In this game, it is not something that is represented, but is a means of representation [...] we have given that object a role in our language game..."

Human beings use the object as the means of representation within a language game, no? So isn't he accounting perfectly well for the point you want to make? Or am I missing something about your objection? — John Doe

Here's the point I'm making. "Human beings use the object as a means of representation" is the proper description. "The object is a means of representation" is the incomplete description. The former mentions "human beings", and this accounts for the intention which is implied by "means".

Wittgenstein's description has the object, which is the standard metre, saying "I am a metre". But objects don't really speak, and in reality human beings are saying "this object represents a metre". It's a simple extension of his description of ostensive definition, except now he has removed the human act of pointing to the object, so that now, the object represents the word without the need for the human act of pointing.

Maybe errata, but that's exactly the same target length as the meter was before. The changing of meter standards over the years follows a pattern of increasing ease of practical reproducibility and increasing precision of measurement. — fdrake

The fact that the "standard" changes by human intervention is the first indication that Wittgenstein's description of a "standard" here is not realistic. It is not an accurate description to say that the object which plays the role of "the standard" is itself the "means of representation". Rather, it is a better description to say that human beings use the object as the means of representation. That is because means only exist in relation to ends, so to leave the intention out of a description of means, is to provide an incomplete description.

No I'm not. I'm talking about objective events, objective sounds. — Terrapin Station

Well then I have no idea of what you're talking about because I have no idea of what you mean by "objective sounds".

Why would we be talking about how people use language? That's not the topic. — Terrapin Station

You seem to have a very short memory. What we've been talking about since we first engaged in this thread is how people use the word "matter", what "matter" commonly refers to. At least that's what I've been talking about, but maybe you have no idea of what I'm talking about, just like I have no idea what you're talking about above.

As for why we would be talking about this, it's because the thread is entitled idealism vs. Materialism, so it's a good idea, for starters, to have an understanding of what people refer to with "matter".

However, this conversation is going nowhere because you seem to have no idea what people refer to with "matter", and have no desire to even begin understanding.

There is only one context pertinent here; ontology! — Happenstance

Yes, the point though is that there are many different ontologies, as the title of the thread starts to indicate. In the different contexts of different ontologies, "real" has different meanings.

I'm starting to think that you really don't know what's real or not! But in your defense, you're not the only one! — Happenstance

That's right, did you read my example? To worry about the distinction between what is real and what is not real is to needlessly create anxiety. However, we all live our lives commonly making judgements about what is real, without referring to any such principles or criteria. Success in our activities based on those judgements allow us to escape the anxiety caused by worrying about the distinction between what is real and what is not real.

Wittgenstein is simply using the actual Standard Metre as a way of showing how such confusions arise, not making normative claims about what we can and can't say. — Ciaran

There is a normative claim being made here by Wittgenstein though, and that's the whole point. He's not referring to a stick, or a bar, or any such object, he is referring to "the standard metre". His point is that this object which is named the standard metre is itself a normative claim. The object itself is claiming to be the standard, the norm, as 'the means of representation". You might say that the standard metre is saying "this is one metre". Therefore to be correct when I say "this is one metre", I must maintain consistency with what the standard is saying.

What do you think Wittgenstein means when he says that the standard metre is the one thing of which we can say neither that it is, nor that it is not, one metre long? — Luke

It's not so much that we cannot say this, because clearly we can, but Wittgenstein is saying that it doesn't make any sense to say this, because the standard metre is itself saying "this is one metre".

Then it will make no sense to say of this sample either that
it is of this colour or that it is not.

We can put it like this: This sample is an instrument of the language
used in ascriptions of colour. In this language-game it is not something
that is represented, but is a means of representation.

...the metal rod in Paris might be replaced down the line and no longer be the paradigmatic meter.. — StreetlightX

Actually it already has. Wikipedia tells me that "a metre" was redefined in 1983 in this way:

The metre is the length of the path travelled by light in vacuum during a time interval of 1/299792458 second.

When I talk about sensing or experiencing "Kashmir" and music, I'm not talking about ideas. — Terrapin Station

Right, but when you say "the song Kashmir is music", you are talking about ideas.

always refer to particulars by "matter." — Terrapin Station

I didn't say "particulars", I said "a particular". No one uses "matter" to refer to a particular object, not even you. If someone did, no one would know which particular object was being referred to, so such talk would be pointless.

In the latter part of 50 Wittgenstein discusses "the means of representation". The metre stick represents "metre". The colour samples represent the different words used for colours. This is a continuation of what Streetlight says above, of the earlier part of 50, "the sense of 'existence' is made relative to grammar". It's similar to Plato's cave allegory in which sensible existence is made relative to ideas, that's what the philosopher sees which the cave dwellers do not. But here it's not ideas which sensible existence is a representation of (as is the case in Platonic idealism), it's words.

He has been building up this platform with his discussion of ostensive definition. In such demonstrations, the objects pointed to are used to represent the meaning, or use, of the words. Now we can remove the pointing of ostensive definition, and the very existence of the object is a "method of representation".

One might ask of Wittgenstein, if someone could, why is an object a "means" of representation, or "method" of representation, and not simply a representation, as is the case in Platonic idealism.

One problem with this is that there isn't anything that's not a particular. That's not to say that there are not abstract or general concepts (types, universals, whatever we want to call them), but concepts are particular events (or series/"sets" of events) in our particular brains. When you take a universal term to refer to a "real abstract," all that it's really referring to is a very vague, particular idea of a "real abstract," in your particular head, at a particular time. — Terrapin Station

I know, you said this already. But this doesn't account for how you can say that the song Kashmir is music. If each of these ideas "the song Kashmir", and "music", are particulars, they are clearly distinct particulars and therefore to say "the song Kashmir is music" is to violate the law of identity.

Outside of that, as has been pointed out to you many times- -and not just by me--"tree" refers to a universal just as much as "matter" does. Neither is a "proper name.". So it's not as if you have a doctrine that one only senses things picked out by non-universal terms. — Terrapin Station

I know, we've been through this already as well. But when I refer to "the tree outside my window", I am talking about a particular. We do not use "matter" in this way, it never refers to a particular. Do you understand this? I can say "that tree", "that chair", etc., and this refers to a particular sensible thing, but if I say "that matter" it does not refer to a particular thing.

What is your definition of real? — Happenstance

I would not define a term like that, because it has too many different uses in different contexts. I might define it for use in a particular context, but I'd have to make clear that the definition is for that particular context only, otherwise you'd see me using it in another way in another context.

So what are these principles? — Happenstance

I can't say that I have an answer to this question because I do not understand the context. This thread appears to wander all over the place, and with such wanderings I do not see a particular context whereby we could set up such criteria. To list such principles would be an attempt to restrict the wanderings of the thread, and the stated principles might just as likely be wrong as right. To produce such principles, I'd have to refer to something else to validate them, but what could I refer to?

Imagine a person tripping on some hallucinogenic drug. That individual might start getting the feeling that it's difficult to distinguish between what's real and not real. As the effect of the drug continues to build, the anxiety over the inability to distinguish real from not real may intensify. How could that person possibly establish principles or criteria to distinguish between real and not real? If the feeling persists, that a distinction between real and not real must be made, the anxiety will increase, as the person falls deeper into the trap of knowing that what needs to be done cannot be done. The only solution is for the person to relax and forget about this problem, because it's not a real problem in the first place. And in believing "it's not a real problem", the person has demonstrated to oneself the capacity to distinguish real from not real, so that the problem is actually resolved.

And so, it's relevant.

Can't be ... too ironic. Though you might be onto something there, truth always proves to be stranger than fiction.

As with your initial confusion about 'games', they were irrelevant then, and they remain irrelevant now. — StreetlightX

Repeat as required. But that's a repetition. Twice within a short section of the book I've fallen into a very similar misunderstanding. It's most likely not irrelevant. And, my interpretations of "game", as well as "grammar", which have proven to be inconsistent with Wittgenstein's use, are in each case according to the primary definitions of those terms in the OED. So, I believe I am observing the beginning of a pattern of idiosyncratic use. As a pattern, if it exists, it cannot be irrelevant.

You are still making a category error. The law of identity doesnt apply to “music” and “the song of Kashmir”, music is a universal and Kashmir song a particular. It does not violate the law. — DingoJones

But TS claims that all universals are really particulars, therefore the law of identity is applicable against TS's claims.

I was talking about experiencing things. The whole point was talking about experiencing a tree pre-conceptually. You said that you can experience the tree but not matter, which is what led to mocking you with the music example . . . and then you decided to seriously endorse the absurdity I was mocking. — Terrapin Station

I said we sense particular things like trees, but we do not sense matter because it is in no sense of the word a particular thing. "Matter" in no way refers to any particular thing which we sense. Where's the problem? Maybe if you could explain where the problem with this is, instead of changing the subject by making a mockery of yourself, we might be able to make some progress on this subject.

i

No, I'm talking about the sounds, because we were talking about experiencing it. Why would I be talking about concepts per se? — Terrapin Station

This is what you said.

Do we violate the law of identity when we say that the song "Kashmir" is music? — Terrapin Station

Clearly you were talking about two distinct abstract concepts here, "the song Kashmir", and "music". As distinct, particular concepts, one cannot be the other without violation of the law of identity. As universals, one, "the song Kashmir", may be classed as within the larger category "music". Obviously you were not talking about experiencing sounds. If that were the case you'd be talking about what you were hearing, not about classifying the song Kashmir as music.

Thanks I'll check it out.

I'm reading a pdf file online, Anscombe 3rd ed.. It's probably not rendered quite right, or I'm not understanding how the "marginal note" refers to the text as I see no reference point.

What was confusing about it? I may be wrong about it but I thought what I typed was pretty clear! Relationships do exist, there is no denying this, as do illusions, so what is your definition of real? — Happenstance

I would not define "real" in a way so as to exclude relations from being real, such that only absolutes are real.

This is a question to both of you, are illusions, even though they exist, real? — Happenstance

I think that this would depend on your context of usage. Illusions are very real things, the existence of which must be accounted for. However in another sense, an illusion may incline one to believe as real, what is not real. So if we assume this distinction between real and not real, we would need some principles to differentiate one from the other in this context.

There, "music" refers to a particular as in a particular song, like "Kashmir" (and a particular instantiation of "Kashmir" at that.) — Terrapin Station

You were talking about "the song called Kashmir", not a particular instantiation of that song. "The song called Kashmir" is an abstraction, a particular concept. How is it that "the song called Kashmir", and "music" both refer to the very same particular concept when you say "the song called Kashmir is music", without violating the law of identity?

Thanks John Doe, I prefer an explanation over StreelightX's derision. The last quote is actually 38 rather than 35. I see that Wittgenstein's use of "grammar" is consistent with StreetlightX's, referring to language use in general, and inconsistent with Sam26's use of "grammar" as rules governing language. It was Sam26's use of the word in response to SLX's post, and SLX's failure to offer a correction, which threw me off, inclining me to object to using the term altogether, if it cannot be used in a consistent manner. .

And who cares what preconceived notions you bring to the table? As with your initial confusion about 'games', they were irrelevant then, and they remain irrelevant now. — StreetlightX

The point of an exercise like this is to dispel such preconceived notions. If you have no desire to assist in that effort, that's fine, but why would you partake in the exercise then? What could be your motive other than to provide a clear and consistent interpretation, pure selfishness?

But Witty has talked about grammar. — StreetlightX

You have mentioned grammar. You have claimed that #47 is about grammar, and explained, "questions about uses of words". I do not think that Witty has used that term though, so we must be clear to understand what you mean by "grammar".

I see that I'm having a similar problem here, with the word "grammar" as what I had with the word "game". To me, "game" usually implies "play according to rules". But we determined that in Witty's usage, rules are not necessary for games. Likewise, to me "grammar" usually implies "rules which govern language use". You seem to be using this word to refer simply to "language use" in general, a broad sense without regard for rules. If you say that #47 is about grammar, then since Witty is not using this word, we must be clear and unambiguous that you use this word to refer to language use in general, and not to refer to rules concerning language use.

Consider Sam26's reply to your report on #47:

Streetlight you are correct to point out the relationship between all of this and epistemology. I think grammar should be seen as having the role of governing the moves within language-games, as opposed to the actual moves. An actual move may or may not conform to the rules of grammar. It follows from this that a correct move is in conformity with the grammatical rules. If we extend this analogy to epistemology, epistemology is simply a move in a language-game governed by the grammar in social contexts. — Sam26

Sam26 uses "grammar" as "having the role of governing the moves within language-games". So there is apparently ambiguity as to whether "grammar" refers to language use in general, as StreetlightX uses it to describe #47, or whether it refers to rules which govern language use, as Sam26 uses it. The point being that such ambiguity can lead to considerable misunderstanding.

I've read ahead, into the 50's and Witty does begin a discussion on rules. My opinion is that we ought to withhold use of the word "grammar" until Witty uses it, so we maintain consistency with his use, avoiding the ambiguity and equivocation which might arise.

Wittgenstein wrote about grammar long before he wrote the PI, so his ideas of grammar are important to the text. — Sam26

Therefore, it is not by accident that Witty has not mentioned grammar so far in this text. He knows all about grammar but he intentionally has not brought it up. Look at the end of 48, is there four elements, or is there nine elements? Where is the rule (e.g. law of identity)? Well, no rule is necessary so long as misunderstanding is avoided.

Not at all. If Wittgenstein had intended, in these first sections, to simply lay out the problems, and if those problems were simply the linguistic ones that have been listed thus far, then what on earth would have prevented him from simply listing then clearly enough to remove the ambiguity. — Ciaran

Do you see the premise stated at 43? Meaning is use. If Wittgenstein is to give meaning to his work, his goal here must be to demonstrate usage. To simply list a number of problems does not give the meaning that demonstrating them does. That's why his method is to proceed from one example to the next.

If, however, you want to follow through the absolutely fascinating insights Wittgenstein has on the nature of enquiry, the pitfalls of certainty and the fragility of the conclusions drawn therefrom, then this is the book for you. — Ciaran

Right, I think that's what we all want here. So what would be the point to skipping ahead and missing all this?

At this point, Witty has nowhere linked grammar with rules (not saying there aren't any, but you're preempting, so your objection doesn't make sense). — StreetlightX

That's correct, and the point being, yours and Sam's discussion of grammar is out of place, not relevant to the text, and actually quite distractive. It's distractive because Sam claims to know Wittgenstein well, and pretends to speak authoritatively. But Sam does not even seem to recognize that Wittgenstein has quite intentionally not brought up the subject of grammar yet. Witty is starting from the most simple elements of language, ostensive definition, and naming, and maybe we will see later how he brings grammar into the picture.

One point of interest here is that §49 answers a question posed back in §26, where Witty writes that "One can call [naming] a preparation for the use of a word. But what is it a preparation for?". It's here, in §49, that Witty answers this question: "Naming is a preparation for describing". — StreetlightX

I think that this is a key point, and this is where we probably ought to look for some sort of guidance from Witty, in the form of some kind of grammar. Unless there is some sort of rules, or conventions, which govern naming, then the descriptive terms which follow, describing the thing named, may not be appropriately attributed to the thing named. Grammar must begin with the most fundamental activity, naming. Remember at 48, the goal is to avoid misunderstanding. But if there is no strict rule or convention (law of identity), one might misunderstand whether the name indicates a type or a particular, whether there is four elements named, or nine elements named.

I'm not sure I can agree with your analysis here. I understand entirely how the bigger question of Wittgenstein's intention cannot be deduced from the text until at least after §89, but I don't think there is much merit in the exegetical work prior to that.

The early points about the role of ostension, for example, seem to hinge entirely on an assumption that Wittgenstein was solely attempting to knock down some kind of straw man version of Augustine's argument which later sections make it clear (to me anyway) that he was not. — Ciaran

I think you should chill out Claran, and not be so dismissive of the earlier parts of the text. All parts of a book are believed to be relevant to the story being told, by the author, or else they would not have been included in the book. What Witty is doing in the earlier parts is developing the issues, the problems which he believes ought to be addressed. If you just jump into the middle of the book you will not even recognize the problems which are being addressed and misunderstanding will be inevitable. .

Here is where I think things actually get super interesting, from an epistemological point of view: if grammar is a condition of sense, and there are innumerable ways in which we can employ grammar(s), what exactly is the status of grammar (hence language and sense) itself? For it’s clear that grammar cannot be ‘read off’ the ‘thing itself’: the chess-board in all its black and white glory provides no definitive answer - cannot provide any definitive answer - as to how to parse what is simple and what is composite about it. The grammar of our languages(s) do not 'naturally mirror' the structure of the world (if it even makes sense to speak of a 'structure' of the world). — StreetlightX

Streetlight you are correct to point out the relationship between all of this and epistemology. I think grammar should be seen as having the role of governing the moves within language-games, as opposed to the actual moves. An actual move may or may not conform to the rules of grammar. It follows from this that a correct move is in conformity with the grammatical rules. If we extend this analogy to epistemology, epistemology is simply a move in a language-game governed by the grammar in social contexts. — Sam26

I don't see any mention of "grammar" as such, so unless this term "grammar" can be somehow related to what Wittgenstein is saying, I don't see how this discussion is relevant. He is still discussing the most simple aspects of language, ostensive definition (in relation to types), and naming (in relation to particulars). Grammar involves rules, and we have not gotten to the point where he discusses what learning a rule consists of. What I think, is that Witty has indicated that we learn all these language-games, ostensive definitions, and naming, without learning any grammar or rules at all. It's a matter of being conditioned in our activities, and creating habits. Whether or not these habits of language use which we develop, are good or bad, correct or incorrect, in relation to some grammar or rules, has not yet been discussed.

When someone says something is real I take it to mean absolute (as opposed to being dependent or relative) in being, so particulars are absolute in being wheres universals are not so absolute but rather dependently being on something absolutely being. Such as music dependently being on absolute instruments for creation and absolute people to listen to. Trees dependently being on particular configurations of absolute matter and absolute people naming these configurations such. — Happenstance

To me, what you have said here appears very confused. Why does something have to be absolute to be real? Are relations not real?

I also didn't really understand your reference to primary elements being "self-refuting". — Luke

It's actually quite simple. The concept of "primary elements" is self-refuting, because these elements are said to be things which nothing can be said about. But this is to say something about them. You'll se that at 46, primary elements are defined as something which cannot be defined. My opinion is that by doing this, the philosophers who posit the existence of such things circumvent the law of identity. They posit the existence of a thing (primary element) which cannot be identified because it cannot be said to have any identifiable features.

The claim here, by Wittgenstein is that the primary element may have a name, but no other means of identification. It is identified by its name. So he points out at 48, if this is the case, then what is being identified, what is being given identity, is the name, rather than the element which the name is supposed to signify. The element itself has no identity because it is assumed to be primary, so nothing can be said about it, and all we are talking about now is the sign itself its, position in the sentence etc., the context and relations of the sign itself. The meaning of the name is given completely and absolutely by its context in use rather than by any reference to the thing named. You could say that we've removed correspondence as the basis of truth, and replaced it with coherency. (But remember, the basic premise ("primary elements") by which this was done is itself incoherent).

What Wittgenstein indicates at the end of 48, is the consequence of circumventing the law of identity in this way. There is now no way to distinguish an individual from a type, as what is being referred to by a name, unless one indicates that it is an individual or a type which is being spoken about. A primary element is represented by a name and nothing else. But all of the same type of primary element is represented by that same name. The designation of "primary element" prevents us from distinguishing one from the other, so they are all the same, just like all instances of the letter R are the same letter R, and if we want to distinguish them as individual instances of R's, we must indicate this.

Music is not a particular, it is a universal, or type. It is a catagory error for you to use the Law of Identity in the way you did, there has been no violation. — DingoJones

I know that music is a universal, and as such there is no violation of the law of identity. The point is that TS claims all things are particulars. And I told TS that a tree is not matter because that would violate the law of identity. TS claimed that a tree is matter in the same way that the song called Kashmir is music. This statement is only true and sound if universals are real.

Democrats need to put their focus on who they're going to run against Trump and just how they're going to successfully market that person so they can win. — Terrapin Station

Actually, the Republicans need to figure out how to get rid of Trump and get someone respectable to run in his place, in time for the next election. Impeachment might be a good option.

Someone like me who thinks that only particulars exist does not think that concepts do not exist (concepts simply are particular ideas in particular heads), and that's all that abstracts/universal terms are. — Terrapin Station

OK, so let's go back and revisit your claim then. You said something like, "the song Kashmir is music", as an example of how we can say "this is that", without violating the law of identity. "The song Kashmir" refers to a particular, and so does "music" refer to a particular (particular idea or whatever), according to what you state here. Since these clearly refer to distinct particulars, the law of identity is definitely violated if we say "the song Kashmir is music".

Perhaps some of what you say could be deduced from what he says, but you're largely missing the point about meaning being undetermined outside a language-game. — Luke

No, I'm not missing that point, that's quite clear, as a premise of sorts. But there's a bigger point being made which extends into the ontological status of "primary elements". So I saw the discussion of the relation between simples and composites as a digression in relation to this ontological matter. Maybe I was wrong, and that shouldn't be classified as a digression.

But look at how this section unfolds. He starts 46 by asking about simples. Then he quotes Plato concerning "primary elements", and implies that there is a relation between "simples" and "primary elements". Now, it appears that "primary elements" are intended by those philosophers who posit them, to be some sort of absolute, as the foundation for all reality. But then at 47 Wittgenstein demonstrates that simples cannot be absolutes, as "simple" gets its meaning from 'composite", and the meaning of "composite" depends on the way that the word is being used (the particular language-game) It appears like he may be driving a wedge between "primary elements" and "simples".

So, consider 48, the example of the coloured squares.

Here the sentence is a complex of names, to which corresponds a complex of elements. The primary elements are the coloured squares. "But are these simple?"—I do not know what else you would have me call "the simples", what would be more natural in this language-game. But under other circumstances I should call a monochrome square "composite", consisting perhaps of two rectangles, or of the elements colour and shape.

Notice, that the primary elements are such (primary elements) simply because they are designated as such. The coloured squares are designated as "primary elements". But are they "the simples"? Yes, they are in this language-game, but this is only because the coloured squares are designated as primary elements in this game. In another context, the elements might be divided further, therefore something else would be designated as primary elements, and accordingly, the language-game would have to devise some other way to represent the primary elements of this game. Aren't the primary elements, supposed by the philosophers, to be the absolutes in the foundation of reality though? How is it that they have now become relative to the particular language-game?

Then the issue with such primary elements, involving the law of identity, is exposed:

But I do not know whether to say that the figure described by our sentence consists of four or of nine elements! Well, does the sentence consist of four letters or of nine?—And which are its elements, the types of letter, or the letters?

What is identified as an "element", is it a type or is it a particular? Then he proceeds to question at 49, 50, what is meant by "element" in that sense of "primary element".

Reiterating his message from §47, whether these primary elements are 'simple' or 'complex' depends on how we agree to use those terms; what we mean by 'simple' and 'complex'. As he states lastly: "Does it matter which we say, so long as we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case?" — Luke

i believe the dichotomy of simple and composite at 47 ought to be treated as a digression. What he demonstrates is that it doesn't make sense to think of things as either simple or as composite, in an absolute sense, as these are relative terms. So this way of thinking is not applicable to "primary elements", which as foundational, are meant to be absolutes. We ought not to think of primary elements as either simple or composite. However, we can maintain the definition of "primary elements" as offered at 46. And this definition of "primary elements", as something which cannot be defined, is inherently self-refuting. So the question of how we ought to describe the primary elements, as either simple or as composite, in order to avoid misunderstanding, is completely irrelevant because primary elements cannot be described. Furthermore, since the notion of "primary elements" is self-refuting, we ought to consider it, in itself, to be a misunderstanding.

No, I'm not sure what that's supposed to refer to, because all I believe exists are particulars. — Terrapin Station

Right, and just a few hours ago you were talking about the existence of music, and matter. How you contradict yourself.

You are really off your rocker. — Terrapin Station

I don't own a rocker, so it's not my rocker that I'm off, I'm off all the rockers.

This is like saying “t-shirts are not clothes though, they are t-shirts. You violate the law of identity if you say t-shirts are clothes” and in the context of this discussion you then use that statement to conclude that there are no clothes, or people cannot experience clothes but somehow still experience t-shirts.
Im afraid your a bit confused here. — DingoJones

That's right, I'm saying that we sense individual pieces of clothing, like particular t-shirts. We do not sense what is referred to here as "clothes", when you say "t-shirt are clothes". if you do not understand that then I'm sure that you are the one confused, not me.

It might be worth talking to someone who isn't as trollish, confused or insane as Metaphysician Undercover. What I said above about this was:

"How do we get to the point of saying that matter is an idea? — Terrapin Station

If you would have paid attention to what I said, instead of just saying "you're off your rocker", perhaps you might understand some of these things. Dismissing someone with such a statement, when you recognize that what they say is true, but you don't want to agree with it, because it conflicts with some of your beliefs, is pure nonsense.

In other words, don't ask the question if you're not going to accept the answer. That's just being a troll.

Do we violate the law of identity when we say that the song "Kashmir" is music? — Terrapin Station

Of course not, this is classification. But music is not the thing you are sensing, you are sensing the particular playing of a particular song, just like "matter" is not what you are seeing, when you see a tree.

Do you understand the difference between a word which is being used to refer to a general idea like "music", or "matter", and a word being used to refer to a particular thing? You don't sense music.

By denying the reality that there is nothing physical, sensible, which the word "matter" refers to, you are creating a problem for yourself. All you need to do is accept this simple fact, and your problems of understanding will disappear.

If trees are matter, then you sense matter all the time, right? (Well, assuming you often encounter trees.) — Terrapin Station

Trees are not matter though, they are trees. You violate the law of identity if you say trees are matter.

The problems with that argument should be pretty obvious to you. — Terrapin Station

I don't see the problem. You asked me for the difference and I told you. You're obviously trying to create a problem where there is none to be found.

The difference is that I can sense the existence of one but not the other. I can go out in the world and see trees all over the place, I can't see matter anywhere, nor can I sense its existence in any way. If this does not qualify as a difference to you, then I think you have serious problem.

Unless you're saying something about the calling per se, that just restates that you think there's a difference between trees and matter. It doesn't specify what the difference is. — Terrapin Station

I specified the difference with great clarity. A tree is a thing which I can sense. Matter is not. What's your problem?

Not exactly. We call things by names so that we can talk about them. I am talking about the things which are named, not the names. So the thing which we are calling a tree is something which I can sense, and these are the things which we call physical things. The thing we call "matter' is not such a thing, because of all the things which I sense, or can be sensed, the thing called "matter" is not one of them.

The thing called "the tree" is something I can see, and reach out and touch. If that thing were called "the matter", then I could see and touch the matter. It's not though, it's called "the tree", and I haven't yet come across anything which I could see or reach out and touch which is called "matter".

There is a fundamental, yet very simple problem with this idea of "primary elements" which Wittgenstein exposes at 48. The problem with the concept of these "elements" is that the very description of them, as something which cannot be described, is in itself, in that sense, contradictory. Something which cannot be described has been described. If we assume the existence of these elements we lose the capacity of the fundamental laws of logic, starting from the law of identity. We assume individual "elements", but they have by stipulation, absolutely no distinguishing features which would make them individual, so they are necessarily all the same element.

So we have the example at 48. Are the three G's three distinct elements, or are they all the same element?

But I do not know whether to say that the figure described by our
sentence consists of four or of nine elements! Well, does the sentence
consist of four letters or of nine?—And which are its elements, the
types of letter, or the letters? Does it matter which we say, so long as
we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case?

But if we go deeper we see that the different squares are already distinguished by some properties. they are different according to their colours, and separated by lines. So if Wittgenstein were to adhere to the stipulation of "primary element", there could be no distinguishing one square from another by means of colour, and if we were steadfast to the rule, even the squares could not be distinguished one from the other by means of shape and position. Therefore the final question is moot. "Does it matter which we say, so long as we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case?" If there really was a type of thing called "primary element", as described, understanding would be impossible.

Actually I believe that numbers ARE things — Fuzzball Baggins

That's fine, but the issue here is whether "numbers" (note the plural) refers to a thing.

I was arguing that just because we can't empirically observe an infinite thing doesn't mean that it's always unreasonable to assume the existence of an infinite thing. — Fuzzball Baggins

I explained to you why it is always unreasonable to assume the existence of an infinite thing. If you have a reasonable rebuttal then please present it.

Here's another example: something caused the big bang. In the absence of any evidence indicating that this event could only happen once, the hypothesis that are physical laws which cause big bangs to spontaneously happen at random point in time and space is more simple and relies on fewer assumptions than the hypothesis that something caused only one big bang to happen and then something else stopped that process from reoccurring. Because of this I can infer that a multitude of big bangs have always been and will always be happening, and therefore there is an infinite multiverse. — Fuzzball Baggins

Sorry, but I can't see any argument here. You seem to misunderstand "the big bang", representing it as something which occurred at some time, in some place.

How do we get to the point of saying that matter is an idea? — Terrapin Station

I discussed this with you earlier in the thread. There is nothing in the physical world that we sense as matter.

You know, so phenomenally, there's a tree say (not as a tree--that is, the concept, etc.--but "that thing"--I have to call it something to type this), and then how do we go from that to saying that the phenomenal tree is an idea? — Terrapin Station

I'm not saying that the tree is an idea, I'm saying that matter is an idea. You sense the tree as a tree, you do not sense it as matter.