That's the lead into 54 in which he discusses different ways in which it may be said that a game is played according to a rule. That's the subject Isaac and I have been discussing.

Wittgenstein doesn't claim that the observation of some characteristic sign is the only means by which a student might learn the rules of the game, nor that it is the most common, it's just an example. An argument against this would have to consist of a demonstration that such signs were never given, otherwise, it's a perfectly valid example of the sorts of ways of someone could learn the rules of a game without being directly taught. — Isaac

The point is that the example is not a good example, and therefore does not properly exemplify the matter which is being referred to. First, you have not represented the example properly here. It is not an "example of the sorts of ways of someone could learn the rules of a game without being directly taught". It is an example of how a person learning the rules of a game in this way, simply by observation, without being taught, might distinguish mistakes from correct play. Since the example requires that the player making the mistake recognizes one's own mistake when it is made, and this is usually not the case when someone makes a mistake, it is based in an unrealistic representation of "making a mistake". Therefore it is not a "perfectly valid example".

It's not that everything is physical because it's an assumption of physicalism. Physicalists are physicalists because everything seems to be physical empirically, where that's not defined by the field of physics, because it's in no way parasitic to the field of physics. — Terrapin Station

Here's how I interpret what you say here. Empirically, everything seems to be physical, therefore everything is physical. This is what you are stating as the premise of physicalism.

"So it is not a physicalist making this claim" doesn't seem to fit there. — Terrapin Station

The ontological claim made was that it is possible that there is something which is not physical. This is the claim which produces the need for someone to determine "what counts as physical". The physicalist, according to the premise stated above, does not believe that it is possible that there is something which is not physical. Therefore, it is not a physicalist who states that there is a need for someone to determine what counts as physical. Do you follow this TS? For the physicalist everything is physical. Therefore there is no need to determine what counts as physical. Therefore it is not a physicalist who is making the claim that someone needs to determine what counts as physical.

It's not a matter of making sense or not. It's a matter of what we're doing, or at least what some of us are doing. We're not a cheerleading squad for field of physics, period. That's not at all what we're doing. And figuring that that's what we're doing is just going to amount to not understanding us. That's up to you, though. Do you want to understand what we're doing or not? — Terrapin Station

If what you are doing, in your ontology doesn't make sense, don't you see this as a problem? But it's even worse than just a matter of not making sense, it's actually contradictory. You say that there's a need for someone to determine what counts as physical, when you've already determined, according to the statement above, that everything is physical. Don't you see this as contradictory? How can I understand what you are doing when the statements you make are contradictory?

It's like you're dedicated to not getting anything right. We're not denying the possibility. We're saying there are no non-physical things, because there's no good reason to believe that there are, including that to some of us, the idea of non-physical things doesn't even make much sense. That doesn't mean that someone couldn't make sense of it, but let's find that person and then examine what they have to say. — Terrapin Station

Saying "there are no non-physical things" is explicitly denying the possibility that there are non-physical things. If you turn around now, and say "we're not denying the possibility", then all you have done is contradicted yourself.

I must admit that I find this obscure. Firstly, note that W considers the (whole) chart (or "such a chart") to be the expression of a rule of the language-game, rather than the individual signs or associations contained within it. In terms of its various roles, we can glean from Wittgenstein's example that the chart is used for the different roles of encoding signs and translating signs when describing complexes. I'm not sure what other roles there could be; perhaps there are different roles when using the chart for elements vs. complexes. However, perhaps just noting that the chart (and therefore a rule) can have more than one role is sufficient..? — Luke

Consider that the same rule may be expressed in various different ways. The table is only one way of expressing the rule. The table replaces the role of "memory and association". The various ways that the same rule may be expressed, are an indication of, or actually are, the various roles that the rule has in the game.

The root is irrelevant, what is relevant is how the words are used. Luke doesn't seem to recognize the difference between using "typical" as a predicate, an adjective modifying the noun "example", and using "type" as a subject, in which case "type" is a noun. Looking for an example of a type is to look for an example of this thing which is called a type, and this is completely different from looking for an example which is typical.

Ha, ha, I hope that's a joke. But just in case it's not meant as a joke, it's clearly not the case that "a typical example" is the same thing as "an example of a type". This is very evident because "example" is the subject, and "typical" is the predicate in "typical example". When I ask for an example of a type, "type" is the subject. Obviously, "typical example", and "example of a type" do not mean the same thing. In one case "typical" is the predicate while "example is the subject.. In the other case "type" is the subject and I am asking for an example of a type. So I am not asking for an example which is typical, I am asking for an example of a type.

Here are some examples. Let's say that "length" is an example of a type. There's a metre stick. How is that stick an example of the type, "length"? Or, let's say that "colour" is an example of a type. How is a red thing an example of the type "colour"? Suppose we have a red thing, a green thing, and a blue thing, similar to the squares in W's example, how are these differently coloured squares an example of the type which is "colour"?

This is where I disagree. I don't think Wittgenstein is suggesting this at all. I think you may have added a 'simply' into your paraphrasing which Wittgenstein did not himself put in there. Nowhere in the aphorism does Wittgenstein suggest the process is simple. Nor do I think he could reasonably have meant as much. — Isaac

This is what he says:

But how does the observer distinguish in this case between players' mistakes and correct play?—There are characteristic signs of it in the players' behaviour. Think of the behaviour characteristic of correcting a slip of the tongue. It would be possible to recognize that someone was doing so even without knowing his language.

My argument is that in most cases there are no such characteristic signs in the actions of the player who makes the mistake, as Wittgenstein's example suggests.. What I suggested as an alternative is that the observer would distinguish correct moves from mistakes on a basis of consistency. A correct move is one which is consistent with other moves. A mistake is an inconsistent move. So the observer produces laws of observation, inductive laws of description, as Wittgenstein suggests with "—like a natural law governing the play.——", and a move which is inconsistent with the inductive rule is designated as a mistake. In this way we do not have to appeal to "characteristic signs in the players' actions", as a means of determining mistakes. As I see this to be a faulty way to determine such mistakes. An honest mistake will very often not display such characteristics, and an act of deception will most likely not.

He must himself know full well how long it takes and so could not possibly have been under the illusion that each individual error reveals to us a rule. — Isaac

This is not the issue. It is not a matter of mistakes revealing the rules. The person is observing the players, and learning the rules of the game through observations of the play. What is at issue is how the observer would distinguish correct play from mistaken play. It is not a case of mistakes revealing a rule, but a case of mistakes obscuring the rules. So in order for the observer to learn the rules, there must be a method whereby incorrect play is excluded as not supportive of the rule.

I find Wittgenstein's example to be insufficient. He implies with the example, that the person making the mistake will give us some indication that a mistake has been made, but this generally is not the case. However, he does say that there would be signs in the players' (plural) behaviour, and this would include one player correcting another player. This seems to be what would occur if one player makes an error and does not follow the rule, another player would offer a correction. For some reason though Wittgenstein does not describe this, nor use this in his example.

Everywhere. — Luke

As soon as you point to a type, I'll believe that you've found an example of a type..

This is what is pointed at during an ostensive defintion: a typical example or examples. — Luke

A typical example is not an example of a type, that's the problem. A typical example is a representation of the type, therefore it is not actually a type so it cannot be an example of a type. Where would we find an example of a type?

You seem to be interpreting the person making the 'slip of the tounge' as the one trying to learn the rules. — Isaac

No, I interpret as you do, the person making the slip of the tongue is being observed by the person trying to learn the rules. The point I wanted to make is that the observer cannot reliably determine when an error is made, simply by observing the actions of the speaker who makes the error, as is suggested by Witty. In most cases an error is like an honest mistake, and the speaker does not know when an error is made. And sometimes the speaker may be acting deceptively (cheating), so the failing to abide by the rule is hidden. Therefore the observer cannot adequately determine from the behaviour of the speaker, when an error is made.

That is why I see this description as lacking, and so I offered a more thorough analysis which would make a complete separation between descriptive rules and prescriptive rules. Then we can describe the fundamental and preparative language-games (the games required that one might build the capacity to understand prescriptive rules) as if there are no prescriptive rules at all. The observer distinguishes consistency and inconsistency of the particular moves in the game, in relation to other moves. Consistency in many moves is conducive to a descriptive, or inductive law or rule, which becomes the paradigm.

However, under this analysis the issue of a "wrong" or "incorrect" move becomes problematic. These words tend to imply that the person has acted outside of a prescriptive rule, what one ought to do. Now I have removed the prescriptive rule altogether, and I have no basis for designating any particular move as wrong or incorrect, only that the move appears to be inconsistent with other moves. Can I say that a move is "wrong" just because it is inconsistent with the moves of others?

One, I was disagreeing with the idea of supporters defining physicalism as "that which is studied by physics." That makes physicalism basically a "parasite" on the discipline of physics per se. I think it's ridiculous to define physicalism that way. To physicalist ontologists the discipline of physics is NOT king and it doesn't get to define what counts as "physical." — Terrapin Station

But the other way around makes no sense. If we allow that the physicalist defines what counts as "physical" then everything is physical, because that's the assumption of physicalism. If there is something which is not physical, then physicalism is denied, so it is not a physicalist making this claim. And if everything is physical, as physicalism claims, then why shouldn't physics, which is the study of that which is physical, study everything?

So it doesn't make any sense at all to allow a physicalist ontology to define what counts as physical. If you want ontology to decide what counts as physical, you must allow for the possibility of something which is non-physical, and this would contradict physicalism, which denies the possibility of anything non-physical. Therefore, if it is true that ontology ought to define what counts as "physical", physicalism must me disallowed as contradictory to this, because it has already decided that all is physical.

To determine this, we need not consider all reality, which includes intentional subjects as well as physical objects, but at the representation of reality physics actually employs. It represents reality in terms of material states specified by dynamic variables and laws transforming these states over time. — Dfpolis

OK, so this is where I get lost. You have claimed that physics does not have 'the potential to explain intentional reality". I have followed that. Now you distinguish intentional subjects from physical objects, and imply that we ought to consider that these two are distinct, according to "the representation of reality physics actually employs". So how does this make sense to you? You have claimed that physics cannot, and cannot even potentially, explain intentional reality, therefore intentional reality lies outside the field of physics. Now you say that we ought to distinguish intentional from non-intentional, using the method of physics, which has no capacity to even recognize the intentional. if we are to distinguish intentional from non-intentional, then we need to start from principles outside of physics, because we cannot do this using the method of physics.

How are you going to convince a physicalist, who believes that there is no aspect of reality outside this physical part of reality, without referring to this part of reality which is outside. Do you see what I mean? The physicalist thinks that there is no such thing as that which is outside the physical, the non-physical. So you cannot demonstrate to the physicalist that there is reality outside the physical, without first demonstrating that there is something outside the purview of physics. You cannot assume that the physicalist will accept your assumption that there is something outside the purview of physics, because this contradicts the physicalist premise, fundamentally.

A paradigm is more like a type than a token, if that helps. — Luke

Well this is the problem isn't it? Where do we find an example or a sample of a type? An object is not itself a type, and therefore cannot provide such an example. And Wittgenstein avoids the spiritual (something mental, such as the example of type is in the mind), by saying that memory is insufficient, so what is the paradigm which exemplifies the type?

This is how I understand paradigms also. It seems to me, if one "pulls out" the focus a bit to look at the whole section, the theme is consistently that things are neither this way nor that, but rather a variety of ways united only by the fact that the use serves some function in a game. — Isaac

Irony at its best. Wittgenstein says to understand this subject we need to look closer. But to understand what he is saying we really need to pull back and look at the whole book.

Wittgenstein mentions how we can tell when a speaker, even of a foreign language, has made an error by their attitude. — Isaac

I think we ought to pay close attention to this section because it seems to be strained, uneasy, as if Witty is manufacturing, creating something to cover over a problem. In reality, usually the person making a mistake does not know where the mistake is being made, and therefore the mistake cannot be exposed in this way. The person will need to be corrected by someone who knows. What is the case though, is that the person who is unsure of the ;language will have an overall attitude of uncertainty when speaking, but this does not expose particular errors as is implied here.

This discussion is at 54, and it is a continuation of what was said at 31, which was the subject of a lengthy discussion between Terrapin Station and I. Notice that Witty outlines two distinct ways of playing a game "according to a distinct rule". In the first way, the person is given a rule, and given practise in applying it. In the other way, the person observes, and learns rules through observation. In the latter way, we could say that the person produces the rule through inductive reasoning. Notice Witty's reference "like a natural law governing the play".

Here we have a distinction between a prescriptive rule, and a descriptive rule. In the former the person is given the rule and instructed to play in this way. In the latter, the person observes, induces the rule, and joins into the play. Now, in the latter case, when the person is trying to induce a descriptive rule, there is the issue of how does the person know when the observed play is following "the rule". So Witty proceeds to discuss how the observer might intuit, from the play of the players, when an error is made. This is problematic.

I believe that the true resolution to this problem is to be found through an analysis which is slightly different, more thorough. Witty does not maintain a true division between these two ways of playing according to a rule. In the latter case, the inductive rule, he assumes that the observed players are following prescriptive rules. This is a conflation of the distinct parts in the analysis. So when the observer sets about the task of inducing "the rule" it is assumed that there is a correct prescriptive rule which the players are following. But if the rules really are descriptive and induced, then there is no such prescriptive rule which the players are following. The rules are produced from induction, following the play.

Now the judgement of error is completely in the hands of the observer. The observer must exclude play which is inconsistent as not conducive to the production of a rule. So the comment quoted above is really irrelevant because it implies that the player knows when a rule is broken. But if the rule is not prescriptive, the player actually never knows when a rule is broken, because this is solely a matter of judgement by the observer who judges whether the play is consistent with the play of others.

We could say that the meaning of a word is maintained by the act of checking for signs of error in its use. All the while you bring the builder an object in response to 'slab!' which he appears satisfied with, you may be content that you have the meaning of 'slab!' in that language game. The moment he rejects what you bring with a frown, you return to the pile and pick a different object, you must have mistaken the meaning of 'slab!'. — Isaac

Yes, this is the point, error must always be judged by the observer. Your action is inconsistent with the action of the others (where the action of the others is the paradigm), therefore your action is in error (outside the inductive rule). In this way we can completely remove the inclination to assume a prescriptive rule, which the player believes oneself ought to follow.

Yes, because the name is not the object. — Luke

No, it's not because the name is not the object. Consider that even if the name is not the object, but meaning was found in a direct correspondence between name and object, then the name would lose its meaning without object. So, because the name has meaning with or without the existence of the object, meaning is not a direct correspondence between name and object. And since meaning is something other than the direct correspondence of name to object, we must look to something other than the object to understand how we learn meaning. And therefore, this is evidence that we must look at something beyond the object, in order to learn how to use words (meaning is use). Witty says it is by referring to a "paradigm" that we understand how to use the word. This paradigm is not an object because that would imply a direct correspondence between the word and that object.

Yes, the paradigm is the archetypal object. Wittgenstein gives an approximate definition of 'paradigm' at §50: — Luke

It's impossible that the paradigm is an archetypal object, because according to 55, it is impossible that the paradigm is an object. An archetypal object is an object, and therefore cannot be the paradigm. Here's what he says again:

An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game.

So Wittgenstein is very explicit. The name has meaning when the object does not exist. The name cannot have meaning without the "paradigm" which he refers to here. Therefore we can quite readily conclude that this "paradigm" cannot be an object, not even an archetypal object, because the name would still have meaning without that archetypal object, and it can't have meaning without the paradigm.

At §56, Wittgenstein challenges the notion that paradigms can be mental rather than public. — Luke

I agree, he claims that paradigms cannot be mental, and argues this at 56 by referring to the failings of memory. However, neither can these paradigms exist as objects, which is argued at 55. This is why I said earlier that I think he must be referring to paradigms of use or something like that.

What do you expect the paradigms would be in the case of language-game (2)? I assume that the name of each stone would be taught via ostensive definition, by being associated with a pattern; with 'stones that look like this'. For other objects, it may not be about what the object 'looks like'; it might be what it smells, tastes or feels like, or something else. — Luke

But the point is that the name is more than just a label affixed to the object. The name maintains meaning when the object is destroyed. So the "paradigm" by which the name is taught must be something other than the object. A simple ostensive definition, associating the name with the stones, does not suffice to account for this meaning which the name has, that goes beyond the existence of the stones. Therefore the "paradigm" by which the meaning of the names is taught, must be something other than the stones themselves. I think this is quite explicit at 55.

So, how is intent shaped and formed to become a goal? — Wallows

That's a good question, and I'm sure it deserves a very complex answer. But I think the answer is unknown so you probably won't get much of an answer at all.

The argument is a little hard to articulate, and doesn't so much show a consideration against idealism as that it forces idealism to slide into panpsychism of some sort. — Snakes Alive

Dualism avoids panpsychism.

The idea is that physicalism isn't "latched on" to physics, and basically subservient to it, so that it's something like the "marketing team for physics" or "the ideological cheerleading team for physics." — Terrapin Station

But this doesn't really answer the question. How would you define "physicalism" such that the entirety of reality would not be subject to being understood by physics?

Physics is studying the same stuff (as we posit as physicalists), as is chemistry, geology, meteorology, etc.--all the sciences are studying the same stuff. — Terrapin Station

If it's all "the same stuff", and that stuff is described as "physical", and physics studies what is physical, then why aren't these other sciences just branches of physics? And why shouldn't we extend this principle to social sciences, and ethics as well? If the behaviour of human beings is nothing other than the behaviour of physical objects, then why shouldn't these subjects be branches of physics as well? I don't see how you can maintain a physicalist ontology without accepting that all these subject, including philosophy as well, ought to be classed as divisions of physics. Either some physical things are not the subject of study of physics (which seems absurd), or else some things are not physical.

There is a conflict between the requirements of scientific and philosophical definition. As I am addressing a naturalistic or physicalistic position, it is reasonable to use the criteria of physics in speaking of material state definitions. — Dfpolis

This is no different than the position which apokrisis supports, that there are differences which don't make a difference. A "naturalistic or physicalistic" position is an ontololcial position therefore philosophical. For the purpose of ontology, we cannot dismiss a difference, as not fulfilling the criteria of "a difference", just because they do this in physics. In physics, they may have standards whereby some differences may be dismissed as irrelevant to the work that they are doing, but in ontology, to say that there is a difference which doesn't qualify as a difference is simple contradiction.

As my whole point is that physics does not give us an exhaustive understanding of reality, I obviously think that a specification sufficient to do physics is not exhaustive. — Dfpolis

if you believe that physics does not give us an exhaustive understanding of reality, then why choose an ontology which contradicts this? In your ontology you have stated that you believe there is no difference between a material state as represented by physics, and the material state as it is in reality.

On what terms would you define "physicalism" then? If all reality is "physical", as is how I understand physicalism, then why wouldn't "physics" be the discipline by which we could gain an understanding of all reality?

W indicates that the teaching of the signs consists of pointing to paradigms, where the paradigms here are the colours (or the coloured squares), and associating those colours with the signs/words/letters "R", "B", etc. However, how is this correspondence maintained in the use of these signs? We would presume that it consists of something other than pointing to paradigms (i.e. something other than ostensive definition). — Luke

I don't think I agree with this. The nature of a "paradigm" must be other than a physical object which plays the role of a sample. Look at what follows, 52-55. He says we must look at this situation up close. Then he discusses a variety of different possible ways which people could learn the language-game of 48. So what he is doing is casting doubt on that statement of 51, the presupposition that the language-would be taught by pointing to paradigms. Now, when looking up close, he sees numerous ways in which the language-game might be learnt.

So even when he introduces the idea of "a rule" at the end of 53, he goes on at 54 to discuss different possible ways of learning how to play according to rules.

54 Let us recall the kinds of case where we say that a game is
played according to a definite rule.

When he says "recall", I believe that this is a reference back to the same principle discussed at 31. So "learning how to play according to a rule" is not necessarily a matter of learning the rule. He again (like at 31) states the possibility of learning to play by the rule, simply by observing the play of the game, without actually learning the rule. In this case there would be no paradigm pointed to, in the sense of a sample pointed to as the rule.

Then, at 55 he returns to the idea expressed in the 40's, that even when the object which corresponds to the word is destroyed, the meaning of the word persists. So there is a sense in which the meaning of a word is indestructible. And he ends 55 with this statement:

An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which
it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game.

Consider what this means. He has already explained that there is no such thing as a named object which is necessary for the name to have meaning. The name lives on, with meaning, after the object is destroyed. So names always have meaning even when there is no corresponding object. But now he is saying that there is something which corresponds to a name, without which that name could not have meaning. This something is what he calls "a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language game".

So, at 56 and onward, he proceeds to discuss the nature of this "sample". As demonstrated at 55, and earlier, 40-45, this "paradigm" cannot be a object, because it must be in this sense indestructible.

I think this touches on a problem you've already mentioned, the difficulty of finding the right words. We have different conceptualizations of the future. In one conceptualization, the future is exactly what can't be here yet. In another, the future is possibility that exists 'now.' In this second sense we can say that human experience is primarily 'futural.' — sign

But isn't the second sense a faulty, or even false conception of the future? We can't conceptualize the future by describing it as what is now. The future is not now, it's what lies ahead. When we conceive of the possibilities for the future, which exist now, we are really referring to the past. We consider the way things have been in the past, along with our capacities to change things in the past, and from this we develop possibilities for the future. There is no conceptualization of "the future" here. The only thing that "the future" does in this conceptualization is validate "possibilities", as real, in the sense of free will. If one does not believe in free will, then even this is removed, and "the future" here refers to nothing at all, as there is nothing to distinguish it as being different from the past.

While I like this conceptualization (which is new to me), I feel the need to complicate it. Why should the future be only conceptual possibility? Can I not have a detailed fantasy or fear of the future? — sign

What would this consist of, the fear of something very particular in the future? I really do not think that this is possible. Consider any time that you have been afraid of a future occurrence. You could only nail down the particulars of that occurrence, to an extent, because the event has not yet happened. The rest of that event escapes the imagining of the particular. So the imagining of that future event is really more general than it is particular.

I can imagine many particular events which I will be involved in tomorrow. But since I do not know the specifics of how these events will unfold, my imagining of them is really very general. The problem is that I can name these events, and this makes them into particulars according to having been named as particular events, but in my mind when I actually think about them, there is just a general idea which is being referred to by that particular name.

And a point that you didn't respond to (which I didn't stress much) is the idea of the 'living' past. This 'living past' is not our memory of what happened. It is what obscurely governs out interpretation of the present with the help of the future as possibility. It is 'invisible' as what we take for granted. We might call it the distortion of the lens which we cannot see through that lens. It is our 'pre-interpretation' of the situation, the one we don't know we have as we employ it. It can become visible in retrospect. We can see later that we were thinking 'inside the box' the box of this 'living past.' I suppose this is a metaphorical use of 'past,' since it is not what is usually intended. — sign

I don't seem to be able to understand what you mean by "living past" here.

Many physicalists argue that reality can be explained by physics, and if physics cannot explain the totality of reality at the present time, it will in the future, as the science of physics advances. Here at TPF, that is often cited as the premise of physicalism, when supporters define "physical" as that which is studied by physics.

Yes, I was insufficiently careful. I should have said "fully specified." Obviously, we have no exhaustive understanding of reality. The possibility of surprise is always present. What I meant was that once we give a material state its intrinsic specifications, it is fully defined. — Dfpolis

But in saying that there is no exhaustive understanding of reality, aren't you also saying that there is no such thing as a material state which is fully defined? What is the case, is that there is always a gap between the description and the material state described, such that one is not completely equivalent to the other. You recognize this when you say that there is no exhaustive understanding of reality. However, you deny this when you say that a material state could be fully defined.

I think that "paradigm" in Wittgenstein's use, refers specifically to examples, or samples of use, rather than an example like the chart of coloured squares, and this is why I associate it with "grammar". Further, "paradigm" seems to imply more than just a simple example, but a pattern of use which consists of a repetition of the word being used numerous times in a similar way.

So what's going on at 51 when he says the following?

Well it was presupposed that the use of the signs in the language-game would be taught in a different way, in particular by pointing to paradigms.

This is in the context of describing the language game of (48) in which there is a pattern of coloured squares, which are given signs. So how is this a "different" way? That language game of (48) is an exemplar, sample, or standard. It is a matter of pointing to a paradigm. Is he now saying that to understand that paradigm, we must refer to a further paradigm? Of course this would be just a recipe for infinite regress.

Or, is it the case that he is trying to lead us away from this idea of pointing to a paradigm? He hasn't yet answered what "correspondence" consists of, and maybe he has a different explanation, something other than pointing to a paradigm.

Because it is fully exhausted by its physical description. It is not "about" something else in the sense of Brentano. Our awareness of the state, on the other hand, is both and act in itself and points to the state it is aware of. So, it is intentional, while the original state is not. — Dfpolis

Yes, natural processes have ends, and as a result an intrinsic intentionality. That is the basis for Aquinas' Fifth Way to prove the existence of God and the reason I hold that the laws of nature are intentional realities. So, physicality is partly intentional. I am not denying that. — Dfpolis

Don't these two statements directly contradict each other? In the first, you are saying that the thing described is fully exhausted by the physical description. In the second you are saying that there is no such thing as something which is fully described by the physical description.

Because it is fully exhausted by its physical description. It is not "about" something else in the sense of Brentano. — Dfpolis

It isn't fully exhausted by the physical description though, that's the point. Survival of a living being, and the activities of living beings are not fully described by physical descriptions. The physicalist assumes that these activities could be described by physical description if the sciences advanced to that point. But the fact is that the physical descriptions of these activities remain incomplete. The non-physicalist (dualist) sees the necessity to assume an immaterial soul. If the descriptions were complete, as you suggest, there would be no issue here. But the descriptions are not complete, hence there are options.

What I an asserting is that the concept of matter is orthogonal to the concept of intentionality and so intentional operations cannot be reduced to material operations. Just to be clear, in physics, we distinguish material states from the laws under which they evolve. — Dfpolis

I want to know what you mean by "orthogonal" here. I assume that it means one thing is at a right angle to another. Therefore there is a point where they meet. Do you mean that "matter" and "intention" are two distinct ways of explaining the same thing (the point where they meet)? if so, then why would one not be reducible to a function of the other? Perhaps you mean "parallel", but then how would they interact? In any case, your use of "orthogonal" doesn't make sense to me, can you explain?

Actually I'm having great difficulty understanding Wittgenstein's use of "paradigm". At first I thought it was similar to "grammar", but the use of this word is becoming more and more prominent. What does he mean by "pointing to paradigms"? Can anyone help me out with this?

Don't we already know that? — Luke

How would we know that, by referring to some paradigm?

".

I made a similar point in the previous thread ("Fallacies of Strawson's Argument vs. Free Will"). Physical desires begin with a natural deficit signaled, neurally and/or endocrinologically, to the brain. There the response can be purely physical (not involving awareness and so not rising to the level of intentionality), or we can be aware of the signaled state, in which case intentionality enters. — Dfpolis

Why would you not call this prior state an intentional state as well? Under your preferred definition, "aboutness", the "natural deficit" which develops into hunger is intentional, as it surely points to something beyond itself, the well-being of the animal. Intentionality is central to the "feeling" from the very beginning, prior to being grasped by consciousness. So intentionality is prior to consciousness.

What are some examples of that then? — Terrapin Station

I described that in my preceding posts.

It's the ANSI (American National Standards Institute) definition, from the American National Standard on Acoustic Terminology document, which is also quoted on Wikipedia, yes. — Terrapin Station

As I said, the definition provided is quite incoherent. Considering that light exists as particles, that definition would class light as sound. You ought to check your references before you quote them because it's probably false that the ANSI defines sound in that way. Anyway, even if the ANSI defines "sound" in that way, this would be an instance of a business defining the term for the specific purpose of that business. That's not a good source for a philosophical discussion.

We still have the unresolved problem of ostensive definition though. We have no clear way of knowing what "kind" of role is being represented by the name. The Paris metre represents the word "metre", but there is still a need to signify which aspect of it represents "metre"? And this requires a further language-game as already demonstrated. So if naming is the "preparation" for a language-game, this still requires an underlying language-game which makes naming intelligible. Therefore naming cannot actually be the preparation for language-games in general, though naming might be the preparation for specific types of language-games.

It appears like Wittgenstein at this point in the book is moving from language-games in general, toward a specific type of language-game.

Indeed. And what do you think of the idea of the primacy of the future for human beings? We 'incarnate' the future, acting in the present in terms of a desired or fear possibility? — sign

I would say that the future is manifested within us as anticipation.

This is a deep issue. Memory seems fundamental here. The past exists as memory, one might say. But surely it's not so simple. I'm interested in the accumulation of meaning. The past is learned from. Experience is synthesized. The 'living' past along with the future experienced as possibility seems to govern our interpretation of the present. — sign

I would like to see a separation between "experience" and "future". I believe it is wrong to say that we experience the future, and this is a big problem with philosophies based in experience, like empiricism, these philosophies cannot account for our relationship with the future. So what happens when "experience is synthesized" (as you say), memories (experiences) are contextualized at an actively changing present, in relation to the future. So what it is which is synthesized, i.e. produced by our minds at the present, contains elements of experience as well as elements of anticipation. Therefore this cannot be properly called "experience". Our being at the present is a synthesis of memories (past) and anticipations (future), experience being proper to the former but not the latter.

This is indeed a great issue. I'm looking into Derrida lately, and he seems to be questioning the presence of the present. I'm still making sense of his difficult work. It seems like a radical thinking of becoming (which may subvert the idea of 'becoming.') — sign

We did a reading group of Voice and Phenomenon here at TPF a couple years back. If you're interested, search it. We covered the book quite thoroughly (though I'm not sure we quite finished) with opinions from different people. If I remember correctly, his distinction between presence and present, might be described in a simplified way as subjective being and objective being, with a sort of transcendentalism. I think Heidegger's description in Being and Time is similar, but more Platonic in the sense that Heidegger builds on the distinction and relationship between the more general and the more specific. This is actually the heart of the issue in all of its complexity. You'll find it in Plato's Timaeus, further developed by Neo-Platonists and early Christian theologians. Simply put, the future appears to us in the form of possibility, which is the general, universal, conceptual. But the past is revealed to us as the existence of particulars.

So according to Plato's Timaeus, there must be an act which is occurring at the present whereby the universal Forms are informing the passive receptacle, matter, to produce the physical existence of particulars. In any case, this is the difficult problem, the future appears to us in the form of possibility, which does not consist of particulars, it is general, universal, though we may express particular possibilities in an attempt to understand and choose. The past appears to us as particulars, individual things with material existence. We can put this into context of this thread by saying idealism looks to the future, while materialism looks from the past. The difficulty is to bridge the boundary between them, which is existence at the present.

This is very good point. I've been looking into Husserl lately, and it seems he was always developing his thought. As you may know, he also tackled the problem of time. He saw that the present was 'thick' and not point-like. Anyway, the deep questions are indeed just difficult. One struggles to find the words and often has to invent some. — sign

I haven't read Husserl but I know that the trend in modern presentism is toward a dimensional, or 'thick" present. I call it the second dimension of time, "breadth". The issue is that the "present" is defined by our presence. But our presence is as described above, a synthesis of elements from the past as well as the future. The present cannot be a non-dimensional point in time which separates past from future because this would deny the possibility of us being at the present. Further, we notice that activity occurs at the present and activity requires a passing of time. So we must allow that there is a passing of time which occurs at the present; whereas this time which passes at the present is not accounted for by the timeline which represents the present as a point between past and future. Einstein's concept of the relativity of simultaneity really opens up this possibility, by demonstrating that the point which marks the present, is really a vague "zone" on the timeline. The one dimensional timeline is produced from one synthesized, or average, perspective between the two extremes of large and small existence. But to allow for the existence of this "zone" at the present, the timeline must have breadth, and this allows for numerous parallel timelines depending on the frame of reference.

Reality also appears to be unified and invariant. — Janus

I don't understand why you would say this. Don't we confront many distinct possibilities at the present, implying the exact opposite.

Sorry MU it wasn't a reference to you. — Wayfarer

I know, I just wanted to add my two cents.

I'd like to hear more about the religious conception of time. — sign

It's a difficult and long process which requires ardently, and arduously, analyzing all the different aspects of time. We can begin with the most simple, what is the most evident to us, and that is that there is a fundamental difference between future and past. We find a recognition of this difference in the oldest religious material in the distinction between what has happened in the past, and what we are looking forward to in the future. Tales, myths, were handed down from the past, with the view that they would be useful for the future. At some time in the past, human beings then recognized the importance of the present, as the boundary between past and future. In the Old Testament, I believe at one point God answers the question of who are you, with I am that I am, or something like that. This signifies that at this time, these human beings recognized the importance of the present.

Following this, the understanding of time becomes even more complex. The ancient Greeks introduced the notions of change and becoming, and these concepts are based in the fact that time is continually passing. This adds a second dimension to the nature of time. Not only is time fundamentally the substantial division between past and future, which is the present, but it is also active. Add to this, the idea that the past consists of actualities while the future consists of possibilities. So the realm of physical existence, whatever it is that has real (actual) physical existence, is the past, what has come to be, and this physical existence (the past) is continually coming into existence at the present from the possibilities which the future hands us. Some might describe it as the physical world being created anew at each moment as time passes. So Neo-Platonist philosophers and Christian theologians studied this problem of how it is that the physical world comes into being from the realm of possibilities, at the present, as time continually passes. This fundamental problem remains unresolved but modern science appears to be distracted from it.

Heidegger was influenced by this and did some great work with it. — sign

Yes, I've read quite a bit of Heidegger, and though his terminology is difficult, he does focus on this problem of the nature of time, and offers some good insight. There are other modern philosophers who have taken up the question as well, but it is very complex, difficult, and confusing. The confusion is the worst aspect because it causes a philosopher to write one thing, then later write something else which is inconsistent, so they tend to write precious little, having not resolved the problems. Then to the reader it might appear like the writer does not have a clue, when in reality the writer is just trying to work out some very difficult problems, and provide some sort of picture for the reader.

Thus, to fully understand/specify an intention we have to go beyond its intrinsic nature, and say what it is about. (To specify a desire, we have to say what is desired.) This is clearly different from what is needed to specify a sample of matter. — Dfpolis

The problem with "to specify a desire", or "to specify an intention", is as Tim woods alludes to above. Intentions and desires are derived from, and based in, something general and very unspecified, just like angst. So when we get to the point of specifying an intention, i.e. to state a specific intention, we have already removed that particular intention from its natural environment of intention in general, just like an inversion of abstraction.

Consider "hunger" for example. It might start as a strange feeling inside. Then the person may specify it from this general feeling, so as to associate the feeling with the stomach. Then one might further specify it as a want for food. From here the individual might consider possible food sources, and specify a particular food desired. Then the person might develop the very specific intention of getting a particular thing which is thought of, to eat. So intention's "intrinsic nature", is for something very general, and unspecific, but when we derive a specific intention, we go "beyond its intrinsic nature" (as you say) because intention is based in a general feeling.

There's a very real problem with that assumption of "more in accordance with reality". Reality is vast and complex. Some viewpoints focus on this, others focus on that. On what basis would you claim that the ones which focus on this, are "more in accordance with reality" than the ones which focus on that.

Almost everyone in this thread, with the exception of Sign, likewise is so bound to a basically realist (scientific or naive) viewpoint, that they can't even comprehend criticism of it - when they respond to criticisms of it, it's obvious that they haven't the first idea of what was intended. — Wayfarer

I'm invisible, or maybe my viewpoint is incomprehensible.

A true scientist does not want the world to be any way (in the ontological, as opposed to the moral sense of course), or if that is impossible to achieve at least aspires to attain a state of not wanting the world to be any way, she wants to find out the truth about the way the world is. Can you honestly say that you don't want the world to be any particular way, that you wouldn't mind if the world turned out not be spiritual but merely material, in other words that you are not emotionally biased and have no desire to get beyond those emotional biases? If you cannot say that then you are not operating in accordance with the scientific spirit; the desire to know the truth, whatever it turns out to be. — Janus

There's a real problem with this paragraph, and that is that once we uncover the deficiencies in human understanding we start to realize that the world is not the way that any of us think that it is. That is why realism at its core is off track. Some of us might think that the world is 'merely material", but this is not the case because the world is not the way that any of us think it is. So it's nonsensical to propose that the world might turn out to be merely material.

And what is the religious theory of time? — Terrapin Station

There is no succinct "religious theory of time" just like there is no succinct "scientific theory of time". But the religious perspectives are far more insightful for giving us guidance toward understanding the nature of time..

"Sound is defined as "(a) Oscillation in pressure, stress, particle displacement, particle velocity, etc., propagated in a medium with internal forces (e.g., elastic or viscous), or the superposition of such propagated oscillation" for example — Terrapin Station

That's not a definition, it's a bunch of incoherent nonsense. Look, you class "oscillation in pressure" and "particle velocity" together within the same definition. This is clear evidence that your so-called example of a definition of sound is nothing but incoherent nonsense. Clearly you just copied that off of some random website, Wikipedia actually, which will allow anyone to add their two cents worth into a definition, resulting in a bunch of incoherent nonsense.

Your evaluation of it is independent of the fact that I explained it. — Terrapin Station

Right, just like your so-called example of a definition, above. would be supposed to demonstrate that you've defined what sound is. Random, incoherent, confused, nonsense, does not qualify as "an explanation".

Anyway, so you're basically using "absolute" to refer to "what's behind it all." I wouldn't say that an understanding of that is necessarily achievable only by science, at least not with the assumptions that are currently made by the sciences, and scientists are just as prone to endorsing nonsense as anyone else, but the answer to "what's behind it all" is certainly not going to be religious, and is certainly not going to be arrived at by anything like religious "inquiry." — Terrapin Station

The problem with this perspective is that the religious traditions give us a much more comprehensive and realistic understanding of the nature of time, and the relationship between time and space, than the assumptions employed in modern science do. All of the unanswerable problems of modern physics, and cosmology, mentioned by wayfarer above, along with the issues of spatial expansion, dark matter, dark energy etc., are all incomprehensible aspects of reality under the paradigm of the scientific representation of time. It is my opinion that the problems in understanding these aspects of reality, will never be resolved until we release the scientific representation of time, and return to the religious ideology for guidance.

There is no referent of "One Metre" at 50 because Wittgenstein here attempts to remove it from any context in any language-game. It is removed from the context of use. The naming, as Luke describes, is the preparation for language-games. We can't say that the referent is "a length" because this is just an idea in people's heads, and this type of occult explanation is what Wittgenstein is trying to avoid. I think it is best to think of the standard metre as an object which represents the word "metre". Therefore, just like in his descriptions of ostensive definition, if someone were to point to the standard metre and say "one metre", we still have the same question of what type of thing is the person pointing to when saying "one metre".

My opinion is that this will prove to be circular unless words are given occultish mystical status, because a word is itself a physical object. So we have one physical object, the standard, representing another physical object, the word metre, without any actual means of establishing this relationship.

If God creates time and even if he always in the state of creating time, then God is eternally creating time. — Walter Pound

Isn't there a new moment of time created at each instant as time passes?

I reckon pushing onto 50 is best.

Given that the holiday season is pressing in on us I am looking to reread up to around the 100 mark by new year and then to 200 by end of January - just so you know. — I like sushi

We've made 50, let's move on.

At 51 Wittgenstein asks what does it mean for an element to correspond with a sign. And, what does it mean to be mistaken, in the sense of using the wrong name, like using "R" to label the black square when black squares should be labeled "B". What does "R" standing for red squares consist of?

Berkeley says that we cannot form abstract ideas of colour without shape, or of bodies without a background, motion without something moving. It is this separation that Locke uses to describe primary and secondary qualities that Berkeley calls abstract ideas. Berkeley says he cannot abstract in that way, can you think of an abstract man, of no particular size, body type, colour, hair etc?

It is this abstraction that allows Locke to claim the general term of matter. For Berkeley this is incoherent, because he cannot imagine a secondary quality in absence of a primary one and so Locke is abusing language by only using it as symbols of denotation. I am still not 100% on how this works, but I hve limited language understanding. — Jamesk

I think we ought to recognize the difference between an abstract concept (universal), and an imagination, an image of a particular within the mind. The former, for example mathematical concepts, geometrical figures, etc., exist by definition. A "square" is such and such, a "circle" is such, and so on. The very existence of these concepts in the realm of the human mind, relies on their respective definitions. On the other hand, we can imagine a particular, by producing an image in the mind without knowing a definition. We can however make a judgement as to how the image corresponds to sensations. Is the image produced from sense experience, or is it completely imaginary?

So, "an abstract man" would not be an image of a particular man, rather a definition of what it means to be a man. We can consider the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in this way as well. Locke looks at qualities, and realizes that some qualities we do not directly sense, or imagine, we deduce their existence through definitions. The question for Berkeley might be described as how would we validate abstract concepts as referring to anything independent from the mind. So he uses "matter" as an example to demonstrate that we can just as easily conceive of the world without matter. It all becomes much more complex than either Locke or Berkeley represents it as, and this is just like a lead up to Kant's a priori/a posteriori, and analytic/synthetic distinctions.

This is right in line with my question. He does actually provide a lot of support for his theory however a lot of that support is almost identical to the support Locke had used and Berkeley had refuted. Kind of like saying you can't use that reason to support matter but I can use it to support spiritual substance.

If we can expose this tactic it would seriously undermine immateriality as an alternative to Locke. — Jamesk

This just takes us back to Descartes' argument. We can validate the existence of our own ideas because they are immediately present to us, but that there is substance (substance or matter, being an abstract idea) independent from this requires building up a system of correspondence, and correspondence is based in fundamental assumptions which cannot be proven. So the arguments Berkeley uses against Locke cannot really be applied back against Berkeley as you suggest. But Berkeley is basically just an extension of Descartes' naivety which is fine for grasping the reality of ideas, but gives us nothing to base an understanding of the physical world on. And the objections which one might use against Berkeley are quite distinct from the ones Berkeley uses against Locke. This would be that his strictly monist reality can provide no principles for correspondence.

Weird. That's such a basic thing to know. Objective sounds are sounds occurring external to your body. — Terrapin Station

"Sound" refers to a sensation. How could a sensation be external to a sensing body?

I explained a number of times what I'm referring to with "matter." — Terrapin Station

I don't recall any such explanation, only a confused bit of nonsense.

Locke builds his case on an ability to abstract ideas from general terms and on primary and secondary qualities. Locke continues on from Descartes by offering indirect realism and by saying that it is ok to doubt, with the little knowledge we have we can still get by and build working scientific theories. — Jamesk

It's been quite a while since I read Locke. But I remember that I think his division between primary and secondary qualities is unsound, and somewhat arbitrary. I think that if this distinction falls through, Locke's ontology is pretty much lost Berkeley provides a much more sound argument, though he really does not provide principles for an ontology. Maybe Berkeley disproves Locke's ontology without providing an acceptable alternative. That's what I remember about Berkeley, he provides a lot of good arguments against some ontological principles, without providing an alternative to those refuted principles. I'll reread yours and wayfarer's posts above, and see if I can recall why I was unimpressed by Locke's ontology, and quite incline to accept Berkeley's points. Maybe I can contribute something worthwhile to the thread.