Not interested in your comment. I'm interested in reading the PI.

Good thing you're participating in a discussion thread and commenting on posts then, genius.

if people aren't interested, that's fine. They don't have to pay attention to me. — Terrapin Station

Rule-following is an activity, and it's one of the activities that takes place in a game. It doesn't necessarily mean that you have learned rules or that rules have been stipulated in some way prior to the learning of the game. The same is true when you teach a child what the word cup means, the child doesn't need to know anything about a rule in order to learn how to use the word. The child observes, and probably already has some background of what it means to associate a word with an object. This is similar to the person in Wittgenstein's example (PI 31), where there is no learning of the rules explicitly or implicitly. Note though that the person has a background with learning other games, and as a result it makes it easier for them to figure out how the game is played.

This does not mean that once the person or child has learned to use pieces in a game, or has learned how to use the word cup, that they are not performing a social activity in accord with rules. Dogs can even learn to play simple games, and obviously a dog has no concept of rule-following or understanding of rules. However, the actions of a dog, in say a competition, is in accord with rules. The dog, child, or adult doesn't need to understand what the rules are in order to learn a rule-governed activity.

It's important to note that the person who is learning the game is already familiar with the kind of activity associated with rule-following. This is true without them understanding what a rule is, or being shown the rules, or learning rules.

This is part of what Wittgenstein, I believe, is saying in this passage.

Yeah, make sure to reply to a bunch of comments of mine then.

Noting and correcting irrelevancies is important sometimes :)

Especially when you're not interested in that.

Rule-following is an activity, and it's one of the activities that takes place in a game. It doesn't necessarily mean that you have learned rules or that rules have been stipulated in some way prior to the learning of the game. The same is true when you teach a child what the word cup means, the child doesn't need to know anything about a rule in order to learn how to use the word. The child observes, and probably already has some background of what it means to associate a word with an object. This is similar to the person in Wittgenstein's example (PI 31), where there is no learning of the rules explicitly or implicitly. Note though that the person has a background with learning other games, and as a result it makes it easier for them to figure out how the game is played. — Sam26

I see how this is true, concerning how a child learns to use words, that the child could learn how to use words, without learning any rules, and even develop a sufficient vocabulary this way. But I don't see how this could be the case for learning any sort of game. Anyone trying to play a game, having learned in this way, would inevitable stray out of bounds of the rules, and would have to be told the rules, and told to stay within the boundaries of the rules. So it would be impossible for a person to learn to play a game without learning the rules, because any practise would involve straying beyond the bounds of the rules, and therefore being taught the rules. In other words, the others engaged in the play of the game would not allow the person the necessary practise to learn a game, without teaching that person the rules.

Perhaps if Wittgenstein took the more general activity "play", and said that a person could learn to play without learning rules, this would be more acceptable, because "knowing how to play" doesn't imply knowing rules, like "knowing how to play a game" implies knowing the rules. However, since we see that one can learn to use words without learning rules, wouldn't it be a more appropriate analogy to say that learning a language is like learning how to play, and learning the more complex parts of language, like the various logical systems etc., in which rules are involved, is like learning how to play different games?

Suppose now, that the person in this scenario, of whom Wittgenstein says "in another sense he is already master of a game", is not really master of a game at all, because he knows no rules. All he is master of is play; he knows very well how to play. Someone says to him, "this is the king", in order to bring a rule into his play, teach him an actual game. The "place" which is "already prepared", as Wittgenstein says, is the person himself, already knowing how to play, and now ready to commit to some rules. That is the place which has been prepared for the rule, by the practice of play.

§31:

§31 continues the theme, already developed previously, that an ostensive explanation requires knowing something about the kind of thing that is being pointed out:

§31: "The words “This is the king” (or “This is called ‘the king’”) are an explanation of a word only if the learner already ‘knows what a piece in a game is’. That is, if, for example, he has already played other games, or has watched ‘with understanding’ how other people play - and similar things". (emphasis in the original).

However, one thing that might be missed - because people have been anticipating alot - is that §31 is actually the first time in the PI that Wittgenstein actually begins to discuss 'rules' explicitly at all. So far, rules were mentioned only back in §3, where, interestingly, Witty actually objects to characterizing games in terms of rules, and says that such a characterization is a 'restricted' one that doesn't capture the generality of games. To recall:

§3: "It is as if someone were to say, “Playing a game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules . . .” - and we replied: You seem to be thinking of board games, but they are not all the games there are. You can rectify your explanation by expressly restricting it to those games."

That ought to put us on alert to the fact that rules are not - so far at least - crucial elements in Wittgenstein's conception of games, and hence, language. This is something that will be developed here in §31 even more. §31 beings by characterizing a situation in which in order to understand a specific ostensive act ("This is the king”), one must know the rules before hand. What is being illustrated here is again, the need for prior knowledge before ostensive explanation can 'work':

§31: "When one shows someone the king in chess and says “This is the king”, one does not thereby explain to him the use of this piece a unless he already knows the rules of the game except for this last point: the shape of the king". So far, so good.

Importantly however, this prior knowledge, while it can be of rules, is not necessarily or always of them. This is what the second paragraph (which begins "However, one can....") aims to bring out, which, among other things, aims to show that rules are just one kind of 'prior knowledge' needed for ostensive explanation to function: "And in that case it is so, not because the person to whom we give the explanation already knows rules, but because, in another sense, he has already mastered a game." There is 'another sense', quite apart from the knowledge of rules, in which one can have the prior knowledge necessary to understand ostensive explanations.

As with §3, Witty is here circumscribing (limiting) the role or importance of rules as necessary elements in the understanding of ostensive explanations. While acknowledging their necessity in some circumstances, the appeal to rules does not exhaust all of them. The rest of §31, which doesn't discuss rules at all, simply goes over some of the same ground as before: the need to have a certain kind of knowledge before ostensive explanations can work.

However, one thing that might be missed - because people have been anticipating alot - is that §31 is actually the first time in the PI that Wittgenstein actually begins to discuss 'rules' explicitly at all. So far, rules were mentioned only back in §3, where, interestingly, Witty actually objects to characterizing games in terms of rules, and says that such a characterization is a 'restricted' one that doesn't capture the generality of games. To recall:

§3: "It is as if someone were to say, “Playing a game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules . . .” - and we replied: You seem to be thinking of board games, but they are not all the games there are. You can rectify your explanation by expressly restricting it to those games." — StreetlightX

At the outset of the book, I would strongly object to this interpretation of #3. At that point there is no reason to interpret that Wittgenstein implies games could be played without rules. In this phrase, “Playing a game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules . . .”, the reference to board games is "on a surface", not "according to certain rules". So it's a real stretch of creative interpretation to claim that Wittgenstein might be implying here that a game could be played without rules. In common usage, "game" implies "play according to rules", and what is implied by W's phrase is that a game could be played in ways other than "on a surface". Your interpretation would appear as completely unwarranted..

However, as I stated earlier, there is a sense of "playing games", like "she is playing games with us", in which one plays without rules. But these are private, unconventional games, and the phrase carries with it a connotation of trickery, foolery, or even deception. If we take away the necessity of rules from game play we no longer have a "game" in the common sense of the word, we have a "game" in this other sense.

That ought to put us on alert to the fact that rules are not - so far at least - crucial elements in Wittgenstein's conception of games, and hence, language. This is something that will be developed here in §31 even more. §31 beings by characterizing a situation in which in order to understand a specific ostensive act ("This is the king”), one must know the rules before hand. What is being illustrated here is again, the need for prior knowledge before ostensive explanation can 'work': — StreetlightX

OK, #3 did not convince me. As I said it's a stretch of creative interpretation to think that Wittgenstein is implying that a game could be played without rules. However, #31 appears to be explicit. So, if Wittgenstein is using "game" in this way, he is using, or conflating, two distinct senses of the word. He is using "game" in the sense of a board game, or the game of chess, in which "play according to rules" is implied, and he is also using "game" in the sense of a private, unconventional game, where there are no rules, but this sense of "game" implies trickery, or deception.

With Wittgenstein it is very important to distinguish which sense is intended by his use of common words. Failure to do this will produce equivocation in one's interpretation. And this qualifies as misunderstanding. So for instance, he might use "game" as "play according to rules" in one paragraph, and in the very next paragraph, use "game" as "play without rules", and if the interpreter fails to recognize that these are two distinct senses of "game", the result is equivocation within the interpretation, misunderstanding. Moreover, we cannot combine these two to make one sense of "game" because "play according to rules" and "play without rules" are logically incompatible.

As with §3, Witty is here circumscribing (limiting) the role or importance of rules as necessary elements in the understanding of ostensive explanations. While acknowledging their necessity in some circumstances, the appeal to rules does not exhaust all of them. The rest of §31, which doesn't discuss rules at all, simply goes over some of the same ground as before: the need to have a certain kind of knowledge before ostensive explanations can work. — StreetlightX

Yes, I very much agree that this is the actual point which Wittgenstein is making. The reference to games is an aside, a diversion or distraction. One might say that he is playing games with us with this distraction, but that in itself is a real living example which serves to prove the point. He's very crafty, isn't he?

We might consider two aspects of game-play according to the two distinct senses of "game". One is the actual play of the game, in which one acts according to the rules. The other is the strategizing which is still part of the play, but there are no rules to it. There is a relationship between the two, such that when we are using language and want to give something a name, a label, there is an aspect of following rules, and an aspect of strategizing. This seems to me, to be the reason for the line "Settle the name yourself".

.

One thing I find curious--and that's the most generous word for it, is something people are suggesting in this thread, and something I've seen suggested in other threads too: the idea that a book can't be approached in terms of its details as it unfolds, to an extent where people even seem to be saying, "Well, yeah, this bit is going to seem obviously wrong, misleading, etc. if you take it at face value as a detail. You need to see the whole"--as if a whole comprised of a bunch of wrong, misconceived, muddle-headed etc. details is somehow going to emerge as something cogent, insightful, etc.

In this phrase, “Playing a game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules . . .”, the reference to board games is "on a surface", not "according to certain rules". — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no textual evidence to support arbitrarily cleaving the phrase in two. Speaking of 'stretchs of creative interpretation'. Nothing in the rest of the post refers to the PI either, so is entirely neglectable.

So it's a real stretch of creative interpretation to claim that Wittgenstein might be implying here that a game could be played without rules. In common usage, "game" implies "play according to rules", — Metaphysician Undercover

Games are going to keep on cropping up here, so I think it's worth mentioning some games without rules: sandcastles, cowboys and indians, trains, bricks, dollies, ... not that we cannot make some rules for any of them if we want to play making rules, indeed making the rules is often a large part of playing dollies, but there is no essential need, such that if it is not rule bound it is not a game.

*spoiler alert*

More generally, Wiki's family resemblance entry gives a sneak preview of the forthcoming demolition of definitive meaning as the universal pattern of meaning.

There is no textual evidence to support arbitrarily cleaving the phrase in two. Speaking of 'stretchs of creative interpretation'. Nothing in the rest of the post refers to the PI either, so is entirely neglectable. — StreetlightX

Games are going to keep on cropping up here, so I think it's worth mentioning some games without rules: sandcastles, cowboys and indians, trains, bricks, dollies, ... not that we cannot make some rules for any of them if we want to play making rules, indeed making the rules is often a large part of playing dollies, but there is no essential need, such that if it is not rule bound it is not a game. — unenlightened

OK, I just thought I'd get some clarification on this matter, seeing as we're supposed to be reading this text together, it's good to have agreement on interpretation. To me, the common use of "game" is to play according to rules. That's my natural interpretation of "game". But if rules are not implied when Wittgenstein makes an analogy between games and language use, referring to "language-games", he uses "game" in a sense which neither implies that the game player is following rules, nor does it imply that the game player is not following rules. One "language-game" might be played according to rules, but another might not be played according to rules.

7. In the practice of the use of language (2) one party calls out the
words, the other acts on them. In instruction in the language the
following process will occur: the learner names the objects; that is,
he utters the word when the teacher points to the stone.—And there
will be this still simpler exercise: the pupil repeats the words after the
teacher——both of these being processes resembling language.
We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) as
one of those games by means of which children learn their native
language. I will call these games "language-games" and will sometimes
speak of a primitive language as a language-game.
And the processes of naming the stones and of repeating words after
someone might also be called language-games. Think of much of the
use of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses.
I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into
which it is woven, the "language-game".

So in the above example when the learner is learning how to name objects, and this is referred to as "language-games", we ought not interpret this as the learner learning rules. The learner might be playing a language-game which does involve rules.

It assumed there are rules. We can certainly “play a game” without knowing the rules; which maybe where some confusion lies in your exchanges above (on one or both sides?).

By this all I mean is that when we “play” we have some aim - be it clearly stated or otherwise. As we play we come to understand certain techniques and methods that yield subjectively (and intersubjectively) “good” results. The more we develop the game the more refined and defined the rules become. The creation of rules is pretty much what “play” is about.

Rules are abstract after all not real. We don’t continue to play a game of chess to its conclusion if the house is burning down around us - reality aways draws us any from the rigid nature of abstract, unyeilding rules. If the game is a bore we adjust it; thus creating a new field of play to explore.

I would hold off, for now, of getting too deep into a discussion of the nature of games and their relation to rules. There's alot of that to come, and as it stands, the thrust of the sections we are discussing have to do with the relation between ostension and rules (that just happen to be in the context of a game).

As it stands, §3 is more indicative than rigorous. It should be taken, at this point, as nothing more than a flag to look out for - one over the question about the articulation of rules and games, and the possibility, still to be explored, that the former do not exhaust the latter. Anything beyond that is going far beyond where we are with the text atm.

§32 is a short but illuminating subsection:

§32 brings the discussion so far back to Augustine briefly, and is thus useful to measure the distance travelled between §1 - the beginning of the book - and now. Recall that Witty's initial gripe with Augustine's theory is that it had no place for different kind of words:

§1: "Augustine does not mention any difference between kinds of word."

In the distance between §1 and §32, we've leant why this matters: without an ability to distinguish between different kinds of words, it would not be possible for ostensive acts to make sense. §32, in turn, implies that it is part and parcel of learning a language that we learn how to make such distinctions. Witty's complaint against Augustine, now extended here, is that Augustine takes for granted that someone can already make such distinctions:

§32: "Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a foreign country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if he already had a language, only not this one."

This is the importance of the contrast between the child, and the foreign language learner: both are learning a language, but the child has to learn something the foreign speaker does not - the ability to distinguish between different kinds of words. The child has to learn (at least) two things, the foreigner speaker, just one. The critique of Augustine then, is that he takes the foreign language speaker as his model, and not the child; or rather, that Augustine has no place in his theory for the child.

The central idea throughout the PI is the idea of the language-game, and under this rubric is the idea of rules of use (or logic of use), and also Wittgenstein's idea of grammar which falls under the role of the rules. Although the role of rules is probably more expansive than just the rules of grammar.

Whether we are referring to Wittgenstein's grammatical rules (which are important), or the more general idea of rule-following, as seen in the application of rules across a wider swath of language usage, rule-following is central.

Grammar is what makes the moves in language possible, just like the rules of chess make the game of chess possible. And just as the rules of chess permit some moves and disallow others, so also does grammar permit and disallow certain linguistic moves. This should be seen under the logic of use, but again keep in mind that the logic of use is broader than just grammar. It includes the various acts that occur in a language-game. For instance, the act of bringing the slab in Wittgenstein's primitive language-game, is also seen as part of the logic of use. Just as the rules of chess bring about the various moves in chess as part of the logic within the game.

It's also part of the nature of the rules of grammar to adjudicate certain moves as correct or incorrect. Again the parallel with chess rules. One can think of the rules of grammar and the rules of chess as more akin to commands to follow in order to play the game correctly. The rules are conventions, but they necessitate certain moves, i.e., if you want to play the game correctly within the social structure. — Sam26

If you're still lurking Sam26, please notice that this passage is completely inconsistent with what our interpretation has provided for us, up to this point. For Wittgenstein, as explained so far in PI, a language-game is not rule based. Rules are not what makes play of the game possible. Therefore grammar (as rules) cannot be, for Wittgenstein, "what makes the moves in language possible", as you state above.

It assumed there are rules. We can certainly “play a game” without knowing the rules; which maybe where some confusion lies in your exchanges above (on one or both sides?). — I like sushi

In Wittgenstein's description of "game", up to this point in the text, I don't think that rules are assumed as necessary to a game at all. That is what StreetlightX describes above. Rules cannot be assumed here. if we can play a game without learning the rules, then rules are not necessary to playing a game.

I would hold off, for now, of getting too deep into a discussion of the nature of games and their relation to rules. There's alot of that to come, and as it stands, the thrust of the sections we are discussing have to do with the relation between ostension and rules (that just happen to be in the context of a game). — StreetlightX

Wait a minute. Rules have barely been mentioned to this point, as you astutely noticed. However, games have been consistently mentioned, even to the point of a description of what constitutes a "language-game", at #7, quoted above. Therefore the thrust of the sections we've been discussing has to do with the relation between ostension and games, not the relation between ostension and rules. He has developed a relationship between ostension and game play, something deeper than an analogy, as it is suggested that ostension is a type of game play (language-game), not "like" game play, as "analogy" would suggest. And, as our brief discussion above indicates, he has not developed a definite or firm relationship between games and rules, therefore he has not developed a firm relationship between ostension and rules. Nor has he even attempt to develop such a relation except the brief suggestion that one can learn a game without learning rules. But "rules" is still a phantom term here waiting to be defined within this schema.

I Like Sushi, as you are our professed leader, what do you suggest as our next section, somewhere around 45?

the thrust of the sections we've been discussing has to do with the relation between ostension and games, not the relation between ostension and rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, by sections we've been discussing I simply meant the paragraphs in §31, which gave rise to the above discussions about games and rules. As far as the PI goes, as pre-§31 has mostly been concerned with establishing that a certain kind of knowledge is needed for ostensive explanations to function effectively. I still think it's much too early and speculative to be discussing Wittgenstein on games and rules.

I reckon pushing onto 50 is best.

Given that the holiday season is pressing in on us I am looking to reread up to around the 100 mark by new year and then to 200 by end of January - just so you know.

In relation to "rules", I agree that it is too early for a discussion of Wittgenstein's position, but in relation to "games", I do not agree. "Language-games" have been extensively mentioned, beginning with the explicit definition at #7, where he describes ostensive learning as a language-game. So I think it is important to grasp at least a minimal understanding of what he means by "game". As you know, I was completely confounded because to me "game" means "play according to rules", and this is how I interpreted "game" in the sense of ostension being a language-game. But you and unenlightened set me straight, that this is not what Wittgenstein means by "game". Playing a game does not necessarily imply knowing rules, and I misinterpreted W's use of "game".

At #7, ostensive definition is called a game, a language-game. Being a game, I mistakenly understood this "language-game" as something which must be played according to rules. I thought that one must already know some rules in order to play the language-game of ostension, being a "game". That's why I got confused at #31. But I now see that Wittgenstein intends ostensive learning to be a game which one knows how to play without knowing rules (as per 31). I now anticipate that he is probably setting this up as the type of game by which one learns rules, learns how to follow rules, or some such thing. We will see.

So I assume, that when Wittgenstein says at 33, "you must already be master of a language in order to understand an ostensive definition", he means "master of a language" in the same way that he means "master of a game" at 31. And this is a way of knowing how to play a game without knowing any rules to the game. So the type of language-game which the child has mastered (that of distinguishing types of usage as W describes) which enables ostensive learning, is a game which one knows how to play without learning rules.

In relation to "rules", I agree that it is too early for a discussion of Wittgenstein's position, but in relation to "games", I do not agree. "Language-games" have been extensively mentioned, beginning with the explicit definition at #7 — Metaphysician Undercover

It's true that §7 does provide a minimal definition of a language game -

§7 "I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the activities into which it is woven, a “language-game."

- elaborated slightly in §23 -

§23: "The word “language-game” is used here to emphasize the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life."

- but, these definitions are simply stipulative and (so far) shed little light on the specificity of why Wittgenstein calls them 'games' (and not, say, 'language-excercises' or 'language-activities'). Without an explicit discussion of games - which has not happened, but soon will - it's still the syntagm 'language-games' - taken as a whole - that is the matter for discussion, and not 'games' as such.

§33

§33 marks a new turn in the argumentation of the PI. From here till roughly §36, Witty will begin to discuss the role of 'experiences' in the understanding of ostensive explanations. Before getting to that, it's important to recap a little, as Witty himself does.

Let's recall the main problem being addressed: that ostension is differential, which means that the same ostensive action can point out many different things, which in turn, raises the question of how we can tell which one of the many things is being pointed out (how can an ostensive explanation be 'individuated', as it were?). Witty's position so far is that one needs to have a 'mastery over the language game' - an understanding of kinds of words, or grammar - in order to answer this question.

§33 tries to address an objection to this scheme. The objection runs that we don't need any such mastery, and that, in order to know what is being pointed out by an act of ostension, all we need to do is appeal to acts of 'attention' or 'concentration':

§33: "You’ll say that you ‘meant’ something different each time you pointed. And if I ask how that is done, you’ll say you concentrated your attention on the colour, the shape, and so on".

Wittgenstein's retort to this is that attention itself is a differential, or rather, equivocal concept, and that 'attending' to something (a color, say), can itself mean very many different things (Witty provides a few different, equivocal examples of 'attention'). If this is so, then this means that the appeal to 'attention' just displaces the question back a step, rather than answering it: if 'attention' is what individuates an ostensive act, then what individuates attention?

Witty then qualifies his reply with an acknowledgement that while such acts of attention may (and often do) accompany the understanding of ostensive explanations, they nonetheless do not, or cannot, play a role in explaining how it is that ostension 'picks out' one aspect of what is being pointed to over others. At this point he makes draws a really interesting analogy: that while playing chess always involves moving pieces 'from here to there', actually playing chess involves more than (just) this. Witty doesn't expand on this, but it's clear this this 'more' would involve something like an understanding of how and why such moves are made: the analogous counterpart to which would be an understanding of how and why an ostensive explanation picks out this aspect of something, and not another (color, and not shape, say).

§34 - §36 will expand on this line of thought, with respect to 'characteristic experiences' in place of 'attention'.

Supplementary comment:

One way to appreciate what's going on at a more global scale is that Wittgenstein is dealing with a twist on the classic question of sufficient reason - but instead of asking 'why is there something rather than nothing', at stake here is a more modest: 'why and how does ostensive explanation pick out this rather than that?' The search for a principle of sufficient ostensive explanation, if you will.

- but, these definitions are simply stipulative and (so far) shed little light on the specificity of why Wittgenstein calls them 'games' (and not, say, 'language-excercises' or 'language-activities'). Without an explicit discussion of games - which has not happened, but soon will - it's still the syntagm 'language-games' - taken as a whole - that is the matter for discussion, and not 'games' as such. — StreetlightX

After #7 he distinguishes different language-games. For instance, at #8 he describes "an expansion of language (2)". But he later distinguishes the language-game at (2) from the language-game at (8). And may refer to language(2) and language (8). So for example, at 16 it's "language-game (8)", but at 17, it's "language (8)", and at 18 its "languages (2) and (8)". So (2) and (8) begin as distinguishable parts of learning "a language". They become distinct language-games. Then the distinct language games are themselves referred to as distinct languages.

So I believe #23 to be quite important because we have an approach presented here, toward the division of human activity. He asks "how many kinds of sentences are there?" And each different kind of sentence (a seemingly endless number), is itself a different language-game, which through the prior example from Frege, and Witty's usage described above, could be considered as a distinct language. But each distinct language-game is really "a part" of the overall activity commonly called "language", And further, even "the speaking of language is part of an activity" or of a form of life, such that the overall activity called "language" is a part of an even bigger activity, a "form of life".

The principle by which the activity, language, is divided here, is according to the kinds of sentences. And you will see that each different kind of sentence serves a different purpose. So the principle presented here, by which human activity is divided, is the purpose of the activity. Activities are segregated according to their purpose.

But the soundness of this division process is questionable because it is theoretical, and most likely could not be carried out in practise. What I mean is that all the different kinds of sentences exist as an integrated part of language which is integrated into the form of life, such that the smaller parts really depend, for existence, on the larger "whole", as having been developed within the context of the whole. So they cannot really be separated out as a distinct language-games, or distinct languages within the larger whole "language". Nor can language be separated from the whole "form of life". The way that they are integrated denies that this is a real possibility, But it is, nevertheless, a very useful theory and thought process, to demonstrate this relationship.

So I believe #23 to be quite important because we have an approach presented here, toward the division of human activity. He asks "how many kinds of sentences are there?" And each different kind of sentence (a seemingly endless number), is itself a different language-game...

...The principle by which the activity, language, is divided here, is according to the kinds of sentences. And you will see that each different kind of sentence serves a different purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

My only comment here would be that I would not talk of 'sentences'. Witty does not - at least in the context of defining language-games - and there's a very good reason for this, which will come up a little later down the track. While it's totally correct to say that language-games are embedded in 'forms-of-life', these language-games do not correspond to sentences, and it is certainly not the case that sentences 'are' language-games, as you put here (which in any case would be inconsistent with Witty's preliminary definition of a language-game which consists of "language and the activities into which it is woven" (my emphasis). Anyway, the point is: if you're thinking about language-games, forget 'sentences'.

Again, I don't like nitpicking, (but it is sometimes necessary to get through to the true meaning). At 23, Witty clearly asks "But how many kinds of sentence are there?" ,And this is a carry through from his discussion of Frege's idea of "an assertion", which Witty characterizes as a kind of sentence.

So at 23 Witty proposes "countless" different "kinds of sentence", and each kind is described as a distinct language-game, such that new kinds come into existence and others become obsolete. "(We can get a rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.)". And this evolution (my term), appears to be what is referred to when a language-game is said to be a "form of life". Forms of life come into existence, and become obsolete through an evolutionary process.

In any case, these nitpicky items are where inconsistencies in an author's work appear to lie. If we assume that there was no such inconsistency within the author's mind, therefore within what the author meant, then the appearance of inconsistency needs to be resolved to truly understand what the author meant.

So at 23 Witty proposes "countless" different "kinds of sentence", and each kind is described as a distinct language-game, such that new kinds come into existence and others become obsolete. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, read carefully. Witty does not describe sentences as language-games. Here is the start of §23:

§23: "But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question and command? - There are countless kinds; countless different kinds of use of all the things we call “signs”, “words”, “sentences”. And this diversity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten". (my bolding)

Witty does indeed begin by saying that there indeed countless kinds of sentence. But importantly, he then goes on to say that there are "countless different kinds of use of all the things we call 'signs', 'words', 'sentences'". What is 'countless' in the second part of the sentence are neither 'signs', 'words', or 'sentences', but the kinds of use of them. In other words, the bolded 'this diversity' refers to the kinds of use, and not individual 'signs', 'words', and 'sentences'. And it is the kinds of use that correspond to 'new types of language' and 'new language-games'.

And this makes far, far more sense that equating language-games with sentences. Not only because Witty is explicit that language-games consist of "language and the activities into which it is woven" (of which a 'sentence' cannot be), but also because it is consistent with Witty's previous description of a language-game as "the whole process of using words" (§7), where again, use is foregrounded, and not as it were, units of meaning. Finally, the fact that the primacy of the 'sentence' gives way to being simply one element in a set (list) of consisting of 'signs', 'words', and 'sentences' means that even if Witty did mean to say language 'were' sentences, they would also have to be 'signs', and 'words'. Which itself would be an incredibly strange thing to say.

In any case, any careful reading of §23 will dispel the mistaken idea that language-games could be identified with sentences - and this is to say nothing of the upcoming discussion about 'simples' and 'complexes' which would further put a definitive nail in the coffin of that reading.

Witty does indeed begin by saying that there indeed countless kinds of sentence. But importantly, he then goes on to say that there are "countless different kinds of use of all the things we call 'signs', 'words', 'sentences'". What is 'countless' in the second part of the sentence are neither 'signs', 'words', or 'sentences', but the kinds of use of them. In other words, the bolded 'this diversity' refers to the kinds of use, and not individual 'signs', 'words', and 'sentences'. And it is the kinds of use that correspond to 'new types of language' and 'new language-games'. — StreetlightX

I agree, a "kind of sentence" is a representation of a kind of usage. A language-game is an activity, and he is talking about different kinds of activities here. So "sentence" signifies a static physical thing, like a symbol or a word, but what is being talked about is the activity, the language-game. There are different kinds of activities within a language and one way of representing this is with the different kinds of sentences listed at 23.

And this makes far, far more sense that equating language-games with sentences. Not only because Witty is explicit that language-games consist of "language and the activities into which it is woven" (of which a 'sentence' cannot be), but also because it is consistent with Witty's previous description of a language-game as "the whole process of using words" (§7), where again, use is foregrounded, and not as it were, units of meaning. Finally, the fact that the primacy of the 'sentence' gives way to being simply one element in a set (list) of consisting of 'signs', 'words', and 'sentences' means that even if Witty did mean to say language 'were' sentences, they would also have to be 'signs', and 'words'. Which itself would be an incredibly strange thing to say. — StreetlightX

Again, I completely agree. A game is an activity (we've dispensed the qualification of 'according to rules' which I had added), and so a language-game is an activity. That's how game is being defined. It would be a completely incorrect interpretation to give primacy to the static sentence, over the activity which the sentence is more like a tool of. Witty's example at 23, that there are different kinds of sentences, serves to demonstrate that within this genus of activity called language, which he says is a game, there are various species, a multiplicity of language-games exemplified by a multiplicity of types of sentence. So reference to "sentence" here is meant only to exemplify different kinds of language use each as a distinct language-game. Therefore #24 starts with: "24. If you do not keep the multiplicity of language-games in view you will perhaps be inclined to ask questions like: "What is a question?..."