Thanks for bringing that to my notice. Stage 2 covers that phase of the choice-making process. Looks like it didn't quite satisfy your high standards of accuracy and truth. I've been accused of wooly thinking. So there. — Agent Smith

The problem is that there is a division between decision and whatever it is which motivates, or initiates action (will). So for instance, you decide what you are going to do, but you do it later, or you don't do it at all. The decision does not necessitate action. That's why we need to assume a separation between what we call "will" as the initiator of action, and the decision making.

How could you choose what one likes and dislikes? These are, as far as I can tell, formed way before one is even conscious about them. I, for example, didn't opt for heterosexuality, but, from what I can gather, I have. The same goes for homo/bisexuals. This proves my point to my satisfaction. — Agent Smith

When you pay proper respect to the separation described above, whether or not you choose your likes and dislikes is irrelevant. Your likes and dislikes may have influence over your decision making, but your will, which initiates your actions, is not necessarily determined by your decisions. So whether or not you have control over your likes and dislikes is irrelevant to whether your will is free, because your will is not determined by your decisions.

:brow:

How could you choose what one likes and dislikes? These are, as far as I can tell, formed way before one is even conscious about them. I, for example, didn't opt for heterosexuality, but, from what I can gather, I have. The same goes for homo/bisexuals. This proves my point to my satisfaction. — Agent Smith

I said you had a hand in it - not that you consciously chose them. You seem determined to absolve responsibility for changing behaviours, based on some supposedly unbridgeable gap between imagined choice and actualising preferences. I have already suggested there are limitations to what we can change. It’s not a matter of choosing, but rather re-conceptualising what it is we like or dislike.

There are people who have developed a sexual preference for young children - do you believe them inherently incapable of a healthy adult relationship? Or do you think it’s possible for them to reconfigure their preferences in an alternative direction?

Our dark history of suppressing homosexual behaviour has shown us that it’s not a matter of choosing or judging preferences, but rather understanding them. In some cases, it is society’s conceptualisation that needs to change. In other cases, it is our own.

On a less controversial note, I grew up as a fussy eater, developing a strong dislike for most vegetables. As an adult, I eventually recognised that this aspect of my ‘personality’ was inhibiting my quality of life. There are always more options available than we’re initially aware of - we just need to seek them out, to get creative. I soon learned that it wasn’t the vegetables I didn’t like in most cases, but often the way they were cooked. After considerable experimentation, I will now eat most vegetables, although for some I remain particular about the cooking process.

I said you had a hand in it - not that you consciously chose them. — Possibility

Then we're on the same page. :up:

However, they seem to be beside the point as far as I can tell. — Agent Smith

The last several posts have indeed be well besides the point. The point I thought concerned free will, and not how decisions are made.

Please bear in mind that there are two stages when it comes to making a choice:

Stage 1. Deliberation on the available options
Stage 2. Actually making a selection

Probably less than 1% of all choices are made by such a cumbersome and formal mechanism, including the smoking example. But as you say, besides the point of free will. The older chess playing programs made almost all their decisions exactly as you describe above, and they hardly have what most people like to qualify as free will, so a decision made this way (by virtual choices as you put it) is not necessarily free, by your definition.
I have a different definition, but I'm trying to reply to the OP, not my own ideas.

In stage 2, all the choices have been processed and the one that we like is selected. It's in this stage, our preferences come into play, preferences we had no hand in determining i.e. we're not free now.

So in stage 1, you examine the options and rightly conclude that quitting smoking would be in your best interest, and in stage 2, the immediate-gratification-monkey (a waitbutwhy term) totally ignores the output of stage 1 and reaches for the ciggy. Still not an example of free will or the lack of it, and not anything that cannot occur with a deterministic robot, a supposedly not free-willed thing.

So my point is: what distinguishes a supposedly free willed human (or squirrel if you want) from something else that isn't free willed?

So in stage 1, you examine the options and rightly conclude that quitting smoking would be in your best interest, and in stage 2, the immediate-gratification-monkey (a waitbutwhy term) totally ignores the output of stage 1 and reaches for the ciggy. Still not an example of free will or the lack of it, and not anything that cannot occur with a deterministic robot, a supposedly not free-willed thing.

So my point is: what distinguishes a supposedly free willed human (or squirrel if you want) from something else that isn't free willed? — noAxioms

Look at the example. At the end of stage 2 the person might reach for the ciggy or not reach for the ciggy. Therefore the person's will is free. If the person was a deterministic robot there would be only one way which the person could go after stage 2.

what distinguishes a supposedly free willed human (or squirrel if you want) from something else that isn't free willed? — noAxioms

A squirrel feels hungry and immediately starts foraging.

A human feels hungry but doesn't necessarily make a beeline for the kitchen!

At the end of stage 2 the person might reach for the ciggy or not reach for the ciggy. Therefore the person's will is free.. — Metaphysician Undercover

By the law of excluded middle, that's true of anything. A rock will reach for the ciggy or not, every time, just like the human. OK, you probably don't mean it that way. You probably mean that there's a finite probability of reaching for it or not, which may or may not be true depending on how the statement is interpreted.

If the person was a deterministic robot there would be only one way which the person could go after stage 2.

OK, you seem to be interpreting it as a statement of determinism. Under a completely deterministic interpretation of QM (such as Bohmian mechanics), the future action any robot, human or squirrel is completely determined by the state at a given time. Unless you can falsify such an interpretation, your statement above is a mere assertion, not any kind of evidence that a human can in any way do something other than what is utterly determined.

If on the other hand the statement is not about determinism but instead about predictability, then I can trivially create a device that reaches for the ciggy with far less predictability than the human who has made a rational decision to never do it again. All you need is a quantum amplifier, something not evolved in any biological creature since it holds no benefit. There are creatures which utilize pseudo-randomness such as a moth that chooses its flight path far more randomly than does the path chosen by a human. By a predictability definition, the moth has more free will than you do, but you seem to be using the determinism definition, not the predictability one.

A squirrel feels hungry and immediately starts foraging. — Agent Smith

Nonsense. It usually forages whether it is hungry or not, and only if it passes phase 1 first where it might prioritize another task due to time of day, weather, danger, or being horny or something. But it certainly isn't a straight hunger-causes-foraging relationship.
I brought up the squirrel in case you included it in your list of things with free will. Apparently you don't, which is what I wanted to know. This tells me you're not one of those 'biology is special' types, but instead take an anthropocentric stance. At what point in our evolution do you suggest that the change from deterministic animal to free-willed creature,and more specifically, what distinguished the one physiology from its immediate predecessor? Or are you in denial of evolution?

Nonsense. It usually forages whether it is hungry or not, and only if it passes phase 1 first where it might prioritize another task due to time of day, weather, danger, or being horny or something. But it certainly isn't a straight hunger-causes-foraging relationship.
I brought up the squirrel in case you included it in your list of things with free will. Apparently you don't, which is what I wanted to know. This tells me you're not one of those 'biology is special' types, but instead take an anthropocentric stance. At what point in our evolution do you suggest that the change from deterministic animal to free-willed creature,and more specifically, what distinguished the one physiology from its immediate predecessor? Or are you in denial of evolution? — noAxioms

Ok, mea culpa. It (the squirrel) eats when it's hungry. We can resist the urge to eat even when we're dying of hunger (hunger strikes).

OK, you seem to be interpreting it as a statement of determinism. Under a completely deterministic interpretation of QM (such as Bohmian mechanics), the future action any robot, human or squirrel is completely determined by the state at a given time. Unless you can falsify such an interpretation, your statement above is a mere assertion, not any kind of evidence that a human can in any way do something other than what is utterly determined. — noAxioms

This is easily falsified, as you request. A "state at a given time" cannot by itself determine any future activity. This is because a state is static, without activity, and any future activity of the thing in this state is dependent on what forces are applied to it. Therefore it is clearly false to say that the future action of a thing is "completely determined" by its present state, because it is also dependent on whatever forces are applied to it.

This is easily falsified, as you request. A "state at a given time" cannot by itself determine any future activity. This is because a state is static, without activity, and any future activity of the thing in this state is dependent on what forces are applied to it. Therefore it is clearly false to say that the future action of a thing is "completely determined" by its present state, because it is also dependent on whatever forces are applied to it — Metaphysician Undercover

:scream: :scream:

It (the squirrel) eats when it's hungry. We can resist the urge to eat even when we're dying of hunger — Agent Smith

That's just an example of something having a higher priority than eating, straight up cause and effect, not an example of free will. And you're wrong: Other things have done this as well, starved in the presence of food due to prioritizing something higher. I can think of one species in danger of extinction because of it.

I do think we have free will, but only because I define it more sensibly. I find nothing distasteful about my decision making mechanism being a product of physics, hence my initial reply in this topic.

[A hard-determinsitic QM interpretation such as Bohmian mechanics] is easily falsified, as you request. A "state at a given time" cannot by itself determine any future activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

This does not follow from any hard-deterministic physics. Quite the opposite in fact, by definition.

This is because a state is static, without activity, and any future activity of the thing in this state is dependent on what forces are applied to it. Therefore it is clearly false to say that the future action of a thing is "completely determined" by its present state, because it is also dependent on whatever forces are applied to it.

Perhaps you should give an example where the forces are not a function of the state at a given moment. The above quote uses the word 'clearly' to justify a statement which cannot otherwise be backed, a tell-tale sign that either you don't understand the subject, or simply refuse to accept the premises.

Hey, I don't buy Bohmian mechanics either, but I'm not so naive to assert it is wrong because it 'clearly' doesn't do something that it in fact does.

Your argument also seems entirely classical, not referencing QM at all. Classical physics is deterministic, but you suggest otherwise.

That's just an example of something having a higher priority than eating, straight up cause and effect, not an example of free will. — noAxioms

You're right!

This does not follow from any hard-deterministic physics. Quite the opposite in fact, by definition. — noAxioms

In any physics, a force is required to change a state. I'm very surprised that you would try to deny this.

Perhaps you should give an example where the forces are not a function of the state at a given moment. — noAxioms

From Wikipedia: "In physics, a force is an influence that can change the motion of an object." So, in physics, a "force" is what what would change the state which exists at "a given moment". Therefore it is clearly not "a function of the state at a given moment", because that would mean that the change has occurred to the state before the force was applied. You are attempting a misrepresentation.

In any physics, a force is required to change a state.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quite a ridiculous assertion. A thrown rock (in space say, no significant forces acting on it) is just beyond the reach of the hand that threw it. A second later it is meters away, a changed state. It is also likely facing a different direction after that second since it's really hard to throw a rock without any spin.

From Wikipedia: "In physics, a force is an influence that can change the motion of an object." So, in physics, a "force" is what what would change the state which exists at "a given moment". .

Changing the motion is not the same as changing the state. The thrown rock is still heading in the same direction after a second (unchanged motion) and has the same spin (unchanged motion) but has a different location and orientation (both changed states). Yes, force is required to change its linear and angular momentum, per Newton's 2nd law, and is that to which your wiki quote refers), but no force is required to change its location, orientation, temperature, etc, all of which are part of its classic state.

This has absolutely nothing to do with the falsification of deterministic physics. Why are you going on about this?

Quite a ridiculous assertion. A thrown rock (in space say, no significant forces acting on it) is just beyond the reach of the hand that threw it. A second later it is meters away, a changed state. It is also likely facing a different direction after that second since it's really hard to throw a rock without any spin. — noAxioms

If there are no forces acting on it, then at a second later in time, it is not in a changed state, it's state is exactly the same as before. That's Newton's first law of motion, it's called the law of inertia.

Changing the motion is not the same as changing the state. The thrown rock is still heading in the same direction after a second (unchanged motion) and has the same spin (unchanged motion) but has a different location and orientation (both changed states). Yes, force is required to change its linear and angular momentum, per Newton's 2nd law, and is that to which your wiki quote refers), but no force is required to change its location, orientation, temperature, etc, all of which are part of its classic state. — noAxioms

It seems you are using "state" in an unconventional way.

This has absolutely nothing to do with the falsification of deterministic physics. Why are you going on about this? — noAxioms

I'm trying to bring to your attention the fault in what you stated.

We must comply, unwillingly!

Are you still stuck with "free will"?
Or you have reached a conclusion? I would like to hear about it ...

We really all believe that there are causes and effects. Only the philosopher can believe that, because some events are caused, that they all are. That's because the philosopher doesn't realize that we decide just what events are, where they begin and end. The philosopher may also not realize that we live on a certain scale, and that causes and effects may obtain on one scale and not another.

We really believe that we make decisions and the only way to deny that is by making certain decisions. Determinism or free will can only obtain in an anthropomorphic universe.

Are you still stuck with "free will"?
Or you have reached a conclusion? I would like to hear about it ... — Alkis Piskas

We must comply, unwillingly! — Agent Smith

Is free will (existence/nonexistence) an empirical claim?

Is free will (existence/nonexistence) an empirical claim? — Agent Smith

No. Metaphysical/psychological claim. What does it mean? It means we can't measure it, nor conduct a scientific experiment to show proof of it. It could only be surmised.

No. Metaphysical/psychological claim. What does it mean? It means we can't measure it, nor conduct a scientific experiment to show proof of it. It could only be surmised — L'éléphant

Time for Newton's Flaming Laser Sword aka Alder's razor!

Time for Newton's Flaming Laser Sword aka Alder's razor! — Agent Smith

Very well applied! To be honest, I've never heard of Alder's razor until now.
So, in essence, we do not dispute what can only be surmised.

We should really discuss how to handle questions like the will or freewill that isn't on par with empirical evidence. Often, I think, the dispute stems from incorrect application of method of examination: one person would challenge the existence of free will by literally asking for scientific evidence. Of course the other could not provide it because there's no scientific evidence of free will.

But, the lack of scientific evidence doesn't prove its lack of efficacy. And here is where philosophy could gain traction and win over the charge of falsity.

:ok:

We must comply, unwillingly! — Agent Smith

Comply with what? If this is your conclusion, can you elaborate it a little or provide me with a link? Thanks.

https://bigthink.com/surprising-science/free-will-or-free-wont-what-neuroscience-says-about-the-choices-we-can-and-cant-make/

I meant a link of a comment of yours! Anyway, thanks.

So, I'm assuming that you meant "comply with fate" or "comply with everything" ...

:ok:

From the article you linked to:

'Libet, however, didn’t see his results as a total refutation of free will. He instead pointed out that during the 500 milliseconds leading up to an action the conscious mind could choose to reject that action. While impulses would be dictated by the subconscious, the conscious mind would still have the capacity to suppress or veto them; something that most people would say they do everyday. This model has been referred to as “free won’t”.'

This looks dodgy. Libet seems to be assuming that the conscious mind can veto a subconscious action almost instantaneously. But a conscious veto must itself require a buildup of electrical potential, which must also take time. And in fact for this veto to permit free will, it would have to start AFTER the conscious mind understands what the action is that it is vetoing. So we would need:

1. Brain starts to build electrical potential for a subconscious action AND for a conscious awareness of that action.
2. Conscious awareness of the subconscious action occurs.
3. Brain starts to build electrical potential for a conscious veto.
4. Conscious veto occurs.

Can all this really fit within Libet's 500 milliseconds?

For what it's worth, I don't believe in free will, for the same reasons that I don't believe in God or an afterlife, i.e.:
1. There's no evidence for it.
2. We have no idea how it could work.
3. We don't need it to explain anything that happens.