But not all games are played by rules that are set and clearly defined. Sometimes the rules are made as we go along by some kind of consent and agreement. There are no rules that stand as the rules for making rules. In addition, the existing rules may no longer be adequate when something new is learned, as in the case of quantum mechanics, where the Newtonian rules do not apply. — Fooloso4

I agree, and part of the problem with language and/or concepts, is that because there aren't always clearly defined rules, we have a tendency to limit the use of a word based on a particular context, and forget other contexts in which the word is also correctly used. We forget the family resemblances associated with being in a family, and focus on only brown eyes and large noses. It's as if when thinking about the concept game we're only focused on board games and ball games.

I think that the method provides no principles for judging correct and incorrect . — Metaphysician Undercover

There are a couple of issues with this; firstly, why would you be so concerned that a method provide principles for strictly judging correct from incorrect? I mean, what's the goal here. Is it just so that we can enjoy policing language users who've 'got it wrong'? What use would we put such a rule to if we found one?

The second I think you might actually find in the text when Wittgenstein talks about accuracy. I may be wrong, but I think what you are looking for (what you think is missing) would be some solution to the problem Wittgenstein already posed when he investigated the claim that the table of correspondence for game 2 (or 48, for that matter) could only be read 'correctly' if one knew the convention to follow from left to right. If we want to 'define' this rule we'd have to draw arrows and say the rule was to follow the arrows. But then how do we know to start at the blunt end and proceed to the pointed end? We'll, we'd have to maybe have a video recording of someone doing just that and say that this is the rule for arrow following. But how do we know from watching an instructional video the we are supposed to perform the same actions as the man in the film?... And so on forever. Wittgenstein is showing that you cannot have what you're looking for. Following one rule requires another rule, and following that rule requires another beneath it. We cannot learn the name of an object until we know what sort of thing 'names' are, we cannot follow ostension until we know what ostension is trying to do, we cannot follow a chart until we know to follow from left to right, we cannot follow an arrow until we know to proceed from the blunt to the pointed end. If you want a description of rule-following, describe a person's every observation, every action, and every response of every person they ever interacted with since birth. That is the full description of their 'learning a rule'. And if you want a fully accurate and complete description of the actual rule itself, collate all of human behaviour since we came down from the trees and there you will have your description.

Which leads me to the third point. The reason why Wittgenstein writes the way he does is widely considered to be his solution to this very problem. He's trying to get us to see something which actually cannot be said, it can only be shown. He's not constructing a watertight argument in logic, because there is no such thing. He's pointing out things which should lead us to 'see' what he's trying to show. Rather like someone trying to point out the beauty of a sunset by gesture alone, it's not going to work unless you're looking where he's looking.

There are a couple of issues with this; firstly, why would you be so concerned that a method provide principles for strictly judging correct from incorrect? I mean, what's the goal here. Is it just so that we can enjoy policing language users who've 'got it wrong'? What use would we put such a rule to if we found one? — Isaac

Isn't that what a "rule" is though, a principle for judging correct from incorrect? If we are here concerned with "rules", but as you suggest, we are not concerned with principles for judging correct from incorrect, what could we possibly be talking about?

That is the full description of their 'learning a rule'. — Isaac

If the full description of "learning a rule" requires that one already knows a rule, and this produces an infinite regress, then obviously this description is faulty.

So what do you think we can conclude from this? If describing language use as a case of rule-following results in such an infinite regress of needing to know a rule in order to learn a rule, ought we not conclude that this is an inadequate description? Doesn't this demonstration prove to you, as it does to me, that it is impossible that language use is a simple case of rule-following?

Consider that we have to account for the creation of rules as well, and this will come up later. It is impossible that creating rules is a rule-following activity or else we have the infinite regress. So if his intent were to make the description of language as a rule-following activity, into a true description, then the rule-creating activity would have to be excluded, as not part of language. Remember #3, we can make a description appropriate by circumscribing the region.

3. Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication; only not everything that we call language is this system. And one has to say this in many cases where the question arises "Is this an appropriate description or not?" The answer is: "Yes, it is appropriate, but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you were claiming to describe." — Wittgenstein

Which leads me to the third point. The reason why Wittgenstein writes the way he does is widely considered to be his solution to this very problem. He's trying to get us to see something which actually cannot be said, it can only be shown. He's not constructing a watertight argument in logic, because there is no such thing. He's pointing out things which should lead us to 'see' what he's trying to show. Rather like someone trying to point out the beauty of a sunset by gesture alone, it's not going to work unless you're looking where he's looking. — Isaac

Yes, this is good, but it's also a big problem for interpretation. To "get it" is not necessarily to understand the particular words, but to see what's being pointing at, beyond the particular words, the bigger picture of meaning. So let's say it's like you say, similar to pointing to the beauty of a sunset. Someone points and says look at that isn't it beautiful. One person might see this or that colour in the sky, another something on the horizon, another a pattern in the clouds (interpretation of art is similar to this), but what the person is really pointing to is the whole scene, as beautiful. The beauty is in the whole scene, not in any particular part. I think meaning is like this, how we see the whole scene, not any specific part.

Is he saying that what was referred to as a paradigm, in 55, "something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning", actually exists in memory? — Metaphysician Undercover

He starts the quoted phrase by saying: “When we forget which colour this is the name of …”. What is not remembered is what the color “greige” means, that is, what color it is. We might remember the color of the foyer but not remember that the color is called greige. So if someone asked you to paint the bedroom greige it would have no meaning. If someone asked you to paint the bedroom the color of the foyer is some house you lived in years ago that color might be the same color the person who asked you to paint the bedroom means, but that might not be the color they had in mind.

Or what does he mean by "comparable" with a paradigm? — Metaphysician Undercover

It is the situation that is comparable. Suppose the person who wanted you to paint the room found a color swatch and wanted the room painted that color, but could not find the swatch to show you. The paradigm, in this case the swatch, is lost. It would be meaningless to ask that the room be painted the color of the swatch if there is no swatch.

He seems to say at 55 that an object cannot be such a paradigm because the name can still have meaning without the object … — Metaphysician Undercover

This does not mean that the object cannot be a paradigm but that a paradigm is not necessary when the connection between the name and the thing named has been made. When the name would have no meaning for someone without an example, a paradigm is used, an example. That example might be an object, but if one already knows that this thing is called “xyz” then “xyz” still has meaning even without the presence of an object.

If the paradigm is within the memory, and the memory is unreliable, then how could we ever know the correct use of the word?

In general, the meaning of a word is determined by its use:

“For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” (§43)

If there were no physical paradigm then the correct use of a particular word might be in dispute. In some cases a dictionary could be consulted or examples of the use of the word in literature, but such cases are rare.

He starts the quoted phrase by saying: “When we forget which colour this is the name of …”. What is not remembered is what the color “greige” means, that is, what color it is. We might remember the color of the foyer but not remember that the color is called greige. — Fooloso4

No, "we forget which colour this is the name of" says that we forget the colour, not that we forget the name.

So if someone asked you to paint the bedroom greige it would have no meaning. — Fooloso4

Not necessarily, because you might still remember that "greige" refers to a colour, but just not remember what colour it is. In this case, the loss of meaning of "greige" would not be complete, or absolute. The word would still have some meaning, it is understood to refer to a colour.

It is the situation that is comparable. Suppose the person who wanted you to paint the room found a color swatch and wanted the room painted that color, but could not find the swatch to show you. The paradigm, in this case the swatch, is lost. It would be meaningless to ask that the room be painted the color of the swatch if there is no swatch. — Fooloso4

OK, but notice that when the colour swatch is lost, the name of the colour still has some meaning. The person recognizes the name as being the name of a colour, but just doesn't have any way of knowing exactly what colour it is.

This does not mean that the object cannot be a paradigm but that a paradigm is not necessary when the connection between the name and the thing named has been made. When the name would have no meaning for someone without an example, a paradigm is used, an example. That example might be an object, but if one already knows that this thing is called “xyz” then “xyz” still has meaning even without the presence of an object. — Fooloso4

I think that what is demonstrated is that the meaning of the name is not rooted in the paradigm (as physical example) at all. A paradigm is not necessary for the word to have meaning. The person forgets what colour "greige" refers to, but the name still has meaning as signifying "a colour". The colour swatch is lost, and the name still has meaning as signifying "a colour". The existence of a paradigm (physical or remembered example) is not necessary for a name to have meaning.

In general, the meaning of a word is determined by its use: — Fooloso4

Right, the meaning of a word is determined by its use. Is this something distinct from "a paradigm"? If so, then this would mean that the idea that the meaning of a word is determined by a paradigm can't be right. But we can create compatibility if the paradigm is somehow a paradigm of use.

No, "we forget which colour this is the name of" says that we forget the colour, not that we forget the name. — Metaphysician Undercover

The name is, in the example I used, “greige”. If you forget which color greige is the name of you do not necessarily forget the color. You may remember the color of the foyer but not remember or know that the name of the color is “greige”.

Not necessarily, because you might still remember that "greige" refers to a colour, but just not remember what colour it is. In this case, the loss of meaning of "greige" would not be complete, or absolute. The word would still have some meaning, it is understood to refer to a colour. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, if someone asked you to paint the room greige and you just grabbed a can of paint and painted the room whatever color that happened to be do you think they would be satisfied because, after all, it is a color? If you don’t know what color to paint then the name greige is meaningless. Perhaps not in an absolute sense, you may already know that greige is a color or figure it out because every paint is some color, but meaningless in the sense that you do not know what to do with it.

OK, but notice that when the colour swatch is lost, the name of the colour still has some meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not say that the name was known only that there was a swatch.

The existence of a paradigm (physical or remembered example) is not necessary for a name to have meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is true. The issue is making the connection between the name and the thing named. A paradigm is a way of doing that. If you cannot make the connection the name is meaningless. Knowing that it is a color is meaningless for the purpose of painting or picking out a fabric or whatever else you might do with a specific color if you don’t know what color it is.

Right, the meaning of a word is determined by its use. Is this something distinct from "a paradigm"? — Metaphysician Undercover

A paradigm may be an example of how the word is used. This is what we find in dictionaries. In general we do not need paradigms for the words we commonly use. If we are unfamiliar with the word, however, a paradigm will help us make the connection.

If so, then this would mean that the idea that the meaning of a word is determined by a paradigm can't be right. — Metaphysician Undercover

The paradigm is an example of what it is that corresponds to the name (§55).

If you don’t know what color to paint then the name greige is meaningless. — Fooloso4

All I can do is repeat. If you do not know which colour "greige" refers to, but you know that it refers to a colour, then the name is not meaningless to you.

Knowing that it is a color is meaningless for the purpose of painting or picking out a fabric or whatever else you might do with a specific color if you don’t know what color it is. — Fooloso4

But it doesn't make sense to say that if a word is useless for some particular purpose it is therefore meaningless. There are many, many, words which are useless for the purpose of picking out a paint or a fabric, but this does not make them meaningless. You are simply declaring that if the person cannot carry out a very specific task related to the word "greige", get a greige coloured paint, then the word "greige" is meaningless to that person. When in reality the word does have meaning to that person because the person knows that it refers to a colour. There is probably hundreds of colour names. The vast majority of them I am incapable of picking out the corresponding colour. However, I would recognize very many of them as colour names. It's nonsense to suggest that just because I cannot identify the corresponding colour, the name is therefore meaningless to me.

All I can do is repeat. If you do not know which colour "greige" refers to, but you know that it refers to a colour, then the name is not meaningless to you. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you do not know what greige is then saying "the color greige" tells you that it is a color. In this case greige tells you nothing at all, it is the word color that tells you everything you know about greige. If you were not told that greige is a color merely saying "greige" is meaningless.

But it doesn't make sense to say that if a word is useless for some particular purpose it is therefore meaningless. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, if you did not know that greige was a color then greige would be meaningless.

When in reality the word does have meaning to that person because the person knows that it refers to a colour. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is only when the word "color" is added to greige that you know it is a color. If you did not know what greige was and I said paint the walls greige you might assume that was the color but you might assume it was some kind of technique.

I am going to hold off commenting further until the discuss moves forward.

56 ...This shews that we do not always resort to what memory tells us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal.

57 ...For suppose you cannot remember the colour any more?—When we forget which colour
this is the name of, it loses its meaning for us; that is, we are no longer able to play a particular language-game with it. And the situation then is comparable with that in which we have lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language,
58. "I want to restrict the term 'name* to what cannot occur in the combination 'X exists'.

The statement of 56 seems clear, memory does not always have the final word in making such decisions. However, at 57 he seems to say that if we forget, then the meaning is gone. So in this sense, memory would be the "highest court" because it determines whether something has meaning or not. Also, it suggests that meaning is not indestructible as was earlier suggested, because when the memory is gone, so is the meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Context is key. At 56 he states that memories can be unreliable, however a (e.g. colour) sample can be used as the criterion of correctness (e.g. to help resolve disputes).

57 opens with the suggestion that "the meaning of the word 'red' is independent of the existence of a red thing," and so suggests a scenario which does not require samples. If we have no samples to rely upon and if we also forget what colour the name refers to, "the situation then is comparable with that in which we have lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language".

If the full description of "learning a rule" requires that one already knows a rule, and this produces an infinite regress, then obviously this description is faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not an infinite regress, no. I'm pretty old, but even my birth was not an infinite amount of time ago. The true and full account of why it is raining right now would require an atom by atom description from the beginning of the universe. Not infinite, but impractically long. None of that prevents me from providing (and making good use of) the explanation "rising water vapour has condensed to a point where it is no longer suspended in the air". We can even predict quite accurately whether it is going to rain tomorrow, not because we know the position of every atom, but because we have a vague theory which works to an acceptable level of accuracy.

It's not that "learning a rule requires that one already know a rule" it's that all the rules Wittgenstein is interested in here, are of that sort. The description of our first acquisition of rules, our first tentative steps, is a matter of of child psychology, not philosophy of language. It is sufficient for this investigation, that Wittgenstein's "close examination" has shown no 'rule of rules', his examples have pointed fairly conclusively to the rule-following being situated firmly (and complexly) within the social context. Somewhere in the millions of interactions emerges the rule, just like somehow in the millions of interactions between air molecules emerges the weather patterns.

Not an infinite regress, no. — Isaac

I don't see how you can deny an infinite regress. If your description of "learning a rule" includes that the person already knows a rule, then unless you can account for this already known rule in terms other than as "a rule", infinite regress is implied, and it is false to say that the description is "complete".

It's not that "learning a rule requires that one already know a rule" it's that all the rules Wittgenstein is interested in here, are of that sort. The description of our first acquisition of rules, our first tentative steps, is a matter of of child psychology, not philosophy of language. — Isaac

So what you are saying here is that Wittgenstein is not describing what "learning a rule" is. He is describing what learning a particular sort of rule is. Maybe we could say that he is describing learning the sort of rules which apply to games. And, to learn this sort of rule requires that one already knows another sort of rule. This is good, but if he later attempts to define "rule" such that all rules are of the sort he is describing (circumscribe the region as per #3), then this other sort, the sort which is a prerequisite to the sort he is describing, needs to be accounted for in terms other than as a "rules", or else the definition is faulty as per #3.

It is sufficient for this investigation, that Wittgenstein's "close examination" has shown no 'rule of rules', his examples have pointed fairly conclusively to the rule-following being situated firmly (and complexly) within the social context. Somewhere in the millions of interactions emerges the rule, just like somehow in the millions of interactions between air molecules emerges the weather patterns. — Isaac

Right, from somewhere within those dusty rags, the mouse "emerges". Tell me another one bro. Isn't the "close examination" intended to get beyond this sort of thinking?

Moving along, at 58 Wittgenstein exposes a complex metaphysical problem. He has already distinguished between having a physical colour sample, and the memory of a colour, (as comparable to having a physical sample). Neither one of these suffices to account for the meaning which the name has. Now, at 58 he discusses the name directly, "red" for example.

He proposes that "red exists" is meaningless. This is because that usage makes it appear like there is a thing named as "red", which exists. In reality there is no such thing (as demonstrated 55-57). So there is just the use of the word "red". That there is no such thing as that which is named by "red" is apparent from the above: it is not represented by the physical sample, nor is it represented by the memory. So "red exists" is just a misleading way of saying that the word "red" has a meaning. And "meaning" is a representation of the use of the word in language.

At the end of 58 he discloses a slight problem with this approach. He admits that "red exists" doesn't really say "the word red has meaning", but this is what it would have to say if it meant anything. What it really says, (according to how it is used), is that there is something named "red", which exists. However Wittgenstein has demonstrated that this is meaningless because there is no such thing as the thing which is called "red". And so he concludes that if "red exists" is to mean anything, it must mean that the word red has meaning.

You can see how it "contradicts itself in the attempt". The way "red exists" is used, is to signify that there is something called "red", which exists. But, there is no such thing as what is referred to by "red", only the meaning or use of "red". I believe it's a sort of paradox, and we might say that using the word "red" in this way creates the illusion that there is something named by "red", and, since meaning is use, the thing referred to, in this usage, must be in some way real because that's the meaning the usage has given it. So Witty's prior demonstration (55-57) indicates that there cannot be anything referred to by the word "red". However, the word is used as if there is such a thing. And, since meaning is use, the meaning is that there is such a thing. But to say that there is such a thing is to say something meaningless.

§58
If the meaning of a word is not tied to an object, paradigm, sample, memory, or any other object (mental or otherwise), then it seems to follow that the meaning of "X exists," is derived in another way. In particular, meaning is derived how it is used in social contexts. So, "X exists," if it is to mean anything, means, there is such-and-such a use for the word. Although as Wittgenstein points out this is senseless.

We could extend this to the proposition that "God exists," which does not derive meaning from whether or not the thing associated with the concept has an instance in reality, but how we use the concept in a variety of social contexts. We should not think that a name is only meant to be some element of reality (PI 59).

This is not to say that the object has no place in the conversation, only that, when it comes to meaning, we need to separate meaning from the aforementioned objects. In saying that "Red exists," it appears "...to us as if we were saying something about the nature of red..." This causes us to look for some thing to associate with the color, which can cause confusion about meaning.

I think there is much more to what Wittgenstein is saying than what we are capturing in our comments.

“In reality, however, we quite readily say that a particular colour exists; and that is as much as to say that something exists that has that colour. And the first expression is no less accurate than the second; particularly where 'what has the colour' is not a physical object.” §58

This seems pretty obvious, so why the convoluted prelude about some unidentified speaker wanting to restrict the term 'name’ to what cannot occur in the combination 'X exists'? Why not? What is the problem? It seems to have to do with ‘names’ rather than any particular thing that is names such as red:

"A name signifies only what is an element of reality. What cannot be destroyed; what remains the same in all changes." (§59)

The two assumptions are connected - the elements of reality are not things that exist they are the elements that are the basis of what exists. This is a reference to the Tractatus’ view of analysis, the simple objects and names out of which the facts of the world and propositions are constructed. But this “particular picture” is now rejected. It is based on seeing the component parts of something composite, he uses the example of a chair, remaining unchanged when the chair is destroyed. Red is just such a component.

58. Wittgenstein (in the role of his interlocutor) states that one cannot say 'Red exists' because "if there were no red it could not be spoken of at all". Wittgenstein provides a less problematic way of viewing it: If 'Red exists' is meant only to say that 'Red' has a meaning, then it is a grammatical proposition rather than an empirical proposition. That is, analogous to the standard metre example, it is a means of representation rather than something that is represented, and so it yields no sense to say either that red exists or red does not exist.

To believe that red must exist despite being unable to say that red exists (per the opening statement), one may be tempted to the metaphysical statement that red exists 'in its own right', or that red is 'timeless' or 'indestructible'.

Wittgenstein states that we want to take "Red exists" as "'Red' has a meaning", and "Red does not exist" as "'Red' has no meaning". However, this is not what those bewitched by the metaphysical picture are really trying to say when they say "Red exists", "but that this is what it would have to be saying if it meant anything." Those in the grip of the metaphysical picture appear to be contradicting themselves by saying "Red does not exist"; but the contradiction is really just a confusion regarding the grammatical and empirical propositions.

§58
If the meaning of a word is not tied to an object, paradigm, sample, memory, or any other object (mental or otherwise), then it seems to follow that the meaning of "X exists," is derived in another way. In particular, meaning is derived how it is used in social contexts. So, "X exists," if it is to mean anything, means, there is such-and-such a use for the word. Although as Wittgenstein points out this is senseless.

We could extend this to the proposition that "God exists," which does not derive meaning from whether or not the thing associated with the concept has an instance in reality, but how we use the concept in a variety of social contexts. We should not think that a name is only meant to be some element of reality (PI 59). — Sam26

How do you relate #59 in this way? It appears to me like "meaning is use" has met the paradox of 58. We want to say "red exists" means that the word red has meaning, rather than that there is an existing thing called "red". However, since meaning is use, and we use "red exists" to say that there is something, a colour called "red", we cannot do what we want to do, the attempt contradicts itself. So it appears to me, like he has met this dead end, this paradox at 58, so he goes all the way back to the proposition "A name signifies only what is an element of reality" at 59, to get a fresh start, from a new perspective.

Wittgenstein states that we want to take "Red exists" as "'Red' has a meaning", and "Red does not exist" as "'Red' has no meaning". — Luke

The problem is that meaning is use . And, we use "red" in this way, as if the word refers to a thing, "red exists", "red is a colour", etc.. So if we claim "red exists" doesn't really say anything about a thing named red, it only says something about how we use the word, then we must look to the use of the word for its meaning and we find that we use the word as if there is something called "red" which exists, So that's what "red exists" actually means. This is why "what we really want is simply to take "Red exists" as the statement: the word 'red' has a meaning", ends up contradicting itself in the attempt.

He seems to propose, at the end of 58, that what "red exists" really means is that there is something existing which has the color red. And when he suggests "what has that colour" is not a physical object, he must be referring back to the "mind's eye", or memory, at 57.

However, I would say that it's doubtful that he has proved at 55-57 that for "red" to have meaning requires that there is something which has that colour. It appears to me that the word "red" could still have meaning when there is no red physical object, nor such a colour in anyone's mind, as this is the case when we create imaginary scenarios. So one might say "red is a colour", while there is no red physical object, nor the image of a red colour in any mind, and "red" would have meaning in this imaginary scenario. This is demonstrated by Fooloso4's example, "greige" is a colour. In this case "greige" has meaning, as a colour, and there is nothing, in the physical, nor the mind, which has that coulour. The word "greige" receives its meaning from the context of use, "is a colour"

.

How do you relate #59 in this way? It appears to me like "meaning is use" has met the paradox of 58. We want to say "red exists" means that the word red has meaning, rather than that there is an existing thing called "red". However, since meaning is use, and we use "red exists" to say that there is something, a colour called "red", we cannot do what we want to do, the attempt contradicts itself. So it appears to me, like he has met this dead end, this paradox at 58, so he goes all the way back to the proposition "A name signifies only what is an element of reality" at 59, to get a fresh start, from a new perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

"A name signifies only what is an element of reality [the interlocutor, or his former self] (PI 59)," is not him going back because he is at some "dead end." He is continuing with his analysis of the idea that a name signifies some thing in reality. Just like you said, the name red, in terms of meaning, is not bound to some object for the reasons his already given in various analogies and examples. Much of 59 is connected with his view of objects and names in the Tractatus. As if some deep analysis of the names and objects will reveal the nature of the logic behind the connection, those things that are the simples. In other words, that one-to-one correspondence between the name in the proposition, and the object, which is the simplest part of a fact in the world. He concludes with, "These are the materials from which we construct that picture of reality." "Picture of reality..." is also pointing back to the Tractatus, viz., the picture theory.

Much of this is an argument against his former view, his early philosophy as seen in the Tractatus. I'm not exactly sure what it was that I said that was confusing or unclear, so I tried to give you some insight in to my thinking as I read this paragraph.

The discussion of the problem saying “X exists” where ‘X’ is a name needs to be seen in context:

For naming and describing do not stand on the same level: naming is a preparation for description. Naming is so far not a move in the language-game—any more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess ... — PI §49

What does it mean to say that we can attribute neither being nor non-being to elements?—One might say: if everything that we call "being" and "non-being" consists in the existence and non-existence of connexions between elements, it makes no sense to speak of an element's being (non-being) … — PI §50

The issue is both linguistic and ontological. Names are the linguistic elements out of which descriptions are constructed. Names also label ontological elements. What can be said is said via the connection of linguistic elements, names. What exists exists via the connections between ontological elements, the building blocks of existence.

Wittgenstein rejects this kind of elemental analysis into simples and composites.

The restriction in §58 of the combination ‘X exists’ is based on the above assumptions. It amounts to saying that a name, the element out of which statements are made is a statement. §59 is the other half of the problem. If a name signifies an element of reality, it would mean that an element, that out of which what reality or what exists is constructed is real or exists.

The seeming paradox disappears when the elemental analysis into simples and composites is rejected.

"A name signifies only what is an element of reality [the interlocutor, or his former self] (PI 59)," is not him going back because he is at some "dead end." He is continuing with his analysis of the idea that a name signifies some thing in reality. — Sam26

However, he has just gone through this big discussion concerning rules of correspondence. This came out of the idea that a name signifies an element of reality. There needed to be a rule of correspondence. And this issue has remained unresolved because the paradigm could not be located.. So now he has to go all the way back, to where he was prior to this discussion of rules, to revisit the idea that a name signifies an element of reality, because no rules of correspondence could be validated.

The seeming paradox disappears when the elemental analysis into simples and composites is rejected. — Fooloso4

I don't see how you can say that. The problem, and apparent paradox, is with the supposition "meaning is use". We use the name "red" as if there is something, an element of reality or something like that, which is named as "red". Unless we reject "meaning is use", we cannot reject the "elemental analysis" unless we find some other thing, something other than an element of reality, which "red" refers to.

I don't see how you can say that. The problem, and apparent paradox, is with the supposition "meaning is use". We use the name "red" as if there is something, an element of reality or something like that, which is named as "red". Unless we reject "meaning is use", we cannot reject the "elemental analysis" unless we find some other thing, something other than an element of reality, which "red" refers to. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don’t see that as paradoxical. As I understand it, what he is rejecting is the idea of “an element of reality”. Red refers to a color, that is how we use the name. We do not need the metaphysical framework of elements and complexes to use the word ‘red’ to name something that is red.

His use of the term 'element' should not be confused with the atomic elements in the periodic table.

I don’t see that as paradoxical. As I understand it, what he is rejecting is the idea of “an element of reality”. — Fooloso4

I don't see that rejection yet. What I see is that he suggested this idea, that names represent elements of reality, way back in the 40"s. In describing this he saw the need for rules of correspondence. Such rules required a paradigm. The paradigm could not be located so now he's gone back to questioning the idea that names represent elements of reality.

Red refers to a color, that is how we use the name. We do not need the metaphysical framework of elements and complexes to use the word ‘red’ to name something that is red. — Fooloso4

You are just obscuring the problem with this statement. We do not use "red" to name something that is red, we use it to name the colour of that thing. Red is a colour. So we use "red" to refer to a thing, and this thing is a colour. Now we have the metaphysical problem of accounting for the existence of this thing, because the use of "red" implies that there is such a thing, a colour, which is named "red". What we "want" to do here, according to Wittgenstein is just to say that it's a a function of how we use "red" and doing this might avoid the metaphysics. However, the problem is that meaning is use, so if that's how we use "red", that's what "red" means, that there's a thing, a colour called "red". So the attempt to do what we want to do, contradicts itself. The contradiction is put aside by saying "red exists" means that there is something somewhere which is coloured red. But this just brings us back to the problem of the paradigm.

We do not use "red" to name something that is red, we use it to name the colour of that thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I said was that

Red refers to a color, that is how we use the name. — Fooloso4

It is not the thing that is red that is named red, a wagon or a barn, for example, but red names the color of the wagon or barn. If I was asked to show someone something that is red I could show them the wagon or the barn. If they understand the language game they know I referring to the color of the wagon or the barn and not to the wagon or barn itself.

Now we have the metaphysical problem of accounting for the existence of this thing — Metaphysician Undercover

§58 brings into question the idea that there is a metaphysical problem:

The same idea—that this is a metaphysical statement about red—finds expression again when we say such a thing as that red is timeless, and perhaps still more strongly in the word "indestructible". — PI §58

We no more have to account for red than for anything and everything else. Why would 'red' be a metaphysical problem and not the existence of wagons and barns and the kid in the wagon and the cow in the barn?

Ahh, I've been crazy busy over the holidays so I haven't been keeping up my commentary, so I'm just gonna pick up where I left off. Excuses if I'm a little behind compared to the thread, and not engaging in current conversation. Apologies to @Luke too for not continuing our conversation where it left off, but I just want to catch up!

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§56

In §55, Witty examined two roles that names could play in a language-game. One in which the name was associated with a paradigm, one in which it was not. §56 adds a third role to this small list: one in which a name is still associated with a paradigm, but instead of the paradigm being something that really exists in the world 'out there', is instead associated with a 'memory-image' that exists 'in the mind'.

That said, despite the distinction between the paradigm 'out there' and the paradigm 'in here', §56 actually spends the majority of its discussion pointing out the similarities between the two types of uses names: the paradigm 'out there' can fade; the paradigm 'in here' can be forgotten.

The question then is this: why does Witty attempt to establish this equivalence between the two 'kinds' of use of paradigms ('out there' in the world and 'in here' here in the mind)? I say that this is a 'question', because at this point, Witty only hints at his motivation for drawing such an equivalence: he's beginning his attempt to undermine any necessary role of 'memory-images' in the use of a name. Hence:

§56: "This shows that we do not always resort to what memory tells us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal".

Pathing back a little, Witty reaches this conclusion by showing the interchangeability of both kinds of paradigms: if a (real-life) sample fades, we might appeal to memory to establish the (correct) use of a name. But the reverse is the case too: memory can also fade, and in this case, one might appeal instead to a (real-life) sample. Thus the conclusion reached so far is largely a negative one: the memory-image ain't all that.

§57

§57 deepens the equivalence between paradigms 'in here' and paradigms 'out there' that was introduced in §56. Recall that in §55, Witty noted that if a paradigm is used in conjunction with a name, then that paradigm must exist, otherwise the name would have no meaning. §57 establishes the same consequences for cases in which the 'memory-image' is forgotten:

§57: "If we forget which colour this is the name of, the name loses its meaning for us; that is, we’re no longer able to play a particular language-game with it. And then the situation is comparable to that in which we’ve lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language."

This actually helps answer a particular question that might crop up in the minds of some readers (it cropped up in mine!): if §55 established that names employed in conjunction with paradigms needed to correspond to something in reality order to have meaning, and if, in turn, §56 established an equivalence between those kinds of names and memory-images, then how could we speak of paradigms ('inside' or 'outside') fading/being forgotten? Isn't the point that they are necessary for the language-game to work? But this is precisely the point: they are necessary, without which the language-game which employs the name in the capacity of a paradigm would not be intelligible.

To speak modally, one could say that Witty argues for the contingency of a necessity: if a name is employed in its capacity of standing for a paradigm, then it is necessary that such a paradigm exist ('out there' or 'in the mind'), in order for the language-game to work. Otherwise, the language-game won't work. This 'injection' of contingency (if I can call it that), further helps undermine the necessity of the 'memory-image' in explaning the use of names:

§57: "And don’t cling to the idea of our always being able to bring red before our mind’s eye even when there is nothing red any more! That is just as if you were to say that there would still always be a chemical reaction producing a red flame".

A quick interpretive note on the last two sections I wrote about: it's often noted that Witty is targeting the idea that the use of names must correspond to images in our head. The open question is whether this entails the opposite position, namely, that words (or names, to be more specific) must then correspond to things 'out there' in the world instead. But, given the equivalence established between 'out there' and 'in here', one ought to instead read Wittgenstein as rejecting the inside/outside dichotomy altogether.

Or, in terms I used previously, we can only speak of inside and outside (in the mind/out there in the world) and names in certain, specific contexts, and not others (when 'names' are used in certain roles and not others). And further, even when those roles are employed, nothing about language 'in itself' necessitates the use of those roles for names: necessity is instead drawn from the 'forms-of-life' which govern language-games.

Isn't the point that they are necessary for the language-game to work? But this is precisely the point: they are necessary, without which the language-game which employs the name in the capacity of a paradigm would not be intelligible. — StreetlightX

I see the point a bit differently. Yes, the paradigm is necessary for such a language-game to work, but only because he has stipulated this by means of the example. It is a presupposition. We have presupposed that there is a language-game which requires rules of correspondence. This language game requires a paradigm.

"An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which
it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game."

We can say, that in order for there to be this type of language-game, the game of correspondence, which requires a paradigm, there must actually be a paradigm. However, his demonstrations show that no such paradigms really exist. Therefore we can conclude that there are no such language-games. I believe he is completely rejecting this type of correspondence. I see it as an "ideal correspondence", and correspondence itself has been reduced to being dependent on an ideal. In a few pages from here he will start to discuss the need to reject the inclination to seek such "ideals" in the effort to validate the rules of language-games. So he is here rejecting correspondence because of this "ideal" nature, it cannot be validated as a real language-game.

In §55, Witty examined two roles that names could play in a language-game. One in which the name was associated with a paradigm — StreetlightX

A color sample is a means of representation (§50). It is a bearer of the name. It shows the meaning of the name. (§40) It serves as a paradigm. (§55)

Can a memory serve as a paradigm? There is an obvious sense in which it can’t. If someone does not know what ‘red’ means I cannot show them by pointing to something in my memory. It is also obvious that if I don’t know or can’t remember what ‘red’ means I cannot show myself by pointing to something in my memory. If, however, I know what ‘red’ means I do not need a paradigm.

I think this is the direction you are going in when you say:

he's beginning his attempt to undermine any necessary role of 'memory-images' in the use of a name. — StreetlightX

if a name is employed in its capacity of standing for a paradigm, then it is necessary that such a paradigm exist ('out there' or 'in the mind'), in order for the language-game to work. — StreetlightX

I think this is backwards. A name does not stand for a paradigm, a paradigm stands for, shows the meaning of, a name.

A quick interpretive note on the last two sections I wrote about: it's often noted that Witty is targeting the idea that the use of names must correspond to images in our head. The open question is whether this entails the opposite position, namely, that words (or names, to be more specific) must then correspond to things 'out there' in the world instead. But, given the equivalence established between 'out there' and 'in here', one ought to instead read Wittgenstein as rejecting the inside/outside dichotomy altogether. — StreetlightX

I agree, and this is very important in so many areas of our thinking. It has particular importance in our understanding of epistemology.

A name does not stand for a paradigm, a paradigm stands for, shows the meaning of, a name. — Fooloso4

I'm using 'stand for' in place of, or as synonymous with, Witty's remark about words 'signifying'. Nothing special going on here.

§56: "But what if no such sample is part of the language, and we bear in mind the colour (for instance) that a word signifies?".

Similarly, when I speak of a memory-image serving as a paradigm, one should read this as 'in the role of a paradigm', where, moreover, I use 'paradigm' interchangeably with 'sample'. Especially since I read §56 as insisting on the similarity/equivalence of role that the memory-image and a 'real life' sample/paradigm play in the kind of language-game under discussion.

if a name is employed in its capacity of standing for a paradigm, then it is necessary that such a paradigm exist ('out there' or 'in the mind'), in order for the language-game to work.
— StreetlightX

I think this is backwards. A name does not stand for a paradigm, a paradigm stands for, shows the meaning of, a name. — Fooloso4

You're right to point this out. The paradigm is the color or the yard stick that the name refers to.