I don't sense numbers.

No.

How about sensing the tape measure stretched between the two rocks? — Terrapin Station

That there is a tape measure and there are two rocks is clearly a judgement rather than a simple sensation.

Do you sense the marking on the tape measure? — Terrapin Station

Yes, of course.

Is this just another judgment, or are you actually explaining what is the case - that the doctor is making a judgment? You end up with an infinite regress of judgments which just becomes incoherent. Is the universe one big judgment? Does that even make sense? — Harry Hindu

I see no need to bring in an infinite regress here. Of course a regress is possible though. If someone makes a judgement, and another asks for the reasoning, or justification for that judgement, then the judgement which follows in explanation, and so on, there would be regress. The regress would not be infinite though, because we are finite beings with finite capacities, so the regress would be limited to the point where someone would break it off and the issue would be left unresolved.

You have to realize that judgments are about things, and it is what those judgments are about that matter. Sure, it could be that judgments is all you can do and make of the world, but the aboutness of those judgments creates a relationship that we usually refer to as "accuracy", so judgments themselves have a property of accuracy where they are more or less representative of what they are about. — Harry Hindu

I would prefer to use "reliability" rather than "accuracy". Our judgements are themselves judged for reliability, but this again is a judgement.

Instead of "judgment", I think I prefer "interpretation". Our senses don't lie, but we can lie to ourselves by interpreting sensory data incorrectly. In interpreting sensory data, we are attempting to determine what they are about. What they're cause is. If they have no cause, then solipsism would be the case, which is what it seems that you are ultimately arguing for. — Harry Hindu

"Interpretation" implies explanation, and very often we judge things without explaining them, so judgement is a far better term here. We very often judge things with little or no understanding of them, and those judgements are likely wrong, but "interpretation" implies that there is some understanding of the thing, which is not required for a judgement.

How else can you explain similar judgments by similar minds? Think about it. If we are all separate minds without a shared world (if that makes any sense) then how is it that we came to similar judgments about our separate sensory data - like that there is an "external" world and that there are other minds, and that you are similar enough to be part of a group of similar entities called "human beings"? How is it that "norms" can even be established and referred to? How is it that language could evolve at all? There must be more to the world than just our judgments - or its solipsism, and I assure you that if solipsism is the case, then I'm the solipsist and you are just a judgment in my mind that only exists when I read your words. — Harry Hindu

Similar minds seeing things in similar ways is explained by "similar minds". I'm not denying that there is a "shared world", what I am denying is that what we (as similar minds) say of the world, is the way that the world is. Remember, I am not questioning the thing, I am questioning the properties. For instance, that the red of the apple is "a property of the apple, light and your sensory system". That is just what you say of the world, it is not necessarily reality.

As long as an individual is judged as within the norm, then that person is correct. But correct, as the norm, does not mean that this is the way the world is. For example, we see that the sun rises and sets, and we might conclude that the sun circles the earth. This might become the norm, the sun circles the earth, and this idea could be judged as correct and be the norm. Just because it is the norm, and correct, does not mean that it is the way that things are.

This seems to be the basis for your claim of inconsistency, but where does he describe philosophy as "just laying things out"? — Luke

"125. It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved.
...
126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither
explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view
there is nothing to explain."

Then, at 127 he shifts, to talk about "assembling reminders for a particular purpose". So here has already gone beyond simply putting everything before us, to talk about assembling things for a particular purpose. Assembling things for a particular purpose is completely distinct from putting everything before us.

Now, 132 presents the biggest problem because of some ambiguity. We want to establish a particular order, not the order, but one order out of many possible particular orders. To do this we give prominence to certain language-games which are not necessarily ordinary or common usage. This appears to be a task of reforming language. "Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible.

However, it appears like he might be dismissing such an effort altogether, by saying near the end of 132 "these are not the cases that we have to do with." And then he presents a metaphor, of an engine idling, implying that the cases we are looking for is cases when language is doing nothing. But this doesn't really make sense, because it's hard to imagine a case when language is being used to do absolutely nothing. And then at 133 he seems to go back to the earlier part of 132 again, looking for a particular order which will prevent misunderstanding, "complete clarity", as if this is the particular goal which when obtained, will solve all philosophical problems.

I see a move of inconsistency in this section. Prior to 127, he describes philosophy as just laying things out, "to make it possible to get clear view" -125. That would be the goal of philosophy, to lay things out for viewing, analysis, whatever. But then at 127 he says that this is done for a "particular purpose", so he introduces the notion that the philosopher is actually laying things out for a further end. "To get a clear view" is something general, and we might describe the philosopher as doing this. But now he moves toward what is the particular purpose of an individual philosopher, in doing this (laying things out), and this is something beyond "to get a clear view".

There is always intention behind the "laying things out", which influences the way things are laid out by the philosopher. So at 132 it is not "the order", but one of the many possible orders, which describes how the philosopher lays things out. So even in the philosopher's act of laying things out to get a clear view, there is a particular view (intended by that philosopher) which is behind the philosopher's particular way of laying things out.

Notice that from 130 he proceeds to talk about a comparison of distinct language-games, with the end goal (purpose) of producing a prominent order, "an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible" -132. So that when we obtain complete clarity there will be no more need, or urge to philosophize -133. Now he has moved to his particular goal, complete clarity, no need to philosophize, and he is no longer talking about the general goal of just laying things out.

The precise inconsistency is found at 132 where he introduces his particular purpose. If the goal of the philosopher were simply to lay out all the different language-games for analysis, this would be consistent with what is said about philosophy prior to 127. However, at 132 he starts to talk about a particular way (his way) of comparing language games, and this is inconsistent with simply laying things out "to make it possible to get a clear view". He has now stated that we lay things out for a further purpose, but that purpose is his, not ours.

Like I said, "The apple is red" is making a category error in attributing redness to the apple when it is actually a property of the apple, light and your sensory system. — Harry Hindu

My point though, is that this is all just a judgement.

We can make different judgments about the letters, but the letters don't change. In other words, the letters have properties in and of themselves that makes them letters regardless of our individual judgments. — Harry Hindu

That there are letters in front of you is a judgement.

If they didn't, then how could the doctor test your vision? — Harry Hindu

The doctor makes a judgement comparing what you claim to see, with a standard, the norm. Whether what is there is or is not really letters, is irrelevant, so long as what you say is consistent with the norm.

I think you are confusing categorizations with judgments. — Harry Hindu

Categorization is clearly a form of judgement.

These categories can vary from person to person and what one considers "ripe", another might consider "over ripe", but we are still both talking about the same thing - some property of the apple that we refer to as ripe. If we both weren't talking about the same apple, then we would both be talking past each other. — Harry Hindu

That the two different people are talking about the same thing needs to be established, that's why we have the law of identity. We identify the thing, in this case it is what we call "the apple", and we agree that this particular thing will be called "the apple". But how do we identify a property? I suggest that we do this with a definition, and this is why I say that we need to refer to some criteria (the definition), to judge whether the thing (called the apple) is ripe or not. If we do not agree on the definition of "ripe", which is often the case, then we are talking past each other.

When I say that the apple is ripe, am I talking about the apple in your head, my head, or there on the table? — Harry Hindu

You are talking about the thing, which you have identified as "the apple". So "the apple" is the subject of discussion, and this subject is related to that object by means of identity. That it is "ripe", what you predicate of that subject, is your judgement, and this is in your mind, just like the subject, the apple, is also in your mind. So in your mind you have judged "the apple is ripe", an act of predication, and this relates to the thing you have identified, because that thing is what you call 'the apple".

You’re being absurd if that’s what you think I meant. The relation is observed and measured. Thus ‘laws’ are established and further refined.

I wasn’t saying anything outrageous. The OP is ridiculous. — I like sushi

You very clearly said, "the laws of physics are observed and measured", "and mathematical abstractions are then created". You did not say that events are observed and the laws are abstracted, you said that the laws are observed and mathematics is abstracted, which is absurd. If you did not mean what you said, you could have simply apologized for making the mistake, instead of accusing me of being absurd.

Do you sense the tape measure? — Terrapin Station

Sure, I see something which I call a tape measure, but even in calling it a tape measure, I am making a mental judgement. I think the point is that there is no sensing without mental activity. So I think it would be incorrect to say I see this, or I see that, as an act of sensation alone, without an accompanying act of mind. Mind is required for seeing, and I believe, any type of sensing.

Woah, cool. You're a psychic! — Isaac

I see with my eyes and read with my mind. If that's what you call being a psychic, then I'm beginning to understand why you have so much difficulty understanding the non-physical. You appear to have a very narrow mind, if you class reading as not the type of thing which your mind does.

I don't. I suppose I would be asserting where the origin of the pattern I'm talking about (which, as above, does not 'exist') physically is. Like a painting of a unicorn. I might say "the unicorn in that painting has black fur, that's unusual for a unicorn, and it looks like it's angry about something". Of course, the unicorn in question does not exist, neither do any of the unicorns I'm comparing it to in establishing it uniqueness, but that doesn't mean it's not relevant where the origin of my abstraction is located. Its about a presumption of shared experience. I see a shirt reflecting partly black, partly white light. I abstract from those light signals a pattern, as set of instructions (black....move an inch...white). I point out the origin of that abstraction, and even talk colloquially about its "being on the shirt" because I presume your mind is sufficiently like mine that you will form a similar abstraction. — Isaac

I really can't understand any of this. I don't see how you can see a shirt, and abstract a set of instructions from the shirt. That makes no sense to me whatsoever. I've never abstracted instructions from a shirt, unless there was something written on the shirt. I don't see much point in continuing this discussion. As usual the person defending physicalism proceeds toward making ridiculous statements in order to defend the ontology, instead of proceeding toward understanding reality. That's not philosophy it's fanaticism

So, the laws of physics are observed and measured (meaning not measuring some imaginary event!) and mathematical abstractions are then created - thought up - in order to make useful and applicable predictions about how experienced phenomena relate - or don’t relate! — I like sushi

That's absurd. How would one observe and measure a law of physics? An event is not a law.

There's little point in talking about one's personal life on an anonymous forum. I've done a lot more than vote. Out there in the world, in real life. But what is your point? — fishfry

I made my point. You compared your political activity to "the average person". But the average person only even votes sometimes, so that really doesn't say much. Just being diligent to vote at every election beats the average person "by a pretty good margin".

you don't sense what the tape measure reads at the other rock, etc. Is that right? — Terrapin Station

That's right, the tape measure doesn't read, I read the tape measure, and reading is a mental activity. I read the tape with my mind, not with my eyes.

Not sure I did, but I may have been careless with my language I suppose. I don't agree that there "is" a pattern on the shirt and one in the imagination (where 'is' is being used to convey existence). I think we can talk about the pattern of the shirt, and we can talk about the pattern of the imagination, but neither exist outside of what they both physically are (shirt and brain). — Isaac

Here's the problem right here. You seem to have agreed that we can talk about patterns without any judgement about whether or not these patterns exist. We'll just talk about patterns, and whether or not the patterns exist is irrelevant. So why do you want to make assertions about where they physically are? If the existence of the pattern is irrelevant to our discussion of it, then it doesn't make sense to make assertions about where it is, don't you think? Can we adhere to this? We'll just talk about various different patterns, acknowledging that where these patterns are, if they are anywhere, is irrelevant.

Have we identified two distinct types of patterns, imaginary patterns, and non-imaginary patterns?

No, and I'm not sure where you might have got that impression from. My understanding of the physics is that the theories at a quantum scale do not apply to objects at a non-quantum level (which neurons certainly would be), that the uncertainties resolve as soon as physical mass is obtained. We might have the particle which mysteriously changes properties depending on whether it is observed, but we do not have any objects which behave this way. — Isaac

What do you mean by "physical mass"? Do you believe that particles without mass are non-physical? There are such particles within, and interacting with the physical mass of the human being, so how can you deny the non-physical aspect of the human being?

How are you determining that the "neurons, synapses, and things like that" are not the pattern? Again, you're begging the question. You're assuming 'the pattern' is some existant thing (such that you can say that a collection of neurons aren't it) in a discussion about whether a pattern is an existant thing. — Isaac

As I said before, if the pattern which we are talking about is not an existent thing, then what are we talking about, and why are we having this conversation at all? We've already agreed that it is a pattern. We agreed that there is one pattern on the shirt, and one pattern in the imagination, two distinct patterns, that are somehow similar. Now you want to rescind that agreement and go back to where you were before that, claiming the imaginary pattern is non-existent, nothing. This is not progress. You agree on a proposition and then it leads you toward a conclusion which you dislike, so you withdraw the agreement.

No. Not a physical object, and not physical at all are two different things. Energy is physical, but it is not a physical object. — Isaac

Energy is not a physical object, it is an attribute, a property of moving objects, the capacity to do work. It is "physical" only in the sense that it is something attributed to an object. Energy is a property of an object. The problem here is that some people assign "existence" to properties without having any physical object to assign these attributes to and then they create the illusion that the attribute has existence all on its own. In this case someone would say that energy exists as something physical, independent of any object. But of course that's nonsensical to say that there is a property existing independently of all objects, unless we look at that property as a concept, then it is an abstraction, in the mind.

I'm starting to see a pattern now in your thinking. It appears like you want to say that the non-physical is real, so long as it is not consider to exist as physical objects. The imaginary pattern is real, but not an existing physical object, energy is real but not an existing physical object. For you, these things are real, and they are not physical objects. However, instead of recognizing that "not physical objects" means that they are "non-physical" you want to make the incoherent move of disassociating "physical" from "object", to say that these things are physical but not objects. Do you understand that "physical" is defined as "of the body"? This is why your move to disassociate "physical" from "object", allowing that things like energy, and imaginary patterns, are physical but not objects is incoherent, because it renders the term "physical" as incoherent and self-contradictory. There are things of the body (physical) without a body (object)

Yes, that's pretty much true in essence. I don't think physicists would use the term' dualism', but it certainly seems as though some very 'spooky' stuff is going on at the quantum scale. But it's not 'nonsense' at all to dismiss it at the human level. There is sound empirical and mathematical evidence for the 'spooky stuff' going on at the quantum level. There is none whatsoever for it going on at the human level. We do not require a 'realm of thought' to create useful models of the world (yet), so why invent one? — Isaac

Oh come on Isaac. Do you truly believe that there is no quantum activity in the human nervous system? Biologists have determined that the molecular structure of living cells is extremely complex. And these molecules are very active, so I would say that they are most definitely making use of quantum activity. Why would you say that there is "spooky stuff" going on at the quantum level, but no "spooky stuff" going on in the human cells.

Can you sense the measurement? — Terrapin Station

Of course not, the measurement is a judgement, in my mind. It is a comparison between the thing measured and the devise, or standard used for measuring. How would I sense the inside of my mind?

So, what are you saying - that there are no such things as properties - only judgments? Judgments about what? — Harry Hindu

We make judgements about anything. Do you recognize the difference between the thing and what is attributed to the thing (a property)? Or, the difference between the subject and the predicate? To say that something has a specific property does not mean that the thing actually has that property, the statement is a reflection of a judgement. It means that the thing has been judged to have that property.

What is ripe for you isn't overripe for your son. It is still in a state of ripeness that either you or your son prefer. It isn't that it is over ripe for your son, it is the same ripeness as it is for you, it's just that he prefer's his under ripe, whereas you prefer yours ripe. You aren't determining the ripeness of fruit. It is your judgment, or preference, of the current state of ripeness. Your judgment has to be about something, and it is about the current state of the fruit. You are committing a category error in projecting "good" or "bad" onto the fruit, when the fruit is only ripe, over ripe, or under ripe, not good or bad. Good and bad are properties of judgments. — Harry Hindu

That's nonsense. If it isn't a judgement which determines whether the fruit is ripe or not then how is the ripeness determined? Do you not see that there needs to be criteria as to what constitutes "ripe" and, that there needs to be a comparison of the fruit in relation to this criteria, in order for the fruit to be determined as ripe or not? If this comparison is not a judgement, then what is it?

This is the case when any properties are attributed to anything, it is a matter of judgement.

Your syllogism is correct, but I don't agree with (nor can see any reason for) the premise. Why would our ability to measure something have anything to do with its having a location in space? Surely all our ability to measure something tells us is our current state of technology, not anything ontological?

If you mean our ability to measure something in theory, then you're just begging the question by asserting that the pattern in the mind cannot be measured. That is the very issue at hand. — Isaac

Ok, you obviously do not like my claim that the imaginary pattern has no location in space, being imaginary. So perhaps you can offer a description or definition of what you mean by "location in space" which would allow that the imaginary pattern has a location in space. To say that the pattern has a spatial location inside a brain is really nonsense because the neurosurgeon will find neurons, synapses, and things like that, but not the pattern which is being imagined.

It is difficult to determine the spatial location of quantum particles, but as soon as they become physical objects their spatial location is not at all difficult to determine. — Isaac

So you believe that there is a time when a quantum particle is not a physical object? I suppose therefore, that at this time it is non-physical. If you accept that the quantum particle is at some times physical and at other times non-physical, then why would you have a problem with a physical/non-physical dualism? It seems like you accept dualism in the principles of physics, but not in ontology of the human being. Isn't this the type of nonsense which the op refers to? Dualism in physics is conventional, but the physicalist doesn't allow dualism in ontology. What's with that?

Not that "physical" is defined by "what we can sense," but you can't sense that something is, say, a meter to the left of something else? How do you figure out that something is a meter to the left of something else if you don't sense that? — Terrapin Station

No I can't sense that one thing is a metre to the left of another, that must be measured or in some other way judged. Senses don't make judgements, minds do.

For, despite the heavy critique of the Tractatus here (re: idealisation and so on), Witty’s understanding of philosophy remains strikingly similar. — StreetlightX

I agree, and I find this to be very odd. The TLP is extremely naïve in its simplistic representation of philosophy. In the PI Wittgenstein appears to recognize this naivety, and the fact that philosophy is much more complex than he originally thought. But for some undisclosed reason, he refuses to recognize, in his writing, the implications of these complexities. The glaring deficiency is that philosophy really does deal with morality, and how human beings ought to be behave, and language use is described by Wittgenstein as a form of human behaviour. So the fact that philosophy deals with how people ought to use language cannot be avoided.

Now he has created a real dilemma for himself. If he is to accurately describe what philosophy is, it is required that he include moral philosophy which prescribes what people ought to do. And if he excludes moral philosophy from his description, saying that philosophy ought not include this, then he is practising that very form of philosophy which he is saying ought not be done.

and that philosophy only ought to describe language — StreetlightX

Here is a fine example of the hypocrisy which Wittgenstein has forced himself into by refusing to bring his criticism of the TLP down to the root of the problem, its representationalism. Instead of beginning at the true base of language use, what he himself has exemplified as "orders", instances of telling someone what to do, he still wants to begin with representation, description. He now jumps the ought/is gap, to maintain his mistaken starting point of representation. But that jump is an act of hypocrisy.

Well not an exact copy, obviously. It will have some similarities and some differences. The key difference (which obtains no matter how accurate the representation) being the location in space. One is in someone's head, the other is on a shirt — Isaac

I don't think that the difference is a matter of "location in space". The pattern on the shirt can be seen and can be measured as occupying space, the one in the designer's mind cannot. The spatial existence of the two is what is different. If being able to be measured, and having spatial relations with other things is having a "location in space", then the imaginary pattern has no location in space. That, I think is the principal difference, the pattern on the shirt can be said to have a spatial location, but the imaginary one cannot.

This huge difference is why we're better off to move to something like what you mentioned, "instructions", or what I mentioned, a "plan" or 'blueprints", to understand the creation of the pattern on the shirt. We can say that the instructions have physical existence, on the paper, but this is a bunch of symbols which represent the ideas of what someone is supposed to do in order to create a shirt with a specified pattern. These ideas of what someone needs to do to create a specified physical object, are in minds.

There is no point in you and I discussing exactly where the pattern is, until we determine what a pattern is, because I think the pattern is what is specified about the shirt, and therefore is ideal, having no spatial location, and you think the pattern is what exists in the shirt therefore having a spatial location in the shirt. Studies in physics demonstrate that it is difficult, if not impossible, to assign spatial locations to parts (particles) within objects. So I think that my position is much more realistic than yours. The pattern is what is specified about the shirt, it is not something within the shirt. Can you agree with this, or would you prefer to demonstrate how you think that it is more realistic to conceive of the pattern as something in the shirt, or on the shirt, rather than something which is said about the shirt?

That sounds like a lazy professor, getting the exam questions off the internet.

It's referring to the relation of the threads--the way they're situated with respect to each other extensionally (or we could more conventionally say the way they're situated in space). You don't think that the relation of the threads is nonphysical, do you? — Terrapin Station

Of course the relations of the threads are non-physical. How could they be conceived of as physical? The threads are physical things which we can sense, and spatial and temporal relations are not sensible so they are non-physical. That this thread is situated, in such a relation to another thread is purely a spatial concept, and therefore non-physical. Or do you think that space is a physical thing? If so, by what sense do you perceive space? And if you don't sense it how could there be a physical thing which you cannot sense?

You seem to be saying everything, including the physical, is non-physical since the only window to the world we have is our mind. It's kinda like saying an apple is the very same thing as light just because we need light to see an apple, which is incorrect. — TheMadFool

No I did not say everything is non-physical. I said that we interpret our sensations of physical things through the use of non-physical principles. Therefore our understanding of the physical is dependent on our understanding of the non-physical, and only as reliable as our understanding of the non-physical. This is why you are misguided in your assumption that knowledge of the physical is more "objective" than knowledge of the non-physical. In reality, the reliability of our knowledge of the physical cannot surpass the reliability of our knowledge of the non-physical. So your apple/light analogy is not relevant.

Are you aware of the tinted glass analogy. If you are looking at the world through a tinted glass, and you cannot avoid looking through that glass, then the tinting of the glass will affect how the colour of the world appears to you. Until you fully understand what the tinting of the glass adds or takes away from the appearance of the world, you will not be able to say how the colour of the world really is. The same is the case with the non-physical principles by which we understand the world. Our minds look at the physical world through these non-physical principles, and until we fully understand what they add or take away from the appearance of the world, we cannot say how the world really is.

No. I must have an image (or instructions) relating to a pattern in order to try to create another pattern just like it. Neither of them are the pattern in some way. They are two different patterns with many similarities. — Isaac

OK, let's say that they are two different patterns. Whether or not they are similar is a matter of judgement.

Yes. "Exists" is not the problem, "the" is the problem. There's no such thing as the pattern. There are patterns (which are just collections of properties we focus on), those patterns have similarities, that's all there need be to it. We don't need to then reify some archetype. — Isaac

If there is no such thing as "the pattern", then I see no reason to be talking about the pattern. But if you say that the shirt has "a pattern", then it is you who is trying to reified "the pattern", claiming that it is a real thing within the shirt. I see no principles whereby we might judge something, what you call "collections of properties" as "a pattern". Is any random thing a pattern to you? Can we agree that there is no point in talking about "the pattern", or "a pattern" if you insist that there is no such thing as 'the pattern", and to say that the shirt has a pattern is pure nonsense? if there is no such thing as "the pattern" which the shirt has, it is nonsense to say that it has a pattern.

But a tartan pattern, for example, is just as possible as apples to remove from the world. In fact, before the advent of weaving, there was a world with no tartan pattern. What you can't do is remove all the tartan patterns from the world but leave all the kilts exactly as they were, meaning that the tartan pattern does not exist independently of the thing it is describing. — Isaac

Talking about the world prior to the existence of some thing, is not the same as attempting to remove something already existing in the world, and then talk about that thing afterwards. These two are completely different. So this comparison is not useful. And since we have no premise to talk about the existence of patterns, as you have insisted there is no such thing as the pattern, we need to establish some premise whereby we can talk about patterns, before there is any point to making a claim such as the one you've made here.

No. A pattern existed in the mind of the designer. A different pattern exists on the shirt. Are you trying to claim that the exact same pattern has been removed from the mind of the designer and placed on the shirt? — Isaac

No, what I claimed is that a copy of the pattern which existed in the mind of the designer was made on the shirt. So we seem to have agreement here, maybe we can find a starting point. The pattern in the mind of the designer is not exactly the same as the pattern on the shirt. Let's say that there is a pattern in the mind, and there is a pattern on the shirt, and they are not the same, and neither can be said to be "the pattern". Do you agree that the pattern on the shirt is a copy of the one in the designer's mind?

The property of ripeness belongs the the apple alone, not redness. — Harry Hindu

That's strange I would think that "ripeness" is a judgement made by human beings, and not a property at all. When the banana is ripe for me, it is overripe for my son. Ripeness is not a property at all, it's a judgement, just like good and bad are not properties of moral and immoral acts, they are judgements of such acts. Come to think of it, redness, big, small, hard and soft, and everything that we call "properties" are just judgements made by human beings. When we say that such and such has X property, we are just making a judgement.

Properties are emergent, and properties are not "composed of parts". — Janus

As having properties is how we describe things. Where does the property emerge from, the human mind which does the describing? If you are direct realist, then the property is the thing, and it is therefore composed of parts.

Dangerously close to it; not to mention the fact that it closes all inquiry since the non-physical, by definition, can't be investigated in anyway. — TheMadFool

Why would you say that the non-physical cannot be investigated? It just cannot be sensed and so we must investigate it with the mind, logic. Magic is a performance, often associated with trickery, illusion and deception. When the method of an act of performance is unknown, it may be said to be magic. But the methods of magic may be investigated. I suggest to you, that the reason you associate the non-physical with magic is that you haven't taken the time to investigate the non-physical, and therefore the acts of the non-physical create the illusion of magic.

That said I see an opening for inquiry into the mind with the mind itself - a sort of self-examination which philosophy encourages. However I don't know how much objectivity, a necessity I presume, can be attained along such lines. — TheMadFool

Yes, that's the route, examine the mind with the mind. I think your concern about objectivity is misguided though. The mind is what is used to understand both sensible world, and the mind itself. But the mind is present to the mind directly and therefore has direct access to itself, while it only has a mediated access to the sensible world, through the means of the senses. So it only understands the sensible through the means of the principles by which it interprets sensations. These principles are not themselves sensible, they are non-physical, and are only understood directly by the mind. Therefore, all of our knowledge of the sensible world, the physical, is only as dependable, or "objective", as our knowledge of the intelligible world, the non-physical. And it is necessary to conclude that our knowledge of the physical is founded, grounded, and based in our knowledge of the non-physical, so it is impossible that our knowledge of the physical is more reliable, or "objective", than our knowledge of the non-physical.

This is why it is not very wise, and possibly dangerous to dismiss the non-physical as magic. The physicists, and other empirical scientists are using the non-physical principles in their performance acts of prediction. If we want to understand what they are doing in these acts, we must proceed towards an understanding of the non-physical principles. If we dismiss the usage of non-physical principles, and therefore the scientific performances, as magic, this is just a disposition of not wanting to know.

I'm not seeing the necessity here. How is our repeatedly using the same name to describe similar arrangements of colour and shape forcing a thing into existence? — Isaac

Do you know what it means to arrange things in a pattern? Would you agree that you must know the pattern, in your mind, prior to arranging the things according to that pattern? If so, then how can you not recognize that the pattern exists in your mind prior to the things demonstrating the pattern? If you are having a problem with the word "exists", then we might leave it out, and say that the pattern is in your mind prior to the things being arranged in the pattern. Do you not understand this, or see some reason to deny it?

If I asked you to imagine a world without apples are you seriously suggesting that the question doesn't even make sense until I can provide you with the details about how exactly I plan to destroy all the apples. Do you ask Putman how exactly he planned on making his vat? Do you require architectural drawings before considering Searle's Chinese room to have any meaning? — Isaac

The question makes no sense to me, but sense to you, because you and I seem to have a different understanding of what a "pattern" is. If "apples" were the type of thing which were impossible to remove from the world, as "patterns" are, then you would see that it makes no sense to ask someone to imagine a world without apples.

It's a thought experiment. Just presume I have some means of destroying things that exist in the realm of platonic forms (or whatever realm you're positing for this pattern). What would the shirt with alternating stripes now look like if I destroyed the pattern {alternating stripes} within the realm in which it exists? — Isaac

OK, I'll try this thought experiment for you. I remove from my mind, a particular pattern. Let's say I forgot it. Then I really cannot say what the shirt would look like, because I forgot the terms I would use to describe it. Maybe I could think up some new, random words to describe it, but what good would that do?

The real issue here, which you seem to have no respect for, is that the pattern existed in the mind of the designer, before it is expressed in the shirt. So it really makes no sense to ask me whether I can banish the pattern from the intelligible world, now, because the pattern was necessarily there in the intelligible world, at that time when the shirt, with that pattern, was created. Whether or not I have the capacity to recognize the pattern is irrelevant.

I didn't claim to be having any trouble imagining the pattern without the shirt. If you actually read my post I'm asking entirely about imagining the shirt (completely unchanged physically), but without the pattern. — Isaac

Unless you are direct realist, the pattern is not in the shirt, it is what the shirt is said to have. The designer has the pattern in mind, and makes the shirt as an example, or representation of that pattern. You can see this in all artificial physical objects, cars, planes, building, etc., they are representations of the ideas, concepts, used to construct them. There is a model, a blueprint, design, which the object is made to be a representation of. This is what is in Plato's cave allegory, sensible objects are a reflection of the ideas used to create them. That's how the philosopher comes to understand the reality of existence.

I don't see how that's relevant. What's relevant is that the concept of "emergence" is such that if something is emergent it is composed of parts. And anything composed of parts is reducible, according to the concepts of "parts" and "reducible". Therefore it is impossible, by way of contradiction, that anything emergent is irreducible. "Emergence" as such is nonsense.

Final cause as described by Aristotle is incompatible with emergence, because it requires that the form of the thing which will come into being is prior in time to the material existence of the thing, as its cause, like an idea, the blueprint or plan for the thing. Final cause implies intention. "Emergence" does not allow that the emergent thing's existence is intentional. Therefore "emergence" is incompatible with "final cause".

So, if the pattern exists as some other thing to the shirt, what happens if we destroy just the pattern (but leave the shirt completely untouched)? — Isaac

The pattern is something other than the shirt because many different shirts are said to have the same pattern. And, the person who designed the shirt had the pattern in mind before it came to exist on the shirt. I don't know how you would destroy a pattern. Suppose 2, 4, 6, 8, is a pattern. Erasing the numerals does not destroy the pattern because I still have the pattern in my mind. So the question doesn't make any sense until you propose how a pattern would be destroyed.

If the two are two different things, there should be some result that is one without the other (A+B, - B, is A, not A+B still), but I can't think what that could be. — Isaac

That the shirt has pattern X, pattern Y, or some other pattern is a judgment which someone makes. The judgement is made by the person who designed the shirt, that it ought to have such and such a pattern. And so the shirt was made to have that pattern. The pattern exists in the designers mind, and on paper, before it exists on the shirt. It could be imagined to be on numerous different media. So it's actually quite easy to imagine the pattern without the shirt. I don't see why this might be difficult for you.

Why would you think it is contradictory? — Janus

I can't believe that this is not obvious to you. If a thing emerges, it emerges from those constituent parts, and is therefore reducible to those parts. How does it make sense to you that something could emerge, but is not reducible to the parts from which it emerges? That would be like saying that there is an effect which cannot be explained by its causes.

Look at a car. It's made of metal, rubber, plastic and glasses that come in varird shapes. Separate they're nothing but together they acquire a property/function that can't be understood if we consider only the parts. Only the whole, all parts together, is what we call a car. I think brain-mind is something very similar and, so, shouldn't cause us to overactivate our imagination. — TheMadFool

I wouldn't say that the parts are nothing without the whole. They are not parts of the car, unless there is a car, but all those bits of metal, glass, plastic, etc., are still something without the existence of the car.

Well, if we take a cellular phone and time travel back to the 12th century it would be unexplicable and I'm quite sure 12th century folks will ''explain'' it as sorcery or something to do with spirits etc. The truth however is that cellular phones are correctly explained with physical radiowaves. This clearly shows that we shouldn't default to magical thinking just because something can't be explained readily with the physical sciences. — TheMadFool

Actually, I think the cell phone would be useless in that situation, without the necessary infrastructure. The cell phone is just a part. It is something without the rest of the system, but it isn't very impressive. I don't know what you mean by "magical thinking", you'd have to explain this. Do you believe that the non-physical is magical?

The pattern is simply the arrangement of colored threads as they comprise the shirt, the relations of them to each other. — Terrapin Station

The shirt is composed of coloured threads. The threads are physical things. To say that the threads are in an arrangement, or a pattern, is to refer to something other than the threads. You refer to a pattern.

But in building a model of suffering we are not attempting to predict how people are going to move! — leo

You seem to be moving toward associating suffering with thought. Thought is mental activity. Mental activity is a movement. So really, I think that trying to model suffering is trying to model how people move. Don't get me wrong, I am not saying that it is completely impossible to produce any such model, but I am saying that any such model will inevitably be very simple and basic, most general. I think there has been some success in modeling the way that people move, in the field of morals and ethics.

There can be pain without suffering, and there can be suffering without pain, so the two are not the same thing, nor is suffering a subset of pain, nor is pain a subset of suffering.

You say that all suffering might qualify as pain but I don't agree. By pain we usually refer to the sensation of physical pain. When you suffer from the death of a loved one, that suffering is very different from the sensation of physical pain. It might however be somewhat similar to the suffering you may experience while you endure a strong physical pain, as in it is an experience you want to stop but you don't know how to stop. — leo

I don't see how there can be suffering without pain. All you are doing here is dividing pain into subsets, and trying to claim that the type of pain which one feels at the death of a loved one is not pain, because it's not a "physical pain". Not all pains are physical. So I don't see that this sort of division and exclusion is useful. Since suffering may coincide with either physical pain or emotional pain, it makes no sense to exclude emotional pain, from the category of pain, claiming that it is not a sort of pain.

Do you agree that we can experience all sorts of pain, physical emotional, or whatever, without suffering, and also that suffering can come along with any sort of pain and is always associated with pain? If so, then it doesn't make sense to separate suffering from pain. And if you insist on such a separation, then the onus is on you to demonstrate what sort of suffering there could be which does not involve pain. Surely when one suffers as the result of losing a loved one to death, there is pain involved. If there were no pain, then how could you call it suffering?

Now I agree that we can't say with absolute certainty that when we feel physical pain and suffering at the same time, that the suffering is a consequence of the pain. At that point it depends on the model of suffering we build. — leo

Isn't the goal to build the correct model though, not just any model? If so, we ought to determine whether the suffering is separable from the pain, as a result or effect of it (as you implied), or whether it inheres within the pain. We do have pain without suffering, we agree on that, so suffering does not inhere within all sorts of pain, but there may be some types of pain which do not occur without suffering. So for example, if we distinguish physical pain from emotional pain, it may be the case that emotional pain is always suffering, as suffering may be inherent within it. If that were the case, then whenever there is emotional pain, there is suffering. If this is the case, then whenever there is suffering which occurs with physical pain, it may be that the suffering is an emotional pain which is coincidental, or even caused by, the physical pain.

What is it that is different between the individual who apprehends pain as something which cannot be overcome, and the individual who apprehends pain as something which can be overcome? Belief. What you refer to as one's attitude or mental approach is in this example one's belief. Depending on what is believed, a given perception may give rise to suffering or not. — leo

Here, you are saying that suffering is the result of a particular belief. This may be the case, but if it is true, then the suffering is caused by the belief, not by the pain. The problem though is that you have reduced "attitude" to "belief", and I don't think that this is acceptable. A person's attitude is one's disposition toward thinking, and one's beliefs are the thoughts which have been formed by such thinking. So an attitude is prior to, and necessary for, the formation of beliefs, as a sort of cause of different types of beliefs according to different attitudes.

Now the suffering may be associated with particular beliefs, as coincidental with them, but it cannot be attributed to the beliefs if it is derived from the attitude, which is the way of thinking, the way that one forms beliefs. If this is the case, then the suffering would be a painful way of thinking, and not necessarily associated with any particular belief. I think it is important to bear this in mind because belief requires judgement. A person thinks, in the effort to resolve problems etc., and when it appears that the problem is solved, this judgement is made, then one no longer needs to consider the problem, as a belief concerning the resolution of that problem has been formed. In some cases suffering may be associated with the inability to make the judgement, the individual is held in suspense. Therefore we ought to associate the suffering with the way of thinking (attitude) rather than with the belief (which is the result of the way of thinking.

What is it that is different between the individual who apprehends pain as something serving no purpose, and the individual who apprehends pain as something leading to something better? Desire. If there is a desire to endure the pain in order to get a stronger body, that pain is not suffering. If there is no such desire then the focus is on the desire to not experience the pain, and that pain is then suffering. — leo

The point which I was trying to make, and I ought to stress, is that the pain is completely separate from the desire. The pain itself is neither desired nor not desired. What is desired is the stronger body. The pain is something which just happens to coincide with achieving that goal. A specific activity is required to achieve the desired end, and some pain happens to be associated with that activity. We do not "desire to endure the pain", nor does pain serve a purpose. We desire the stronger body, and therefore the activities required for that, and the pain happens to come along with those activities, so it is endured. The activities serve the purpose and the pain is a by-product, the pain does not serve the purpose. We now have a perspective of pain which is completely disassociated with desire. Pain is neither something which is desired, nor is it something which we desire to avoid, it is just something which happens to be there.

I don't agree that there is always a conflict between what is desired and what is experienced.

If you desire something but you don't have it, and you focus on the fact you don't have it, you focus on the conflict and you suffer.

However, if you desire something and you believe you can get it, you don't focus on the fact you don't have it. The belief changes the experience, the experience is not the same because the focus is not the same. You focus on the goal you desire, you visualize it, and this desire is stronger than the desire to avoid the perceived pain. There is a difference between what is desired and what is experienced, but it is not a conflict. A difference is not always a conflict.

But I agree it should be possible to come up with a better formulation than "suffering is a conflict between what is desired and what is experienced/believed", that is more precise and less prone to misinterpretations. — leo

You describe suffering here as a mental anguish. Notice how what you describe are ways of thinking, attitudes. One way of thinking is to focus on the goal, what is desired, and act to obtain that goal. The other way is to focus on the fact that you do not have what you want. The latter, you say, is associated with suffering. This may be one example of a way of thinking (attitude) which is associated with suffering, but I belief there are many others, perhaps you could identify some others. .

You'd have to explain that if you mean it literally. If you're saying that physical laws per se aren't physical things, that would be more understandable. Surely you're not claiming that, say, a pattern on a checkered shirt isn't physical? — Terrapin Station

There is the checkered shirt, that is a physical thing. Then there is the pattern which the colours are said to be in, that is not physical. So the pattern which a checkered shirt has, is not a physical thing.

Anyway, I don't think we can use the existence of abstraction as an argument against physicalism because abstractions are functions of the physical brain isn't it? — TheMadFool

OK, let's say that an abstraction is what a physical thing (a brain) does. How can you construe what a physical thing does, as something which is itself physical? The brain is physical, but how is what the brain does something physical? For example, a person walks to the store. The person is something physical, the store is something physical, and the ground is physical. But how is walking something physical? Despite the fact that "physics" is involved in understanding the relations between physical objects, this does not mean that these relations are physical.

I understand that thoughts aren't physical but the interesting thing to note is that arguments that are based on it seem to be argumentum ad ignorantiams: ''Look. We can't explain mind in physical terms. Ergo, it must be non-physical.'' — TheMadFool

I don't see the problem. When it becomes evident that mind cannot be described in physical terms, we assume that it is not physical. How is that a problem? When it becomes evident that colours are not smells we assume that colours are not smells. Where's the problem? Colours are not smells, nor is mind physical. There is no problem unless you want to believe that everything is physical, then there's a problem

Many thinkers, who will still call themselves physicalists consider emergent physical properties to be irreducible; which means that mechanistic explanations will be impossible in principle. — Janus

Despite your claim that "many thinkers" believe this, if you yourself think, you ought to recognize it as incoherent. If something is "emergent", then it emerges from something else, and it is therefore reducible to its constituent elements. It is contradictory to say that something which is emergent is irreducible.

The interaction problem only exists for those who think of mind and matter as completely different substances. Positing a third intermediary which is a composite of both does not really help, since we have no good reason to consider mind and matter to be completely different substances in the first place. The whole of nature would be better considered to be composite like the intermediary in the tripartite model, that would be much more parsimonious. — Janus

There is very good reason to consider two completely different forms of actuality, and therefore two completely different substances. These reasons are evident all over this forum in the form of various philosophical problems. Mind and matter are apprehended as completely different. The so-called interaction problem is an argument used against the dualist description, which is to treat these two as different substances. But the third "intermediary" renders this interaction argument as impotent. Therefore dualism remains as an acceptable solution to these philosophical problems.

When something is apprehended as "composite", a proper understanding of that thing requires an understanding of the individual elements of that composition, and the reasons for their union. So it does not serve us in our attempts to understand nature to simply say that nature, as a whole, is a composite, and ignore the fact that a composite is composed of distinct parts, united somehow. The division is evident to us, like the division between past and future, and to ignore the division in order to claim that the two distinct parts are really one, without understanding how the two distinct parts are united, is just a mistake.

To summarize, we actually have very good reason to consider mind and matter as distinct substances. The so-called interaction problem has no bearing. And, if our goal is to understand nature, and nature appears to be composite, there is no reason not to make the appropriate divisions in analysis. So denying the dualist distinctions is just detrimental to the process of understanding.

Laws of physics are models of things that many of us experience. There are things that many of us experience (desires, beliefs, suffering) that laws of physics do not take into account, but that doesn't mean we can't build models of how desires, beliefs, suffering and other experiences interact with one another. I don't see a fundamental difference between the two.

We take a ball to be an objective thing because we synthesize various reports of that ball from various living beings from various points of view. If you and I experience a ball moving, we're not experiencing the same thing, we're not seeing the ball from the same point of view, you're not seeing what I see and I'm not seeing what you see. Same goes for your desires and beliefs, I'm not experiencing them, but you can tell me what you experience, and we can synthesize various reports and build a general model that applies to various individuals. — leo

I can't understand the point you are trying to make here. Do you not see the difference between modeling the movement of an inanimate object, and describing the activities of living beings? You can make an accurate predictive model of the inanimate movement, but you cannot do that with a living being, because you will never know all the variables, and never know how the variables might influence the being's movement. Sure you can make some extremely simple models like Pavlov, but that's very basic. You can make a model to predict how the ball will move when thrown, but you cannot make an accurate model to predict how the dog will move when you let the dog out the door.

Yes we can't control everything. But there are things that can be done to reduce your suffering. If you experience pain and you suffer because of it, there are things we can do to make you experience less pain.

Again my aim is not to eliminate all possible suffering forever, but to come up with methods that can more effectively deal with suffering. Current methods deal quite well with physical pain and the resulting suffering, but there is a lot of other suffering that current methods deal poorly with. And effective methods are derived from accurate models. — leo

You are clearly making a separation here between pain and the suffering which you might say, it "causes". I don't see any principles for such a separation. When I feel pain, and suffer, the pain and the suffering are one and the same. I know that you've already said that people can have pain without suffering, and I accept this, but that just means that not all pain is suffering. So pain is the wider category in this way of using the terms, not all pain qualifies as suffering, but all suffering might qualify as pain. Therefore you do not have the principles to say that the suffering is something different from the pain, as something caused by the pain, or the result of the pain. Some pain is simply apprehended as suffering, and therefore classified as suffering, and some pain is not.

The reason why some pain would qualify as suffering and some would not needs to be investigated, perhaps it has to do with the intensity, the longevity, or something else. But now I think it is you who is playing on a semantic distinction between "pain" and "suffering", in an attempt to say that these words refer to a different aspect of the same thing, one being a cause, the other an effect, when really it's just two different ways of referring to one and the same thing. When I feel pain, and I suffer, the pain and the suffering are one and the same thing. When I feel pain and I do not suffer, it is simply the case that I have not judged the pain to be sufficient to qualify as "suffering", which is a special way of "feeling pain". That this is the case is evident from the many instances when I feel pain, but I don't know whether I am suffering or not. It cannot be the case that the pain is neither causing suffering nor not causing suffering, because one or the other must be the case if there were a causal relation. What is really the case is that I am incapable of judging whether the pain qualifies as suffering or not, and this is probably due to not having knowledge of the criteria required to class the pain as suffering.

Yes I agree that attempting to avoid all possible suffering can lead to suffering in itself. But again, it doesn't hurt to not put your hand in a fire. It doesn't hurt to not walk into incoming traffic. It doesn't hurt to not undertake endeavors that will most likely lead to suffering.

People live their lives according to what they desire and believe, but their desires and beliefs are partly shaped by their understanding of the world, of existence. I see a good model of suffering as one tool that people can use to live the life they want. They don't have to use it, but when they need it it's nice to have. And better have a tool that works well than one that doesn't. — leo

This is all irrelevant. If you know that doing a particular thing will cause suffering, you will not do it. That's clear. But as I explained above, real instances of suffering are derived from accidents, the unknown. So a model which tells one to avoid activities with a high probability of causing suffering is really useless.

Let's continue to consider why some pain would qualify as suffering and some would not. We carry out many activities knowing that there is a high probability of some pain, but we do them anyway, assuming that the pain will not be suffering. So there is a saying "no pain no gain", in cases like athletics, where training and conditioning requires some pain. We submit to pain for the long term goal, and that pain is not suffering. Why is it not suffering? Because of the attitude, that pain is necessary for some good. But such individuals may live on the borderline of suffering. What if it starts to appear like they are not making progress toward their goals, or that they are incapable of obtaining such goals? Then the pain might begin to appear as suffering.

Do you agree that what distinguishes "suffering" from "pain" is one's attitude, one's mental approach to the pain? When the pain is approached with a defeatist's attitude, it is apprehended as suffering, something which cannot be overcome. But when it is approached with the attitude that it must be overcome, and I must continue to get on with my activities, then it is not suffering, it is just pain.

Would you agree with the idea that the person who experiences physical pain suffers because he doesn't want to experience the sensation of physical pain, and that the young man who is having trouble finding a woman suffers because he wants to find a woman and he can't do it?

In both cases, there is a conflict between what is desired and what is experienced. I suggest that this is what suffering is. — leo

I don't think that this description is quite accurate. Very few people could be described as wanting to feel pain, so we can't describe suffering as when the pain is unwanted, it is almost always unwanted. So the pain is never really consistent with the desire. What seems to be at issue is whether the pain is acceptable or not.

This is why I proposed the categorical separation between pleasure (or what is desired as good), and pain. We cannot really oppose the pain to what is desired, and we ought not make a direct comparison or relationship between the thing being desired, and the pain which may or may not occur in the process of attempting to obtain it. The principal reason for this is that we must not allow that failure in the efforts to obtain the goal is itself painful, because failure is quite common and this could lead to suffering. The whole process, the activities of working to obtain goals is set aside from the pain which might be involved, as the pain is accidental to that process, though some pain might be necessary. This allows that the pain does not interfere with the process, altering one's perspective on the process, developing a defeatist's attitude.

So there is always a conflict between what is desired, and what is experienced, because achieving our goals takes work, effort, and there is pain (which is not desired) that is involved with this. The pain is unwanted, so it really conflicts with what is desired, but it is not suffering. We accept the pain despite the fact that it is not desired, for the sake of achieving our goals. It is when the pain is apprehended as unacceptable that it is called suffering. This might occur if the goal begins to appear unobtainable, the pain would become unacceptable.

That there are certain patterns to the interaction of matter and that these patterns can be described mathematically doesn't undermine physicalism.

Physicalism basically claims all is matter. It doesn't deny that there are patterns/laws in the way matter behaves. — TheMadFool

But patterns are not physical things. Doesn't physicalism dictate that all things are physical? How can one be a physicalist and accept the existence of such patterns?

But you still have not explained how a composite of microphysical entities produces the phenomenon of liquidity. — Janus

But can you find me any scientifically observed properties of liquids which can't be explained in terms of basic physical concepts like shape, volume, motion, temperate and pressure? — Dusty of Sky

Oh look, Janus has reversed the roles, asking Dusty to defend physicalism. Janus, why are you asking Dusty to defend physicalist principles? if you recognize that liquidity cannot be explained by physical principles, then why not just accept the principles which Dusty is putting forward, and follow the conclusion which is made concerning physicalism?

The you have the problem of how something physical could interact with something non-physical. — Janus

The problem of how the physical interacts with the non-physical was solved a long time ago by Plato, through the introduction of a third principle, the medium between the two. This is called "Plato's tripartite soul", mind, body and the medium spirit. Look it up. Descartes did not adequately describe this principle and so reintroduced the problem of interaction to anyone who does not look beyond Cartesian principles to understand dualism. However, anyone who has studied dualist principles with more effort will know that interaction is a non-issue, which was resolved for western philosophers prior to the life of Jesus.

I'd say I've been more politically active in real life over the years than the average person. By a pretty good margin. — fishfry

In many countries it's barely over fifty percent who vote, so saying that you're more politically active than the average person doesn't say much.

If you apply the model of Newton's laws to the trajectory of a ball, you have a method for dealing with the trajectory of this ball, that doesn't mean you're not applying a model. — leo

I agree with this, but laws of physics can't be applied to acts of living beings because living things are self-moving. So it's not semantics that I'm arguing. What type of universal model would be adequate for understanding intentional acts? It's fundamental to a living being that it's motives are unique to itself. Sure you can make generalizations, like if you strike someone with a hammer or similar object you will cause pain, but I really don't think that this sort of generalization is helpful in dealing with the particular nature of the individual instances of suffering which you seem to be interested in.

Psychotherapy has hypotheses/beliefs as to causes of suffering and ways to relieve it, there is a general model implicitly being applied to a particular instance when they are dealing with a particular individual. — leo

I do agree that some general statements can be made about the cause of suffering, such as the hitting with the hammer example, and there are many other straight forward causes of suffering. Also, there are drugs to relieve pain, as well as some forms of suffering, but you seem to be looking for something more than this. If you believe that the tools which the doctors already use are inadequate for dealing with suffering, then what more do you want, other than to throw away these models and deal with the peculiarities of particular instances?

If you put your hand in a fire, and your hand burns, and you suffer, you can analyze the situation and infer that you can prevent a particular type of suffering by not putting your hand in a fire. In a similar way, you can try to analyze in the general case how suffering comes about and prevent suffering by not behaving in ways that will lead you to suffer. — leo

Yes, that's obvious, but most actual cases of suffering are caused accidentally. No matter how well I know that the fire will burn me, this won't prevent me from getting burned when I slip and fall into the fire while stoking it. This is what I meant when I said that suffering is caused by accidents, things we are unaware of, unknowns. I can know that walking down the street is dangerous, a car might hit me, but this doesn't prevent me from doing it, because there are things which I value that require taking this minimal risk. But if a car is hitting me it's already too late to prevent the suffering which will follow.

If you're familiar with Aristotle's ethics you'll know that he talks about a balance, "the mean". Virtue is found in the middle (the mean) between the two extremes, both of which are vises. So courage for example is the mean between being rash and being timid. If we refrain from behaving in ways which could lead to suffering we will fall into that extremity of being timid, and this could increase the possibility of a different sort of suffering.

The key points here are "possibility", and "the unknown". If we avoid any situation where there is the possibility of suffering arising, then we wouldn't do anything. But suffering comes about when you least expect it because there will always be possible causes of suffering which are unknown to you, and therefore not avoided by you. So if you do nothing, because doing anything causes the possibility of suffering, you might find that doing nothing could actually cause suffering itself. This is why we need a healthy balance, the mean between trying to avoid the possibility of suffering arising, which drives us away from doing things, and living an active life.

First step is to list all instances in which people suffer, then find similarities between them to hypothesize underlying causes. — leo

If this is your approach, then I think the first step would be to categorize different types of suffering. I think that you will find that there are a number of different types which are not at all similar. Being not at all similar, they have completely different underlying causes, and need to be classed separately. So for instance the person who accidental put a hand into the lawn mower has one type of suffering, and the young man who is having trouble finding a woman for a date has a completely different type of suffering. I believe that these two are so completely different with respect to causation, that it's difficult to understand why we even call them by the same name, "suffering". The problem I see, is that we will go on and on, determining many different types of suffering, each being a different type according to its mode of causation, until we hit numerous forms of suffering which we cannot say what the cause is. These of course are the most difficult forms of suffering to deal with. At this point we will have identified some difficult forms of suffering to deal with. But since we do not know the causes of them, how does this help us? In other words, the forms of suffering which we can identify the cause of, the doctors already know this, and have ways of treating them. And the forms of suffering which we cannot identify the cause of, we cannot help the sufferer because we cannot identify the cause of the suffering.

The desire to perceive no pain presumably won't stop you from perceiving the pain, but sometimes there are ways to not perceive it, by focusing on other things. The more people focus on their pain the more they suffer (when they don't want the pain), but if you can divert their attention by asking them unrelated questions, they can forget about the pain momentarily, they stop perceiving it and stop suffering meanwhile. There is evidence of this.

In my own experience there were several instances where I was so focused on something that I didn't even notice I hurt myself, although I should have perceived a sharp pain if my thoughts weren't absorbed on something else. — leo

I agree with all this, and that's why I first suggested separating pain from pleasure. I believe that if we can focus on things which we enjoy, and things which we are doing because we want to do them, we can put any suffering which we have, in the background. And, I believe that in most cases suffering is similar to pain, which is caused by an injury, and injuries heal with time. So if we can focus away from the suffering, and occupy ourselves with the things that we enjoy doing, we can give the injury and the suffering time to heal. The problem is to understand the particular source of the suffering, just like understanding the physical injury, because we can very easily reinjure in the same spot and then the wound just festers without healing. Therefore we often must avoid certain activities which we enjoy because these activities are not conducive to healing, but we need to be able to identify which activities are likely to reinjure the weakness which has been created by the injury.

Now, imagine if, when those Russians reached out to Donnie, if they'd reported it straightaway to the FBI. — Wayfarer

Remember, it was about thirty years ago when DT first started meeting with Russians, and he threw out into the media the possibility that he might run for president some time, not long after that. At this point he probably thought it was all pie in the sky, even a joke, so the FBI, at that point in time, probably would have taken it as a joke too. But if the Russians groomed him for the position, when does it change from a joke to a crime?

As a general comment suffering is subjective, so indeed an accurate model of suffering will have to take into account the subjective experience of the individual rather than treating the individual as some objective blob of matter. — leo

Then you are not talking about "a model of suffering", you are talking about modeling a particular instance of suffering.

That's not an impossible task, psychotherapy already applies a model of suffering that makes use of the subjective state of mind of the individual, with some limited success. Interacting with the individual through speech can help reduce/eliminate/prevent some suffering. — leo

So how can you call this a model of suffering, if it is a method of dealing with particular instances of suffering? I would say that it is not accurate to say that psychotherapy is applying a model of suffering, rather they have a method for dealing with suffering.

Do you see a difference between reducing/eliminating suffering and preventing suffering? The first is to deal with an existing condition, and the second is to avoid an unwanted condition. The latter, preventing suffering, I think is an unrealistic goal. This is because suffering is unintended, it is accidental, the result of mistake, and other things which are unintended. So as much as we make all the safeguards that we can, to avoid the unintended problems, the very nature of suffering is that it comes about from the things which we are unaware of, the unknown, thus it cannot actually be avoided. Therefore preventing suffering is like preventing mistakes or accidents. We naturally try to avoid these things, but by the time we see the particular instance taking shape, it is already too late to avoid it. We can live prudently and cautiously, but a human being is an active being, and limiting our activities for the sake of avoiding the possibility of mistake, accident, or suffering, may itself be a mistake, and a cause of suffering.

The more realistic approach I think, is to deal with suffering as an existing condition, one which is unwanted. Since it is existing, present, then it must be caused. To understand the condition itself would require understanding what caused it. Each instance of suffering, being particular and unique must have had it's own distinct causes. As explained above, the causes of suffering are unintended, things we were unaware of, and were unknown at the time of causation, and this may remain the case even after the suffering is caused, if one cannot pinpoint the exact time the suffering started. So I believe that the difficult first step of any procedure, or method for dealing with suffering would be to determine the causes.

This is a start, but here we have the beginning of a model. There is an interplay between what is desired, what is perceived and what is believed. Suffering seems to occur when what is perceived contradicts what is desired. And we can act on this conflict by acting on desire, perception and belief. — leo

I think that this is naïve, and not a true representation of what suffering really is. If suffering were the interplay between desire, perception, and belief, and resulted when what is perceived contradicts what is desired, as described, then we could satisfactorily deal with suffering by altering our beliefs. We could prevent ourselves from desiring what contradicts our perceptions, by adjusting our beliefs. So for example, if you had a physical pain, suppose you crushed your finger and you were suffering, then you could deal with your suffering by altering your desire to perceive no pain, when you are actually perceiving pain. You could theoretically desire the pain, tell yourself that the pain is good, and this would produce consistency between perception and desire, releasing you from the suffering.

I think that to describe suffering in terms of conscious acts like "desire", "perception", and "belief", is a mistake. This is because, as described above, suffering is derived from the unintended, the unknown, what we are unaware of, so it is largely unaffected by the conscious activities of desire, perception, and belief. The conscious mind has a very limited amount of influence over the human body, constituting a relatively small part of the human physiology, and suffering is perceived, apprehended by the conscious mind, but as something outside its control. So suffering is more like an unwanted perception.

Awe, that's so cute. A pair of boobies.

But in desiring to model suffering, I don't necessarily attempt to bring about pleasure, rather I want to help people suffer less, give them the tools to escape a feeling that they want to escape without dying but don't know how to escape without dying. Someone who has escaped this feeling doesn't necessarily experience a constant state of pleasure, but they don't experience the terrible feeling anymore. — leo

The issue though, is that fulfilling a desire is equivalent to, or the same thing as pleasure. Pleasure is fulfilling a desire. So if you have a desire to model suffering, then to do this will bring you some sort of pleasure. If you desire to model suffering because this will help people suffer less, then this is what will bring you pleasure. This is not about bringing pleasure to others, it is about pleasuring yourself. You think that it is good to help others with their suffering, so to do so will bring you pleasure.

You say that you want to help people suffer less, but suffering is particular, unique to the individual. How do you think you can model suffering in general, when there are so many different ways that people suffer? Each person who suffers needs care specifically designed for that person. Don't you think that helping a person to suffer less requires attending to that individual on a personal level?

So it seems to me that if we focused on bringing about pleasure then many people would still be stuck in unescapable suffering. Today's society is focused on providing pleasure in many ways, and yet many people suffer and kill themselves. — leo

I think the point is that pleasure is something wanted, desired, so it is always in the future. It is something to look forward to. But suffering is due to past misfortune. So to focus on pleasure is to focus on the good which the future may bring, and doing what we can to bring about that good, while focusing on suffering is to focus on a past which really cannot be changed. I think that suffering cannot be avoided because it is already present, caused. But by looking to the future, things desired, pleasures, we can distract ourselves from the suffering. And wounds heal with time.

In this regard, to create a 'surveyable representation' is to create a kind of 'local map of grammar': it is to understand how the/a grammar of use relates to the particular activities (forms-of-life?) in which that grammar finds its purpose. — StreetlightX

In my translation we are talking about a "perspicuous representation". The perspicuous representation is said to be "of fundamental significance for us", and it is implied at 123 that we are lost (have a philosophical problem) without it. So philosophy, if we can say "what philosophy is", is the way that we understand the use of words. We often say that a person has "a philosophy", and this for Wittgenstein means a way of understanding the use of words. Hence the oddness of understanding the use of the word "philosophy". But this, one's understanding of the use of the word "philosophy", is incorporated within, as part of one's philosophy.

The overall picture which Wittgenstein is putting forward is exactly as the perspicuous representation StreetlightX has provided. Ways of using words are developed, evolve from particular instances of use (the local). From this comes distinct language-games, and distinct meanings for the same words (thus a family of meanings). This is exactly opposed to, or an inversion of the Platonic ontology of meaning which positions eternal Forms (universals) as prior to particular instances, imparting reality (real meaning) to the particular instance of use through participation in the universal. In the Wittgensteinian ontology of meaning there is no need for an overriding universal concept to give any instance of use meaning, but this creates a gap between particular instances of use and the well-defined language-games (complete with rules), because the particular instance which evolves into the game, is prior to the game. The gap needs to be filled to support a proper understanding because existing within the gap would be like being lost (present us with philosophical problems). Therefore we have a need for "intermediate cases".

The intermediate cases are like the commonly quoted "missing links" in evolutionary theory, which would provide the connections, the relations required to fill the gap between one species and another, or one language-game and another. Logic dictates that the properties or features of the intermediate cases, the missing links, must be attributed to the individual instances, because there is no species, or "universal" there (Platonism denied), to attribute them to. .

This thread is an attempt at creating a model of suffering, through observation and reason, by looking at all the instances in which people suffer, and attempting to find out how suffering comes about and how it disappears. — leo

We could take the approach of Plato. The Gorgias, and the Protagoras, if memory serves me, provide the best examples. What Plato does, (Socrates in the dialogues) is to separate pleasure from pain such that they are not in dichotomous opposition to each other. Placing pain and pleasure as opposite to each other in the same category, proves to be a problem because then pleasure can only be derived as a relief from pain. Then pain and suffering are required necessarily, as prior to, in order to have the goal of bringing about pleasure. So Socrates wants to put pleasure into a different category, such that we can bring on pleasure without the pain and suffering which would be required as prior to pleasure if the two are opposed.

Does this sound reasonable to you, that pain and suffering are categorically distinct from pleasure? The distinction becomes important when we look at pleasure as that which is desired, the goal or end. When they are dichotomously opposed, then the goal or desire for pleasure is necessarily the desire to end pain and suffering. When they are distinct, then the goal, what is desired, pleasure, is not necessarily to bring an end to pain and suffering.

The question now is why do you have a desire to model suffering. If we can bring about pleasure without ending suffering, then why focus on the suffering? The desire, what is wanted, is always based in some form of pleasure, the good, and this is categorically distinct from suffering. Why bring yourself down by focusing on the suffering, when this is unnecessary for bringing about pleasure and good?

To me, it doesn't make sense to say, "There is really no such thing as 'what Wittgenstein is saying.' I think it's plainly contradictory, at least in terms of how we normally use the word say. — Sam26

If a group of people like us cannot agree on an interpretation, and the author of the material intentionally ensured such disagreement through the use of ambiguity, then it is correct to say that there is no such thing as what the author is saying.

Consider his example, "stand roughly here". What does "roughly" add to the statement "stand here", other than ambiguity? If he says "stand here", you know exactly where he wants you to stand, where he's pointing. If he says "stand roughly here", you do not know exactly where he wants you to stand, because he is saying that there are many possibilities of places where you might stand in that area. The author implies that there is a place where you are wanted to stand, yet adds "roughly" to say that there is really no such place. What "roughly" does, is pass the choice of where to stand to the hearer, so that there is no such thing as the exact place where Wittgenstein wants you to stand. This is what the intentional use of ambiguity does, it gives to the reader a choice in interpretation, so there is no such thing as what the author says because the author is giving you a choice of what is said. You decide what the author said, and different people can decide on different things, because there is no such thing as what the author really said, as the author plays a game of possibilities. Likewise, when the speaker says "stand roughly here", there is no such thing as the place where the speaker wants you to stand, there are many possibilities, and the speaker has used ambiguity to allow you to choose the place where you ought to stand.

The use of that example by Wittgenstein, to demonstrate the use of ambiguity indicates that he is intentionally using ambiguity. If a word is recognized as having a family of meanings, and interpretation of that word will depend on one's background (the language-games which one is familiar with), and the author proceeds to use that word in a way which "fits" with a multitude of different language-games, without indicating a specific language-game as intended, then ambiguity is intended.

Sometimes it's about the right balance between what he's saying here or there and the overarching picture of his method of linguistic analysis. — Sam26

There's actually two "methods" which we have to keep an eye on here. One is what you call his method of analysis, the other is his method of writing (the way he uses words). There is really no such thing as "what Wittgenstein is saying". But if we were to look for "what he is saying", wouldn't that just be the theory he puts forward, "his method of linguistic analysis"?

Or would you say that there are three distinct things here, his method of analysis, his way of using words (i.e. his philosophy), and what he is saying? We cannot dismiss "the way he uses words", as a method in itself, and this refers to things like, he speaks clearly or ambiguously, he speaks honestly or deceptively, etc.. These, and similar judgements, are judgements we make concerning the way that people use words, which is a reflection of their personal philosophy.

In fact, when interpreting the PI, as is done in this thread, and in my thread on OC, we are making the same mistake. We are looking for that precise exegesis, which leads to a discovery of Wittgenstein's meaning. — Sam26

Why would you assume this, that we are looking for a precise meaning? Have you not attended philosophy seminars? The goal is to discuss the variety of interpretations, in an attempt to understand the various perspectives of understanding, brought to the table by the different backgrounds of the different participants. Sometimes we may be influenced to alter our understanding based on the perspective of another.

The way (method) of the author of philosophy is often the way of poetry, and that is the way of ambiguity. The intent of the poet is to say something which will be received as significant by a very wide audience. If you and I come from completely different backgrounds, then different sayings will be significant to me, from what will be significant to you. But if the author uses words with sufficient ambiguity, the same phrase may be significant to both you and I, but significant in differing ways. This means that we may each derive meaning, but different meaning. The poet (also sometimes the philosopher) uses ambiguity as a tool, to say something which appears to be significant to the very different members of a very wide ranging audience. When the commentators and critics discuss the poetry, they will rarely agree on the meaning. But such discussions are a very useful exercise to help one understand the variations in understanding, and this aids us in understanding being human.

What your words say depends upon what they are doing—how they are at work—in a context of use". — StreetlightX

When we, as poets and philosophers, use ambiguity (as described above), what we are doing takes a completely different form from "the thought which the sentence itself expresses", because it is assumed already, within that mode of usage that there is no such thing as the thought being expressed.

I am not the keyboard, I am the pragmatic relation with the keyboard. No 'i' apart from this relation , and no keyboard apart from it. Both the 'I' and things have no existence apart from this being-in-the -midst-of. — Joshs

But I have the capacity to remove myself from the keyboard, thereby annihilating that relationship. And if I go on to establish relationships with other things, then just like the relationship with the keyboard, not one of these is a necessary relation. Therefore the "I" really is apart from the relations.

If you want to position the "I" as necessarily "in-the-midst-of", then you must start with the relations which are necessary to the "I". If you do find these necessary relations, I think you will also find that the "I" is not in the midst of them. Was the "I" in the midst of the sexual relation which brought you into existence?

If time is infinite, the universe should go through all possible states eventually — Devans99

Wouldn't this allow that the universe would eventually come back to the exact same state again, making time cyclical rather than infinite?

And the only way to do this is to begin in the middle of things, to begin by ‘cognitively mapping’ (as Csal said) how things stand right now, in order to assess the possibilities of transformation, to measure the transcendental from within, — StreetlightX

Any point which you assume as the middle, or centre, will always end up having something further within, even if it's just a matter of "information" within that point. So the assumption of a middle point actually provides a false start. No starting point can be the middle because there is always something further inside, by the nature of infinity. The assumption of a middle is a lost cause. The seed, which forms the actual existence of "possibilities of transformation", itself must have an actual existence, and therefore a "within". This seed, as possibilities of transformation, has no centre or middle itself, and the information within cannot be described as having the spatial form which lends itself to the concept "middle". In other words, being within cannot be described as being in the middle.

Learning to type is like learning to play a musical instrument, it's a matter of fingering. Anyone who says that playing a musical instrument is "mechanistic" doesn't know how to play. You must do it with feeling. I would say that the same is the case for typing.