So Plato sees "the good" as what gives causality to ideas, and this is final cause in Aristotle. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the passage from Book Lambda I cite above, the element of causality of what Aristotle finds to missing from Plato's good: " And those who posit the Forms also need a more authoritative principle; for why did things participate in the Forms or do so now? "

However one looks at the questions of the first principles of the creation, Book 6 ends with observations upon the uses of images (such as analogies to the sun and the divided line} to approach what is beyond images:

“I understand,” he said; “you’re talking about the things dealt with by geometrical studies [511B] and the arts akin to that.”
“Then understand me to mean the following by the other segment of the intelligible part: what rational speech itself gets hold of by its power of dialectical motion, making its presuppositions not sources but genuinely standing places, like steppingstones and springboards, in order that, by going up to what is presuppositionless at the source of everything and coming into contact with this, by following back again the things that follow from it, rational speech may descend in that way to a conclusion, [511C] making no more use in any way whatever of anything perceptible, but dealing with forms themselves, arriving at them by going through them, it ends at forms as well.”
“I understand,” he said, “though not sufficiently, because you seem to me to be talking about a tremendous amount of work; however, I understand that you want to mark off that part of what is and is intelligible that’s contemplated by the knowledge that comes from dialectical thinking as being clearer than what’s contemplated by what are called arts, which have presuppositions as their starting points. Those who contemplate things by means of the arts are forced to contemplate them by thinking and not by sense perception, but since they [511D] examine things not by going up to the source but on the basis of presuppositions, they seem to you to have no insight into them, even though, by means of their starting point, they’re dealing with things that are intelligible. And you seem to me to be calling the activity of geometers and such people thinking but not insight, on the grounds that thinking is something in between opinion and insight.” — Republic, Book 6, 511b translated by Joe Sachs

Pursuit of the good in this context is not an object or a goal in the way one says that the telos of making a chair is made actual when the plan for it has come into being. Learning what is real versus what is opinion is the activity being sought after. Aristotle speaks of telos as becoming what one was made to be, as quoted above:

"we reach the conclusion that the good of man is an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence or virtue, and if there are several virtues, in conformity with the best and most complete."

In speaking of the good as a quality of creation as a whole, this language of telos for individual beings is exchanged for the outcome of the activity of the unmoved mover:

"For it does not possess goodness in this part or that part but possesses the highest good in the whole, though it is distinct from it. It is this manner that Thinking is the thinking of Himself through all eternity."

With these differences in mind, what does it mean for the 'final cause' to replace Plato's good? Perhaps you could cite particular passages that illuminate the idea.

Sophistry is this: gift-wrapped horseshit!

Philosophy is this: pearls of wisdom, with/without a velvet-lined top-of-the-line case.

In the passage from Book Lambda I cite above, the element of causality of what Aristotle finds to missing from Plato's good: " And those who posit the Forms also need a more authoritative principle; for why did things participate in the Forms or do so now? " — Paine

What I argued with Apollodorus in the other thread, is that "the good" itself is not properly a Form. The key to understanding this is that the good enlightens the intelligible objects, like the sun enlightens the visible object, as described in The Republic. This puts the good into a separate category from the Forms which are intelligible objects. It is by making the good into a Form, that Apollo equated the good with the One, and insisted that the One is the first principle for Plato, claiming the Neo-Platonists to have a better interpretation of Plato than Aristotelians.

The One is definitely a Form, but Apollo and I discussed Aristotle's mentions of a difference between mathematical objects and Forms, because the One can be seen to be both. I argued that mathematical objects are just a special type of Form which are derived from the One, which crosses the boundary between types. However, the good escapes mathematics altogether, and as I argued, even if we make a hierarchy of type of Forms, the good must be something completely different, by the sun analogy. And the good belongs in the category of many, not of one.

Pursuit of the good in this context is not an object or a goal in the way one says that the telos of making a chair is made actual when the plan for it has come into being. Learning what is real versus what is opinion is the activity being sought after. Aristotle speaks of telos as becoming what one was made to be, as quoted above: — Paine

I would say that thinking in this sense is in the pursuit of a goal. The goal might be truth. But then the goal might be some other pragmatic thing based on application, or prediction, or whatever. It is this feature, that the action is carried out for a purpose, a goal, but the goal is unclear even to the person thinking, which creates the problem. And if we look directly at the action, as Aristotle did, in his ethics, in an attempt to determine the end, we see that whatever end is intended, becomes the means to a further end, and then a further end, which appears as if it might extend indefinitely, unless we posit an ultimate end, as he did, happiness.

In speaking of the good as a quality of creation as a whole, this language of telos for individual beings is exchanged for the outcome of the activity of the unmoved mover: — Paine

I don't understand this at all. You seem to be making "the good" into "the One", like Apollo was, saying it's "a quality of creation as a whole". And this appears completely inconsistent with Aristotle. For Aristotle, perfection, or good, is a feature of the individual, in its fulfilment of its own particular form, which is unique to it, and only it, by the law of identity.

What are you talking about? There is no unstated premise in the distinction between seeing what you eat and eating what you see. Either you eat everything you see or you don't. — Fooloso4

I can't believe you don't see this. The statement says I eat what I see, and it says I see what I eat. There is no difference between these unless it is specified either I see more than I eat, or I do not see more than I eat. That further premise is not provided. So your claim "either you eat everything you see or you don't" is not relevant to any conclusion drawn. The information has not been provided. Allowing such information to affect your conclusion is invalid logic. You are producing a conclusion drawn from a premise which is not part of the argument.

It's a sophistic trick, a form which is very commonly exemplified with equivocation. A common word will be used in a premise, and the premise will give that word a very strict meaning. However, since it's a common word, the interpreter will assign a much wider meaning to the word then is given to it by the premise. Then the interpreter will allow a conclusion based on the wider meaning, rather than adhering to the strict meaning given in the premise. This is equivocation, and its very similar to what you re doing here. You are giving a wider meaning to "see" than what is provided by the premise "I see what I eat". The premise allows only what I am eating to be what I see, but you are assuming some further meaning of "see", not stated.

For whatever that’s worth..... — Mww

When I'm getting attacked mostly on the basis of ad hominem

Well, consider the source. Enough said. — Fooloso4

It means a lot.

Ehhh....not to worry, until it becomes as bad as....

“....How should the minds that in the freshness of youth have been strained and ruined by the nonsense of Hegelism, be still capable of following (...) profound investigations? They are early accustomed to take the hollowest jingle of words for philosophical thoughts, the most miserable sophisms for acuteness, and silly conceits for dialectic, and their minds are disorganised through the admission of mad combinations of words to which the mind torments and exhausts itself in vain to attach some thought....”
(W.W.R., I, Pref.2, 1844)

....Arthur’s verbal castration of poor ol’ G. Dubyah F., or at least his followers, which is the same thing.

Anyway, I’m merely a pacifist spectator, maybe with a clandestine affirmative nod here and there.

For Aristotle, perfection, or good, is a feature of the individual, in its fulfilment of its own particular form, which is unique to it, and only it, by the law of identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Aristotle relates the telos of individuals to the fulfillment of their kind of being, as noted in the quote given above. I will add the passage that prefaces it for clarity:

For just as the goodness and performance of a flute player, a sculptor, or any kind of expert, and generally of anyone who fulfills some function or performs some action are thought to reside in his proper function, so the goodness and performance of man would seem to reside in whatever is his proper function.........we must make it clear that we mean a life determined by the activity (energeia) as opposed to the mere possession of the rational element. For the activity, it seems, has a greater claim on the function of man. — 1097b(Emphasis mine)

I don't understand this at all. You seem to be making "the good" into "the One" — Metaphysician Undercover

On the contrary. Chapter 10 of Book Lamba of Metaphysics presents the good of the whole world as the relations between beings through the order imposed by the Mover. This view conforms with the first criticism of the 'Form of the Good' Aristotle brings forward in the Nicomachean Ethics:

However, the term "good" is used in the categories of substance, of quality, and of relatedness alike; but a thing-as-such, i.e., a substance is by nature prior to a relation into which it can enter; relatedness is, as it were, an offshoot or logical accident of substance. Consequentially, there cannot be a Form common to the good-as-such and the good as a relation. — 1096a, 16

I would say that thinking in this sense is in the pursuit of a goal. — Metaphysician Undercover

That makes sense. Plato, however, is keen to make a distinction between dialectic and art in the matter. As quoted above from Book 6:

And you seem to me to be calling the activity of geometers and such people thinking but not insight, on the grounds that thinking is something in between opinion and insight.”

Sorry Paine, I can't read the material for you. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ad hominem or astute observation of my limitations?
Only Pot and Kettle can know for sure.

There is no difference between these unless it is specified either I see more than I eat, or I do not see more than I eat. — Metaphysician Undercover

A Venn diagram with one circle being the things you eat and the other circle being the things you see shows that there is an area of overlap but also an area that does not overlap. They are not the same.

A Venn diagram with one circle being the things you pursue and the other circle being the things that are good shows that there is an area of overlap but also an area that does not overlap. They are not the same.

It is your failure to see the difference that leads to your absurd conclusion that everything we do must be good. A claim that Plato not only does not make but one he rejects.

Aristotle relates the telos of individuals to the fulfillment of their kind of being, as noted in the quote given above. I will add the passage that prefaces it for clarity: — Paine

Well, obviously there are many different kinds. So this "good" must be specific to the kind. Now how do you make this compatible with what you said earlier "the good as a quality of creation as a whole", when the whole consists of many different kinds each with its own sort of good?

On the contrary. Chapter 10 of Book Lamba of Metaphysics presents the good of the whole world as the relations between beings through the order imposed by the Mover. — Paine

Again, you state "relations" here in the plural. There is a number of different relations therefore there must be a number of different goods. By what principle do you attribute these relations, which are the goods, to the whole, rather than to the individuals. A relationship between you and I has aspects specific to me, and aspects specific to you, but nothing proper to "the whole".

Take Socrates' description of "just" for example. The just state is the one in which each individual does one's own thing, minds one's own business, without interfering in the affairs of others. Clearly, each individual has one's own goods, making each individual privy to one's own particular affairs. But what "good" has the state? The state is said to be just, because it provides for each individual to have one's own particular goods. We cannot assign "good" also to the state, without changing the meaning of "good", because a state is a different kind of thing from an individual. And if you insist that the good of the state is the same as the good of the individual then we have a vicious circle of logic which provides us with no headway in trying to understand "good".

However, the term "good" is used in the categories of substance, of quality, and of relatedness alike; but a thing-as-such, i.e., a substance is by nature prior to a relation into which it can enter; relatedness is, as it were, an offshoot or logical accident of substance. Consequentially, there cannot be a Form common to the good-as-such and the good as a relation. — 1096a, 16

Primary substance for Aristotle, as defined in his Categories, is the individual. So if the good is a quality of substance, it is attributed to the individual. This is why there cannot be a Form of the good.

A Venn diagram — Fooloso4

It was a simple statement, not a Venn diagram. You're trying to alter the premise.

A Venn diagram with one circle being the things you pursue and the other circle being the things that are good shows that there is an area of overlap but also an area that does not overlap. They are not the same. — Fooloso4

There's a big problem with this assumption. Plato said "the good" is what every soul pursues. It is you who wants to define "the good" as something other than this, in some way which would allow your Venn diagram of overlap. So I asked you, how are you going to define "the good" then. It's easy to make a bold assertions like "every soul pursues the good some of the time, but not all of the time", but by what principles are you going to distinguish between when the soul is pursuing the good, and when the soul is not pursuing the good? And what kind of randomness within the soul would make it be pursuing the good at one moment, but not pursuing the good at the next moment? We do not experience such random shifts in our pursuits.

Suppose for example a person is working on a good project and is therefore pursuing the good. But something comes up and the person perceives a need to steal, to keep the project going. The person is still working on the good project, therefore pursuing the good. But since the person is actively stealing, is the person pursuing the not good at the very same time that the person is pursuing the good? How could the person be pursuing the good and pursuing the not-good at the same time, in relation to the same project?

It was a simple statement, not a Venn diagram. You're trying to alter the premise. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is a simple statement that can be represented in a Venn diagram.

It's easy to make a bold assertions like "every soul pursues the good some of the time, but not all of the time" — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not the assertion. The assertion is the one you quote from Plato. The point is, the fact that you pursue something does not make it good. It is pursued because it is thought to be good, but pursuing something because you think it is good does not make it good.

Suppose for example a person is working on a good project and is therefore pursuing the good. — Metaphysician Undercover

Suppose a person is working on a bad project.

But since the person is actively stealing, is the person pursuing the not good at the very same time that the person is pursuing the good? — Metaphysician Undercover

Then what the person is doing, stealing, in pursuit of what is good, the project, is bad. The means, stealing, is bad even though the ends, the project, is good.

That is not the assertion. The assertion is the one you quote from Plato. The point is, the fact that you pursue something does not make it good. It is pursued because it is thought to be good, but pursuing something because you think it is good does not make it good. — Fooloso4

You obviously haven't read Plato. It is clear that things are not pursued because they are thought to be good, as "the good" escapes the grasp of reasonable thinking, We do not grasp "the good", we do not think "X is good therefore I'll pursue it", we simply pursue things for various reasons. This is important to understand, because it is central to the idea that virtue is not a type of knowledge. "The good" does not guide us as a form of knowledge, such that it enters into our thinking about our activities, and we conclude "I must do X because X is good". It guides us by influencing our thinking from a position which is external to our knowledge. It guides us without us knowing that it guides us.

So, what defines something as "good" is the fact that it is pursued, because the good is what guides our pursuits. When he is talking about understanding "the good" in that section of "The Republic", he issues the disputed statement. "Every soul pursues the good and does its utmost for its sake." 505e trans. Grube.

Before stating this, he mentions the problems with defining "good'" and that people talk about the good as if they know what it means when they do not. Then he suggests that some define "good" as "pleasure", and some as "knowledge". He rejects pleasure because obviously, some pleasures are bad, and some are good.

Instead of moving toward a more specific definition, such as a certain type of pleasure, he moves to a more general description, what every soul pursues is the good. This allows that pleasures which are not pursued are not good. And, that things pursued other than pleasure might be good as well. Also, in not giving a clear definition, it allows that "the good" is not a form of knowledge. He excludes "the good" from knowledge.

So he rejects "knowledge" because the soul "is perplexed and cannot adequately grasp what it is". When asked again, whether he considers the good "to be knowledge or pleasure or something else altogether", Socrates move along to the analogy with beauty.

By this analogy, beauty is related to the senses in the same way that good is related to the intellect. He says that in the case of visible beauty, there is, other than the beautiful thing and the perceiver, a third thing required, this is light. And in the case of visible beauty, light is what turns out to be the "valuable" thing, as the overall "cause" of sight. In an analogous way, the good is described as the cause of intellection. The good illuminates the intelligible objects, making them intelligible to us, just like the sun illuminates visible objects, making them visible to us.

We can conclude therefore, that intellection, and understanding, are guided by the good, and that whichever intelligible objects (ideas) become intelligible to us, this is caused by the good illuminating them. The good shines its light on the idea, making it intelligible to us.. Furthermore, the good is something which is pursued. Therefore we can make the further conclusion that our pursuits determine in a causal way, the intelligible objects (ideas) which are intelligible to us.

The good therefore is not a type of knowledge, but a guiding principle of knowledge. It is external to, and independent from, the objects of knowledge, like the sun is independent from the objects of sight.

It is clear that things are not pursued because they are thought to be good, as "the good" escapes the grasp of reasonable thinking — Metaphysician Undercover

Thinking something is good is not the same as grasping the good. Believing something is good is not the same as knowing it is good.

we do not think "X is good therefore I'll pursue it" — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's see what Plato's Socrates has to say about this:

No one goes willingly toward the bad or what he believes to be bad; neither is it in human nature, so it seems, to want to go toward what one believes to be bad instead of to the good. — Protagoras 358c

As the quote from the dialogue Protagoras makes clear, it is what one believes to be good that one pursues and what one believes to be bad that one avoids.

So, what defines something as "good" is the fact that it is pursued — Metaphysician Undercover

One might believe the pleasant is good (358b) and pursue it, but, as you point out:

He rejects pleasure because obviously, some pleasures are bad — Metaphysician Undercover

So, it cannot be what defines something as good is that it is pursued since we do pursue pleasure.

Socrates concludes:

Well then, by ignorance do you mean having a false opinion and being deceived about matters of importance? — 358c

A false opinion and being deceived about what is good leads one to pursue what is bad. Here we see the connection between knowledge and virtue.

Protagoras makes clear — Fooloso4

:grin: Protagoras...makes...clear :rofl:

Thinking something is good is not the same as grasping the good. Believing something is good is not the same as knowing it is good. — Fooloso4

I keep asking you to justify this claim, but you do not. If there is some simple, clear and distinct principle, other than "thinking something is good", which makes the thing actually and truly good, then please produce it.

Let's see what Plato's Socrates has to say about this:

No one goes willingly toward the bad or what he believes to be bad; neither is it in human nature, so it seems, to want to go toward what one believes to be bad instead of to the good.
— Protagoras 358c

As the quote from the dialogue Protagoras makes clear, it is what one believes to be good that one pursues and what one believes to be bad that one avoids. — Fooloso4

Notice in your quote that it says "so it seems". There is a reason for this. That idea (what seems to be the case) is the very idea which Plato ends up refuting. We often willingly do what we believe, and know to be bad. How is this possible?

It is possible because we do not have a true understanding of "the good", as explained in The Republic. What we claim to know as "good" might be false. Your understanding of "the good" produces a situation where we can knowingly do what is bad; when a person lies, steals, or cheats for example. We truly believe that such things are bad, we even claim to know that they are bad, yet we do them any way.

How is this possible, when it is completely contrary to what "seems" to be the case? It is possible because what seems to be, is not really what is the case. What is the case is that we really and truly do not know what "the good" is, yet we assume to know what it is, as you exemplify, and from this faulty assumption we assume to know what "bad" is as well. Then we proceed to do what we believe to be bad, because our believe as to what is good and bad, is faulty.

So, it cannot be what defines something as good is that it is pursued since we do pursue pleasure. — Fooloso4

As I said, some pleasures we do not pursue. because we cannot engage in all at once, so we need to prioritize. Therefore you have no argument here.

A false opinion and being deceived about what is good leads one to pursue what is bad. Here we see the connection between knowledge and virtue. — Fooloso4

Ah, you're catching on, but not drawing the proper conclusion yet. The proper conclusion is that the belief that virtue is a knowledge is the deception. The claim "I know the good" might incline one to act in a way accordingly. However, as Plato points out in The Republic, the good is not something that anyone knows, not even the highest philosophers. The good is something completely outside the realm of human knowledge as that which illuminates the things known. It is the cause of intellection, and therefore not knowledge, which is the product of it. So we must conclude that the real relationship between knowledge and virtue is not as you assume. Virtue is the cause of knowledge, not the effect of it. Therefore it must be something other than knowledge. And, any person who says "I know the good", and acts accordingly, is the one who is deceived, because no one can know the good.

I keep asking you to justify this claim, but you do not. If there is some simple, clear and distinct principle, other than "thinking something is good", which makes the thing actually and truly good, then please produce it. — Metaphysician Undercover

My claim is that thinking or believing something is good is not the same as knowing that it is good. Thinking or believing something is good does not make the thing actually and truly good. You make the distinction yourself when you point out:

He rejects pleasure because obviously, some pleasures are bad — Metaphysician Undercover

If we pursue pleasure and some pleasures are bad then pursuing pleasure does not make it good.

We often willingly do what we believe, and know to be bad. How is this possible? — Metaphysician Undercover

You are now making the argument you rejected! If we willingly do what we believe, and know to be bad then what we are pursuing in such cases cannot, as you previously claimed, be good because we pursue it.

Previously you said:

every act is inherently good. — Metaphysician Undercover

and:

everything we do is good — Metaphysician Undercover

but now you admit that we often do what is bad. If every act is inherently good then how can an act that is inherently good be bad?

You say:

It is possible because we do not have a true understanding of "the good" — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you know that every act is good if we do not have a true understanding of the good?

So, what defines something as "good" is the fact that it is pursued, — Metaphysician Undercover

A true understanding of the good cannot be that the good is whatever we pursue. You now say that we do not have a true understanding of the good:

What is the case is that we really and truly do not know what "the good" is, — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree, but you seem to disagree with yourself. You previously said :

Accordingly, your phrase "Knowledge of the good itself is that by which we can truly determine whether a particular act is good" makes no sense at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

If it is not by knowledge that we can truly determine whether a particular act is good then in what way can we determine that it is good? Certainly not by the fact it is done.

The proper conclusion is that the belief that virtue is a knowledge is the deception. — Metaphysician Undercover

The proper conclusion is that virtue is problematic. Lacking knowledge we do not have the true measure of virtue.

Virtue is the cause of knowledge — Metaphysician Undercover

Is your claim that virtue is the good?

How can we distinguish between virtuous and non-virtuous acts? By virtue of virtue? If virtue is the good and we cannot know the good then we cannot know virtue.

My claim is that thinking or believing something is good is not the same as knowing that it is good. Thinking or believing something is good does not make the thing actually and truly good. — Fooloso4

I've been asking you to justify this claim, because I really cannot understand it. I can't see how anything other than thinking that something is good could make something good. If you can't justify it, perhaps you can give me an example or something, so that I could begin to understand what you mean.

Are you familiar with Plato's Euthyphro? Is pious being loved by the gods, or is piety what the gods love? We can apply the same test here. Is "good" what is deemed by human beings, or is good a quality apprehended by us to be inherent within the thing. I think the answer is obvious. It is not a quality which we apprehend as inhering within the act, but a judgement we make by comparing the act to some principles. Therefore belief in those principles and one's capacity to judge, is what makes the act good.

You make the distinction yourself when you point out:

He rejects pleasure because obviously, some pleasures are bad
— Metaphysician Undercover

If we pursue pleasure and some pleasures are bad then pursuing pleasure does not make it good. — Fooloso4

I don't see that you have a point here. Pleasure comes in a variety of types, the ones pursued are good.

You are now making the argument you rejected! If we willingly do what we believe, and know to be bad then what we are pursuing in such cases cannot, as you previously claimed, be good because we pursue it.

Previously you said:

every act is inherently good.
— Metaphysician Undercover

and:

everything we do is good
— Metaphysician Undercover

but now you admit that we often do what is bad. If every act is inherently good then how can an act that is inherently good be bad? — Fooloso4

You are cherry picking quotes out of context. In the context of "everything we do is good", I clearly stated that bad is not opposed to good. So you really have no point here.

You say:

It is possible because we do not have a true understanding of "the good"
— Metaphysician Undercover

How do you know that every act is good if we do not have a true understanding of the good?


So, what defines something as "good" is the fact that it is pursued,
— Metaphysician Undercover

A true understanding of the good cannot be that the good is whatever we pursue. You now say that we do not have a true understanding of the good: — Fooloso4

Look, we can know that every act is good without having a true understanding of "the good", simply by knowing what it means to act. Once we reject determinism and accept free will, then a freely willed act requires a cause which is not deterministic. "The good" as an overarching Form of knowledge would be deterministic, forcing one to act according to that Form. "The good" as your will to act, in whatever way you want, at any particular moment in time, is not deterministic. Obviously we cannot have a true understanding of "the good", or else our acts would be deterministic, forced by that understanding.

You seem to be confusing the predicate "good" which we might attribute to an act, or a type of act, with the supposed Form called "the good". The point demonstrated is that we attribute the property "good" without knowing the Form, "the good". As Paine explained, Aristotle took the further step to completely reject "the good" as a Form altogether. And, I've been explaining that this is consistent with Plato, because "the good" is what makes the Forms intelligible by illuminating them, and is therefore not a Form itself. In the terms of free will, in the preceding paragraph, it is the will to understand. So it is very common for people to say such and such are good, without having any understanding whatsoever of "the good".

And, when you consider what I say above, that when we judge an act as good, this is "a judgement we make by comparing the act to some principles", you'll see that there is no single principle by which we judge "good". Each time we judge an act as good, we employ principles specific to the situation. Therefore it is impossible that there could be one principle called "the good", by which we could judge acts as good.

If it is not by knowledge that we can truly determine whether a particular act is good then in what way can we determine that it is good? Certainly not by the fact it is done. — Fooloso4

Why not? I see no justification for your claim that good is something other than this, and a very convincing argument from Plato that this is exactly what makes an act good, that it has been carried out as an intentional act.

This is all hopeless twisted. On a number of different topics several of us having tried to help you untangle your confused thinking. I am done trying.

This is all hopeless twisted. — Fooloso4

That's why most people give up on trying to understand Plato, it requires a lifetime of effort to even get close. They cannot read it in a week and fit it all into a simple exegesis, so they give up. not having the ambition required to match the ambition of Plato. Most philosophy appears hopelessly twisted to anyone who requires their education to be in a straight forward format. In the end though, the individual may proceed forward by following the straight forward doctrine, but we move ahead by solving the hopelessly twisted puzzles.

That's why most people give up on trying to understand Plato — Metaphysician Undercover

I have been reading and studying Plato for close to fifty years. I have started several threads here on Plato. Why people give up on trying to understand Plato has nothing to do with you.

we move ahead by solving the hopelessly twisted puzzles. — Metaphysician Undercover

What you fail to see is that your hopelessly twisted puzzles are of your own making. This is true not only of your perverse reading of Plato but for your perverse reading of Wittgenstein as well.

Primary substance for Aristotle, as defined in his Categories, is the individual. So if the good is a quality of substance, it is attributed to the individual. — Metaphysician Undercover

The Categories does point out that what can be predicated as a quality requires a primary substance, an individual being, without whom referring to qualities would be meaningless. On the basis of this reasoning, you seem to be denying that a relation between beings could ever go beyond the 'good' as the predicate of an individual being. It is difficult for me to visualize, it seems to be a Protagorean result gained through an inversion of the eternal, or something.

But I don't have to understand the thesis to notice it does not fit with other things Aristotle said. Aristotle discussed the good as a quality of the cosmic whole in Book Lambda, For the purpose of inquiring into first principles, the whole of creation is a substance that the Mover causes to exist, along with the order that comes into being through his rule.

The holistic view that connects the individual (and what is good for them) with the cosmos (the being that includes all beings) can be seen in the introduction of soul into the arguments made by Aristotle. The Categories make no mention of the idea of composite beings:

It is also clear that the soul is the first substance, the body is the matter, and a man or an animal, universally taken, is a composite of the two; and 'Socrates' or 'Coriscus', if each term signifies also the soul of the individual, has two senses (for some say it is the soul that is the individual, others that it is the composite), but if it signifies simply this soul and this body, then such an individual term is like the corresponding universal term. — Metaphysics,1037a

The concept of soul is said to be central to the process of becoming an individual. With this starting principle it becomes related to the whole of creation:

Now, summing up what has been said about the soul, let us say again that the soul is in a way all existing things; for existing things are either objects of perception or object of thought, and knowledge is in a way the objects of knowledge and perception the objects of perception. — De Anima, 431b 20, translated by J.L Ackrill

Aristotle bases this claim on linking the inquiry of all nature (fusis) to the existence of the soul:

Since [just as] in the whole of nature, there is something which is matter to each kind of thing (and this is what is potentially all of them), while on the other hand there is something else which is their cause and is productive of all of them---these being related as an art to its material---so there must also be these differences in the soul. And there is an intellect which is of this kind by becoming all things, and there is another which is so by producing all things, as a kind of disposition, like light does; for in a way light too makes colours which are potential in actual colours. And this intellect is distinct, unaffected, and unmixed, being in essence activity. — ibid, 430a 10

This use of light as an analogy bears a strong resemblance to its use by Plato in Book 6 of the Republic, but reformulated in order to avoid the deficits Aristotle finds there. For the purpose of this present argument, the important point to realize is that the 'function of man' discussed in Nicomachean Ethics is not just a general predicate that can be applied to a set of individuals but relates to how those individuals come into being in a cosmos filled with these other beings.

To argue that one's interlocutor has not studied enough is an abandonment of a thesis made upon its own merits. Admitting that one's arguments are useless is not exactly a clinic on how to do Platonic dialectic.

What you fail to see is that your hopelessly twisted puzzles are of your own making. This is true not only of your perverse reading of Plato but for your perverse reading of Wittgenstein as well. — Fooloso4

Indeed.

To argue that one's interlocutor has not studied enough is an abandonment of a thesis made upon its own merits. Admitting that one's arguments are useless is not exactly a clinic on how to do Platonic dialectic. — Paine

A dialectic involves a topic and two people. If one of those people has a hopelessly twisted conception of the topic, the only recourse for the other may well be to laugh and walk away.

Rationality is of little use on the irrational.

Rationality is of little use on the irrational. — Banno

Well, I do not mean to claim as much. I cannot judge as irrational what I cannot conceive of in my own terms. There is always the possibility that I am too limited to understand. I just wanted to observe that withdrawing from the discourse between two, as you observe, is not one of the possible moves within it.

I just wanted to observe that withdrawing from the discourse between two, as you observe, is not one of the possible moves within it. — Paine

If, on sitting down to a game of chess. one's opponent moves the rook diagonaly, you might at first try to instruct them as to the correct move. But if they insist on repeating the error, one might reasonably attribute malice or foolishness. Either way, the game is at an end.

In this case, the game is trying to understand what certain texts are trying to say. All the players are interpreters. If one does not understand what the move is, one cannot claim it is breaking a rule. I don't understand MU's argument. The fault could be mine. His withdrawal from the game has no bearing upon that possibility.

I don't understand MU's argument. The fault could be mine. — Paine

No, it isn't. You are relatively new here. You'll learn. It's a worthwhile lesson. Sometimes folk just do not make sense.

On the basis of this reasoning, you seem to be denying that a relation between beings could ever go beyond the 'good' as the predicate of an individual being. — Paine

I think the issue here is that predication is of a subject. If we want to make a relation into a subject and make a predication of that subject, we lose the substantiation afforded by the primary substance because a relation cannot be primary substance. Then there is no object which exemplifies the subject, only relations, and relations are fundamentally relative, therefore subjective. In other words, a relation cannot be a primary substance, consequently it has no true identity by the law of identity, so there is no possibility of truth.

Accordingly, if we make "good" (by definition) the property of a relation rather than the property of an individual, the concept is not grounded in anything substantial. But there is no problem to make "good" the property of individuals, because it is individuals who act, and acts are what are judged as good. As the action is a property of the individual, so is the good. Therefore we have virtuous, or "good" people. This you'll find is very consistent with Aristotle's ethics, a virtuous person is one who acts as such, and the acts come from strength of character rather than chance. It really makes no sense to define "good" as the property of a relation. And I haven't yet seen any serious attempts to make this sensible.

But I don't have to understand the thesis to notice it does not fit with other things Aristotle said. Aristotle discussed the good as a quality of the cosmic whole in Book Lambda, For the purpose of inquiring into first principles, the whole of creation is a substance that the Mover causes to exist, along with the order that comes into being through his rule. — Paine

This is a pointless paragraph. You know from the other thread that I reject Book Lambda as inconsistent with the rest of Aristotle's writing, and it is debatable whether it was actually written by him. It is more consistent with the Neo-Platonist trend to equate the good with the One. As I said above, I believe Aristotle had a better understanding of Plato then The Neo-Platonists. And, I think Book Lambda to be a Neo-Platonist teaching passed off as Aristotle. because the bulk of Aristotle's writing is extremely consistent but this is not consistent with the rest.

The holistic view that connects the individual (and what is good for them) with the cosmos (the being that includes all beings) can be seen in the introduction of soul into the arguments made by Aristotle. The Categories make no mention of the idea of composite beings:

It is also clear that the soul is the first substance, the body is the matter, and a man or an animal, universally taken, is a composite of the two; and 'Socrates' or 'Coriscus', if each term signifies also the soul of the individual, has two senses (for some say it is the soul that is the individual, others that it is the composite), but if it signifies simply this soul and this body, then such an individual term is like the corresponding universal term.
— Metaphysics,1037a

The concept of soul is said to be central to the process of becoming an individual. With this starting principle it becomes related to the whole of creation:

Now, summing up what has been said about the soul, let us say again that the soul is in a way all existing things; for existing things are either objects of perception or object of thought, and knowledge is in a way the objects of knowledge and perception the objects of perception.
— De Anima, 431b 20, translated by J.L Ackrill

Aristotle bases this claim on linking the inquiry of all nature (fusis) to the existence of the soul:

Since [just as] in the whole of nature, there is something which is matter to each kind of thing (and this is what is potentially all of them), while on the other hand there is something else which is their cause and is productive of all of them---these being related as an art to its material---so there must also be these differences in the soul. And there is an intellect which is of this kind by becoming all things, and there is another which is so by producing all things, as a kind of disposition, like light does; for in a way light too makes colours which are potential in actual colours. And this intellect is distinct, unaffected, and unmixed, being in essence activity.
— ibid, 430a 10

This use of light as an analogy bears a strong resemblance to its use by Plato in Book 6 of the Republic, but reformulated in order to avoid the deficits Aristotle finds there. For the purpose of this present argument, the important point to realize is that the 'function of man' discussed in Nicomachean Ethics is not just a general predicate that can be applied to a set of individuals but relates to how those individuals come into being in a cosmos filled with these other beings. — Paine

I think you are mistaken here Paine. The soul is "in a way" all things, through the potential of the intellect, and its capacity to know all things. Aristotle does not mean that the soul actually is all things, "in a way" is used for a reason. The power of the soul "to know all things" is not necessarily the good, because if the good has to do with intellection, it might simply be the power of the soul to know. Then "all things" is accidental. But you want to make "all things" essential, and conclude therefore that the good is a relation between the individual and the whole cosmos. This is unwarranted because even if I grant to you that "good" ought to be defined as the quality of a relation, rather than the quality of an individual, there is nothing to indicate that it is any more than a quality of the various relations between the individual and the particular things that the individual knows. Where do you derive the need to relate the individual to the whole cosmos from? I see no principles here. So the quotes you've produced do not support your conclusion.

This is a pointless paragraph. You know from the other thread that I reject Book Lambda as inconsistent with the rest of Aristotle's writing, and it is debatable whether it was actually written by him. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have yet to provide the support for this statement. I have seen some commentary regarding this topic in various writings but you have not attempted to do more than claim it to be true. In any case, the argument in De Anima replicates the same view given in Book Lambda.

Then "all things" is accidental. But you want to make "all things" essential, and conclude therefore that the good is a relation between the individual and the whole cosmos. — Metaphysician Undercover

On the contrary, there is vast difference between the 'good' as it relates to the whole of the cosmos and the problems of individual beings. But I am not the one claiming there is no 'overarching' good. It seems absurd to assert that Aristotle intended to separate the two goods as a category mistake in the way you seem to be arguing for.

You have yet to provide the support for this statement. I have seen some commentary regarding this topic in various writings but you have not attempted to do more than claim it to be true. In any case, the argument in De Anima replicates the same view given in Book Lambda. — Paine

I thoroughly demonstrated the inconsistency in that other thread. In De Anima Bk 1 Ch 3 he explains why the soul is not an unmoved mover, it is not an eternal circular motion, nor any type of motion at all, because it is definitively immaterial, and it's incoherent to speak of an immaterial motion. Further, he explains that the thinking on thinking which is thought to be such an eternal circular motion does not describe the true nature of thinking, because thinking consists of conclusions, ends, and never proceeds endlessly without such. Therefore the ideas expressed in Metaphysics Bk 12 are directly refuted here.

Then Appollodorus proceeded to De Caelo in an effort to support that part of Metaphysics. However, a thorough reading of that work will show that it also refutes Metaphysics Bk 12. First, he's very clear to say that an eternal circular motion is theoretically "possible". Then he proceeds to explain how any circular motion must consist of material substance. Then, anything material is generated and corrupted. So he leaves it to us, from these premises, to conclude that although eternal circular motion is logically possible, it is in reality, physically impossible.

We know that "The Metaphysics" is a collection of works put together by Aristotle's school a long time after his death. This part you refer to is clearly inconsistent with the work which we know is his. Instead, it supports a Neo-Platonist tradition which proceeded in a different direction from Aristotle with respect to immaterial substance. The principal point being that Aristotle demonstrated how we cannot appeal to matter based descriptions (circular motions, and the human being thinking about thinking), in any real attempt to understand immaterial substance. He leads us through the rest of his Metaphysics, and De Anima, to understand the logical necessity to assume immaterial forms as prior to, and the cause of, material things being the particular things that they are, by the law of identity. And, he shows us that these classic ideas, circular motion, and thinking on thinking, do not provide us with a true immaterial representation, and therefore ought to be rejected.

On the contrary, there is vast difference between the 'good' as it relates to the whole of the cosmos and the problems of individual beings. But I am not the one claiming there is no 'overarching' good. It seems absurd to assert that Aristotle intended to separate the two goods as a category mistake in the way you seem to be arguing for. — Paine

The point though, is that there is no such thing as "the 'good' as it relates to the whole of the cosmos". That's an idea you've fabricated, or imported from somewhere else, as is not derived from Plato nor Aristotle. The "good" in Plato, is what illuminates individual intelligible objects. Until "the cosmos" becomes intelligible, rather than simply having some sort of aesthetic eloquence, or appeal as a beautiful proposal, there is no "good" in relation to the cosmos. And Aristotle is explicit to refer to the good of man, as happiness, and the highest activity as contemplation, without speaking of any "good of the cosmos'. And he is very careful to dissuade us from the sophistry of eternal circular motions, and a thinking thinking on thinking, which might have been proposed as the good in relation to the whole cosmos.

So it is not that I am trying to separate "the two goods". There is only one true sense of 'good'. Plato and Aristotle each support this, the "good" is relative to the individual, or particular. The idea that there is some sort of universal "the good", as good relative to the cosmos, is what both of them reject as sophistry. People who claim such a "the good", are claiming to know what cannot be known. Obviously "the 'good' as it relates to the whole of the cosmos" is self-contradicting, because the the whole of the cosmos is an absolute, absolutely everything, so to say that there is something such as 'the good' which is relative to this, is blatant contradiction. This why creation myths have a hierarchy of goods in a temporal order, God created this because He saw it was good, then that, then that, etc..

Well, at least we can agree that your interpretation is not tenable if Book Lambda is a legitimate expression of Aristotle's thought. There is a hefty amount of scholarship regarding the sources of text and editors of the book and its relation to other writings, but you are the first I have heard say it is an out and out counterfeit. You have not provided any support for this claim. Perhaps you could pull the source of it out from under its cover.

Your demonstration on the other thread brought you to this point:

I can't see the point you are making here, Paine. Aristotle clearly says that thoughts are dependent on images. It's at the end of your quote. And images are derived from the senses. So we have no basis for a "nous" which is independent of the senses, sense organs, and material body. It's true that Aristotle, at some points alludes to the appearance of a separate, independent mind, but such a thing is inconsistent with the principles he clearly states. — Metaphysician Undercover

In a separate comment, I will list all the places I know of where Aristotle alludes to a separate, independent intellect. I don't have time to run them all down until can get back to my books next week.

But I will restate the problem I had with your comment the first time around. You are using a certain set of texts to establish your interpretation of what Aristotle means to say. On the basis of that, you declare Aristotle is not consistent with his own principles when he refers to an active, separate intellect. Whatever explanation might be put forward for the conflict of principles, it is always logically possible that the inconsistency belongs to your interpretation.

Outside of its description in Book Lamba, it should be noted that many of the other books of the Metaphysics try to see how and if the introduction of composite beings relate to the method in the Categories. There is much scholarly debate on these topics and disagreement about which statements are consistent with other statements. The statement in Book Lambda: "the soul is the first substance" is a part of that conversation even if you dismiss the rest of the book as Neo-Platonists propaganda.

...it is always logically possible that the inconsistency belongs to your interpretation. — Paine

When that possibility is not taken seriously the whole of the text or texts may be distorted in order to accomodate an interpretation. That is just bad hermeneutic practice. I follow the advise of those who say that when there is an apparent contradiction look to see if it is or can be reconciled based on further consideration and closer examination.