I'm simply asking you now if you can sense some length of the tape measure, that is, some extension of it, some section of it. — Terrapin Station
You agreed that you can sense the tape measure, and you agreed that you can sense markings on the tape measure. But you denied that you can sense any extension of the tape measure--that is, some arbitrary segment of it. — Terrapin Station
So if you can't sense any extension, but nevertheless you can sense the tape measure, you must be somehow sensing a single mathematical point of it only, no? Because anything more than that would have some extension. — Terrapin Station
This does not follow logically, because both "point" and "extension" require a definition, — Metaphysician Undercover
I think we'd have to move to inductive logic, but inductive conclusions are debatable. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you agree that by standard geometrical definitions, the tape measure has both points and extension, and to mark off a particular segment of extension requires points, which by definition have no spatial extension and are not sensible? — Metaphysician Undercover
Okay, but I'm still hoping you can give an example. — Terrapin Station
All I'm asking you about is the fact that you agreed that you can sense the tape measure, but you denied being able to sense some extension of it. — Terrapin Station
I didn't see how this question was relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your criticism of my comment was based on something not following logically because terms used require a definition. — Terrapin Station
So presumably, according to you, things only follow logically when terms used do not require a definition. — Terrapin Station
The way you phrased the comment was "Due to the fact that these terms require definitions, this can not follow logically," as if any terms that would require definitions excludes those terms from arguments that follow logically.
If you just wanted definitions, you could have just asked that. — Terrapin Station
But aren't you familiar with the idea of extension(ality) in ontology? I'm asking because if this stuff is that unfamiliar/that new to you, it's going to be difficult to have the sort of conversation I was hoping to have. — Terrapin Station
Because what does not make logical sense to you may not be so illusive to others. If I could put a banner at the top of this site it would be "Your incredulity is not an argument". — Isaac
Assuming an external law wouldn't move us closer to an explanation. It would just raise the question of why there happens to be one particular law in effect rather than another. — Andrew M
This is the sort of thing it's worth doing philosophy over--"Thinking hard" about what it is that you sense. — Terrapin Station
I agree. And unless you think that there's an infinite regress of laws, you have to eventually ask why law A is in effect rather than law B or C. And regardless of what your answer is, I don't think you can attribute it to physical objects or their features. Laws are unchanging and exert control over all activity throughout the entire universe, whereas physical objects and their features change and they are limited to particular regions of space time. — Dusty of Sky
I think maybe it's the passing of time that I sense. What do you think? — Metaphysician Undercover
Seriously, though, it depends on the kind of physicalism we are talking about. Regarding the OP ↪Dusty of Sky I doubt many physicalists, or any sensible physicalist, would claim that nothing exists except "concrete objects in a material world" since elementary particles are not, according to current physical theory, any such thing; they are fields or waves or intensities in a field. On that conception of the physical, why could ideas, equations or theories not also be such? — Janus
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