A 96-sided polygon isn't a circle but is merely circle-like, that's all. — Agent Smith

It all depends on how you define "circle-like". Clearly it is not at all "circle-like" when we compare a curved line to straight lines at angles to each other. If the defining thing is practical purpose, then it is circle-like, because it serves the purpose in practice.

But since the representation, which serves the purpose, is really nowhere near like the thing it is meant to represent, we can see a deep problem, if truth is supposed to be correspondence. Our theories which work in practice, and are confirmed and validated by the fact that they do work, (experimentation), might still be far from the truth.

That's exactly what it means, it's basic calculus. — Pantagruel

The problem though is that a curved line is fundamentally different from a straight line, because the curved line, no matter how short the segment, will always require two dimension, and the straight line will always be on one dimension. So there will always be angles between the sides, no matter how many there are. If basic calculus denies this difference between the straight line and the curved line, it must be mistaken.

Well, I won't say you're wrong. There must've been a very good reason why the Greeks were so reluctant to incorporate infinity into their math. Even Archimedes & Eudoxus, two people who were among the first to employ the method of exhaustion simply stopped/limited their calculations at/to an arbitrarily large but finite number (Archimedes used, if memory serves, a 96-sided polygon to approximate a circle when calculating ππ). — Agent Smith

Things like this have proven to be very useful, just like the calculus that Pantagruel refers to, it's very useful. I would call these useful lies.

What, may I ask, are the specific issues you have with ∞∞? Is it the paradoxes (Cantor's mind probably couldn't parse them and ergo, his brain crashed) or something else? — Agent Smith

What if I said that the issues I have with infinity are infinite? Look at the issue in my reply to Pantagruel for example. The concept of infinity is used to blur the fundamental difference between the straight line and the curved line. The two are incompatible, but employing infinity makes it seem like they are not incompatible. There are countless examples of similar instances where infinity is used to blur the incompatibility between two fundamentally incompatible things, like discrete and continuous for another example. It's just a basic error carried out for convenience sake, like representing a circle as a 96 sided polygon.

Why? Do the math. Lemme show you: — Agent Smith

I do not accept any mathematics which employs infinity. Infinity is not applicable to real world situations Such mathematics may be very useful in many situations, but the infinity monkey example demonstrates how adhering to principles which are not actually applicable to real world situations, will eventually give us absurd conclusions.

I don't think there is a justified reason to think this. — Yohan

That's what I've been saying, the conclusion is based in faulty mathematics which employs infinity as a number.

So you're saying that if there is an infinite number of monkeys typing, it's very likely that one might sit down and type some Shakespeare right off the bat. Well, I see the point but I don't buy it. I guess the example not only shows how ridiculous infinite time is, it shows how ridiculous an infinity of anything is.
What if your die had an infinite number of sides, do you think it would be circular?

You have convinced me of one thing: what you say should be rejected because it is inconsistent. But according to you, you are in good company: — Fooloso4

The problem is that you have clearly not followed what I said, so you have simply convinced yourself through some sort of bias or prejudice. I clearly said that the whole of what the person said is not to be rejected, only specific propositions, which are judged to be inconsistent with truth, are to be rejected.

If I have given you two contradicting propositions, by what principle other than ad hominem, do you reject them both?

I see your point, only vaguely though. — Agent Smith

What does it mean to see a point "vaguely"? Does this mean that the point only has a vague existence, or does it mean that your mind only has a vague grasp of it? Or both, or neither? If the point itself is in your mind, then I would conclude both.

But your claim is not that you don't understand but that what you are reading is inconsistent. — Fooloso4

Yes, that's because I've gone through the further stage I've describe, reference to secondary sources. This justifies my claim. What I could not understand in my primary readings, it turns out that I could not understand it because of inconsistencies.

In that case you are no longer talking about one's judgment that they cannot understand but that one understands well enough to reject it. It may still be the case that a person still does not understand. — Fooloso4

Again, this is the secondary stage, which is justified by secondary sources.

It means that the judgment was wrong. — Fooloso4

No, that's clearly false. The possibility that one's judgement is wrong does not mean that the judgement is wrong. If the only way to justify a judgement was to exclude all possibility of mistake, then judgement would be unjustifiable.

More inconsistency. — Fooloso4

I don't think so, there's simply a clear lack of effort to understand, on your part, and a refusal to recognize the part between (reference to secondary sources), which separates statement A from statement B. Furthermore, you are comparing a statement about the whole, (not rejecting what has been read), with a statement about a part (rejecting a proposition). The first applies to an inability to understand what has been read, and the second to an understanding developed through further analysis.

For example, suppose there's a logical argument which consists of two premises which appear to be acceptable, and a conclusion. The conclusion however, appears to be wrong for some reason, outlandish, absurd, or totally inconsistent with observation. This is how Aristotle described sophistry, as using logic to produce an absurd conclusion. Take Zeno's paradoxes for an example of such sophistry.

Now, we ought not simply reject the whole thing, just because we do not like the conclusion. But, we cannot accept it because the conclusion is clearly wrong. So, we need to analyze the premises individually, along with the logical process applied, to see what the problem is. These are the puzzles of philosophy which I referred to earlier.

What Aristotle noticed, is that strict adherence to the law of excluded middle as a logical principle, by sophists, could produce absurd conclusions. He demonstrated that the reason for this is that "becoming" is of a completely different category from the logical category of "being and not being". Plato revealed this issue in numerous dialogues. So if an act of becoming, a movement for example, is described in a premise as states of being and not being, there is really an incompatibility between the thing being described, and the description. Therefore we ought to reject such premises as false. So for example, in relation to Zeno's paradoxes, if a movement (an act of becoming), is described as being at point A at one time, and being at point B at a later time (states of being), we ought to reject those premises as false. The movement is what happens between point A and point B, and it is categorical different from being at point A and being at point B, as "becoming" is categorically different from "being and not being". The law of excluded middle would incline us to believe that it must be either being or not being, thereby denying the possibility of becoming.

The question is: what significance and conclusion do you draw from the conclusion that some dialogues are placed in the early period, some in the middle, and some in the late period? — Fooloso4

When there is an inconsistency in a philosopher's material, between what is stated at an earlier time, and what is stated at a later time, we can accept that the later is more representative of what the philosopher believed as the truth. And when the philosopher has much material like Plato, we can usually find within the middle part, the arguments by which the earlier statements are refuted, and which ultimately support the later statements.

In the case of Bk Lambda, of Aristotle's "Metaphysics", which Paine refers to, this book has been placed at the end of "Metaphysics", which is supposed to be after his "Physics". So we get the illusion that this book expresses Aristotle's final decisions, his most developed thought. However, in reality we find the ideas and arguments expressed in Aristotle's other books, which actually refute these proposals of Lambda. Therefore we ought to conclude that this book should really be placed at the beginning of Aristotle's work, as the beliefs of a young Aristotle, which he later refuted, or the more likely conclusion, as I explained to Paine, that it is not really Aristotle's writing.

I still feel, time isn't really a factor in re the infinite monkey theorem. Why, as you yourself so graciously pointed out only one monkey would be needed for this rather boring task, it has all of eternity to try out all character combinations. — Agent Smith

The point being that the monkey needs all of eternity (infinite time). Assign any particular amount of time to the monkey and it is highly probable that it would not complete the task in that time. Give the monkey infinite time, and it is impossible that it will not complete the task. As I said above, this just shows how ridiculous the concept of infinite time is.

Is it possible that one is wrong? — Fooloso4

I don't see how this would be possible. How could a person be wrong, in one's judgement that they cannot understand something. This would mean that the person really understands something which they think they do not.

That one's own mode of interpretation in this case misses or misunderstands something? If so then rejecting what is read as inconsistent is itself inconsistent. — Fooloso4

It's not a matter of rejecting what is read, it's a matter of recognizing inconsistencies within what is read, which makes it impossible to understand it. So the interpreter never claims to understand what is written, because this is impossible, as it is interpreted as inconsistent and therefore impossible to understand. Therefore the initial assumption which the reader makes is that the material is misunderstood.

You are misrepresenting it as a claim of understanding. But this cannot be the case, because the person interprets the material as inconsistent, which renders understanding as impossible. This is why we move to secondary sources. So for instance, when Plato is interpreted as inconsistent with respect to the theory of participation, one might move on to Neo-Platonists and Aristotle, to aid in the process of trying to understand Plato.

The point being that it is not a matter of claiming to understand the material, then rejecting it because it is understood as inconsistent, it is a matter of recognizing that you cannot understand the material, so you move to secondary sources for assistance. Then, when the secondary sources offer conflicting interpretations, you have grounds for a judgement of ambiguity or inconsistency. The primary source then needs to be revisited, with a new attempt to understand, before that judgement is made. Nothing can be rejected simply on the basis of inconsistency, because one or the other of the two inconsistent parts may be acceptable.

Is the judgment of the individual subject always consistent with the truth? If it is not then it is inconsistent to say in this case that we really ought to reject the proposition. — Fooloso4

I really don't see that you have a point here. When a person judges a proposition as inconsistent with truth, this is grounds for the person to reject it, forcing the ought by implication, false therefore reject. The fact that the person might make a mistake, does not negate the judgement, nor the ought implied by the judgement. If the person is worried about mistake, and is skeptical, then the judgement is suspended. If the person is not skeptical, then the judgment is made, and the ought is implied, and whether or not the person is wrong in that judgement is irrelevant because the ought is forced by the judgement, not by anything else.

There is a clear inconsistency here. A contradiction. First you say there are distinct periods then you don't think there are distinct periods. Are you saying that there are distinct periods but you don't think there are?

What you say contains several inconsistencies. It should be rejected. — Fooloso4

I really can't grasp what you are saying. "His thoughts are divided into distinct periods", indicates an artificial act of division, so that the divisions produce distinct periods, which have become conventional. Think about the way that the day is divided into morning and afternoon. So, I told you that I don't believe that there are real distinct periods, I believe there is just a progression, which has been divided into distinct periods for pragmatic purposes, convenience. Likewise, I think that the passing of time is just a progression which has been divided into distinct periods, for convenience.

If you look into Lamarck's "Zoological Philosophy" you'll find a description of orgasm as a fundamental aspect of living.

Any task requires time. Even with an infinite number of monkeys it is not guaranteed that one of them would type any particular thing at first try. This is because many of them would type the very same thing. in the first few moments. So time is the essential feature. We might even consider that one monkey would type all of Shakespeare in an infinite amount of time.

But still we'd have to consider what constitutes all of Shakespeare. Would typing one text at one time, then another text at a much later time qualify? If so, then would typing the first letter at one time, then the second letter at another time, and the third letter at a later time, etc., qualify? What happens with all the intervening letters?

The infinite monkey theorem, as a rendition of the principle of plenitude, is really a demonstration that the idea of infinite time is ridiculous.

Consider Lamark's use of "orgasm" as the fundamental, and defining feature of life.

Lamarck claimed that gelatinous matter could receive the “vital orgasm,” a sort of agitation of molecules opposed to universal attraction. “Uncontainable” fluids, caloric and electricity, could provoke this “vital orgasm.” Later, the containable fluids, gases, and liquids, especially water, crossed this matter and deposited particles. This process was the beginning of nutrition. Lamarck considered that this steep of transformation corresponded to the structure of the... — https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-642-11274-4_859

The infinite monkey theorem states that a monkey hitting keys at random on a typewriter keyboard for an infinite amount of time will almost surely type any given text, such as the complete works of William Shakespeare. In fact, the monkey would almost surely type every possible finite text an infinite number of times. However, the probability that monkeys filling the entire observable universe would type a single complete work, such as Shakespeare's Hamlet, is so tiny that the chance of it occurring during a period of time hundreds of thousands of orders of magnitude longer than the age of the universe is extremely low (but technically not zero). The theorem can be generalized to state that any sequence of events which has a non-zero probability of happening, at least as long as it has not occurred, will almost certainly eventually occur. — Wikipedia

Infinite monkey theorem: — Agent Smith

You know the infinite monkey theorem is a feature of an infinite amount of time.

But rather than any further attempt to understand or even leave it open as problematic you have concluded that it should be rejected. — Fooloso4

Yes, if it is unintelligible to one's own mode of interpretation, it ought to be rejected for that reason.

What may appear to you to be an inconsistency may not be. But rather than any further attempt to understand or even leave it open as problematic you have concluded that it should be rejected. — Fooloso4

"Consistent with the truth" is a judgement made by an individual subject. If this is not the judgement then we really ought to reject the proposition.

What I am saying is that we should not be too quick in deciding there is an inconsistency that a philosopher like Plato is unaware of. — Fooloso4

I see no justification for this claim. If I interpret some things as inconsistent, why should I believe they are really consistent? That makes no sense at all.

You say that there are distinct periods in Plato's development. Does he change his mind about Forms?If so, in what way? — Fooloso4

I don't think there are "distinct periods", just a progression. And yes, he clearly changes his mind about Forms, he comes to reject the theory of participation

The problem is that you wildly overestimate your reading skills. Although there may be cases where an inconsistency is real, you are all too quick to declare inconsistencies where the real problem is evidently a deficient understanding on the part of the reader. — Fooloso4

There' a saying, 'better safe than sorry'. It's safer to say that conclusions cannot be drawn, due to inconsistency, then to assume consistency and draw a false conclusion. We ought to approach all philosophy with the skeptical attitude that inconsistency is possible, and be very alert to recognize it when we see it. As I described above, in philosophy it's far more likely that a declaration of no inconsistency is the sign of a deficient understanding, than a declaration of inconsistency. As I explained, it's a feature of the subject matter.

See, you misrepresent my position. The person who does not see the possibility of inconsistency projects one's own principles into the reading, forcing an understanding based on that. The person who sees inconsistency is not forcing an understanding, and maintaining an open mind. The latter is the appropriate method of philosophy.

The chronology of when the dialogue were written is not the same as the chronology of when the dialogues are set to have taken place. Parmenides is a "late dialogue" but it takes place when Socrates was young. The chronology of events raises serious questions about dividing Plato's work into distinct periods. Why would he situate what is supposed to be a late development, his criticism of the the theory of forms, at the beginning of Socrates' philosophical education? — Fooloso4

I can't understand this. Are you asking why Plato wrote about the young Socrates' fascination with the theory of forms, later in Plato's lifetime? Isn't there numerous dialogues concerning the young Socrates' fascination with the theory of forms, right from the beginning of Plato's writing? Can you make the point clearer? I don't see it.

Humans are programmed to find order whether it exists or not. We believe we see order even in random arrangements Consider how many see the face of Jesus in a piece of toast.. — Real Gone Cat

What you describe is not seeing order where there is none, it is a misinterpretation of the order which is there, and that is very common. A piece of toast is an instance of order, saying that it is Jesus' face is a misinterpretation.

But why must the cause be divine? THAT is not self-evident. — Real Gone Cat

It is because this is what defines "divine", so it is true by definition. It makes no sense to ask why is the creator of the universe "divine", because "divine" is simply the word we use to refer to the creator. You could use some other random word, but then you'd miss the convention. It's like asking why the river consists of "water". It's the word we use. You could use some other random word but you'd miss the convention.

You have not provided any support for this claim. — Paine

As I said, I provided the support in an in depth way in the other thread, and outlined it in my last post. That book is clearly inconsistent with works of Aristotle which are well known to have been produced by him. And, since it is also known that the books under the title "Metaphysics" were teachings collected together in Aristotle's school, many years after his death The conclusion that this particular section was not actually his work is justified, in that way.

Regardless though, the point is that this section of "Metaphysics" is inconsistent with other parts of Aristotle's work. This could be a feature of a changing mind of the writer, like we find in Plato. So Plato's works are carefully ordered chronologically, and his thoughts are divided into distinct periods. In the case of Aristotle, we'd have to put that section of "Metaphysics" near the beginning of the order, because we see how he produces arguments to refute those ideas. He would not conclude this after refuting it, but he might propose it prior to refuting it. This is similar to the way that Plato produces arguments which refute the theory of participation, so the dialogues which support participation are presented as earlier. Instead, though, that book Lambda is placed at the end of "Metaphysics", as if it's Aristotle's final conclusion. As I showed in the other thread, and outlined in my last post, he actually moves to refute it those ideas.

In a separate comment, I will list all the places I know of where Aristotle alludes to a separate, independent intellect. I don't have time to run them all down until can get back to my books next week. — Paine

Yes, I remember you brought up a number of mentions of an independent intellect. I agree that with respect to "the intellect" there is obvious inconsistency in Aristotle. And this is an issue which has always been a problem. It is very evident in the Scholastics, manifesting as the division between the active intellect and the passive intellect. The desire to have as a principle, a separate, independent intellect, led to the notion of a complete separation between active and passive intellect. This allows that the active intellect might be free from the influence of the passive matter (potential), allowing the intellect the capacity to know all things.

This is a clear problem, because what Aquinas presents, is that the human intellect is deficient, being dependent on the material body. So Aquinas proposes that the intellect might only adequately know things like God, after separation from the body.

But a completely separate, active intellect appears to be impossible by Aristotle's principles. This is because the intellect in each of its capacities, the capacity to know, prior to learning, and the capacity to act, posterior to learning, are all properly described as potentials. This led Aquinas to assume a potential which is not properly material, to account for the desire to portray a separate, active intellect, unbound by matter.

I do not accept this resolution, because it introduces two distinct types of "potential", and distinctions of type are formal. This distinction of types of potential would put fundamental forms as inherent within matter, instead of allowing for the reality of true separate Forms. But if we allow for true separate Forms, as Aquinas surely wanted to do, with God and the angels, then these Forms (form being actual) cannot be a sort of intellect, because intellect is fundamentally a potential.

The need to conclude separate Forms is produced by the cosmological argument, BK.9 of "Metaphysics". The separate Forms account for the actuality which is necessarily prior to potential, in the absolute sense. If we adhere to what Aristotle discusses in Bk 1, Ch.3 of "De Anima", we see that the separate Forms must be truly immaterial, and cannot be described in material representations like eternal circular motions. Further, the thinking on thinking representation is said to be improper as well, because it does not accurately represent thinking. And, it is later shown how thinking as the act of an intellect is fundamentally a potential, therefore it cannot be used to represent a pure, independent actuality.

So here we find the fundamental inconsistency of Neo-Platonism, specifically Plotinus. We see "the One" as the first, and most fundamental principle. But the One is supposed to be both pure, absolute potential, as well as the first cause, from which all proceeds. But pure, absolute potential cannot be a cause, because it lacks any actuality, as explained in "Metaphysics" Bk.9, the cosmological argument. This argument by Aristotle effectively refutes both materialism (having matter as the first principle), and Pythagorean Idealism (having ideas as the first principle), by classifying both as potential. "Matter" may then be understood as an idea, and ideas are potential. This leaves the aspect of reality which is supposed to correspond to "matter" as something unintelligible, and opens the door to matter based mysticism. Neo-Platonism mistakenly adhered to principles of Pythagorean Idealism which had been refuted by Plato and Aristotle, in a bid to ward off material mysticism.

But I will restate the problem I had with your comment the first time around. You are using a certain set of texts to establish your interpretation of what Aristotle means to say. On the basis of that, you declare Aristotle is not consistent with his own principles when he refers to an active, separate intellect. Whatever explanation might be put forward for the conflict of principles, it is always logically possible that the inconsistency belongs to your interpretation. — Paine

Actually, I refer to a wide variety of material, as indicated above. Chiefly, Aquinas provide a very good presentation of these interpretive problems, because they had become exposed by the Scholastics. Appollodorus accused me of reading Plato through Aristotle, and Aristotle through Aquinas, instead of interpreting the person directly. The problem being that Appollo took this as a fault, when really these are the people who put much effort into solving the puzzles put forward by the philosophers before themselves. So it doesn't work, as a criticism, to accuse me of an idiosyncratic interpretation, and also accuse me of reading one philosopher through the mind of another, as Appollo did.

Outside of its description in Book Lamba, it should be noted that many of the other books of the Metaphysics try to see how and if the introduction of composite beings relate to the method in the Categories. There is much scholarly debate on these topics and disagreement about which statements are consistent with other statements. The statement in Book Lambda: "the soul is the first substance" is a part of that conversation even if you dismiss the rest of the book as Neo-Platonists propaganda. — Paine

The fundamental issue of the "Metaphysics" is, I would say, what Aristotle lays out around BK 3, I think. The question is why is a thing what it is. He dismisses often cited question of why is there something rather than nothing, as unanswerable, and therefore misleading, so he proceeds to the more relevant question of why is any particular thing, the thing which it is. Primary substance according to "Categories" is an individual, a particular, and now, the particular must have an identity by the law of identity.

He points to the following logical argument. A thing must be the thing which it is, by the law of identity. And, when a thing comes into being, it must necessarily come into being as the thing which it is or else a thing could be other than the thing which it is, in violation of the law of identity. It is impossible that the self-same thing could be two distinct things at the same time. Therefore we can conclude that the form of the thing, as "what the thing is" is temporally prior to the existence of the material thing, as the cause of the thing being what it is, rather than something else, when the thing comes into existence. Otherwise a thing would be a random collection of parts, but it is not, it has an orderly form. When taken in the absolute sense, as the cosmological argument (Bk 9), we see that there must be an immaterial Form, prior to all material existence.

Around BK 6, Aristotle questions where the form of the thing comes from. He distinguishes between natural things and artificial things, and provides an in depth description of artificial things. The form of the thing comes from the soul of the artist. This is important, because we see that the form, of what the thing will be, when the thing comes into existence, does not inhere within the matter itself, but comes from some other source. Then he leads us toward the conclusion that there is a very similar situation in natural things. So we must assume separate independent Forms, according to the principle that the form does not come from within the matter.

The issue you point to. "the soul is the first substance", needs clarification. Primary substance is a particular individual, which by Aristotle is a composition of matter and form (hylomorphism). The soul, by "De Anima", is a form, the first form of a body having life potential in it, so we can understand it in the sense of an independent Form, described above, being the cause for the material body coming into being as the body which it is, rather than something else. But it's doubtful whether it is correct to call such a Form a substance, because it doesn't fit into Aristotle's definition of "substance" in "Categories", either in the primary or secondary sense.

When that possibility is not taken seriously the whole of the text or texts may be distorted in order to accomodate an interpretation. That is just bad hermeneutic practice. I follow the advise of those who say that when there is an apparent contradiction look to see if it is or can be reconciled based on further consideration and closer examination. — Fooloso4

More often than not, what is the case is that the inconsistency gets overlooked, it goes undetected by the readers, because each reader interprets in one's own way, ignoring the parts which don't really make sense. However, it manifests later in discrepancies between various interpretations. The inconsistencies in Plato produced discrepancies between Neo-Platonism and Aristotle, for example. And the inconsistencies in Aristotle manifest in the problems which the Scholastics confronted.

So the bad hermeneutic practice is actually the opposite of what you say it is. To attribute the appearance of inconsistency to a deficiency in the skill of the reader, rather than to a deficiency in the skill of the writer is the wrong approach. This is because inconsistency in philosophy is common and pervasive due to the complicated, complex, and unexplored subject matter. Philosophy ventures into the unknown. If we assume the the appearance of inconsistency is a deficiency in reading skills, when the inconsistency is real, and within the material, due to a deficient understanding of the writer, we will either get bogged down in our attempts to understand, never being able to understand inconsistent material, or we'll have to ignore relevant material, and then we'll get bogged down in discussing who's interpretation is the correct one.

Therefore the appropriate procedure is to proceed with a healthy respect for the likelihood of inconsistency in the material, and with a mind open to the reality that the writer most likely did not have a complete understanding of the material. Remember, what is being sought is the truth concerning the subject, not the truth as to what so and so said about the subject. This leaves us in a position to accept whatever an author says, which appears to be consistent with the truth, and reject whatever one says which appears to be inconsistent with the truth. Looking for the truth as to what so and so said will be a fruitless effort because the reality of ambiguity renders this as an impossible ideal.

First, we must define order. Does order mean subscribing to a pattern we find pleasing? Give an example, and let's parse it. — Real Gone Cat

Order means have things in their right place. So any sort of pattern is an order. If each part of the pattern were not in the place required to make that pattern, the group of parts would not be ordered in the way required for the pattern, and there would not be that pattern. If there was a different pattern instead, the parts would be ordered in the way required for that pattern. Only if there was no pattern would there be no "right place", consequently no order.

Second, consider the fine-tuning "problem" - the idea that certain constants need to fall within very narrow ranges for life to exist. This ignores the fact that the real numbers are uncountably infinite between, say, 1.99 and 2.01, and may be put in a one-to-one correspondence with values between -1,000,000 and +1,000,000. Thus, the fine-tuning "problem" is actually due to our choice of units not the required accuracy of some Creator. — Real Gone Cat

I don't see how this is in any way relevant. I was talking about empirically verified order, in the observable universe. That the order in mathematics is somehow related, is an idea that hasn't been justified.

Third, requiring order (if you can find it) to have a cause, is a case of trying to find a question to match an answer. Why does order require a cause? Are you asking, "Why does the number line have small numbers on the left and large numbers on the right?" (This goes back to my first question.) — Real Gone Cat

I am not asking a question, "why does order require a cause?", I am stating a brute fact, a self-evident truth, that order requires a cause. "The right place" for the parts to be implies something other than random positioning. And, other than random positioning, implies that they must be caused to be there, because if they weren't caused to be in the position they are, their positioning would be random. Therefore the difference between random positioning and ordered positioning implies that the ordered positioning must have been caused. And the fact that random positioning might be caused does not negate the fact that ordered positioning is necessarily caused.

I think this is the wrong way to look at things. If we could approach the universe from the outside, and found it to be well-ordered, then we might correctly be surprised. But we are products of this universe - we evolved to survive, and even thrive, in this universe. Therefore, it seems ordered to us. It would be much more shocking to find that it lacked order. — Real Gone Cat

Sure, it's not at all surprising to find order in the universe, we ourselves are organized beings, so it would be very surprising, actually false, if we found a universe without order. But whether or not we are surprised is not the point. I don't see how this element of surprise refutes the premise that order is caused. Do you have an explanation of how we might conceive of uncaused order? Or do you appeal to magic to account for how order suddenly appears from disorder? If the latter, doesn't magic require a magician?

Yes, Ukraine will have to give up claims of sovereignty over Crimea too. — Baden

That would be required for your claim that Russia has fulfilled all its goals. As of yet, I see no indication that Ukraine is ready to give up Crimea, and reclaiming it would be one of Ukraine's goals. So I think your claim that Russia is "winning" is a bit premature.

I wish the war was an 'unmitigated disaster' for Russia, but the fact that they're winning, despite their problems, mitigates the disaster somewhat for me from any reasonably objective perspective. It still puzzles me how you'd refer to the war if Russia was losing or looked like any of its major goals (Ukranian neutrality, autonomy for Donbass) were under threat. But, whatever, we'll just have to agree to differ on that. — Baden

Such assessments are rather pointless without reference to an outcome in the dispute over Crimea. As far as I know, Ukraine has insisted on sovereignty over Crimea, and this steadfast position, with support from the west, has been an irritant to Russia. You mention Russia's goals without mention of Ukraine's goals. A war has two sides.

The argument of natural theology is not that 'God' is some testable theory, but the reason that anything exists at all in the first place. Of course that is not a 'testable theory' in that you can't then replicate the entire universe under controlled conditions of there being God or no God. — Wayfarer

I think that this is the right way of looking at things. In this sense, all empirical evidence supports God, and we can know that God is the truth, stronger than we can know any other fact. The argument is basically that each and every aspect of existence, as observed, is an organized, or ordered, arrangement of parts. And, organized or ordered arrangements require something which orders them. The thing which ordered the parts is called God, So God is a necessary conclusion.

Now, having said that, there is some issues with the appearance of disorganization, or disorderly activity in fundamental parts (particles). I see two distinct ways to approach these issues. We can say that this appearance of disorder in the universe is evidence of not-God, or we can say that this appearance of disorder is evidence of a failing in our capacity to understand, what is really organized and orderly. Of course the latter is the rational approach, because it inspires us to subject our scientific theories to strict skepticism, in an attempt to determine their deficiencies, and why these theories render basic parts of an organized and ordered universe as unintelligible to us. The alternative approach, that fundamental parts of the universe are disorganized and disorderly, and an organized and orderly structured universe magically sprang into existence on top of a disorganized foundation, hence not-God, is clearly irrational.

Interestingly, there are forms of realism people have proposed where the only universals/forms are the fundemental particles. I've never seen nominalism of this sort before, but I could see how it would work. Fundemental particles would be the only tropes, and tropes would really just be names for the excitations of quantum fields we observe. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is Platonic realism. "Fundamental particles" are nothing but mathematical equations made to represent observations. When we claim that these mathematical representations constitute the reality of what is observed, this is Platonism. I don't think this qualifies as nominalism, because nominalism would say that these equations are just our way of describing what is observed.

Physicists generally claim that fundemental particles do lack haeccity. Lately though, there has been some debate as to how indiscernible particles really are. In some cases, they may not be fully indiscernible, the jury is out. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The problem I see is with this assumption: that the observation of a particle, at one time, then a particle at another time, is the same particle. So for instance, a photon is emitted, and an equal photon is absorbed at another place, in a way which corresponds. It is assumed that these are the same particle but that is where the problem is. The continuous existence of the particle between t1 and t2 cannot be accounted for, so the claim that the two instances are instances of the same particle, is not really a valid claim.

Now, keep this lack of haecceity in mind and think of how different particles might be seen to function very much like the way letters function in a text (a "T" is always a T; the specific T is meaningless, only its role in a word matters). Words are made up of letters, but words can have properties like "adjective" or "noun." Their traits don't come from their parts. Then, their role as subject or predicate in a sentence is further not derived from their letters, but by their relationship to other words. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The "role" of a thing, like its function, is an attribute of its context, which presumes a larger whole. The problem though is that we cannot entirely remove meaning from the thing by negating or ignoring the context. So meaning is not completely determined by context, resulting in some form of intrinsic meaning inherent within the thing, as the thing which it is according to its form (law of identity). So we might say the meaning of a word is dependent on the context of usage, but this is not entirely true, or absolute, because there must be something intrinsic within the word, or else any combination of words could have any meaning, and we couldn't figure out any meaning. So the word has some built in limitations which restrict the scope of its usage. Likewise, in you example of letters, the symbol "T" has built in limitations as to acceptable usage, as a letter for example, and we cannot accurately say that the generic "T" "is meaningless", and "only its role in a word matters".

But then which letter/concept in a word holds the trait "noun?" Which parts can be summed up into the concept "noun?" This property can't just be attributed to the rules of spelling, the way the rules of geometry denote "triangle" from the slope of a triangle's three lines, because random mixes of letters can be proper nouns in fiction novels and we create new words all the time. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In general, the narrower, more restrictive concept, holds within it, the broader, less restrictive, as explained by Aristotle. So the concept "man" holds within it, as a defining feature, the concept of "animal", which holds within it, "living", etc.. In this way, "living" is an essential part of "animal", which is an essential part of "man". So "sentence" has "noun" within it, as a defining feature, "sentence being the narrower or stricter, while "noun" is the broader concept. Therefore "noun" is a trait of "sentence", like "animal" is a trait of "man".

When we get to the very particular, the individual, what Aristotle calls primary substance, we see that it is not within anything. So "animal" is within "man", and "man" is within "Socrates", but "Socrates" being a name (proper noun) referring to an individual, is not within any further concept. This allows that the proper noun has no restrictions, not being within anything, so a name could be a random mix of letters, or whatever, and the name is valid or true, substantiated, by the individual which it refers to. The individual has an identity, or existence according to the law of identity.

If the individual named is fictitious, and it is claimed that this individual is supposed to be a real individual, then we have a form of sophistry because the named thing is really a specific concept within a conceptual structure. So the named fictitious thing, Santa Clause for example, is really within, and dependent on a conceptual structure, whereas Socrates names a thing outside and independent of conceptual structure. When it comes to "photon" and other fundamental particles, the named thing is within a conceptual structure supported by observation. So it's halfway between fiction and nonfiction, the conceptual structure is supported by some sort of observational data, but the substantial existence of the thing named as "photon X" cannot be validated through temporal continuity, so it is not really a thing with identity, as primary substance is supposed to be.

So, if traits are actually just parts, I'm not sure I see a way for propositions such as "the block Thomas picked up is triangular," can have truth values. Because the block is actually made up of atoms that aren't triangular, and if you say that the triangularity comes from the block's parts, then you are admitting that objects can have traits that their parts lack, and of course "being made of atoms" isn't necissary or sufficient as a cause of being triangular. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't see the problem. The block is an object, and is therefore primary substance. We can name it, and the name becomes the subject, and we predicate. The block is shaped like a pyramid. If we say that the block is really atoms, then we have made the atoms into the objects, or named subjects, and the block is something made from the relations of those atoms. But the atoms are now supposed to be the individual objects we are talking about, the primary substances, not the block. If real substantial existence cannot be given to the atoms, as is the case with photons, then we are back to talking about the block as the objects, and the atoms only exist within the conceptual structure, not referring to any real particles with substantial existence.

A "trait" is not a stand in for a part of an object. For example, traits aren't parts in the sense that a liver is a part of a human body or a retina is part of an eye. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't agree with this. Concepts are composed of parts, and the parts are "traits", only in a slightly different way from the way that physical objects are composed of parts. This is because the parts which are said to make up a physical object are understood as concepts anyway. So an object has different formations of molecules, which might be referred to to separate one part of the eye from another, but this is a conceptual description. And we see this more clearly when we say a molecule consists of atoms, and atom of other parts. It's all theory. conceptual. Unless you take an object, and start physically breaking it apart, there is no basis for your claim of difference. But when you do this, the object doesn't necessarily break at the points indicated. If you cut up the eyeball the retina does not necessarily separate itself out, because this is a theoretical distinction you have made.

A trait - that is a trope (nominalism) or the instantiation of a universal (realism) - applies to the emergent whole of an object. They have to do so to serve their purpose in propositions. For example, the emergent triangularity of a triangle is a trait. The slopes of the lines that compose it are not traits, they are parts (they interact with traits only insomuch as they effect the traits of the whole). The way I wrote that was misleading, but the context is the identity of indiscernibles. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So these assumptions are not true at all. The lines and angles are traits. The line and the angle are concepts which are traits of the concept of triangle, and they are also the parts of the triangle.

So to rephrase it better, the question is "is a thing defined by the sum of all the true propositions that can be made about it, or does it have an essential thisness of being unique to it?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

Each particular thing is unique, in itself, having a thisness all to itself, but it is defined by the true propositions made about it. There is a gap between these two due to the deficiencies of the human capacities.

You have yet to provide the support for this statement. I have seen some commentary regarding this topic in various writings but you have not attempted to do more than claim it to be true. In any case, the argument in De Anima replicates the same view given in Book Lambda. — Paine

I thoroughly demonstrated the inconsistency in that other thread. In De Anima Bk 1 Ch 3 he explains why the soul is not an unmoved mover, it is not an eternal circular motion, nor any type of motion at all, because it is definitively immaterial, and it's incoherent to speak of an immaterial motion. Further, he explains that the thinking on thinking which is thought to be such an eternal circular motion does not describe the true nature of thinking, because thinking consists of conclusions, ends, and never proceeds endlessly without such. Therefore the ideas expressed in Metaphysics Bk 12 are directly refuted here.

Then Appollodorus proceeded to De Caelo in an effort to support that part of Metaphysics. However, a thorough reading of that work will show that it also refutes Metaphysics Bk 12. First, he's very clear to say that an eternal circular motion is theoretically "possible". Then he proceeds to explain how any circular motion must consist of material substance. Then, anything material is generated and corrupted. So he leaves it to us, from these premises, to conclude that although eternal circular motion is logically possible, it is in reality, physically impossible.

We know that "The Metaphysics" is a collection of works put together by Aristotle's school a long time after his death. This part you refer to is clearly inconsistent with the work which we know is his. Instead, it supports a Neo-Platonist tradition which proceeded in a different direction from Aristotle with respect to immaterial substance. The principal point being that Aristotle demonstrated how we cannot appeal to matter based descriptions (circular motions, and the human being thinking about thinking), in any real attempt to understand immaterial substance. He leads us through the rest of his Metaphysics, and De Anima, to understand the logical necessity to assume immaterial forms as prior to, and the cause of, material things being the particular things that they are, by the law of identity. And, he shows us that these classic ideas, circular motion, and thinking on thinking, do not provide us with a true immaterial representation, and therefore ought to be rejected.

On the contrary, there is vast difference between the 'good' as it relates to the whole of the cosmos and the problems of individual beings. But I am not the one claiming there is no 'overarching' good. It seems absurd to assert that Aristotle intended to separate the two goods as a category mistake in the way you seem to be arguing for. — Paine

The point though, is that there is no such thing as "the 'good' as it relates to the whole of the cosmos". That's an idea you've fabricated, or imported from somewhere else, as is not derived from Plato nor Aristotle. The "good" in Plato, is what illuminates individual intelligible objects. Until "the cosmos" becomes intelligible, rather than simply having some sort of aesthetic eloquence, or appeal as a beautiful proposal, there is no "good" in relation to the cosmos. And Aristotle is explicit to refer to the good of man, as happiness, and the highest activity as contemplation, without speaking of any "good of the cosmos'. And he is very careful to dissuade us from the sophistry of eternal circular motions, and a thinking thinking on thinking, which might have been proposed as the good in relation to the whole cosmos.

So it is not that I am trying to separate "the two goods". There is only one true sense of 'good'. Plato and Aristotle each support this, the "good" is relative to the individual, or particular. The idea that there is some sort of universal "the good", as good relative to the cosmos, is what both of them reject as sophistry. People who claim such a "the good", are claiming to know what cannot be known. Obviously "the 'good' as it relates to the whole of the cosmos" is self-contradicting, because the the whole of the cosmos is an absolute, absolutely everything, so to say that there is something such as 'the good' which is relative to this, is blatant contradiction. This why creation myths have a hierarchy of goods in a temporal order, God created this because He saw it was good, then that, then that, etc..

On the basis of this reasoning, you seem to be denying that a relation between beings could ever go beyond the 'good' as the predicate of an individual being. — Paine

I think the issue here is that predication is of a subject. If we want to make a relation into a subject and make a predication of that subject, we lose the substantiation afforded by the primary substance because a relation cannot be primary substance. Then there is no object which exemplifies the subject, only relations, and relations are fundamentally relative, therefore subjective. In other words, a relation cannot be a primary substance, consequently it has no true identity by the law of identity, so there is no possibility of truth.

Accordingly, if we make "good" (by definition) the property of a relation rather than the property of an individual, the concept is not grounded in anything substantial. But there is no problem to make "good" the property of individuals, because it is individuals who act, and acts are what are judged as good. As the action is a property of the individual, so is the good. Therefore we have virtuous, or "good" people. This you'll find is very consistent with Aristotle's ethics, a virtuous person is one who acts as such, and the acts come from strength of character rather than chance. It really makes no sense to define "good" as the property of a relation. And I haven't yet seen any serious attempts to make this sensible.

But I don't have to understand the thesis to notice it does not fit with other things Aristotle said. Aristotle discussed the good as a quality of the cosmic whole in Book Lambda, For the purpose of inquiring into first principles, the whole of creation is a substance that the Mover causes to exist, along with the order that comes into being through his rule. — Paine

This is a pointless paragraph. You know from the other thread that I reject Book Lambda as inconsistent with the rest of Aristotle's writing, and it is debatable whether it was actually written by him. It is more consistent with the Neo-Platonist trend to equate the good with the One. As I said above, I believe Aristotle had a better understanding of Plato then The Neo-Platonists. And, I think Book Lambda to be a Neo-Platonist teaching passed off as Aristotle. because the bulk of Aristotle's writing is extremely consistent but this is not consistent with the rest.

The holistic view that connects the individual (and what is good for them) with the cosmos (the being that includes all beings) can be seen in the introduction of soul into the arguments made by Aristotle. The Categories make no mention of the idea of composite beings:

It is also clear that the soul is the first substance, the body is the matter, and a man or an animal, universally taken, is a composite of the two; and 'Socrates' or 'Coriscus', if each term signifies also the soul of the individual, has two senses (for some say it is the soul that is the individual, others that it is the composite), but if it signifies simply this soul and this body, then such an individual term is like the corresponding universal term.
— Metaphysics,1037a

The concept of soul is said to be central to the process of becoming an individual. With this starting principle it becomes related to the whole of creation:

Now, summing up what has been said about the soul, let us say again that the soul is in a way all existing things; for existing things are either objects of perception or object of thought, and knowledge is in a way the objects of knowledge and perception the objects of perception.
— De Anima, 431b 20, translated by J.L Ackrill

Aristotle bases this claim on linking the inquiry of all nature (fusis) to the existence of the soul:

Since [just as] in the whole of nature, there is something which is matter to each kind of thing (and this is what is potentially all of them), while on the other hand there is something else which is their cause and is productive of all of them---these being related as an art to its material---so there must also be these differences in the soul. And there is an intellect which is of this kind by becoming all things, and there is another which is so by producing all things, as a kind of disposition, like light does; for in a way light too makes colours which are potential in actual colours. And this intellect is distinct, unaffected, and unmixed, being in essence activity.
— ibid, 430a 10

This use of light as an analogy bears a strong resemblance to its use by Plato in Book 6 of the Republic, but reformulated in order to avoid the deficits Aristotle finds there. For the purpose of this present argument, the important point to realize is that the 'function of man' discussed in Nicomachean Ethics is not just a general predicate that can be applied to a set of individuals but relates to how those individuals come into being in a cosmos filled with these other beings. — Paine

I think you are mistaken here Paine. The soul is "in a way" all things, through the potential of the intellect, and its capacity to know all things. Aristotle does not mean that the soul actually is all things, "in a way" is used for a reason. The power of the soul "to know all things" is not necessarily the good, because if the good has to do with intellection, it might simply be the power of the soul to know. Then "all things" is accidental. But you want to make "all things" essential, and conclude therefore that the good is a relation between the individual and the whole cosmos. This is unwarranted because even if I grant to you that "good" ought to be defined as the quality of a relation, rather than the quality of an individual, there is nothing to indicate that it is any more than a quality of the various relations between the individual and the particular things that the individual knows. Where do you derive the need to relate the individual to the whole cosmos from? I see no principles here. So the quotes you've produced do not support your conclusion.

We want to contract it. Most of our inventions have been designed to reduce the time taken for a given task. — Agent Smith

This is not contracting time, it is expanding it. Think about it. If task A normally takes two hours, and you find a way to make task A take two seconds, you have expanded the time around task A. Task A remains the same. But if you take a period of time called "two hours", in the second instance of task A you have a whole lot of free time left over, which you did not have in the first. Therefore time has been expanded around task A.

I've asked for my account to be closed.
My 'resignation' refused for the time being.
Usually, I wouldn't make this public but I'm beyond caring.
Take care all. — Amity

Drastic measures. I sit on the edge of my chair, waiting, what could be next?

From "why is everyone calling me a cheerleader", to "you must all be cheerleaders like me". — StreetlightX

The problem is not with the "cheerleader" portrayal as such. I think the problem is with the portrayal as a cheerleading for the underdog. I don't think this is a matter of cheerleading the underdog, in fact I don't see how it could be. It's very clear that the cheerleaders apprehend the side being cheered for as "us". Now "us" is always the good guys, therefore to be cheered for, because in war if you do not agree that "us" is the good guys, you are excluded from "us".

One might cheer from a third party position, but at first take, that would appear to be utterly ridiculous because war gives nothing to cheer for, unless you're one of the parties. A classic World War really provides no third party position. But if the third party becomes an organized "us", we might have a new form of world war. The third party would be opposed to both sides engaged in battle, and would cheer only for loses, in the battleground, never for gains. That's a very ugly image. But it may be real.

This is all hopeless twisted. — Fooloso4

That's why most people give up on trying to understand Plato, it requires a lifetime of effort to even get close. They cannot read it in a week and fit it all into a simple exegesis, so they give up. not having the ambition required to match the ambition of Plato. Most philosophy appears hopelessly twisted to anyone who requires their education to be in a straight forward format. In the end though, the individual may proceed forward by following the straight forward doctrine, but we move ahead by solving the hopelessly twisted puzzles.

My claim is that thinking or believing something is good is not the same as knowing that it is good. Thinking or believing something is good does not make the thing actually and truly good. — Fooloso4

I've been asking you to justify this claim, because I really cannot understand it. I can't see how anything other than thinking that something is good could make something good. If you can't justify it, perhaps you can give me an example or something, so that I could begin to understand what you mean.

Are you familiar with Plato's Euthyphro? Is pious being loved by the gods, or is piety what the gods love? We can apply the same test here. Is "good" what is deemed by human beings, or is good a quality apprehended by us to be inherent within the thing. I think the answer is obvious. It is not a quality which we apprehend as inhering within the act, but a judgement we make by comparing the act to some principles. Therefore belief in those principles and one's capacity to judge, is what makes the act good.

You make the distinction yourself when you point out:

He rejects pleasure because obviously, some pleasures are bad
— Metaphysician Undercover

If we pursue pleasure and some pleasures are bad then pursuing pleasure does not make it good. — Fooloso4

I don't see that you have a point here. Pleasure comes in a variety of types, the ones pursued are good.

You are now making the argument you rejected! If we willingly do what we believe, and know to be bad then what we are pursuing in such cases cannot, as you previously claimed, be good because we pursue it.

Previously you said:

every act is inherently good.
— Metaphysician Undercover

and:

everything we do is good
— Metaphysician Undercover

but now you admit that we often do what is bad. If every act is inherently good then how can an act that is inherently good be bad? — Fooloso4

You are cherry picking quotes out of context. In the context of "everything we do is good", I clearly stated that bad is not opposed to good. So you really have no point here.

You say:

It is possible because we do not have a true understanding of "the good"
— Metaphysician Undercover

How do you know that every act is good if we do not have a true understanding of the good?


So, what defines something as "good" is the fact that it is pursued,
— Metaphysician Undercover

A true understanding of the good cannot be that the good is whatever we pursue. You now say that we do not have a true understanding of the good: — Fooloso4

Look, we can know that every act is good without having a true understanding of "the good", simply by knowing what it means to act. Once we reject determinism and accept free will, then a freely willed act requires a cause which is not deterministic. "The good" as an overarching Form of knowledge would be deterministic, forcing one to act according to that Form. "The good" as your will to act, in whatever way you want, at any particular moment in time, is not deterministic. Obviously we cannot have a true understanding of "the good", or else our acts would be deterministic, forced by that understanding.

You seem to be confusing the predicate "good" which we might attribute to an act, or a type of act, with the supposed Form called "the good". The point demonstrated is that we attribute the property "good" without knowing the Form, "the good". As Paine explained, Aristotle took the further step to completely reject "the good" as a Form altogether. And, I've been explaining that this is consistent with Plato, because "the good" is what makes the Forms intelligible by illuminating them, and is therefore not a Form itself. In the terms of free will, in the preceding paragraph, it is the will to understand. So it is very common for people to say such and such are good, without having any understanding whatsoever of "the good".

And, when you consider what I say above, that when we judge an act as good, this is "a judgement we make by comparing the act to some principles", you'll see that there is no single principle by which we judge "good". Each time we judge an act as good, we employ principles specific to the situation. Therefore it is impossible that there could be one principle called "the good", by which we could judge acts as good.

If it is not by knowledge that we can truly determine whether a particular act is good then in what way can we determine that it is good? Certainly not by the fact it is done. — Fooloso4

Why not? I see no justification for your claim that good is something other than this, and a very convincing argument from Plato that this is exactly what makes an act good, that it has been carried out as an intentional act.

Thinking something is good is not the same as grasping the good. Believing something is good is not the same as knowing it is good. — Fooloso4

I keep asking you to justify this claim, but you do not. If there is some simple, clear and distinct principle, other than "thinking something is good", which makes the thing actually and truly good, then please produce it.

Let's see what Plato's Socrates has to say about this:

No one goes willingly toward the bad or what he believes to be bad; neither is it in human nature, so it seems, to want to go toward what one believes to be bad instead of to the good.
— Protagoras 358c

As the quote from the dialogue Protagoras makes clear, it is what one believes to be good that one pursues and what one believes to be bad that one avoids. — Fooloso4

Notice in your quote that it says "so it seems". There is a reason for this. That idea (what seems to be the case) is the very idea which Plato ends up refuting. We often willingly do what we believe, and know to be bad. How is this possible?

It is possible because we do not have a true understanding of "the good", as explained in The Republic. What we claim to know as "good" might be false. Your understanding of "the good" produces a situation where we can knowingly do what is bad; when a person lies, steals, or cheats for example. We truly believe that such things are bad, we even claim to know that they are bad, yet we do them any way.

How is this possible, when it is completely contrary to what "seems" to be the case? It is possible because what seems to be, is not really what is the case. What is the case is that we really and truly do not know what "the good" is, yet we assume to know what it is, as you exemplify, and from this faulty assumption we assume to know what "bad" is as well. Then we proceed to do what we believe to be bad, because our believe as to what is good and bad, is faulty.

So, it cannot be what defines something as good is that it is pursued since we do pursue pleasure. — Fooloso4

As I said, some pleasures we do not pursue. because we cannot engage in all at once, so we need to prioritize. Therefore you have no argument here.

A false opinion and being deceived about what is good leads one to pursue what is bad. Here we see the connection between knowledge and virtue. — Fooloso4

Ah, you're catching on, but not drawing the proper conclusion yet. The proper conclusion is that the belief that virtue is a knowledge is the deception. The claim "I know the good" might incline one to act in a way accordingly. However, as Plato points out in The Republic, the good is not something that anyone knows, not even the highest philosophers. The good is something completely outside the realm of human knowledge as that which illuminates the things known. It is the cause of intellection, and therefore not knowledge, which is the product of it. So we must conclude that the real relationship between knowledge and virtue is not as you assume. Virtue is the cause of knowledge, not the effect of it. Therefore it must be something other than knowledge. And, any person who says "I know the good", and acts accordingly, is the one who is deceived, because no one can know the good.

Agreed; there is a body between. I was objecting to “we’re a body”, which I take to be a misconception. A categorical error of equating the mere representation of a metaphysical object of pure reason, with a concrete spacetime reality. — Mww

The temporal analogy holds quite well for this idea of "we're a body", or more precisely "I'm a body" ("we're a body" contains a further problem of unity). If the body, in its existence, is like the present in time, we still have to account for the reality of the future and the past. Future and past are somehow external to the present, outside it, but are still a very real part of it as defining features. Likewise, there are very real parts (defining features) of a living being, which are somehow outside the living body.

The explanatory gap? — Mww

I believe it's a failing in our understanding of what constitutes a "boundary". Peirce had some interesting ideas on this issue, but I do not agree with his proposed resolution. Suppose there are two distinct substances in contiguity. What keeps them separate? Either we propose a third substance which acts as the boundary to separate the two, or we assume a zone of mixing. If I remember correctly, Peirce chooses the latter, a mixing, and the boundary becomes vague, because that's how such situations appear empirically, through our senses. However, I believe that removing the need for a third substance introduces an unwarranted principle of unintelligibility into the explanation. Now we have no reason why the two are separated in the first place, they are simply not completely mixed. So I think, that to provide a true explanation we must always appeal to a "third substance" as the boundary, because it is only by understanding a third thing, that the reason why the two are separated will be grasped.

This is very evident in the nature of time. as well as the human experience of internal/external. If we propose that the human experience is just a mixing of internal/external, or that the present in time is just a mixing of future and past, without assuming a third thing which is the actual reason why the two sides of these apparently dichotomous divisions exist, then these two (human experience, and the present in time) become unintelligible. Therefore we must apprehend the reality that these are not true dichotomies, because in each case there is a third thing, which acts as the boundary separating the two which only appear to our senses to be dichotomous.

I’d agree there’s an inside and an outside, but not that “we’re a body between” them. — Mww

The body is between the inside and the outside, just like the present is between the future and the past. We can claim directions "toward the inside", "toward the outside", just like we claim "toward the future" and "toward the past". But we cannot produce a dividing line, because there is a massive body where we think there should be a divisor.

That is not the assertion. The assertion is the one you quote from Plato. The point is, the fact that you pursue something does not make it good. It is pursued because it is thought to be good, but pursuing something because you think it is good does not make it good. — Fooloso4

You obviously haven't read Plato. It is clear that things are not pursued because they are thought to be good, as "the good" escapes the grasp of reasonable thinking, We do not grasp "the good", we do not think "X is good therefore I'll pursue it", we simply pursue things for various reasons. This is important to understand, because it is central to the idea that virtue is not a type of knowledge. "The good" does not guide us as a form of knowledge, such that it enters into our thinking about our activities, and we conclude "I must do X because X is good". It guides us by influencing our thinking from a position which is external to our knowledge. It guides us without us knowing that it guides us.

So, what defines something as "good" is the fact that it is pursued, because the good is what guides our pursuits. When he is talking about understanding "the good" in that section of "The Republic", he issues the disputed statement. "Every soul pursues the good and does its utmost for its sake." 505e trans. Grube.

Before stating this, he mentions the problems with defining "good'" and that people talk about the good as if they know what it means when they do not. Then he suggests that some define "good" as "pleasure", and some as "knowledge". He rejects pleasure because obviously, some pleasures are bad, and some are good.

Instead of moving toward a more specific definition, such as a certain type of pleasure, he moves to a more general description, what every soul pursues is the good. This allows that pleasures which are not pursued are not good. And, that things pursued other than pleasure might be good as well. Also, in not giving a clear definition, it allows that "the good" is not a form of knowledge. He excludes "the good" from knowledge.

So he rejects "knowledge" because the soul "is perplexed and cannot adequately grasp what it is". When asked again, whether he considers the good "to be knowledge or pleasure or something else altogether", Socrates move along to the analogy with beauty.

By this analogy, beauty is related to the senses in the same way that good is related to the intellect. He says that in the case of visible beauty, there is, other than the beautiful thing and the perceiver, a third thing required, this is light. And in the case of visible beauty, light is what turns out to be the "valuable" thing, as the overall "cause" of sight. In an analogous way, the good is described as the cause of intellection. The good illuminates the intelligible objects, making them intelligible to us, just like the sun illuminates visible objects, making them visible to us.

We can conclude therefore, that intellection, and understanding, are guided by the good, and that whichever intelligible objects (ideas) become intelligible to us, this is caused by the good illuminating them. The good shines its light on the idea, making it intelligible to us.. Furthermore, the good is something which is pursued. Therefore we can make the further conclusion that our pursuits determine in a causal way, the intelligible objects (ideas) which are intelligible to us.

The good therefore is not a type of knowledge, but a guiding principle of knowledge. It is external to, and independent from, the objects of knowledge, like the sun is independent from the objects of sight.

Aristotle relates the telos of individuals to the fulfillment of their kind of being, as noted in the quote given above. I will add the passage that prefaces it for clarity: — Paine

Well, obviously there are many different kinds. So this "good" must be specific to the kind. Now how do you make this compatible with what you said earlier "the good as a quality of creation as a whole", when the whole consists of many different kinds each with its own sort of good?

On the contrary. Chapter 10 of Book Lamba of Metaphysics presents the good of the whole world as the relations between beings through the order imposed by the Mover. — Paine

Again, you state "relations" here in the plural. There is a number of different relations therefore there must be a number of different goods. By what principle do you attribute these relations, which are the goods, to the whole, rather than to the individuals. A relationship between you and I has aspects specific to me, and aspects specific to you, but nothing proper to "the whole".

Take Socrates' description of "just" for example. The just state is the one in which each individual does one's own thing, minds one's own business, without interfering in the affairs of others. Clearly, each individual has one's own goods, making each individual privy to one's own particular affairs. But what "good" has the state? The state is said to be just, because it provides for each individual to have one's own particular goods. We cannot assign "good" also to the state, without changing the meaning of "good", because a state is a different kind of thing from an individual. And if you insist that the good of the state is the same as the good of the individual then we have a vicious circle of logic which provides us with no headway in trying to understand "good".

However, the term "good" is used in the categories of substance, of quality, and of relatedness alike; but a thing-as-such, i.e., a substance is by nature prior to a relation into which it can enter; relatedness is, as it were, an offshoot or logical accident of substance. Consequentially, there cannot be a Form common to the good-as-such and the good as a relation. — 1096a, 16

Primary substance for Aristotle, as defined in his Categories, is the individual. So if the good is a quality of substance, it is attributed to the individual. This is why there cannot be a Form of the good.

A Venn diagram — Fooloso4

It was a simple statement, not a Venn diagram. You're trying to alter the premise.

A Venn diagram with one circle being the things you pursue and the other circle being the things that are good shows that there is an area of overlap but also an area that does not overlap. They are not the same. — Fooloso4

There's a big problem with this assumption. Plato said "the good" is what every soul pursues. It is you who wants to define "the good" as something other than this, in some way which would allow your Venn diagram of overlap. So I asked you, how are you going to define "the good" then. It's easy to make a bold assertions like "every soul pursues the good some of the time, but not all of the time", but by what principles are you going to distinguish between when the soul is pursuing the good, and when the soul is not pursuing the good? And what kind of randomness within the soul would make it be pursuing the good at one moment, but not pursuing the good at the next moment? We do not experience such random shifts in our pursuits.

Suppose for example a person is working on a good project and is therefore pursuing the good. But something comes up and the person perceives a need to steal, to keep the project going. The person is still working on the good project, therefore pursuing the good. But since the person is actively stealing, is the person pursuing the not good at the very same time that the person is pursuing the good? How could the person be pursuing the good and pursuing the not-good at the same time, in relation to the same project?

Formal systems can be supported by acts of measurement. That makes them useful as models of the world. — apokrisis

Sure, but the point is that the standards as to what constitutes "support" for a formal system cannot itself be a formal system. So it's wrong to characterize something which is not understood as a formal system as "frantic hand waving", or else formal systems would just be totally useless fictions or fantasies.

The word 'matter' is etymologically related to 'mother': — Wayfarer

That's right, Plato's description of "matter" as the female receptacle, in the Timaeus is very sexual in nature. Plato plays with word meanings like that a lot. You'll see Socrates described as a midwife when "conception" is discussed, in the Theatetus for example.

In the passage from Book Lambda I cite above, the element of causality of what Aristotle finds to missing from Plato's good: " And those who posit the Forms also need a more authoritative principle; for why did things participate in the Forms or do so now? " — Paine

What I argued with Apollodorus in the other thread, is that "the good" itself is not properly a Form. The key to understanding this is that the good enlightens the intelligible objects, like the sun enlightens the visible object, as described in The Republic. This puts the good into a separate category from the Forms which are intelligible objects. It is by making the good into a Form, that Apollo equated the good with the One, and insisted that the One is the first principle for Plato, claiming the Neo-Platonists to have a better interpretation of Plato than Aristotelians.

The One is definitely a Form, but Apollo and I discussed Aristotle's mentions of a difference between mathematical objects and Forms, because the One can be seen to be both. I argued that mathematical objects are just a special type of Form which are derived from the One, which crosses the boundary between types. However, the good escapes mathematics altogether, and as I argued, even if we make a hierarchy of type of Forms, the good must be something completely different, by the sun analogy. And the good belongs in the category of many, not of one.

Pursuit of the good in this context is not an object or a goal in the way one says that the telos of making a chair is made actual when the plan for it has come into being. Learning what is real versus what is opinion is the activity being sought after. Aristotle speaks of telos as becoming what one was made to be, as quoted above: — Paine

I would say that thinking in this sense is in the pursuit of a goal. The goal might be truth. But then the goal might be some other pragmatic thing based on application, or prediction, or whatever. It is this feature, that the action is carried out for a purpose, a goal, but the goal is unclear even to the person thinking, which creates the problem. And if we look directly at the action, as Aristotle did, in his ethics, in an attempt to determine the end, we see that whatever end is intended, becomes the means to a further end, and then a further end, which appears as if it might extend indefinitely, unless we posit an ultimate end, as he did, happiness.

In speaking of the good as a quality of creation as a whole, this language of telos for individual beings is exchanged for the outcome of the activity of the unmoved mover: — Paine

I don't understand this at all. You seem to be making "the good" into "the One", like Apollo was, saying it's "a quality of creation as a whole". And this appears completely inconsistent with Aristotle. For Aristotle, perfection, or good, is a feature of the individual, in its fulfilment of its own particular form, which is unique to it, and only it, by the law of identity.

What are you talking about? There is no unstated premise in the distinction between seeing what you eat and eating what you see. Either you eat everything you see or you don't. — Fooloso4

I can't believe you don't see this. The statement says I eat what I see, and it says I see what I eat. There is no difference between these unless it is specified either I see more than I eat, or I do not see more than I eat. That further premise is not provided. So your claim "either you eat everything you see or you don't" is not relevant to any conclusion drawn. The information has not been provided. Allowing such information to affect your conclusion is invalid logic. You are producing a conclusion drawn from a premise which is not part of the argument.

It's a sophistic trick, a form which is very commonly exemplified with equivocation. A common word will be used in a premise, and the premise will give that word a very strict meaning. However, since it's a common word, the interpreter will assign a much wider meaning to the word then is given to it by the premise. Then the interpreter will allow a conclusion based on the wider meaning, rather than adhering to the strict meaning given in the premise. This is equivocation, and its very similar to what you re doing here. You are giving a wider meaning to "see" than what is provided by the premise "I see what I eat". The premise allows only what I am eating to be what I see, but you are assuming some further meaning of "see", not stated.

For whatever that’s worth..... — Mww

When I'm getting attacked mostly on the basis of ad hominem

Well, consider the source. Enough said. — Fooloso4

It means a lot.

Thermodynamics is the ground for time. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is not really true. Time is a constraint in thermodynamics, but thermodynamics is clearly not the ground for time, because time is an unknown feature. We cannot even adequately determine whether time is variable or constant. I think it's important to understand that the principles of thermodynamics are applicable to systems, and systems are human constructs. Attempts to apply thermodynamic principles to assumed natural systems are fraught with problems involving the definition of "system", along with attributes like "open", "closed", etc..

Definition requires difference. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is a mistaken notion which I commonly see on this forum. Definition really does not require difference. Definition is a form of description, and description is based in similarity, difference is not a requirement, but a detriment because it puts uncertainty into the comparison. So claiming that definition requires difference, only enforces my argument that this is proceeding in the wrong direction, putting emphasis on the uncertainty of difference rather than the certainty of sameness. A definition which is based solely in opposition (difference), like negative is opposed to positive for example, would be completely inapplicable without qualification. But then the qualification is what is really defining the thing that the definition is being applied to.

Logically, it would make more sense to start down at the very smallest differences that can be discriminated. If you wanted to define visible colors, you work your way around something analogous to a digital color wheel, and tweak the various shades in small increments until you've laid out a map of all the discernable colors. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Notice what you say, you look for something "analogous". Analogy informs us through similarity, not through the differences. The differences are what we must work to exclude, to make the analogy work.

If you look at theories of parts and wholes in metaphysics, generally it is proposed that things are just the sum of their traits, and so traits are the logical unit of analysis. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is not true at all. It is generally proposed in metaphysics, and supported by evidence, that a whole is greater than the sum of its parts. There is a logical fallacy, the composition fallacy, which results from what you propose.

The primary opposing theories to this view hold that objects possess an essential haeccity, a substratum of "thisness." This substratum of bare being/identity makes a thing different from just its traits, and so neatly solves many problems of identity that come up when you posit that a thing is just the tropes/universals it possesses/instantiates. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And this is nothing but nonsense. What could a "substratum of 'thisness'" possibly refer to? "Thisness" is what we assign in predication. It is a feature of human description. It is impossible that the human description is the substratum of the thing itself. This is the same sort of problem which you demonstrate with thermodynamics and "system" above. You attempt to make the description, or the model, into the thing itself. But then all the various problems with the description, or model, where the model has inadequacies, are seen as issues within the thing itself, rather than issue with the description.

Mysterious tendencies don’t lend themselves to formal treatment, just frantic hand waving. — apokrisis

Nothing in the real world submits itself to "formal treatment". Formal systems are pure theory. And, there is a very real divide between theory and practice, which produces the necessity for standards of application. The standards for applying formal systems in practice, cannot themselves be formal systems. So those who dismiss such standards as "frantic hand waving", choosing to apply formal systems willy-nilly, produce nothing but fictious nonsense.

But the problem with that view is, it doesn't allow for the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences, nor for the fact that mathematics is governed by rules. So I'm firmly part of the 'mathematics is discovered' camp. — Wayfarer

This problem goes both ways. There is the "unreasonable effectiveness" to deal with, but also there is mistaken axioms to deal with. How do you account for the reality of mistaken discoveries? What is it that is discovered, when the discovery is a mistake?

So, how does your acknowledgement that the pursuit of the good is difficult relate to your previous claims that there is no 'overarching' good? — Paine

Pursuit of "the good" as one individual object, the One, is a mistaken venture, and that is the obvious reason why pursuit of the good is extremely difficult. I covered this with Apollodorus, who insistently reduces "the good" to the One, in another thread. Incidentally, this is one reason why Aristotle rejects "the form of the good", because "the good" turns out to be a multitude of particulars, rather than one specific form.

but everyone wants the things that really are good — The Republic 505d

Understanding "the good" is how Plato came to the revelation (in his middle period) that the Pythagorean theory of participation was inadequate. If you look closely you'll see that he actually rejects "participation" in his later work, such as "The Sophist", and this rejection is what Aristotle provides us with a continuation of.

The principal issue is the relationship between passive and active, which Aristotle did an excellent job of exposing. In the theory of participation, the Idea is passive, and the objects which partake in the Idea are active, in the sense that they partake. This passivity denies the Idea any active causality in the real world. But what we see in the evidence of artefacts, is that ideas are somehow very causally active. So Plato sees "the good" as what gives causality to ideas, and this is final cause in Aristotle.

This is the reversal of "representation" which is required to truly understand the nature of knowledge. Commonly, knowledge is described as a representation, a modeling, or a map of the real world. But this totally misses the principal function of knowledge, which is to bring about change in the world. So we need to reverse things, to see the real world as a representation (or reflection) of the ideas. This is the significance of the cave allegory. The shadows on the wall are the material artefacts, the fire is the good, and the human beings are using the ideas to create the shadows. The shadows are a reflection of the ideas, but they can only be apprehended as such through a grasping of "the good", as the fire. Once the philosopher apprehends this, then he ascends beyond the cave (the artificial world) to an understanding of the whole world in this way. The material existence is a reflection of the ideas, but we cannot neglect the fact that it is only such if we appeal to a higher "good" beyond the human good. The human good is the fire, the higher good is the sun.

Do you eat everything you see? — Fooloso4

This is the unstated premise, (that you do not eat everything you see), which makes your example an example of sophistry. In logic the premises must be stated, and if you appeal to subliminal implications it's not valid logic but sophistry.