"One must determine something which remains unchanged for a period of time, and this is continuity". What you are describing is a mathematical abstraction. It is a device that we invented as a tool in our attempts to make sense of the world. But other than pure mathematical objects, there is no such thing as pure continuity in the world of meaningful experience. — Joshs

Right, that's what I am saying, continuity is something synthetic, it's constructed conceptually. I would agree that there is something apparently paradoxical, or appearing to be inherently contradictory about constructing something continuous, just like "being the same differently" is contradictory. But take a look at the different ways that we come across the notion of continuous. They all involve infinity, because to be bounded, or to have an end would destroy the continuity. We define "continuous" by referring to a never ending action, counting, dividing, or in the natural world, something like the earth circling the sun forever.

But all of these continuous activities are imaginary, in the sense of continuing without an end is imaginary. And, each of the continuous activities involves doing something with individual units. It is not to the units themselves, or the collection of units, that we assign "continuous" to, it is what is being done with those individual units, the activity, which is called "continuous". So "continuous" is conceptual, it is a feature of the description of what is occurring. We see an activity, and we describe it as continuous.

As far as continuing to be the same differently, if you repeat a word to yourself over and over(or glance at it on a page), the sense of the word will change. This effect applies to any meaning we attempt to repeat. If you want to preserve 'same' to mean pure mathematical identity, then, what we intend to mean when we repeat a meaning continues to be similar to itself by at the same time differing from itself. This is non-logical continuity, the way our unfolding experiences belong to patterns and themes while always transforming in subtle ways the very meaning of those patterns and themes. — Joshs

Here you are mixing up the action which is continuous, with the individual units involved in the continuous action. So you are repeating a word, with a meaning. The word, and the meaning are the entities involved in the activity. (This is like the game "Whisper Down the Valley", in which you whisper a phrase to the person next to you, and they whisper it to the next person, so on, around a circle of people, until it gets back to the first person who notices how much the phrase has changed.) Notice, that regardless of how the entity involved in the activity changes, the activity itself remains the same, as continuous.

However, this is just a property of the way that we describe activities. Close examination of the activity will reveal that the activity itself, necessarily changes when the entities involved in the activity change. But when we make the description, we abstract, and claim that the activity remains the same, despite the minute changes involved. It is really quite difficult to place the idea of continuity in relation to the abstraction. It seems to be fundamental to the abstraction, as required for abstraction, a continuity of sameness through different things, but it is not actually part of the description (or abstraction), only an underlying assumption which supports the abstraction.

In order to see what various things have in common requires making distinctions and disregarding all other features. — Fooloso4

Seeing what things have in common is not a matter of making distinctions though. It is a matter of seeing different things as the same, seeing all the different shades of blue, as the same colour, blue. So it is somewhat opposed to making distinctions, it is overlooking differences, to say that different things are the same.

It is relevant to the different ways that we can see things. One might see all the different shades of blue as different colours, or one might see them all as the same colour, blue.

One can have an experience of the “flow” even without reflection
on time, without applying the notion of the past and the present. It is a basic experience of some change, a passive synthesis, the living present. — Number2018

I don't see how this is possible. In order to notice a flow one must recognize a past. And this is the same with "change", in order to notice change one must have memory of the way things were. So without bringing the past to bear upon the present, all that would be evident would be what is present, and there would be no indication of flow or change.

So, we can define “flow” as “this living present.” — Number2018

So I disagree with this. If there was only present, there would be no flow at all. The flow is the activity which is the future becoming the past. These, future and past, are necessary for flow.

The key quote from James is :"What we hear when the thunder crashes is not thunder
pure, but thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it. Our feeling of the same
objective thunder, coming in this way, is quite different from what it would be were the thunder
a continuation of previous thunder." — Joshs

What you describe here is a discontinuity. But it doesn't make sense to understand continuity in terms of discontinuity, because discontinuous is just a negation of continuous, something deficient in continuity. So we need to define continuous first, and understand continuity first, before we can proceed toward understanding a lack of continuity.

Thunder breaking the silence is a discontinuity. It is a description of breaking the continuous silence. The key to understanding what this is, this breaking continuity, is to understand first, what continuity is.

It must be understood instead as akin to a fabric changing its textural shape as a whole, in a breeze .It is not a matter of reductively determining each state of the fabric by reference to a previous state, because the attempt to do so further transforms the sense of that past. — Joshs

This change you describe here, "a fabric changing its textural shape", is a discontinuity. It had a shape, and that shape comes to an end. It's a discontinuity. We cannot proceed to understand this change, this discontinuity, until we first understand what it means for something to have a shape, and this would be to hold a shape for a period of time, a continuity.

It is not a matter of reductively determining each state of the fabric by reference to a previous state, because the attempt to do so further transforms the sense of that past. — Joshs

I think that is exactly what it takes to determine continuity, reference to previous states. One must determine something which remains unchanged for a period of time, and this is continuity.

There is a way of continuing to be the same differently that eludes the reifications of conceptual logic, a kind of referential but not deterministic consistency, that accrods better with actual phenomological experience of the world — Joshs

But this is nonsensical contradiction. To continue to be the same, differently, is just contradiction, and that's why it eludes conceptual logic. It's nonsense, and meaningless to talk in such a contradictory way. .

So if we assume your premise that the present is a change between the past and the future is true then how can you explain the space-time continuum? It is represented as a continuity not a discontinuity in time. — Paul24

Space-time continuum is a conceptual structure we use for measuring. That it is based in an assumption of continuity is really irrelevant. I assume that time will continue to pass, as it has for all my life, but this is irrelevant to the fact that I believe there is a radical difference between future and past.

Past may be determined and fixed, but it must also enter into the very horizon that we experience as the 'present'. Otherwise there would be no sense of the continuity of meaning and purpose from moment to moment. The present arises out of a background context that it is at the same time continuous with and differs from. — Joshs

I agree that past enters the horizon of experience, but we cannot deny that future also enters this horizon. In consciousness these two are represented by memory and anticipation respectively. I disagree with the quote from James, saying "Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows." Consciousness is chopped up, but not in the way described. We are torn between our past selves, and the future we want for ourselves, and so we are divided. Our past actions and habits force us in a determinist sort of way, but we are always trying to break free from this determinism to will ourselves into a better future.

The continuity we adhere to is created, synthesized, constructed in order to allow us to apply past experience toward future actions. Without an assumed continuity between past and future, no logic could prepare us for the future. The continuity is supported by the inertia of massive existence. We have observed, through the past, that massive existence has the power of inertia, and this supports the assumption of continuity.

I'm not following your reasoning here, why would never being sure you learnt it advise reading more? In hope some surity might one day come, perhaps? I can perhaps see that in some defined topic with widespread agreement. If I didn't get maths I might well simply continue reading in the hope that one day I get what everyone else seems to have got. But what is it that everyone seems to have got in philosophy? I've reached just about the highest level of 'state-approved' learning it's possible to reach. I'm not sure I've 'got' anything at all. — Isaac

Consider what Wittgenstein says here:

98. On the one hand it is clear that every sentence in our language
'is in order as it is'. That is to say, we are not striving after an ideal,
as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable
sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us.—On the
other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect
order.——So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence.

How would you relate to this? How does Wittgenstein propose to separate "ideal" from "perfect?

81 ...But here the word "ideal" is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages were better, more perfect ...

I would say, that judging by your paragraph above, you would read something, have a vague understanding, despite the possibility of some misunderstanding, and accept your reading as sufficient. Would you call it perfect? Myself, if I was interested in the subject, I would not be satisfied with a vague understanding with some degree of misunderstanding. That would be an imperfection in my understanding. If the subject interested me, I would reread the text to get a better understanding of it, or proceed to read something else relevant to help me out. It's just a matter of approach, some of us actually are "striving after an ideal", that's just what is instinctual to us, while others are not. But it is the nature of "the ideal" which is tricky. So long as we recognize that "the ideal" is by its very nature impossible to achieve, then we are never frustrated by the reality that we never obtain the ideal, despite the fact that we are striving for it, and therefore we continue to better our understanding through this striving for the ideal.

You name me a conceivable position one could hold with respect to the current text and I'll find you a professional published philosopher who holds that view. To be honest, the view you personally seem to hold would be about the hardest, Norman Malcom perhaps is closest. — Isaac

I've read the book before, much of it more than once, and have not formed a firm "position". That is because far too much of it is difficult to understand, and I never took the time to understand each passage. I reread sometimes as I read, and upon reading the book I had respect for the fact that I still
didn't understand much of it, and so I continued to reread some passages. That's why I am really enjoying the exercise of this thread. Maybe by the end of this I will be able to hold a position.

The point is it seems to be a quest which the very nature of it admits will never be fulfilled. — Isaac

Exactly, that's the nature of "the ideal". Do you know the saying "practise makes perfect"? We practise with the goal of getting better. It's not really the goal of perfection, because we respect the fact that perfection is impossible. So let's remove 'the ideal", because it's not real, it's not at all practical. But then what direction is "better"? There is no such thing as better now, and where we are is perfect.

Yes, but did Kant himself think that "one simple unity" was empirical? I think to him, numbers themselves and counting were all a priori, though possibly synthetic. — schopenhauer1

I agree, I was using that as an example of why Kant's category of a priori is not very good. I think other comments on this thread have illustrated the same thing.

Again, that's where I get confused with Kant. He doesn't demarcate enough. His examples are kind of fuzzy and taken as givens of why they are a priori sometimes. — schopenhauer1

My opinion is that we must allow that there is such a thing a priori knowledge, but it would probably be impossible to give an example of it, because of the a posteriori basis of language itself. So a priori knowledge is not something which can be exemplified, but we can know from logical demonstration that there must be ( necessarily is) such a thing. That's why examples are always fuzzy and confusing.

Since time appears like a flow to us, could it be possible that the past, the present and the future be as one? — Paul24

The problem with this idea is that we notice a very distinct difference between past and future. Things in the past are determined, fixed, and there is no possibility of changing them. Things in the future are to some extent undetermined, and there is possibility involved with what will or will not occur. It is this difference which give "the present" meaning. It is not the appearance of "flow" which gives the present meaning, because if there were no difference between past and future, "the present", with the associated flow, could be at any point on the time line, with a flow occurring.

So the idea that "flow" is the defining aspect of the present, is flawed and misleading. Once we reject this notion, and see the present for what it is, as the division between future and past, we get a completely different perspective on the apparent "flow". The change from future to past, as time passes, no longer appears as a flow, but it appears as a change. The two are radically different because "flow" is represented as a continuity, and change is represented as a discontinuity

The fact that you are never sure that you learnt it, is the reason why you keep reading more.

Philosophy: love of wisdom. You're not familiar with Socrates are you?

The problem I see is that the principles by which we proceed into logical process, the propositions as premises, which are necessary for logic to proceed, are usually principles which are derived from experience. So if there is such a thing as "a priori" in Kant's sense, some sort of principles which are not derived from experience (and if I remember correctly, he provides a convincing argument for the reality of this), then these must be something like the rules of the logical processes themselves. It's questionable whether a priori principles could even be accurately put into words, because the use of words is learned from experience. For example, what would be the rule for counting? Add one. But even stating with "one", simple unity, is to take an empirically induced principle. If we do not start with one, what sort of rule for counting could we produce?

I agree, to discuss things in terms of necessity, is to use different categories than Kant uses.

There are two fundamentally different types of necessity, that which is prior to logical process, as needed for it, and that which is posterior to logical process, as that which is made necessary by logic. But this is not equivalent to Kant's a priori/a posteriori division.

We must be careful not to equivocate between these two senses of necessity, and I think Kant's categories may create ambiguity. His, are probably not the best that could be drawn..

It is necessary that a priori knowledge is necessary. It must be so because "a priori" refers to principles which cannot be justified by experience. Since they cannot be justified by experience, the only thing which makes them acceptable as true, is the assumption that they are necessary. If we reject their necessity then there would be absolutely no reason to accept them as true.

Does no one ever read to learn something in your reality?

Everyone reads every text looking to find support for the thing they already believe to be the case at the outset. — Isaac

Another one of your faulty assumptions. You should take heed of what you claim is Wittgenstein's purpose, and quit with the pathetic generalizations.

Infinite divisibility is an insufficient criterion for continuity. After all, the rational numbers are infinitely divisible--thus serving as the basis for Zeno's paradoxes--but no one takes them to be truly continuous. I now find magnification to be a more perspicuous illustration--no matter how much we were to "zoom in" on continuous space-time, we would only ever "see" continuous space-time--never discrete point-instants. — aletheist

Isn't zooming in basically the same thing as dividing? Anyway, space-time is completely conceptual, there is no such thing as zooming in on it. If you were zooming in on something, it would be an object, like a molecule or an atom or something like that. You couldn't even produce an absolute vacuum, and try to zoom in on it, whatever that would mean, because the absolute vacuum is purely conceptual. The idea of zooming in on an absolute vacuum is nonsensical, and the idea of zooming in on space-time is even more nonsensical (if that makes any sense) than the idea of zooming in on an absolute vacuum.

No, space-time itself is the terrain, and mathematical models of it are the map. — aletheist

Space-time is a mathematical model, just like a triangle is a mathematical model. I don't see where you think you might find this thing called space-time other than in the minds of physicists.

Infinite divisibility is a red herring. Continuous motion through space-time is the fundamental reality. — aletheist

What does "continuous motion" mean other than that the intervals of time and distances are infinitely divisible?

False, spacetime is real as in it's part of the model of physical reality as understood by both QM and Relativity. — MindForged

Yeah sure, it's part of the model, we've been through this already. The model is conceptual, so it's real in the same sense that models are real, and concepts are real. Are you familiar with the analogy of the map and the terrain? Spacetime is part of the map.

Whether or not a graviton exists isn't even understood. — MindForged

Right, see why I say that your claim that general relativity provides us with an understanding of gravity is false? If general relativity provided us with an understanding of gravity we wouldn't have to question whether or not a graviton exists.

(just a feature of space in the presence of matter) — MindForged

Right, so space-time is different where there is matter from where there is no matter. That's what I meant, instead of the concept accounting for the existence of gravity, the concept changes to account for gravity. That's like saying that I have a concept of the boiling of water, "water boils at 100 degrees Celsius". But for some reason water on top of a mountain boils at a different temperature. Instead of producing a new concept of the boiling of water, employing pressure as well temperature,, I just adjust the concept, to say that water boils at 100 degrees Celsius, with some exceptions for elevation. There are exceptions to the concept of space-time to allow for differences in the presence of matter, but space-time, as a concept, does not incorporate within itself, an understanding of gravity.

Spacetime is a real thing. — MindForged

Right, spacetime a real concept, just like unicorn is. The fact that it's extremely useful separates it from the concept of a unicorn, which is not so useful. However, this just places it more like the concept of Santa Clause, or the perfect circle, a very useful concept.

General relativity gives us an incredibly accurate understanding of gravity and acceleration. — MindForged

No it doesn't it just gives us the means for modelling the effects of gravity. General relativity gives us no understanding of gravity itself, none at all. If it did, it could point us to the graviton.

Like come on, you're not giving anything serious to overturn the overwhelmingly minority position you hold as compared to physicists on the issue. — MindForged

I've talked to many physicists, and your claims, that space-time is more than just a conceptual tool, is just not consistent with what these physicists tell me. You're just taking an extremely speculative metaphysical proposition, and claiming that physicists believe this proposition. Maybe some do.


Acceleration is something which physics has never been able to properly model. The basic problem is that a thing at rest, must go from zero velocity to a positive velocity at some particular time, so its acceleration would be infinite at that particular time. Relativity, in a way, sidesteps this problem by denying absolute rest, and different frames of reference can be employed. However, this just creates a convoluted relationship between potential energy and kinetic energy, and so, the fact that acceleration is not actually being properly modeled is hidden under this complexity.

If they cannot be observed (nor their consequences) then how can you know this? You're begging the question by presuming we're born with some instinctual understanding and so not being satisfied until you have found it. — Isaac

I didn't say their consequences cannot be observed, clearly they are, as the person learns. Learning is the consequence. To deny that there are instinctual factors involved in learning would be ridiculous. Could you teach a rock? Even if you consider the way that an AI computer learns, that computer must be pre-configured in a very specific way to be able to learn. To dismiss the instinctual factors involved in learning, as irrelevant to the process of learning, would be completely ridiculous. Call that "begging the question" if you like, but if it comes down to having to justify what is extremely obvious, I'd prefer to just beg the question.

And how do you know they are faulty. What test are you applying here? — Isaac

The test is analysis, that's the purpose of the thorough analysis in Wittgenstein's process, which you are wont to ignore. The analysis is to root out any faulty assumptions. If you simply believe that there are no faulty assumptions in this field, or that if there are any, we will never be able to identify them, then sure, the analytical process appears meaningless to you.

But you seem to hold the obviously faulty assumption that instinctual factors are not relevant to the learning process. And since these factors are not in themselves observable, only effects of them are observable in confluence with the observable aspects of the learning process, there are many other faulty assumptions which people hold, concerning the instinctual factors of the learning process. One such faulty assumption, is that we, as human beings, all instinctually "see things" in the same way. Read 74 closely, and don't simply ignore that fact, or dismiss it as irrelevant.

Why on earth is this a problem? What aspects of human life has been so manifestly spoiled by the fact that not everyone agrees where blue ends and green starts? — Isaac

As I told Sam, distinguishing correct from incorrect is a moral issue; "moral" being defined as concerned with the distinction between right and wrong. If we as human beings, cannot even find a way to agree on the simple question of the boundary between blue and green, how do you think we could find a way to agree on more important moral issues, which hold things that we believe to be important, at stake?

I mean, there's only four basic ways to interpret the PI — Isaac

Spoken in true hypocrisy, from the person who says that the general rule, and universalization, are what Wittgenstein wants us to avoid.

Huh? The assumption of discreteness is what creates problems like Zeno's paradoxes. As I have said before, recognizing that continuous motion through space-time is a more fundamental reality than discrete positions in space or discrete moments in time dissolves Zeno's paradoxes. — aletheist

The discreteness in Zeno's paradoxes is not an assumption, it's a fact of the measurement system, the numbers represent discrete units. The moving items must cover the discrete units of distance, in the discrete units of time, provided by the measurement system. The measurement system gives us discrete units. However, continuity in the actual distance and time is assumed under the claim of infinite divisibility. The paradoxes are created by that assumption of continuity.

I am not aware of any reason to interpret them as inconsistent with the continuity of space-time. — aletheist

Are you telling me that the observed behaviour of quantum particles which cannot be explained by the laws of physics, does not indicate to you that the behaviour of these discrete units is inconsistent with the continuity of space-time?

The theory of relativity in physics does
not deal with what time is but deals only with how time, in the sense of
a now-sequence, can be measured. — Joshs

Heidegger was quite advanced in his understanding of time. Do you see the fact revealed in this quote? How the physicists tend to deal with this problem, Einstein included, is to deny that time is anything other than a tool for measuring. By denying that time is even something which is measured, the question of "what time is", is left as inapplicable.

I don't think "stand roughly there" refers to an area at all. It refers to a spot, "there", the spot where I want you to stand. But the speaker who says that, has improperly determined the spot by saying "roughly", thereby allowing many possible spots. For the reasons I have given.

I see it the other way around--measurement is arbitrary; we impose it by comparing something to a discrete unit, but the underlying reality itself is continuous. — aletheist

I think I see what you're saying, but I believe the situation is more complex than you make it out to be. I agree that we measure in discrete units, numbers, and that there is arbitrariness in the measurement.. But I think that the idea that the thing measured is continuous is an assumption that we make which is made to support arbitrary the measurement. It is not based in evidence. The evidence, such as Zeno's paradoxes indicates that the underlying reality is discrete. Nevertheless, if the thing measured is continuous, then the discrete units of measurement may be arbitrary without any negative effect to the validity of the measurement. So we assume continuity of the underlying reality because this validates arbitrary units of measure. However, the assumption of continuity creates problems like Zeno's paradoxes which demonstrate that the underlying reality is likely not continuous. So I conclude that in reality things are discrete, but since our units of measurement are arbitrary, based on the assumption that the underlying reality of things is continuous, our arbitrary units are incommensurable with the underlying real units. Therefore we have problems with some measurements which need to be precise.

I am not aware of any such premise. Relativity theory is the basis for the current scientific understanding of the space-time continuum. — aletheist

Right, but the space-time continuum is understood by physicists as conceptual. It is not understood as a medium within which things exist. This would contradict the fundamental principle of relativity, that things do not exist within such a medium. The "space-time continuum" is the fundamental principles upon which a coordinate system can be constructed, just like "Euclidean space" is. They are each, "space-time continuum", and "Euclidean space", fundamental concepts upon which models are build. We don't say that things exist in the medium of Euclidean space, because we recognize that Euclidean space is completely conceptual. Likewise with "space-time continuum". Physicists don't say that things exist in the medium of the space-time continuum, because they recognize that this is just a conceptual structure.

There is nothing to warrant the assumption that discrete things can exist and interact without a continuous medium within which to do so. — aletheist

I already explained this to you. Discrete things overlap in their existence, just like molecules as discrete things, overlap one another. There is no place in the physical realm for a continuous medium, or a need to assume one. The only reason for assuming a continuous medium is to justify the easy choice of arbitrary units of measurement. If we recognized that the underlying reality consists of discrete units rather than assuming a continuity, then we could not justify the use of arbitrary units of measurement because our units would have to be commensurate with the real units. Instead, we take the easy way, assume continuity and make arbitrary units of measurement. And this produces measurement problems.

I am not aware of any such evidence. — aletheist

Are you unaware of the uncertainty principle, the measurement problem, and quantum entanglement? These are evidence that fundamental particles do not behave in a way which is consistent with the continuity of space-time.

So what? I have some spare time. I find the book extremely interesting. And I like to be an active participant in discussing it.

This is similar to the person who gives the order to Wittgenstein to teach the children a game - they do not "properly determine" or draw a boundary around what type of game to teach the children at first (i.e. they do not tell him to exclude gambilng games), but this does not change the meaning of "game". In your words, it just means they are "not fussy about the particular" game. The further instruction not to teach them a gambling game acts as a rigid boundary, or a more specific definition, for this special purpose. — Luke

I think I see your point, but isn't it kind of an inverted version. In the one case, "teach the children a game" is wide open, unbounded, referring to anything which could be construed as a game, until it's restricted by "anything except gambling". In the other case, "stand there" is completely restricted to the precise point where I want you to stand at, until it is unrestricted by adding "roughly". In the one case the qualification "except gambling" is used to restrict, and in the other case the qualification "roughly" is used to release a restriction already implied.

What do you mean by "properly determined"? — Luke

If I said "stand there", I would be referring to the particular spot that I want you to stand at, because that's the nature of standing, to be at a particular spot, standing. We are always standing at a spot, not at an area, so that's what "stand there" refers to, a spot, not an area. If I add "roughly", to say "stand roughly there", it does not change the meaning of "stand there" such that I am now telling you to stand at an area rather than at a spot, it just means that I am not fussy about the particular spot where you stand, and therefore I have not bothered to properly determine the precise spot where I want you to stand. That's what I mean by "properly determined". "Stand roughly there" refers to a spot where you will stand if you carry out that instruction, but I have not properly determined that spot, leaving you a multitude of possible spots where you could stand and still be said to have carried out the instruction..

you want to know how people learn colours then you'd be well advised to simply observe people learning colours. It's an empirical investigation, it can't be carried out from the armchair. — Isaac

But this is clearly incorrect, and that's the problem. There are relevant factors, innate within the human mind, things we're born with, instinctual, which cannot be observed. Therefore, if we wish to understand how people learn colours, we must take the observations, reason out what is missing from the observations, which is still necessary for the learning process, and this we can posit as the innate, or instinctual factors. So what is required is a very thorough analysis of the various factors, and this is what Wittgenstein is trying to give us. Allowing any faulty assumptions will throw the whole investigation askew.

Here's an example. Let's assume that we naturally, instinctually, distinguish different shades of colour. Now we have a whole range of different shades. But we have some shades which we call "blue" and some shades which we call "green". You might conclude that we draw an arbitrary boundary, these shades are blue, those shades are green, with some sort of boundary between. However, then we would have the problem which Sam26 referred to, some shades one group of people would call blue, while another group might call green, because the boundary is arbitrary, and there's really no way to say that one group is right and the other wrong.

But what if the original assumption is wrong? What if we do not instinctually notice different shades, what if what we instinctually notice is that some shades appear to be the same? So, for example, I notice one shade, and later a slightly different shade, but I recognize them as the same. I call them both "blue" because I see them as the same, though they are really different. If this is the case, then the "boundary" is created in a completely different way from the way described above. The boundary is not an arbitrary division between a range of different shades, the boundary is the limits to what we perceive as the same.

The two assumptions in the example are opposed. One assumes that what we instinctually notice is differences, the other assumes that what we instinctually notice is things being the same. Whichever assumption you go by, completely changes your perspective on boundaries, in relation to the opposing assumption. In reality, it's probably very complex, we instinctually notice both. But if some of us notice one more than the other, or notice sameness in some categories,, and difference in others, then the way that we relate to the different boundaries is going to be very different from one person to the next.

I mean we deal with the situation quite comfortably all the time. It serves no purpose to say "there's something queer going on here" when doing it is the simplest thing, all we're having trouble with is saying what it is that we're doing, and that is a pseudo problem, it may just not be sayable. — Isaac

It's not a pseudo problem. How and why we respect, and disrespect, boundaries, is a very real issue. As I indicated to Sam26, the issue goes far beyond the rules of language.

It seems quite evident to me that there must be a real context within which discrete things exist and react. For example, we say that they have extension in space-time. — aletheist

The "context" is our own measurement of them. We measure their existence, and say that they have "extension" but extension is just how they are represented in the model which provides the basis for measurement. How could they have a measurement without being measured? What is measured is the thing itself, and so it is said to have "extension" as extension is assigned to it through measurement.

First, I am arguing for the reality of space-time, not its existence; as I have stated repeatedly, these terms are not synonymous. Second, there is no necessity for something real to be absolute--the whole point of relativity is that space-time is really relative; as I have also stated repeatedly, continuous motion through space-time is a more fundamental reality than discrete positions in space or discrete moments in time. — aletheist

You said, "continuous space-time is the real environment in which those discrete things exist." I simply pointed out that this is contradictory because "space-time" is a concept that is derived from relativity theory, which has a premise that denies the possibility that discrete thing exist in such a medium.

Therefore, if you want to assign "real" or "reality" to space-time, you need to describe this reality in a way other than as the medium or environment, within which discrete things exist. I suggest we describe "space-time" as real, in the sense of being conceptual, so we provide the necessary separation between the things measured and the means of measurement. This way we avoid the contradiction involved in saying that it is the real environment, or medium in which discrete things exist. Discrete things do not exist in any medium. There is nothing to warrant that assumption.

All discrete things and events behave in a way which is consistent with the continuity of space-time. — aletheist

That's clearly false, and disproven by quantum mechanics. Fundamental particles do not behave in a way consistent with the continuity of space-time.

But who thought we did learn colours like that. Did you? — Isaac

Personally, I never gave it any thought, so this is all new to me. As far as I know, maybe that's what people thought.

It's not a puzzle in the least... — Isaac

It's clearly a puzzle, if you want to know how people learn colours, unless you already know how people learn colours, which I do not.

unless you are looking for a general rule, which is exactly the sort of philosophical muddle Wittgenstein is trying to resolve. — Isaac

How are you going to know how people learn colours, unless you know it as a general rule? If every individual learns colours in a different, and unique way, then there is no such thing as "how people learn colours". But then we could not say that people know their colours, unless it were somehow innate. Since Wittgenstein is clearly interested in how people learn colours, then its absolutely false to say that he is trying to avoid the philosophical muddle of the general rule. The "general rule" which is the product of inductive reasoning, and fundamental to description, is exactly what Wittgenstein is interested in.

We have no trouble with this, nor would anyone describing our actions literally in this case describe them otherwise. — Isaac

What do you mean "we have no trouble with this"? That's exactly what Wittgenstein is demonstrating, the trouble with this. All you are doing is claiming "I have no problem distinguishing blue from green, so why are you making an issue out of this?" But where does the "we" come from in "we have no trouble with this", when someone else is showing the trouble with it?

74 ... Of course, there is such a thing as seeing in this way or that; and there are also cases where whoever sees a sample like this will in general use it in this way, and whoever sees it otherwise in another way.

A medium cannot consist of discrete things or discrete events, because it is the environment in which those things react and events occur. — aletheist

OK, let's assume that a "medium" is the environment that things exist in. Where do you get the idea that this environment does not consist of discrete things? It seems quite evident that all there is around discrete things is other discrete things. That's what "react" means, one discrete thing is interacting with another. And discrete things overlap each other in their spatial existence, one molecule overlaps another for example, and they interact in this way. There is no need to assume that there is a medium between, or around the discrete things, that's just imaginary, conceptual.

I agree--but continuous space-time is the real environment in which those discrete things exist. — aletheist

But this is false. Relativity theory depends on the assumption that there is no such medium in which things exist. If there was such a medium, it would exist as an absolute, against which all the motions of things could be mapped, in an absolute way. But this contradicts the very premise of relativity, that there is no such absolute, that all motions are relative. So it is clearly impossible that space-time is "the real environment", or "medium", within which discrete things exist, because that assumption would blatantly contradict the premise upon which the concept of "space-time" is constructed.

If the discrete things and events that we can and do observe behave in ways that are consistent with continuity, why would we rule out its reality? — aletheist

They do not though, that is the point. No discrete things, or events, behave in a way which is consistent with continuity, that's a big problem. We map those things with a conceptual structure which assumes continuity. But the models, which allow for infinity, as a feature of continuity, are unable to account for the beginnings and endings of discrete existence. That's a fundamental problem.

So yes, I do get a bit frustrated at what I see as a long discussion about how thermometers work (to return to my metaphor) when I don't see anything there that any rational person could disagree with. 72, where we're currently at, is a classic example. Luke has just accurately laid out what Wittgenstein means by this example, but what is there to disagree with about it? I mean what possible other way could any intelligent person think about such cases? — Isaac

But Wittgenstein lays out little problems, in almost every section, one after the other, and often suggests resolutions. And there is a problem at 72, which Luke exposes very nicely. The first two examples have the very same colour called "yellow ochre". The last example has different colours, with the same name "blue". So what he is demonstrating is that this is not the way that we learn colours, because we learn to apply the same names, "blue" for example, to distinctly different shades of colour. It is not a case of learning what the things have in common, that's the point here.

Look what he says at 73 when he talks about comparing colours to those on a table. He says "this comparison may mislead in many ways". The problem being that the one word, "blue" refers to many different shades of colour. "Which shade is the 'sample in my mind' of the colour green—the sample of what is common to all shades of green?" And he introduces "shape" to the problem as well, to demonstrate that the issue is complex. We are not only talking about things with different colours, but different shapes and different colours. He suggested that it is possible that there are "general samples", "schema", but asks how we would recognize it as a general example rather than as a particular instance. The suggested answer is that "this in turn resides in the way the samples are used."

So he has laid out a problem at 72. How do we learn to apply the same word "blue" to multiple different shades of colour? It cannot be a case of pointing to different samples and seeing what they have in common, like the ochre-yellow, because they do not have a common colour. So he suggests that it is in "the way the samples are used". Then proceeding to 74, he begins to discuss the difference between seeing a sample as a sample in a "general" way, and seeing the sample in a "particular" way.

Try this. "Stand roughly there" does not signify an area at all. It signifies a point, which has not been properly determined.

I assume that at 71, he's leading up to his discussion of definition at 72-73. What do you think he's saying with the analogy of "stand roughly there"? Is he saying that a definition need not be exact? You still know where to stand even though he has not told you exactly where to stand. Does "roughly there" signify a bounded area, without boundaries? Wouldn't that be contradictory? To avoid contradiction, which do you think it signifies, a bounded area, or not?

Can you (or anyone else) establish or change the properties of space-time just by thinking differently about them? — aletheist

Yes, it's an evolving concept. It came into existence and changed when necessary. Einstein realized the concept of special relativity by thinking differently about space and time. And he realized general relativity by thinking differently about special relativity and gravity.

Sorry, that is not what it means to be a medium. — aletheist

A medium is what exists in the middle, between two places. What exists between you and I, as the medium, is discrete things.

What did you have in mind as a "medium"?

That's your opinion. Got any support for that opinion? — aletheist

Empirical evidence demonstrates to us that all which exists in the world is discrete things. These are the things we sense. We conceive of continuities and continuums, but we never ever encounter such in the empirical world. So the evidence indicates that continuities and continuums are conceptual whereas the physical world consists of discrete things.

Thanks for the encouragement Banno. I'll try to keep on track of the thread, I promise.

No, space-time is real--it is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it. — aletheist

That's your opinion. Got any support for that opinion?

On the contrary, space-time is the continuous medium (reality) within which discrete things react and discrete events occur (existence). — aletheist

Where does this idea of a continuous medium come from? Things themselves are the medium of separation between you and I. The medium consists only of discrete things. The continuum is purely conceptual, it's our tool for measuring the discrete things which form the medium.

Spacetime is literally part of the relevant models in physics. — MindForged

Right, it's part of the model, not what is modeled, that was my point. It's theoretical like a perfect circle is theoretical. So we could take a model of a perfect circle, and map real things against it like the orbits of the planets, and see how they vary from the perfect circle. The circle is conceptual, the orbits are real

Spacetime has it's own behavior which is correctly predicted by current models, namely how it is deformed by massive objects. — MindForged

Actually, the model is deficient in its capacity to account for things like gravity and acceleration, so principles are added to allow for the model to be flexible. This gives the appearance that an aspect of the model, space-time is fluid, behaving. In reality the model just changes itself in an attempt to account for the things which it can't properly model. So if you happen to believe that space-time is a real entity, you'll believe that it changes according to those principles which have been added to allow for flexibility of the model.

Take my analogy of the circle for example. Suppose that when it was found out that the orbits of the planets were not real circles, we adjusted the concept of "circle" such that each planet would have a circle for its orbit, and we just dropped the idea of a perfect circle. Then we could claim that a circle is a real thing. That's what you're doing with space-time. The concept has been adjusted to allow for things like gravity, dark matter, dark energy, spatial expansion, etc., and instead of recognizing that this indicates that reality is other than the concept, you claim that this is an indication that the concept is of something real.

MU, what you're saying goes way beyond what I'm saying, so don't equate the two. — Sam26

I definitely would not equate the two, because what I'm saying goes way beyond what you're saying. Nevertheless it's an extrapolation of the same principle, some metaphysical implications.

The way you talk about rules seems confusing to me. — Sam26

So far, Wittgenstein has not laid down the law, what exactly is a rule. Maybe that's why I am confused. Notice though, how he's described concepts, as unbounded, vague, even ambiguous. Maybe the meaning of "rule", being a concept, is like this. In that case you and I could each go in different directions of interpretation, while both following the same rule. What if a word itself, or a collection of words, is a rule? Then my interpretation is just as much following the rule as yours, or anyone else's is. And there is no correct interpretation, or correct way to follow a rule, only agreement and disagreement.

On the whole I think the thread is going well. I hope we don't give up on it like so many other threads. — Sam26

I agree.

Well of course, no one would expect that you could simply will anything to happen, you have to act on it to achieve success.

Spacetime is not conceptual, not under any model in physics. You'd have to be seriously in denial to think models saying space is curved and correctly predict gravitational lensing and predicts that simulateneity is relative to reference frames is also saying that thing is not part of the world — MindForged

Space-time is part of the model in physics. What is modeled is the way things behave, the way events occur. There's nothing about the model which says that space-time is something real. In fact, to describe space as curved, is to separate space from time, which is not an aspect of the model. So saying "space is curved" is just speaking metaphorically.

I've said it myself, but we have to be careful, i.e., if meaning equates to use, then it would follow that anyone, or any group who used a word or concept incorrectly, could make the claim that their use of the word is the correct use. — Sam26

As we get further into how Wittgenstein describes what it means to follow a rule, you'll see that this is exactly what follows from his position. To act correctly is to be observed as following a rule. But there is no principle whereby we might judge which rule is the correct rule when two fundamental rules contradict. There is no principle whereby "correct" or "incorrect" might be judged of rules themselves, because this is judged in relation to rules. That is a problem which I believe I've brought to your attention before, (I know I've explained it to Luke). But supporters of Wittgenstein seem to always be insistent that it is not a real problem.

It's ultimately a moral issue, distinguishing right from wrong. Other metaphysics, like Plato's for example, turn to something further like "good", or religions turn to "God", as a principle to resolve the value of any particular rule. Then there are metaphysics which produce ideas like utilitarianism, and pragmatism. It's all somewhat arbitrary, so the issue is never really resolved whether you take Wittgenstein's position, another metaphysical position, or a religious position. So I think Witty's point just ends up being that it's a waste of time to look beyond "the rule" for the principle of right and wrong.

If you were to "zoom in" on space-time itself--not any physical object within space-time--you would never "see" anything other than continuous space-time. — aletheist

That's because "space-time" is purely conceptual. If you "zoom in" on a concept defined as continuous you'll never see anything other than continuity, otherwise the concept would be contradictory.

2. It isn't possible to wilfully forget. Try forgetting your name. Unless you have brain damage that isn't possible even if you distracted yourself or emply other techniques you suggest. — TheMadFool

I think you can willfully forget through distraction. It would be very difficult to forget your name though because people keep reminding you. Maybe if you lived in isolation you could accomplish that Every time the thought comes back which you want to forget, distract yourself so that it goes way. It gets easier and easier to make it go away, and the memory gets more and more vague, coming back less often. Eventually it just doesn't come back. The thing is, remembering takes effort so forgetting is not as difficult as you might think.

There's a problem here though. It is one of the most fundamental aspects of our experience, that past events are substantially different from future events. Past events cannot be changed, while we can influence the occurrence of future events. Therefore something is clearly amiss if relativity validates B-theory, and B-theory contradicts one of the most fundamental empirical truths.