As a general point though, it's worth pointing out how odd it is to say that things 'stand for' words. Everyone knows what it means for a word to stand for something; the opposite makes little sense. It's also not the case that paradigms 'show the meaning of a name': a paradigm exhibits nothing but itself - one can look at a color sample all day and it will not 'show' its name (short of having its name written on it); it is our use of language and the incorporation of the sample - in its role as a sample in a language-game - that will 'show' the name of a sample. In itself, a paradigm or a sample 'stand for' nothing - they are just there, as dead, inert, stuff. This all has little to do with the sections under discussion, but, just for fun, its worth nothing that this basic semiotic point about the intensionality of language was actually mentioned back in the boxed note of §35:

"It is only in a language that I can mean something by something."

Anyway, not a point I really want to follow through on, but this is the second time in this thread where 'things' have been said to stand for words, and it bothers me.

A paradigm, whether it is a physical or mental sample, is an ideal. That's why this concept of rules of correspondence needs to be dismissed. It is based in an ideal (correspondence itself is an ideal). The ideal acts as a prejudice, a predetermined way of looking at things (like the example of spontaneous generation), as if the ideal were a real description. But a real description of language never reveals the ideal so the ideal (and therefore correspondence) must be excluded as not part of what language really is.

§56: "But what if no such sample is part of the language, and we bear in mind the colour (for instance) that a word signifies?". — StreetlightX

Is this possible? Can there be a name of a color for which no sample exists? How can we know what color is being named without a sample that is part of our language?

Similarly, when I speak of a memory-image serving as a paradigm, one should read this as 'in the role of a paradigm', where, moreover, I use 'paradigm' interchangeably with 'sample'. Especially since I read §56 as insisting on the similarity/equivalence of role that the memory-image and a 'real life' sample/paradigm play in the kind of language-game under discussion. — StreetlightX

My point is that there is no equivalence between a paradigm and a memory image. The memory image is dependent on something that was seen in the world, something that is remembered. Paradigms must be public, shared.

As a general point though, it's worth pointing out how odd it is to say that things 'stand for' words. — StreetlightX

The sample is a bearer of the name. When used as a paradigm it shows what the name, in this case, ‘red’ means. The name 'red' does not stand for the paradigm, the paradigm is merely an example of the name. The name 'red' stands for or represents whatever is that color.

It's also not the case that paradigms 'show the meaning of a name': a paradigm exhibits nothing but itself - one can look at a color sample all day and it will not 'show' its name — StreetlightX

You are right, I cannot derive the name by staring at the sample. If, however, I refer to “bluorange” I can show you what the name blueorange means by pointing to the sample. The sample shows what the name means. The name is a label. The sample shows what it is a label for.

it is our use of language and the incorporation of the sample in that use that will show the name of a sample. — StreetlightX

Eliminate all samples, all paradigms or examples, and our use of language cannot show what ‘red’ or ‘bluorange’ means.

An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game. — PI §55

§56: "But what if no such sample is part of the language, and we bear in mind the colour (for instance) that a word signifies?". — StreetlightX

Is this possible? Can there be a name of a color for which no sample exists? How can we know what color is being named without a sample that is part of our language?

Similarly, when I speak of a memory-image serving as a paradigm, one should read this as 'in the role of a paradigm', where, moreover, I use 'paradigm' interchangeably with 'sample'. Especially since I read §56 as insisting on the similarity/equivalence of role that the memory-image and a 'real life' sample/paradigm play in the kind of language-game under discussion. — StreetlightX

My point is that there is no equivalence between a paradigm and a memory image. The memory image is dependent on something that was seen in the world. Paradigms must be public, shared.

As a general point though, it's worth pointing out how odd it is to say that things 'stand for' words. — StreetlightX

It is not that things stand for words but that the thing is the bearer of the name. When used as a paradigm, an example or sample, it shows what the name, in this case, ‘red’ means.

It's also not the case that paradigms 'show the meaning of a name': a paradigm exhibits nothing but itself - one can look at a color sample all day and it will not 'show' its name — StreetlightX

You are right, I cannot derive the name 'red' by by staring at the sample. If, however, I say “bluorange” I can show you what the name blueorange means by pointing to the sample. The sample shows what the name means. The name is a label. The sample shows what it labels.

Eh, I don't think you're paying enough attention to the fact that a paradigm is a role that something occupies in a particular language-game, and not an actual object or thing. — StreetlightX

W. is discussing both the function of a paradigm in language and what can serve in that function. What can serve in that function is often an actual object or thing. It is important to see why a memory-image cannot serve in that role.

You deleted your post so I deleted mine and now the order of things is messed up :sad: Anyway, I'm still quite unclear on the nature of your objection. When you say that "there is no equivalence between a paradigm and a memory image", this seems quite straightforwardly wrong, insofar as §56 and §57 both go out of their way - in fact it seems to me to be the very point of both discussions - to establish some rather clear equivalences:

(1) In §56, samples and memory-images both function to undergird a certain type of language-game, and the similarity Witty draws there is that both can 'fade', and that this fading has the same consequences for the kind of language-game under discussion. Just under half the discussion there is devoted to drawing out this similarity:

§56: "If we use a sample instead of our memory, there are circumstances in which we might say that the sample has changed colour, and we judge whether this is so by memory. But can’t we sometimes speak of a darkening (for example) of our memory-image? Aren’t we as much at the mercy of memory as of a sample? (For someone might feel like saying: “If we| had no memory, we would be at the mercy of a sample.”) - Or perhaps of some chemical reaction.""

(2) In §57, the comparison is even more straightforward, insofar as Witty spells out in so many words that the forgetting the color is "comparable to that in which we’ve lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language" - this being the conclusion and thus the major lesson of §57.

If you think I simply shouldn't be calling a memory-image a paradigm, then fine, but that's a rather trivial terminological quibble that is altogether quite thin compared to the quite heavy thrust placed on making comparisons and similarities between the two that are operative all throughout §56 and §57. And this to say nothing about the questions of modality that I addressed in my previous posts on these.

Anyway, not a point I really want to follow through on, but this is the second time in this thread where 'things' have been said to stand for words, and it bothers me. — StreetlightX

Why should this bother you? It's how Wittgenstein himself describes a paradigm at #50

We can put it like this: This sample is an instrument of the language used in ascriptions of colour. In this language-game it is not something that is represented, but is a means of representation.—And just this goes for an element in language-game (48) when we name it by uttering the word "R": this gives this object a role in our language game; it is now a means of representation. And to say "If it did not exist, it could have no name" is to say as much and as little as: if this thing did not exist, we could not use it in our language-game.—What looks as if it had to exist, is part of the language. It is a paradigm in our language-game; something with which comparison is made. And this may be an important observation; but it is none the less an observation concerning our language-game—our method of representation.

Notice that the object itself is the means of representation. But that's the nature of a paradigm in this context, whatever it is which is identified as "the paradigm" must represent the name, as the rule instantiated. That's why correspondence is inherently idealistic, as much as we use names to represent things, correct use of names is grounded in an ideal (the paradigm). It might bother you to hear it said that things stand for words, but it doesn't matter because Wittgenstein is rejecting this type of correspondence as unreal anyway. If he stayed on this course investigating correspondence, then when he got to numbers and mathematical names, the paradigms for correct use of these words could only be platonic forms. How could a platonic form be present to us as a paradigm?

Notice that the object itself is the means of representation — Metaphysician Undercover

It is. But the name is what represents - what stands for. And it bothers me because its basic semiotics. Signs stand for things. Things do not stand for signs. Again, a minor quibble.

Forget this idealisation stuff. It has nothing to do with the PI.

In §56, samples and memory-images both function to undergird a certain type of language-game, and the similarity Witty draws there is that both can 'fade', and that this fading has the same consequences for the kind of language-game under discussion. Just under half the discussion there is devoted to drawing out this similarity: — StreetlightX

I did not delete it intentionally. I'm not sure what happened. I changed a couple of minor grammatical errors but must not have hit post. I retrieved the word file I had it on and re-posted from that. There were a few things in the original post that I did not have on file so what is there now is not exactly the same.

When you say that "there is no equivalence between a paradigm and a memory image", this seems quite straightforwardly wrong, insofar as §56 and §57 both go out of their way - in fact it seems to me to be the very point of both discussions - to establish some rather clear equivalences: — StreetlightX

He defines a paradigm as follows:

An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game. — PI §56

If you did not know what ‘red’ means I cannot point to something in my memory that would serve as an example or to something in your memory. Nor could you find it by searching your memory images. I might say: Do you remember that wagon you used to have? You might say in response that you remember the wagon and it was blue. Did you forget the correct name of the colors or is your memory image not accurate or did you have another wagon that was blue?

In §56, samples and memory-images both function to undergird a certain type of language-game, and the similarity Witty draws there is that both can 'fade', and that this fading has the same consequences for the kind of language-game under discussion. Just under half the discussion there is devoted to drawing out this similarity: — StreetlightX

In the middle of §56 he asks:

But what do we regard as the criterion for remembering it right? — PI §56

When it comes to the length of a meter we appeal to a physical standard. Memory could result in various lengths and so cannot be the paradigm for a meter.

Let us imagine samples of colour being preserved in Paris like the standard metre. We define: "sepia" means the colour of the standard sepia which is there kept hermetically sealed.

A memory cannot be a standard. A standard must be public. It must be something that all of us can use.
— PI §50

In §57, the comparison is even more straightforward, insofar as Witty spells out in so many words that the forgetting the color is "comparable to that in which we’ve lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language" - this being the conclusion and thus the major lesson of §57. — StreetlightX

He does not say we lost the paradigm but that the situation is comparable with losing a paradigm. It is comparable because the name of the color has lost its meaning. The name does not mean anything as long as we cannot make the connection between the name and the color. But the difference is, we can still consult an example of the color, that is, a paradigm. The paradigm is not lost because there are still examples of things that are red that can be pointed to and agreed upon as red.

Sure, a memory-image is not a paradigm, happy to accept that. Hardly bears on the substance of the discussion, but okay.

↪Fooloso4 Sure, a memory-image is not a paradigm, happy to accept that. Hardly bears on the substance of the discussion, but okay. — StreetlightX

The reason I am pushing this is that it has bearing on the problem of a private language and related issues.

I have also just returned from holidays and I wanted to provide a more comprehensive exposition of §56 and §57 in response to the latest discussion between Fooloso4 and StreetlightX. However, it appears I may be too late. But I will post it anyway, since I've written it. I also wanted to welcome Fooloso4 who I think has been providing an excellent reading of the text.

§56. Assume that there were no (external) samples available in the language, and instead "we bear in mind the colour (for instance) that a word signifies". Wittgenstein immediately diagnoses the problem with this assumption:

"But what do we regard as the criterion for remembering it right?"

W will return to this issue of an internal standard more forcefully in the private language 'argument'.

W continues on to say that if we use a sample instead of our memory-image, then there may be cases in which we seem to remember the sample as being (e.g.) darker than it was before. Therefore: "Aren't we as much at the mercy of memory as of a sample?". He appears to reject this suggestion with the following example (of a sample): "Imagine that you were supposed to paint a particular colour “C”, which was the colour that appeared when the chemical substances X and Y combined." W notes that if we seem to remember the colour produced by the chemical combination as being brighter or different than it was before, then our memory must be at fault (since it is assumed that the chemical combination always reproduces the same colour). Hence: "This shows that we do not always resort to what memory tells us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal."

Further points:
W suggests that the memory-image (i.e. our bearing in mind the colour) and our ability to recall it via memory is what makes "the colour in itself...indestructible". But he then criticises the use of a memory-image as the standard/paradigm.

W states: "(For someone might feel like saying: “If we had no memory, we would be at the mercy of a sample.”)" Although W does not say as much, it is doubtful that any language-game could be played without memory, for then we could not remember how to play it. However, the point here is not the general use of memory in the language-game, but rather the use of a memory-image as a standard in the language-game.

§57. W posits a metaphysical concept of colour: “Something red can be destroyed, but red cannot be destroyed, and that is why the meaning of the word ‘red’ is independent of the existence of a red thing.” - Certainly it makes no sense to say that the colour red (as opposed to the pigment) is torn up or pounded to bits." The next line I do not understand as I am unfamiliar with the phrase, but Wittgenstein asks whether we don't say “The red is vanishing”? The "But don't we say..." indicates Wittgenstein's objection to the metaphysical concept. If we are to assume the metaphysical concept then W will not allow us the move of relying on samples or memory-images of red, as these should not be required if red is actually independent of the existence of a red thing. Wittgenstein deflates the metaphysical concept: "For what if you cannot remember the colour any more? - If we forget which colour this is the name of, the name loses its meaning for us; that is, we’re no longer able to play a particular language-game with it. And then the situation is comparable to that in which we’ve lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language."

Forget this idealisation stuff. It has nothing to do with the PI. — StreetlightX

On the contrary. The whole point to this first part of PI seems to be to describe how language is a rule-following activity without having to refer to ideals to account for the rules. I don't want to spoil it for you, but I've been reading ahead, and this will be made quite explicit by the time we reach #100..

In the next section, 60-63, he'll continue his attack on correspondence. He'll compare a language-game in which the named objects are "analysed", to a normal type language-game. Each of the two language-games has its advantages and disadvantages. We cannot say that the "analysed" way provides a better description than the other way, only a different description.

I conclude from this, that we can name what's in the corner of the room as "the broom", or, "the broomstick and the brush which is fitted onto it". One is just as good as the other, but something is lost in each. There is no ideal way of describing the situation, therefore no true correspondence.

Forget 'true' correspondence. Stop using words not employed by the PI. 'Ideal', 'True Correspondence', etc - these are MUisms that muddy the text beyond recognition. Among the lessons of the PI is that one ought to give up the search for things like 'true' correspondence or 'ideal way of describing the situation' - not because things are 'non-ideal' or 'not-true', but because the very idea of 'true' and 'ideal' as you use it is misguided from the very start.

As I've been out of the discussion for a while I don't want to hold things up responding to comments on previous sections, but I will say something in general that I think has been an issue for some. The passages in the book are meant to be largely aphoristic. The 'answer', such as there is one, is not in the actual text, we're not going to understand it better by a closer exegesis. The 'answer' is what the text points to, not what it actually says.

I think that's roughly what @StreetlightX has been trying to say about the discussion of the term 'paradigm', but I might be wrong about that, so I thought I'd make the point separately anyway.

I don't see how you can deny an infinite regress. If your description of "learning a rule" includes that the person already knows a rule, then unless you can account for this already known rule in terms other than as "a rule", infinite regress is implied, and it is false to say that the description is "complete". — Metaphysician Undercover

That was the point of my weather analogy. Are you suggesting that the statement "it will most likely rain tomorrow because a warm front is approaching" is not sufficiently 'complete' because it has not described the cause of the warm front in terms of the spatio-temporal history of each atom constituting it? Wittgenstein is writing a book about the way in which our language sometimes creates pseudo-problems that we agonise over when really they are just a non-sensical use of language. To point us in the direction of his thinking, he only need show that language cannot be analysed into a simple series of rules outside of the social context in which the language user has been raised. Just as the weather forecaster only need point to the approaching warm front to indicate that we might want to pack an umbrella tomorrow. He does not need to follow the trail to the very atoms which make up the atmosphere at that point, and Wittgenstein does not need to follow the trail back to the manner in which the neonatal brain establishes its first social rules. (Coincidentally, a small part of the research interests of a close colleague actually does cover the manner in which the neonatal brain establishes its first social rules, so if that's where your interest lies I could ask about some sources, but they'd be psychological, not philosophy.)

§60
Wittgenstein continues in 60 to repudiate that the sense or meaning of a proposition/concept/word is somehow enlightened by some deeper analysis, as in his example about the "broom." This again points to his former thinking in the Tractatus. However, note that this analysis is not about a deeper understanding of an idea (the ideas for e.g. in the PI), but a deeper understanding of the object associated with the word. As if the meaning of broom really refers to the parts associated with the word.

If I say, "Bring me the broom," do I need some further analysis to reveal what is really meant by the statement/word? Does further analysis of the kind described in 60 really add something that's missing? And if we were to ask someone, as Wittgenstein points out, what they really meant, would they add this missing analysis, i.e., would it reveal the thinking behind the statement?

This reminds me of how people try to analyze what we really mean by the word nothing, as if there is some metaphysical thing associated with the word. You'll even find threads on the word nothing, as if there is some hidden meaning or sense in the word itself, apart from its use . If you ask me to look in a particular room to see what's in there, and after looking I say, "Nothing," - then later, you look in the room and note that there was a desk in the room, would you come back and say, "What do you mean there was nothing in the room?" You might, but we can all think of circumstances where it would be completely appropriate to use the word nothing in this situation depending on context. Now there is a difference between Wittgenstein's example in 60 and this example, but I'm pointing out that the use of a proposition/word/concept will tell us much more about meaning or sense than most anything else.

Forget 'true' correspondence. Stop using words not employed by the PI. 'Ideal', 'True Correspondence', etc - these are MUisms that muddy the text beyond recognition. Among the lessons of the PI is that one ought to give up the search for things like 'true' correspondence or 'ideal way of describing the situation' - not because things are 'non-ideal' or 'not-true', but because the very idea of 'true' and 'ideal' as you use it is misguided from the very start. — StreetlightX

I really ought to just ignore this comment as gratuitous nonsense. But since you really seem to believe what you've said, I'll defend what I've stated.

"Ideal" will be an important term when he describes vague boundaries of concepts, inexactness. Sometimes we describe descriptions overlooking the fact that vagueness and ambiguity inheres within description, and it's as if we're looking for an "ideal language". In order to introduce his concept of a rule as a "sign-post", which allows for ambiguity, he needs to get us to reject the prejudice, that a rule is an ideal.

81. F. P. Ramsey once emphasized in conversation with me that
logic was a 'normative science'. I do not know exactly what he had
in mind, but it was doubtless closely related to what only dawned on
me later: namely, that in philosophy we often compare the use of words
with games and calculi which have fixed rules, but cannot say
that someone who is using language must be playing such a game.——
But if you say that our languages only approximate to such calculi
you are standing on the very brink of a misunderstanding. For then
it may look as if what we were talking about were an ideal language.
As if our logic were, so to speak, a logic for a vacuum.—Whereas logic
does not treat of language—or of thought—in the sense in which a
natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and the most that can
be said is that we construct ideal languages. But here the word "ideal"
is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages were better, more
perfect, than our everyday language; and as if it took the logician
to shew people at last what a proper sentence looked like.

All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has
attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning,
and thinking. For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and
did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or
understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules.

98. On the one hand it is clear that every sentence in our language
'is in order as it is'. That is to say, we are not striving after an ideal,
as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable
sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us.—On the
other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect
order.——So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence. — Wittgenstein

Are you suggesting that the statement "it will most likely rain tomorrow because a warm front is approaching" is not sufficiently 'complete'... — Isaac

Yes, as a description, it is not complete. This is the problem with descriptions, and correspondence in general, descriptions are never complete. "Complete description" is an oxymoron. Consider the part of PI before us now, 60-64. We can describe the very same situation in two distinct ways, one being the "analytical" way. Neither description gives us everything, as each is lacking in its own way. End of 63: "But can I not say that an aspect of the matter is lost on you in the latter case as well as the former?" No description is "complete". As in my discussion with StreetlightX above, Wittgenstein is moving us away from ideals such as "complete".

To point us in the direction of his thinking, he only need show that language cannot be analysed into a simple series of rules outside of the social context in which the language user has been raised. — Isaac

This is an issue not yet resolved though. What if he cannot point us in the direction of his thinking in this way? Judging by the responses of various readers in this thread, the interpretations are starting to go in various directions. If this continues, then the pointing us in "the direction of his thinking" has failed.

Among the lessons of the PI is that one ought to give up the search for things like 'true' correspondence or 'ideal way of describing the situation' - not because things are 'non-ideal' or 'not-true', but because the very idea of 'true' and 'ideal' as you use it is misguided from the very start. — StreetlightX

Here's the problem with this claim. If Wittgenstein wants to show that terms like "perfection", "order", and consequently "rule" are not defined by words like "ideal" and 'true", it does not suffice to simply say that using words like "ideal" and "true" is misguided and wrong-headed, because that is begging the question. So it must be demonstrated, and this requires showing how things are non-ideal, and not-true, then the conclusion will be that using these words is misguided. But don't forget, at 58, how the attempt appears to contradict itself. There is a paradox here.

§60 picks up on §46 and §47, the problem of simples and composites.

But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed?—What are the simple constituent parts of a chair?—The bits of wood of which it is made? Or the molecules, or the atoms? "Simple" means: not composite. And here the point is: in what sense 'composite'? It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the 'simple parts of a chair'. — PI 47

"Further analysed" in §60 returns to the same point. A broom maker might regard a broom as a brush and stick since he may combine various kinds of brushes and sticks. To a physicist brush and stick is no more an analysis than broom. Wittgenstein’s concern is not, of course, with brooms but with the idea of a fundamental analysis, of absolute simples:

Both Russell's 'individuals' and my 'objects' (Tractates LogicoPhilosophicus] were such primary elements. — PI §46

There is a sense in which further analysis distorts our thinking. We do not understand a broom by analysis but by sweeping the floor. We do not understand a chair by analysis but by sitting on it.

Yes, as a description, it is not complete. This is the problem with descriptions, and correspondence in general, descriptions are never complete. "Complete description" is an oxymoron. — Metaphysician Undercover

You've missed a very important qualifier in my sentence. I asked if you would suggest that the reason given was not sufficiently complete, ie not complete enough to achieve its task.

This is why I think a broader view of Wittgenstein's intention is so important (as I keep mentioning) because one can only judge a philosophical endeavour, should one judge it at all, by whether it achieves what it sets out to do. It is only ever going to show some map, some model of the way things are from some particular frame. To ask completeness of it would be like complaining that a contour map did not show the vegetation completely.

The passages in the book are meant to be largely aphoristic. The 'answer', such as there is one, is not in the actual text, we're not going to understand it better by a closer exegesis. The 'answer' is what the text points to, not what it actually says. — Isaac

I don’t think we can forgo a careful reading, an “exegesis”, of the text. The aphoristic nature of his writing does not preclude but demands just such a reading. There has been a great deal of misunderstanding as to what it is that Wittgenstein is pointing to. One of the most striking features of Wittgenstein’s work is how little agreement there is to what he is saying.

I do not think Wittgenstein intends to point to answers. So, what is he pointing to? The reader:

I ought to be no more than a mirror, in which my reader can see his own thinking with all its deformities so that, helped in this way he can put it right. — Culture and Value 18

His work is within the therapeutic tradition of philosophy:

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more a working on oneself. On one's interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.) — Culture and Value,16

§59. The idea that a name signifies some indestructible element of reality is a presupposition; a "particular picture" that is not given to us by experience. W suggests that we get this idea by seeing composite things (such as a chair) as being composed of constituent parts. "We say that the back is part of the chair, but that it itself is composed of different pieces of wood; whereas a leg is a simple constituent part. We also see a whole which changes (is destroyed) while its constituent parts remain unchanged."

§60. Wittgenstein asks whether the statement "My broom is in the corner" is actually a statement about the broom's constituent parts of its broomstick and brush. He suggests that the latter statement is a "further analysed" form of the former statement, which articulates something hidden in the former. But is this what the person making the statement really meant: the constituent parts? We don't typically consider the constituent parts when we ask someone (e.g.) to hand us a broom, as this is unnecessary in most cases. W raises this point because the philosophical tendency is to think that the further analysed form is somehow better, more true, or even the goal of philosophical thinking (such as in his Tractatus).

@Sam26@Luke@John Doe@StreetlightX

I just want to thank you lot for the great discussion/exegesis. I hope you manage to keep it up.

Thanks Fdrake, but for some reason my writing lately has been piss poor. I can't put my thoughts down very well. Help, I'm getting old.

§61. At §60, Wittgenstein considers a language-game in which someone is ordered to bring or move about objects which are composed of several parts. He states that there are two ways to play the game: (a) names are given to composite objects only; or (b) names are given to their parts only ("and the wholes are described by means of them"). At §61, Wittgenstein asks whether an order in (a) has the same sense as an order in (b). He states that he would concede that they do, particularly since that is how he described it, although he notes that it has not yet been established what is meant by "the same sense" here.

§62. W supposes that the person given the order must consult a table which co-ordinates names and pictures in order to bring the required object. W asks whether the person will do the same "when he carries out an order in (a) and the corresponding one in (b)?" He answers: "Yes and no". W states that we may say the point of the two orders is the same, but it is not always going to be clear what the 'point' of the order should be. W draws an analogy to a lamp which has the essential purpose of giving light, but which also has the inessential purposes of being an ornament, filling a room, etc. W notes that there is not always a clear boundary between essential and inessential.

§63. It could be said that a sentence in (b) is an analysed form of a sentence in (a), which "readily seduces us into thinking that the former is the more fundamental form". We might think that the person with the unanalysed form is lacking something compared to the person with the analysed form who "has got it all", however "can't I say that an aspect of the matter is lost to the latter than to the former?"

§64. W proposes an altered version of language game (48) in which "names signify not monochrome squares but rectangles each consisting of two such squares". A half red, half green rectangle is called "U"; a half green, half white one called "V", etc. W asks us whether we could imagine a people who only had the combined names (i.e. "U", "V", etc.) without having the individual colour names. He asks how these symbols stand in need of analysis, and whether it possible to replace this game by (48) now that we have no names for individual colours. He asserts: "It is just a different language-game".

You've missed a very important qualifier in my sentence. I asked if you would suggest that the reason given was not sufficiently complete, ie not complete enough to achieve its task.

This is why I think a broader view of Wittgenstein's intention is so important (as I keep mentioning) because one can only judge a philosophical endeavour, should one judge it at all, by whether it achieves what it sets out to do. It is only ever going to show some map, some model of the way things are from some particular frame. To ask completeness of it would be like complaining that a contour map did not show the vegetation completely. — Isaac

Really, this is a philosophical investigation with metaphysical implications. The task of a philosopher is not the same as the task of a meteorologist. In philosophy any description which clearly implies infinite regress is undoubtedly an incomplete description. But you were the one who claimed that the description was complete. And now you realize that in "view of Wittgenstein's intention", perhaps you ought not even talk in terms like "completeness".

don’t think we can forgo a careful reading, an “exegesis”, of the text. The aphoristic nature of his writing does not preclude but demands just such a reading. — Fooloso4

I don't think this chimes with what Wittgenstein was trying to do at all. He's quite clear at 90-94 about the purpose of the investigation in this respect, plus a dozen mentions of it elsewhere.

We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of statement that we make about phenomena — PI 90

Note the deliberately vague 'kinds of statement', not a complete list, not an ordered and categorised index, just a reminder of the kinds of statements.

At 91 he warns against thinking that there is something 'hidden' in the ordinary expression which analysis can reveal.

At 93 he specifically references the plight of the person who thinks that propositions are something queer as being caused by the forms that we use in expressing ourselves that "stand in his way"

Philosophy, as we use the word, is a fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert on us — Wittgenstein - Blue Book

I think, though, that Marie McGinn puts it best when she says that that Wittgenstein attempts "... not a systematization of the rules that govern our use of words, but an evocation of the distinctive patterns of use...". The key word there being 'evocation'. We have to pull out of focus a bit to see what Wittgenstein is trying to evoke, not focus in further to establish once and for all what a 'rule' is, or what a 'paradigm' is. To do this would be to apply the very method he is trying to advise against to his own text. I'm not intending to waste much time flogging a dead horse, but that's why I wrote that quote of Ramsey's earlier (whose thought runs through the book). This level of analysis is antithetical to the very purpose of the book. It is, to a great extent, about vagueness, the blurred boundaries of a concept, the inexactness of a definition.

If you're going to pay such close attention to the words used, then at least do so without prejudice. Take a look back over the sections we've covered already and count how many times Wittgenstein has used modal expressions... might, not for all, a large class, maybe, sometimes.. etc. If his exact choice of words is to be considered important, then what is to be made of his inclusion of modality in virtually every proposition except those about the philosophical method, about which he uses completely different language... all, not, always... etc.

As I say, I'm not going to continue flogging a dead horse, if you, and others, are committed to an elucidatory exegesis, then this is perhaps not the place to try and convince you otherwise, but it's going to feel like two separate conversations are going on (unless we have any doctrinal readers here, in which case, three).

The task of a philosopher is not the same as the task of a meteorologist. In philosophy any description which clearly implies infinite regress is undoubtedly an incomplete description. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you have already determined the task of the philosopher then I don't think you're going to get much out of this text.

But you were the one who claimed that the description was complete. And now you realize that in "view of Wittgenstein's intention", perhaps you ought not even talk in terms like "completeness". — Metaphysician Undercover

I claimed it was "sufficiently" complete, a fact I already pointed out once that you had overlooked, such that your now continuing to do so seems disingenuous.

If you have already determined the task of the philosopher then I don't think you're going to get much out of this text. — Isaac

Actually I only said what the task of philosophy is not. It's not the same as the task of the meteorologist. This was to show the irrelevance of your analogy. What are you suggesting, that anyone with basic level training in philosophy won't get anything out of the book? Why might that be?

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I claimed it was "sufficiently" complete, a fact I already pointed out once that you had overlooked, such that your now continuing to do so seems disingenuous. — Isaac

Such a description might be "sufficiently" complete for meteorology, as per your analogy. But my studies of philosophy have taught me that in philosophy, a description which leads to infinite regress is one which is incomplete and needs further investigation. That's why I rejected your claim that the description is sufficiently complete, despite your effort to justify the claim with that analogy. The analogy does not serve the purpose, and in my judgement the description is not sufficiently complete, for the reason stated..

Note the deliberately vague 'kinds of statement', not a complete list, not an ordered and categorised index, just a reminder of the kinds of statements.

At 91 he warns against thinking that there is something 'hidden' in the ordinary expression which analysis can reveal.

At 93 he specifically references the plight of the person who thinks that propositions are something queer as being caused by the forms that we use in expressing ourselves that "stand in his way" — Isaac

Isn't what you are doing here exegetic?

It is, to a great extent, about vagueness, the blurred boundaries of a concept, the inexactness of a definition. — Isaac

Isn't that something that becomes clear through from a careful reading of the text?

If you're going to pay such close attention to the words used, then at least do so without prejudice. — Isaac

I agree. It is not a question of determining a precise meaning of a word but of eliminating misunderstandings of what he means when he uses the word. This is exactly what you are doing when you point to modal expressions. A careful reading of the text does not commit one to " trying to fit [what is vague] into an exact logical category". Ramsey also warns against: "laziness and wooliness".
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Isn't what you are doing here exegetic? — Fooloso4

Yes, I'm not suggesting no exegesis, I'm advising against too close-focused an exegesis which I think is at risk here. The examination of sections without reference to the wider project, or other texts I think risks misunderstanding, but I didn't mean to make such a big deal of it, I only intended it to be a suggestion as to a direction I thought might help resolve some problems.

Isn't that something that becomes clear through from a careful reading of the text? — Fooloso4

No, I don't think it does, at least not in real time, as it were. I think, if it's going to become clear it will most likely be by comparing the section in question to the wider project, other sections and other notes Wittgenstein made. Wittgenstein's style is too aphoristic to yield to interpretation simply by the terms of the section alone.

A careful reading of the text does not commit one to " trying to fit [what is vague] into an exact logical category". Ramsey also warns against: "laziness and wooliness". — Fooloso4

Absolutely, and I wouldn't want to position myself against a careful reading, I'm specifically arguing against a strict section-by-section exegesis of terminology, which, to me, reads too much like categorisation, but if that's the process people here prefer then that's fine, I just wanted to make a suggestion.