At that, "'murder' is defined as being wrong" is actually incorrect. Use a dictionary for once. — Terrapin Station

OED: murder, "the unlawful premeditated killing of a human being by another".

I assume that "unlawful" necessarily implies wrong.

If you have some idea of how murder is defined, then you're pretending if you say that you have no idea how to define it. — Terrapin Station

Clearly, the way I define "murder" is significantly different from the way you define it. You were using the word, in your example. I had a feeling your were using it in a way which was different from the way that I understand it, because as I explained, with the way that I understand the word (which is the way it's defined above from the OED), your example does not support your claim.

Therefore, I concluded that you have your own personal definition of "murder", which is not consistent with the one I quoted from the OED, and this personal definition is the one which supports your claim. That's why I said your example is meaningless unless you provide a definition.

Frozen block-time comes from the physicist Brian Greene. I don't know whether he came up with the interpretation, or just wrote about it in one of his books. — Marchesk

Were his books science fiction?

I have further looked into it, and my current understanding is that the scale was originally based, in part, on the boiling point of water, but that this wasn't even represented on the scale as 100 degrees Celsius by the man himself, Anders Celsius. 100 degrees Celsius represented the freezing point of water. It wasn't until a year later that someone else, Jean-Pierre Christin, decided that 100 degrees Celsius would represent the boiling point of water. — Sapientia

See, you learn something new everyday. When I was young we called it "centigrade". The Kelvin scale introduces absolute zero, but uses the same Celsius scale. Finding absolute zero at -273 degrees Celsius, Kelvin puts this as zero, so zero degrees Celsius is 273 degrees kelvin.

And nowadays, by international agreement, the Celsius scale is defined by two different temperatures: absolute zero, and the triple point of Vienna Standard Mean Ocean Water (VSMOW). Meaning that neither the melting nor boiling point of water under one standard atmosphere remains a defining point for the Celsius scale. — Sapientia

Did you verify what the triple point of VSMOW refers to? Triple point refers to the pressure point which the various stages, gas liquid and solid may coexist, and VSMOW is purified ocean water, to exclude the possibility of heavier or lighter water. And, from Wikipedia "The value of the triple point of water is fixed by definition, rather than measured." These measures were introduced to increase accuracy, the scale is still the same old centigrade scale, meaning one hundred degrees between the melting and boiling point of water.

Your second sentence in the quote above is false, and so it cannot form part of a sound logical argument. Even if your third sentence logically follows from the second, this is trivial in light of the fact that your second sentence is false. — Sapientia

Judging from what you've said, you do throw away all restrictions. Nothing can be impossible, not even contradiction represents impossibility for you. You claim to respect that contradiction represents impossibility, but in practise you change definitions at will, so contradiction may be avoided. You have no respect for contradiction in practise, Your claim is hollow, which generally indicates dishonesty. So where are your restrictions if nothing is impossible? My second sentence is true.



.

Have you not seen the science fiction movie out in the theaters right now called Arrival, or read the novella it's based on?

Anyway, the future having not occurred is just an epistemic situation for us. It's not because the future is radically different. It's because we haven't perceived it yet. Today isn't radically different than yesterday or five years ago. Those were all future days at one point. — Marchesk

And you base this claim on a science fiction movie? Is that supposed to incline me toward believing you?

If the frozen block interpretation of relativity is correct, then the future, past and present all exist the same, ontologically speaking. We just experience the illusion of time flowing. — Marchesk

If science fiction is believed as correct, then a lot of absurd consequences follow.

Why would you be pretending that you don't know what murder refers to as a behavior and be pretending that we're just saying something about a name per se? — Terrapin Station

I'm not pretending. But the whole disagreement I had with Sapientia revolved around the fact that I said "murder" is defined as being wrong. If this is the case, then "murder is wrong" is just a statement of redundancy. There is no judgement here, because the judgement is already inherent within the definition of murder. There was a judgement made in deciding to define this particular type of act, "murder" as wrong, and there is a judgement made when one decides to call an observed, or described act "murder". But if we assume, as you do, when you make your statement "murder is wrong", that "murder" has already been defined, and we assume, as I do, that murder is defined as being wrong, then your statement does not express any judgement. It just expresses redundancy, or at most, it indicates that you know what murder is. Therefore your claim that "it is wrong to murder" expresses a (subjective) ethical judgement is false. All that this statement expresses is that you know the objective meaning of "murder", just like saying "water boils at 100 degrees Celsius" expresses that you know the objective meaning of "100 degrees Celsius".

Also, I kind of wonder what's special about the future such that we could suppose it to be radically different than the past. Is it just because we haven't experienced it yet? — Marchesk

We haven't experienced the future yet because it hasn't happened yet. It's impossible to have experienced something which hasn't occurred. Is it difficult to fathom the meaning of "hasn't occurred"? It's just like non-existent. See, the past has occurred, and that's why the future is so radically different from the past, it has not.

We're discussing human behaviours, I assume that "one" refers to a human being who is behaving. Now you've claimed "one shouldn't murder", but this is absolutely meaningless unless you say what murder is.

Do you see my point? You've offered "One shouldn't murder" as a judgement about human actions. But there is no judgement being expressed here unless there is a described act which is being judged not just a name, "murder", and the claim that this name refers to that which one should not do. What kind of judgement is that, to judge a name? Otherwise anytime you accuse someone of murder, that individual would say, I didn't murder, show me what "murder" means, and how my action is consistent with that, or else you have no case against me. Unless murder has a definition how can you be judging it as wrong?

If you do not say what type of act "murder" refers to, how can you claim to have made a judgement about human behaviours? "Murder" could refer to absolutely any behaviour.

But you have no description of what type of act murder is. You only have murder as an example of a behaviour. Before you can judge it, don't you think that you need a description, to designate the particular type of behaviour which is called "murder"?

OK, you've made an assertion, murder is behaviour. Now where does the ethical judgement come in to play?

How could one judge behaviour if there is no behaviour being judged?

No. What I'm referring to is such as "One shouldn't murder," or "It is wrong to murder." That is a judgment about behavior. — Terrapin Station

That's not a judgement about behaviour, it's a simple statement. "A judgement about behaviour" implies that there is a particular instance of behaviour which is being judged. So until "murder" is defined as a particular behaviour, or a particular type of behaviour, there is no judgement about behaviour here. "It is wrong to murder" is meaningless, unless "murder" is described.

At any rate, whether you call that a judgment or simply a rule, there's nothing objective about it. There's no such thing as objective rules in general. — Terrapin Station

Here is the question I posed earlier. Let's say someone suggested that 100 would be the temperature assigned to the boiling point of water, and all the people agreed to that convention, and started using this scale, so that it"s considered a fact that water boils at 100. In comparison, let's say that someone suggested that it is wrong to murder, describing a particular act, saying that this described act is wrong, and assigning "murder" to it. So all the people agreed to this convention, the described act is wrong, and it's called "murder". Under these conditions, would you say "water boils at 100" is more objective than "it is wrong to murder"?

Then you're not talking about ethics. You don't have ethics if you don't have judgments about behavior. — Terrapin Station

Ethics is rules, a code for human behaviour. We have two things here, human behaviour, and a code of rules. Judgements about behaviour is something completely different. Judgements come when someone looks at the behaviour, and looks at the rules, making a comparison. From your perspective, that judgements are the subjective aspect, do you agree that both the behavior, and the rules (ethics) are objective?

There is a difference between objective, as I have defined it, and absolute. — Sapientia

I don't recall that you defined "objective", care to restate your definition?

Of course, it necessarily will be for you, because you have defined it that way, against my advice. — Sapientia

It's not I who established the Celsius scale, and the convention which holds that necessity, so it's not I who "defined it that way". You advise me to reject that convention, but you haven't justified your advice. So I take it as bad advice. If your desire is to counter that convention, with a new proposal, that it's possible for the temperature of boiling water to be other than those covered by the Celsius convention, then go ahead put forth your proposal.

The solution is simple: don't restrict yourself in that way. — Sapientia

That's the way logic works though, through restrictions. You throw away all restrictions, leaving yourself with no logic. This leaves your claims completely illogical. Then you offer me advice?

I'd certainly not agree with that. Ethical judgments are necessarily mental. How would we make sense out of saying that there are nonmental judgments? — Terrapin Station

No, I wasn't talking about ethical judgements, I was talking about ethical matters. Ethical matters are matters of human behaviours, human beings acting amongst others. These would be the matters which are judged in ethical judgements, and are not themselves matters of mental activity. Therefore according to your distinction ethical matters are objective matters.

So you'd have no quarrel with the idea that matters of ethics are just as objective as matters of science?

So, well & good. but personal continuity is an explanandum, not an explanans. We can either posit some sort of soul (which, having been posited, drastically lowers any assurance one might have about the impossibility of one's existing after death.) If, on the other hand, one rejects the idea of a soul, then another explanation must be put forth.

That second explanation is what I was hoping to draw out. — csalisbury

That's a tall order, asking someone to put forth an account of the continuity of existence. We see that inanimate objects, as well as the living, continue to exist through time, so we can rule out the soul as the source of continuity. What next?

Consider human activities then, human beings moving around in the world, doing things. These are not mental activities, are these objective matters?

Or the laws of nature could have suddenly changed in which case nothing would be what it had been any more. — John

If this occurs, then the substance is not water anymore, due to the different laws of nature, so it would not be the case that water would be boiling at a different temperature. That's the point in maintaining the principles of identity, and non-contradiction. If the substance does not behave like water, then its not water. If the laws of nature change in such a way as you suggest, then we no longer have water in existence, nature has changed to get rid of water.

But, in any case, it is a trivial point because, although we cannot be certain, we have very good reasons to believe that such a thing is not, in fact actually, as opposed to merely logically, possible. — John

It's not completely trivial, because it's relevant to the question of what is and is not logically possible. To maintain the power of logic, for understanding the world which we live in, it must be held to strict principles. These are the fundamental laws. If we allow that it is logically possible that the subject which is identified as "water", could be other than as it is identified (it boils at 100 and freezes at 0, etc.), we allow the logical possibility of the complete failure of all logic. Logic becomes illogical if it does not abide by its own principles. How is it not contradictory to say that it is logically possible that logic could be illogical?

How do hallucinations make use of light? When you claim to see a giant spider, where is this reflected light coming from that cause the brain to create an image of a giant spider? — Harry Hindu

If I'm looking at the wall, and hallucinating a giant spider on the wall, I am still seeing the wall, and making use of light to see the wall.

If we don't see light, then explain how we don't see anything (except the color black) when the lights are out? — Harry Hindu

Black is not a colour, so it is not the case that we see black, we see nothing. But seeing nothing, when there is an absence of light doesn't mean that we see light. What is the case is that we see objects, but we only see them if they are lit up with light. A laser could shine through the air in front of your eyes, and so long as air is perfectly clear, you wouldn't see it. If you look at the source of the laser light, you see it.

We are capable of hallucinating even when there are no lights, just as we can hear voices even when there are no sounds. When we are deprived of any sensory input for a length of time we begin to hallucinate and dreaming is simply hallucinating while sleeping. The images don't come from light. They come from our imagination and memories. — Harry Hindu

I know, but in these cases we aren't seeing, nor are we hearing. You don't see while you're dreaming, nor are you hearing when you imagine sounds.

But it isn't set in stone. It isn't necessarily the case that water will boil at the same point on the scale at which it was originally designated, and which it has been found to boil at in countless past cases. — Sapientia

So what do you think could cause this to change, i.e. that water could suddenly start boiling at a different temperature? And, if you think that it could suddenly change, how is our knowledge that water boils at 100, objective knowledge? Or do you think that all knowledge is subjective?

It's certainly not logically impossible... — John

I think it is logically impossible, because if the substance started boiling at a temperature other than 100, it would either not be water, or not be degrees celsius.

It is just that our current understanding is fallible, and our knowledge is limited. — Sapientia

Do you think that it's possible that the thing which we know as "water" is not really water as we know it? If so, then what makes our scientific knowledge "objective"? Or, is all knowledge subjective?

I'll try to get to the "heart" of what you're asking, and that's how we determine what to believe when it comes to objective matters. — Terrapin Station

What do you think constitutes an "objective matter". What would distinguish an objective matter from a subjective matter?

That is just what temperature it happens to boil at. — Sapientia

OK Sapientia, believe what you want, water just happens to boil at 100 degrees, by some sort of chance coincidence. Do you mean by this, that the scale of temperature, Celsius, existed, and people were using it to measure temperature, then at some point they boiled water and found that water boiled at 100 degrees?

If you've seen that in this thread, this thread has problems. — Terrapin Station

Yeah, I think you're new to this thread, it does have some real problems. What's your opinion, may I ask? How do we determine whether one belief is more objective than the other?

If that is what I said, then you should be able to quote me saying just that, rather than something else. Go ahead and try. — Sapientia

You already asked me to do this, so I already reproduced that quote.

But I am saying that the case for considering temperature to be objective is stronger than the case for considering morality to be objective, because the former has been demonstrated scientifically, and the latter has not, and therefore they are not analogous in that way. — Sapientia

Of course I didn't exactly quote you, I paraphrased:

How it relates to what we were talking about, is that you said science is more likely to be objective than ethics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps one could change the boiling temperature of water at normal sea level pressure (approx. 106 kPa) by adding salt. Since salty water freezes at a different temperature to fresh water, perhaps it also boils at a different temperature. — andrewk

Ever use a candy thermometer, or boil water with sugar? There's soft ball, hard ball, soft crack, hard crack, etc.. Maple syrup is in its finished state of 67 brix (67%sugar), when boiling at 104.2 degrees Celsius, sea level pressure. But that's not water, that's maple syrup.

More importantly, what if it's not water, but 'water' from Hilary Putnam's Twin Earth? — andrewk

How about Kurt Vonnegut's ice-nine?

Well, the point about religions of all kinds is that they are a kind of formal proscription of what ought to be considered good. We might take issue with their judgements, or even, as many people have, abandon them altogether, but if you do, then what other basis can one adopt? I'm not arguing for a 'return to a religious past' - my view is more that religious traditions embody important moral truths. But the reason they're not objective, is because in such cases, we ourselves are both the object and the subject! — Wayfarer

I see religion as a process whereby agreement is created. This is accomplished through communion and the respect for authority. Of course people will point to divisiveness between distinct religions, and between religious and non-religious as evidence that religion does not create such agreement. But this gives us a question similar to yours, without religion, what can create such an agreement.

So I see the loss of a united religion as far more significant than what you describe. When disagreement concerning moral (subjective) issues is allowed to permeate through society, it will fester, and undermine all forms of agreement. As we've seen in this thread, objectivity is based in agreement.

From Plato's Republic, the good is what makes intelligible objects intelligible, like the sun makes visible objects visible. So if we lose "the good", we lose intelligibility.

I think that Derrida implies an actual restart, by claiming closure. Then, he starts saying we have to go older than this, and older than that, finally saying more ancient than originary, implying that we go back to a start prior to the original start. I think that the cycle is like a spiral, such that each time we go back to the "older", it must be older than the older that we went back to the last time.

Certainly, there could be room for re-naming the terms, or for dividing up the scale differently. So to that extent, measurables also constitute an 'inter-subjective agreement' or convention, but given that convention, then the results of measurement will be the same for all observers. — Wayfarer

I've given considerable thought in the past few days, along with suggestions from this thread, to the question of what makes science more objective then ethics. What I've realized is that we place identified things in relationships of comparison in our efforts to understand them. In science we compare objects to other objects, and this is what produces objectivity. The only subjective aspect in science is that act of comparison. In ethics, the objects are acts, which in themselves are objective, but they are not compared to other acts, they are related directly to a system of values, which is inherently subjective. So to state it simply, in science we have objects related to other objects, while in ethics we have objects (acts) related to subjects, therefore subjectivity necessarily enters into ethics.

I think what is necessary, is to agree that there is a real good. I seem to recall metaphysician undercover disputing why any such conception is necessary at all. The answer is, as a foundation for ethical judgement. — Wayfarer

Actually, I think that's where I started in this thread. But what I think I said, is just like what you say above, it is necessary to agree that there is a real good ( I think it was actually "absolute good" which was referred to). But what I said is that it is not necessary to agree on the actual conception of this real good, exactly what the real good is, only to agree that there is such a thing.

Right, but that's a daft way to define it, and amounts to the fallacy of equivocation. You then can't have water boiling at 30 degrees Celsuis, even though you actually can. It's as daft as arguing that it's impossible to turn right, by ruling it out by definition. — Sapientia

What's daft is you saying that you actually can have water boiling at 30 degrees, at sea level pressure.

But it can be a different temperature, because it isn't necessarily the case that water will boil at 100 degrees Celsius. All your argument shows is that if water necessarily boils at 100 degrees Celsius, and we boil water, then it will boil at 100 degrees Celsius. But water doesn't necessarily boil at 100 degrees Celsius. — Sapientia

What I've said is that this is what defines "100 degrees Celsius", the boiling point of water at average sea level pressure. If you really believe that there is another definition of 100 degrees Celsius, then why don't you produce it?

For example, one could have heated a volume of water for 3 minutes, until it reached 100 degrees Celsius, at which point it boiled. But the second time around, the same volume of water, heated under the same conditions as before, might take 30 seconds to reach 30 degrees Celsius, and boil at that point instead. — Sapientia

Have you tried that yet, to get that water to boil at 30 degrees? I bet it won't work.

Again, don't be silly. Those are false analogies. I myself gave an example of that kind earlier, and contrasted it with what we are discussing: a right angle triangle is 90 degrees by definition. It can't be 110 degrees. But you are muddling up two fundamentally different things. The results of scientific experiments are not like analytic a priori truths. — Sapientia

The point, which I told you, way back, is that the temperature scale is created around certain things, like the boiling and freezing point of water. such that these temperatures, 100 degrees, and 0 degrees Celsius, are defined by these things. Therefore it is impossible that water could boil at a different number of degrees Celsius, because this would render that temperature scale invalid. It would be contradiction. Why do you find that so hard to believe? Can you suggest something else that the scale is built around?

I've kinda lost sight of how it relates back to the original topic, but what the hey. Maybe if 100 degrees Celsius is defined as the boiling point of water under normal conditions, then God exists, and we can call it a day. — Sapientia

Really, you've seen the light and are ready to believe in God?

How it relates to what we were talking about, is that you said science is more likely to be objective than ethics. I said that ethics might be just as objective as science because murder is defined as being wrong, just like 100 degrees is defined as the boiling point of water. Then you took exception to both of these proposed definitions.

So we haven't really made any progress in determining what constitutes objectivity. Brainglitch seemed to say that some type of agreement constitutes objectivity, which seems reasonable. But you and I, Sapientia, can't seem to agree on anything. So I guess for us there is no such thing as objectivity.

Comparing the ideality of the positive infinite to the relation between my-death and the Ideal (as infinite differance) makes this realtion between my-death and the Ideal finite, an empirical matter. So once infinite differance appears, it is finite, rather than infinite. Differance is the finitude of life as the essential relation to itself as to its death. "The infinite differance is finite" -- a contradiction, of course, but a contradiction meant to elucidate differance as play between oppositional concepts -- finite:infinite, absence:presence, negation:affirmation. — Moliere

Thanks Moliere,
Now here's where I have difficulty. We have first, "the ideality of the positive infinite". Then we have "the Ideal (as infinite differance)". Then "the Ideal finite". How can the Ideal be both infinite differance, and also finite? Don't you think that there is contradiction in referring to the Ideal as both infinite, and finite? What could be the purpose for such a move? We could assume two distinct Ideals, one infinite and the other finite, but then one would be the true Ideal, and the other not.

"So once infinite differance appears, it is finite rather than infinite". This really doesn't make sense either. If the true Ideal is infinite, then how could it ever appear as finite? It is as if Derrida cannot decide whether the true Ideal is infinite or finite, and so wants to say that it is both. Is it the case that the true Ideal is infinite, but it appears as finite? To say of something, like the Ideal, that it is both of two exclusive attributes, does not demonstrate that this thing is the "play between oppositional concepts", it is simply to make contradictory claims.

We can express the relationship between the Ideal and the opposing terms in far simpler ways. For instance, the Ideal is comprised of both opposites, like temperature, an ideal, consists of both hot and cold, and size consists of big and small, etc.. That is how the Ideal allows each of the two opposing terms to partake in itself.

The issue here though, I believe, is that finite and infinite are not properly opposed. Unlike true opposites, each of which always exists within the same category as the other, infinite and finite are categorically different. Those words name distinct categories. So I think that what Derrida is exemplifying here is a crossing from one category to the other. Perhaps what he is saying is that I relate to my death through the Ideal, as infinite differance, but this act itself causes the Ideal to become finite. However, if this is the case, it implies that we have a deep misunderstanding of the nature of the Ideal, as infinite.

If differance appears between, outside, or points to a place that is not dominated by these oppositions, by the metaphysics of presence, then the metaphysics of presence is the end of history. Or, perhaps a better way of saying it, it is a closed history whereupon we master it as we master an object. And, furthermore, even "history" has this quality of mastering, of knowledge as a relation to an object, and is the production of the being in presence. — Moliere

Under the interpretation which I offered above, this "mastering" is really the developing of a deep misunderstanding. It is a deep misunderstanding because the Ideal is understood as being of a particular category. But when the Ideal is mastered, the Ideal is known and knowledge is therefore absolute, according to knowing the Ideal, history is closed, but then the Ideal is suddenly of a different category, and all that existing knowledge is for naught. It is as if knowing the object turns it into a subject, and then it is no longer an object but a subject, so that the entire knowledge of it, as an object is no longer valid knowledge, such that we have to start all over again, to come to know it as a subject.

2nd paragraph, page 88: Seems to me to be speculating on what this outside of a closure would mean, and acknowledges that if we were to encounter such a question it would sound unheard-of, that it would not be either knowledge or not-knowledge, and that it would seem as if we were wanting to say nothing. I believe the reference to "old signs" is the sort of phenomenological etymology that Heidegger practices, but clearly Derrida believes something more must be done in order to escape this closure. It seems to me that this paragraph acknowledges that we must use signs such as "knowledge", "objectivity", "affirmation:negation", "absence:presence", "finite:infinite" because these oppositions structure our very way of thinking. But there is some hope that through differance we can "break free" of these hierarchies. — Moliere

I think, that what might be hidden in these cryptic messages is that this closure is not complete, it is not really absolute. How could it be absolute when the infinite changes to become finite the moment it becomes known? Then the finitude of it cannot be known because it is known as infinite, and this knowledge of it as infinite, reveals that it is finite. So I believe there is some cyclical process being referred to here. That is why we must go back, and refer to "old signs", to pick up the cycle all over again, from the beginning. We have to face the reality, that what we think of as absolute knowledge, must really be a closure of history, a closure not because knowledge is complete, and there is nothing more to know, but because of that deep misunderstanding, we have to go back and start the cycle all over again.

Why do you think that it's impossible? — Sapientia

It's quite obvious, and I'm amazed that you still haven't caught on. One hundred degrees Celsius is, by definition the temperature which water boils at, at seal level pressure. To say that water could boil at another temperature, at sea level pressure, contradicts this. Therefore it's impossible. If what you have, boils at a different temperature, then either it's not water, or you're not assigning the temperature
number right, or it's not the right pressure, or something like that. It is impossible. Try this, blue is the colour of the clear sky, by definition. Therefore it is impossible that the clear sky could be a colour other than blue, that would be contradictory. If it's not blue, then it's not a clear sky, or you are assigning the name "blue" wrong or something like that.

It's possible unless there is a contradiction. — Sapientia

There is contradiction! That's what I've been trying to tell you. What do you believe, words are not defined, so that you can use words however you please without contradicting yourself? Would you say that it's possible that black could be white, or that a circle could be square, because you happen to enjoy using words in a way that's free from the confines of conventions?

And the evidence doesn't show that it is impossible. It shows that it is extremely unlikely. — Sapientia

And I suppose the evidence shows that it's extremely unlikely that a circle might be square?

You haven't shown that my thought experiment has contradictory premises.. — Sapientia

You asked me to consider the word "murder" with the same definition which it currently has, but with a different definition. If that's not contradictory, I don't know what is.



?

Oy vey, hahaha. It's like you're not quite able to understand anything I write. — Terrapin Station

Ever consider the possibility that this says a lot more about you than it says about me?

Sapientia doesn't seem to get the point.

I'm saying that under those same conditions, it is possible for water to boil at a different temperature on the same scale, say, 30°C, for example. So, for example, if the room temperature was 21°C, and heat was applied to the water, then it is possible that it boils when it reaches 30°C, rather than the usual 100°C. — Sapientia

Really? I didn't think it was possible to get water to boil at a temperature other than 100, other than by changing the pressure. Actually I don't really believe you, have you ever tried, and had success at this before?

This would mean that under those same conditions, an extremely unusual result was produced. But your claim entails that that is impossible. I have taken your claim, and shown that this logically follows. You can't reasonably argue against a valid logical argument just by expressing bewilderment, as you have done thus far. Quit stalling and produce a reasonable and substantive response, assuming you are capable of doing so. — Sapientia

Well, good luck then. Until you actually prove to me that you can make water boil at 30 degrees without lowering the pressure, I'll continue to express bewilderment. You can claim whatever you want is possible, that it's possible for you to jump over the moon, or that you're omnipotent, if you like. I'll just express bewilderment, without bothering to make any logical argument against this. Evidence speaks for itself.

And lastly, I think it is telling that you've avoided addressing parts of my posts, and avoided properly engaging with the thought experiment, and avoided asking sensible questions, and avoided explaining yourself, and so on. — Sapientia

Well, it should be obvious that the things you say leave me totally bewildered, including your thought experiment, which has contradictory premises, and that's why I don't bother to reply to much of your posts. The bewilderment leaves me unable to explain myself.

What I'm doing is looking at what actually obtains in relation to how terms/concepts are being used, from more of a "behavioral" perspective. Thus, when people are believing myths, fictions, ambiguities, incoherencies, etc. (as might be the case with various terms/concepts/etc.) we can talk about what's really going on in relation to those terms/concepts/etc. with respect to things that do exist. — Terrapin Station

OK, I think I'm starting to understand what's going on here. You are assuming that "time" does not refer to anything real, you are treating it like a fiction, or something that does not exist. That's what you insinuate with this passage. I thought it was clear from prior discussion in this thread, before you joined, and the op itself, that we are discussing time as a real thing. The op does allude to the possibility that "the moment" itself is not a real thing, but I thought it was clear that we were assuming time to be a real thing in this thread, and this is the thing we are discussing, time. There is no suggestion that time might be a myth or fiction, only that the "moment" might be a fiction.

Of course, if you want to debate whether or not the word "time" refers to something real, that's a slightly different issue. You however, seem to begin from the assumption that "time" does not refer to anything real, and you proceed to give meaning to the word from that perspective. I think that this is way off track of the op, and that's why I'm having difficulty understanding what you're talking about. We have opposing assumptions, I assume that "time" refers to something real, and you assume that it does not. Then we proceed in our separate directions, me talking about a real thing called "time", and you assuming that I am talking about some fictitious thing, without ever establishing any consistency in our assumptions. In other words, we have no agreement on what we are talking about. It's as if I were talking about God to you, not realizing that you are atheist, so that all the time that I refer to God, you are thinking that I am talking about a fictitious thing. But if I'm not atheist, and truly believe in God, then I am not talking about a fictitious thing, I'm talking about a real thing, and you really haven't got a clue what I'm talking about.

All this time, I thought you were talking about the same thing as me, a real thing called "time", when in reality you were talking about a fictitious thing called "time". I now see why we have no degree of understanding on this issue

I have a background in both music and philosophy. I taught music for awhile, including teaching some private students. What this is reminding me of is a student I had who had a serious learning disability. It took me a year to teach him the concept of major scales. He eventually got it, sort of, but it was a challenge to say the least. — Terrapin Station

I think my learning disability is much more serious than this. I really don't think I'll ever "get it".

I agree, I will probably never be capable of understanding how you can determine through a person's behaviour, what they are really referring to with their words, in distinction from what they think they are referring to, and that what they are really referring to is something other than what they think they are referring to.

You'd have to first show me how this is not a case of you prioritizing the wrong evidence. When we want to understand what a person is referring to, we first and foremost consider the person's choice of words, context of words, as evidence. The context of words in relation to other words forms the primary evidence of what the person is referring to. Other behaviour is secondary evidence. In some cases, especially in cases of a mistaken choice of words, the two distinct forms of evidence appear contrary to each other. Then we have a problem of interpretation, and may find secondary evidence to be a key factor. But to choose secondary evidence in priority over primary evidence, on a regular basis for interpretation, is to me, a big mistake.

So in order to make me understand your claim, you'd have to demonstrate why you think that secondary evidence is more reliable as the basis for interpretation of words, than primary evidence is.

What I'm doing is looking at what actually obtains in relation to how terms/concepts are being used, from more or a "behavioral" perspective. Thus, when people are believing myths, fictions, ambiguities, incoherencies, etc. (as might be the case with various terms/concepts/etc.) we can talk about what's really going on in relation to those terms/concepts/etc. with respect to things that do exist. — Terrapin Station

This appears to be irrelevant, if anything more than gibberish. Perhaps you could explain?

That would follow if the aim were to talk about persons' beliefs, how they think about things, etc. But for at least the third time now, that's not what I'm doing. I'm not referring to what people have in mind, what their specific beliefs about time are. It's not a survey of beliefs. — Terrapin Station

If you're not referring to what people believe about time, then what are you referring to, your own personal belief? Clearly your own personal belief, that "time" and "change" refer to the same thing is not consistent with what others believe, or else we could exchange these two words in common phrases. Since your belief is not consistent with others, don't you think that the onus is on you to justify this belief?

It's due to a functional analysis, over many years, countless contexts, etc. of what we're referring to with "time." I'm not referring to what people have in mind, what their specific beliefs about time are in that. It's not a survey of beliefs. It's a functional analysis of what is being actually referred to, extensionally, that is; how the term is being used, etc. — Terrapin Station

OK, so you've managed to distinguish between what people think they are referring to, and what people are actually referring to. Don't you think that this is just a case of you misunderstanding these people? I mean, if you determine that people are actually referring to something which is not what they think they are referring to, haven't you misunderstood them?

You haven't claimed anything about linguistic substitution. But if what you claim is true, that two distinct words refer to the very same thing, linguistic substitution follows logically. We can use either of the two words to refer to that thing

Do you understand that? — Terrapin Station

No, you've insisted that time is change, time is identical to change, so why can't we switch names? That doesn't make sense to me. If we are referring to the same thing with two different words, we should be able to switch words at will.

it's not an name change, It's a statement of an identity relationship. What justifies asserting the identity relationship is the years of functional analysis re how "time" is used--what it actually refers to, functionally.

Do you understand that part so that I don't have to explain it again? I know you don't agree with it, but I shouldn't have to keep explaining it as my view. — Terrapin Station

As I said, I think your functional analysis is faulty. Try, as I suggested, replacing "change" with "time", in any common use of the word "change". You will find that the meaning of the statement is greatly changed. "Change is what objects do" becomes "time is what objects do". Any such exchange which I tried ends in absurdity, so really I don't see any validity to your claim of identity.

Therefore your claim is incomprehensible to me, and I really don't understand it. If you could proceed to explain your functional analysis, and how you came to this conclusion, which appears to be extremely faulty, perhaps you could help me to understand.

But why were you worrying? After all, no one was caning you in the hallway. Caning may have been impending but it wasn't happening then. So why worry about it? (Again, I know these questions seem stupid) — csalisbury

Let's get some clarification on terminology here. Worry implies anxiety. Anxiety implies anticipation. So Wayfarer is very consistent here:

I have no anwer, other than 'anticipation'. — Wayfarer

The difficulty here is that the relationship between anticipation and worry, through the medium of "anxiety", is an irrational relationship. In other words, worry is an irrational response to anticipation. When anxiety takes hold, and we pass from intelligible anticipation, to unintelligible worry, we can no longer make sense of our anticipations.

So, let's focus on anticipation, perhaps we can determine why it leads from intelligibility to unintelligibility through anxiety to worry. What csalisbury appears to point to is an assumed continuity. There is an identity, an assumed continuity between myself right here, now, and myself at a future time. That assumed identity ensures that these are the same person. Further, through empathy or similar means, we can also create an identity between ourselves and others, and this assumed identity, between us and others is produced by our anticipation of what will happen to others, involving a continuity between us and others. Notice that my claim is that anticipation creates this assumption of continuity. We assume a continuity between us and others because it is necessary in order to account for anticipation concerning what will happen to others. This makes that anticipation intelligible, just like the continuity between me now and me later makes that anticipation intelligible. That is what TGW points to:

Rather the notion of there being the same person at another time is derivative of the phenomenology of the future. — The Great Whatever

We feel anticipation, we create, within our minds' a continuity, and this continuity justifies the anticipation, rendering it intelligible. The anticipation becomes intelligible based on the assumed reality of this assumed continuity. But stemming from within, in its raw form, anticipation is unintelligible. In reality then anticipation leads from unintelligible to intelligible.

The problem with anxiety and worry is that it is a failure of our capacity to make anticipation intelligible. When we fail, anticipation remains unintelligible, and proceeds to anxiety and worry. So in response to your question csalisbury, it is the continuity of identity, between myself, here and now, and myself at a future time, which justifies or validates the anticipation. If the continuity is real, the anticipation is valid. The continuity between myself and another does not do so well to justify anticipation as does the continuity between myself now and myself later. If the event is imminent, and in my future, anticipation is highly justified. How I deal with this anticipation, in my mind, determines whether I go into an irrational anxiety and worry or not. If the event is immanent, but in someone else's future, anticipation is may not be so highly justified because the continuity between myself and another, may not be so well justified.

It's not. Seeing is when you are using light as a source of information about the world. Hallucinating or dreaming is when you aren't using light as a source of information about the world. — Harry Hindu

Clearly that's false. Hallucinating still makes use of light, it is a misuse perhaps, but we still see depite the fact that we are hallucinating as well. Classing dreaming and hallucinating together as opposed to seeing, is a dreadful classification, totally unacceptable.

Once two people get into a ding-dong it's hard to butt in! I liked what you said anyway, Cava :) — mcdoodle

I couldn't see the relevance of Cavacava's post.

Of course his argument is about the unreality of time, but I find it helpful in thinking about time. — Cavacava

TS and I were discussing the reality of time. TS thinks that in reality, time is nothing other than change. I've been trying to dispel that illusion, but TS is persistent.