This goes against everyday observable events... — creativesoul

No it does not, because someone can be talking about something and the other person have no idea of what the thing is which is being talked about. So talking about something does not, in itself, qualify as successful reference.

I didn't say that you cannot reference through language, I said that language is not necessary.

Talking about something does not qualify as successful reference. That's the point Reference is to direct one's attention. So the "successful reference" was carried out by pointing my head toward the thing, not by talking about it..

"Pointing", it's your example, but you seem to think pointing is "sign language". So consider taking one's hand and placing it somewhere to feel something, or holding one's head and pointing it in a particular direction, like my father used to do when I was a child, to show me where to look to see what he was talking about. You see, talking about something (describing), and directing one's attention to the thing being talked about, are two distinct things. And, simply naming the thing being described will not direct a person's attention to it. Directing one's attention (successful reference) involves showing one where to look.

I’m not sure it has a meaning. Or at least a cogent one. Different is a relational condition. We never describe “different”; we describe a relational discrepancy and label it a difference. The logical inference is the preview of judgement, true, an act of reason, but all that does is quantify the discrepancy by deducing that the properties for A are not the same as the properties for B. And THAT is all we can say about “difference”. — Mww

You don't think "different" has a cogent meaning? How would you judge that A is different from B if "different" did not have a cogent meaning? That the meaning of "different" is relational is irrelevant. Isn't all meaning relational? Let's say it means "not the same". The judgement that A and B are not the same is a logical judgement. Even if "that is all we can say about 'difference'", I think that this is saying something logical.

Parents talk about naming their kids all the time, and what names they would have had if such-and-such! — Snakes Alive

Nixon is a family name. It's not a matter of saying I wish I had called my son Nick instead of Dick.

What not everyone agrees on is whether his ideals were valuble or not and perhaps how to interpret sertain things. I dare say that Hitler thought his views were not only valuble but righteous, while most of the rest of the world disagreed. So if one individual (you) thinks that they are good, but another individual (the rest of the world) thinks they are bad--and ideas are the ultimate truth--then how can this conflicting truth be settled? Are your own ideas of self more real than the ideas another holds of you, or are we to hold that both views are always true? Do others know you better than you know yourself? I can't find a truly satisfying answer in my understanding of Plato's world's. — Carmaris19

If you have read Plato's "Republic" you will understand that he introduces "the good". Though it is often presented as Plato's "idea of good", it is not really an idea, more like an ideal. The good is said to be what makes ideas intelligible, like the sun makes visible objects visible. So if another person's ideas (like Hitler's) are not consistent with "the good", they will appear as unintelligible.

You don't know what logic is. Learn 101 level stuff like that first. — Terrapin Station

I'm not interested in your unrealistic definition "logic". Any instance of reasoning is using logic. So answer the question, if it's not a logical judgement then what is it?

You asked if "A is different than B" is logical/illogical. The answer is that no, it isn't. "A is different than B" has nothing to do with logic. — Terrapin Station

As I explained, you are clearly wrong. Whether A is different from B is a logical judgement. This is because one needs to proceed with a knowledge of what "different" means, and make the judgement accordingly. That is a judgement of logical.

If you really believe that this is not a logical judgement, then what sort of judgement do you think it is, just a random guess?

You could ask if "Just in case A isn't identical to B, then A is different than B" is logical. Would you like to ask something like that instead? — Terrapin Station

No I would not like to ask that. I would like to ask you what sort of judgement is the judgement that A is different from B, if it's not a logical judgement?

When I compare a brick to a cinder block, I’m not sure I’m inferring anything. Why can’t I just be observing a difference, without having to logically infer there is one? — Mww

The point is that "different" has a definite meaning. And, if you are judging that a brick is different from a cinder block, then you are inferring that these two things qualify for the relationship called "different". Simply seeing a cinder block, and seeing a brick does not constitute judging them as different. My dog sees these things, and I do not know what sort of judgement my dog makes when seeing them, or how my dog perceives them, but I am quite sure that my dog does not judge them as "different". She never told me that things are different, so I don't believe that she knows how to use this word.

Are you saying sensual awareness itself involves logical inference? — Mww

Actually I am saying quite the opposite. I am saying that we ought to be careful not to conflate these two, sensual awareness and logical inference. Being sensually aware is one thing, but putting words to the things which we are aware of, is a completely different thing. And, we ought not say that putting words to things is just a matter of being sensually aware, because there are all sorts of creatures who are sensually aware yet they do not put words to things. The difference I believe is that putting words to things is an act of reason, rather than an act of sensation, and acts of reason are referred to as logical, or illogical if mistaken.

A counterfactual is a useful logical tool. But if it is used to say "if X were not named X ...", then it is just being used in an attempt to bypass the law of identity, and consequently legitimize contradiction.

Logic is about inference/implication--what follows from what, basically. — Terrapin Station

Right, so we have a word, "different", and we know what that word means. Then we compare A and B, and make the inference A is different from B. Why would you say that this is not a logical inference?

Sure I've heard of counterfactuals

It means, if we rolled back in a time machine (which is impossible), to way back before Nixon and his family got the name, and somehow got them to use a different name, then Nixon would not be named "Nixon".

More simply put, it's contradiction, clear as a bell.

When I say "A is different than B", would you say that this is illogical, or would you say that this judgement is made without the use of logic? I would say that the judgement is made with the use of logic, because we must determine what "different" means and judge A and B to see if they qualify as different.

You know that there is more than one form of logic don't you?

Yes I read the op, and it seems to me that "reference" is to direct someone's attention, with language or otherwise. The op directs my attention toward naming and describing, neither of which is essential to reference. So I'd say that the op is a failed attempt at directing my attention toward the concept of "reference".

So there appears to be all sorts of problems with your lay out. First, 1) is impossible, because I cannot direct your attention to something simply by naming it. This would require that you already know the name of it. And how would you know the name of it, if I am the one naming it. My act of naming a thing will not direct your attention to it. Next, 2) is highly unlikely, as you say. So we get to the others, 3-6 which are various combinations of naming and describing, and this is what language use generally is, acts which combine naming and describing. But by distracting us into the subject of language use, you have completely avoided the issue of what is prerequisite to, and what constitutes a successful reference, i.e. a successful act of directing one's attention.

What produces a successful reference is a type of compatibility between the two individuals involved. This is not a correspondence, nor is it a coherency, but it is a type of consistency. Therefore analyzing the different ways in which language is used will not reveal to you the nature of successful reference, because successful reference is a function of consistency which is understood through principles of sameness, or similarity, rather than through these principles of difference.

When a capable creature is referring to some thing, they are always doing so via common language use. There are no examples to the contrary. — creativesoul

You don't seem to have ever actually defined "successful reference", but I see no reason to conclude that this can only be done through common language. Even your own (later) example, of pointing, is not an instance of using language. By common definitions of "point" and "language". pointing is not an instance of using language. Your entire thesis appears to be based in this faulty premise. In reality, pointing is neither an instance of naming, nor an instance of describing, and neither is successful reference, it is simply a matter of directing one's attention. So you have actually produced a representation of "successful reference", which completely excludes what successful reference really is, and that is, an instance of directing one's attention.

Different elements are logically different, by the law of identity.

Yes, nevertheless it is fundamental that the subjective time occurs in mind. — Number2018

I thought we were talking about time itself, not "subjective time".
\

The relations between “objective, idealized time,” and “the subjective time of mind”
are incredibly complicated, and cannot be clarified unless we comprehend the latter one. — Number2018

I disagree, I don't think there is any such thing as "the subjective time of mind". I think that this route of inquiry is therefore misleading, because "subjective time" is an illusion.

If so, instead of philosophy, we need to go to wizards, magicians, or augurs.:smile: — Number2018

Why would that be? It is philosophy which deals with matters of the soul.

The main problem with this kind of analysis that it does not allow us distinct and differentiate between the different times in which we live and think. — Number2018

There is no such thing as "the different times in which we live and think". Our entire lives are lived at the present, everything we do, we do at the present. But just because our lives are at the present, this does not mean that the past and future are not real parts of time. That's the problem with the premise of "subjective time", it provides us with a misunderstanding of time right from the beginning. We place all of our past experiences in the past, as if they occurred in the past, but they really occurred at the present. This produces a very confused way of looking at time which can only be resolved by removing this "subjective time" from our perspective, and starting with a new premise, to look at time itself.

That's not a logical difference. Logically, both are simply that x implies the necessity of y. — Terrapin Station

One big problem here Terrapin, they're not both x implies y. One is x implies y, the other is y implies z Do you know about the law of identity, a principle of logic? There is a logical difference between two distinct things.

80 continues to question the idea of fixed meaning. Is it possible there could be rules which govern the use of words?

81 is quite difficult, and I believe pivotal to an understanding of Wittgenstein's belief of how rules apply within language. Here's the concluding paragraph from each, ed. 3, and ed. 4

All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has
attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning,
and thinking. For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and
did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or
understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules. — Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, ed. 3

All this, however, can appear in the right light only when one has
attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning
something, and thinking. For it will then also become clear what may
mislead us (and did mislead me) into thinking that if anyone utters a
sentence and means or understands it, he is thereby operating a calculus
according to definite rules. — Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, Hacker, Schulte, ed. 4

Notice the disagreement between "lead us", and "mislead us". I believe that this ambiguity is indicative of what Wittgenstein means when he says that someone operates according to a rule.

I was expecting Metaphysician Undercover to simply define or assert or include in the concept the necessity of the existence of God, because that's what he has done before. That's what I was getting at. But I see now that he has referred to the cosmological argument, which is a much better approach. — S

I was just trying to clarify what I believe AJJ was saying.

What is wrong with you that you can't simply spell out/specify what you take the logical difference to be when I request for you to do that? — Terrapin Station

I spelled it out. They have different premises. One argument proceeds from the premise that there are human experiences to the conclusion that there is a universe. The other proceeds from the premise that there is a universe to the conclusion of God. Do you, or do you not, recognize that this is a "logical difference"?

The problem is that you can use the logical form to do just about anything, which really means that it does nothing. — S

No, that's just the nature of logic, it is constructed so as to allow us to do as much as possible (what you call "just about anything") so long as we stay within the confines of validity. Because of this, it is very important to ensure that we proceed with sound premises. If we can use unsound premises, then we probably could do anything we want.

If you say that the universe necessitates God, then I can say that the universe necessitates anything else whatsoever or no God. We'd just be making shit up and playing with logic. — S

Sure, you can make up whatever premises you want. The problem is that they would likely be unsound. The premises which lead from the existence of the universe to the necessity of God are found in the cosmological argument. You can look that up and judge the soundness of the premises for yourself. I haven't read the entire thread and do not know if AJJ presented these premises.

Are you claiming that the premise "there are human experiences", is no different from the premise "there is a universe"? I see a big difference, don't you?

have a hunch that you're going to keep failing to realise that your reasoning can be used against you, and is thus ineffective. We're still in that situation now with the above. — S

At this point, I don't really care if my reasoning can be used against me. I don't even know what you mean by that. Care to explain?


AJJ uses a premise concerning the universe, and proceeds to conclude the necessity of God. You use a premise concerning human experience and proceed to conclude the necessity of a universe. See the difference?

There is no relevant difference. The reasoning is of the same logical form. He'll just say that with his argument, it's true, and with yours, it's not. But, of course, you could just say the same thing, only swapping the truth values around.

His is not an argument through reason, it's an argument through bald assertion.

Good luck getting through to him. — S

I agree that the reasoning is of "the same logical form". But I don't understand your claim that the reasoning can be used against me. TS reasons from the premise of human experience to the conclusion that there must be a universe. AJJ takes that conclusion as a premise and proceeds to the further conclusion that there must be God. So where's the problem?

It degenerated into the usualy discussion of what eternalism is rather than its implications. — noAxioms

Wouldn't it be necessary to have very clear principles of exactly what eternalism is, before we can determine its implications? If we can't agree on those principles, discussing implications is sort of meaningless. One could just change the principles of what eternalism is, to produce favourable implications.

Why couldn't the same logic say that if there is our experiences there is necessarily a universe? — Terrapin Station

It wouldn't be "the same" because there would be different premises. But once the necessity of the universe is proven we can go on to prove the necessity of God.

I think what Terrapin was saying is that, since there is logic which demonstrates that if there are experiences, then there is necessarily a universe (sans God), and since there are experiences, there is a universe (sans God), therefore God isn't necessary, then AJJ's logic is effectively countered and cancelled out. — S

The only thing which makes God "necessary" is the logic. So if you don't bother with the logic then God won't be necessary. So to take TS's example, if you don't bother with the logic, then the universe won't be necessary for experiences.

It doesn't counter or cancel out AJJ's logic, it just demonstrates that it is possible to ignore the logic. And, since necessity is produced by logic, ignoring the logic is ignoring the necessity. But ignoring the logic does not make the necessity go away though, for those who do not ignore it.

So if we were to say something like "the universe is necessary for our experiences" that wouldn't be magical thinking re the universe (sans God) necessarily existing? — Terrapin Station

I think what AJJ was saying is that there is logic which demonstrates that if there is a universe there is necessarily God. We observe that there is a universe, therefore there is God.

I see this operation as the fundamental and absolutely necessary condition of any conscious act! — Number2018

Right, I agree, but this is a defining aspect of consciousness, not a defining aspect of time. The dual present you described might be fundamental to consciousness, but if you deduce that it is therefore fundamental to time, you have an invalid deduction because you have no premise to state the relation between consciousness and time. The present may be fundamental to time. And the dual present is fundamental to consciousness. That's why I say the impression that the dual present is an aspect of time is an illusion, it's consciousness wrongly imposing itself on time.

The problem is that when we need “to recognize something, how can we differentiate, make any distinctions within ourselves? — Number2018

It think that how we make distinctions is a secret of the soul itself. No one knows exactly how we differentiate.

To sum up: how can we realize
in our individual minds, that the radically new forces are coming from the Future? — Number2018

This comes about from a logical analysis of the nature of time. Time is passing. And with the passing of time, there is past time which is coming into existence. This is a "becoming". A becoming requires a cause. The cause of past time cannot be the present, because if the present were actively creating past time there would be no future, just the present creating the past. So it must be the future which is the cause of past time. Imagine the present like a static membrane, a plane or something, The future is being forced through, or forcing itself through, the present to create the past. So unlike Deleuze, I look at the future as the agent. And although activity occurs at the present, the present is essentially passive in the sense that the activity is cause by the force of the future. So the activity at the present is like passive matter being moved by the cause which is time passing, and the future is the cause of that.

Yes memories have content, in the same way that a digital image has pixel values, but it is a vacuous tautology to say that information is intrinsically past-referring. unless that content is related to other content in a particular way. — sime

I don't see how you can say this. To say that a digital image has pixel values, is already to relate that image in a particular way. So to say that memories have content is to already assume that they have the relationship, which you deem is necessary. Therefore they do not need to be related in any further way as you seem to be saying.

Consider false memories and deep-fake photographs. What does it mean to say that they are false, in the sense of having no referent in the past? In a causal sense all phenomena could be said to represent the past, whether the phenomena is considered to be genuine or fake, and whether the phenomena is recalled into mind or externally perceived in the world. — sime

I don't think it is possible to have a memory with no referent in the past. Then it would not be a memory at all, but an imagination. An incorrect, or false memory is to remember something incorrectly, it is not to completely invent something in an absolute way, because that would not be a memory at all, but an instance of imagining something.

In practice, we verify the truth of memories and photographs and it is our process of verification that decides whether the memory is "true" or "false". Orthodox opinion interprets past-contingent propositions as being intrinsically past-referring and purely by the force of their expressed content and independently of the process of their verification. In contrast, I'm saying it is the process by which a proposition is verified that determines whether the content of the proposition is past, present or future referring. — sime

Even this I disagree with. There is a difference between determining the meaning of a proposition, and verifying the proposition as to true or false. To determine the meaning is to determine its content, and this is the process which determines whether it refers to past, present, or future. But this is completely different from verifying whether it is true or false.

78. He provides examples to demonstrate that there is a difference between knowing something, and being able to say it. How a clarinet sounds, for example.

79 The phrase "Moses did not exist" has different meanings depending on how "Moses" is defined, or described.

The name 'Moses' can be defined by means of various descriptions.

I believe this is a pseudo-problem created by conflating description with definition. These two are distinct. A description presupposes the existence of a thing being described, whether that thing is imaginary or not. A definition does not describe a thing, but a use, it describes the word's meaning, its use. Descriptive terms have meaning without having a thing which is being described. If there were such a thing, it would be a concept as in the case of "red". So descriptive words have potentially a definition, the definition describing the word's use. Now we introduce the proper noun, the name of a person. There is neither a definition, nor a description, which is appropriate, because this name signifies the thing to be described, whether imaginary or not. So the name, in this sense of a proper noun, cannot have an associated definition because it already has a designated use of referring to a particular thing (imaginary or not), nor is there necessarily a description for that thing.

Wittgenstein produces a similar resolution, saying that the name "N" has no fixed meaning. You can see that in the conflation of description and definition, this means that neither definition nor necessary description, can be properly assigned to it. So he asks: "Should it be said that I am using a word whose meaning I don't know, and so am talking nonsense?"

The proper noun is symbolic of the law of identity, which allows that a thing may be identified without a description. Further, the thing identified need not be a descriptive concept like in the case of "red", such that the name has meaning (use) in that way. The law of identity allows that a symbol can have meaning, by referring directly to a thing; that thing being neither a conception providing for the use of the word (and the possibility of a definition), nor is it necessary that the thing has a description whatsoever.

I cannot fathom a hard distinction between memories and present experience, for i cannot see much of a distinction between memories and photographs. And in the case of a photograph, in order for it to 'refer' to the past, it must be used in a certain way. — sime

Would you say that a photograph (and memory as well) could represent something in the past. I don't see any problem saying that. It is not a matter of how the photograph (memory) is used, it is a matter of how it is produced. The capacity to be used in a certain way is dependent on how the thing is created.

As with photographs, it doesn't make sense to say that the content of individual memories are past-referring in and of themselves . — sime

What do you mean by content of memories? In the mind, memories are content. Why are you seeking to give content to content? If you look for the content of a photograph, perhaps it is the past thing which was photographed. So if you look for the content of a memory, wouldn't that be the experience which was remembered? But can we truthfully say that the thing represented by a symbol is really the content of that symbol? Within the mind, the symbol is itself content.

This synthesis is passive because it is not carried out by the mind, but occurs in mind, which contemplates, prior to all memory and all reflection. — Number2018

As far as I can tell, things carried out within a mind, are carried out by that mind, so this doesn't make sense to me.

If there were not a repetition of physical stimuli in the surrounding environment, there would be just chaotic and quick changing, so that the basic living organisms would not be able to sustain any kind of the necessary stability and succession. — Number2018

Why would you say that stability is a repetition rather than a continuity. It appears to me, that things which stay the same through time do so by means of a continuity like inertia. So the continuity demonstrated by inertia, providing stability, is distinct from any repetition of moments, which is the means of change.

So, there is the external material repetition of a kind AB, AB, AB… Or, 123C4, 123C4, 123C4…we can call
this repetition “a bare material repetition”. — Number2018

There is no reason to consider this as a repetition rather than the continued temporal existence of AB. And if A and B are distinct, such that one follows the other, and the continued existence of either one is broken, then there is no reason to assume that a second occurrence of A would be the same identical A as the first.

Memory is the fundamental synthesis of time which constitutes the
being of the past (that which causes the present to pass).
At first sight, it is as if the past were trapped between two presents: the
one which it has been and the one in relation to which it is past. The past is
not the former present itself but the element in which we focus upon the
latter. — Number2018

I don't know where you pulled this quote from, but I find it to be off the mark. The author does not consider the role of the future here. If you look closely at the nature of time, you will see that it is the future which causes the present to pass. A new moment is always pushing in, from the future, to take the place of the existing moment, at the present, and this forces that present moment into the past. So the future is always a force, which is forcing the presentmoment into the past. We as living beings must adapt, and figure out ways to deal with this force which is always upon us. If not, we are ourselves, forced into the past (death).

Particularity, therefore, now belongs to that on which we focus - in
other words, to that which 'has been'; whereas the past itself, the 'was', is
by nature general. The past, in general, is the element in which each former
present is focused upon in particular and as a particular. In accordance
with Husserlian terminology, we must distinguish between retention and
reproduction. However, what we earlier called the retention of habit was
the state of successive instants contracted in a present present of a certain
duration. These instants formed a particularity - in other words, an
immediate past naturally belonging to the present present, while the
present itself, which remains open to the future in the form of expectation,
constitutes the general. By contrast, from the point of view of the
reproduction involved in memory, it is the past (understood as the
mediation of presents) which becomes general while the (present as well as
former) present becomes particular. — Number2018

I pretty mush agree with this part. The past consists of particulars, instances of existence. But since the mind and memory are deficient, there is a vagueness about the past so that we may look at it in terms of logical possibilities. It is possible that X or that not X is the particular thing which actually occurred, if we cannot remember it. This induces a certain sense of generality of the past. But true generality, in the sense of real ontological possibility belongs to the future. However, we reduce that general "possibility" of the future, to particular possibilities when we relate to the future logically, in the case of decision making for example.

The present and former presents are not,
therefore, as two successive instants on the line of time; rather, the present one necessarily contains an extra dimension in which it represents the former and also represents itself. The present present is treated not as the future object of memory but as that which reflects itself at the same time as it forms the memory of the former present. — Number2018

I believe that there is a problem in this passage, which is a conflation of the being which is experiencing the passing of time, with the passing of time itself. It is only the conscious being which brings back the past moments of present to have them continue existing at the present. This is what creates the illusion of a double present. But if you separate the continuity of continued existence (the continuity supported by inertia), from the passing of moments, then the dual nature of the present is seen in a different way. Not only is there a succession of moments, as time passes, but there is also a continuity of existence, being, which carries through the present.

According to this comprehension of the active synthesis of memory,
each conscious act of mind has the dimensions of reproduction and
reflection. The problem now is that the activity of mind has been
pre-designed and pre-constructed, so that the Past has become
the dominating instance, so that “present” and “future” has converted into the dimensions of this time, and the active synthesis of the mind
has become the transcendental a priory of the Past. — Number2018

Yes, I see this as a problem, because what has been described is reducible to an everlasting, eternal cycle of repetition of moments. It's really a circle. The way to escape this circle is to see the future as radically different. We can begin with the assumption, for argument sake, that every new moment coming from the future is completely different, and there is nothing to make anything the same from one moment to the next. Each moment the future could be throwing us something completely new. Then, recognize that there actually is continuity, inertia, and seek the reason for this. The reason for it is that some things in the past, (massive things) have the power to act in the future. So when the future is forcing a new moment upon us, the massive existence which we've observed in the past appearing as a continuity distinct from the repetition of different moments, is acting within the imposition of that future moment, such that it acts upon us from the future, as a force from within the moment of the future which is now upon us. You can see that this requires an inversion in the concept of causation. No longer would you see a thing in the past having caused something in the present, or causing something in the future, It is always the moment of the future, coming upon us which is causative, and massive things with continued existence demonstrate that they have a causal power within that moment.

I'm using transcendental as metaphysical a-priori (not derived from experience). — Joshs

So how could there be transcendental categories then, if they're not derived from experience? Wouldn't they be completely arbitrary? Is this why Heidegger says they are invented?

If it's a negotiating tactic, then it's a bullshit negotiating tactic, like holding a gun to a person's head is a bullshit negotiating tactic.

I believe that Husserl referred to this synthetic activity of mind with regard to concepts an 'idea in the Kantian sense', a meaning that can be repeated indefintely as self-identical. For Kant the objectivity of science is secured transcendentally via the categories which make infinitization and ideality possible. Husserl modifies Kant by dropping the trasncendental categories of perception and instead locating the basis of ideality in the interative self presencing within the tripartite structure of time consciousness. — Joshs

It's hard for me to grasp how you are using "transcendental" here. Categories are produced through judgement, distinctions, so categories which transcend human judgement (transcendental categories) doesn't seem possible. If this is what grounds the objectivity of science, then it is a false objectivity, grounded in subjective judgements rather than being grounded in the object which we seek to understand. Therefore, I can see why Husserl would want to modify this, but "the tripartite structure of time consciousness" seems to be just another representation of categories.

Doesn't Heidegger get beyond this problem by looking at the horizon itself, and "that which regions". It's been a long time since I read "Being and Time", but if the horizon is the present itself, then perhaps the regions are past and future. This is not a categorization, because it is not classifying things by their properties, or producing categories based on properties, it is more like setting out the grounds for classification, by looking directly at the divisor, the horizon, to determine the grounds for division. That is what I think is necessary, to look directly at the division, the boundary, which is the present, to formulate objective principles for describing what exactly it is which is being divided, then the categories can be produced based on these principles.

Question: do we really want to hold with either Kant or Husserl concerning a trancendental justification of ideality? IS there something in the self that comes back to itself identically moment to moment as it interacts with a world? If not, then pure ideality never is able to constitute itself in consciousness.
Outside of number itself as empty self -identical counting, is there anything in the mind's abstractions that meaningfully returns to itself identically? This was Derida's argument , as well as Merleau-Ponty's. The idea in the Kantian sense is a solpsism, ignoring the embodied basis of thought. — Joshs

I think the problem here is that the ideal is impossible to replicate. We hold an "ideal" as a goal of perfection or some such thing, but the true ideal, by its very nature, cannot be obtained due to the implied perfection. Therefore there is nothing which comes back to itself identically within consciousness, moment to moment. That is an ideal which due to the imperfections of human disposition is impossible to obtain. We know that the key to the nature of reality is found in the particularity, uniqueness of one moment to the next. And, it appears like there is nothing which escapes this, the whole of the universe changes at each moment of passing time. As much as we might notice aspects which do not change, "the whole" reaches from its implications of wide extension, right into the most narrow extension, into the inner most aspects of that thing which appears not to change, so that thing really changes and we just don't notice the change.

In the Platonic tradition, the ideal becomes the particular, the One, or the whole, because each individual thing is seen to have its own perfect Form, proper to itself, despite the fact that it changes from one moment to the next. The moment to moment change to the individual thing's Form, might be considered by us as an imperfection to the thing, but this is accounted for by its context which puts it into a larger whole. The larger whole in turn has its own moment to moment changes and this puts it into an even lager context, to account for those apparent imperfections, until we reach the One, which as the ideal, becomes the starting point as the goal or objective.

So I believe that the exercise of looking for the moment to moment repetition of something identical is a very useful exercise, in the sense that it will bring to one's mind the futility of seeking the ideal in this way. Even counting is unsuccessful because each number is different than the last, as the numbers get higher and higher, and this demonstrates the asymmetrical nature of time. Then, if we assume that the thing counted, a moment of time, is the very same from one to the next, all we need to do is look around us to see that this assumption is not true, things change. So when we count, and assume that there is something unchanged which is being counted, this is just a fictitious assumption, there is really nothing there being counted, if this is the condition. And nothing cannot be counted.

think that our disagreement is caused by different applications and meanings of the terms of “flow,” and “the living present.” Your comprehension of “flow” belongs to a reflective conscious experience of time. Whereas I think of “the living present” as related to the different subjective time - at the level of the first passive synthesis. — Number2018

OK, so you already have a synthesis built into your concept of "present", that's why you denied my need for a synthesis. But what do you mean by "passive synthesis"?

Hume takes as an example the repetition of
cases of the type AB, AB, AB, A .... Each case or objective sequence AB is
independent of the others. The repetition (although we cannot yet properly
speak of repetition) changes nothing in the object or the state of affairs AB.
On the other hand, a change is produced in the mind, which contemplates:
a difference, something new in the mind. When A appears, we expect B
with a force corresponding to the qualitative impression of all the
contracted ABs. — Number2018

There is a problem with this, and that is that there is no such thing as a repetition of the very same AB, AB, over and over again. Each new moment is particular, and brings something new, something changed. So there is no such thing as a pure repetition of AB, and this is why a mind is necessary right at this point. The mind abstracts and creates the repetition of AB, by removing the unnecessary differences which distract..

This is by no means a memory, nor indeed an operation of
the understanding: contraction is not a matter of reflection. Properly
speaking, it forms a synthesis of time. A succession of instants does not
constitute time any more than it causes it to disappear; it indicates only its
constantly aborted moment of birth. Time is constituted only in the originary synthesis which operates on the repetition of instants. — Number2018

So according to what I said above, it actually is the mind with memory, that synthesizes time. A mind must create the repetition through abstraction. Time as such, is entirely in the mind. But to truly understand time itself we need to go back to the occurrences which the mind abstracts from, when it creates the repetition of AB, and understand the nature of these.

There is no one thing that all things that have something in common have. Making distinctions is not the one thing that seeing what things have in common have in common. — Fooloso4

I know, but the point is that "seeing what things have in common" is really a matter of overlooking their differences. So when we see all the different shades of blue, simply as blue, I think that this might actually be a deficiency in the way that we see them, because we are seeing them all as the same, "blue" when they are in fact different.

See the second case in § 72, the shapes and shades of leafs in §73, and other examples where we see what things have in common despite their differences. Do we see a dog and a horse or cow as the same or different? In some respects we can see them as the same and in others as different. They do have a lot in common. — Fooloso4

Right, so if we see dogs and horses and cows all as animals, we see them as the same, animals. But I think that this is not a very precise or accurate way of seeing them, because it is a matter of overlooking all the differences between them, and seeing them all as the same, animals.

It's not as if the concept is just a definition to which we have yet to put words though. He's saying that that our ability to apply the unspecified definition is entirely and exhaustively what constitutes it. — Isaac

No, he's not stating that at all, he's asking if this is the case. There's a difference between stating what one believes is the case, and asking if such and such is the case. So he asks if this is the case.

75 What does it mean to know what a game is? What does it
mean, to know it and not be able to say it? Is this knowledge somehow
equivalent to an unformulated definition? So that if it were
formulated I should be able to recognize it as the expression of my
knowledge? Isn't my knowledge, my concept of a game, completely
expressed in the explanations that I could give?

That is what he asks at 75. Then he proceeds with the analogy of the pictures, at 76-77, to demonstrate that this is not the case. Putting a definition to the concept is like producing the picture with clear boundaries to correspond with the picture with vaguely outlined colour blotches. When the picture is too vague, like in the case of "good" the task is hopeless.

No, this is not a good analogy because it still implies that there is something there to be seen that the blurred image is hiding from the unfocused gaze. What Wittgenstein is saying here is that often there is no hidden shape, the edges appear blurred because they actually are blurred, they remain undefined because no definition seems required for them to function. In fact they may well be more useful blurred as they are. — Isaac

There is something there, the concept, in the undefined version the boundaries are vague and blurred. In the analogy it is "two pictures, one of which consists of colour patches with vague contours, and the other of patches similarly shaped and distributed, but with clear contours." To answer the question above (at 75) he is asking if the defined version (clear contours) can be made to correspond with the blurred version. He says that the "degree to which the sharp picture can resemble the blurred one depends on the latter's degree of vagueness." If there is not even a hint of an outline, he says that it becomes a hopeless task. This is how he sees concepts in aesthetics and ethics, concepts like "good". It would be extremely difficult (a hopeless task). So in the case of these concepts with extremely vague contours, he seems to think that it would be impossible to provide an adequate corresponding definition.

I don't see any evidence that Wittgenstein is taking this route because he thinks it is "easier". He's taking this route because he feels the dialectic process has caused more problems than it has solved. What meanings are now clear to us, that were previously clouded, as a result of the application of the Platonic dialectic method? — Isaac

He clearly indicates that providing a clear definition of meaning for these ethical concepts like "good", might be a "hopeless task", and states as a conclusion that it would be "easier" to consider a family of meanings.

Then it will be easier for you to see that the word must have a family of meanings.

So what do you think Wittgenstein is trying to show with respect to the theme of the book? Where do you think this discussion of 'seeing' is leading? Why bring it up now? What does Wittgenstein want us to do with it? — Isaac

I would say that he is leading to 75 from 74. Or else we could accuse him of being out of order.

75. He approaches the concept "game" from a slightly different perspective (a different way of seeing it). He asks what does it mean to know what a game is without being able to say what a game is. This is how "concepts" have been exposed to this point, we use words without being able to define them. So he asks: "Is this knowledge somehow equivalent to an unformulated definition?"

76. He proceeds toward investigating this possibility. If someone else were to draw a boundary (define the concept), it would be different from the boundary "I" would draw; "I" want to draw no boundary at all. "His concept can then be said to be not the same as mine, but akin to it." The two concepts are like two pictures, the other having clear boundaries between the different colours, Wittgenstein's as colour patches with vague contours. (Notice the analogy with how we see things, the other person has an image with sharp boundaries, like clear 20/20 vision, Wittgenstein's is like a person who does not see so well, seeing different colours, but vague boundaries.)

77. Now he proceeds to question how the sharp bounded image can be made to correspond to the vague one. This is to investigate the question implied at 75. Is defining the concept an attempt to represent the undefined concept? He describes this as a "hopeless task". " Anything—and nothing—is
right." And he says that this is what we find in the fields of aesthetics and ethics. This would be the case if we attempted to define such concepts as "good". So, "it will be easier for you to see that the
word must have a family of meanings."

At 77 he appears to be dismissing the method of Platonic dialectics. The Platonic method is to analyze all the different ways a word is used, and attempt a synthesis which is consistent and representative of "the meaning" of the word. It requires a thorough analysis of the different ways of using the word, rejection of contradiction, and a striving towards the "ideal" representation of meaning. Wittgenstein appears to be saying that instead of trying to determine the ideal definition of words like "good", as is the method of Platonic dialectics, we ought to allow a family of meanings, because this is "easier".

USA has over 10 million illegal immigrants, which costs the country in the order of $100billion, though Trump may be right and the figure could be $250billion annually. — Inis

So if the number $100 billion is inaccurate, as you imply, why the arbitrary raising of it by $150 billion, instead of lowering it by that amount?

"One must determine something which remains unchanged for a period of time, and this is continuity". What you are describing is a mathematical abstraction. It is a device that we invented as a tool in our attempts to make sense of the world. But other than pure mathematical objects, there is no such thing as pure continuity in the world of meaningful experience. — Joshs

Right, that's what I am saying, continuity is something synthetic, it's constructed conceptually. I would agree that there is something apparently paradoxical, or appearing to be inherently contradictory about constructing something continuous, just like "being the same differently" is contradictory. But take a look at the different ways that we come across the notion of continuous. They all involve infinity, because to be bounded, or to have an end would destroy the continuity. We define "continuous" by referring to a never ending action, counting, dividing, or in the natural world, something like the earth circling the sun forever.

But all of these continuous activities are imaginary, in the sense of continuing without an end is imaginary. And, each of the continuous activities involves doing something with individual units. It is not to the units themselves, or the collection of units, that we assign "continuous" to, it is what is being done with those individual units, the activity, which is called "continuous". So "continuous" is conceptual, it is a feature of the description of what is occurring. We see an activity, and we describe it as continuous.

As far as continuing to be the same differently, if you repeat a word to yourself over and over(or glance at it on a page), the sense of the word will change. This effect applies to any meaning we attempt to repeat. If you want to preserve 'same' to mean pure mathematical identity, then, what we intend to mean when we repeat a meaning continues to be similar to itself by at the same time differing from itself. This is non-logical continuity, the way our unfolding experiences belong to patterns and themes while always transforming in subtle ways the very meaning of those patterns and themes. — Joshs

Here you are mixing up the action which is continuous, with the individual units involved in the continuous action. So you are repeating a word, with a meaning. The word, and the meaning are the entities involved in the activity. (This is like the game "Whisper Down the Valley", in which you whisper a phrase to the person next to you, and they whisper it to the next person, so on, around a circle of people, until it gets back to the first person who notices how much the phrase has changed.) Notice, that regardless of how the entity involved in the activity changes, the activity itself remains the same, as continuous.

However, this is just a property of the way that we describe activities. Close examination of the activity will reveal that the activity itself, necessarily changes when the entities involved in the activity change. But when we make the description, we abstract, and claim that the activity remains the same, despite the minute changes involved. It is really quite difficult to place the idea of continuity in relation to the abstraction. It seems to be fundamental to the abstraction, as required for abstraction, a continuity of sameness through different things, but it is not actually part of the description (or abstraction), only an underlying assumption which supports the abstraction.