Discuss away. See what comes of it.

Okay then. Well, thanks for disrupting the discussion to advise us that we're not discussing it properly, and then leaving without telling us how to discuss it properly.

The analysis would be very different if a person were to approach the text assuming it to be a statement of 'the way things are' to if a person were to approach it as a normative statement of 'you should look at things this way (even though other ways are perfectly possible)'. In the former case, one can critique the text by arguing 'no, things are not that way, here's an example', but in the other, one would critique the text by saying 'looking at things this (other) way has the following use/value'. — Ciaran

As some form of explanation, I take it that you're advocating the latter approach? Could you provide an example? e.g. by saying more about this:

The early points about the role of ostension, for example, seem to hinge entirely on an assumption that Wittgenstein was solely attempting to knock down some kind of straw man version of Augustine's argument which later sections make it clear (to me anyway) that he was not. — Ciaran

I'm sorry if I've offended you or acted inappropriately, It was not my intention. I don't think there is a way to discuss it "properly" so it was certainly not my aim to tell anyone what that way is. I think people should discuss it in whatever way satisfies them most, I just wanted to establish what approach was being adopted here, and I think I've done that now.

By way of explanation, I really don't see how anyone could possibly approach a text section by section without first establishing what reason there would be for saying anything at all about it. The words are what they are afterall. If there's no objective beyond reading them we might as well just write them out word-for-word. It seems here (perhaps, being more charitable) that there are just too many different objectives. Some seem to be writing what they think the propositions mean simply so that others can benefit from their 'wisdom' on the matter (leaving the deeper psychological motives aside for the moment). Some seem to want to take what Wittgenstein says as a statement of the way things are and find counterexamples. Some want to ask whether their interpretation is what Wittgenstein 'really meant'. All three approaches are flawed. Firstly what would be the point in reading the opinion of a random internet poster as if it were gospel? If you're studying, you'll need the view of an accepted authority, if you're past studying, you'll have your own views no less well-informed and the interest is in contrasting them. If the aim is to get at the way things are, then as I commented to MU, there are much better textbooks about language and understanding that are probably more accurate and certainly more easily accessible. If the aim is to get at what Wittgenstein 'really' meant, then we have slipped from philosophy to history (or at worst idolatry, in any assumption that what Wittgenstein 'really' meant has some authority to bear on the matter of what 'is').

Personally, I think the most productive way to run these things is to read the whole text first alone, take each proposition and discuss what it means to each other. After a few exchanges, move on to the next proposition. There's no right answer to be had, it's just a matter of seeing if what other people think about it sits well with your own world-view or not. Of course challenging their view is a good way of doing that, but it becomes pointless if that's done with the intention of getting to the 'right' answer at the end, it's certainly pointless if dissenting views are going to be snubbed as 'uneducated'.

But as I say, it's not pointless if people want to have "look at the size of my...reading list" competition. If that's the objective then it all makes perfect sense, it's just not for me, that's all.

Could you provide an example? e.g. by saying more about this: — Luke

Certainly.

What I'm saying is that I don't think the enemy here is Augustine, nor his conception of language, it is (or rather it is going to be) the type of language confusion which could lead to the sort of statement Wittgenstein picks out. Augustine does not present a theory about the way language is acquired in the confessions, nor does he set out to do so. Not only does he not claim that ostension is sufficient for all of language, but he does not claim that ostension is either this or that type of thing, his interest is not in providing a complete picture of either language or ostension in respect to it. Wittgenstein is well-read enough to know this. Wittgenstein is not attacking the idea that ostension identifies it's object purely by the act, he is using the very obvious fact that it does not to set up an attack on the type of thinking that could lead us to such a conclusion, using Augustine's work as an example. He's basically saying - look at this statement by Augustine, you could be mistaken for taking it as a serious description of the way things are because it sounds convincingly like one, but you already know is is nonsense. It is just disguised nonsense and so appears to be worthy of dissembling.

He's leading us through the process of identifying the sorts of statements which appear to be about something but rather have simply over-generalised, in a way a child knows is wrong.

The extraction of language from it's context that Wittgenstein is showing cannot be fruitful is not something that the general population do, it is not a thing which the uneducated need to be taught about so that they can become more knowledgeable, it is something that experts do to manufacture the very body of knowledge about which they are expert.

But that's just my interpretation.

The extraction of language from it's context that Wittgenstein is showing cannot be fruitful is not something that the general population do, it is not a thing which the uneducated need to be taught about so that they can become more knowledgeable, it is something that experts do to manufacture the very body of knowledge about which they are expert.

But that's just my interpretation. — Ciaran

I tend to agree. Thanks for your response.

Wittgenstein wrote about grammar long before he wrote the PI, so his ideas of grammar are important to the text. — Sam26

Therefore, it is not by accident that Witty has not mentioned grammar so far in this text. He knows all about grammar but he intentionally has not brought it up. Look at the end of 48, is there four elements, or is there nine elements? Where is the rule (e.g. law of identity)? Well, no rule is necessary so long as misunderstanding is avoided.

Not at all. If Wittgenstein had intended, in these first sections, to simply lay out the problems, and if those problems were simply the linguistic ones that have been listed thus far, then what on earth would have prevented him from simply listing then clearly enough to remove the ambiguity. — Ciaran

Do you see the premise stated at 43? Meaning is use. If Wittgenstein is to give meaning to his work, his goal here must be to demonstrate usage. To simply list a number of problems does not give the meaning that demonstrating them does. That's why his method is to proceed from one example to the next.

If, however, you want to follow through the absolutely fascinating insights Wittgenstein has on the nature of enquiry, the pitfalls of certainty and the fragility of the conclusions drawn therefrom, then this is the book for you. — Ciaran

Right, I think that's what we all want here. So what would be the point to skipping ahead and missing all this?

At this point, Witty has nowhere linked grammar with rules (not saying there aren't any, but you're preempting, so your objection doesn't make sense). — StreetlightX

That's correct, and the point being, yours and Sam's discussion of grammar is out of place, not relevant to the text, and actually quite distractive. It's distractive because Sam claims to know Wittgenstein well, and pretends to speak authoritatively. But Sam does not even seem to recognize that Wittgenstein has quite intentionally not brought up the subject of grammar yet. Witty is starting from the most simple elements of language, ostensive definition, and naming, and maybe we will see later how he brings grammar into the picture.

One point of interest here is that §49 answers a question posed back in §26, where Witty writes that "One can call [naming] a preparation for the use of a word. But what is it a preparation for?". It's here, in §49, that Witty answers this question: "Naming is a preparation for describing". — StreetlightX

I think that this is a key point, and this is where we probably ought to look for some sort of guidance from Witty, in the form of some kind of grammar. Unless there is some sort of rules, or conventions, which govern naming, then the descriptive terms which follow, describing the thing named, may not be appropriately attributed to the thing named. Grammar must begin with the most fundamental activity, naming. Remember at 48, the goal is to avoid misunderstanding. But if there is no strict rule or convention (law of identity), one might misunderstand whether the name indicates a type or a particular, whether there is four elements named, or nine elements named.

That's correct, and the point being, yours and Sam's discussion of grammar is out of place, not relevant to the text, and actually quite distractive. — Metaphysician Undercover

But Witty has talked about grammar. We've talked about grammar.

Do you see the premise stated at 43? Meaning is use. If Wittgenstein is to give meaning to his work, his goal here must be to demonstrate usage. To simply list a number of problems does not give the meaning that demonstrating them does. That's why his method is to proceed from one example to the next. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it's not the need to demonstrate that I was raising as an example, it's the nature of that which is demonstrated. He does not proceed from one example to the next. He raises a question then leaves it hanging, he sets up an obvious strawman, only to knock it down without triumph, he invites us to carry out our own thought experiments only abandon them... These are not at all the actions of someone wishing to relay to us some 'facts' about the way the world is that we can simply assess, each by its correlation with said world from the comfort of our armchairs.

I'm merely arguing against the analytical exegesis that seems to be going on here, not implying that the book should not be read in order. I'm presuming (perhaps wrongly) that everyone producing any volume of comments has read it at least once.

But Witty has talked about grammar. — StreetlightX

You have mentioned grammar. You have claimed that #47 is about grammar, and explained, "questions about uses of words". I do not think that Witty has used that term though, so we must be clear to understand what you mean by "grammar".

I see that I'm having a similar problem here, with the word "grammar" as what I had with the word "game". To me, "game" usually implies "play according to rules". But we determined that in Witty's usage, rules are not necessary for games. Likewise, to me "grammar" usually implies "rules which govern language use". You seem to be using this word to refer simply to "language use" in general, a broad sense without regard for rules. If you say that #47 is about grammar, then since Witty is not using this word, we must be clear and unambiguous that you use this word to refer to language use in general, and not to refer to rules concerning language use.

Consider Sam26's reply to your report on #47:

Streetlight you are correct to point out the relationship between all of this and epistemology. I think grammar should be seen as having the role of governing the moves within language-games, as opposed to the actual moves. An actual move may or may not conform to the rules of grammar. It follows from this that a correct move is in conformity with the grammatical rules. If we extend this analogy to epistemology, epistemology is simply a move in a language-game governed by the grammar in social contexts. — Sam26

Sam26 uses "grammar" as "having the role of governing the moves within language-games". So there is apparently ambiguity as to whether "grammar" refers to language use in general, as StreetlightX uses it to describe #47, or whether it refers to rules which govern language use, as Sam26 uses it. The point being that such ambiguity can lead to considerable misunderstanding.

I've read ahead, into the 50's and Witty does begin a discussion on rules. My opinion is that we ought to withhold use of the word "grammar" until Witty uses it, so we maintain consistency with his use, avoiding the ambiguity and equivocation which might arise.

I do not think that Witty has used that term though — Metaphysician Undercover

It was discussed when we went over §29, and the boxed note after §35, where the term was employed. In any case, I've made clear my use of the term in my own discussions of those passages, so I'd prefer you didn't mistake your short memory for a lack of fidelity on my part. And who cares what preconceived notions you bring to the table? As with your initial confusion about 'games', they were irrelevant then, and they remain irrelevant now.

Heh, I'm basically doing one subsection a night, and at this rate, it ought to take about two years or so lol. But hopefully not every section will demand commentary. — StreetlightX

This strikes me as the appropriate amount of time needed to read the PI. :razz:

But we determined that in Witty's usage, rules are not necessary for games. Likewise, to me "grammar" usually implies "rules which govern language use". You seem to be using this word to refer simply to "language use" in general, a broad sense without regard for rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that we have to take "The Concept of Grammar in Wittgenstein" as the sort of thing you could write a dissertation about, like "The Concept of Freedom in Hegel" or whatever. He's using grammar in his specific, idiosyncratic way. Attempting to grasp what he means by this term is really an attempt to get at the heart of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Querying his use of this concept should drive at least one aspect our questioning.

As far as where we're at in the text -- Wittgenstein has mentioned grammar three times: §20, §29, and §35. He will not mention it again until near the end of the meta-philosophy section, §122. So what can we learn?

§20: "The sentence is 'elliptical', not because it leaves out something that we mean when we utter it, but because it is shortened -- in comparison with a particular paradigm of grammar."

Misleading translation. He says: "im Vergleich mit einem bestimmten Vorbild unserer Grammatik."

Here, "bestimmten" has a connotation of correctness; Vorbild a picture or model put in front of us.

§29: "Perhaps someone will say, "two" can be ostensively defined only in this way: "The number is called 'two'. For the word "number" here shows what place in language, in grammar, we assign the word. But this means that the word "number" must be explained before that ostensive definition can be understood."

Here, I take it he's merely making explicit what he has been doing in these opening sections -- starting to challenge what we might call the typical picture of what grammar is and how it functions.

§35: "Can I say "bububu" and mean "If it doesn't rain, I shall go for a walk?" -- It is only in a language that I can mean something by something. This shows clearly that the grammar of "to mean" does not resemble that of the expression "to imagine" and the like."

Continuing the dialectic of the challenge, we're beginning to see the difficulties inherent to conceiving 'meaning' as a mode of imagination or representation.

Thanks John Doe, I prefer an explanation over StreelightX's derision. The last quote is actually 38 rather than 35. I see that Wittgenstein's use of "grammar" is consistent with StreetlightX's, referring to language use in general, and inconsistent with Sam26's use of "grammar" as rules governing language. It was Sam26's use of the word in response to SLX's post, and SLX's failure to offer a correction, which threw me off, inclining me to object to using the term altogether, if it cannot be used in a consistent manner. .

And who cares what preconceived notions you bring to the table? As with your initial confusion about 'games', they were irrelevant then, and they remain irrelevant now. — StreetlightX

The point of an exercise like this is to dispel such preconceived notions. If you have no desire to assist in that effort, that's fine, but why would you partake in the exercise then? What could be your motive other than to provide a clear and consistent interpretation, pure selfishness?

Personally, I think the most productive way to run these things is to read the whole text first alone, — Ciaran

Off you go, then.

:ok:

Thanks John Doe, I prefer an explanation over StreelightX's derision. The last quote is actually 38 rather than 35. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, technically it's a note but as far as I understand it's supposed to connect up with 35. I double checked and it is definitely 35 in the Hacker/Schulte translation. Perhaps you're reading an older Anscombe edition?

I just gotta say that what is introduced in §1 is the theory that ostension is the basis of language; that what follows shows that ostension is already part of a language game; and that hence the theory presented in §1 is incomplete.

The text at the point we are up to now is looking at another supposed basis for language, simples or atoms or whatever. Again, it is being shown that to name a simple is already to engage in a language game. And hence, again, the theory that language has its basis in simples is incomplete.

Having read ahead a bit, I would say that so it goes, until it is pointed out that there is a way of understanding a rule that is not given by articulating the rule, but shown in following the rule.

And this is why doing trumps saying, use trumps meaning.

I'm reading a pdf file online, Anscombe 3rd ed.. It's probably not rendered quite right, or I'm not understanding how the "marginal note" refers to the text as I see no reference point.

If you want it (free, legal, etc.): Latest edition (fourth)

I just gotta say that what is introduced in §1 is the theory that ostension is the basis of language; that what follows shows that ostension is already part of a language game; and that hence the theory presented in §1 is incomplete.

The text at the point we are up to now is looking at another supposed basis for language, simples or atoms or whatever. Again, it is being shown that to name a simple is already to engage in a language game. And hence, again, the theory that language has its basis in simples is incomplete.

Having read ahead a bit, I would say that so it goes, until it is pointed out that there is a way of understanding a rule that is not given by articulating the rule, but shown in following the rule.

And this is why doing trumps saying, use trumps meaning. — Banno

I think this is a really great indication of where the text is headed though I have huge qualms with that last sentence. I guess we'll have to wait for the rule-following section to really dig into the matter.

Thanks I'll check it out.

I guess we'll have to wait for the rule-following section to really dig into the matter. — John Doe

Should be fun.

Off you go, then. — Banno

What do you mean by this?

I just gotta say that what is introduced in §1 is the theory that ostension is the basis of language; that what follows shows that ostension is already part of a language game; and that hence the theory presented in §1 is incomplete. — Banno

Why do you think that Wittgenstein presents such a theory? If his goal is to actually discuss language acquisition and use, why has he chosen a half-developed theory from 600 years which no-one even believes any more. Do you think perhaps he was unaware of Piaget's, Thorndike's or Watson's theories on language acquisition, all popular at the time and nothing like Augustine's. Perhaps you could give a rough sketch of what you think popular opinion about language acquisition was at the time Wittgenstein wrote PI with a few sources. It might help to understand where you're coming from with this interpretation.

§29: "Perhaps someone will say, "two" can be ostensively defined only in this way: "The number is called 'two'. For the word "number" here shows what place in language, in grammar, we assign the word. But this means that the word "number" must be explained before that ostensive definition can be understood."

Here, I take it he's merely making explicit what he has been doing in these opening sections -- starting to challenge what we might call the typical picture of what grammar is and how it functions. — John Doe

I'll ask you the same question I've just asked Banno, if that's OK. Could you give a rough idea of what sources you think Wittgenstein was working from when you refer to "the typical picture of what grammar is and how it functions". Form where is he obtaining this typical picture do you think?

What do you mean by this? — Ciaran

Ah. Socrates.

Why do you think that Wittgenstein presents such a theory? If his goal is to actually discuss language acquisition and use, why has he chosen a half-developed theory from 600 years which no-one even believes any more. Do you think perhaps he was unaware of Piaget's, Thorndike's or Watson's theories on language acquisition, all popular at the time and nothing like Augustine's. Perhaps you could give a rough sketch of what you think popular opinion about language acquisition was at the time Wittgenstein wrote PI with a few sources. It might help to understand where you're coming from with this interpretation. — Ciaran

Hm. The Archeology of Wittgenstein.

That might be an interesting approach, and if you ever follow through on it, I'd give it a look.

Eh, who cares whether Witty got Augustine right, or if it really does represent some commonly held view. Augustine is a foil to develop a point, and can be treated as that without loss. Irrelavent point.

who cares whether Witty got Augustine right, or if it really does represent some commonly held view. — StreetlightX

Well.. I do, obviously.

Augustine is a foil to develop a point, and can be treated as that without loss. — StreetlightX

Yes, I agree. Unless you're trying to claim that "the point" being developed is one about how what people think about the way language is acquired is wrong, in which case Wittgenstein's source for "what people think about the way language is acquired" becomes important. Otherwise what's the point? Wittgenstein saying "x is the way things are" becomes pointless if no one thinks that x is not the way things are.

It doesn't make any difference if you move "the point" from statements about language acquisition to statements about the nature of ostension. One still has to ask "do people think x?" before telling people that x is not the case.

If, however, "the point" is to show a method for dissolving any philosophical pretention, then the choice of foil doesn't matter, Augustine is as good as any. That's why it matters.

Irrelavent point. — StreetlightX

Irrelevant to what?

Perhaps we could find out the rules (beyond those of grammar and logic) which operate beneath Witti's consciousness and define a system of conceptual possibilities that determines the boundaries of thought and language use in PI. The we might also provides a philosophical treatment and critique of phenomenological and dogmatic structural readings of his philosophy, portraying continuous narratives as naïve ways of projecting Witti's consciousness onto the past, thus being exclusive and excluding.

Actually, I've found the critique in this forums quite helpful in developing ideas.

And what you have to say might well be interesting; in order to find out, it needs to be said. That is, perhaps you might make your question about Augustin relevant by pointing to some relevance.

Actually, I've found the critique in this forums quite helpful in developing ideas. — Banno

I'll defer to your much greater experience on the matter. I've certainly found discussing things with my reading group useful, having unfortunately recently been disbanded, I thought I'd try an Internet version. Can't say as my first impressions have been particularly positive.

And what you have to say might well be interesting — Banno

Yes, the line of thinking obviously interested me enough to persue it, so it's not unreasonable to think it might interest others. What I'm questioning is whether spending time developing the idea is worth the childish put-downs any dissenting voice receives here, not whether anyone might be interested.

perhaps you might make your question about Augustin relevant by pointing to some relevance. — Banno

See my response to StreetlightX above, basically I think its a mistake to treat it as a book about language in any academic sense (by which I mean any sense that some problem 'really is' some solution). Any such text would have started with an summary of current thinking, not a 600 year old, half-formed strawman of an idea.

I think its a mistake to treat it as a book about language in any academic sense — Ciaran

Well that's a bit rude. So you don't like his writing style.

Given his background I think it worth allowing him to play with the form of academic writing. Especially as this is a primary text, not something intended for those who themselves are unaware of such background.

It's not his writing style per se, although I do think that is relevant. It the structure of any such investigation. No one writes a treatise about how the sky is 'really' blue, because no one thought it wasn't. There's nothing to investigate, no problem to solve.

So it is with the analysis here, I think. If I could take this as an example of the sort of analysis;

Rather, the point of the early passages are to establish the differential nature of ostension (in contrast to a 'linear' understanding of ostension); i.e that the 'same' ostensive act (pointing at 'this', say), can play different roles depending on the use to which ostension is put. There is no one kind of thing that ostension always picks out, but always the possibility of a variety of kinds of things (or put differently: in principle, there is always the possibility of a one-to-many mapping between ostension and what is 'picked-out', and never a simple one-to-one mapping between them): — StreetlightX

Who thinks there is only one kind of thing ostension points out? I mean, imagine asking someone in the street "are you always certain what kind of thing a person is pointing out?", who's going to say that emphatically, yes, it is always the case that ostension is clear about the kind of thing it targets. I doubt even half the ordinary folk would think that, let alone any actual professor of linguistics or child development. In fact, we know for a fact from people like Piaget, that they certainly were not labouring under such a delusion.

Wittgenstein's target is the sort of linguistic edifice which could have us seriously talking about language as if that were the case, despite knowing full well it isn't. His target is in fact the exact thing that's being done here.

See my response to StreetlightX above, basically I think its a mistake to treat it as a book about language in any academic sense — Ciaran

Says someone who reckons it's important if Witty correctly represented Augustine? And I'm accused of being too academic? Cute.