And the only way to do this is to begin in the middle of things, to begin by ‘cognitively mapping’ (as Csal said) how things stand right now, in order to assess the possibilities of transformation, to measure the transcendental from within, — StreetlightX

Any point which you assume as the middle, or centre, will always end up having something further within, even if it's just a matter of "information" within that point. So the assumption of a middle point actually provides a false start. No starting point can be the middle because there is always something further inside, by the nature of infinity. The assumption of a middle is a lost cause. The seed, which forms the actual existence of "possibilities of transformation", itself must have an actual existence, and therefore a "within". This seed, as possibilities of transformation, has no centre or middle itself, and the information within cannot be described as having the spatial form which lends itself to the concept "middle". In other words, being within cannot be described as being in the middle.

Learning to type is like learning to play a musical instrument, it's a matter of fingering. Anyone who says that playing a musical instrument is "mechanistic" doesn't know how to play. You must do it with feeling. I would say that the same is the case for typing.

then it would seem that what is legal is not something fixed by principles of justice at all, but something determined by power and influence. — Janus

That's right, it's a matter of judgement, and those who make those judgements, by that very capacity, are those who have power and influence..

If you feel satisfied with that and supportive of it, then that is your business. personally I find it quite repugnant. — Janus

Why is it repugnant to you, that those who make these judgements are those who have power and influence. Doesn't it seem natural to you, that the people who make these sorts of judgements are the people who have power and influence?

The screen I'm looking at, for example, is a pure difference. It's not existent by its form. At any moment it might disappear or even turn into a flower. I cannot use the forms I expect of it to judge whether it exists. — TheWillowOfDarkness

There's such a thing as "inertia". Due to the brute fact of inertia, described by Newton's first law, your screen will not disappear at any moment, nor will it turn into a flower at any moment. Force, (cause), is required for this. In reality you can, and we do use the forms that we expect of a thing, to judge whether the thing exists or not. That's inductive reasoning. To deny that things will continue to be as they were, without a cause of change, is just to deny the law of inertia, but what's the point to that?

The point is - the whole enterprise brings you right back to where you started. — csalisbury

It's not surprising that this process is circular, because "centre" is derived from circle. When you assume a centre you've already assumed equidistance from that point, and the circle is necessarily implied. There's no escape from the circle without denying the reality of the centre, which we do by emphasizing the fact that pi is irrational. If, after denying the reality of the circle we assume a spiral, we have to accept completely different principles, such as Fibonacci, and lack of centre.

What's the alleged crime? — Janus

I don't know, I haven't seen the indictment, some espionage or something like that. I think the US wants to emphasize how some information was obtained, rather than the simple reporting of information.

There must be an allegation that a crime has been committed to support indictment. — Janus

I think the US already has an indictment.

The real issue is over whether he has by any reasonable criteria committed any crime, — Janus

I think that's the judgement that a trial is supposed to determine. So without a trial the question is rather pointless.

I believe that if there is an “ether medium” then the laws of physics will be different when a body is at rest relative to the ether and when it is moving at a constant speed in a straight line relative to the “ether”. — MrCypress

Doesn't the Michelson-Morley experiment show that if there is an ether, bodies do not move relative to the ether? This would mean that possibly bodies are a function of the ether, and their movements are changes in the ether.

If you eat the food off the plate, you are not leaving things the way they were. You are leaving the plate the way it was, but not the food. Therefore you are selective in what you are referring to as "things". It's called "cherry picking", the fallacy of incomplete evidence. This thing stays the same therefore I am leaving things the way they were. Call me a pedant if you like, but it's a matter of fact, and one which is important to this philosophical investigation. If you think that we ought to overlook this fact then you are the one who is an idiot.

Here's the point, after spending a section of the Philosophical Investigations describing an act of striving after an elusive ideal, Wittgenstein insinuates that we ought not strive after that ideal, in the subtractive manner described by StreetlightX. Then at 133 he introduces another ideal, which he says we are striving after. So if he were giving a simple description of language, leaving things the way they are, he'd describe this aspect of language, this striving after an ideal, whether it be this ideal or that ideal, without passing judgement that such and such ideal ought not be striven after, and then proceeding to introduce a different ideal which should be striven after. He says that philosophy ought to be descriptive rather than normative, but this itself is a normative statement. So he has no escape from the fact that philosophy is normative, and if his intent was to produce a true description he would describe it as such, rather than implying that it ought to be other than it is.

Have you read MrCypress' posts?

Unfortunately because of the misinterpretation of the null result of the Michelson & Morley experiment he came to believe that you cannot sense motion relative to it. Einstein said, "But this ether may not be thought of as endowed with the quality characteristic of ponderable media, as consisting of parts which may be tracked through time. The idea of motion may not be applied to it." The confusion about this was created by the failure to detect the ether wind. The design of this experiment was incorrect. Looking for a difference in the motion of light will never be detectable relative to the emitting source motion. This is true because light moves autonomously relative only to the medium it is moving within. The density and tension of the medium is what determines the maximum velocity. — MrCypress

What I think is that there must be detectable motion of the emitting source of light, relative to the medium (ether).

Suppose an object is moving relative to space, and some sort of ether occupies this space. Suppose also that the object is emitting light, and the movement of the light is a property of the space (ether). Wouldn't is be possible to track that object's movement relative to the ether based on the wave patterns?

Obviously, cleaning is not leaving everything the way it was, or else cleaning would be doing nothing.

He contrasts metaphysical use and everyday use. When he says in 117: — Fooloso4

He's not making a contrast, by bringing the metaphysical use back to everyday use, he is dissolving that contrast. As I explained to Luke, his method of bringing it back is to show that the metaphysical use is a particular instance of use, just like any other particular instance of use (special circumstances).

he is not referring to any use but everyday use. It is everyday use that he means by actual use. It is only the philosopher who would point to something in front of him and say "This is here". That is not actual use, that is, everyday use. In everyday use it makes sense, its metaphysical use does not. — Fooloso4

As I said, you cannot point to an instance of actual use and say that is not actual use. That is pure nonsense. So what you are claiming here is pure nonsense, and not what Wittgenstein is doing. Wittgenstein does not attempt to say that metaphysical use is not actual use, that would be nonsensical.

If there is a distinction between everyday use, and metaphysical use, these are both classes of actual use. Wittgenstein wants to close this separation, and bring metaphysical use into the same fold as everyday use. He does this by showing that any instance of use, is a particular instance of use (use under special circumstances), and so all instances of use, be it metaphysical, or everyday, are classed similarly.

The special circumstances are particular circumstances. Particular circumstances are not just any circumstances. — Fooloso4

Every instance of circumstances is unique and peculiar, particular, specific, as "that set of circumstances". Therefore any set of circumstances is "particular circumstances". When you point to a set of circumstances, saying "this, here", you individuate that particular set of circumstances, and no other set of circumstances is that particular set of circumstances. This is the basis for the law of identity. Pointing to an object and saying "this, here" is what identifies the object according to the law of identity. However, you may point to any set of circumstances, and say "this, here". So any set of circumstances is particular circumstances, and may be thus identified, according to the law of identity. A particular is unique.

If the answer to the question at 116:



... is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home?

is yes, then what does he mean when he goes on to say:



What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.
?

And what does he mean when at 117 he says:



... he should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense.)

if the metaphysical use is actual use? If the use in the example is actual use then why would he say that this person should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used? — Fooloso4

What he means is that when we look at a metaphysical use of the word, it may or may not make sense to us. If one knows the language-game which that particular instance of use is derived from, its home, then it makes sense. This making sense of the word can only be done if one is familiar with that particular language-game (the home game), and in the case of metaphysical use, this might require that the person is educated in metaphysics. That is why I said, the terms of algebra make no sense to me, but it is only because I am not familiar with that place in the language (the language-game) that these terms are used.

That is to treat the metaphysical use exactly as we would treat any other instance of use. Any word may make sense to you, in its particular instance of use, if you are familiar with the language-game which is home to that particular instance of use. But if you are not familiar with the way that the word is used it will not make sense to you. There is a generalization according to a way of using the words (language-game). If you are familiar with this way, the use makes sense. The metaphysical use, is the actual use, and the author is using the words in a way, a metaphysical way. The special circumstances in which the words are actually used like that are the particular instances, just like the algebraic use is a way, and the actual use, the special circumstances, where those words (terms of algebra) are used like that are the particular instances. Each and every instance of use is an instance of using words in special circumstances, but each displays a way of use (a language-game). The particular instances of use are "everyday use", because every day is a new day with new special circumstances. So every instance of use is use according to special circumstances, but the same individual will employ many different language-games each day depending on the special circumstances..

To anticipate a bit, this is why Witty will say, a little later down, the these investigations thus "leaves everything as it is" (§124); - in terms I used earlier, the Investigations are subtractive, not additive. — StreetlightX

You can't subtract and leave everything the way it is, so the Investigations must be neither subtractive nor additive, to fulfill that purpose. Pointing to ideas as wrongful guidance is just as normative as pointing to ideas as rightful guidance.

The context in which it is actually used, as opposed to some metaphysical claim. — Fooloso4

But making a metaphysical claim is a context of actual use, just like any other special circumstance of use. You can't say that making a metaphysical claim is not an instance of actual use, that would be untrue.

Just because someone says something that does not mean that is how the word or statement is actually used. — Fooloso4

Yes it is. When someone says something, that is exactly how the statement is used. An instance of someone saying something is a particular instance of actual use, in particular circumstances. What else could special circumstances of actual use ever mean? Each instance of use is particular to the special circumstances of that instance of use. So that instance of someone saying something is exactly how the word or statement is actually used. and another instance would be another instance of how it is used.

How the word or statement is actually used, refers to particular instances of actual use, "special circumstances", as opposed to a generalization such as "this is how the statement is actually used". So for example the statement of 117, "This is here", we might make the generalization that this statement is used in the context of pointing to an object. But that would be incorrect because it really does not indicate how the sentence is actually used. We would have to refer to particular instances of use, in special circumstances, to see how the sentence is actually used. We cannot see how the sentence is actually used through a generalization. because we have to look at actual instances of use.

A correct context would be any context in which it does make sense, that is, any context in which it is actually used. Which is to say, the special or particular circumstances in which it is actually used. — Fooloso4

So that would be in the context of a language-game then? If the word is use in the context of a game, it is a correct use, if it's outside of all games, it would be incorrect. How would one know whether the use is outside of all games, or just outside of the games that the person is familiar with? I couldn't say that a particular use is "incorrect" just because I'm not familiar with the particular game, so how could anyone say that any particular usage is incorrect?

If, actual usage is what determines correctness, then any and all usage is correct, so what's the point in calling it "correct" usage, or "correct context" if usage is inherently correct, and therefore any context of usage is thereby correct context?

I would say it is not that statements get there meaning from correct context, but that it is only in a correct context, that is to say, particular circumstances or situations that a statements has a meaning. — Fooloso4

Isn't this a misleading statement though? Suppose a word like "game" has a family of meanings, and therefore is involved in a multiplicity of different language-games. Now a statement would be similar, having numerous possibilities for a useful context, depending on the language-game involved. Where do you jump from numerous possibilities to "a correct context"?

My view of OC 348 is that statements get their meaning from correct context, that is, not just any context, which is why, it seems, Wittgenstein said, it "...stands in need of such determination." The correct use of the phrase "I am here" is driven by a certain kind of situation. If you hear someone say that context drives meaning, this isn't quite right, if it were, then any statement would have meaning simply because of context. Remember that incorrect uses take place within a context. The statement fails to have meaning unless it's in the proper context. The logic behind the correct use of this phrase will not work in just any situation or context. Hence, again, the need for Wittgenstein to say that it "...stands in need of such a determination." — Sam26

The problem though, is that the same words may be involved in a multitude of different language-games. Therefore there cannot be such a thing as "the correct context" because the proper context would be dependent on which language-game is involved.

That's why at 117, if "This is here" makes sense to you, it is because you are familiar with a language-game which others whom it does not make sense to, are not familiar with. And so the person who is familiar with that language-game can imagine circumstances in which it actually makes sense to use that sentence, and the person who is not familiar with that language-game cannot.

That is a metaphysical perspective, not a physical one, and what you refer to as a force there is completely different from what a force means in physics. — andrewk

The two distinct perspectives of temporal continuity, which I described, are both metaphysical perspectives, that's the point. That "inertia" is the one adopted by physics doesn't make it any less metaphysical.

Hah, not you. Still, I'd say something like: a language game is conditioned by a form of life. So, in the 'context' of building something, 'slab' and 'block' mean something specific. In another context (maybe a certain board game say), the words will mean something different ('play the "slab" card'; 'play the "block" card'). A form-of-life has to do with the purpose one puts language too: are you a builder? A puzzle-game maker? In a situation of strife? A philosopher? And this in turn will condition how langauge is put to use for you: what language-game you employ. And what language-game another imagines you to be 'playing'. What action, what activity, what form-of-life are you engaged in? - this will condition the language-game in which words are used. — StreetlightX

I've reconsidered what I said yesterday about language-games taking the place of context. Language-games cannot completely take the place of context because there is always a multiplicity of language-games which each word is involved in. Therefore we have to appeal to context in order to determine the appropriate language-game. This is why, in the following section, Wittgenstein starts to talk about numerous possible purposes. If there was only one language-game it would be possible to understand meaning according to the game. But since there are numerous games, we need a procedure to determine which game is at play in any particular circumstances. So the second sense of "context", particular circumstances, cannot be superseded by language-games, because we need to refer to these particular circumstances in order to determine which language-game is at play.

Perhaps what you are challenging is whether it is ever possible for two objects to be perfectly at rest relative to one another. If so, fair enough. — andrewk

Yes, that's the issue, the inertial frame of reference is essentially arbitrary. Yet it is extremely important because inertia under Newton's first law represents the temporal continuity of existence, i.e. things that do not change as time passes. Newton's concept assumes that there is such a thing as an object with no forces acting on it, and this object will continue in time to be as it was. This a completely unrealistic assumption.

The opposite perspective (which I believe is more realistic), is that the temporal continuity of existence requires an acting force (traditionally that would be God). So the law of inertia, upon which the "scientific" definition of rest is based, takes what had been attributed to the act of God, the temporal continuity of existence (things which stay the same as time passes), for granted. This taking inertia for granted, assumes that the temporal continuity of mass is necessary (cannot be otherwise), requiring no forces, while the opposite perspective assumes that a force is required for temporal continuity. But if the temporal continuity of mass is not necessary, (and there may be good evidence that it is not, in QM), then this so-called "scientific" definition of rest is completely off track. And so we would need to assume some force to fill the place of "the Will of God", in order to account for what we observe as rest.

"Rest" is not a scientific principle. What rest is, has never been demonstrated empirically. That "rest" is relative to a frame of reference is an ontological principle adopted by relativity theorists, for the purpose of ease in calculations (as you described). That this is what "rest" really is has never been scientifically proven and therefore it is false to claim that this is a scientific principle.

On what occasion would you point at an object and say "This is here"? — Luke

This would be done on the occasion of making a philosophical demonstration, as Fooloso4 points out, it's similar to when Moore says "here is one hand". Notice that Wittgenstein is trying to "bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use". He is doing this by showing that a philosophical use (such as the demonstration of "this is here") is no different from any instance of ordinary use, each one being a particular instance, of "special circumstances". Each instance of use, whether philosophical, mathematical, scientific, mundane, or whatever, may be classed in the same category, as a particular instance of special circumstances. So the instance of philosophical use is no different in the sense of aiming for "the ideal", it is just another instance of use, and like any other, it has a particular purpose specific to itself.

A language-game determines not 'just' the meaning of a word, but also, the kind of word any particular word is: the role it plays in that game. — StreetlightX

Notice the two distinct senses of "context". I think that the second sense accounts for the kind of word by relating to the particular circumstances of use. Both senses of "context" are important to meaning, but you're right, neither can account for a word playing a role. So "language-game" encompasses and supersedes both senses of "context".

Where I think "language-game" really excels is in the fact that it refers to activity (movements within a game). We therefore attribute meaning to human actions, rather than assuming that meaning is associated with static, defined relations, like "context" does. The difference is significant because classically the act is understood as the means to the end, while the end is a static object (what is intended), but meaning was always associated with the end (what was meant, intended). One might say that classically the act only had meaning by being related to an end. "Language-game" gives us the principles whereby we can associate meaning directly with the act itself, rather than the end, so that meaning is inherent within the act, being derived from the game, not the end.

'Preferred' is a function of someone's mind - the person that prefers it. It is not ontological. For a given calculation there will often be a frame that makes the calculation simplest. Indeed, in GR, the biggest challenge is often in finding a frame that makes the calculations manageable. Again, that is a pragmatic, rather than an ontological consideration. — andrewk

The point though, is that "rest" is an ontological principle. Therefore the reason why one rest frame is preferred over another ought to be ontological rather than pragmatic. In scientific endeavours we ought to choose the best in relation to determining the truth, rather than what makes the calculations easiest..

There will be no universally preferred frame because a frame that is best for one purpose may be terrible for another. A laboratory-based frame is best for lab-based experiments. An Earth-centred frame is best for satellite management. A sun-centred frame is best for long-range space missions and predicting movements of solar system bodies other than the moon. — andrewk

Now you base "best" in what "makes the calculations simplest" rather than true ontology. As I said, the easiest is not necessarily "the best". Your use of "best" here is not based in the intent of finding truth, but in the intent of making calculations easier.

For a cabin attendant serving meals in a commercial jet, the preferred frame is that of the jet, but for an air traffic controller directing the flight paths for the jet and other planes, the preferred frame is that of the control tower. Neither would want to use the frame of the other. — andrewk

In many of our day to day procedures we settle for less than the best, that is obvious. But science ought to strive for nothing less than the best understanding of nature, and that is the truth. This requires adherence to solid ontological principles rather than pragmatic principles.

The point made by Wittgenstein was that if the sentence "This is here" makes sense to you, then you ought to question the special circumstances where it is actually used.

It appears like the sentence does not make sense to Luke, nor does it make sense to unenlightened, so these two move to deny that the sentence is ever actually used. The sentence does make sense to myself, and Fooloso4, so we move to question the special circumstances in which it is actually used, i.e. at 117 in the Philosophical Investigations.

When philosophers publish philosophical musings, like Wittgenstein has, they are full of things which make sense to some, but do not make sense to others. As he says, it depends on whether or not the words are being used in a way that you are familiar with. I am familiar with this type of philosophical statement, so "This is here" makes sense to me. But when I see algebra it does not make sense to me, because I am not familiar with it.

I don't know what "absolute motion" would be, perhaps you mean absolute rest? In any case, it's a matter of a preferred perspective, the preferred rest frame. Do you agree that it's better to model the movement of the planets as movements relative to the sun as the rest frame, rather than as movements relative to the earth as the rest frame? If the preferred rest frame makes sense to you, then why not allow that there is an ideal, or best rest frame (absolute rest)?

It is your problem, not the theory's problem. — andrewk

That depends on your ontological perspective, doesn't it?

You make it sound like speed is a property of an object. It isn't. I am not moving at some speed. I can only have speed relative to an arbitrary reference. — noAxioms

This is a problem with even the earliest forms of relativity theory. In relativity, velocity is not a statement concerning a property of an object, it is a statement concerning the object in relation to something else. So it is possible that there is something moving at 99.999% the speed of light relative to yourself right now, and therefore we could model you as moving at 99.999% the speed of light relative to this thing.

As I said, it's a problem with relativity theory, and that's because it robs us the capacity to determine real motions. Notice that relativity theory arose from the realization that the motions of the sun and planets could be modeled equally as heliocentric, or as geocentric. In reality, one model is more accurate than the other, and that's the case with all motions, and why relativity is deficient in its capacity to give us an accurate modeling of motions.

I don't see how it could be both "used in absolutely any circumstances" (general) but also "something specific" (particular). By "special circumstances" Wittgenstein does not mean just any context. It is not made into a context or some set of "special circumstances" simply by adding that he also points at the object. — Luke

Think of this. Someone could point to absolutely any object, at any particular place whatsoever, and say "this is here". Therefore, the sentence in itself, is very general in its usability. However, if or when, someone actually points to an object and uses the sentence, its meaning is very specific in its use, to indicate that special object in that special place.

So, the circumstances are not unique, or special at all, as they are in themselves, because it could be absolutely any circumstances. That is, until the sentence is applied, and this transforms the circumstances into something special. The sentence, in the context of the pointing, specifies this object in this place, creating special circumstances from circumstances which were not special at all. It is this act of individuating an object, "this here", which the law of identity is based. Following this the object may be named.

They were trying to build a Trump building even as the election campaign was going on. — ssu

The fact that they were hiding this, at that time, indicates that there was not complete ignorance.

Exactly, it could be used in absolutely any circumstances, therefore the circumstances in which it is usable are not "special" at all. But if it were used, as it is in the example, the use of it would make those circumstances very special.

Compare this to how he presents the form of a proposition at 114, "this is how things are". The one, "this is how things are" is a generalization, it creates something general. The other "this is here", creates something specific (special). Wittgenstein is directing us away from the use of language for creating something general (what philosophers do), toward its use for creating something specific (special). That's what ordinary language use does, creates something special, it specifies. Ordinary language use is very specific to the circumstances, we refer to particular things in particular locations, and that's where language's usefulness is based. Talking about specific things in specific places is ordinary use, and that's the foundation of language.

The philosophical type of language use, generalizations ("this is how things are", or "essences"), is a special type of language use, created for special purposes. As we'll see in 120-135 this dissolves the generalized idea that philosophy is done for 'a purpose', rendering it as philosophy is done for a variety of different special purposes. That's because all forms of language use are based in specification, as the foundation of language, mentioned above. Now what is specified is the particular purpose.

132. We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the order."

The context is given, someone says "this is here" as he points to an object. There's a sort of paradox involved because one might point to any object and utter that phrase, and it would make sense. Yet without context the phrase makes no sense . So it is not required that the circumstances are "special", because the phrase is applicable in all circumstances. However, it is only meaningful in the sense that it indicates special circumstances. You might say that the phrase (in the context) creates special circumstances.

When the philosopher says “This is here”, I think he is referring to Moore's claim "here is one hand". Moore's point is that it exists, it is real. But when not doing philosophy does such a statement make sense? It would make no sense for me to walk up to someone and say "here is one hand, and here is another". The example in §117 is some object. Now it might make sense to say “This is here” if we are looking for the object, but in this case the object is right in front of him. In this case, "here" does not mean in this place, as if a hand could be misplaced, but intends something metaphysical - I know irrefutably that it exists. But that is not how the word 'here' is ordinarily used, except perhaps if we are looking for something whose existence is in question; but not as confirmation of existence in general. — Fooloso4

In the example, "this is here" means nothing more than "this object is in this place", exactly as it sounds. Notice a pointing motion is indicated. The problem is that "this is here" is only meaningful if the special circumstances (the context of the act of use) are considered. When the special circumstances are considered (the pointing to an object), it refers to a particular object in a particular place. Without consideration of the special circumstances it could refer to any object in any place, and therefore looses its meaning. The phrase makes no sense outside the context of the special circumstances.

There's a sort of paradox indicated because the phrase is extremely useful (able to be used to refer to any object at any place), but it really has no meaning (makes no sense), other than what is given to it by the special circumstances of the particular instance of use. That's a peculiar aspect of language, the more useful phrases are the ones which are allowed to derive their meaning from the special circumstances of their use. This relates back to when he described the concept of "game" as unbounded. Being unbounded makes the word "game" very useful (may be used in many different cases), but we may create a boundary for a special purpose.

69...We do not know the boundaries
because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary—
for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable?
Not at alll (Except for that special purpose.)

This is a bit tough and I have to go a bit beyond what's just there to make sense of this one, but here's what I make of it: the metaphysician insists that she is using an expression in just the same way that it is used in an 'ordinary' circumstance (or what Witty refers to as a 'special circumstance'): "I’m using it with the meaning you’re familiar with."

And Witty's response is something like: you can't just say this. If meaning is use in a language-game, the language-game needs to be in place if that 'same' meaning is to be preserved - and it's not at all clear that, in the metaphysician's use, that language-game (or any language-game) is in place.

This is why Witty is critical of the idea that the meaning of terms is retained in "every kind of use": but Witty's whole point is that there is no 'every kind of use': use is always 'language-game relative' - use in this or that language-game, not "every kind of use". — StreetlightX

"Language-game" is a substitute for "context" here. "Context" has two very distinct connotations, each of which are very important to meaning. The first is the position of a word in relation to other words in an act of use. The second is the special circumstances which constitute the environment of the act of use. "Language-game" as StreetlightX uses it here, acts as a substitute for both of these, "meaning is use in a language-game". So "language-game" provides us with a third sense of "context". "Context" does not refer here to a static position, or state of things in relationship to each other, it refers directly to the act, as a move with context, within a game.

The first sense of context (the positional relations of words) may be subsumed as part of the language game, a move within the game. The move is to put words in relations to each other. But as StreetlightX points out, the metaphysician's game is unfamiliar, perhaps as a sort of personally created, private game, though the metaphysician insists that the game ought to be familiar to you. When the game is unfamiliar to you, meaning cannot be determined by the first sense of context (positional relations of words), so we are left with context in the second sense, "special circumstances" as the only means to determine the meaning.

The inseparability of meaning from use must work both ways, so when I use 'supernatural' in this game, the aura of the Roman gods is somehow invoked, whether I intend it or not. — unenlightened

That is because it is the game we are familiar with. But if a philosopher used "supernatural" in a context (relation to other words) in which the invoking of Roman gods was out of place, and therefore the use of that word seemed like nonsense, then we'd complain that the philosopher was using the word in a nonsense way, because we couldn't understand that context. Then to understand what the philosopher was talking about, we'd have to turn to the "special circumstances" of that use. What exactly is it, according to the context of that particular act of use, in its special circumstances, that the philosopher is referring to?

All that said, Wittgenstein wrote remarks on several occasions that indicated his recognition of a theological sense in which mathematicians like Georg Cantor thought of the infinite cardinal numbers as representing platonistic "completed " infinities; namely in Wittgenstein's acknowledgement of the "giddy feelings" that accompany thinking about set-theory from the platonistic perspective, and and have psychologically motivated it's development. Wittgenstein, while clearly recognising this theological motivation and use of mathematics, forewarned that it led to the unnecessary development of confusing and over-complicated formalisms of logic that were misleading when it came to the practical application of logic and mathematics. — sime

So those mathematicians like Cantor, think that they have attained God's perspective, and this is the source of the giddy feelings?

Quantum mechanics provides conclusive evidence that the universe is not the type of system which is required for the heat death. That's why the many worlds interpretation is logically acceptable.

Energy is the ability to do work. If at maximum entropy there is no energy available to do work, then effectively there is no energy on that definition. — Janus

The problem though is that there is a conservation law, and entropy does not actually decrease the amount of energy. So at maximum entropy there is still the same amount of energy, on that definition. All you have done is created a contradiction, saying that there is energy, but it's no longer the capacity to do work, when energy has already been defined as the capacity to do work. That's why i am sought to change the definition of energy. It's what would be needed to avoid the contradiction. But i am's definition is nonsense, and the definition of energy has already been established as you can see.

The "heat death" is just nonsense, it assumes that the universe has the characteristics of an artificial system, created by human beings. Then it describes the capacity of that system to do work, from the perspective of the human beings who created it, for a particular purpose. So it's nonsense because it requires that the universe is a system created by human beings.

You're mixing up "medium" with the QM wavefunction. That's a linguistic mistake, which is understandable because the word "wave" is in there.

You also confuse the physical property of "energy", which can really only be defined in mathematical terms in specific contexts with what you say is its linguistic definition, "the ability to do work". — i aM

It seems like you have an aversion to discussing things "linguistically".

But even linguistically, that is still not quite right. Here is the first sentence from the Wikipedia article on "energy":

"In physics, energy is the quantitative property that must be transferred to an object in order to perform work on, or to heat, the object." — i aM

That's interesting, because Wikipedia doesn't even have an entry for "quantitative property". So by defining "energy" as a quantitative property, and not defining "quantitative property", the author of this quote has led me on a wild goose chase. Did you happen to read the footnote to that quote you produced? Some author of self-help books for high school students, Robert L Lehman, arguing that energy is not the capacity to do work. So much for your appeal to authority.

Sorry, you can count me out of your discussion because I discuss things linguistically.

We simply cannot proceed with any investigation if we hold such a high standard for 'the same'. We cannot talk about anything, because all terms are artificial groupings of things which are only similar, not truly 'the same'. In order to show the relevance of what you're saying here you'd need a supporting argument as to why the level of similarity in intent I'm referring to was not acceptable for the type of investigation this is. — Isaac

That's not true at all, "same" has a very useful purpose, it refers to one identical thing, one and the same. And, similar things can be members of the same group, so can different parts be parts of the same whole. But similar things are never the same thing. If two things are similar, then call them "similar", or perhaps members of the same group. There is no need to say that similar things are "the same", no purpose to that. We have two distinct words, "similar" and "same", each with its own purpose. What's the point in calling two similar things "the same" unless your intent is to deceive?

So, the very opposite of what you propose is what is really the case. There's no point in proceeding with any such investigation if we allow ourselves to refer to similar things as the same? All we could do is confuse ourselves. That's why we distinguish "similar" from "same", to avoid the confusion which results from thinking that similar things are the same thing. We need high standards of identity if we have any desire to make progress in a philosophical investigation such as this, and this means maintaining the distinction between "similar" and "same".

To reply to your claim then, no degree of similarity is acceptable for calling two distinct things "the same", because "similar" refers to a multitude of things and "same" refers to one thing. So it is impossible that similar things are the same thing. Therefore please do not say that similar things are the same, because we know that this is impossible.

There's a lot said by Wittgenstein in the upcoming section 137-200, about what you might call the "unthinkingly" way of doing things. I'm going to read that section again, and take some notes. I'll get back to you on this subject, perhaps we can discuss it further.

Of course I am referring to current scientific understanding of energy. Before the idea of entropy obviously energy was understood "separately form the second law"; unfortunately that doesn't support your incoherent position, since it is irrelevant. — Janus

It seems like you did not read the quote I posted from your referred site:

"Recall that the simple definition of energy is the ability to do work. Entropy is a measure of how much energy is not available to do work. Although all forms of energy are interconvertible, and all can be used to do work, it is not always possible, even in principle, to convert the entire available energy into work. That unavailable energy is of interest in thermodynamics, because the field of thermodynamics arose from efforts to convert heat to work."

That is from the site you referenced on "heat death". Notice, "the ability to do work" is the definition of energy, even today. Also, at the proposed "heat death" there is still energy, therefore the ability to do work. Speculators have simply taken some principles from thermodynamics, and have concluded in an extremely dubious way, that this capacity to do work (energy) becomes unavailable to do work through entropy, until the "proposed heat death" when all energy is unavailable. It is extremely dubious because that conclusion requires some completely unsubstantiated, and improbable premises, concerning the nature of time, human capacities to create systems, and the universe.

Then you don't have a model. Whereas special relativity is a self-consistent model that makes predictions that have been experimentally confirmed in numerous ways. See — Andrew M

Right, we went through this already, in this very thread. The Michelson-Morley experiments failed to determine the relationship between the wave medium and physical objects, and special relativity gave what appeared to be a simple and satisfactory way around this problem. However, the problems of QM, and wave-particle duality ought to indicate to you that special relativity really is not satisfactory. Without understanding the relationship between objects and the wave medium, we cannot establish the relationship between the wave and the particle in wave-particle duality.

Notice, that to produce the conclusion that there is no wave medium, from the Michelson-Morley experiment, requires the premise that the medium is independent from physical objects. But the conclusions from QM indicate that the particles (physical objects) are a feature of the wave function. So QM actually disproves the premise required to say that the Michelson-Morley experiment demonstrates the non-existence of the medium. Now we need to go back and determine the relationship between the particle (object) and the wave medium, to understand wave-particle duality. But this will never happen if physicists adhere to special relativity and deny that there is a medium.