Or the laws of nature could have suddenly changed in which case nothing would be what it had been any more. — John

If this occurs, then the substance is not water anymore, due to the different laws of nature, so it would not be the case that water would be boiling at a different temperature. That's the point in maintaining the principles of identity, and non-contradiction. If the substance does not behave like water, then its not water. If the laws of nature change in such a way as you suggest, then we no longer have water in existence, nature has changed to get rid of water.

But, in any case, it is a trivial point because, although we cannot be certain, we have very good reasons to believe that such a thing is not, in fact actually, as opposed to merely logically, possible. — John

It's not completely trivial, because it's relevant to the question of what is and is not logically possible. To maintain the power of logic, for understanding the world which we live in, it must be held to strict principles. These are the fundamental laws. If we allow that it is logically possible that the subject which is identified as "water", could be other than as it is identified (it boils at 100 and freezes at 0, etc.), we allow the logical possibility of the complete failure of all logic. Logic becomes illogical if it does not abide by its own principles. How is it not contradictory to say that it is logically possible that logic could be illogical?

That is really such a sloppy analysis. Any aspect of experience requires both the subject of experience, the experienced object, and the mental actions by which perceptions and the like are assimilated into the mind, into the stream of conscious experiences, recognised, judged, and the like. There is no hard and fast barrier or division between the subjective and objective, nor are 'mental phenomena brains functioning in mental ways', which is egregious and completely discounted physicalist reductionism.

In any case, there's another thread about subjective and objective.

Our current understanding (taken as a whole and not in regard to details) may or may not be fallible. — John

Whose understanding? If it isn't fallible, then it can't possibly be mistaken. But we are human, and thus not just capable of error, but prone to error.

You think it's possible that someone somewhere has a current understanding of the world that cannot possibly be mistaken? I think that I would have to accept that that is possible, but extremely unlikely, much like water boiling at 30 degrees Celsius under normal conditions. Both propositions go against our current understanding of nature, and are, to my knowledge, without precedent.

You need to make a distinction between knowing and knowing that you know. What we think of as our knowledge may indeed really be knowledge, because it may indeed reflect absolute reality, or it may not. So our knowing about our knowing is indeed uncertain, but our knowing itself may or may not be fallible. — John

I acknowledge that distinction. I also note that you're making a distinction between what we think of as our knowledge, and our knowledge. That makes sense.

I agree with all of that, although I'm contemplating that last part: that our knowing itself may or may not be fallible. There are different conceptions of knowledge. So I think the meaning of "knowledge" is important here.

Consider human activities then, human beings moving around in the world, doing things. These are not mental activities, are these objective matters?

Or the laws of nature could have suddenly changed in which case nothing would be what it had been any more. — John

Exactly.

That this might happen is not from a purely logical point of view, impossible, because it involves no purely logical contradiction. But, in any case, it is a trivial point because, although we cannot be certain, we have very good reasons to believe that such a thing is not, in fact possible. — John

We have very good reasons to believe that such a thing is in fact extremely unlikely. What are these very good reasons to believe that such a thing is in fact impossible, rather than just extremely unlikely?

That is really such a sloppy analysis. — Wayfarer

I thought you weren't replying to me any longer?

Any aspect of experience requires

Do you believe that for some reason I'm defining things in terms of experience per se? Why?

Yes, insofar as we're talking about anything other than a brain functioning in a mental way, we're talking about something objective.

So, for example, when we talk about brains functioning in non-mental ways, we're talking about objective things.

So you'd have no quarrel with the idea that matters of ethics are just as objective as matters of science?

I'd certainly not agree with that. Ethical judgments are necessarily mental. How would we make sense out of saying that there are nonmental judgments?

On my kindle, that aligns as if you're linking to Harry Hindu's post, but I'm guessing you're instead linking to my post above it. I just don't know why you're linking to that post. (Or why you'd alternately be linking to Harry Hindu's post for that matter, if that isn't just a quirk of the kindle.) . . . Okay, I guess it doesn't matter since you deleted that comment.

I was going to respond, but it will end badly. Let's leave it.

Haha, okay

So what do you think could cause this to change, i.e. that water could suddenly start boiling at a different temperature? — Metaphysician Undercover

That could be any unknown or mistakenly ruled out factor. So, virtually anything. And it doesn't have to be plausible or fit in with our current understanding; it only has to be possible.

And, if you think that it could suddenly change, how is our knowledge that water boils at 100, objective knowledge? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't get the connection you're attempting to make. There is a difference between objective, as I have defined it, and absolute. If it couldn't change, then it would be absolute. If it doesn't depend on what you feel or think etc., then it is objective.

And careful not to confuse metaphysics and epistemology. My point in relation to objectivity is metaphysical, rather than epistemological. Whether or not water boils at 100 degrees Celsius is both metaphysical and (arguably) objective. I have said that there is a stronger case that this sort of thing is objective than that morality is objective. I have not said that our knowledge of anything is objective, let alone our knowledge of water boiling at 100 degrees.

Or do you think that all knowledge is subjective? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I'm not sure what that means. In one sense it is, since it comes from a subject after all. And it does also seem to depend on what one believes.

I think it is logically impossible, because if the substance started boiling at a temperature other than 100, it would either not be water, or not be degrees celsius. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not a valid counterargument, because, as I explained, we aren't just talking about a substance; we are talking about water in particular. So it cannot not be water. So, that only leaves you with one possibility.

But I think that that's wrong, because it could be something other than 100 degrees Celsius on the Celsius scale, since 100 degrees Celsius is just what the boiling point of water was originally designated as, and what it has consistently been demonstrated to accord with, and what it currently is, and most likely will be, but, importantly, not what it necessarily will be. Of course, it necessarily will be for you, because you have defined it that way, against my advice.

Do you think that it's possible that the thing which we know as "water" is not really water as we know it? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. Why not? But possibilities can be trivial in comparison to what the evidence suggests.

If we allow that it is logically possible that the subject which is identified as "water", could be other than as it is identified (it boils at 100 and freezes at 0, etc.), we allow the logical possibility of the complete failure of all logic. Logic becomes illogical if it does not abide by its own principles. How is it not contradictory to say that it is logically possible that logic could be illogical? — Metaphysician Undercover

That last part is funny. This is a good example of how a muddled premise can lead you down the wrong path. You go wrong from the start when you set in stone what can vary.

Of course, if you restrict yourself in that way and then try to break those restrictions, then you'll have a problem. The solution is simple: don't restrict yourself in that way.

"Which is why it is only probable, as opposed to certain, that the boiling point of water will be 100 degrees Celsius, the same as it has been innumerable times in the past."
In fact we can not even say it is probable. To do that we would need to make some assumptions about regularity, which we have no ground for making.

"under conditions as close as possible to any previous experiment"
There's no such thing as 'conditions as close as possible'. This is fundamental and crucial. It cannot be dismissed by claims of pedantry.

Also, I suspect that I may (perhaps for the first time?!?) agree with MU. If, as it seems to be, the Celsius scale is defined by a temperature of 100 being the temperature at which pure water boils at 1060 kPa then by definition, whenever pure water boils at 1060 kPa, the temperature is 100C, regardless of what a thermometer says, and regardless of what the value of 1/(dS/dE) may be. What we would learn from such an interesting development is that the Celsius scale is context-dependent, contrary to what had been previously supposed.

[For some reason the quote facility does not work on this computer]

I'd certainly not agree with that. Ethical judgments are necessarily mental. How would we make sense out of saying that there are nonmental judgments? — Terrapin Station

No, I wasn't talking about ethical judgements, I was talking about ethical matters. Ethical matters are matters of human behaviours, human beings acting amongst others. These would be the matters which are judged in ethical judgements, and are not themselves matters of mental activity. Therefore according to your distinction ethical matters are objective matters.

No, I wasn't talking about ethical judgements, I was talking about ethical matters. Ethical matters are matters of human behaviours, human beings acting amongst others — Metaphysician Undercover

Then you're not talking about ethics. You don't have ethics if you don't have judgments about behavior.

If you're just saying that, say, someone stabbing someone else is a behavior that doesn't require mentality (which is actually only true if we're either talking about it being purely accidental or we're talking about robots; it's not true if we're talking about someone intentionally stabbing someone else*) then sure, I'd agree with that.

*I'd agree, though, that even then we could talk about it simply in terms of (observable) behavior, which would be objective, but again that would have nothing to do with ethics. You only get ethics with judgments about behavior.

There is a difference between objective, as I have defined it, and absolute. — Sapientia

I don't recall that you defined "objective", care to restate your definition?

Of course, it necessarily will be for you, because you have defined it that way, against my advice. — Sapientia

It's not I who established the Celsius scale, and the convention which holds that necessity, so it's not I who "defined it that way". You advise me to reject that convention, but you haven't justified your advice. So I take it as bad advice. If your desire is to counter that convention, with a new proposal, that it's possible for the temperature of boiling water to be other than those covered by the Celsius convention, then go ahead put forth your proposal.

The solution is simple: don't restrict yourself in that way. — Sapientia

That's the way logic works though, through restrictions. You throw away all restrictions, leaving yourself with no logic. This leaves your claims completely illogical. Then you offer me advice?

Then you're not talking about ethics. You don't have ethics if you don't have judgments about behavior. — Terrapin Station

Ethics is rules, a code for human behaviour. We have two things here, human behaviour, and a code of rules. Judgements about behaviour is something completely different. Judgements come when someone looks at the behaviour, and looks at the rules, making a comparison. From your perspective, that judgements are the subjective aspect, do you agree that both the behavior, and the rules (ethics) are objective?

In fact we can not even say it is probable. To do that we would need to make some assumptions about regularity, which we have no ground for making. — andrewk

Good point. That is even more sceptical than my initial position. I will give it some thought.

There's no such thing as 'conditions as close as possible'. This is fundamental and crucial. It cannot be dismissed by claims of pedantry. — andrewk

Why not? But if that's going to be a problem for you, I guess I could just copy and paste your own way of putting it: to conduct a similar experiment in which certain specified conditions are managed to be as close as possible to those of the earlier experiment. Although that is a bit of a mouthful.

Surely we can just assume for the sake of argument what these conditions are, rather than specifying them? I do think that that would be pedantic. If it matters that much to you, go ahead and specify any conditions you think need to be specified. I think the rest of us can continue the discussion using the shorthand "under normal conditions" with the assumption that, in the example being discussed, this includes things like "at sea level" and "at normal atmospheric pressure" and "without adding salt to the solution" and so on, without listing every single one.

Also, I suspect that I may (perhaps for the first time?!?) agree with MU. — andrewk

That is a surprise for a couple of reasons. Firstly, because it is MU ( :D ). And secondly, because, based on the above, it seemed as though your position was going to be even further from his position than mine was.

If, as it seems to be, the Celsius scale is defined by a temperature of 100 being the temperature at which pure water boils at 1060 kPa then by definition, whenever pure water boils at 1060 kPa, the temperature is 100C, regardless of what a thermometer says, and regardless of what the value of 1/(dS/dE) may be. What we would learn from such an interesting development is that the Celsius scale is context-dependent, contrary to what had been previously supposed. — andrewk

Well, it was only ever meant as an example of a more general point which I have explained separately. If what you say is correct, then I would just have to use something else as an example or express the current example differently. There are plenty of examples to choose from. I think that getting bogged down in semantics has just been one big diversion.

My original point was something along the lines that the scientific method has been put to the test, and has proven to be a superior means of identifying and ruling out subjective factors as inconsequential, in contrast to certain alternatives, and, specifically, in this case, moral judgement, which is itself subjective, and often seems to be influenced by emotion, and plays a big role in ethics. And that there is therefore a stronger case for objectivity with regards to the former than with regards to the later.

Ethics is rules, a code for human behaviour. We have two things here, human behaviour, and a code of rules. Judgements about behaviour is something completely different. Judgements come when someone looks at the behaviour, and looks at the rules, making a comparison. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. What I'm referring to is such as "One shouldn't murder," or "It is wrong to murder." That is a judgment about behavior.

At any rate, whether you call that a judgment or simply a rule, there's nothing objective about it. There's no such thing as objective rules in general.

And I explained in the post you're responding to that we can talk about behavior "from an objective perspective," but from that perspective, it has nothing at all to do with ethics.

No. What I'm referring to is such as "One shouldn't murder," or "It is wrong to murder." That is a judgment about behavior. — Terrapin Station

That's not a judgement about behaviour, it's a simple statement. "A judgement about behaviour" implies that there is a particular instance of behaviour which is being judged. So until "murder" is defined as a particular behaviour, or a particular type of behaviour, there is no judgement about behaviour here. "It is wrong to murder" is meaningless, unless "murder" is described.

At any rate, whether you call that a judgment or simply a rule, there's nothing objective about it. There's no such thing as objective rules in general. — Terrapin Station

Here is the question I posed earlier. Let's say someone suggested that 100 would be the temperature assigned to the boiling point of water, and all the people agreed to that convention, and started using this scale, so that it"s considered a fact that water boils at 100. In comparison, let's say that someone suggested that it is wrong to murder, describing a particular act, saying that this described act is wrong, and assigning "murder" to it. So all the people agreed to this convention, the described act is wrong, and it's called "murder". Under these conditions, would you say "water boils at 100" is more objective than "it is wrong to murder"?

A judgement about behaviour" implies that there is a particular instance of behaviour which is being judged. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why?

How could one judge behaviour if there is no behaviour being judged?

If we believe that nature is governed by laws then I would say we have very good reason to think it is actually impossible for those laws to suddenly change.

If we think that nature is not governed by laws but merely gratuitously happens to currently appear as though it is due to pure chance then I would say that we have no good reason to think that anything is either likely or unlikely.

Committing murder is behavior, for example. It's not like it's not behavior just because we're talking about it in general rather than a particular instance of it.

Well, it was only ever meant as an example of a more general point which I have explained separately — Sapientia

Yes, the problem with long debates in very long threads like this is that it's very hard to get, and keep, a fix on what exactly the claim and counter-claim are. I thought 'this looks interesting' and traced it back for at least three pages and could not find a definitive statement of the respective positions, but only skirmishing on what may well have been tangential issues.

Perhaps it would be good to have a recap of exactly what the dispute is. Or maybe even a formal debate, if that's the sort of thing this platform can support.

OK, you've made an assertion, murder is behaviour. Now where does the ethical judgement come in to play?

I explained this already. By judging that murder, in general, is wrong, or that one shouldn't murder.

But you have no description of what type of act murder is. You only have murder as an example of a behaviour. Before you can judge it, don't you think that you need a description, to designate the particular type of behaviour which is called "murder"?