Bertrand Russell, in his Logic and Knowledge essay (p. 230), states that the argument "All A is B and all A is C, therefore some B is C" is a fallacy. The formalization would be:
(∀x)[Ax⊃Bx]
(∀x)[Ax⊃Cx]
∴(∃x)[Bx⊃Cx]
Why is this a fallacy? I thought it is because if the premises are universal (∀x) then the conclusion must be so, and not an existential one (∃x). But can't we imply "some B are C" from "all B are C"? — Nicholas Ferreira

The problem is that it is invalid to cross predicates in this way. A is B is to predicate B of the subject A. A is C is to predicate C of the subject A. B and C are predicates of the subject A. Until we convert either B or C into a subject, and predicate something of that subject, we have nothing to allow us to draw any conclusions about either B or C, because B and C have not been presented as subjects.

I don't find anything similar with Hitler when looking at Trump. Has Trump had any kind of ideology and even written a book about it? No, and the art of the deal was written by a ghostwriter who isn't proud of it. War veteran? No. Somebody who has huge megalomaniac visions for his country? No. — ssu

How do you know that Trump has no megalomaniac visions? This type of person keeps one's visions a secret. That's how deception works, by hiding one's intentions. Trump does it by throwing up a wall of confusion, casting the image that there are no specific goals underneath, that he's confused, will let others lead, and he'll just go with the flow. Don't let that fool you, the goals are there. He's done this all his life.

I think the best way to get rid of unwanted beliefs is to forget them. Unlike The Mad Fool, I think that this is actually very possible. The best way to forget things is with distraction and time. Time will actually do it on its own and we get forgetful when we age, then we die and I assume all memories are lost.

If evolution is true we have been molded by our environment into ''perfect'' survival machines.

Now ask yourself, ''is it good or beneficial to forget?''

The answer is ''no'' because memory is part of learning which is essential for survival. If you forget that your friend died after eating a poisonous mushroom it is likely that you too will err in the same way. So, forgetting is bad and remembering is good. — TheMadFool

The answer is ''no'' because memory is part of learning which is essential for survival. If you forget that your friend died after eating a poisonous mushroom it is likely that you too will err in the same way. So, forgetting is bad and remembering is good.[/quote]

Just because it is more often than not, beneficial to remember, doesn't mean that it is always beneficial to remember. We have evolved such that living creatures die, and memories are lost, so this argument about survival is a bit weak. "Survival" in the context of evolution is about survival of the species, not the individual. So it appears to be good for the species if the individuals, with their own idiosyncrasies, and personal memories, pass on. Life evolving on this planet needs a mechanism whereby memories which are good for the creatures are passed on, and memories which are bad for the creatures are forgotten. The mind is fallible and the mistakes which it makes must be somehow forgotten in order that we can look at things in a new light.

Your error was your repeated claim that a) use creates a boundary; and that b) instances of use are for a special purpose. — Luke

There's no error,.it's clear from what Wittgenstein says. A boundary may be created in use for a special purpose. But it is not necessary to create such a boundary in instances of use. What I said, was that every instance of use is an instance of use for a particular purpose. However, it's not necessary that every instance of use for a particular, or "special" purpose, is an instance of creating a boundary.

However, we can decide to draw a limit to the concept, if we choose to, for a special purpose. It is not an instance of use that draws this boundary, but our agreement in a particular instance or for a particular purpose to use the word in this special (more specific) way. Otherwise, there is no boundary to the concept and it will just have it's usual unbounded meaning. — Luke

Each instance of use is carried out by an individual. An individual person uses a word. A person may decide to create a boundary through definition of the term (as in a logical proposition). Agreement is irrelevant. Wittgenstein says nothing about agreement here.

Your claim that I was making an error was based in this:

Wittgenstein is referring to the conventional use of the word, not to a special purpose use. — Luke

Once you remove this division, which you made rather than Wittgenstein, and recognize that every instance of usage is for a particular purpose, whether that purpose involves creating a definitional boundary or not, (such boundaries being unnecessary for use), then your claim that I made an error is unsupported.

Sorry, but I just can't see your point. you appear to have gotten totally confused.

Furthermore, in your previous post you read Wittgenstein as posing a paradox and... — Luke

I said that I could see the likely possibility of a paradox ("probable paradox") involved with the position Wittgenstein is arguing. I did not say that I read Wittgenstein as posing a paradox. Perhaps this is why you appear so confused, you misunderstood, or didn't correctly read what I wrote.

Now, after I pointed out your error, you pretend that none of this was your position. — Luke

What you call my "error" was based in your unwarranted introduction of the concept of "conventional use". Remove that assumption (that there is such a thing as "conventional use") because it is unsupported by the text, and the appearance of error disappears.

Use for a particular purpose creates a boundary. If it's used for something other than a particular purpose, then I assume there would be no boundary created. But the next issue is whether there is exactitude or precision to such boundaries. And that reflects the unmentioned question of whether "special purpose" is something which has exact or precise boundaries.

The concept is being framed up as something having no particular boundaries, which can be made into something with particular boundaries, through the application of boundaries. The issue being that since its inherent nature is to be free of boundaries, the boundaries which are applied cannot obtain the status of precise, or exact, because that would create absolute restrictions, annihilating the concept as inherently unbounded. Consider that if the concept could be bounded in any absolute way, this would contradict its own nature, as being unbounded, leaving it no longer a concept. So the applied boundaries must still allow the concept some degree of unboundedness, in order to maintain the concept's nature as a concept (being inherently unbounded). Thus the boundaries are vague and inexact.

You said that the use produces a boundary. — Luke

It's not necessary.

Now your catching on.

So, what is your understanding of “time itself”? — Number2018

What we refer to as "time", and what is measured as time, is the process by which what is in the future becomes what is in the past.

So, what is your understanding of “time itself”? Do you believe that there has been the real, true time so that different models and theories can no more than approach it, represent it or distort it? — Number2018

I don't think we presently employ any models of time which recognize that there is a substantial difference between past and future. All models that are used imply a continuity through the present, but the substantial difference between past and future, which is evident to us, invalidates this continuity.

Wittgenstein is referring to the conventional use of the word, not to a special purpose use. ("To repeat, we can draw a boundary - for a special purpose.") The conventional use does not have a definite, precise or "rigid" boundary. ("For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a game, and what no longer does? Can you say where the boundaries are? No. You can draw some, for there aren’t any drawn yet.") But this is unproblematic. ("...this never bothered you before when you used the word “game”.") — Luke

No, he does not refer to "conventional use" nor does he distinguish an instance of special use from an ordinary instance of use. He says at 68 that there is no boundary, but that never troubled you before, when you used the word. Then he says that this does not mean that the use of the word is unregulated. Then at 69 he says this:

We do not know the boundaries because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary—for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable?

Clearly he is saying that the concept is usable without a boundary.Then he proceeds at 70 to explain the difference between describing something "roughly", and describing something "exactly". He is questioning whether an "exact" description is even possible.

So he never introduced the notion of "conventional use", as you are claiming. You are adding that, and it distorts what Wittgenstein has actually said. He has distinguished between having a boundary and not having a boundary. The boundary is produced when the word is used. Each instance of use being for a particular, or "special" (besondern) purpose.

Perhaps this is where our confusion started (mine as well as yours): you initially claimed that Wittgenstein was "removing the need for a definition from the existence of a concept". This may be seen as partly right, but only if we take "definition" to mean precise definition (which I wasn't). Because what Wittgenstein is saying is that an inexact, non-rigid, vague definition works just as well in many cases. — Luke

He seems to be saying that an "exact" definition is impossible, but this just means that all definitions are to some extent vague or ambiguous. Wittgenstein is saying that the word "game" does not need any definition whatsoever to be usable. It receives its meaning (and therefore becomes definable) through use. In whatever way that you or I, or any other person uses the word, a definition might follow from the way that it was used, for that particular purpose.

This relates to his comments in the following/concurrent sections relating to inexactness and vagueness, and his signalling that words/sentences do not require a precise meaning/definition to be useful (e.g. "stay roughly here"). A boundary can be given to a term to make it more precise ("for a special purpose"), but it is not required for the conventional use/usability of a term. — Luke

So, what I think he is arguing now, in this section, is that all designated definitions, boundaries, and "places", are inexact, vague. You appear to think that he is categorizing and distinguishing between two types of definition, the precise and the vague. I see that he has already established his two categories as having a definition, and not having a definition, and now he is proceeding to argue that all instances of definition are to some extent ambiguous, vague and inexact.

I think a lot of people see the universe as an object like that, coming into being somehow from non-being, just like every actual object in the universe. I don't. I think it contradicts what a universe should be. — noAxioms

Why does this contradict what a universe should be? Do you think that a universe ought to be given a special status? Why, and what would be that special status?

What if someone happened to believe that Wittgenstein is the one making a mistake? Such a person might believe that boundaries are inherent within, and essential to any concept itself, rather than a product of how the concept is used for specific purposes. How would we ever determine which position is the correct one? Maybe if we proceed Wittgenstein will provide us with a demonstration to help us decide.

The perfect example of the cyclic model of time is a religious life, organized by following the same festivals and rituals throughout each year. — Number2018

That's not time which is being cyclical, it's the actions of people which is cyclical in that description. That some people are repetitive in their activities doesn't mean that time itself is cyclical.

The point of this thread is to discuss and understand what Wittgenstein is saying in the text. Therefore, I'm not adding an "extra condition" by talking about context; this context has been created by what he is talking about in the text and, in particular, in the section of the text that we are currently discussing. I didn't make up these examples for context: — Luke

You're right, "game" has a context within Wittgenstein's use here. Therefore it is being used for a special purpose, and there is likely a boundary implied by that usage. That's why I see a probable paradox in what Witty is arguing. He's saying that the concept "game" has no boundary unless someone gives it a boundary by using it for a specific purpose. However, whenever the word "game" appears, it's an instance of someone using the concept for a specific purpose. So he's really created an imaginary, and most likely impossible situation (unless platonic realism is the case) , in which the concept "game" exists, but it is not being used by anyone for any specific purpose.

However, what I think is important in Wittgenstein's description, is that the boundary is created by the context of usage, (the purpose), it is not inherent within the concept. So instead of conceiving of a concept as something which necessarily has boundaries (boundaries are essential to a concept), we conceive of a concept as providing the possibility for boundaries. This puts concepts into a different category from boundaries.

And, by doing so, subjectively, we reproduce our past and a cyclic model of time. — Number2018

I don't see where the cyclical aspect comes from.

There are non-linear contemporary philosophies of time — Number2018

Yes, cyclical perhaps, but I don't see how that would be grounded. Any others?

What changes to make ‘now’ ‘then’? There is some measurable quantity we call time that changes. So it is reasonable to discuss the duration of 'now'. — Devans99

Right, change occurs at the present, now. And since change requires that time passes, it is very reasonable to discuss the duration of now.

Isn't a word itself a sign?

I agree with you. Since we cannot predict and foresee our future, we are inclined to eliminate it, to substitute it for familiar images and identifications from the past. As a result,the cyclic model of time has been reproduced over and over again. — Number2018

What I'm thinking of, is more of a linear model of time. The problem being that the model really only takes into account the past. All of our experience is in the past. We proceed with inductive reasoning and draw conclusions about the past. The problem being that instead of recognizing that the past begins at the present, and that the future is fundamentally different from the past, we draw a line of temporal continuity in the model, through the present into the future. So we end up with a linear model of time which extends from past through future, with the present being a point somewhere on this line, without accounting for the fact that the future is substantially different from the past, and such a continuity is a misrepresentation.

And yet again, Witty iterates that this in turn does not mean that boundaries cannot be drawn: "we can draw a boundary - for a special purpose." - but we don't need such a boundary for us to understand what a game is - unless we have a 'special purpose' in mind for it: "Does it take this to make the concept usable? Not at all! Except perhaps for that special purpose". To summarize in point form: — StreetlightX

I see a possible paradox here. We may draw a boundary for a special purpose. In this case the concept is being used for a specific purpose. However, Wittgenstein says that the concept is "usable" without such a boundary. As Luke points out, this would mean that there are no restrictions to the possible uses of any such concept. If this is the case then there is nothing which distinguishes one concept from another, each is infinitely usable. Each concept is usable in an infinite number of ways, having its use defined by the particular instance of usage.

The problem being that the usefulness of a tool is created by having a particular purpose for that tool, not by having an endless number of uses. Usefulness is created by conforming the tool to the specific use. A "tool" which has no particular use, like a piece of matter, may be infinitely usable, but it has little if any usefulness, and can't really be called "a tool". So we really need a distinction between "useful" and "usable" to bring the concept from the category of usable into the category of useful.

No, I don't see him saying that the concept has no definition whatsoever, as you claim; only that the concept is not everywhere circumscribed by rules. Therefore, this leaves some rules/boundaries/definition to the concept. — Luke

Well, I don't see how you can miss it, because. he clearly states that a concept may be bounded by a definition but "it need not be so". Then, we can use the concept in a way so that it "is not closed by a frontier". And, the concept of "game" is like this. Further, at 69 he says of the concept "game", "We do not know the boundaries because none have been drawn."

For example? — Luke

Look at 85, Wittgenstein compares a rule to a sign-post. A sign-post is not a boundary. They are fundamentally different. A sign-post encourages you to proceed, a boundary prevents you from proceeding.

That's fine, except your claim was that no boundary or definition is required for the concept of a game whatsoever. — Luke

Let's be clear, this is not my claim, it is Wittgenstein's claim. And, he's very explicit about this point. You ought not deny it, or you'll misunderstand what he's showing us.. I am still undecided as to whether I agree or not, I'll see where it leads. However, I see no reason to reject this claim, at this point. If this means that the word "game" can mean anything at all, then what's wrong with that? We are fundamentally free to use words however we please, This is very obvious with the youngsters who make up new uses for words every day.

This implies that the word, in this context (of "board-games, card-games, ball-games, athletic games, and so on"), can mean anything at all. But the word "game" (in this context) has a circumscribed meaning/definition/usage, even though it is not everywhere circumscribed. — Luke

Hold on, you've added an extra condition "in this context". The context acts as a boundary, it bounds the word, as a particular instance of use, therefore with a particular purpose. Notice that Wittgenstein says that the concept itself is unbounded, but it may be bounded for a particular purpose. So putting a word into a particular context is an instance of limiting the concept for a particular purpose.

Apocryphal has it that there are a group of First Nations folk in Australia who don't see time as a line, but as walking backwards.

You can see where you have been, but not where you are going.

I kinda like that. — Banno

That's right, precious few of us will ever actually turn and face the future, because it's way too scary. So we just keep looking at the past, attempting to employ some principles of logic to determine what's coming at us from the future. What most of us don't realize though, is that we're naturally inclined through evolutionary forces, to face the future. So we're actually facing the future, and going forward. That we seem to be facing the past and walking backward into the future, is really a matter of walking forward, but facing a giant mirror showing only what's behind. So we're really going forward, while looking at a giant rear view mirror. It's quite complicated I know, but we won't take our eyes off that rear view mirror to actually face the future, because the future itself is way too scary.

Nowhere does he say or even imply: 'There is no need for a definition or boundary of the concept "game"'. — Luke

If you refuse to understand what is written, then I can't help you to see what you deny is there. But I'll try one more time. He starts 68 with a proposition. The concept of number is defined for you as ... such and such. He replies to this proposition with "It need not be so". He says he can give the word "number" rigid limits, (a rigidly limited concept), or he can use "number" in a way such that the extension of the concept is not closed by a frontier.

Do you understand that he is saying that he can use the word "number" in a way such that its meaning is not bounded by a definition? So he proceeds with "And this is how we do use the word 'game'." He is explicitly saying that we use the word "game" in this way, such that the extension of the concept is not bounded by a definition.

Rules are boundaries. — Luke

Not exactly, so consider that notion a misleading prejudice, and forget it. Here's the point. Boundaries are rules, but not all rules are boundaries. So he has excluded definitional boundaries as the type of rules which apply in the concept of "game". However this does not mean that the concept is unregulated. We can conclude that the concept is regulated in a different way, rules other than definitional boundaries are what govern the conception of "game".

If you look back to 66, you'll see that the concept "game" is described as a "complicated network
of similarities", which are characterized at 67 as "family resemblances". Do you see the difference between a network of similarities, and a boundary or a limit to this network? The network of similarities is necessary for the existence of a concept, a boundary to the network is not necessary.

That is a very distorted reading and I think you are putting too much emphasis on the final sentences of this quite difficult section to be drawing any specific conclusions from it. — Luke

Well, the first part of 58 is where he lays out the conditions for the apparent "contradiction". At the end, he offers a resolution. So it's only natural that after understanding the conditions of the contradiction, I would focus on his proposed resolution.

Where is your textual support for these claims? — Luke

I told you, read 68-69. "'"All right: the concept of number is defined for you as...' ---It need not be so.". Read this as not necessary. "For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No.You can draw one; for none has so far been drawn." It's all right there, a boundary or definition is not necessary. There is no need for a definition or boundary of the concept "game", yet the word still has meaning and is useful.

He's not saying that you can't learn how to use certain words by referring to things or objects. We teach children all the time by pointing to things (cups, houses, trees, etc). He's saying that meaning or sense is not derived in this way, i.e., not by pointing to some object. — Sam26

Since meaning is use, then you would just contradict yourself if you said that we learn how to use words this way, but we don't learn their meaning in this way.

So, ostensive definition can be part of the learning process. Learning meaning or sense involves a wide variety of uses that may include pointing to this or that in social contexts, but is not dependent on this or that object. — Sam26

Yes, of course ostensive definition is part of the learning process, but look at what he's focusing on in this section of the book, the capacity to recognize similarities, "family resemblances".

And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. — 66

What he's starting to focus on is this, the recognition of similarities. It's not the existence of similarities, but the recognition of similarities, and this is what he is pointing to as the fundamental aspect of conception. And, notice that he is deliberately separating this from what he seems to think is the faulty representation of conception, as the creation of a boundary or definition. You could say he is separating the material aspect, as the capacity to recognize similarities, from the formal aspect, as the existence of definitions and boundaries, and he is arguing that it is this material aspect which provides the basis for existence of a concept. The formal aspect is shown as not necessary.

One 'technical' note here is that §68 marks the reappearance of 'rules' as an object of discussion (they've been 'missing' since §54). With respect to them, the point made seems to be something like: rules function as constraints - they mark, like 'boundaries', lines beyond which one cannot go, without for all that exhausting the range of what can be done within a game. Hence: "No more are there any rules for how high one may throw the ball in tennis, or how hard, yet tennis is a game for all that, and has rules too." — StreetlightX

I believe there's a bit of a trick to understanding the use of "rules" here. His use of the term will take a sharp turn at 81, and this is a sort of preparatory usage at 68, so it might be good to read it a couple times.

The premise is, we cannot state the boundary to the concept "game". So the consequent proposition (I interpret the phrases within quotes as propositions to be analyzed) is "But then the use of the word is unregulated, the game we play with it is unregulated." The reply is that "It is not everywhere circumscribed by rules...". And this is how we play games, some activities within the game are regulated, others are not, as his example shows. Now, the concept "game" has been shown to be unbounded, but this does not force the conclusion that there are no rules. It just means that the rules which are there, are not such limits of boundary. What I intuit, is that if we want to find the rules which govern conception, we must release the notion that these rules are constraints such as boundaries, or limits of definition. So if we restrict our understanding of "rules", such that the rules of conception must be limits of definition, boundaries, we will never find the rules of conception.

Where does Wittgenstein speak of an "imaginary red"? — Luke

It's what you called "fictional", I called it "imaginary". Wittgenstein referred to it in this way: "'what has the colour' is not a physical object". When he says that there is something which has the colour red, but this thing is not a physical object, doesn't this imply "imaginary red" to you? Or do you hold a difference between a fictional object which is red, and an imaginary red? I think you're trying to make something out of nothing.

As I explained in my previous post, and as is clear from the quote, he does not speak of imaginary colours: — Luke

Of course he speaks of imaginary colours. Look at 56-57. He speaks of bringing the memory of the colour before "the mind's eye", and he even says the "memory-image". "And don't clutch at the idea of our always being able to bring red before our mind's eye even when there is nothing red any more."

If an image of red in the mind's eye is not an "imaginary colour", then what is? I'll tell you what is. We can create an "imaginary colour" by definition, as I described. Notice that these two senses of "imaginary colour" are quite distinct. That's my point.

No, he is pointing out that the concept of a game or a number (and probably many more concepts) is not "everywhere bounded by rules" (§68). The concept can be made more rigidly bounded or defined for some purpose if we desire, but it is otherwise not so exactingly defined (§69). However, this doesn't mean that (until we make the definition more exact) it is not defined, or that "he is removing the need for a definition". — Luke

I think you misunderstand. He clearly removes the need for a definition. Reread 68-69. He says that we can give a concept boundaries, close the frontier, but this is not necessary. It is done for a particular purpose. Nevertheless, for Wittgenstein this does not mean that there are not rules involved. What this means is that the rules at play here are other than definitions or boundaries. If we want to look for the rules involved with the concept of "game" we must look for something other than a definition or a boundary.

He is not "presenting the concept as something other than requiring a definition". An ostensive definition is also a definition. Are you suggesting that the only true definition is in (numerical) terms of wavelength, or what did you have in mind? — Luke

Hasn't he already rejected ostensive definition as insufficient for learning types? Didn't he demonstrate that we must already know how to distinguish types before ostensive definition can be successful? We don't learn concepts of types, like "game" through ostensive definition. There must be some other form of rule, other than a rule of definition, which is at play here.

However, Wittgenstein is talking about the coloured object being non-physical or perhaps fictional, whereas you appear to be talking about the colour (itself) being non-physical. I don't follow why you are raising this possibility. — Luke

Right, so what I was pointing out, is that I thought that Wittgenstein's representation of the imaginary "red" was not quite correct (I had a slight disagreement). Notice that at 58 he wanted to replace "red exists" with "the word 'red' has meaning", but the attempt appeared to contradict itself. He resolves the contradiction, by admitting that "In reality, however, we quite readily say that a particular colour exists", with the following qualification as to what this means, "and that is as much as to say
that something exists that has that colour".

So let me explain my disagreement. He has allowed that "exists" can refer to imaginary colours. But when he says this means "something exists that has that colour", and allows that "'what has that colour' is not a physical object", I think that he doesn't properly represent how an "imaginary colour" really exists. It is not a case of a non-physical object having the colour red, it is a case of a definition. So the colour "red" is defined into existence, as an object, just like the mathematical objects are defined into existence. They exist as objects so long as the definition is adhered to

This relates directly to his description of concepts at 68-80. Notice at 68-69, there is no defined boundary to the concept "game". We can however draw a boundary (definition), for a specific purpose. At 70, he describes the concept of "game" as "uncircumscribed". This word relates right back to #3, where he talks about producing a definition for a specific purpose. The definition circumscribes the area.

Then at 75, he's back onto this idea, asking if to know what a game is, but not be able to say what it is, is like an "unformulated definition". But this is problematic because at 76, if someone draws a boundary (formulates a definition) it wouldn't be the same boundary that I would draw.

So, in all of this, right back to that point at 58, he is removing the need for a definition from the existence of a "concept". To know what red is, or what a game is, does not require that one knows a definition. He is presenting the concept as something other than requiring a definition. Accordingly, I know what 'red' is if I can point to a red thing. And, he has completely separated this from "I know what red is if I can recite a definition of 'red'".

As expressed by my disagreement above, I am not yet convinced that this separation, and the way it's expressed at 58, is accurate. It is implied that if I can recite the definition of red, yet cannot point to a red thing, then I do not know what red is.

Yes, your quoting of Wittgenstein gives a good indication of what Wittgenstein is doing. I'm more trying to understand what you are doing, which is why I have requested you to support your assertions/questions with textual references. — Luke

So what I am doing is attempting to understand what Wittgenstein is doing. When his way of doing things is inconsistent with, or clashes with, what is customary for me, then understanding what he is doing becomes difficult. This is where disagreement crops in, I want to go this way, as is my habit, and Witty says no, go that way.

I see that section, 61-63, could be used as a strike against Platonism. The common Platonist argument is that the same idea, concept, or information, can be presented in different physical forms; different media or even different languages can represent the very same idea. Since different physical forms represent the very same idea, concept, or information, then the idea, concept, or information represented is something distinct from the physical representation of it. Therefore the idea, concept, or information, has an independent non-physical existence. That is the Platonist argument. You'll see that Wittgenstein is here arguing that distinct representations, which some might say represent the very same "order" in two different ways, do not really represent the very same "order", they are two distinct orders. This undermines that Platonist premise.

I don't see what you're getting at here except that we can make up a name for a non-existent colour (when would we ever use such a name?). Anyhow, what does this have to do with the phrase "Red exists" or our preceding discussion? — Luke

Replace "red" with the made up colour, let's call it "X". Suppose someone proposes that we combine a specified multiplicity of precise wavelengths of light, for a lab experiment or some other purpose, and we call this colour "X". The point is that "X" has meaning but it has not yet been created, and not yet been seen. So "X" has meaning even though there is nothing, not a physical object, nor in the mind, which has that colour. It's getting off track of the text, just an opinion. but I just thought I'd put that out there as a possibility. Words like "red" may be given meaning through definition. We can define things into existence, if imaginary things qualify as having existence. Isn't this like Sam26's example of "God"?

We could extend this to the proposition that "God exists," which does not derive meaning from whether or not the thing associated with the concept has an instance in reality, but how we use the concept in a variety of social contexts. We should not think that a name is only meant to be some element of reality (PI 59). — Sam26

Perhaps it is because our readings of the text are so far removed, but I find your comments to be quite disconnected from the text. Given that we are trying to read it together, could you please provide more references to the text to support your assertions in future. This may help to reduce confusion and determine where/how you disagree. — Luke

Do you not find that my quoted passages from 65-77 are a good indication of what Wittgenstein is doing in that section? https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/243311 What do you think I'm missing, or misrepresenting?

Yeah, well you crack on with that, I don't want to sound like I'm telling people what they should do.

This is as much aimed at the other posts as yours, but, the kind of onanistic scholasticism that this whole thread has shown is not for me so I'll duck out of this one.

I mean, two pages of self-congratulatory fake 'eureka' to arrive at the basic standard Hacker and Baker interpretation of a single aphorism which I can only presume (from the level of implied scholarship) that everyone has already read. So what was the point? I just don't get it. — Isaac

What can I say? If you don't enjoy it ... It's not like your parents are forcing you to go in with the Boy Scouts.



Since correct terminology appears to be important to you, just let me inform you that Wittgenstein does not use "identity" here, nor does he discuss identifying the different forms that the two distinct language games may take (according to my translation). He actually seems quite critical of their assigned identities as "analysed" and "unanalysed" forms.

What he talks about is whether the orders of the two distinct language games have "the same meaning", whether they achieve "the same" thing, whether the person who carries out the orders does "the same" thing. So he is asking whether the two distinct orders (as distinct language games) are actually two forms of the same order. He concludes that each "form" of expressing the order [misleading in this representation of mine, because it's not really one order but two distinct orders], is in it's own way deficient.
"—But can I not say that an aspect of the matter is lost on you in the latter case as well as the former?"

don't see that we ever really say "red exists", though. At least, I've never used the phrase outside of a philosophical discussion... However, Wittgenstein is not saying that we don't use this phrase (at §58); just that if we do, then it is typically used to mean that there is something which has that colour. — Luke

It is implied that red is a thing which exists when we say things like "red is a colour". So we do use red in this way, like if I were to say "I know what red is", or "red is my favourite colour", etc.. I agree that Wittgenstein's solution is to say that what this means is that there is something which has that colour.

But as per my discussion with Fooloso4 on this subject, I am not convinced of this solution. We can say "red is a colour", and "red" can have meaning, in that context of being designated as a colour, without there being anything which has that colour. We can know "red is a colour" without there being anything which has that colour. So it appears like we can give words like "red" a meaning through a definition like that, so that the word has meaning within that logical structure, without the necessity of there being a thing which has the colour red. So it seems to me that Wittgenstein's solution doesn't really capture what it means for "red" to exist in the imagination. There doesn't need to be a thing which has the colour red, for "red" to have meaning, because "red" can have meaning by definition (or context within a logical structure).

However, with regards to your example, the statement "red is a colour" is typically something that might only be said when teaching somebody the meaning of the word "red" (or "colour"). — Luke

I disagree. I think we commonly use "red", as well as the other colours in this way. For example: "Red is my favourite colour". "I pick red as the colour to paint my room." "What colour is it?" "The primary colours." "The colours of the rainbow." "Blue is the colour of the sky". And so on.

But notice that there seems to be a special requirement. "Red" is used here in the context of "colour", and it is this context of usage which gives the impression that red is an independent thing. It isn't an independent thing though, because it relies on this necessary relation with "colour" for its existence (via usage) as a thing.. This is the "essentialism", or necessity within a concept, which Wittgenstein may be trying to reject, or at least showing that it can be rejected. When red is defined as necessarily a colour, it gets existence as a thing, by being restricted to being a member of that category, "colour". We see this with the numerals, 1,2,3,4, they signify individual things because what they signify is necessarily a number, a definite thing, and nothing else. In Wittgenstein's upcoming discussion of concepts, he removes all of this nonsense of a constructed necessity, (boundaries are constructed for a purpose), to get down to the bare bones of what a concept really is.

Witty posits that red is used as a paradigm in most language games in which red plays a role. — fdrake

Red itself is not the paradigm here. The paradigm is a sample, an example of a red thing, which gives meaning to the word "red". This paradigm may be a physical object, or in the mind. That is Wittgenstein's resolution to the apparent contradiction. "Red" has no meaning unless there is a paradigm to demonstrate red. So "red exists" has no meaning, because "red" has no meaning, unless there is an example of something red, be it a physical object or in the mind. The appearance of contradiction is avoided, because that's all that "red exists" means, that there is such a sample of red, to give the word "red" meaning .

One could define a boundary, it's not that some state of affairs prevents this from being possible, just that it is not necessary. — Isaac

One could define a boundary --- for a particular purpose.

3) But we do want to say something about “red exists” - there is a point we want to make about it, and that point is that “red exists” ‘means’ that ‘red has meaning’ (and conversely, ‘red doesn’t exist' ‘means’ that ‘red has no meaning’). — StreetlightX

This is because meaning is use, and we cannot neglect that premise. We do use "red" in this way, as if it names something, e.g. "red is a colour". That is what causes the appearance of contradiction, we must submit to the fact that the word is used in such a way that "red" refers to an existing thing. Wittgenstein offers a resolution to the contradiction.

In the next section is an extensive discussion of the nature of concepts. here is what I consider to be exemplar passages:

65 ...For someone might object against me:
"You take the easy way out! You talk about all sorts of language-games,
but have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game, and hence of language, is: what is common to all these activities, and what makes them into language or parts of language.
...
I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all,—but that they are related to one another in many different ways.

66...And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.

67...And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And
the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.
But if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all these constructions—namely the disjunction of all their common properties"—I should reply: Now you are only playing with words.
One might as well say: "Something runs through the whole thread—namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres".

68 And this is how we do use the word "game". For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No.

69.We do not know the boundaries because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary—for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable? Not at alll (Except for that special purpose.)

70. "But if the concept 'game' is uncircumscribed like that, you don't really know what you mean by a 'game'."

71. One might say that the concept 'game' is a concept with blurred edges.—"But is a blurred concept a concept at all?"—
...Frege compares a concept to an area and says that an area with vague boundaries cannot be called an area at all.
...But is it senseless to say: "Stand roughly there"? Suppose that I were standing with someone
in a city square and said that. As I say it I do not draw any kind of boundary, but perhaps point with my hand—as if I were indicating a particular spot. And this is just how one might explain to someone
what a game is. One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way.—I do not, however, mean by this that he is supposed to see in those examples that common thing which I—for
some reason—was unable to express; but that he is now to employ those examples in a particular way.

72.Suppose I shew someone various multicoloured pictures, and say: "The colour you see in all these is called 'yellow ochre' ".—This is a definition, and the other will get to understand it by looking for and seeing what is common to the pictures. Then he can look at., can point to, the common thing.

73.Though this comparison may mislead in many ways.—One is now inclined to extend the comparison: to have understood the definition means to have in one's mind an idea of the thing defined, and that is a sample or picture.
...Which shade is the 'sample in my mind' of the colour green—the sample of what is common to all shades of green?

75. What does it mean to know what a game is? What does it mean, to know it and not be able to say it? Is this knowledge somehow equivalent to an unformulated definition?

76. If someone were to draw a sharp boundary I could not acknowledge it as the one that I too always wanted to draw, or had drawn in my mind. For I did not want to draw one at all. His concept can then
be said to be not the same as mine, but akin to it. The kinship is that of two pictures, one of which consists of colour patches with vague contours, and the other of patches similarly shaped and distributed, but with clear contours. The kinship is just as undeniable as the difference.

77. And if we carry this comparison still further it is clear that the degree to which the sharp picture can resemble the blurred one depends on the latter's degree of vagueness.
...In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning of this word ("good" for instance)? From what sort of examples? in what language-games? Then it will be easier for you to see that the word must have a family of meanings.

Sorry this is a long one - disproportionate to the length of the section - but its a really tough one so I’ve had to try and dig at it. Still not totally happy with the exegesis and I think I’ve missed some details (particularly with respect to the ‘contradictions’ - I still don’t quite get how they are derived), but I think I got the general structure and motivation right, hopefully. — StreetlightX

I think that's very good, considering the difficulty of the passage. Did you read my interpretation from a few days ago: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/242060 ? I focused on how the attempt to say what the phrase must mean, to be meaningful, appears to contradict itself. Witty offers a resolution, which you say 'rubbishes the whole enterprise", and this is a sort of compromise situation, that "red exists" means that there is something which has the colour.

But as I discussed with Fooloso4, this doesn't really capture the imaginary scenario. In the imagination one might say "there is a colour named red", and therefore "red" would have meaning as an unseen colour, without there being something which has that colour, even in the imagination. So "red" can be given meaning through a logical necessity (definition) without needing that there is something which has the colour, even in the mind.

I'm not sure I see how, but perhaps I'm missing something. An aphorism is supposed to evoke something in the reader. That something is not 'hidden' in the terminology, it arises in the reader as a result of their 'seeing' what the author means. — Isaac

Notice that it requires the reader "seeing" what the author means, And since an aphorism is brief, there is a need for strict passage by passage interpretation to see them all.

Doesn't an aphoristic style require a strict, section by section examination of terminology to avoid misunderstanding?

The incompatibility between being and becoming had been demonstrated by Plato. Aristotle formalized it. I understand the argument as presented by Aristotle like this. Our descriptions are always of what is, being, a static state. We describe what is at one moment and then what is at the next moment, and if there is a difference we infer change. Change is the difference between what is now, and what was then. To account for the change we could describe an intermediate state. But the intermediate state would be different from each of the first two states, so there would be changes between the intermediate, and the other two. We could introduce two more intermediate states, but this just leads to infinite regress. Change cannot be described in terms of being.

The thing is how does introducing potentiality and actuality solve the issue of whether change is real or not? — Walter Pound

We must account for change as real because it is supported by observation, there is difference. As per the infinite regress, it cannot be accounted for under the terms of what is and is not. So Aristotle introduced a new category, which neither is nor is not, and this is potential. He argues that we must allow an exception to the law of excluded middle for the reality of potential, otherwise the law of non-contradiction will be violated, which he is opposed to.

If you have already determined the task of the philosopher then I don't think you're going to get much out of this text. — Isaac

Actually I only said what the task of philosophy is not. It's not the same as the task of the meteorologist. This was to show the irrelevance of your analogy. What are you suggesting, that anyone with basic level training in philosophy won't get anything out of the book? Why might that be?

.

I claimed it was "sufficiently" complete, a fact I already pointed out once that you had overlooked, such that your now continuing to do so seems disingenuous. — Isaac

Such a description might be "sufficiently" complete for meteorology, as per your analogy. But my studies of philosophy have taught me that in philosophy, a description which leads to infinite regress is one which is incomplete and needs further investigation. That's why I rejected your claim that the description is sufficiently complete, despite your effort to justify the claim with that analogy. The analogy does not serve the purpose, and in my judgement the description is not sufficiently complete, for the reason stated..

You've missed a very important qualifier in my sentence. I asked if you would suggest that the reason given was not sufficiently complete, ie not complete enough to achieve its task.

This is why I think a broader view of Wittgenstein's intention is so important (as I keep mentioning) because one can only judge a philosophical endeavour, should one judge it at all, by whether it achieves what it sets out to do. It is only ever going to show some map, some model of the way things are from some particular frame. To ask completeness of it would be like complaining that a contour map did not show the vegetation completely. — Isaac

Really, this is a philosophical investigation with metaphysical implications. The task of a philosopher is not the same as the task of a meteorologist. In philosophy any description which clearly implies infinite regress is undoubtedly an incomplete description. But you were the one who claimed that the description was complete. And now you realize that in "view of Wittgenstein's intention", perhaps you ought not even talk in terms like "completeness".

Among the lessons of the PI is that one ought to give up the search for things like 'true' correspondence or 'ideal way of describing the situation' - not because things are 'non-ideal' or 'not-true', but because the very idea of 'true' and 'ideal' as you use it is misguided from the very start. — StreetlightX

Here's the problem with this claim. If Wittgenstein wants to show that terms like "perfection", "order", and consequently "rule" are not defined by words like "ideal" and 'true", it does not suffice to simply say that using words like "ideal" and "true" is misguided and wrong-headed, because that is begging the question. So it must be demonstrated, and this requires showing how things are non-ideal, and not-true, then the conclusion will be that using these words is misguided. But don't forget, at 58, how the attempt appears to contradict itself. There is a paradox here.

Forget 'true' correspondence. Stop using words not employed by the PI. 'Ideal', 'True Correspondence', etc - these are MUisms that muddy the text beyond recognition. Among the lessons of the PI is that one ought to give up the search for things like 'true' correspondence or 'ideal way of describing the situation' - not because things are 'non-ideal' or 'not-true', but because the very idea of 'true' and 'ideal' as you use it is misguided from the very start. — StreetlightX

I really ought to just ignore this comment as gratuitous nonsense. But since you really seem to believe what you've said, I'll defend what I've stated.

"Ideal" will be an important term when he describes vague boundaries of concepts, inexactness. Sometimes we describe descriptions overlooking the fact that vagueness and ambiguity inheres within description, and it's as if we're looking for an "ideal language". In order to introduce his concept of a rule as a "sign-post", which allows for ambiguity, he needs to get us to reject the prejudice, that a rule is an ideal.

81. F. P. Ramsey once emphasized in conversation with me that
logic was a 'normative science'. I do not know exactly what he had
in mind, but it was doubtless closely related to what only dawned on
me later: namely, that in philosophy we often compare the use of words
with games and calculi which have fixed rules, but cannot say
that someone who is using language must be playing such a game.——
But if you say that our languages only approximate to such calculi
you are standing on the very brink of a misunderstanding. For then
it may look as if what we were talking about were an ideal language.
As if our logic were, so to speak, a logic for a vacuum.—Whereas logic
does not treat of language—or of thought—in the sense in which a
natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and the most that can
be said is that we construct ideal languages. But here the word "ideal"
is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages were better, more
perfect, than our everyday language; and as if it took the logician
to shew people at last what a proper sentence looked like.

All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has
attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning,
and thinking. For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and
did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or
understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules.

98. On the one hand it is clear that every sentence in our language
'is in order as it is'. That is to say, we are not striving after an ideal,
as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable
sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us.—On the
other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect
order.——So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence. — Wittgenstein

Are you suggesting that the statement "it will most likely rain tomorrow because a warm front is approaching" is not sufficiently 'complete'... — Isaac

Yes, as a description, it is not complete. This is the problem with descriptions, and correspondence in general, descriptions are never complete. "Complete description" is an oxymoron. Consider the part of PI before us now, 60-64. We can describe the very same situation in two distinct ways, one being the "analytical" way. Neither description gives us everything, as each is lacking in its own way. End of 63: "But can I not say that an aspect of the matter is lost on you in the latter case as well as the former?" No description is "complete". As in my discussion with StreetlightX above, Wittgenstein is moving us away from ideals such as "complete".

To point us in the direction of his thinking, he only need show that language cannot be analysed into a simple series of rules outside of the social context in which the language user has been raised. — Isaac

This is an issue not yet resolved though. What if he cannot point us in the direction of his thinking in this way? Judging by the responses of various readers in this thread, the interpretations are starting to go in various directions. If this continues, then the pointing us in "the direction of his thinking" has failed.