What I wrote is Plato's and other philosopher's take on sophists and sophistry. If Plato did excuse sophists and their method as simply misguided or self-delusional, great! It jibes with Socrates' pronouncement that no one is knowingly evil.

If Plato did excuse sophists and their method as simply misguided or self-delusional, great! It jibes with Socrates' pronouncement that no one is knowingly evil. — Agent Smith

This is another issue, and it really strikes at the heart of Plato's attack on sophistry. Socrates actually demonstrates that people are knowingly evil. We often do what we know is wrong. Augustine discussed this issue, as derived from Plato, at great length. Through this principle Plato demonstrates that virtue is not a form of knowledge. Since the sophists claim to teach virtue as a form of knowledge, and virtue is argued to be distinct from knowledge, sophistry is refuted in this way.

This is consistent with what I posted above. The sophists' claim to be able to teach virtue is based in the assumption that they knew virtue, in order to be able to teach it. Socrates demonstrated that they really did not know virtue. So what they taught was really a form of deception, even though they truly believed that they knew virtue, and that they could teach it.

The problem seems to be that sophistry is always something they do.

We of course are rational and clean and nice and good.

This is another issue, and it really strikes at the heart of Plato's attack on sophistry. Socrates actually demonstrates that people are knowingly evil. We often do what we know is wrong. Augustine discussed this issue, as derived from Plato, at great length. Through this principle Plato demonstrates that virtue is not a form of knowledge. Since the sophists claim to teach virtue as a form of knowledge, and virtue is argued to be distinct from knowledge, sophistry is refuted in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting. Virtue is not knowledge. Could you expand and elaborate on that?

This is consistent with what I posted above. The sophists' claim to be able to teach virtue is based in the assumption that they knew virtue, in order to be able to teach it. Socrates demonstrated that they really did not know virtue. So what they taught was really a form of deception, even though they truly believed that they knew virtue, and that they could teach it. — Metaphysician Undercover

How was Plato going to teach people virtue, if virtue isn't something knowable?

How was Plato going to teach people virtue, if virtue isn't something knowable? — Agent Smith

Plato did not claim to teach virtue, the sophists did, and they charged a lot of money for it. Socrates argued that a person could know what is right, but still act contrary to this, and do what is wrong. This type of behaviour is actually quite common, as intentional criminal acts.

So the problem is that knowing what is right will not necessitate doing what is right. And since virtue is a judgement of one's actions, we have to conclude that there is a separation between knowing what is right, and doing what is right. Therefore even if the sophist were capable of teaching what is right, this would not ensure that the student would proceed to act virtuously. There is an ingredient to virtue, a necessary ingredient, which is missing here.

Look at the difference between your two statements above, "virtue is not knowledge", and "virtue isn't something knowable". The first can be true while the second is false. We know that virtue is not knowledge, from the evidence that people knowingly act wrongly. But this does not imply that virtue is not knowable, as was stated, we can know what is correct, but not act that way. So we can know virtue. But the missing ingredient is the motivation to act according to what is known. Virtue can be known, as an object of knowledge, but it is not itself a type of knowledge, so this is not an instance of knowing knowledge, it's knowing something else, virtue.

Plato did not claim to teach virtue, the sophists did, and they charged a lot of money for it. — Metaphysician Undercover

What did Plato claim to teach with respect to morality?

Socrates argued that a person could know what is right, but still act contrary to this, and do what is wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you sure? How do you explain Socrates' statement that no one knowingly is evil?

Look at the difference between your two statements above, "virtue is not knowledge", and "virtue isn't something knowable". The first can be true while the second is false. — Metaphysician Undercover

How can we know something that isn't knowledge?

What did Plato claim to teach with respect to morality? — Agent Smith

I don't recall ever coming across, in Plato's writings, a place where he makes explicit claims concerning what he is teaching. But I think might refer to "dialectics" as what he, or Socrates in his dialogues, is doing, representing the philosophical process he supports. This appears to be a form of skepticism, where he takes a word like "just" in "The Republic", and questions a number of people who claim to know the meaning of the term, in an attempt to get an understanding of the "idea" which the word signifies.

How do you explain Socrates' statement that no one knowingly is evil? — Agent Smith

You'd have to provide this statement for me in context, for me to answer that question. I'll tell you though, that it is often very difficult when reading Plato's dialogues, to distinguish between Socrates' actions of critical skepticism towards a concept, and the appearance that he is supporting that concept. Further, Plato changed his attitude toward a number of fundamental concepts over the lifetime of his writings. That is a feature of Platonic dialectics, to maintain an attitude of uncertainty, an open mind. This mental capacity, which is a suspending of judgement toward fundamental propositions, provides for the Socratic condition of uncertainty, not knowing, which is the prerequisite for the dialectical process.

So if Socrates claimed, "no one is knowingly evil", and he professed to know the truth of this proposition, rather than proceeding toward understanding what is meant by this proposition, to better enable a judgement of truth or falsity, that would contradict Socrates' claim to be unknowing, and this would completely undermine the dialectical process demonstrated by Plato. Furthermore, I suggest that the fact that this concept (no one is knowingly evil), is recurrent in a number of dialogues, indicates that it is one that Plato was far from settled on at that time. It could even be, that Socrates himself, the real man, was inclined toward believing this concept, persuaded by sophistry, while Plato was inclined to be more skeptical of it. If this is the case, then we'd see the concept appear in numerous dialogues, even having Socrates appear to be supportive of the idea, and it might not be until a later dialogue where we'd find the indication that Plato actually trends toward rejection of the concept.

How can we know something that isn't knowledge? — Agent Smith

The object of knowledge, what is known, is not the subject of knowledge (the thing as it is represented within the knowledge itself). So for instance, I know my chair, as the object of my knowledge, but the chair isn't my knowledge. The knowledge I have of my chair holds "my chair" as a subject, and predication determines how I know my chair; it looks like this, and is in this place, etc., are predicated to the subject. The subject in this case is meant to have a direct one to one relationship with the object, so that "my chair" might refer to the object itself (external to myself), and it might equally signify the subject of predication (internal to my knowledge). It is intended, in that case, that the subject "my chair" represents only that one identified object, but the subject might in other cases represent many objects classed together, like when the subject is "a chair".

I don't recall ever coming across, in Plato's writings, a place where he makes explicit claims concerning what he is teaching. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then how do you know what he didn't teach?

persuaded by sophistry — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you know this?

The object of knowledge, what is known, is not the subject of knowledge (the thing as it is represented within the knowledge itself). — Metaphysician Undercover

I'll give you an example of something that's not knowledge, the string of symbols: )^a. This is not a proposition, hence can't be knowledge. How can we know )^a?

Then how do you know what he didn't teach? — Agent Smith

I like to take the Socratic approach, and claim not to truly know such things. Those were my opinions, I do not profess them as knowledge.

I'll give you an example of something that's not knowledge, the string of symbols: )^a. This is not a proposition, hence can't be knowledge. How can we know )^a? — Agent Smith

I don't know. Got any suggestions? There are some serious difficulties involved with any attempt to understand the nature of knowledge, which Plato demonstrated.

Those were my opinions — Metaphysician Undercover

Same here.

Got any suggestions? — Metaphysician Undercover

None whatsoever. I thought you would know (better). It's your theory.

None whatsoever. I thought you would know (better). It's your theory. — Agent Smith

He has made the same claim before, along with the same reluctance to actually support it.

He has made the same claim before, along with the same reluctance to actually support it. — Paine

:ok:

He has made the same claim before, along with the same reluctance to actually support it. — Paine

Sorry Paine, I can't read the material for you.

Excellent post. :up:

Here, I haven't time to work on providing the requested support, but start with this:

Finally, in the Meno the question how virtue is acquired is raised by Meno, a disciple of Gorgias, and an ambitious seeker of power, wealth, and fame. Socrates’ interlocutors are usually at first quite confident about their own competence in the discussion. Nor is such confidence unreasonable. If virtue is a kind of ‘skill’ or special property that enjoys general recognition, its possessor should know and be able to give an account of his skill. As the Socrates’ examinations demonstrate, however, such self-confidence is usually misplaced and the ‘knowledge’ professed by Socrates’ conversation partners is frequently revealed to be at best an implicit familiarity, When they are confronted with their inability to explain the nature of their cherished virtue or expertise, they end up admitting their ignorance, often with considerable chagrin and anger. — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-ethics/

That excerpt sits well with Socrates' overall take on knowledge. (I neither know nor think I know).

But the issue is with what Socrates demonstrates about the claims that others make, in particular, claims about the relationship between virtue and knowledge.

Consider that virtue is attributed to human acts. Socrates goes to those who act (have a skill), and asks them to explain the knowledge which enables the skill. They cannot, So Socrates forces them to admit that they do not really have the knowledge which they claim to have.

What we have exposed here is the division between know-how and know-that. And, knowing how to do something does not really qualify as "knowledge" in the strict epistemic sense of the word, which refers to knowing that. So Socrates exploits this division to demonstrate that those who know how to do something do not necessarily know what they are doing.

If we apply this principle to virtue, as an attribute of human activity, then we see the division between knowledge, as knowing-that, and virtue, as an activity. Knowledge, in the strict sense of the word is not a requirement for virtue.

:ok:

MU's explanation does not touch upon his claim regarding knowingly doing evil. Consider the following regarding intentions which obviously are the source of a world of suffering:

Evils, Theodorus, can never be done away with, for the good must always have its contrary, nor have they any place the divine world, but they must needs haunt this region of our mortal nature. That is why we should make all speed to take flight from this world to the other, and that means becoming like the divine so far as we can, and that again is to become righteous with the help of wisdom. But it is no easy matter to convince men that the reasons for avoiding wickedness and seeking after goodness are not what the world gives. The right motive is not that one should seem innocent and good--that is no better, to my thinking, than an old wives' tale--but let us state the truth in this way. In the divine there is no shadow of unrighteousness, only the perfection of righteousness, and nothing is more like the divine than any one of us who becomes as righteous as possible. It is here that a man shows his true spirit and power or lack of spirit and nothingness. For to know this is wisdom and excellence of the genuine sort; not to know it is to be manifestly blind and base. All other forms of seeming power and intelligence in the rulers of society are as mean and vulgar as the mechanic's skill in handicraft. If a man's words and deeds are unrighteous and profane, he had best not persuade himself that he is a great man because he sticks at nothing, glorifying in his shame as such men do when they fancy that others say of them, They are no fools, no useless burdens to the earth, but men of the right sort to weather the storms of public life.
Let the truth be told. They are what they fancy they are not, all the more for deceiving themselves, for they are ignorant of the very thing it most concerns them to know--the penalty of injustice. This is not, as they imagine, stripes and death, which do not always fall on the wrongdoer, but a penalty that cannot be escaped. — Plato, Theaetetus, 176a, translated by F.M. Cornford

I would type in more but have to do some chores to shore up my righteousness.

Evils, Theodorus, can never be done away with — Plato, Theaetetus, 176a, translated by F.M. Cornford

:ok: but...

the good must always have its contrary — Plato, Theaetetus, 176a, translated by F.M. Cornford

Makes sense, yin-yang, but what if...

In the divine there is no shadow of unrighteousness, only the perfection of righteousness, and nothing is more like the divine than any one of us who becomes as righteous as possible. — Plato, Theaetetus, 176a, translated by F.M. Cornford

But then...

All other forms of seeming power and intelligence in the rulers of society are as mean and vulgar as the mechanic's skill in handicraft. — Plato, Theaetetus, 176a, translated by F.M. Cornford

Hmmmm :chin: We ain't seen nothin' yet.

deceiving themselves — Plato, Theaetetus, 176a, translated by F.M. Cornford

People and their delusions. Me and mine...

a penalty that cannot be escaped. — Plato, Theaetetus, 176a, translated by F.M. Cornford

Which planet?

Sophistry, is it pre-philosophy or post-philosophy?

Which planet? — Agent Smith

The dialogue continues to say the one we are living on, seeking the good as much as possible or suffering the cost of not trying.

Sophistry, is it pre-philosophy or post-philosophy? — Agent Smith

The dialogue of that name says this at the end:

The art of contradiction making, descended from an insincere kind of conceited mimicry, fo the semblance-making breed, derived from image making, distinguished as a portion, not divine but human, of production, that presents a shadow play of words---such are the blood and lineage which can, with perfect truth, be assigned to the authentic Sophist.

Is that how you are asking if it is pre or post philosophy?

suffering the cost of not trying — Paine

That I can relate to.

You mean to say philosophy is about truth? To me, philosophy is about discourse that happens in the search for truth, there being no gurantee that there is a truth, good/bad for us.

I get the part about no guarantees. I don't think promises are what is on offer in the Theaetetus text. We don't know much about what is going on. We do have lots of data about bullshiting ourselves and others.

Just before the part I quoted, Theodorus was wondering how much better the world would be if we weren't so stupid. I took Socrates' response to be an agreement with the statement if one accepted the difficulty involved for everyone who tries to act on the observation. And the first step is to say it is not stupid to try.

We do have lots of data about bullshiting ourselves and others. — Paine

Not deliberate. (Genuinely) confused, hence the BS we find ourselves neck deep in.

it is not stupid to try. — Paine

suffering the cost of not trying — Paine

:broken:

U's explanation does not touch upon his claim regarding knowingly doing evil. — Paine

Plato's first step in his overall demonstration that people knowing commit evil, is Socrates' examples which refute the idea of a necessary relationship between knowing and doing. As Socrates shows, people act without knowing what they are doing. This means that actions are not necessarily derived from knowing. Therefore acting does not require knowing. This is only the first step in a long, and complicated, demonstration which proceeds from Plato's earlier writings to his later. It is complex and nuanced, requiring significant effort to understand and this is the reason why I didn't provide the support for my claim, which you requested earlier. The next step is to understand that acting is inherently good. A human act is directed toward an end, the good.

Put those two principles together, acting does not require knowledge, and acting is inherently good, and you have what is required to conclude that virtue is not knowledge. Beyond this, there is a need to place "evil" in relation to good.

for the good must always have its contrary, — Plato, Theaetetus, 176a, translated by F.M. Cornford

That "the good" must have a contrary is the very idea which Plato ends up demonstrating to be faulty. The good is shown as the motivation for action, and there is really nothing which is contrary to this. In this way the good is shown to be the cause of existence. Why did God create the universe? Because He saw that it was good to do such. So under Aristotelian principles all existence is good, to exist is good, so that the various existing things have different degrees of goodness as determined by the perfection of their forms. Form is fundamentally good. Then it doesn't make sense to assign evil, or badness (if this were the contrary to good) to anything, because all things have form, therefore existence, and the contrary of good (as existence), would be non-existence. This is fundamental to Christianity in the principles of love and forgiveness. We are all fundamentally good, and it makes no sense to assume a contrary to this, that people are evil.

The good is shown as the motivation for action, and there is really nothing which is contrary to this. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is contrary to this is what prevents the fulfillment of the motivation. We seek the good but if we do not know the good then what we do may be contrary to it. This is the connection between knowledge and virtue.

In this way the good is shown to be the cause of existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

From the Republic:

The good is not the source of everything; rather it is the cause of things that are in a good way, while it is not responsible for the bad things.

(379b)

Sophistry is rather rampant in our society, because mass media and an abundance of information, has turned us all into "know-it-alls", and we will go around showing off our knowledge in subjects which we are really quite ignorant of. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree

What is contrary to this is what prevents the fulfillment of the motivation. We seek the good but if we do not know the good then what we do may be contrary to it. This is the connection between knowledge and virtue. — Fooloso4

Notice that you say "what we do may be contrary". The point is that we are always going to do something, and we are always acting for some good. And as you say we can act without knowing the good. Therefore acting, which logically implies a good, does not require that the good is known.

Remember, Plato demonstrates that the good cannot be equated with pleasure, by showing how pleasure has an opposing condition, pain, and the good cannot have such an opposite. There cannot be an opposite to the good, because any such condition (like pleasure), must come into being from the non-being of itself, its opposite. So a condition of pleasure must be preceded by a condition of pain which is the non-being of pleasure. Then pleasure is a relief from pain. If this were the case with the good then the bad would necessarily precede the good, and we'd have to seek the bad in order to obtain the good.

Here's a point to consider concerning the relation between knowledge and virtue. If we look at the evidence of how morality has been successfully cultured in the past, we look at religions as the propagators of morality. And, we see that morality is induced through faith, rather than through knowledge. Good acts and good moral character are encouraged and conditioned through hope and faith, not through knowing the good.

Remember, Plato demonstrates that the good cannot be equated with pleasure, by showing how pleasure has an opposing condition, pain, and the good cannot have such an opposite. — Metaphysician Undercover

See the distinction between opposite things and the opposites themselves in the Phaedo.

“… you do not understand the difference between what is said now and what was said then, which was that an opposite thing came from an opposite thing; now we say that the
opposite itself could never become opposite to itself, neither that in us nor that in nature. Then, my friend, we were talking of things that have opposite qualities and naming these after them, but now we say that these opposites themselves, from the presence of which in them things get their name, never can tolerate the coming to be from one another."

(103b-c)

And, we see that morality is induced through faith, rather than through knowledge — Metaphysician Undercover

A good example! Unfortunately for you it points to the opposite of what you claim. Euthyphro believes he is acting piously by indicting his father. Socrates argues that Euthyphro does not know what piety is. He turns the discussion to the question of the just. Whether what Euthyphro was doing was good turns on knowledge of the just and good.

Immoral things are often induced through faith. Atrocities done in the name of God. Acting as though one is doing the will of God. In such cases it is not a lack of faith but a lack of knowledge. They are doing what they think is good but what they are doing is the opposite.

What you've presented seems to support precisely what I've said. Notice, that when we are discussing the good of an act, we are discussing something attributed to or directly related to the act. We are talking about opposing qualities, like pleasure and pain, we are not not talking about opposites themselves, as independent ideals.. You seem to be trying to separate "good" from the act, as if it were something independent from the act.