The real world doesn't work in words, and definitions. — Kippo

But you were talking about what is "true". And truth concerns how the words and definitions correspond with the real world. So words and definitions are just as important to truth as is "the real world". To say that biological determinism is "true to an extent" is really meaningless, because it's like saying that the words vaguely correspond with reality. And what this means is that there appears to be some semblance of correspondence, but when it comes right down to the specifics, correspondence is just not there, and the semblance of correspondence is just an illusion.

Biological determism is the domain of science. It has nothing to do with free will, which is logically compatible with biological knowledge — Kippo

Let me get this straight. Free will is compatible with biological knowledge. Then there is something called "biological determinism" which has nothing to do with free will. But since determinism is not compatible with free will, I conclude that biological determinism is not compatible with biological knowledge, which is compatible with free will. Why adopt the position of biological determinism, which grasps for some semblance of correspondence, but is really not compatible biological knowledge?

FWIW, this reminds me of phenomenology. The stuff that is usually too close for us to notice is uncontroversial, but only after someone manages to see it and point it out. And maybe it can only be pointed out a little bit here and there. ('Form of life' is something like 'by means of a faculty.') — pomophobe

There's still a problem here. Some people are near-sighted, some people are far-sighted, some see both well, and some don't see at all. When someone sees something, and points it out to another who does not see it, this does not necessarily make the other person agree that it is there. When an individual has deficient eyesight, you cannot make the person see something by pointing to it. And that person will only agree that the thing is there, if there is trust in the one pointing it out. You might say religion is built on this trust (faith), for every person who sees God there are multitudes who do not, but they agree, and follow on trust or faith.

That's why 128 is simply false. Pointing out to a person, something which you understand, and the other person does not understand, and even presenting it in many different ways, will not necessarily incline the other person to agree. This is very evident here at TPF. The underlying attitude which is conducive to agreement is something completely different.

Biological determism is certainly true to an extent - there is no controversy there - only disagreement as to how much culture and randomness affect behaviour. — Kippo

There's a big problem with saying that biological determinism is true to an extent, whether or not you think there is no controversy here. When there is exceptions to a rule, this is evidence that the rule does not capture an understanding of what is going on, even if you might say that the rule is "true to an extent". Exceptions render the rule meaningless, and "true to an extent", really indicates that the rule is false.

If a creature is observed to act in a certain way, due to habit, then we might make a rule concerning that activity. One might call this "biological determinism". But when the creature displays the capacity to break the habit, then the claim of "determinism" is falsified. So there's really no such thing as "biological determinism", or 'soft determinism", those terms are smoke and mirror illusions which veil misunderstanding and false rules, whereas "freewill" represents something substantial, the capacity to break out of habits.

Well, I'll state the obvious, 128 falsifies itself. It's a philosophical thesis which cannot be agreed with.

What 128 actually says is that the only thing philosophy can do is to state the obvious. Since it's obvious, no one will debate it. He's simply wrong though, as skepticism demonstrates. So we cannot look at 128 as anything other than a false thesis.

Most people don't believe in determinism or that biology explains and predicts everything we will do, — jamesfive

Biology: the study of living organisms.

It's very clearly false, this assumption that biology explains and predicts everything we will do. Sorry jamesfive, but if you want to defend determinism you'll have to do better than that.

Something still needs to be said about the possibility of debate, as well as agreement. — StreetlightX

Actually, a lot more needs to be said about debate and agreement. Wittgenstein falls short here. By 133 he is talking about "clarity" as if clarity is the sole cause of understanding, and the resolution to all philosophical problems. However, "agreement", the attitude required for agreement,, how agreement is derived through discourse, and its relation to understanding, is completely neglected by Wittgenstein here.

It's as if he takes it for granted that a clear description will automatically produce agreement. A philosophical theses must be a description, and if it's a clear description, it will be agreed upon. He may revisit this issue later. For example, it's clearly a duck, therefore not a rabbit, and the clarity of the description ought to lead necessarily to agreement. Even"'clarity" does not seem to be capable of resolving philosophical problems because a clear description cannot change a person's attitude.

I think 128 is meant to be paradoxical. The only thing which cannot be debated is tautology, allowing freedom for skepticism. But tautology is to say the very same thing in two different ways, and this is literally impossible. It's actually contradiction when taken literally. So tautology has no foothold against the skeptic. Therefore, the thesis, or proposition which everyone agrees with, (the tautology), is in fact impossible so the philosopher ought not even attempt this. There is no point to the philosopher even putting forward a thesis (assuming that agreement is a goal of philosophy).

In any case, take 128 as a pretext to what follows. What is hidden from us (129) is the differences between language-games (130). We make translations, for example, and state tautologies, assuming to say the very same thing twice, but this assumption obscures the fact that we are not actually saying the very same thing with the two distinct sayings, due to the differences between language-games.

I believe this is a very important indication of Wittgenstein's distinction between what is and what must be. A philosopher might say that the translation (the copy) must say the very same thing as the original, or else there would be misunderstanding. This is what he referred to as the "requirement" in relation to logic. It must be this way or else the result is absurdity. But it's merely a prejudice toward what it means to understand that forces this requirement on us. Understanding does not require exactness, sameness, what is required is to serve the purpose.

It's a Platonist assumption that two distinct sentences symbolize one and the same idea. But when we take the original and the copy for "what is", they are very clearly physically different from each other. And, the meaning of each is understood through language-games which are different from each other. So we must get rid of this Platonist prejudice which inclines us to think that two distinct statements "must" say the very same thing in order for logic to exist, and for human beings to communicate and understand each other.

Perhaps we have been inclined to misread Wittgenstein's "must" as "ought". He seems to use "must" to refer to some logical conclusion which is forced on us by prejudice and presupposition. So we look at mathematics, logic, and language, with the attitude that they "must" be this way, in order to do the work that they do. But this "must" is forced by a prejudice concerning what they are actually doing. And this prejudice may itself be a misunderstanding. So Wittgenstein is saying that we ought to release this prejudice which makes us look at language, logic, and mathematics through the lens of what they must be, to look at them as they actually are.

Language is limited by purpose, because it is subjugated by purpose, is it not? I think maybe this is the essence of the shift that he has made at this point in the text. Earlier, the concept of game was described as inherently unbounded. Wittgenstein wanted to describe all concepts as essentially unbounded, yet boundaries could be created for a specific purpose. Now, he seems to be positioning purpose, and consequently the boundaries associated with purpose, as immanent within the order which is necessary for meaning. So purpose, and the boundaries which come with it, are necessary for meaning. Now the unbounded really has no place in language.

This is the logical consequence of his premise "meaning is use". This premise forces purpose as a logical necessity. "Use" implies purpose, as there is never a use without a purpose. So if meaning is use, the limitations and boundaries associated with particular purposes are necessary for any meaning. The only way I can think of to avoid this would be to associate meaning with something other than use, something limitless, without an end. This would free language from the limits of the particular purposes of sentient beings.

There's a lot to be said on this subject because it strikes to the deepest level of ontology.

This is the sort of thing it's worth doing philosophy over--"Thinking hard" about what it is that you sense. — Terrapin Station

I think maybe it's the passing of time that I sense. What do you think?

To me, the inconsistency which comes into play at 127 is obvious. But I see the switch at 127 as necessary because the position held before this is untenable, and that is best displayed at 98.

This is where I part company with Wittgenstein. — Sam26

Why does Sam26 part company with Wittgenstein at this point, while I see the opposite, this is where Wittgenstein becomes more reasonable? I find that he becomes more reasonable, in the sense that he recognizes that things get ordered towards a particular goal, but I do not necessarily agree with his stated goal of philosophy, "clarity".

"The signpost is in order - if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose"; the philosohper's job consists in recalling these purposes). I think that works. — StreetlightX

I believe the multitude of purposes is represented as a multitude of language-games at 130. Often a specific game has a particular object, goal or end.

But this is where we have the inconsistency which I've been discussing with Luke. He now (131-133) proceeds to talk about arranging and ordering the recollections for a particular purpose which he names as "clarity". This is to create an order, or hierarchy of purposes, not "the order", but one order out of many possible orders. But this act of creating an order is completely inconsistent with simply laying things out to view, with no explanation. Ordering for the purpose of clarity is explanation.

"Professional politicians" are not all liars — Bitter Crank

Here's an example of Trumpian logic. All professional politicians are liars. I'm not a professional politician. Therefore I'm not a liar.

The sad part ... many of his supporters seem to think it's valid logic.

I support that. But that's just an assertion.

You said that the business (work) of philosophy was the goal of philosophy, and I painstakingly pointed out to you that this was incorrect. — Luke

Despite your pains, there is no such error. If the work of philosophy is to do X, then the philosopher's goal is to do X. You are incorrectly arguing that if this work is used for some further end, then that end is the goal of philosophy. It is not. That further end is the goal of some other discipline which might use the work of philosophy toward that further end. The goal of each discipline is to do the work which is proper to that discipline, and nothing else. That's why these distinct fields of study are called "disciplines", we are disciplined not to have goals outside the boundaries which define the work of the field.

I supported this with quotes from a secondary source reading of the text. — Luke

There's a big problem for you though, none of your quotes support your claim. They support mine.

See the association of order and sense? — Luke

Yes, the association is exactly as I said, and as Wittgenstein said, sense is dependent on order. If there is a sense, then there is an order. But it is not the case that order requires sense. So order is independent from sense. Your quoted passages say nothing about the order, I did say something about the order. And if it is an order, something can be said about it.

Did you have any further defence for your claims about the goal of philosophy? I directly responded to your question. Don't insult me with this crap. — Luke

I pointed out that your response missed a key point. The so-called goal of philosophy requires a process, or work, described at 130-132, which is inconsistent with the described work of philosophy prior to 127. Why does that insult you?

It might surprise you that there is more to a sentence than its words; sentences also have a meaning or a sense — Luke

Meaning is use in the context of this book, and the way a sentence is used (therefore its meaning) is distinct from the sentence itself. We cannot say that the meaning is a property of the sentence, it is the use.

At §98, "order" refers to the sense/meaning of a sentence. (How many times do I need to say that?) — Luke

Order does not refer to sense or meaning, I went through this already. Order is what is required for a sentence to have a sense. 'If there is a sense there must be order' does not indicate that "order" refers to sense.

At §132, "order" refers to the arrangement of grammatical evidence. — Luke

Right, and at 98, "order" refers to the "grammatical evidence" of the sentence. That's why the two uses of "order" are comparable. If you read from 130 on toward 132 you'll see that this order, which you call "grammatical evidence", is understood by comparing language-games, similarities and differences.

Referring back to 98, how an individual composes a sentence, the choice and ordering of words, and what follows, the "sense" of the sentence, depends on the language-games which the individual is involved in. So the "grammatical evidence" (order) of the sentence (98), which allows the sentence to have a sense, is the very same "grammatical evidence" (order) which underlies our knowledge of the use of language: It is an understanding of the order of language-games which allows one to know the sense of a sentence, as well as to have knowledge of the use of language. Knowing how to grasp the sense of a sentence is the very same thing as having knowledge of the use of language.

That's a good question. I don't think I really know.

I don't sense extension, nor do I sense a point. That's why I asked for definition, to be clear on what you were asking. These are properties, like other attributes, which must be judged according to some definition, as I've been arguing.

There is a distinction to be made - which I have tried to make it in my previous posts - between the work of philosophy and the goal of philosophy. I think that the work of philosophy, per Wittgenstein, is to lay things out to get a clear view, but that this is not the goal of philosophy. The goal of philosophy is to make the philosophical problems disappear, which is achieved when we attain complete clarity (§133). The process of arriving at that goal (i.e. the work of philosophy) is not the goal. — Luke

You're missing a key part of the description, which is explored at 128-132. This is the method by which philosophy proceeds toward its goal of making philosophical problems disappear. And the method is an arrangement of the order (a hierarchy) in language-games. The method described by Wittgenstein is known as platonic dialectics. Prior to this point in the book, the strategies of platonic dialectics have been dismissed, because the method of philosophy described by Wittgenstein has been just to look at things and describe things. The point I'm making is that at 127 there is a shift in the description of the method of philosophy, from simply describing things and even doing things (laying things out) to provide a clear look at things, to now, actively arranging things for the purpose of clarity. The latter might be called explanation.

My reading: On the one hand, we don't need to provide some unexceptionable sense to our ordinary (vague) sentences or to construct a perfect language. On the other hand, the sense of our ordinary vague sentences is already in perfect order. So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest (i.e. in terms of sense) sentence. — Luke

Right, the sentence is vague in the terms of sense. I agree. Bit the sentence only has a sense because it has an order. The order, within the sentence is what gives it a sense. If it had no order it would have no sense.

It seems undeniable that even a vague sentence like 'There is something on the table' must have a 'perfect order' buried in it, one that pins down its meaning exactly. [...]

As I said, the sentence consists of words. If the order is not the order of the words, then what is it? To say that the order is somehow "buried in it" does not answer the question. We could break down a spoken sentence and analyze the individual syllables and sound patterns (which Plato actually did), or we could break down a written sentence and analyze the individual letters, looking for the buried order, but the point is that we ought not invoke some sort of mystical spirit to account for "the sense". "The sense" must be discoverable from the physical "order".

I'll just say that I believe the problem with this way of looking at "sense" is that it neglects "context" as contributing to the sense. So if we attribute sense to order, then we have to bring context into order, such that the context of the sentence is part of the sentence's order. Wittgenstein deals with context in terms of language-games, so now at 128-130, he is discussing the ordering of language-games which a philosopher might do. But this still does not give us everything which is necessary, to describe context in the sense of the particularities and peculiarities of individual situations.

The way you phrased the comment was "Due to the fact that these terms require definitions, this can not follow logically," as if any terms that would require definitions excludes those terms from arguments that follow logically.

If you just wanted definitions, you could have just asked that. — Terrapin Station

Seems you didn't read the entire post.

But aren't you familiar with the idea of extension(ality) in ontology? I'm asking because if this stuff is that unfamiliar/that new to you, it's going to be difficult to have the sort of conversation I was hoping to have. — Terrapin Station

Yes I am familiar with extension. That's why I asked for definitions You seemed to be saying that "extension" and "point" were mutually exclusive. But as I understand geometry, a line has both extension and points. So I didn't see the premises (definitions) which were required to make your conclusion.

He makes no mention of the "goal of philosophy" in either of those sections. If you want to pretend like you've already proven otherwise, then so be it. — Luke

109 We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.
And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems.
124. Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is.
125. It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved.
126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain.

Take it as you will, but if "the business of philosophy" is to do such and such, then I would assume that its aim or "goal" is to do that. Don't you think?

If one describes philosophy such that the business of philosophy is to explain nothing, yet it is the goal of philosophy to clarify (which is to explain), there is a problem with the description.

Your claim that "he is talking about the ordering of words in a sentence" at §98 is ridiculous. — Luke

A sentence consists of words and nothing else. If a sentence has perfect order within it, then that order must be the order of its words. If you happen to think that the "perfect order" which is "in the vaguest sentence", could possibly refer to something other than the ordering of its words, perhaps you could try your hand at explaining this.

Your criticism of my comment was based on something not following logically because terms used require a definition. — Terrapin Station

Right, I was saying that the logic you used could only be meaningful if you had some definitions. I was saying that you needed such definitions, requesting them.

So presumably, according to you, things only follow logically when terms used do not require a definition. — Terrapin Station

What? I requested definitions, saying you needed definitions for your logic to be valid. How does that lead to the conclusion that I'm claiming that logic can only proceed without definitions?

You could at least quote the parts of §125 and §126 which support your claim that "just laying things out" is the goal of philosophy. — Luke

I did. If you cannot understand, then so be it.

When he speaks of "order" at §98, he is talking about the sense of a sentence. This is quite obvious from the context of §98 and §99. — Luke

He says "On the other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect order". This does not say that the sense is the order. It says that order is necessary (as determined by some sort of logic) for there to be sense. The order, which produces sense, is what I described above. At this point in the book (130-133), we have moved from "sense", to what underpins sense (as has been determined to be required for sense at 98), and that is "order".

I get that you don't like Trump's style. — fishfry

Do you like Trump's style, of inciting hatred for the purpose of political advantage? I recognize that there is a style of "attack" which has become prevalent in politics, to focus on the weaknesses and wrongs of the other party, because it produces political advantage. But it also incites hatred which leads to division within the nation. Trump takes the "attack" to a new level, utilizing the divisions (national borders) already in place, to incite hatred of the others for the purpose of political gain. As if this were the way to produce a great nation.

This is your unsupported assertion. He never states this is the goal of philosophy. But maybe if you say it enough times it will become true. — Luke

I quoted 126 at least twice and 125 at least once. I'm not here, to teach you how to read. I would expect that anyone partaking in this discussion would have already ascended to a basic level in that. Making it possible to get a clear view of things (which is "the business of philosophy" 125), and, arranging things for the purpose of clarity (after 127), are two distinct things. These two are mutually exclusive.

These are different uses/meanings of the word "order". — Luke

Actually, the use of "order" in these two instances is very similar. At 98 he is talking about the ordering of words in a sentence. This order is given in the act of creating the sentence. At 130-133 he is talking about the ordering of language-games. This is an order given by the philosopher, who sets up the language-games as objects for comparison (the creative act known as platonic dialectics).

In each of these cases we choose from a vast selection of objects, arrange the selected ones in an order, and give them public existence for the purpose of saying something. In the first instance (98), he is talking about a selection of words which are given order as a "sentence". The person says something through the means of the sentence. In the second instance he is talking about the philosopher selecting language-games which are given order to create a "model" (131). The philosopher says something about "the facts of our language" (130) through the means of the model.

The problem is that at 98 he says that any order is "perfect", as if clarity is unimportant in the creation of sentences. And this is simply the way that language is, whatever order is necessary to serve the purpose is the perfect order. Clarity is not necessarily the aim, because language aims at efficiency (getting things done as unenelightened said), and clarity is not very efficient. Wittgenstein was stating in this earlier part of the book, that this is the way language is. That is his description. Yet at 130-133, when it comes to the philosophical act of modeling language-games for the purpose of demonstrating "the facts of our language", all of a sudden clarity is of the utmost importance to the philosopher.

If clarity is of the utmost importance to Wittgenstein the philosopher, then Wittgenstein is not adhering to the principles of description which he has himself laid down. He has described language as serving many possible purposes, and therefore being vague because of this, but when he moves to model language as a philosopher (stating that the philosopher ought to only describe), he appears to choose one purpose, one aim, the goal of clarity. If he has in fact chosen the goal of clarity, he is inconsistent. But, as I said in the earlier post there is still some ambiguity at 132 as to whether he has truly chosen clarity as his aim.

Okay, but I'm still hoping you can give an example. — Terrapin Station

I didn't see how this question was relevant. To me it seemed like you were trying to change the subject. Perhaps all logic requires definition, I don't know, this would dependent on one's idea of logic, but that's not what we're discussing. Since I haven't implied that some logic does not require definitions I see no warrant for your request for an example, and I am not interested in determining whether or not all logic requires definitions.

All I'm asking you about is the fact that you agreed that you can sense the tape measure, but you denied being able to sense some extension of it. — Terrapin Station

Right, until you explain what you mean by "some extension of it", I cannot say that I can sense some extension of it. If you are asking me whether I can sense a particular extension, and you indicate to me, the particular extension you are referring to, then I may be able to answer yes, but I definitely cannot sense the vague and indefinite "some extension of it".

As I implied in the last post though, to talk about a particular extension requires the assumption of non-physical points, to separate that particular part from the rest of the tape measure. So I don't ever really sense a particular extensional section of the tape measure as separate from the rest of the extension of the tape measure.

Complete clarity is the goal, for that is when the philosophical problems completely disappear. You originally said that the goal of philosophy for Wittgenstein was "just laying things out...to get a clear view". — Luke

Yes, do you see the inconsistency there? Complete clarity is what Wittgenstein says is the goal of philosophy after 127. Prior to 127 the goal of philosophy is just laying things out.

However, the process of getting a clear view is not the goal, for it is not the end of that process. The goal is the final achievement of that clear view: complete clarity. — Luke

The aim is complete clarity, as stated at 133. If you choose to ignore this that's your choice. If the complete clarity is for the purpose of something other than philosophy, then this further goal is irrelevant to this discussion of philosophy.

There is no "switching" or inconsistency. Arranging things into a particular order for a particular purpose is the process of getting a clear view. — Luke

Of course it's inconsistency, you seem to be in denial. At 126 it is stated that there is no need for "explanation". To "explain" is to make clear. Therefore to arrange things for the purpose of getting a clear view, is the very definition of "explain". To arrange things for the purpose of getting a clear view is completely opposed to what is stated prior to !27.
"126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain."

If you must, go right back to 98: "So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence.". By what principle is one order better than another order? If a philosopher is creating an order for the purpose of clarity, then that philosopher is explaining. But Wittgenstein has introduced no principle whereby explaining is what a philosopher ought to do. In fact, he has explicitly denied that there is any need for a philosopher to explain. Any order is a perfect order, even the vaguest of sentences, and there is no reason why any philosopher ought to arrange things in any specific order, for any specific purpose, because all orders are equally "perfect".

Therefore all this talk which occurs after 127, about arranging things for the purpose of clarity, is completely inconsistent with what was said prior to 127.

Regardless, I have no interest in arguing over the word "explanation". — Luke

I know, because rather than take a good look at how "explanation" is used, you'd rather simply deny the glaring inconsistency.

I think we'd have to move to inductive logic, but inductive conclusions are debatable.

Anyway, you seemed to be applying deductive logic. Something like "It is not an extension, therefore it is a point". Do you agree that by standard geometrical definitions, the tape measure has both points and extension, and to mark off a particular segment of extension requires points, which by definition have no spatial extension and are not sensible?

You agreed that you can sense the tape measure, and you agreed that you can sense markings on the tape measure. But you denied that you can sense any extension of the tape measure--that is, some arbitrary segment of it. — Terrapin Station

Right.

So if you can't sense any extension, but nevertheless you can sense the tape measure, you must be somehow sensing a single mathematical point of it only, no? Because anything more than that would have some extension. — Terrapin Station

This does not follow logically, because both "point" and "extension" require a definition, they are mathematical terms, like numbers, things which are not sensed, but understood by definition. If we agree that what I am sensing is called a "tape measure", there is no point to asking whether that tape measure is a point, an extension, or both, without defining the terms. Saying that the tape measure is one or the other, or both, would be to assign properties to the tape measure. With definitions we can make the judgement as to whether the tape measure has those properties.

When someone says we are aiming at something, as is the case in 133, "the clarity we are aiming at", then that thing is a goal.

Whether this clarity aimed at is a means to a further end is irrelevant to the inconsistency which I am pointing out. The inconsistency is that prior to 127 Wittgenstein is describing philosophy as simply putting things in front of us, not explaining anything, but after 127 he switches to say that the philosopher will arrange things into a particular order, for a particular purpose. He then proceeds to identify that particular purpose as clarity at 133.

To arrange things into a particular order, for the sake of clarity is an act of explanation. To "explain" is to make clear, and this is obviously inconsistent with 126.

"126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain."

The point being that there is a radical difference between laying everything out in front of us for the sake of observation, and arranging things in an order for the sake of clarity. The latter being a form of explanation.

Rather than being the goal of philosophy [your unsupported assertion], getting a "clear view" is a means to an end; — Luke

No, it is succinctly stated at 133 that clarity is the end of philosophy. "For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear."

I don't understand your question. Why would I judge a tape measure to be a point?

How would my eyes separate one section of the tape from another?

I'm simply asking you now if you can sense some length of the tape measure, that is, some extension of it, some section of it. — Terrapin Station

No, length is a judgement.

I don't sense numbers.

No.

How about sensing the tape measure stretched between the two rocks? — Terrapin Station

That there is a tape measure and there are two rocks is clearly a judgement rather than a simple sensation.

Do you sense the marking on the tape measure? — Terrapin Station

Yes, of course.

Is this just another judgment, or are you actually explaining what is the case - that the doctor is making a judgment? You end up with an infinite regress of judgments which just becomes incoherent. Is the universe one big judgment? Does that even make sense? — Harry Hindu

I see no need to bring in an infinite regress here. Of course a regress is possible though. If someone makes a judgement, and another asks for the reasoning, or justification for that judgement, then the judgement which follows in explanation, and so on, there would be regress. The regress would not be infinite though, because we are finite beings with finite capacities, so the regress would be limited to the point where someone would break it off and the issue would be left unresolved.

You have to realize that judgments are about things, and it is what those judgments are about that matter. Sure, it could be that judgments is all you can do and make of the world, but the aboutness of those judgments creates a relationship that we usually refer to as "accuracy", so judgments themselves have a property of accuracy where they are more or less representative of what they are about. — Harry Hindu

I would prefer to use "reliability" rather than "accuracy". Our judgements are themselves judged for reliability, but this again is a judgement.

Instead of "judgment", I think I prefer "interpretation". Our senses don't lie, but we can lie to ourselves by interpreting sensory data incorrectly. In interpreting sensory data, we are attempting to determine what they are about. What they're cause is. If they have no cause, then solipsism would be the case, which is what it seems that you are ultimately arguing for. — Harry Hindu

"Interpretation" implies explanation, and very often we judge things without explaining them, so judgement is a far better term here. We very often judge things with little or no understanding of them, and those judgements are likely wrong, but "interpretation" implies that there is some understanding of the thing, which is not required for a judgement.

How else can you explain similar judgments by similar minds? Think about it. If we are all separate minds without a shared world (if that makes any sense) then how is it that we came to similar judgments about our separate sensory data - like that there is an "external" world and that there are other minds, and that you are similar enough to be part of a group of similar entities called "human beings"? How is it that "norms" can even be established and referred to? How is it that language could evolve at all? There must be more to the world than just our judgments - or its solipsism, and I assure you that if solipsism is the case, then I'm the solipsist and you are just a judgment in my mind that only exists when I read your words. — Harry Hindu

Similar minds seeing things in similar ways is explained by "similar minds". I'm not denying that there is a "shared world", what I am denying is that what we (as similar minds) say of the world, is the way that the world is. Remember, I am not questioning the thing, I am questioning the properties. For instance, that the red of the apple is "a property of the apple, light and your sensory system". That is just what you say of the world, it is not necessarily reality.

As long as an individual is judged as within the norm, then that person is correct. But correct, as the norm, does not mean that this is the way the world is. For example, we see that the sun rises and sets, and we might conclude that the sun circles the earth. This might become the norm, the sun circles the earth, and this idea could be judged as correct and be the norm. Just because it is the norm, and correct, does not mean that it is the way that things are.

This seems to be the basis for your claim of inconsistency, but where does he describe philosophy as "just laying things out"? — Luke

"125. It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved.
...
126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither
explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view
there is nothing to explain."

Then, at 127 he shifts, to talk about "assembling reminders for a particular purpose". So here has already gone beyond simply putting everything before us, to talk about assembling things for a particular purpose. Assembling things for a particular purpose is completely distinct from putting everything before us.

Now, 132 presents the biggest problem because of some ambiguity. We want to establish a particular order, not the order, but one order out of many possible particular orders. To do this we give prominence to certain language-games which are not necessarily ordinary or common usage. This appears to be a task of reforming language. "Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible.

However, it appears like he might be dismissing such an effort altogether, by saying near the end of 132 "these are not the cases that we have to do with." And then he presents a metaphor, of an engine idling, implying that the cases we are looking for is cases when language is doing nothing. But this doesn't really make sense, because it's hard to imagine a case when language is being used to do absolutely nothing. And then at 133 he seems to go back to the earlier part of 132 again, looking for a particular order which will prevent misunderstanding, "complete clarity", as if this is the particular goal which when obtained, will solve all philosophical problems.

I see a move of inconsistency in this section. Prior to 127, he describes philosophy as just laying things out, "to make it possible to get clear view" -125. That would be the goal of philosophy, to lay things out for viewing, analysis, whatever. But then at 127 he says that this is done for a "particular purpose", so he introduces the notion that the philosopher is actually laying things out for a further end. "To get a clear view" is something general, and we might describe the philosopher as doing this. But now he moves toward what is the particular purpose of an individual philosopher, in doing this (laying things out), and this is something beyond "to get a clear view".

There is always intention behind the "laying things out", which influences the way things are laid out by the philosopher. So at 132 it is not "the order", but one of the many possible orders, which describes how the philosopher lays things out. So even in the philosopher's act of laying things out to get a clear view, there is a particular view (intended by that philosopher) which is behind the philosopher's particular way of laying things out.

Notice that from 130 he proceeds to talk about a comparison of distinct language-games, with the end goal (purpose) of producing a prominent order, "an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible" -132. So that when we obtain complete clarity there will be no more need, or urge to philosophize -133. Now he has moved to his particular goal, complete clarity, no need to philosophize, and he is no longer talking about the general goal of just laying things out.

The precise inconsistency is found at 132 where he introduces his particular purpose. If the goal of the philosopher were simply to lay out all the different language-games for analysis, this would be consistent with what is said about philosophy prior to 127. However, at 132 he starts to talk about a particular way (his way) of comparing language games, and this is inconsistent with simply laying things out "to make it possible to get a clear view". He has now stated that we lay things out for a further purpose, but that purpose is his, not ours.

Like I said, "The apple is red" is making a category error in attributing redness to the apple when it is actually a property of the apple, light and your sensory system. — Harry Hindu

My point though, is that this is all just a judgement.

We can make different judgments about the letters, but the letters don't change. In other words, the letters have properties in and of themselves that makes them letters regardless of our individual judgments. — Harry Hindu

That there are letters in front of you is a judgement.

If they didn't, then how could the doctor test your vision? — Harry Hindu

The doctor makes a judgement comparing what you claim to see, with a standard, the norm. Whether what is there is or is not really letters, is irrelevant, so long as what you say is consistent with the norm.

I think you are confusing categorizations with judgments. — Harry Hindu

Categorization is clearly a form of judgement.

These categories can vary from person to person and what one considers "ripe", another might consider "over ripe", but we are still both talking about the same thing - some property of the apple that we refer to as ripe. If we both weren't talking about the same apple, then we would both be talking past each other. — Harry Hindu

That the two different people are talking about the same thing needs to be established, that's why we have the law of identity. We identify the thing, in this case it is what we call "the apple", and we agree that this particular thing will be called "the apple". But how do we identify a property? I suggest that we do this with a definition, and this is why I say that we need to refer to some criteria (the definition), to judge whether the thing (called the apple) is ripe or not. If we do not agree on the definition of "ripe", which is often the case, then we are talking past each other.

When I say that the apple is ripe, am I talking about the apple in your head, my head, or there on the table? — Harry Hindu

You are talking about the thing, which you have identified as "the apple". So "the apple" is the subject of discussion, and this subject is related to that object by means of identity. That it is "ripe", what you predicate of that subject, is your judgement, and this is in your mind, just like the subject, the apple, is also in your mind. So in your mind you have judged "the apple is ripe", an act of predication, and this relates to the thing you have identified, because that thing is what you call 'the apple".

You’re being absurd if that’s what you think I meant. The relation is observed and measured. Thus ‘laws’ are established and further refined.

I wasn’t saying anything outrageous. The OP is ridiculous. — I like sushi

You very clearly said, "the laws of physics are observed and measured", "and mathematical abstractions are then created". You did not say that events are observed and the laws are abstracted, you said that the laws are observed and mathematics is abstracted, which is absurd. If you did not mean what you said, you could have simply apologized for making the mistake, instead of accusing me of being absurd.

Do you sense the tape measure? — Terrapin Station

Sure, I see something which I call a tape measure, but even in calling it a tape measure, I am making a mental judgement. I think the point is that there is no sensing without mental activity. So I think it would be incorrect to say I see this, or I see that, as an act of sensation alone, without an accompanying act of mind. Mind is required for seeing, and I believe, any type of sensing.