Notice, that when we are discussing the good of an act, we are discussing something attributed to or directly related to the act. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is a distinction between the intent of or motivation for an act and the evaluation of that act. Not everything we do is good.

A human act is directed toward an end, the good. — Metaphysician Undercover

Being directed toward an end is not the same as attaining that end. Not every act is good.

We are talking about opposing qualities, like pleasure and pain, we are not not talking about opposites themselves, as independent ideals.. — Metaphysician Undercover

When you say:

... "the good" must have a contrary is the very idea which Plato ends up demonstrating to be faulty — Metaphysician Undercover

When Plato talks about "the good" he does not mean some quality that is good but the good itself. The good itself cannot be opposite of itself. The good itself is not some thing or act that is good. Knowledge of the good itself is that by which we can truly determine whether a particular act is good.

There is a distinction between the intent of or motivation for an act and the evaluation of that act. Not everything we do is good. — Fooloso4

But everything we do is for a good.

Being directed toward an end is not the same as attaining that end. Not every act is good. — Fooloso4

As I explained in a post above, every act is inherently good. I don't know if you read that post, but this is fundamental to Christianity, and why love and forgiveness are the chief principles of Christianity.

When Plato talks about "the good" he does not mean some quality that is good but the good itself. The good itself cannot be opposite of itself. The good itself is not some thing or act that is good. Knowledge of the good itself is that by which we can truly determine whether a particular act is good. — Fooloso4

The good itself is what motivates the act, what Aristotle calls "that for the sake of which". Knowledge of the good itself, is knowing what motivates one's own actions. Since every act is particular, there is a specific good unique to each and every individual act. Accordingly, your phrase "Knowledge of the good itself is that by which we can truly determine whether a particular act is good" makes no sense at all. There is no such thing as an overarching "the good", relative to which, particular acts might be judged as good or not.

But everything we do is for a good. — Metaphysician Undercover

But that does not mean that everything we do is good.

As I explained in a post above, every act is inherently good. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is an assertion. One that is wrong and is not supported by Plato.

I don't know if you read that post, but this is fundamental to Christianity — Metaphysician Undercover

Sin is fundamental to Christianity, although that problem was supposed to have been fixed, Christianity does not claim that people no longer sin.

The good itself is what motivates the act, what Aristotle calls "that for the sake of which". Knowledge of the good itself, is knowing what motivates one's own actions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Knowledge of the good itself is not knowledge of what motivates one's own actions but rather what distinguishes between those actions that are good and those that are not. Actions can be motivated by the desire for power, greed, anger, and on and on. Plato was not blind to these motivations. He discusses them in the Republic and elsewhere.

There is no such thing as an overarching "the good" — Metaphysician Undercover

It is clear that you have not read or perhaps just not understood what Plato says about the good itslef in the Republic.

But that does not mean that everything we do is good. — Fooloso4

Yes it does mean that everything we do is good, unless you move to judge "good" by some other principle. What principle would you propose?

Sin is fundamental to Christianity, although that problem was supposed to have been fixed, Christianity does not claim that people no longer sin. — Fooloso4

"Sin" is a completely different concept. We were talking about "good". This is the point, it is a mistake to oppose "sin": with "good". A sinner is still fundamentally good, therefore we forgive.

Knowledge of the good itself is not knowledge of what motivates one's own actions but rather what distinguishes between those actions that are good and those that are not. — Fooloso4

Again, if "good" is not defined in the way I described, a definition which is consistent with both Plato and Aristotle, as that for the sake of which an action is carried out, then what principle do you propose? You talk about some phantom sense of "good" which is supposed to have an opposite, "not good", and you claim that knowing this "good" will provide you with a basis for judgement between "good" and "not good". But obviously this is just your phantasy, there is no such sense of "good".

Suppose we define "good" as the opposite of "not good". How is this supposed to help us distinguish actions that are good from actions which are not good? That is why we don't define "good" in this way, we define it in relation to a specific purpose. Then we have a principle to judge whether an act is conducive to the specified good.

It is clear that you have not read or perhaps just not understood what Plato says about the good itslef in the Republic. — Fooloso4

In The Republic, the good is what makes an intelligible object intelligible, just like the sun is what makes a visible object visible. This is exactly what I've been describing, an intelligible object becomes intelligible to a person, as it is required for a purpose. The purpose, or good, lights up the intelligible object, making it intelligible, just like the sun lights up the visible object, making it visible.

Sophistry = No substance + rhetoric (Marilyn Monroe dead)

Philosophy = Substance + rhetoric (Marilyn Monroe alive)

?

Sophists offer us beautiful dead women as if we're necrophiliacs, philosophers offer us beautiful alive women who we can have a decent relationship with.

Sophists offer us beautiful dead women as if we're necrophiliacs, philosophers offer us beautiful alive women who we can have a decent relationship with. — Agent Smith

Nice!

As the old man put it, a living dog is better than a dead lion.

a living dog is better than a dead lion. — lll

:lol:

Agent Smith alive is better than Socrates dead. :grin:

The problem is to distinguish the one from the other. If your relationship with Marilyn Monroe is only to see her on the screen, then this relationship is exactly the same whether she's presently dead or alive. In this situation there is no difference to you between sophistry and philosophy.

Yeah, yeah!

Yes it does mean that everything we do is good, — Metaphysician Undercover

Is your intent to demonstrate your sophistic skills?

Republic 509b:

Therefore, say that not only being known is present in the the known as a consequence of the good, but also existence and being are in them besides as a result of it ...

(Bloom translation)

Is your intent to demonstrate your sophistic skills? — Fooloso4

No, I am demonstrating Plato's use of "the good". You use "good" in a way which demonstrates that you do not understand Plato, so I am trying to help you. If you have no desire to understand, insisting that my demonstration of what Plato wrote is just sophistry, then this discussion is pointless.

Republic 509b:

Therefore, say that not only being known is present in the the known as a consequence of the good, but also existence and being are in them besides as a result of it ...
(Bloom translation) — Fooloso4

Exactly as I described above, "consequence of the good" refers to what Aristotle named as final cause, purpose. "Being known" is subsequent to (the consequence of) the purpose or intent of the knower, and purpose and intent are necessarily relative to a good. So for instance, I'll learn how to change a tire for the purpose of repairing a flat. Repairing the flat is the good. That knowledge within me (how to change a tire), that instance of "being known", is a consequence of the good I intend, which is to repair a flat.

You have a desire to take another step, to make a judgement as to whether what I intend (as the good), is a true good or is perhaps not good. But you have given me no principles for making such a judgement, nor have you given me reference to where Plato describes such principles. As I've told you this sense of "good", which has an opposite, "not good", is not consistent with Plato. "Pleasure" has its opposite, "pain", but "good" has no such opposite, and this is why "good" cannot be equated with "pleasure".

Therefore I assume that this is just your own subjective opinion, a feature of your imagination, this sense of "good", which you are trying to insert into the discussion. Thus it is you who is practicing sophistry, trying to slip in a meaning of "good" which is not consistent with the one which is the subject of our discussion, in an attempt to equivocate.

How can we guard against sophistry? — Average

I tend to demand fewer fallacies and biases from the ones I debate against. More careful attention to how facts stick together with the premises and conclusions. The more we challenge our own arguments with the same scrutiny as our "opponents" do, the more we reach the truth we are trying to reach for ourselves. To demand that others review their own logic and force them to make their argument airtight before continuing the discussion, the less the discussion becomes a battle of emotionally argued opinions.

Be early in these demands of the other interlocutor, otherwise, the discussion will derail quickly.

On this forum, this is happening a lot. And I find it interesting that when I bring up fallacies and biases that other people are making, that becomes an unwelcome addition to the discussion. This has always puzzled me and feels more like an unwillingness to actually review their own argument, holding onto the opinion, the ideology or faith as if their life depended on it. People generally don't want to change, and even in a place like this forum, people tend to be bad at actually seeking truth past their own beliefs, ideologies and opinions.

The distinction between good as a benefit and evil as harmful to a being leads Socrates to demand the following from Glaucon:

“I granted you the just person’s seeming to be unjust and the unjust person’s seeming to be just, because you two asked for it. Even if it wouldn’t be possible for these things to go undetected by gods and human beings, it still had to be granted [612D] for the sake of argument, so justice itself could be judged in comparison with injustice itself. Or don’t you remember?”
“I’d surely be doing an injustice if I didn’t,” he said.
“Now since they have been judged,” I said, “I’m asking on justice’s behalf for its reputation back again, and for you folks to agree that the reputation it has is exactly the one it does have with gods and human beings, so that it may carry off the prizes it gains and confers on those who have it for the way it seems, since it has also made it obvious that it confers the good things that come from what it is and doesn’t deceive those who take into their very being.” [612E]
“The things you’re asking for are just,” he said. “So will you give this back first,” I said, “that it doesn’t escape the notice of the gods, at least, that each of them is the sort of person he is?” “We’ll give it back,” he said.
“And if it’s not something that escapes their notice, the one would be loved by the gods and the other hated, just as we agreed at the start.”
“There is that.”
“And won’t we agree that everything that comes to someone loved by the gods [613A] is the best possible, at least with everything that comes from the gods, unless there was already some necessary evil for him stemming from an earlier mistaken choice?”
“Very much so.”
“Therefore, in accord with that, the assumption that has to be made about a just man, if he falls into poverty or diseases or any other apparent evils, is that these things will finally turn into something good for him while he lives or even when he dies. Because someone is certainly never going to be neglected by the gods when he’s willing to put his heart into becoming just and pursuing virtue [613B] to the extent of becoming like a god as much as is possible for a human being.”
“It’s not likely anyway,” he said, “that someone like that would be neglected by his own kind.” “And shouldn’t we think the opposite of that about an unjust person?”
“Emphatically so.” — Plato, Republic, 612c, translated by Joe Sachs

this discussion is pointless. — Metaphysician Undercover

On that we agree, but not for the reason you imagine.

Thanks Paine. Somehow it escapes MU's notice that there is the problem of unjust actors and unjust actions in the Republic.

But everything we do is for a good. — Metaphysician Undercover

:rofl:

There are interesting points of comparison and contrast between Plato's 'idea of the good' and Aristotle's use of 'final causes'. Declaring they are identical, and that that fact is obvious to anyone who has done enough reading is an odd abandonment of a thesis. It is a kind of solipsism.

Apart from specific claims, it seems to me that the role of the dialectic is important to keep in mind as both Plato and Aristotle have their own ways of recognizing and using it.

Declaring they are identical, and that that fact is obvious to anyone who has done enough reading is an odd abandonment of a thesis. — Paine

Well, consider the source. Enough said.

I don't know what has not been revealed.

Somehow it escapes MU's notice that there is the problem of unjust actors and unjust actions in the Republic. — Fooloso4

How is this a problem? We ere talking about "the good", not "just" or "unjust". You never moved to establish a relation between these. And I still do not believe you could if you tried, because it's not at all straight forward.

Declaring they are identical, and that that fact is obvious to anyone who has done enough reading is an odd abandonment of a thesis. It is a kind of solipsism. — Paine

And I suspect the latter, for you often heard it said that the form of the good is the most important thing to learn about and it's by their relation to it that just things and others become useful and beneficial — The Republic 504e

Notice above, that what is described as being in relation to the good, is what Aristotle calls the means to the end. The good is the end, and things are deemed as just or beneficial when they are apprehended as the means to the end. Now consider the line below, and take it for exactly what it says. "Every soul pursues the good". Therefore what every person pursues is the good. In Aristotle this is final cause, as in his example, health is the reason why the man is walking. Health is what the man pursues, and is therefore the (final) cause of him walking. It is the good, in this instance, what the person pursues.

Every soul pursues the good and does its utmost for its sake.[/quote} — The Republic 505e

In order to compare Aristotle's' and Plato's views of the good, it may be best to start with Aristotle's rejection of the 'form of the good' in which particular beings participate. In Book One of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle raises the objections that he has in numerous places against the 'theory of ideas'. The discussion then moves to looking for the good in the proper function of man. Since this is found to be reflected in man's rational element, Aristotle says:

we must make it clear that we mean a life determined by the activity (energeia) as opposed to the mere possession of the rational element. For the activity, it seems, has a greater claim on the function of man. — Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a5, translated by Martin Ostwald

After linking the more excellent activity with the highest good, Aristotle says:

we reach the conclusion that the good of man is an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence or virtue, and if there are several virtues, in conformity with the best and most complete. — ibid. 1098a 15

As demonstrated in De Anima, we can only know the world through our lives as combined beings. Our inquiry into first principles, however, allows us to reason what the fundamental conditions of this experience might be. Aristotle discusses the good in this context in his Metaphysics::

For it does not possess goodness in this part or that part but possesses the highest good in the whole, though it is distinct from it. It is this manner that Thinking is the thinking of Himself through all eternity.
Chapter 10
We must also inquire in which of two ways the nature of the whole has the good and the highest good, whether as something separate and by itself or as the order of its parts. Or does it have it in both ways, as in the case of an army? For in an army goodness exists both in the order and in the general, and rather in the general; for it is not because of the order he exists, but the order exists because of him. Now all things are ordered in some way, water-animals and birds and plants, but not similarly, and they do not exist without being related to at all to one another, but they are in some way related. For all things are ordered in relation to one thing. It is as in a household, in which the freemen are least at liberty to act at random but all or most things are ordered, while slaves and wild animals contribute little to the common good but for the most part act at random, for such is the principle of each of these, which is their nature. I mean, for example, that all these must come together if they are to be distinguished; and this is what happens in other cases in which all the members participate in the whole. — Metaphysics, Book Lambda 1075a 10, translated by H.G. Apostle

It is worthwhile to read all of Chapter 10 to see how his view of an 'overarching good' compares with other thinkers. As a matter for the inquiry of first principles he says:

Again, no one states why there will always be generation and what is the cause of generation. And those who posit two principles need another principle which is more authoritative. And those who posit the Forms also need a more authoritative principle; for why did things participate in the Forms or do so now? And for all other thinkers there be something which is the contrary of wisdom or of the most honorable science, but for us this is not necessary, for there is nothing contrary to that which is first. For, in all cases, contraries have matter which is potentially these contraries, and ignorance which is the contrary of knowledge, should be the contrary object; but there is nothing contrary to what is first. — ibid. 1075b,15

I will continue tomorrow to compare the observations made above with the Sun as an analogy for the good in the Republic. The good order of my household now requires that I eat too much corned beef and cabbage.

You fail to see your mistake. It does not follow from the claim that we pursue the good that the good is whatever it is we pursue.

A little help from Lewis Carroll:

To say what you mean is not to mean what you say. We may see what we eat but that does not mean we eat what we see.

If the good is whatever we pursue then the destruction of the rain forests to build luxury housing is good. To kill everyone you do not like is good. To enslave people in order to obtain cheap labor is good.

Thank you for your suggestions.

Continuing from my first comment on the theme, I will try to approach Plato's views of the good.

Reading Book 6 of the Republic after reviewing Aristotle's objections strongly suggests that Aristotle had at least some of these passages in mind when making his arguments. Aristotle questioning the value of the claims as propositions in the inquiry of 'first principles' naturally raises the question if Plato's goal in making his claims were meant to satisfy such an inquiry. How rigidly to understand the 'theory of the Forms' as a theory has been debated for centuries and we are still at it. My tiny mind is not going to resolve that for all time, but it may not be remiss to focus on the context in which Plato is arguing for the possibility and the need for a philosopher king in these passages. Since they are not very far apart, I figure that reading between where starts and ends his citations might be instructive.

“So, my comrade,” I said, “it’s necessary for such a person to go around by the longer [504D] road, and he needs to work as a learner no less hard than at gymnastic training, or else, as we were just saying, he’ll never get to the end of the greatest and most relevant study.”
“So these aren’t the greatest ones,” he said, “but there’s something still greater than justice and the things we’ve gone over?”
“Not only is there something greater,” I said, “but even for those things themselves, it’s necessary not just to look at a sketch, the way we’ve been doing now, but not to stop short of working them out to their utmost completion. Wouldn’t it be ridiculous to make a concentrated effort in every way over other things of little worth, to have them be as precise and pure [504E] as possible, while not considering the greatest things to be worthy of the greatest precision?”
“Very much so,” he said, “and a creditable thought it is, but what you mean by the greatest study, and what it’s about—do you imagine,” he said, “that anyone’s going to let you off without asking you what it is?”
“Not at all,” I said. “Just you ask. For all that, you’ve heard it no few times, but now you’re either not thinking of it or else, by latching onto me, [505A] you think you’ll cause me trouble. But I imagine it’s more the latter, since you’ve often heard that the greatest learnable thing is the look109 of the good, which just things and everything else need in addition in order to become useful and beneficial. So now you know pretty well that I’m going to say that, and in addition to it that we don’t know it well enough. But if we don’t know it, and we do know everything else as much as possible without it, you can be sure that nothing is any benefit to us, just as there would be none if [505B] we possessed something without the good. Or do you imagine it’s any use to acquire any possession that’s not good? Or to be intelligent about everything else without the good, and have no intelligence where anything beautiful and good is concerned?”
“By Zeus, I don’t!” he said.
“And surely you know this too, that to most people, the good seems to be pleasure, and to the more sophisticated ones, intelligence.”
“How could I not?”
“And, my friend, that the ones who believe the latter can’t specify what sort of intelligence, but are forced to end up claiming it’s about the good.”
“It’s very ridiculous,” he said. [505C]
“How could it be otherwise,” I said, “if after reproaching us because we don’t know what’s good they turn around and speak to us as though we do know? Because they claim that it’s intelligence about the good as though we for our part understand what they mean when they pronounce the name of the good.” “That’s very true,” he said.
“And what about the people who define the good as pleasure? Are they any less full of inconsistency than the others? Aren’t they also forced to admit that there are bad pleasures?”
“Emphatically so.”
“So I guess they turn out to be conceding that the same things that are good are also bad. Isn’t that so?” [505D]
“Certainly.”
“Then isn’t it clear that the disagreements about it are vast and many?”
“How could it not be clear?”
“And what about this? Isn’t it clear that many people would choose the things that seem to be just and beautiful, and even when they aren’t, would still do them, possess them, and have the seeming, though no one is content to possess what seems good, but people seek the things that are good, and in that case everyone has contempt for the seeming?” “
Very much so,” he said. [505E]
“So this is exactly what every soul pursues, for the sake of which it does everything, having a sense that it’s something but at a loss and unable to get an adequate grasp of what it is, or even have the reliable sort of trust it has about other things; because of this it misses out even on any benefit there may have been in the other things. On such a matter, of such great importance, [506A] are we claiming that even the best people in the city, the ones in whose hands we’re going to put everything, have to be in the dark in this way?” — Republic, 504c to 506a, translated by Joe Sachs (emphais mine)

I was hoping this comment could be done in two parts. But it now seems to me that the analogy of the Sun as the good requires more work on my part.

It does not follow from the claim that we pursue the good that the good is whatever it is we pursue. — Fooloso4

Yes it does, unless one states that we pursue something other than the good as well as pursuing the good, the inverse holds. No qualification is stated at this point. We pursue the good, therefore whatever it is that we are pursuing is the good. The end.

We may see what we eat but that does not mean we eat what we see. — Fooloso4

Yes it does mean that. I see what I eat means very exactly, that I eat what I see. That I may be seeing other things, or that I might eat other things, needs to be mentioned to be made relevant. If you tell me, "I see what I eat", then ask me "what do I see?", so I name what you are eating, and you say I am wrong, because you were looking at something else as well, you are only practicing sophistic deception by using unstated premises.

If the good is whatever we pursue then the destruction of the rain forests to build luxury housing is good. To kill everyone you do not like is good. To enslave people in order to obtain cheap labor is good. — Fooloso4

Actually you need to distinguish the means from the end here. The luxury housing is the good which is pursued, the destruction of the rainforest is "just", or justified by this end. So it is beneficial. That's what I described above, concerning Plato's statement that the just and beneficial exist in relation to the good, as the means to the end.

The problem you disclose here (i.e. that what is sought as "the good" to some might not be thought to be good to others), is dealt with by Aristotle in his classic distinction between the apparent good, and the real good. But we can find the seed to this distinction in Plato, at the part I referenced above for example:

And isn't this also clear? In the case of just and beautiful things, many people are content with what are believe to be so, even if they aren't really so, and they act, acquire, and form their own beliefs on that basis. Nobody is satisfied to acquire things that are merely believed to be good, however, but everyone wants the things that really are good and disdains mere belief here. — The Republic 505d

Thanks for the quote, it puts what I've quoted in context. Notice that after he says that the good is what every soul pursues, he proceeds to say that we are unable to get an adequate grasp of it. Our actions are brought about by our pursuit of the good, but we are not even able to properly grasp the good which we pursue. This is why Plato argues that virtue is not knowledge. Aristotle assigns "happiness" as the ultimate good, attempting to bring the good into the fold of intelligibility.

I think you'll find the best discussions about whether virtue is knowledge, and teachable, in Protagoras and also Gorgias. This I think is where he does the most work to separate good from pleasure.

So, how does your acknowledgement that the pursuit of the good is difficult relate to your previous claims that there is no 'overarching' good?

I see what I eat means very exactly, that I eat what I see. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you eat everything you see?

So, how does your acknowledgement that the pursuit of the good is difficult relate to your previous claims that there is no 'overarching' good? — Paine

Pursuit of "the good" as one individual object, the One, is a mistaken venture, and that is the obvious reason why pursuit of the good is extremely difficult. I covered this with Apollodorus, who insistently reduces "the good" to the One, in another thread. Incidentally, this is one reason why Aristotle rejects "the form of the good", because "the good" turns out to be a multitude of particulars, rather than one specific form.

but everyone wants the things that really are good — The Republic 505d

Understanding "the good" is how Plato came to the revelation (in his middle period) that the Pythagorean theory of participation was inadequate. If you look closely you'll see that he actually rejects "participation" in his later work, such as "The Sophist", and this rejection is what Aristotle provides us with a continuation of.

The principal issue is the relationship between passive and active, which Aristotle did an excellent job of exposing. In the theory of participation, the Idea is passive, and the objects which partake in the Idea are active, in the sense that they partake. This passivity denies the Idea any active causality in the real world. But what we see in the evidence of artefacts, is that ideas are somehow very causally active. So Plato sees "the good" as what gives causality to ideas, and this is final cause in Aristotle.

This is the reversal of "representation" which is required to truly understand the nature of knowledge. Commonly, knowledge is described as a representation, a modeling, or a map of the real world. But this totally misses the principal function of knowledge, which is to bring about change in the world. So we need to reverse things, to see the real world as a representation (or reflection) of the ideas. This is the significance of the cave allegory. The shadows on the wall are the material artefacts, the fire is the good, and the human beings are using the ideas to create the shadows. The shadows are a reflection of the ideas, but they can only be apprehended as such through a grasping of "the good", as the fire. Once the philosopher apprehends this, then he ascends beyond the cave (the artificial world) to an understanding of the whole world in this way. The material existence is a reflection of the ideas, but we cannot neglect the fact that it is only such if we appeal to a higher "good" beyond the human good. The human good is the fire, the higher good is the sun.

Do you eat everything you see? — Fooloso4

This is the unstated premise, (that you do not eat everything you see), which makes your example an example of sophistry. In logic the premises must be stated, and if you appeal to subliminal implications it's not valid logic but sophistry.

This is the unstated premise, (that you do not eat everything you see), which makes your example an example of sophistry. — Metaphysician Undercover

What are you talking about? There is no unstated premise in the distinction between seeing what you eat and eating what you see. Either you eat everything you see or you don't.

I don’t have the era-specific expertise required for direct support herein, but the expertise.....or maybe just the favoritisms......I do have, being taken from the same general arguments as yours, offers support indirectly. What I mean is, for a great deal of what you’ve said so far, I can find references from subsequent metaphysics that supports it.

For whatever that’s worth.....