Really? Why do you think it's 'sketchy' the London Marathon is run by a few thousand people each year, I think it's pretty safe to say they all at least have in common he intent to run as much as they are able along the set route. Unless you're going to get into some totally unnecessary sorties paradox, I don't see the problem with saying these people all have the same intent. — Isaac

Different runners run the marathon for different reasons, I've seen them interviewed. So I don't see any common intent there. Many may have a similar intent, but if we hold to a strict sense of "same" which is common in philosophy, and called for by the law of identity, their intentions are not the same.

Well. If you seriously think it would make more sense to say that it is the intent of a supernatural being who created a billion planets only to populate one of them, mostly with bacteria, but with one species whose main purpose it seems is to sing to him on Sunday, then you clearly have a very different definition of 'sense' to me. — Isaac

It makes more sense to say that a being who is assumed to have intention has intention (even if that being is fictional), than it does to say that a thing which is known not to have intention has intention. That is my opinion, and that is why "God" makes more sense to me in that particular context. The idea of panpsychism does not make sense to me, neither does the idea of a world-soul, or universal-soul make sense to me. Maybe you reason to think otherwise.

I've seen signs hung the wrong way round. — Isaac

OK, "wrong way round" implies that a mistake was made. Now who would you hold responsible for the sign being hung the wrong way around? Unless the sign-hanger was instructed to hang it that way, the responsibility for that mistake rests on the sign hanger. Or would you prefer to blame the state-soul? The state-soul made the mistake. Saying that the person did it "unthinkingly" does not remove the intentionality from the act. Habitual acts of human beings are still classified as intentional acts. "Unthinkingly" does not absolve one from blame.

Figuring out pi to a lot of precision doesn't involve hunting down an ever closer physical approximation to a circle. — noAxioms

How does one approach the figuring out of pi?

The argument was over the scientific definition of energy, which cannot be understood separately from the Second Law of Thermodynamics, but if now you just want to insist on your own definitions, then further discussion will be pointless. — Janus

My definition is the same as the one on your referred site. The laws of thermodynamics came into existence following the defining of energy. So you're wrong, energy was understood prior to the second law, and therefore separately from the second law. You really just blabber on, demonstrating that you have absolutely no understanding of this subject

As I said, I don't think we have the principles required to precisely measure the various motions of objects in relation to the motions of light because we have not yet determined the relationship between objects and the medium in which the light waves exist.

I don't understand the question. They see the thing which is emitting the light, as emitting light.

OK. So do you claim that the light emitted from the middle of the moving traincar towards the front is travelling at c + v (where v is the velocity of the traincar) from the train-platform observer's reference frame? — Andrew M

I don't think that the movement of objects can be satisfactorily related to the movement of light, in the manner suggested by special relativity, because the relationship between the objects and the medium within which the light waves exist, has not been properly established.

I told you, I don't believe in heat death. And I also told you that I think your description of it, as energy (which is by definition the capacity to do work), that is not available to do work, is contradictory. Why would I want to read up on this? It's like you're telling an atheist to go read some theology. What's the point?

You don't seem to understand, all energy is "the capacity to do work" whether it's potential energy or kinetic energy.

So, as I said already, and as indicated in the quote I brought from your referenced article, at the so-called heat death there would still be energy, as the capacity to do work.

MU seemed to have raised the zombie of personal intent creating the rule again with the ambiguous "The only way we have to judge whether a person followed a rule or not is to judge whether the person behaved as intended.". It is important, I think, to stress (as you have done in your post) that a single person's intent does not make a rule. I realise we haven't yet reached the private language argument, but things have once or twice seemed to be heading down that dead end. — Isaac

The problem here is that only individual people have intent. We can generalize, take a vote or something, and say it is "the will of the people" or some such thing, but to say that numerous people have the "same" intent is very sketchy, and highly improbable. Here's a good example of that very problem in Fooloso4's post:

The intent is to regulate the flow of traffic. That does not change even if the standard by which the flow of traffic is regulated changes. To use one of Wittgenstein's tribe examples, a colorblind tribe would not have color coded traffic lights. They would have some other standard, but the intent would still be to regulate the flow of traffic. — Fooloso4

Whose intent is it to regulate the flow of traffic? It's obviously not the intent of the traffic lights. You might say that it's the intent of the state, or the city, but these aren't the type of things which have intent. It would make more sense to say that it's God's intent, at least god is supposed to be a being with intention. And as described above, a group of people do not have a single, "same" intent, so "it's the will of the people" doesn't make sense either.

I don't see intent having such a leading role. Imagine a sign actually being made and put in place. Who really intends for the pointy end to point to Dublin? I doubt very much if anyone involved actually does, they just do. If anyone really has an intent, it would be to get paid. — Isaac

The issue is that with "meaning is use", Wittgenstein has clearly referenced purpose and therefore deferred to intention. To understand a word's meaning is to understand its use, which means that we need to understand its purpose and therefore the intention behind it. Normally, in questions of intention (which are often moral questions), we hold a person responsible for one's own actions. Therefore the person who plants the sign is responsible for which way it is pointed. If it points to Dublin, then it is the person who planted it, who intended it to point that way. I don't see how you could think that the person who planted the sign just planted it randomly without intending to have it point the way that it does, regardless of whether or not that person was getting paid to plant it.

As I said in my earlier post, Wittgenstein has decided that the fundamental principles of language are moral principles, rather than logical principles. He has dismissed those elements of crystalline purity required (the ideal) for ideal understanding, to be replaced with "serves the purpose". But now, by describing language use as a human activity, intended to serve a purpose, he has stumbled into the field of moral philosophy. The fundamental principles which support language are the same principles which support morality.

132. We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use
of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many
possible orders; not the order. To this end we shall constantly be
giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of
language easily make us overlook. This may make it look as if we
saw it as our task to reform language.
Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in
our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice,
is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with.
The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine
idling, not when it is doing work.
133. It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for
the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But
this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear.
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping
doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy
peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself
in question.—Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples;
and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved
(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed
methods, like different therapies.

Notice, he has not really dismissed "striving for the ideal". Our aim is complete clarity, which will make philosophical problems disappear. But now the philosophical problems have become much more complicated because we have to deal with "serves the purpose", and therefore intention. There is not one "purpose", but a complex, and philosophy takes the characteristics of therapy. — Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations

No, the relative ordering of events necessarily follows from the invariant speed of light in different reference frames. — Andrew M

Right, that's the point. The assumption that the speed of light is invariant (which is essential to special relativity), is what produces these contradictions.


It's not a cop out. You can't just through phrases like "heat death" at me, and ask me a complex question concerning the event referred to, without providing me with some description as to what these terms refer to. I personally have no belief in "heat death", I think it's a misguided speculation. So your question is like asking an atheist a complex question about the nature of God. It's pointless.

I assume that there will be no human beings in existence at the "heat death". So if you interpret "the capacity to do work" as "the capacity to do work for human beings" (which is how you seem to interpret it, but not how the definition is intended to be interpreted in physics), then there would be no such energy at the time of the heat death, because there would be no human beings.

I can't answer that, I don't know the heat death scenario

Now consider the train-and-platform scenario (including the two traincar pictures). Per special relativity, the statement "The light reached the front and back of the traincar simultaneously" is true for an observer on the moving traincar while false for an observer on the train platform. — Andrew M

Right, we are talking about the temporal ordering of two events, when the light reaches the front of the traincar, and when the light reaches the back. Special relativity allows for contradiction in the ordering of these events. The "noon" example is just a name given to one event, so it's not a proper analogy. What I call "noon" you might call "midnight", and it's just a matter of translation, we are still talking about the same time under different names. Calling the same thing by different names is a matter of identity, not contradiction But in the case of special relativity it is a matter of predication. One event is predicated as prior in relation to the other, and to allow the opposite as well, is contradiction. Noon in Sydney is prior to noon of the same day in London, no matter what your reference is, and.there is no contradiction

And that's not the way it's modeled in QFT. In QFT, objects (including particles) emerge from the interactions of more fundamental fields. That is, the existence of the object is dependent on the existence of the fields. — Andrew M

Right, that's why I'm pointing this out as a problem with QFT. The way that fields are modeled, they cannot have reality unless the field is the property of an object. Remove the electromagnetic field from the object which it is a property of, and it's just a piece of theory. If QFT does not model its fields as properties of some object, or objects, they are theories without reality. Physics does not have the principles required to model free standing fields, from which particular existence arises, the fields are dependent on the prior existence of objects. That dependence needs to be included in the models.

Intended by whom? Not the signpost maker, he will have simply presumed, made a sign with a pointy end and pointed it at Dublin, because that's what one does. Not the town planner, he commissioned a sign to be made without even specifying which way the pointy end should point. — Isaac

I suppose it must be the intention of the sign-post maker we're talking about, maybe the intention of the town planner plays a role too, and even others. Is there a common intention? I don't think It's God's intention because the sign-post is artificial. Wittgenstein clearly talks about the sign-post fulfilling its purpose. (87..."The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils
its purpose.") I don't see any way that there could be a purpose for that sign-post being there unless it was put there with intention. Perhaps someone might just randomly plant the sign, but that's not what Wittgenstein is talking about, he's talking about purpose. It's very simple, "use" implies intent. There is no "using" without intent.

What if a moronically stupid sign maker had decided that the blunt end would point to Dublin, and he expected that one follow that. Who's made the mistake, the person now walking away from Dublin, or the sign maker? — Isaac

Then the sign-post did not fulfil the purpose. Right?

Who or what determines the meaning? What is said may mean different things to difference people. If I am the speaker and you take what I said in the wrong way then what you thought what I said meant was an improper meaning, it was not without meaning. — Fooloso4

StreetlightX seems to have an allergic reaction to "intention", breaking out in rash statements any time the word is used. Generally, Streetlight would prefer to change the subject to intension, thereby removing the end from intend. But in the context of this text, "intension" does not serve Wittgenstein's purpose. It's quite clear that the sign-post must be read in the way intended in order that it serve the purpose. The only way we have to judge whether a person followed a rule or not is to judge whether the person behaved as intended.

Meaning is in no way predicated on intention in Witty, and this includes when it doesn't conform to intention. — StreetlightX

"Use" implies "for the purpose of", and "serves the purpose" plays an important role in the Philosophical investigations. In everyday usage, to say that something serves the purpose is to say that it does what it was intended to do. Wittgenstein makes no attempt to divorce "intention" from "purpose".

You are mixing together, the definition of energy (the capacity to do work), with the relative condition of "available". Whether or not the energy is available to us has no impact on whether or not it is the capacity to do work. Energy on the other side of the world is not available to me, yet it is still the capacity to do work. Here's a quote from you referenced article:

"Recall that the simple definition of energy is the ability to do work. Entropy is a measure of how much energy is not available to do work. Although all forms of energy are interconvertible, and all can be used to do work, it is not always possible, even in principle, to convert the entire available energy into work. That unavailable energy is of interest in thermodynamics, because the field of thermodynamics arose from efforts to convert heat to work."

Entropy has no affect on energy's capacity to do work. The condition "available" just reflects the limits of the system used to harness the energy. Various different ways of harnessing energy (converting it from one form to another in a controlled manner), have differing degrees of efficiency. There is no such thing as one hundred per cent efficiency or else we'd have perpetual motion. The fact that some of the energy is lost into unharnessed forms does not mean that it is not energy. When a system has 85 per cent efficiency, the remaining 15 per cent is still the capacity to do work (energy), despite the fact that it is unavailable, it has just slipped into unharnessed areas because of the limitations of the system..

That certain energy is not available to a human being with the desire to use energy, does not mean that this energy is no longer the capacity to do work. That would be contradiction.

Exactly so. That's why it is called the theory of relativity and not the theory of objectivity. It's only a problem if you add that additional premise as you are doing. — noAxioms

Adding the premise doesn't make it into a problem, it's the thought that there ought to be an objective reality which makes it into a problem. If you don't mind an ontology with no objective reality, then there's no problem.

I didn't really understand most of what you wrote, so I will just try to focus on this passage. What you seem to be ignoring is entropy; which is the continual dissipation of the capacity of energy to do any work, which in theory culminates in so-called 'heat death' the total absence of any potential for energy to do any work. Remember that matter and energy are equivalents, and the form of energy only obtains provided there are differentials in potential which allow energy to "flow'. — Janus

No, entropy is something completely different. Energy is defined as the capacity to do work. Entropy cannot rob energy of this unless it left energy as something other than energy. And entropy does not violate conservation laws.

But, why would it not be correct to say that potential energy is actualized? If, as in your example of water held in a dam that is not doing any work, the water is released and does the work of turning the turbine, should be not speak of the energy potential being actualized? — Janus

That's just the way it's been conceptualized, energy is a property of something moving, just like momentum, and motion does not just disappear, or become something other than motion, as described by Newton's laws. So modern physics does not employ the ancient concept of potential being actualized in the case of the concept energy. There is potential (energy), and this potential remains constant as it takes many different forms.

"Potential" in the sense of "potential being actualized", really has only a philosophical meaning, because its ontology is considered as dubious. Here, "potential" means a possibility rather than a capacity (or power), as in energy. When there are numerous possibilities, and one is actualized, we might say that this specific potential is actualized. But to bring those possibilities into reality, rather than just logical possibilities requires a denial of causal determinism. This is why we need to keep the "potential of energy, as capacity or power, separate from the "potential" of "actualizing a potential", because physics does not have the ontological principles to relate these two. Notice that the former refers to "potential" in a general or universal sense, and the latter requires a particular "potential", so category mistake could occur.

And to repeat my earlier point; it would seem to make little sense to say that energy is the potential to do work, and yet energy is not capable of doing any actual work. Yet you seem to want to say this, and have as yet, given no argument or explanation for why you want to say it. — Janus

This is that ontological gap which we have no principles to form a bridge. To do "actual work" is just a matter of perspective. When is the work actually done, when the water turns the turbine, when the electricity is transmitted through the wires, when it runs the compressor on my fridge, when the cold keeps my food fresh? So, we keep the potential of energy (the capacity to do work) as completely separate from any work actually being done, in order that the conservation principles are maintained. It is important to understand that the concept of "energy" was produced as a conservation principle to compete with Newton's conservation of momentum. The reason why the thing which is conserved, as time passes, has the nature of "potential", goes back to Aristotle's concept of matter, as the thing which does not change as time passes, and matter is designated as potential. So the conceptual structure was already there, by which potential remains constant as time passes.

In the context of QM, consider that the wave-function is analogous to the potential of energy (capacity to work). It must remain constant, continuous, as time passes, according to conservation laws. Then there is a so-called collapse of the wave-function, and this is analogous to actual work being done, a potential being actualized. We cannot relate these two because "actual work being done" would remove potential and violate the conservation law. So we have a gap between the potential, which must always remain constant according to conservation laws, and the "actualizing of a potential", which would remove some of that potential placing it into a different category of "actual", thus violating the conservation law.

SR is also quite consistent for the same reason: different orderings of events are not contradictory if they're from different perspectives. Meta for instance commits this fallacy by deliberately omitting the perspective references: — noAxioms

The problem is that to say that the ordering is dependent on perspective means that there is no objective truth with respect to the order. Therefore the two propositions "A is prior to B", and "A is not prior to B" may be both true, and this is contradiction That you blame this contradiction on "different perspectives" does not make the contradiction disappear, it's just a sort of rationalization. You're just saying that this contradiction is acceptable, kind of like if I said that the best dinner is beef steak and you said that the best dinner is pork chop, we'd accept this contradiction because it's a matter of perspective. But it doesn't make the contradiction go away

My point is simply that if you want to say that energy has an actual potential to get things done, then there must be an activation or actualization of that energy when it gets things done. It is the distinction between 'energy at rest' and energy at work. — Janus

It's very simple, energy is the capacity to do work. As a capacity it is a potential. We look at things and attribute "energy" to these things, and energy is a potential which the things have. If you want to say that this potential is "actual", in the sense of being real, that's fine, but it's really just conceptual, it's a value we assign to the thing.

Now, according to the law of conservation of energy, it is not correct to say that the energy ever gets actualized. When the energy "gets things done", it is just transformed from one form to another, remaining as energy, and therefore remaining as potential. Energy is always potential, and never gets actualized because that potential (the capacity to do work) is always conserved in the temporal continuity of existence. That's why some people get hooked on the idea of perpetual motion. This is just the way that we've come to describe motion, we assign it a value, energy, it has proven to be a very useful way.

[

Per the LNC, there is also "and in the same sense". In this case, the reference frames differ. Do you reject special relativity? — Andrew M

"In the same sense" means using the words in the same way. It has nothing to do with reference frames unless "temporal order" has a different meaning from one reference frame to the next.

The issue was whether fields are real in the ontology of QFT which Carroll's comments confirm. — Andrew M

No, the issue was whether or not the thing modeled as "a field" has the nature of potential or not. As I explained to Janus, energy is modeled as potential, but this does not mean that energy is not real. That fields are modeled as potential does not mean that they are not real. However, just like in the example of "energy", potential is the property of something which is actual. So a field would be the property of something because there needs to be something actual which has that potential For example an electromagnetic field is a property of an object.

Surely you can see it's problematic to reconcile what we understand as 'objectivity' with the notion that reality comprises an endless series of parallel (but ever so slightly different) universes, only one of which we can ever be aware of. I'm sure I'm not the only person who this strikes as preposterous. — Wayfarer

The problem here I think is that there is no real principle whereby we can say that there is "only one which we can ever be aware of". That's what destroys objectivity in many-worlds, that we are aware of only "one world" is an illusion.

Maybe try reading up on it. — Janus

I've read a heck of a lot about it already, and submitted an extensively researched paper in university on the development of the concept of energy. All you need to do is google "energy" to see that "energy" is the capacity to do work, not "work getting done". I described very clearly the difference between potential energy and kinetic energy in my last post. I conclude that you're hopelessly lost, and helplessly refusing to acknowledge you misunderstanding.

Potential energy is the potential to get work done, actual energy is the getting of work done; in any actual doing of work some of the energy is "wasted" and discharged as heat (heat energy which of course itself does other "work"). — Janus

That's incorrect, energy is the capacity to do work, it is not "the getting of work done". Flowing water for example has a certain amount of kinetic energy, as the capacity to turn a turbine etc. (do work). The energy is there whether or not the turbine is. If we build a dam, the water is held up from flowing, and that held up water has potential energy. Release the water through the flood gate and the potential energy turns to kinetic energy, the capacity to do work. Run it through the turbine and the kinetic energy of the flowing water is transformed into electrical energy (the capacity to do work). Energy is not the getting done of work.

We are approaching an extensive section (approximately 135-200) in which Wittgenstein makes an examination of the concept of "understanding". I believe this section to contain significant insight, numerous distinctions, differentiations between various mental activities. So I plan to read through this section numerous times and see if I can reproduce and elucidate some of these distinctions here in this thread.

As a preamble to this endeavour, let me say that the concept of "understanding" seems to have fallen through the cracks in modern philosophy. It's neglected by epistemology which deals with the difference between knowing and not knowing, and neglected by philosophy of mind which deals with the thing which is supposed to know. "Understanding" may be characterized as the process whereby a mind moves from not knowing something, to knowing that thing.

In the classical Aristotle-Aquinas tradition this would be a process of habituation. Knowledge, as what a mind has, can be described as a habit of the living active human being. It's the tendency to think in a particular way. Aristotle first described "habit" in this way, as a property of a living being, the propensity for a certain type of potential to be actualized in a particular way. Aquinas developed theory concerning all sorts of habits, including the habits of the intellect. "Habit" was a very important concept in philosophy, being used to explain the properties of living beings, until the arrival of evolutionary theory. A great rift developed, between Lamarckian evolutionary theory which grounded evolutionary changes in habit, and Darwinian theory which grounded changes in chance variations. It appears that as a result of this great divide, and the western world's adoption of Darwinism, "habit" has been relegated to the furthest limits of respectable science.

I believe we will find a resurgence of the concept of "habit" (though not under that name), in this section of the Philosophical Investigations. We might find that Wittgenstein seeks to replace the notion of learning a principle, with the idea of developing a particular habit.

In a sense, the many-worlds hypothesis is a reductio ad absurdum of the notion of objective reality, because everything possible happens in at least one world, so there is no objective fact of the matter about whether any given event happens. What is objective is the god's eye view of all the worlds. But only gods can have that view. — andrewk

So it's an objective fact that everything possible is actually happening, at every moment of time, in the many-worlds hypothesis?

Pushing it and pushing it and pushing it, shoving it down people's throats uninvited, littering the forum with it. The problem is that it is too repetitive, too stubborn, too oblivious. It is excessive. — S

Are you talking about the professors of dogma? That you hate this activity and believe it to be "detrimental to the quality of the forum" is your own personal opinion. But the world is full of such professors, so having them here in the forum is a fair representation of the reality which we face throughout our lives

I think you know that that's a problem somewhere deep down, but because it's me that's raising it, you very predictably turn up, just like the others, to express your disagreement with whatever I say, and to try to spin your own little narrative. — S

If you do not believe in the pet theories which are being shoved down your throat (dogmata), then identify the weaknesses, and attack those weaknesses, over and over again if necessary. You cannot expect dogma to be changed just by pointing out to the professor of that dogma that you do not like it. Otherwise you are free to ignore such professors, and read something else. Where's the problem?

Why would you do that? Obviously I'm using the term in a looser sense than that. — S

I did that just to say that you're not talking about spam, you're talking about something else, and calling it spam. If you can't handle someone pushing their pet theory, I think a philosophy forum is not the place for you to be.

It's not the only problem, but why are philosophy-types so annoying as to nitpick? — S

If the philosophy-types annoy you then what's with the self-punishment of hanging around The Philosophy Forum?

"Spam" is usually something which comes in your email. It refers to sending the same message to many different locales. Spam on forums would be a case of sending the same message to many different forums. That's why it's classed with advertising. Repeating the same thing over and over again on the same forum (pushing one's pet theory) is not "spam".

I think there's an important relation between 107 and 108 which should not be overlooked. The seeking of the ideal is finally determined as fruitless at 107. Logic does not have the solid grounding which we keep telling ourselves that it must have in order that it be useful (the requirement). This requirement is for once and for all, found to be void. But now there is nothing under our feet for traction. So at 108 he turns to "our real need", to put something solid underfoot.

There's a bit of a problem here philosophically though, because "our real need" is just another ideal. You'll find this ideal if you study Christian moralists. You'll see a distinction between the apparent good, and the real good (wants and needs). I believe this distinction dates back to Aristotle, more fully developed by Aquinas. The "real good", here "our real need", is an ideal, despite the material basis of this idea. The chimeric characteristic of "our real need" is a product of the uniqueness of material beings, evident in the concept of life forms.

So as much as it may appear like Wittgenstein has removed "the ideal" from the description, as a false requirement, he has really just superseded the ideal which is required for sound logic (epistemological ideal) with the ideal which is required for sound moral principles (ontological ideal). This is completely consistent with his description of language as a human activity rather than as a system of symbols for representation. Now meaning is based in fundamental, material human needs (the Marxist social structure) rather than relations between symbols and what is represented.

133. It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for
the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But
this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear.
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping
doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy
peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself
in question.—Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples;
and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved
(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
... — Philosophical investigations

"The ideal" is right back in the picture in a different guise. One ideal has been replaced by another as the philosopher moves from epistemological problems to moral problems. The former being unresolvable due to the existence of the latter.

If you shout 'banana', when there is a wolf, it is no use, no one will come to your aid to fight a banana; you have to shout 'wolf' — unenlightened

But we're talking about meaning, "use", and when I shout "banana" it has meaning regardless of whether anyone understands my use,and comes to my aid, or not. That "banana" is not the best thing to shout in that situation is the reason why I argue that we ought to always be seeking the ideal when choosing our words.

Every wolf is unique, and every wolf attack is unique, but every wolf attack demands the same call, and every non wolf attack demands the same call not be made (where 'same' is roughly but recognisably - 'Woolve' would probably be near enough, and it is the near enough ness that allows language to be mutual. And being mutual (and thus consistent) is necessary to language being useful, rather than decorative. — unenlightened

This is the matter of "serving the purpose". If shouting "banana" does not serve the purpose, then I have a problem. I am using "banana" in a certain way, but it is proving to be not a very useful way, like hitting a nail with the screwdriver is not very useful. It would be incorrect to say that I am not using the screwdriver to hit the nail, when I actually am, but still that particular use is turning out to be not very useful. A word like "woolve" might serve the purpose, but then again, it might not, so it is clearly less than ideal. A hammer might appear to be the ideal tool for banging nails, until someone shows up with an air-nailer. Then we have a distinction to make between "serving the purpose" and "ideal".

I'm not comfortable with these formulations which smell too much of metaphysics. And they seem out of keeping with the paragraphs both before and after it. Any thoughts? — StreetlightX

I agree, 104 seems to be right out of context. I'll see if I can make sense of it.

I believe that in this section, 100-108, he begins by referencing the primary elements of the Tractatus. He has already dismissed this idea of material elements of fundamental clarity, upon which language and logic is based, but he still references them as "ideals", which we, for some reason, think must be there. At 100, a game can exist without them. But what kind of "game" could that be? It seems like logic would be impossible -101. The fundamental elements of clarity must be there somewhere, hiding in the background -102. It appears like we cannot dispense the notion, like glasses we cannot take off -103.

I think that what is described at 104 is the primary act of abstraction. Predication is that fundamental act by which we take the particular thing, and say something general about it. This is what allows comparison. To put this in context of the ideal which he is discussing, I would say that "highest generality" implies this ideal. So I think he is saying that we are mislead into believing that this fundamental abstraction, this act of predication is an ideal, the highest form of generality, upon which the strength of logic is based. But really, when he turns things around at 108, it may turn out to be the lowest form of generality. What we thought was the most ideal, the fundamental predication, is really the least ideal.

At 105, we don't find the purity of the ideal, here in the fundamental abstraction of the predication, and this dissatisfies us because now we cannot support the rigour of logic. So at 106 he wants to turn way from this highly formal mode of thinking (logic) to everyday thinking because the ideal which was required of logic is just not there. So we need to look at everyday thinking to see what really supports logic. And this is very evident at 107, what was required of logic, that it proceeds from pure, solid principles, is just not there, and our everyday thinking shows us that our thinking is really the opposite of this, we proceed from vague uncertainties, attempting to clarify them. And this is the turning around which he speaks of at 108. Aristotle stated that logic proceeds from the more certain toward the less certain, but maybe he really had things reversed.

That cannot be true.There must be some consistency of use, to be able to use words at all. — unenlightened

I don't know about that, "consistency" is something other than simple use. It might be an attribute, a type of use. But meaning is restricted to use here, as the premise, and if consistency enters the picture, then that is another thing. This is the problem of "types" which Wittgenstein exposed earlier. What is exposed is a lack of consistency. If I point to a particular rock and call it "slab", then to maintain consistency, every time I say "slab" I ought to be referring to that particular rock. But that's not the case, "slab" is used to refer to a type, and therefore many different rocks. So the notion of "consistency" is misleading to us, and we ought to move away from that. Now we move to a family of different meanings, different uses, and this difference demonstrates a type of inconsistency. It appears like Wittgenstein is focusing on inconsistency in use, rather than consistency.

I think that's the point of the passage I quoted, 125-127. We get caught up in this idea that everything goes according to rule (consistency), but that's really not the case, as every instance of use is unique.

Energy is both the capacity to do work and the force that gets work done. The first is potential energy and the second is kinetic energy. I'm not sure if all forms of energy that get work done qualify, according to any conventional definition, as kinetic energy, but in any case we can generalize and call all forms of energy that get work done actual energy as opposed to potential energy. — Janus

You don't seem to understand. Energy is the potential to get work done. We make a judgement concerning a particular aspect of an active thing, its capacity to do work, and call that it's "energy".. You can say that this aspect of the thing is actual, in the sense of "real", just like the judgement that a thing is red is a judgement of something real, but that doesn't change the fact that in the case of "energy" what is being judged is a thing's potential. So all you are saying is that this potential which the active thing is judged to have (called "energy") is something real, actual. When we describe things in terms of "energy", we are describing potential, whether or not we believe that this potential is something real.

There isn't a contradiction. Do you accept the relativity of simultaneity in special relativity? If so, then you already accept that a correct account of events can be reference-frame dependent and not absolute. — Andrew M

I think that the relativity of simultaneity allows for the same type of contradiction. It allows that it is true that two events are simultaneous, and also true that two events are not simultaneous. That is contradiction, plain and simple. The relativity of simultaneity undermines the objectivity of the law of non-contradiction in a very fundamental way. This law states that the same predication cannot be both true and false at the same time. The relativity of simultaneity allows discretion, choice, in the judgement of "at the same time".

Sean Carroll gave a lecture a few years ago entitled, Particles, Fields and The Future of Particle Physics. I recommend listening to his discussion of one of the slides (between 28:00 - 30:40) that includes the line, "Particles are what we see. Fields are what reality is made of." Do you disagree with Carroll's characterization of QFT? — Andrew M

Whether or not I agree with Carroll that reality is made of fields is irrelevant to the issue here. The question is whether what is represented by "fields" is of the nature of potential or not. As I explained to Janus above, what is represented by the concept "energy" is potential. Many people believe that energy is what reality is made of, but that does not change the fact that what is represented by "energy" is potential. And if we represent reality as composed of potential, that's only half the picture, because it doesn't provide us with a representation of what is actual. You might say that the reality is that there is an endless number of possible worlds, but what makes one of those possible worlds into the one that we live in, the actual world? That's what's missing if you represent the totality of reality as potential, a principle by which there is an actual world. If you cannot give reality to this principle as well, then there is no actual world in your ontology.

Rules of use, (grammar) determine sense. Without these rules a word has no meaning, meaning is use. — unenlightened

I don't think this is correct, context is what determines sense, not rules of use. This is what Wittgenstein is getting at, each instance of usage is a particular case, with a specific purpose, and the meaning of the words used is unique to that particular instance of use. That's the basis of "meaning is use".

125 ... The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique,
for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not
turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled
in our own rules.
This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e.
get a clear view of).
It throws light on our concept of meaning something. For in those
cases things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is
just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: "I didn't
mean it like that."
The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is
the philosophical problem.
126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither
explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view
there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no
interest to us.
One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible
before all new discoveries and inventions.
127. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders
for a particular purpose. — PI

Are you not familiar with the idea of kinetic energy and the difference between that and the idea of potential energy? — Janus

Yes, but how does that make a difference? Energy is the capacity to do work, therefore a potential. Kinetic energy is actually having that potential by virtue of being active, and potential energy is potentially having that potential. So potential energy is a double layer of potential.

Consider it in Newton's terms, an apple is hanging in the tree, it has potential energy by virtue of gravity and the fact that it could fall. If it is falling, it has kinetic energy, and thereby has the potential to hurt someone, hitting them on the head. The falling apple has the potential to exert force (work). When it's in the tree, it has the potential to fall and thereby has the potential to have the potential to hit someone on the head, double potential.

As Banno analyzed earlier here, this already has a precedent in relativistic physics which is also consistent with an objective reality. — Andrew M

Redefining "objective reality" so that contradiction is acceptable in an objective reality is not what I would consider as an acceptable solution.

The field is not constructed as potential. QFT says that the physical things that we observe emerge from the interactions of more fundamental physical fields. That is, those physical fields (one per particle type) are part of the ontology of QFT. — Andrew M

As far as I understand "fields", they are always modeled as potentials, and this includes "the more fundamental fields" of QFT. If you understand them as a model of something actual, then I think you misunderstand the ontology of QFT. But perhaps I'm wrong, and you can show me how a field is modeled as something actual. Read what I said above to Janus "energy" refers to a potential.

No, the classical sense (with absolute state) can be rejected altogether. On a relational model such as Rovelli's RQM, particles, atoms and molecules (and apples, desk lamps and human beings) are all quantum systems with relative state. — Andrew M

This is the point of the op then. The classical sense of "object" can be rejected altogether, and we no longer have any objective reality, everything is a "relative state".

On a quantum fields model, the fields for each particle type are real whereas it is particles that are potentials between interactions. — Andrew M

All you are doing here is constructing a double potential. The field itself is constructed as potential, then you layer another potential on top. This method of layering potential is not new in physics. Consider the concept of energy. As the "capacity" to do work, energy is fundamentally a potential, the potential for work. Then there is potential energy, and this is the potential for the potential for work. The double potential does not make energy actual, energy maintains its definition as a potential. Nor does the fact that the fields represent the potential for interaction between particles make the fields actual, they maintain their created status as potential. and we now have a double layer of potential.

EM waves don't have a propagation medium either. — fdrake

That's what I've been discussing with andrewk, whether EM waves are real waves or not. Andrewk insists that "wave" is defined in physics in such a way that a medium is not required for a wave. But this is contrary to the Wikipedia page on waves in physics, and contrary to what I learned in high school physics, as well. I think andrewk is just fabricating a definition to support an ontological position, and asserting the correctness of that intentionally directed definition.

Think that's how it happened. Michaelson-Moorley? Michaelson-Morley, was linked by andrewk earlier in response to MU IIRC. — fdrake

As I explained to andrewk, the Michelson-Morley experiment was inadequate, using the restrictive premise that objects would be separate from the ether rather than a part of it. That premise is contrary to observational evidence that EM waves penetrate objects. The premise that an object, such as the earth, is independent from the ether is misleading. This is evident in QM, which models the object (particle) as a property of the wave field.

Here's the conclusion from your referenced Wikipedia page. Notice that the experiments were inconclusive. Al that such experiments really show is that the relationship between the proposed ether and the earth, is unknown. Instead of resolving the issue, of the relationship between the ether and physical objects, scientists opted for special relative which provided a way around this problem. However, the problem remained and is amplified in quantum uncertainty. To say that the Michelson-Morley experiment demonstrates the non-existence of ether is a complete misrepresentation. What those experiments demonstrate is that the nature of the ether is not understood

From the standpoint of the then current aether models, the experimental results were conflicting. The Fizeau experiment and its 1886 repetition by Michelson and Morley apparently confirmed the stationary aether with partial aether dragging, and refuted complete aether dragging. On the other hand, the much more precise Michelson–Morley experiment (1887) apparently confirmed complete aether dragging and refuted the stationary aether.[A 5] In addition, the Michelson–Morley null result was further substantiated by the null results of other second-order experiments of different kind, namely the Trouton–Noble experiment (1903) and the experiments of Rayleigh and Brace (1902–1904). These problems and their solution led to the development of the Lorentz transformation and special relativity. — Wikipedia

In particular, §99 tries to head-off the objection that an 'indeterminate' sense - one without a strict boundary, like 'stay roughly there', is not 'good enough' to have, as it were, its own measure of perfection. In terms of §98, one can say that 'stay roughly here' 'is in order as it is'. It needs no further specification to be 'perfect' ... but not ideal. — StreetlightX

This is where I believe Wittgenstein has gone off track. It appears like "stay roughly here" serves the purpose, but it really does not. if someone said that to me, I'd ask "What do you mean? Where are my boundaries? How long must I stay roughly here? Can I stray to the right, can I stray to the left? Can I go get lunch? What do you want from me? How do I know if I've complied with what you want? Is what you want something that I am willing to give?"

So, back at 68-69 he describes how we "we can draw a boundary—for a special purpose". I believe that each particular instance of use involves a special purpose, that's what defines a particular instance of use, its special purpose. And, each instance of use requires boundaries designed for that purpose. Therefore it is implied that boundaries are inherently necessary for each instance of use, and it is those boundaries which make the language useful.

Wittgenstein's attempt to remove the necessity of boundaries would render language completely useless. So boundaries are necessary and they are tailored to the circumstances. In the process of tailoring the boundaries we always seek the ideal. We seek the boundaries which are ideal for the particular situation.

In your reply you seek first to counter my suggested definition of 'wave' by referring to the definition currently on Wikipedia - which anybody could change in two minutes - and then at the end of your third para to claim that part of the Wikipedia definition is nonsense. — andrewk

The point remains, that in physics a wave is defined as a vibration in a medium. It is an activity, and when there is activity there is something which is active. We can have a verbal, or mathematical description of a type of activity and that description can stand alone, as activity X, but once we apply the description to something real (use it to describe something), we engage with the underlying assumption that there is something which is involved in that activity. If it helps for you to understand this by referring to Aristotelean "substance", that's fine, but it's just a simple fact about how we describe things. If we describe a movement in the world it is assumed that there is something moving, otherwise we are describing a type of motion, a concept.

I admit that I was wrong to say that a field is completely mathematical, physicists do regard fields (like an electromagnetic field) as real things. The problem is that a field is modeled as force, and therefore potential energy. So the real existence of the field is modeled as the potential for activity in an object. For example, you can map a space with coordinates and show with vectors the force at each point. The force will change as time passes, and this may display a wave-like pattern.

The issue is that this is not the modelling of a wave. It is the modelling of a wave-like force. It is not the activity of a wave which is being modeled, what is being modeled is a force which has the capacity to cause activity in objects. As an analogy, suppose we model the force of a hammer hitting a nail. We model the effects of the hammer on the nail. This is not a modelling of the hammer. Looking at the model of this force, without any other information, we would assume that there is something there (substance, the hammer itself), which hits the nail. But we have no information about that thing other than the force which it applies on the nail, so we have no means for describing that thing itself, until we look directly at it as a thing to observe. Likewise with the modeling of the force within a field. What is modeled is the effects of the force on objects. This indicates a wave-like activity. But until we look at the field itself, as an object, a moving thing (and this means as a wave in a medium), therefore something actually moving rather than the potential for motion, we have no means for properly understanding that thing.

That's like saying that what we call "apples" aren't actually apples, that's just the word we use. So it's really a semantic issue. If one understands particles in a classical sense (i.e., as having an absolute state) then, I agree, physics gives us no reason to think such things exist. However if one understands particles (and apples) in a quantum/relativistic sense (as having a relative or relational state) then there is no problem - it's a natural fit. — Andrew M

Well, I wouldn't agree that "there is no problem". Let's assume two distinct ways of using "particle". Now we must avoid equivocation so we need some principles to distinguish between particles in the classical sense and particles in the quantum sense. If we start looking at different particles, when do we cross that line? Take an electron for example. It must be a particle in the classical sense, because the structure of molecules and atoms is dependent on those particles. However, it also appears to be a particle in the quantum sense. And this might appear to be the case for the other parts of an atom. We can't use "particle" in both senses without equivocating, and we cannot say that these parts of the atom are actually both types of "particle", because that would be contradictory.

Or, conversely, it's not imaginary since it has physical consequences. Perhaps consider it a manifestation of the measurement problem that can be understood in terms of potentiality. — Andrew M

OK, so as I explained above to andrewk, I'll accept that a field is assumed to be more than imaginary. The problem is that it is modeled as the potential for activity, rather than a real active thing. So the issue is with the modeling technique, not the assumption that an imaginary thing is real. Therefore there is an inconsistency between the assumption, that the field is a real active thing, and the modeling of the field, as the potential for activity.

I can certainly imagine a "perfect circle", an "infinite extension", an "ideal body" and so on. — sime

Suppose "pi" defines the perfect circle. Do you think that striving to resolve the exact mathematical value of pi would be a case of striving after the ideal? We all think that pi has no end, and to prove that it has no end is a fruitless task, like proving infinite has no end. But what if someone found the end?

Not in physics. In physics a wave is a phenomenon that behaves in accordance with the wave equation. — andrewk

No, in my high school physics, that is not how "wave" was defined. Here is what Wikipedia says:

"In physics, a wave is a disturbance that transfers energy through matter or space, with little or no associated mass transport (Mass transfer). Waves consist of oscillations or vibrations of a physical medium or a field, around relatively fixed locations."

Notice two key points: first, "transfers energy", second, "vibrations of a physical medium or field". The problem with "vibrations of a field", is that a "field" is purely mathematical, there has been no physical substance identified which corresponds to "field". Nothing corresponds to "field", it is pure mathematics, so it is nonsense to talk of vibrations of a field. And waves as "vibrations of a field" is something completely imaginary.

Another thing, in relation to the Michelson-Morley experiment. That experiment was completely inadequate because it premised a separation between physical objects and the supposed medium. It did not account for the possibility that objects are part of the medium, that the objects and the space between them are all part of the same medium. And, the empirical evidence, that light waves pass through physical objects, indicates that the objects must be part of the medium.

don't think physics provides any reason to doubt that the elementary particles (as described in the Standard Model) exist and have measurable physical properties just as everyday macroscopic objects do. — Andrew M

I don't agree with this. I've spoken to physicists who say that there is no reason to believe that what they call "particles" in the Standard Model, are actually particles at all. That's just the word that is used. Of course there is something real here which is referred to by the word, but what the word is actually refers to is states of the field. However, the "field" is purely mathematical, with nothing physical corresponding. Therefore it is incorrect to say that these particles actually exist, they are products of the mathematics.

The issue here is that a "field" is an imaginary thing, created by mathematics.