You call it trickery, I call it science. — T Clark

Making exceptions to the rule stipulated by the theory, whenever the theory fails in its predictive capacity, to account for these failings, instead of acknowledging that the theory is faulty, is not science.

Someone proposes dark matter as a solution to an inconsistency, so people go looking for it. Eventually, they find it or, if they don't, they have to change models. Isn't that the way it's supposed to work? — T Clark

Dark matter is posited as such an exception to the rule. Where general relativity fails in its predictive capacity, dark matter is posited to account for that failing. There is nothing to look for except the reasons why general relativity fails in its predictive capacity, i.e. the faults of the theory.

If the way things are seen and apprehended change, the experience of those things must change. — Mww

This is not necessarily the case. We just need to accept what Plato tells us, that the senses deceive us, and we obey reason instead of the senses. So we do not alter the experience, we simply accept with our minds, that the experience doesn't give us the truth, and we base our logic in something other than what sense experience gives us.

In a different thread I am discussing a good example of this, the heliocentric model of the solar system. Sensation gives us the experience of the sun coming up and going down, rising and setting. But we must move beyond this sense experience and accept that the earth is really spinning, and the sun is not revolving around the earth. To accept this, it is not required that we change our fundamental experience of the sun coming up and going down, we just need to accept that this fundamental intuition is actually wrong, discard it as a premise for our logic, and move along toward a better understanding. The better understanding is provided for by the fundamental assumption that our sense experience misleads us, but changing that experience is unnecessary.

And if it is the case I am not presented with exactly the same thing because the base intuitions might be altered, then how am I to explain, e.g., my experience of a pencil that is subsequently, merely as a condition by some other time and place, experienced as something not a pencil? — Mww

So it's not at all a matter of learning how to experience something like a pencil as something other than a pencil, its a matter of recognizing that the empirical representation is fundamentally misleading. This is what modern science shows us very clearly. The thing you experience as a pencil is really molecules, or atoms, or protons, neutrons, and electrons, or fields, or whatever, which is way different from your sense experience of a pencil. When the reality of the heliocentric model was revealed to us, it opened our minds very widely to the fact that the way things appear through sensation is not at all like the way things really are. And the Platonic mantra "the senses deceive us" was given real credence allowing for philosophy like Descartes' "Meditations" to be taken seriously.

But it isn’t; the human intelligence is experientially consistent. For any individual, a pencil apprehended today is apprehended as a pencil tomorrow, all else being given. It must be that either the Kantian notions of a priori intuitions as the unavoidable way we see and apprehend things is false, or, such notion is the case but rather, the idea that alteration of those intuitions into something deeper and more real, is false. — Mww

So this is not an acceptable dichotomy. There is some degree of consistency in experience, and as I said, consistency is cultured, propagated. However, there is also some degree of inconsistency, and even a small degree of inconsistency is evidence of something faulty within experience. The fact that there is inconsistency is evidence that intuitions can change over generations. And evolutionary theory supports this as well.

It still must be considered, how it is that you and I, and humanity in general, no matter the particular word used to represent it, see and apprehend this one thing, say, a pencil, and agree that it is an experience common to all of us. — Mww

But I don't agree with this. I focus on the differences between individuals, and I argue that these differences are very clear evidence that the fact that there are similarities between us does not justify the claim that we have "the same" experience. And because we cannot say that we all have "the same" experience, we also cannot assert as you do, that there "is an experience common to all of us". That's a false assumption, so no inquiry as to how it is possible is warranted. The appropriate inquiry is as to why we have similar experience. And my answer to this, is as I said, it is propagated, and cultured, intuitively. So the true "deeper" intuition which is common to living beings, is the tendency to create sameness, similarity, within unique and particular individuals, whose true essence is to be different from each other.

I’m surprised that you, of most participants herein, would advocate the alteration to a deeper level, of that which is already given as a basic foundational conception. To suggest the reduction of a fundamental is self-contradictory, is it not? Furthermore, and possibly even more surprising, is what could space or time be altered to, such that there is a deeper level to them? — Mww

The problem is that the "basic foundational conception" is wrong in a very fundamental way, as described above, "the senses deceive us", as described above. Therefore we must go to the deeper level to get a true understanding, a level deeper than sensation itself to get beyond the deceptive intuitions produced by sensation.

Then, too, if basic a priori intuitions are given as limits for seeing and apprehending things, which does seem to be the case, then to alter them to a deeper level implies the possibility for removing such limitations, which is also self-contradictory, insofar as we are certainly limited. — Mww

It's not contradictory, it's a matter of seeing these intuitions as wrong, and overriding them with the conscious mind, as described above. It's only if you subscribe to some form of naturalism, within which you would say that what "nature" provides us with is what is good, or correct, then you would say that the will to override these intuitions would be contradictory. But Plato thoroughly demonstrated the failing of such a naturalism. The natural tendencies are bodily tendencies, and we must use reason and will to get beyond these faulty tendencies.

Your dragon causing the sun to go around the Earth didn't really allow any predictions at all beyond that the sun would come up, which everyone already knew by keeping track of the behavior of the sun. — T Clark

That the theory doesn't allow any predictions at all, is exactly the point I was trying to make. The mathematics applied to an observed pattern provides the prediction. The trickery I referred to, involves associating a theory with the mathematics so as to create the illusion that the predictions support the theory.

We can see the same trickery with the Ptolemaic system. We can model the sun and planets as making orbits around the earth, and employ geometry and mathematics within that theory, to make predictions. The predictions will be accurate to a large extent. But then there will be a small percentage of fringe cases, retrogrades, etc., anomalies where the normal prediction procedure will fail, so a special rule will need to be created to deal with each anomaly. This is where the trickery lies. Instead of recognizing, and accepting that when the model fails at the fringes, this means it is wrong, we produce "excuses" for the failings, exceptions to the rule.

We can see this in modern physics and cosmology with the general relativity theory. At the very small, local scale, quantum mechanics, the theory fails. Also, at the very large scale, it produces anomalies when dealing with cosmological spatial expansion. The anomalies are dealt with by positing things like dark matter and dark energy. (The dragon accounts for the failings in the predictions, because it has a mind of its own and doesn't follow the law every single time, exceptions to the rule). The desire to hang on to the theory, despite its failings produces the trickery.

In the case of the Ptolemaic system, it is my understanding that it was believed by many to be wrong, long before Copernicus demonstrated it to be wrong, even before Ptolemy produced the actual model. The idea that the real truth was that the planets orbited the sun was revealed thousands of years ago because of the nature of the observed retrogrades. The correct heliocentric model could not be formulated though because geometers worked with circles. Circular orbits produced predictive failings which could not be corrected for. However, the failings of retrograde motion could be corrected for, in the geocentric model, so it remain prevalent. It wasn't until Copernicus exposed all the exact failings of the circular orbit model, that elliptical orbits could be presented as the solution.

ust wonderin’.....if a base a priori intuition informs unavoidably, how might it be altered? Wouldn’t experiential consistency be questionable? — Mww

I think experiential consistency is questionable. That's why we have difference of intuitions, differences of preference, and so on. These are the peculiarities of the individual. We can see that in standardized moral training, and standardized education in general, we attempt to create consistency. I believe this tendency to produce conformity is itself deeply intuitive. It's the reason why evolving living beings exist as distinct species, rather than just a whole bunch of different varieties.

Take my cat: The term 'cat' is arbitrary: you know, the noise we make and the knowledge we have of those furry living things never gives us something indubitable, not that is is wrong to think of it as a cat, but that this kind of knowledge has no determinate foundation. It is up in the air when questions about it are the most basic.
But what happens when we remove ourselves from this, if you will, ready to hand environment of knowing and we ask ontological and epistemic questions, not just in academic curiosity, but existentially, apart from the text, IN the world? Can we meaningfully say that because our language is indeterminate, then, say, my cat does not exist? So here: there is something intuitively absolute, "pure" even, about the givenness of the presence of the cat that is not language bound, and this is a kind of "knowledge" that exceeds the usual contextualized knowing. — Constance

I can't see how the analogy works. You can point to your cat and say "I know that's a cat, but I don't really know what a cat is". But you cannot point to an are, and say "I know that's an are, but I don't really know what an are is. That's the difference, you can point to a particular cat, as an example, but you cannot point to an example of "are" because it's purely universal.

I think a better example would be the Ptolemaic cosmological system. It was very complicated and it turns out in the end it was wrong, but it worked well until Copernicus and Kepler came along. Their theory eventually superseded Ptolemy's. Ditto with Newton and Einstein. I guess Newton was wrong, but we still use his theories for non-relativistic applications, which is most of what we deal with. — T Clark

Yes, you're probably right, it's a better example because it's a real example. I just went to a ridiculous example to make the point more obvious.

The OP provides an excellent opportunity to investigate the boundaries of religion. — Agent Smith

Who do you propose could set the boundaries to religion? Such boundaries could only be set by God, or the gods, because only these divinities might have access to that knowledge. If human beings tried to set such boundaries the human beings would be claiming to know what could only be known by God, and that would necessarily be mistaken. Reminds me of "The Euthyphro". An adventure which is a mistake from the outset.

Can't we think about being without the limitations of the human condition? A transcendental state can set us free from these limitations. The static whole of the transient, transgressive, changing, differentiating, or becoming nature of subjective being can be experienced as a solid, static, transcendental state of eternal, infinite, and objective, absolute essence, dissolving all distinctions, boundaries, perspective, and diversity in still unity. — Haglund

No, this is exactly what we cannot do. We must respect the fact that thinking about anything, is, by its very nature something limited by the human condition. So it is absolutely impossible to "think about being without the limitations of the human condition". "Thinking" is fundamentally limited by the human condition therefore these limitations inhere within the thinking. So if we want to take the perspective of some sort of disembodied being, we are not even talking about "thinking" anymore, nor would this disembodied being be properly called an "intellect", as "intellect" is attributed to a thinking human being. We can't even properly call it a "being"

That's why this whole approach is fundamentally flawed. The appropriate approach is to recognize the reality of our limitations, attempt to understand them and determine how they influence our thinking. So from the Kantian perspective for example, we should see that these fundamental limitations are described as the a priori intuitions of space and time. These base intuitions inform the way that we see and apprehend things, in a way which we cannot avoid. When we come to understand this basic reality, we can move beyond these intuitions, to a deeper level, to see how these intuitions themselves, might be altered toward something more real, by locating the basic limitations at an even deeper level.

You misunderstand the nature of science; hypotheses are never proven, — Janus

Isn't that exactly what I said, predictions do not prove hypotheses? So why do you think it constitutes a misunderstanding?

We (the community of inquirers) accept theories for as long as observations continue to manifest what is predicted of those theories. — Janus

What you express here is a mistake. As in my example, it's a mistake to accept hypotheses solely on the basis of successful prediction, because it's not the hypothesis which enables the prediction, it's the mathematics which does. There's a common form of trickery in which the deceiver uses mathematics to make predictions, and claims that the predictions support a pet hypotheses. Anyone who does not apply the required analysis, and rigorous logic, which is usually very arduous, may be deceived.

Therefore it is a mistake for us to accept theories just because observations "manifest what is predicted of the theory". The fault here is in your notion of "predicted of the theory". It's not theories which make predictions, it's human beings.

But this line of thinking simply denies that there is anything "there" in some emphatic, irresistible way. I may not know what things are, but THAT they are, notwithstanding "are" being interpretatively indeterminate, is impossible to deny. — Constance

This really makes no sense. You say "I know that things are", but "are" you say, has a completely indeterminate meaning. How can you possibly know that things "are", when you cannot know what "are" means. Your statement is basic contradiction "I know that things "are', but I don\t know what 'are' means".

We can think in terms of causation and imagine ways in which the things of the observed world and their observed parts and functions might work. Then we can think of what we would expect to observe if our hypotheses were right, and if, on experimentation, we do observe what we predicted, then we accept our hypotheses, and they become established as theories. — Janus

I think you're missing something here. When a hypothesis produces a prediction which works, this does not necessarily mean that the hypothesis ought to be accepted. Prediction is mostly produced from observation of temporal patterns, statistics, and mathematics, and a hypothesis generally goes far beyond the simple mathematics. So for example, imagine that I watch the sun rise and set day after day, and I produce a hypothesis, that a giant dragon takes the sun in its mouth around the back side of the earth, and spits it out every morning. I might predict the exact place and time that the sun will rise, and insist that my theory has been proven by my uncanny predictions. Clearly though, the successful predictions are nothing more than successful predictions, and my hypothesis hasn't been proven at all.

Therefore we must consider the logical relationship between the hypothesis and the prediction. It's very easy to be fooled into thinking that a certain prediction proves a specific hypothesis, when in reality we have to rule out all other possible competing hypotheses which could equally be said to be proven by the same prediction. This is a logical process which is crucial in designing experiments.

Okay, we accept it as granted, no need for proof right? Now, how did we arrive at this conclusion, is it from a particular kind of mathematics? Or is this more from logical inference? — chiknsld

It's metaphysics, theory, hypothesis. I wouldn't really characterize it as a conclusion, more like a proposition.

Very interesting, I suppose this is the ultimate reason for what you said previously -our intellect or consciousness which seems to be made of immaterial substance. — chiknsld

Yes, see Wayfarer was talking about memory consisting of a multitude of points, which are somehow united. The relationship which unites them does not appear to be a spatial pattern. What relates them may be a non-spatial pattern.

Dark energy is fascinating indeed. You're saying that dark energy has something to do with the same counterintuitive nature of our immaterial intellect, that same counterintuity is reflective in the current peculiarities of the universe? Very interesting. :) — chiknsld

I would not say that it's counterintuitive. As I said, the reality of the immaterial aspect of the human being, free will, spirit, etc., is very intuitive. It's just that the modern trend toward physicalism and scientism has suppressed this intuition in an unnatural way, making it appear to be counterintuitive. But when you look at the reality of the situation, you ought to be able to see that this physicalist attitude is acquired through the current educational institutions. It is not an intuition at all, but an attitude acquired in our educational process, and this attitude suppresses the natural inclination toward spirituality.

When you say ‘human’ do you have in mind an a priori ala Kant? To be human is then to be possessed of a prior categories. This makes humanity a divine notion. — Joshs

No, I do not agree with Kant's a priori category. What I think, is that the mind operates in unison with sensation in specific preestablished ways. This means that there is something prior to mental experience, similar to Kant's a priori, as the conditions for such experience, but this, whatever it is which is prior to experience, cannot be conceptual in any way. So Kant calls them "intuitions". Well, I find "intuition" as an equally faulty word, because that word as we normally use it, has mental experience implied within. That's why when Aristotle investigated the nature of intuition in his "Nicomachean Ethics" (what he considered the highest form of knowledge, incidentally), he concluded that it is a combination of innate and acquired features. Therefore, I believe that to properly characterize what is prior to mental experience, as the condition for such experience, we need to go beyond "intuition".

That is the very claim which Kant refuted. — Janus

This wasn't a refutation at all, just a simple assertion. But it's really a defeatist attitude. If we say that reality extends beyond our capacities of sensation (and what science shows us is that it does), yet we claim that reason has not the capacity to understand this reality, then we render science as impotent. Science uses hypotheses to understand what is beyond the limitations of sensation.

But this is also why we have to be wary of scientific conclusions, and duly subject them to skepticism. We tend to fall under the illusion that scientific theories are verified by sense experience, and therefore in some sense cannot be wrong, providing us with certainties. The problem though, as the ancients indicated, is that sense experience is what leads us wrong in the first place, and the goal of science is actually to access that true reality (noumenal) which is beyond sensation. If science's verification is provided by sensation, then we have the potential for a vicious circle within science, such that the deceptions of our senses are used to verify deceptive theories.

At issue in the way that line of thinking developed, was the fact that through the faculty of reason, you could know something with apodictic certainty - mathematical certainty, as we like to say. — Wayfarer

I would say that what Plato demonstrated, and especially Aristotle, is that this form of certainty, which you call "apodictic" is really an illusion, a false certitude which is nothing more than sophism. As Aristotle demonstrated, mathematical axioms and geometrical constructs, which are proposed for various purposes, what Plato called "the good", are forms which are property of the human mind. When "the good" wanders, strays from truth and honesty into pragmaticism, then persuasion may become the principal goal involved with such proposals. Then we have mere sophistry. Einstein for example, was a master at this type of persuasion, in his presentation of the nature of time. He presents a conception of "time" which is pragmatic rather than truthful, and offers numerous different persuasive arguments as to why this conception of time ought to be employed.

So, from the empirical perspective it is of course true that the Universe precedes our existence, but from the perspective of transcendental idealism, ‘before’ is also a part of the way in which the observing mind constructs the world.

My tentative, meta-philosophical claim is that this implies that in some sense, the appearance of conscious sentient beings literally brings the universe into existence. Not that ‘before’ we came along that it didn’t exist, but that the manner of its existence is unintelligible apart from the perspective brought to it by the observer. We can’t get ‘outside’ that perspective, even if we try and see the world as if there’s no observer. (Sorry for the length of this post.) — Wayfarer

This is exactly the point, and it's very well said here Wayfarer; nice job. Wittgenstein likes this example too, the earth existed before me, he implies that it's something which cannot be doubted. Actually though, it's a very good example of precisely why we need to doubt such things, which we otherwise would tend to take for granted.

We see "the world" is a human construct, a conception, how we understand our environment, what's around us, enveloping us. So if "the world" refers to the way that I understand my environment, then it's impossible that the world existed before me. That's a basic fact. Now, to move to this belief, that the world actually existed before me, I have to accept the truth (correspondence) between this conception of my environment, which envelopes me, "the world", and the actual reality of my environment. Once I accept this as a truth, then all the temporal, spatial, and mathematical conceptions implied by this concept "the world", as logically prior to that concept (necessary for it), are implicitly accepted by me as well. These become true conceptions, as necessary for rendering truth to "the world existed before me". The problem is that we readily accept "the world existed before me", because it is extremely intuitive, without taking the time required to understand exactly what that proposition entails.

So you can see that the simple proposition "the world existed before me" involves a massive web of temporal, spatial, and mathematical conceptions all tied together, as necessary to ensure the truth of that proposition. If any of these conceptions might be inaccurate, then the entire proposition is cast into a shadow of doubt. The most obvious problem is the term "before". Our conception of time is so primitive and obscure, that we do not know with any degree of certainty what "before" actually means. And so, in setting a relationship between myself and my environment, which includes the concept "before", I have to approach with much skepticism.

-No, how do you prove that? — Nickolasgaspar

Ok, rather than call what is outside of natural "supernatural", would you prefer "non-natural"? I don't really care about the terminology. If you dislike the term "supernatural" let's just call it "non-natural".

What natural things are necessary of is irrelevant to how we establish and verify possibilities.The possibility of the supernatural must be demonstrated, not assumed. — Nickolasgaspar

When it is demonstrated that there is something other than the natural, then we must call it something. You defined "natural" as what manifests through verified building blocks, so the manifestation of the building blocks themselves must be something other than natural. Can we call this the "non-natural"?

-Sure, our will is a real phenomenon......declaring it "fee" is scientifically ignorant because none of our choices are really free from the system we are in. — Nickolasgaspar

A "system" is a human construct. This statement makes no sense.

You need to demonstrate that supernatural causality is real and that it is required for A. — Nickolasgaspar

It's already been demonstrated. According to your definition of "natural", nature builds things from building blocks. But obviously the building blocks are necessary for whatever nature builds. And whatever produces the building blocks is outside of nature, not natural, according to your definition. Yet it is definitely a requirement for whatever nature builds, because nature requires the building blocks to build stuff. If you do not like the term "supernatural" we'll just call it "non-natural". I'm not partial to "supernatural" myself.

Whether a supernatural explanation is relevant,that is on you do demonstrate sufficiency and necessity through objective positive evidence in favor of the supernatural...not by making arguments through the use of gaps in our epistemology. — Nickolasgaspar

I've demonstrated the necessity to assume a cause which is not natural, by your definition of "natural". If you do not want to call it "supernatural", because "supernatural" means something else to you, I really don't care, we can just call it something else. How does "divine" sound to you? That's got a much better ring than "supernatural".

In Science Natural is every process or phenomenon that manifest in reality through verified building blocks of the physical would and or their advanced properties. — Nickolasgaspar

Sure, the "Natural" is everything which manifests "through verified building blocks", but we still need to account for the existence of these so called "building blocks". That's what we deal with in metaphysics. If "Natural" is whatever is constructed with the building blocks, then whatever constructs the building blocks must be supernatural. Do you agree?

No, since, we as human produce artificial things, but they are not supernatura because in order for them to exist a long line of natural processes must take place first. (i.e. QM, emergence of atoms, emergence of molecules, emergence of chemical properties, emergence of biological properties and structures, emergence of mental properties, emergence of skills through training....thus production of a artificial things (i.e. jewellery). — Nickolasgaspar

That natural things are necessary for the effect A, does not exclude the possibility that supernatural things are also required for the A effect.

In order for an artifact to be supernatural that would demand the existence of mind properties non contingent to the causal line described above somehow interacting in matter and producing the artifact. — Nickolasgaspar

Yes, remember I mentioned "free will". And the hypocrite that you are, chose to reject the reality of free will.

Sure it is, and by the time we introduce our scientific knowledge we realize that we are not really free to make free choices.
Our biology, our peers, our given needs and circumstances limit our free will in really mundane choices. — Nickolasgaspar

That the extent to the freedom of the will is limited, does not necessitate the conclusion that it is not real. Look at the above, natural causes are required for the occurrence of A , and also supernatural causes are required for A. If it is a fact that the natural effectively restricts the supernatural, this does not necessitate the conclusion that the supernatural has been excluded.

Really , you can demonstrate impossibility and distinquish it from personal incredulity? How would you do that???? — Nickolasgaspar

We use logic to demonstrate impossibility.

No evidence means.... no evidence, it doen't mean positive evidence or even indications for a magical realm. — Nickolasgaspar

No evidence of X, means no evidence of X, but no evidence of X might still be evidence of Y. No evidence of X does not mean no evidence absolutely as you imply here. You seem to be ignoring what I've reiterated numerous times, that "natural" requires a definition.

You don't know if we have all the facts and if advances in our technology will allow new observations to produce additional facts that could support our evidence for a mechanisms. — Nickolasgaspar

Are you suggesting that we change the definition of "natural" in the future, to allow for what would now be necessarily supernatural.

There isn't anything to understand about the supernatural because it's a made up bin where magical thinkers through everything we currently don't understand in there. The supernatural is ill defined so it has no explanatory power. We don't observe or verify supernatural causation and we shouldn't use it on things we currently do not understand.
Imagine if we stopped searching for the cause of diseases because our superstitious ancestors came up with supernatural explanations like gods and theodicy,evils spirits , evil eye, cursing etc.
Again your arguments are superstitious and outdated. — Nickolasgaspar

I propose we define "natural" in the common way, as "not artificial". Do you agree that artificial things must be supernatural?

Superstitious beliefs in the supernatural is NOT philosophy.
Philosophy should produce wise claims to assit our understanding of the world....not to point to mystery worlds we have to way to testing them...lol

The supernatural is Pseudo Philosophy. — Nickolasgaspar

A discussion of free will is philosophy. And any hypocrite who denies oneself free will is incapable of understanding reality. So until you change your attitude, it's pointless to discuss philosophy with you.

Even if we can't do that, we can imagine what it would be like to escape the human perspective. — T Clark

Try it then. Try to remove the human temporal perspective, so that there's no "now". You'd have the entire temporal expanse of the universe at once. There'd be no separation of any object from any other object, because everything would exist everywhere all at once. If you wanted to imagine just a short portion of time, what would separate that portion from the rest other than your chosen perspective?

Matter and energy interacting out there in the universe, is a human perspective. It's how we describe things. You cannot escape the human perspective.

Quite a ridiculous assertion. A thrown rock (in space say, no significant forces acting on it) is just beyond the reach of the hand that threw it. A second later it is meters away, a changed state. It is also likely facing a different direction after that second since it's really hard to throw a rock without any spin. — noAxioms

If there are no forces acting on it, then at a second later in time, it is not in a changed state, it's state is exactly the same as before. That's Newton's first law of motion, it's called the law of inertia.

Changing the motion is not the same as changing the state. The thrown rock is still heading in the same direction after a second (unchanged motion) and has the same spin (unchanged motion) but has a different location and orientation (both changed states). Yes, force is required to change its linear and angular momentum, per Newton's 2nd law, and is that to which your wiki quote refers), but no force is required to change its location, orientation, temperature, etc, all of which are part of its classic state. — noAxioms

It seems you are using "state" in an unconventional way.

This has absolutely nothing to do with the falsification of deterministic physics. Why are you going on about this? — noAxioms

I'm trying to bring to your attention the fault in what you stated.

Logic can never necessitate an ill defined unfalsifiable assumption about a realm. — Nickolasgaspar

It seems you really do not understand the nature of logic.

Just because we are unable to identify the cause of a phenomenon , we rush to make up an explanation with magical properties that defy natural roles. — Nickolasgaspar

You are not reading what I said. I said when we are able to determine, that it is impossible that the phenomenon could have had a "natural" cause, according to how we define "natural", then we can conclude "supernatural". I am not talking about being unable to identify a cause, I am talking about identifying a cause as supernatural.

No when lacking evidence for a natural mechanism, means that we ....lack evidence for a natural mechanism. It doesn't mean that we have evidence for the supernatural! — Nickolasgaspar

Look Nickolasgaspar, no evidence of a natural mechanism for a particular thing, is evidence of no natural mechanism for that thing, no matter how you spin it. Now, when the evidence becomes such that it is impossible that there is a natural mechanism, according to accepted definition of "natural", then you can keep searching for that non-existent natural mechanism forever, which you will not find because there is no evidence of it, or you can turn around to face reality, and make an attempt to understand the supernatural.

-Whatlol? You are pulling my leg right? We don't have free will. We are bind by our biology and peer pressure and environmental influences etc. We have will that ins't free. We only have some really brief bursts of freedom mainly for superficial choices.
This is a theological not a philosophical concept. — Nickolasgaspar

I see it's pointless to discuss philosophy with you.

Very interesting. — chiknsld

Yes it is, isn't it? But the need for a schema like this is only really understood when one recognizes and accepts the reality of free will.

This does not follow from any hard-deterministic physics. Quite the opposite in fact, by definition. — noAxioms

In any physics, a force is required to change a state. I'm very surprised that you would try to deny this.

Perhaps you should give an example where the forces are not a function of the state at a given moment. — noAxioms

From Wikipedia: "In physics, a force is an influence that can change the motion of an object." So, in physics, a "force" is what what would change the state which exists at "a given moment". Therefore it is clearly not "a function of the state at a given moment", because that would mean that the change has occurred to the state before the force was applied. You are attempting a misrepresentation.

he problem is with the nature of philosophy not with my statement describing the incompatible nature of supernatural assumptions. — Nickolasgaspar

No the problem is with the opinion expressed by your statement. Clearly when the assumption of the supernatural is necessitated by a combination of the evidence, the definition of "natural", and logic, then philosophers ought to assume the supernatural. Your opinion is that philosophy should stop short of assuming the supernatural, even if the supernatural is necessitated by the logic. That's why your opinion is faulty.

We either have evidence for a natural mechanism or have zero evidence for a natural mechanism. This is the true dichotomy. — Nickolasgaspar

You left out evidence for something which has no natural mechanism. Take free will for example. We have evidence of free will, and there is no natural mechanism to explain it.

In order for the supernatural to be part the discussion, you will first need to demonstrating the existence of the supernatural. — Nickolasgaspar

This is not true. All that is required is evidence of something which is not natural. This effectively demonstrates the necessity for the supernatural to be part of the discussion.

Logic dictates that you need to have evidence for your claim( the supernatural). The lack of evidence for an other claim doesn't automatically render yours the answer. — Nickolasgaspar

As I said, evidence that there is something which is not natural, is evidence of the supernatural.

What occurs to me on reading it, is the question of what faculty or property unifies a single memory in such a way that it can be deposited across a number of different systems (it is referred to as an ‘engram’). What makes it whole? I don’t discern any comment or speculation in the article about that point. But, philosophically, this is where I think there is evidence for something like vitalism: that there is a faculty or attribute of living systems which orchestrates a huge number of diverse, individual cellular interactions into a unified whole, which operates on a number of levels, including memory. — Wayfarer

Consider that there are separated points in space, non-dimensional points which have real existence. Between the points is "space" as we know it through our techniques of geometry and measurement. The non-dimensional points are very real though, having some sort of internal structure which is completely foreign to us because it is non-spatial, and we understand physical things only through their spatial representations. Within these points is the immaterial reality which is very intuitive to us. And the activity in here (whatever it could be), accounts for the observed oddities of our universe, oddities which appear to us when the universe is represented by spatial models; like spatial expansion, dark energy etc.. The non-dimensional points though, might be related to each other, through their internal activity, and these relations cannot be represented as spatial relations.

Seeing things in this way opens up a whole "internal universe" which is completely different from the external spatial universe that we are aware of through sensation.

Now, the problem in accessing and understanding the internal universe is the failings of our geometrically based conceptions, which were constructed chiefly for utility in the external, spatial universe. The principal problem today, is the relativistic concept of space-time, which portrays time as a fourth dimension of space. This forms our conception of time around our conception of space, making time a property of spatial activity, instead of making spatial activity a property of the passing of time. The true logical conclusion is that the passing of time is required for spatial activity, not that time is the product of spatial activity. So if we invert the existing conception, to give proper logical priority to time, making the passing of time the logical necessity for the existence of spatial activity, then we allow for non-spatial activity at the base of, or the cause of spatial activity. Then the activity within the non-dimensional points, described above, becomes intelligible to us, as non-spatial activity. And time is properly positioned as the zeroth dimension rather then the fourth.

OK, you seem to be interpreting it as a statement of determinism. Under a completely deterministic interpretation of QM (such as Bohmian mechanics), the future action any robot, human or squirrel is completely determined by the state at a given time. Unless you can falsify such an interpretation, your statement above is a mere assertion, not any kind of evidence that a human can in any way do something other than what is utterly determined. — noAxioms

This is easily falsified, as you request. A "state at a given time" cannot by itself determine any future activity. This is because a state is static, without activity, and any future activity of the thing in this state is dependent on what forces are applied to it. Therefore it is clearly false to say that the future action of a thing is "completely determined" by its present state, because it is also dependent on whatever forces are applied to it.

All philosophical explanations should stop before entering any supernatural assumption. — Nickolasgaspar

This is clearly a biased statement.. Whenever evidence and logic indicate the reality of that which is beyond the natural, then the appropriate conclusion is the supernatural. To deny the reality of what the evidence and logic lead you toward, because it's contrary to what you already believe, is simple prejudice.

The rash is back. So I'm bumping this thread. There are good philosophical and social reasons to remove certain threads.

The list in the OP would today read:

Adam Eve and the unjust punishment
Divine Hiddenness
Multiple Messiah Theory
Explanations of Christian Hell?
Understanding the Christian Trinity
The Possibility of Infinite Punishment in Hell
Are there any scientific grounds for god?
The eternal soul (Vitalism): was Darwin wrong?
An Argument Against Theological Fatalism
Jesus and Greek Philosophy

Again, these threads should be removed if they
...take scripture or revelation as a starting point for discussion; theology, not philosophy.
— Banno — Banno

Banno utters nonsense again! Philosophy will take any commonly held belief as a starting point for discussion or inquiry. That's very evident in Plato's dialogues, and Plato is arguably the definitive philosopher. The subjects mentioned here involve deep philosophical questions. Banno seems to want to limit "philosophy" to "what interests Banno", and that's a very selfish attitude, especially since Banno's interests are very shallow.

So in stage 1, you examine the options and rightly conclude that quitting smoking would be in your best interest, and in stage 2, the immediate-gratification-monkey (a waitbutwhy term) totally ignores the output of stage 1 and reaches for the ciggy. Still not an example of free will or the lack of it, and not anything that cannot occur with a deterministic robot, a supposedly not free-willed thing.

So my point is: what distinguishes a supposedly free willed human (or squirrel if you want) from something else that isn't free willed? — noAxioms

Look at the example. At the end of stage 2 the person might reach for the ciggy or not reach for the ciggy. Therefore the person's will is free. If the person was a deterministic robot there would be only one way which the person could go after stage 2.

Thanks for bringing that to my notice. Stage 2 covers that phase of the choice-making process. Looks like it didn't quite satisfy your high standards of accuracy and truth. I've been accused of wooly thinking. So there. — Agent Smith

The problem is that there is a division between decision and whatever it is which motivates, or initiates action (will). So for instance, you decide what you are going to do, but you do it later, or you don't do it at all. The decision does not necessitate action. That's why we need to assume a separation between what we call "will" as the initiator of action, and the decision making.

How could you choose what one likes and dislikes? These are, as far as I can tell, formed way before one is even conscious about them. I, for example, didn't opt for heterosexuality, but, from what I can gather, I have. The same goes for homo/bisexuals. This proves my point to my satisfaction. — Agent Smith

When you pay proper respect to the separation described above, whether or not you choose your likes and dislikes is irrelevant. Your likes and dislikes may have influence over your decision making, but your will, which initiates your actions, is not necessarily determined by your decisions. So whether or not you have control over your likes and dislikes is irrelevant to whether your will is free, because your will is not determined by your decisions.

In stage 2, all the choices have been processed and the one that we like is selected. It's in this stage, our preferences come into play, preferences we had no hand in determining i.e. we're not free now. — Agent Smith

You've left out stage 3, and that is what you actually end up doing. And stage 3 might be contrary to what you decided in stage 2, like if you decided not to smoke anymore, and you actually light up a cigarette. That stage 3 is not necessarily forced by something subconscious, nor is it necessarily forced by the conscious decision, is evidence that the will is free.

Why is there existence at all? This is truly absurd. This is the absurdity of existence. There is no reason that existence should exist. There should just be nothing. Nothing existing for all of eternity. Nothing on top of nothing on top of nothing...on top of nothing. And there should never be existence after that. — chiknsld

Actually what you propose is what's absurd. To conceive of the possibility of nothing requires negating the appearance of all that is. This becomes completely absurd, and the possibility of nothing becomes a true impossibility. So pondering the possible reality of nothing is just like pondering the reality of any absurd impossibility, like a square circle, or anything like that. It's just another useless exercise in futility. The proposition of absolute nothing is the most preponderate absurdity, being truly inconsistent with absolutely everything.

Our intuition is that it defies all logic. — chiknsld

This, unless you have access to some very strange intuition, is also the opposite to reality. Intuition surely presents us with the idea that existence is highly intelligible. That is what motivates us in our attempts to understand it. If our intuition was that existence defies logic, we would not be at all inclined to apply logic toward understanding it.

part from the question of whether causes and first principles exist outside of the individual beings they bring into existence, they can be distinguished from each other during the inquiry into their nature. What, after all, is an inquiry into causes if one cannot make that distinction?

The soul is the cause and first principle of the living body. But these are so spoken in many ways, and similarly the soul is cause in the three ways distinguished; for the soul is cause as being that from which the movement is itself derived, as that for the sake of which it occurs, and as the essence of bodies which are ensouled.
— De Anima, 415b8, translated by D.W. Hamlyn

But the intellect, as a potential (from the passage I quoted), is posterior to the material body, dependent on it, just like every other power that the soul has.
— Metaphysician Undercover

The potentiality of the intellect in III.4 is not described as a dependency upon the "material body" but as a condition that allows it to think "all things": — Paine

Do you apprehend a difference between the soul, as "the cause and first principle of the living body", and the intellect, as "a condition which allows it to think 'all things'"? The latter is posterior to the former, as the former is the cause of being of the latter.

Also, the potentiality of the intellect is definitely described as dependent on the material body. That's the point of the reference to imagination. Thinking requires imagination, which requires the bodily senses. That's how Aristotle describes all the powers of the soul, the higher are dependent on the lower, and they are all features of the various living bodies. We can conclude that the powers, or potencies, of the soul are materially based, because in his physics, matter provides the potential for change. They are potential, therefore they are materially based.

He demonstrates that the powers exist as potential, by explaining that any of the powers is not active all the time, it must be actualized. So the power resides in the potential (we can conclude matter). Aquinas looked at this with respect to the nature of "habit", and found that the habit, even though it is a specific way of acting, resides in the potential, material aspect, not in the act itself, the formal aspect.

I am still no closer to understanding your interpretation and you report the same consternation about mine. — Paine

I have to admit, I do not see the point you are trying to argue. There appears to be no consistency to what you say. You assert an "active intellect" which "exists separately", but then you readily admit to the obvious, that Aristotle describes the intellect as a potential, in all of its facets. When attempting to support the idea of a separate "active intellect", you refer back to "the soul", as if there's no separation between the soul and the intellect. But you need to respect the fact that the intellect is a product of the soul, just like all the other powers of the soul, which are all features of the material body. In describing the intellect, you cannot refer directly to the soul, because one is just a property of the other.

They are not separated in the generated individual, but Aristotle distinguishes between the soul as form and the individual repeatedly as the bulk of my quotes demonstrate. De Anima begins with the distinction: — Paine

The soul, as the form of the individual, is not a being which is separate from the matter, nor is it an intellect. The soul is a type of actuality which is necessarily prior to the material body, as the cause of it. A cause must be an actuality. That's what I tried to explain to you before, but you seem to want to describe the soul as some sort of intellect which persists after the material body. The intellect, as a power of the soul is a potency, or potential, though. And we have no principles to support the idea of a cause persisting after its effects.

The intellect is a property of what you call a combined (material) being. There is no principle to support an "active intellect" which "exists separately". The idea of a "separate form" is supported by the necessity of a cause (the soul in this case) preceding its effect (material body). The soul must be separate because it necessarily exists when there is no material body, prior to it, because of the temporal nature of "cause"; it is prior to the material body. As necessarily actual, Aristotle assigns "the soul" to the category of "form" But the intellect, as a potential (from the passage I quoted), is posterior to the material body, dependent on it, just like every other power that the soul has. Each and every one of the soul's potencies is dependent on, therefore not separable, from the body. In the case of the intellect, this is demonstrated by the example, the intellect is dependent on the imagination. The idea of a separate active intellect is a notion which is left unjustified.

True measurement, to me, simply means the correct value of (say) the length of a line. So, a square has a diagonal whose true measurement is 2–√2. — Agent Smith

Then how were you distinguishing between the true value of a measurement, and a measurement which is close to the true value?

Suppose there's a line. Do you think the line has a measurement without being measured? How could it?

Except for the forms and matter which make such beings possible. — Paine

But form and matter are not separate beings. Form and matter are principles of Aristotle's physics, which are applied toward understanding being, such that we can say that a being necessarily consists of both. Primary substance is individuals, and individuals consist of both form and matter.

And I'm saying we don't have an option. Infinity and infinitesimals are the best available tools we have to study curves. Maybe some day we'll discover something better. Until that happens, we're stuck with what we have. — Agent Smith

I have a slightly different opinion. I think we will not discover something better until we reject what we have. As I said, necessity is the mother of invention. Everyday I pick up my hammer and bang some nails. I think this tool's just fine, it serves the purpose well. I will never replace it unless I am dissatisfied with it. And until someone shows me, look it's got this problem and that problem, I'll continue to think it's just fine.

What is a true measurement to you? — Agent Smith

I don't know, that was your words. You were talking about being close to the true measurement. If you talk about "true measurement in that way, then there is no such thing. But I think any measurement is a true measurement, how could it not be a true measurement, yet still be a measurement? The issue is the measuring technique.

In Aristotle all beings are generated.

I'm fully aware of hylomorphism, as is evident in my last post. All things are "combined beings". So I don't understand your usage, as if "combined beings" refers to a special class of beings.

What I am saying is that the reason why perfection is impossible is that the tool (mathematics) is fundamentally flawed.

Imagine if the true value of a measurement is 4.5879... units. I can get very, very close to that value and that should be more than enough. Note mathematicians are fully aware of this rather embarrassing state of affairs. Irrational numbers were called incommensurables. — Agent Smith

It's not an issue of there being a "true value of a measurement" and we can get very very close to that, it's a matter of there being no true value, because the way of measuring is fundamentally flawed. So you have no justification to your claim that you "can get very very close" to the true value. If you could show the true value, to show how close you are to it, you wouldn't accept the "very very close" value, you'd accept the true value instead.

What you're not grasping, is that when measurement is impossible, which is what "incommensurable" implies, then there is no true measurement, and no such thing as close to the true measurement. What is evident is that the measuring tool is inadequate for the job. Need to get a better tool, properly designed for the job

So, something that is not perfect is deeply flawed? — jgill

Mathematics consists of ideals. An ideal which is not perfect is deeply flawed.

You're a perfectionist and so the mathematics of infinity and infinitesimals won't make any sense to you. — Agent Smith

That's exactly the problem. I thought mathematics was supposed to provide us with precision, perfection in our understanding. Then I was disillusioned, realizing that it's all a facade, and deep misunderstanding lies behind.

This does not reflect Aristotle's thinking. Only some combined beings are capable of thought. The capacity is directly related to the condition of the body. This is made clear in the passage preceding the one I quoted: — Paine

That's exactly the point I am making. The capacity to think is directly related to the material body. Therefore it is a mistake to represent that capacity (the intellect), as something which can exist independently of the material body.

The intellect seems to be born in us as a kind of substance and not to be destroyed. — ibid, 408b 18, emphasis mine

When the word "seems" is used, one must be aware that this is an idea which is being expressed as something to be doubted. It appears you are not distinguishing between the use of "intellect" at the beginning of the passage, and "soul" at the end of the passage. The two are very distinct in Aristotle, and statements about one cannot be used as a conclusion about the other.

Here again, it is important to follow distinctions Aristotle makes between the soul as a principle that animates all life from the experience of combined beings. Aristotle states at the beginning of the book that only combined beings can be affected: — Paine

I don't understand your use of "combined beings". It doesn't appear Aristotelian to me. Is this supposed to be like the Plato's notion of body and soul? If so, it is mistaken to represent Aristotle in this way, because he breaks down this ancient notion. For Aristotle, each individual thing, alive or inanimate, consists of matter and form, the living being has a special type of form, "soul".

Therefore the distinction you make "only combined beings can be affected", appears completely unsupported. Notice in your quote he talks about specific affections which are peculiar to the soul. He does not make the more general statement that affection is something unique to the soul. Of course in his physics he talks about all material substance as capable of change, matter being the potential for change.

Book 3, chapter 4 follows the discussion of imagination in chapter 3 and begins the argument of how the intellect can be seen as a potential in relation to what makes it actual. The last paragraph of chapter 4 says: — Paine

There is a very real problem with saying that the intellect "is actually nothing before it thinks". You ought to be able to see this clearly. Before it thinks, the intellect must have the capacity to think. And this is a very specific capacity, it's not the capacity to be warm or cold, the capacity of self-nourishment, the capacity to move, or anything like that, it is the specified capacity, to think. Therefore the thing which has the capacity to think, the intellect, must very clearly be something actual, prior to thinking, in order to have this specific capacity. So when we say that the intellect is "actually nothing" before it thinks, this must be qualified by a very specific set of possibilities,. It is actually nothing, in relation to that specific set of possibilities.

The following chapters demonstrate how admitting in 431a8 that the 'soul never thinks without an image" is not admitting that the intellect is a "form of imagination" as described at the beginning of the book. — Paine

I don't see what you're alluding to.

Now, you're joking, right? :smile: — Agent Smith

Of course I'm not joking. Let's assume that two straight lines is "close" to being a single curved line, two being "close" to one. The curved line is a single line, the two straight lines is two distinct lines. Now you seem to think that the more straight lines you put together, 3, 4, 5, 6, the closer you get to being a single line, such that as you approach an infinity of straight lines, it becomes one curved line. Can't you see that you're going the wrong way? Instead of getting closer and closer, you're getting further and further. Producing a larger and larger multiplicity does not somehow produce the conclusion that the multiplicity is getting closer and closer to being a single entity.

Show us then a different method of measuring the length of a curve if not using infinitesimally small straight lines. I bet you can't and so infinitesimals and infinity it is. Nevertheless we'll wait, with baited breath, for you to discover a new way of tackling curves. — Agent Smith

I use something flexible like a string, bend it around in the curve to be measured, then I lay it out straight and measure it as one long length. The single curved line is effectively converted to a single straight line, then measured as such, in that way. You have to be careful though because the "inside" measurement is always distinctly shorter than the "outside" measurement, and this is a problem which cannot be avoided. So the inside of the string will complete the circle in a shorter length than the outside of the string.

This thing you refer to, "using infinitesimally small straight lines", is not itself an act of measurement, because as I told you, an infinitesimal length cannot be measured, and therefore cannot be used as a unit of measurement.

Yes, curious isn't it? A problem is that this is an existence theorem. — jgill

The question then, is there a way to determine whether it is true or not? For example, if you stir a coffee, is there a way to determine that there is a molecule or something like that, which remains in the same place after stirring as it was prior? Or is this just a principle which is useful for some purposes, but is not really true? I guess it depends on what is meant by "continuous function" and whether it is true to think of things in terms like this.