 'you are'.

Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine [je meines]"

p. 42 (in #9 The Theme of the Analytic of Dasein)


For Heidegger being seems to be radically individualized. Dasein/Existence can't be logically subsumed under a genus. It is interesting to note that Husserl's starting point was individual "targets" (Gegendstand) or intentional objects. In plain "passive" perception there is individual homogenous figures. These are already somewhat familiar and arouse certain expectations. When an experience of this individual object proceeds these prior expectations are fulfilled or not and experience is accordingly revised. Vaguely figurative or known object becomes "explicated" to its determinations. Throughout the explication the appearing determinations are "hold" or maintained in respect to the current object under consideration. They continually individualize or "enrich" the current object. On the other hand, determinations can be viewed also with respect to ontological typifications (this would be the generalizing aspect here). What Husserl describes is the intuitive "pre-predicative" experience prior any "purely" logical operations, that is generalizations, predications, inductions, deductions etc. How Heidegger relates to this? Is Heidegger's point of view that scientifical-logical operations can't be applied to Dasein/Existence at all? Dasein can't be ontologically typified? In this passage (and in the whole B&T) Heidegger is redefining Husserl's conception of the intuitive pre-predicative field of experience? He is interpreting Husserl's basically "epistemological" (theory of knowledge) stance from the perspective of Life philosophy? (Then the explications/determinations don't appear along with the ("kinaesthetically") "moving" or proceeding contemplative analysis (at the object) but along with the moving "living" whereby these determinations become functional significations i.e. they become something that matters or cares us? That is, predicates become non-logical, non-theoretical expressions.)

(I am currently reading Husserl's Experience and judgement which might affect these my "interpretations" (which actually are more like study notes).)

This is a well known fact. Heidegger's short "explanation" or "self criticism" of his interpretation can be found in a preface to second edition of his Kant book (1950). Heidegger speaks here about endeavour/experiment which tries to start/set in motion a thinking dialogue/discussion (Gespräch) between thinkers; in difference to the methods of historical philology, which has its own task, thinking dialogue (Zwiegespräch) is under different laws (and which are more vulnerable to lacks and neglects).

[Heidegger writes in German: "Diese ("laws of thinking dialogue") sind verletzlicher. Das Verfehlende ist in der Zwiesprache drohender, das Fehlende häufiger."]

Interesting passage from the "Being-There and Being-True According to Aristotle (Interpretations of
Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI)" (1924).

"The aim of the present interpretation is to enable Aristotle to speak again, not in order to bring about a renewal of Aristotelianism, but rather in order to prepare the battleground for a radical engagement with Greek philosophy — the very philosophy in which we still stand. If an examination of Aristotle’s text should show that much of what we say here is not to be found there in the text, that would not be an argument against our interpretation. An interpretation is a genuine interpretation only when, in going through the whole text, it comes upon that which common sense never finds there, but which, although unspoken, nonetheless makes up the ground [Boden] and the genuine foundations of the kind of vision from out of which the text itself came to be. We need not go further into the steps taken in this kind of interpretation, which in its principles goes back to phenomenology’s investigations of the matters. That approach should become apparent of itself in the very way this interpretation looks at things and inquires into them."

https://www.academia.edu/34868841/BECOMING_HEIDEGGER_second_revised_edition p.216


And:

"There are five distinctive possibilities of ἀληθεύειν, that is, of “being-true” in the Greek sense of uncovering an entity. Let us put the question more precisely: how does Aristotle characterize these five distinct ways of being-true, that is,ἀληθεύειν? What is his “guiding thread” [Leitfaden
, clue] for distinguishing them, and what criteria does he use to put them in a specific order of priority?

III. The Ways of Being-True and its Distinctive Possibilities

To begin with, let us enumerate these five different ways of uncovering.

1. ἐπιστήμη : knowledge
2. τέχνη : here I emphasize that τέχνη does not mean manipulating some-thing. Rather, τέχνη is a form of ἀληθεύειν and it means know-how [sich Auskennen] when it comes to manipulating something
3. φρόνησις : insight, or, better, practical insight [umsichtige Einsicht]
4. σοφία : pure understanding
5. νοῦς : pure apprehension [Vernehmen] "

https://www.academia.edu/34868841/BECOMING_HEIDEGGER_second_revised_edition p.223

If "care" has nothing to do with caring then why would he have called it "care"? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think Sorge/care/concern is an entirely formal term (even though it is meant to describe a "pure" category which conditions any concrete experiences). There is certain connotations that H. intends to incite. There is even some threat involved. Dasein is actively involved in maintaining itself. Dasein is a living being in a temporal world. However, care as a metaphysical concept has to be kept separate from all "naturalism" or "historical materialism". These, like sociology, psychology etc all "conceptual systems" and their terms are under "phenomenological reduction" in the phenomenology of Dasein. Heidegger has to invent new terms when he tries to reflect phenomena as they are given as themselves. That is, entirely unmediated through given terms or concepts. Which doesn't mean that intentional structures like care are not in themselves intricately mediated complicated wholes.

In any case, Heidegger wasn't afraid to question and problematize i.e. think and reflect.

There is reflection and thinking involved in everyday activity. Heidegger calls it sight (Sicht). This (more general) sight guides circumspection (Umsicht). Umsicht is constantly reflecting how things relates to each other. The most banal acts like grabbing the door knob requires Umsicht (to illustrate the difference: Sight would be here all that is necessitated "to go out (from this building)"). (This doesn't mean neurotic behaviour!) Using hammer "authentically" involves always concentrated effort i.e rather intensive "about-sight"/circumspection/Umsicht. Being "totally absorbed" in hammering would describe some madman waiving whatever heavy object. It is not about "mechanical" reacting in different directions. It (Dasein) is not about something just happening in an entirely unconscious darkness.

Heidegger's point is that the birth of modern science or Galileo had a certain "project" (design, Entwurf) on the basis of which world was disclosed in such manner that its mathematical explanation became possible. Behind mathematical natural science there is operating certain understanding of the world or being. This resembles Kant's transcendental sphere which makes objective science or objects possible. For Heidegger "transcendental" is not logical (in kantian sense) sphere or forms of thought derived from the logical categories, but it is the understanding of being. Understanding of being is essentially historical. There is "great events" that change this understanding and consequently our whole conception of the world. Pre-socratics were an event, Aristotle-Plato "complex" was an event, Galileo-Descartes-Newton was an event. All these events changed our understanding of the being. To understand our modern technical-scientific world we have to understand the "project" in which Galilean understanding operates. Later Heidegger's conception of the modern "(un)being" (negative connotation) as "Ge-stell" ("Enframing") aims precisely to this understanding when it "analyses" our Galilean-modern "world view". For Heidegger there is no progression, evolution or enlightenment involved here. These historical events are just "fateful" transformations in our world view. What we estimate as "knowledge" or truth changes and which entails that our whole life gets a new direction. (On the other hand, the theme of Being (and its relation to Truth) as underlying common theme in all these alterations. Somehow being or how being has not been reflected or how it has been left unthought affects all these events. All presumed radically new beginnings have been operating on this "hidden", unthought ground. They have been guided by certain horizont which keeps these fateful (or seemingly accidental) transformations within certain limits. )

Not really. If you have a passage you're thinking specifically about, please direct me to it.

Heidegger often says that time, "temporality," is the horizon for any understanding of being. That's a difficult sentence to get your mind around, but since we're essentially caring, temporal beings (human beings), and we have an understanding of being, it is only through temporality that something like "being" can be understood. — Xtrix

This is a good point. I should have been more careful. According to B&T we a r e care or concern. That is, we a r e our significative relations (primarily our practical life). Certain kind of "objects" emerge from here. And this kind of being has as its sense (Sinn) the temporality. Our care-being means temporal being. Heidegger didn't explore in B&T what is being as such. It seems that our understanding of being as presence stems from a certain kind of care.

I don't quite understand what you're getting at here. How does the second sentence relate to the first? And what does the second mean? — Xtrix

I am just trying to understand what H. means (in B&T) with the "authentic existence" and how it relates to History (Geschichte, not historie as science) as H. understands it. What kind of "authentic" mode of presence there could be? And how this relates to truth as unconcealedness (as opposed to correspondence)? How the Husserlian "stretched" presence (now is not a point) relates to this? There something relatively enduring is "mixed" with something already gone (past) and something not yet present. How Heidegger conceives "identity in difference"? Or continuity? Problems of ideality, substance etc??

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And how Husserlian (and Heideggerian?) point of view differs from Aristotle's is that being and becoming is conceived as something belonging to appearance, to intentional experience. They are not purely ontological concepts (without any kind of subjectivity). For Husserl (and for Heidegger?) ontology has always phenomenology as a "correlative" counterpart. And which entails transcendental subject (Husserl) or Dasein/Existence (Heidegger). Aristotelian ontology is more like "realistic ontology" (which the rational soul has constructed?)

Heidegger's relation to Aristotle's form/matter -distinction and Hegelian dialectics are obviously very difficult subjects. But these themes as contrasts are involved here too. For Heidegger they are part of the traditional, conventional understanding of being. That is, they remain "naive" metaphysics, they don't reflect themselves or their concept of being.

Rough sketches:

--

"Being" has been Heidegger's main concern right from the beginning. From this one could ask, that is Heidegger interested merely in something static? Is he not interested in change or becoming at all? Is he reducing becoming to being? Already in Being and Time being was interpreted to mean something temporal. Is not temporality or time becoming? If being is temporality it seems that being is becoming. But I think the question is about the relation between constant change and something that sustains itself through the change. That there is some relatively enduring whole through the accidental continuous change.

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I think for H. it is a question about some enduring whole amidst the change. That is, if there shall be Dasein and its truth. Dasein is historical change which is becoming but this change is not just accidental or random. There is enduring wholes involved in change. There is being in the becoming. Or the becoming can be meaningful which means that it i s something. If it would be merely becoming it couldn't be understood at all. Is the becoming something (relatively) teleological or just random change? I think that the word "become" means something teleological. Something that already is, is becoming itself.

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I think it is for Heidegger self evident that we always "have" something or that there i s something. This is his phenomenological-"ontological" starting point. There is no any comprehension to start with if there is only change or becoming. Pure becoming is nothing. There is always being and the change of being. But the change of being can't be pure becoming (change) or nothingness for us. Actually, nothingness is important concept for Heidegger. Somehow he recognizes this pure becoming as a "potential moment" in the whole. There is this purely accidental moment involved here. It refers to meaninglessness or that there is no "world" involved at that moment?

Why does Kant separate the appearance into form and matter? Why does he suppose that the sensations cannot already be given to us ordered a certain way, and instead supposes that sensations are just give to us in a disordered way? It seems like an arbitrary distinction he makes in order to create the need for pure intuition and the Categories. — Kryneizov

If he would suppose that they are g i v e n us ordered that would be "objectivism"? Kant wants to formulate a new concept of subject. He subjectivizes the form to be our rational knowledge.

From B34 onwards I have found more than fifty occurrences of the term "sensible intuition" in the English version of Cambridge University Press, 1998. Which German term are they translating? — David Mo

They probably translate the verb anschauen (or Anschauung as noun), that is, "intuiting" in the context of "real" sensual-empirical cognition here and now. Sensible intuition is receptivity, something "passive" where material is given. Possibly the "deduction" section in Critique should be consulted where Kant deals with the imagination (Einbildung) etc. (I try here to clarify these terms for myself too. My knowledge of Kant is rusty and lacking in many ways.) (Husserl has a lot to say about these phenomena, by the way.)

Intuitions. — Mww


In Kantian terminology I'm using now, intuitions are not templates (a priori), they are the content of our ideas. Space and time are the templates of sensible intuition. The metaphysical error is to use space and time templates without sensible material.

You are probably using "intuition" in other sense. — David Mo

Few remarks (I am not a native speaker of English or German, however, I read Kant in German):

The translation of intuition (Anschauung) can be very deceptive. It seems that Kant uses intuition (as a German word) only referring to intellectual intuition. This kind of intuition doesn't refer to any (pure or sensible) Anschauung (intuition) at all . On the other hand, there is Anschauung as sensible intuition i.e empirical intuition preceding the perception (Wahrnehmung) of object. Then, there is Anschauung as a "visual" illustrative aid in geometrical-mathematical construction (pure intuition; math. figures or forms are pure or ideal). Finally, there is imaginative or reproductive Anschauung (Einbildung) where empirical appearances are reconstructed in mind when one doesn't have a direct perception of the object.

Could be, but....what is the sensible content of an idea? “Invisibility” is an idea, but hardly has sensible content. — Mww


So, is invisibility a metaphysical idea? Or is it the result of applying a logical (non-x) category to things in general? I would say that "nothingness" is a metaphysical idea when you turn a logical relationship (negation) into a substance: "the" nothingness. Perhaps the same can be done with "the" Invisibility. Parmenides started with that - it is said. — David Mo

Would Kant think that invisibility is the concept of visibility with zero intensity? The succession of the sensations of visibility is (has attained, or is still) zero i.e. without fulfillment or empty. Or something like that. Then this concept would be used "correctly" i.e. in the context of empirical experience. The category of quality would be in that way operative, category, that helps to "determine" the degree of reality. (Actually the category of quantity is involved here too.)