Your brain doesn't actually know how far the light travelled from an object to the retina. The retina is just presented with a 2D image on its surface. For a rod or cone one light wave is much the same as the other i.e. it does the same thing whether the light wave travelled 10 centimetres or 10km. The depth information, the distance the light wave travelled, is not included in the light wave. It doesn't carry that information with it and pass it on to the retina. Retinal cells just fire off in the same way regardless of how far the light travelled. It is the brain which interprets all the different neuronal impulses and builds this experience of depth. — dukkha

Instead of saying things like the "brain doesn't actually know", let's refer to what the brain does in relation to sensing, as interpretation. Let's say that the brain interprets the data. I really don't know the mechanisms which are in place by which we judge depth, or distance, but we do have a number of senses, and they all work together. I think that in judging distance, hearing gives us much information.

Here's something you should consider. The ears operate by detecting waves, just like the eyes operate by detecting waves. The ears, especially in some animals like birds, are very good at determining the position of the source of those waves. Do you not think that the eyes as well might have some mechanisms which work toward determining the location of the source of the waves?

With respect to depth perception though, distance, do you agree that there is often mistake in our interpretations? Something on the horizon might appear to be small and close, when really it is big and far. There are many different factors which influence one's judgement of distance. Principally, I think we position "objects" relative to each other. A stand alone object on the horizon would be difficult to judge, but if there are other objects, and we recognize the type of object, such as trees, cars, buildings, that recognition gives us knowledge of the size, and we can compare the object at question's relative position. Also, if one moves around a bit, parallax is used in the judgement.

Things look red blue yellow etc. This is not because things in the external world actually look red blue etc, it's because internally representing the radiation the retinas fire off in response to *as a colour experience* is evolutionarily successful. — dukkha

There is a real difficulty in your phasing here. When you say "things look red..", the "look" here refers to the sense perception of seeing. Then you say "this is not because things in the external world actually look red...". But again, you use the word "look", so you are still referring to the perception of seeing. To maintain consistency, we should say that things actually do look red, because this is how we perceive them, and what they look like is a reference to how we perceive them.

So what you might like to say, is "this does not mean that they actually are red". In this way you can properly express your belief that there is a difference between the way things look, and the way things actually are. However, you may be faced with the question of is there such a thing as the way things actually are. This is a very valid question, because if things look different from various different perspectives, and various different sensing systems, what justifies the assumption that there is one particular way that things actually are?

Yes, in terms of the physical description/explanation of sensory perception, all visual experiences have the same *ontology* - all are generated/created by a physical brain. But we're not talking about the ontology of visual perception itself - we're talking about phenomenology, how things are presented to us. So to couch it in physicalist terms, when we have a visual experience of glass, has the physical brain created a depth experience similar to the way it creates depth in a television screen experience (but better, so much better that most of us are fooled by it), or has the physical brain created a depth experience which is phenomenologically similar to the depth experience it creates with the objects around our bodies, i.e. the depth experience is NOT illusory - when we see glass the brain has presented to us a visual perception as if the glass is not there/invisible (like air) and we are seeing the various objects beyond the glass at differing depths. — dukkha

I really think you have created a false dilemma here dukkha. We see the TV as an object, and we judge that we are watching the screen of that object. We see the glass as an object, and we judge that we are looking through that object. We see the body of water as an object, and we judge that we are looking at the stick through that object. What is "actually the case" is not an issue, because we are discussing the way we perceive things, interpret things, and this is how we interpret them. If one did not see the TV as an object, or did not see the glass as an object, or did not see the water as an object, then there would be a problem of illusion.

So when you say "when we see glass the brain has presented to us a visual perception as if the glass is not there/invisible...", you are stating a falsity, which is really contradictory. If we do see the glass, then the brain recognizes that the glass is there, and it is false to say that the brain has presented us with a representation as if the glass were not there. Only if one was looking through glass, and did not see the glass, could you claim that the representation was as if the glass were not there. But then it would be false to say that the person "sees the glass". That person does not see the glass. And that is why it is possible that someone can walk right into a glass door, because they do not see the glass.

Or put it like this, does it make a difference in terms of the visual phenomenology, when someone is driving a car with a windscreen or without one? Is the experience the same in both cases, as in the depth of our visual field does not terminate at the inner surface of the windscreen when the car has one, and the depth of your visual field - how far you can see ahead is not changed at all from having a windscreen and not having one. So when there's no windscreen we experience the depth of our visual field as extending all the way to the road beyond the car, and further onward. Is the extent of your visual field unaltered by a windscreen being fitted, so that you are still seeing the road and world ahead of the car, much like you were when there was no windscreen? — dukkha

So again this is a false problem. When driving in a car, we see the windshield, and judge that we are seeing through it. Certain things on the windshield, moisture, dirt, chips, blemishes, and cracks, may affect our vision beyond the windshield, and so we naturally try to account for these problems. If the vision through the windshield is too bad, one will choose not to drive. Contrary to your claim, that it is not, how well you see ahead really is affected by the windshield. It's just that the affect is minimal, so that we can cope with it. No one gets into the car thinking that the windshield is not there, because they see it. If it were super clear, and someone didn't see it, that person might touch it to confirm that it is there, in order to rest assured that bugs and things like that would not get into the eyes.

We don't see water, nor sticks. We see light and our brains create a model of the world using this information in light and how it is either being absorbed, reflected or passing through transparent objects. — Harry Hindu

I think you misuse the word "see". According to common usage, we see objects. We do not see the light which reaches our eyes, that's not a conventional use of the word "see".

So to spell it out, if this is the same as how we see glass, when we look at glass we are looking at a flat surface but are experiencing an illusion of depth beyond the glass. Or when we look at glass are the things we see not an illusion od depth, but actual depth as in it is the objects beyond the pane of glass which are being internally represented by the brain. — dukkha

I think that in a TV screen there is a source of light radiation, right there in the screen, but in the case of glass, the source of light is further beyond the glass itself. So these two are quite different with respect to the "illusion of depth".

Because it's not the actual physical object beyond the brain which we are directly looking at (as if our eyes are windows upon the world which we look 'through', but rather an internal visual perception - a representation of those (hypothesised) physical objects, then within the context of this thread we OUGHT have no problems with discussing the phenomenology of the physical brains internally generated visual perception. — dukkha

If your claim is that the entire visual perception is created by the brain, without any influence from things external to the brain, then what's the point in discussing how the brain differentiates between one object and another, in any sense whatsoever? If all the objects are simply created by the brain, then there is no difference between the TV screen and the glass, because they are both simply creations of the brain. Nor is there any real difference between any object created by the brain, in the sense that these are all fictions. However, the brain might create such a difference, dictate that X is different than Y. But then any difference is just a difference because the brain determines it as a difference.

You said that it is true by definition that water boils at 100°C. If so, then it logically follows that water cannot boil at any other temperature. — Sapientia

I think it has been demonstrated and learnt, that water boils under similar conditions. These conditions are described as the same temperature at the same pressure. That temperature is designated as 100 degrees Celsius at average sea level pressure. — Metaphysician Undercover

We obviously learn, especially in relation to ethics, through empathy and experience. That's what I said, isn't it? Do you have a sensible question? — Sapientia

Do you really believe that we learn ethics through empathy?

You're just wasting time, which could be better spent on learning ways to improve your debate skills. — Sapientia

I'm not interested in debating, it's not something I would enjoy, so I think that learning debating skills would be a waste of my time.

Aaaaaaand you're back to missing the point. No, in this thought experiment, the meaning of "murder" can't be anything you want it to be. It means, as it means today, in our world, something along the lines of one person killing another person in an attempt to kill or cause harm. And without the assumption that this act is necessarily immoral! Which would obviously defeat the purpose of the thought experiment. — Sapientia

As I said, this proposition is contradictory. You propose that the meaning of "murder" is the same, but different. That renders your thought experiment nonsensical.

I'm not sure I understand all of your comments there, but it is "a set of things to be referred to" if you like, namely all changes. I'm not saying it's an abstraction. Changes aren't abstraction, they're real, particular occurrences. Time is those occurrences, it's all changes/motion. (And at this point I'm just saying the same thing again, really.) — Terrapin Station

OK, there is a set of things named "changes". You want to refer to those things under a different name, "time". What justifies this change of name? You already suggested a "functional analysis", from which you claimed that people use these two words, "time" and "change" to refer to the same thing. But as I demonstrated by referring to your example of x to x' indicating change, and T1 toT2 indicating time, you yourself do not use these two words to refer to the same thing. So this so-called functional analysis has been proven faulty, and does not suffice to support your claim.

You might be mistaking my definitional statements for an argument. "Time is identical to change" isnt' an argument, it's a statement or definition of what time is. Definitions will ultimately be "circular" if you go enough steps, otherwise they're not doing the job they're supposed to do. — Terrapin Station

Definitions are not circular, they are grounded in how a word is used. The dictionary provides a description of how each word is commonly used. Your definition of "time" clearly does not represent the way that "time" is commonly used, and is therefore unacceptable as a proposition.

I believe this--and this is the case for many things I believe--due to years of functional analysis in many different contexts. It's more of an empirical observation than anything like an argument. — Terrapin Station

This functional analysis is clearly faulty, as your example demonstrates, you yourself do not use "time" and "change" in the same way. I really don't believe you ever carried out any such functional analysis of many different contexts over years of time. Just try replacing the word "change" for the word "time" in any common statement to demonstrate how absurd your claim is. "It's time to change my clothes" becomes "it's time to time my clothes". "Something has changed here" becomes "something has timed here". "Change is what an object does" becomes "time is what an object does". Your so-called functional analysis appears to be a real farce.

It's pretty simple though: if one takes time to be identical to change (and that's a definition, not an argument), then that there's a change tells us that there is time. — Terrapin Station

I agree with "that there's a change tells us that there is time". But this does not entail that time and change are identical, because it does not exclude the possibility of time without change. "If X then Y", does not necessitate "if Y then X". That would be affirming the consequent which is a known logical fallacy. Furthermore, we cannot start with the assumption that time and change are identical, due to the arguments presented above. Therefore you still have not presented me with a premise, or principle whereby we can say that if there is time, then there is change.

The difference is that time is any change/motion, of anything. Or in other words, it ranges over, in the sense of being identical to, ALL changes/all motion. The T variable represents this. — Terrapin Station

Now you have taken a generalization, an abstraction, change, which is what we say about any change, that it is a change, and assigned the name of a particular thing "time" to that abstract thing. So either that particular thing which you refer to as the "T variable" has no meaning other than as the abstract generalization, "change", in which case the T variable is redundant, or else it refers to a real particular thing, time, and therefore it could not be the same as the generalized "change". Which is it, is time a thing to be referred to, or is it just a generalized "change"?.

But time isn't something other than those changes/motions. — Terrapin Station

OK, so what we have is "the clock reads 10:42", and "the clock reads 10:43". This is change, in one instance 10:42, and the other, 10:43. The difference between these is the difference between a 2 and a 3. That is the change which has occurred, a 2 has been changed to a 3. How do you infer that there is something other than this, which is called time? If there is nothing other than the change from a 2 to a 3, what is this "T variable"? How is the change from a 2 to a 3 construed as a T variable?

It's not an equivalence. It's that x (the clock) is in one state, which is T1, and then it's in another state--it has changed. So that's T2. Change is what we're naming with T1 and T2. "X" on the other hand, is a variable for the clock. — Terrapin Station

That's not what you said though. You said that there is one state x, and another state x'. Your claim was that you know that x' is different from x, because x was at T1, and x' was at T2. You also claim to know that T1 is different from T2, because of a different reading on the clock. If x now becomes the clock, we have circular reasoning. You now know that x is different from x' because they represent different numbers on the clock, not because one is at T1 and the other at T2, only because 2 is different than 3. So how do you know that any time has past, just because there is a different number on the clock?

Right, so you're instead asking why I believe that time is identical to change/motion. — Terrapin Station

That's what I've always been asking you, because it's what you assume to be justification for your claim that there cannot be time passing without change. The point is that this supposed identity is false, and therefore does not justify your claim at all.

It's due to a functional analysis, over many years, countless contexts, etc. of what we're referring to with "time." I'm not referring to what people have in mind, what their specific beliefs about time are in that. It's not a survey of beliefs. It's a functional analysis of what is being actually referred to, extensionally, that is; how the term is being used, etc. — Terrapin Station

Clearly that's a faulty functional analysis, as is indicated by your example, x is different from x' because x is at T1, and x' is at T2. The difference between x and x' is based in the assumed difference between T1 and T2.

The difference between x and x' is assumed to be something different then the difference between T1 and T2. This is expressed by the two distinct sets of symbols {x, x'} and {T1,T2}. To support your claim, requires that you demonstrate how there is a relationship of equivalence between x and T1, and between x' and T2. You need to demonstrate that x is equivalent to T1, not just related to T1. Then the difference between x and x' (which is called change), is equivalent to the difference between T1 and T2 (which is called time). Inability to demonstrate such an equivalence indicates a failure of your functional analysis. In other words, it is very clear that what we refer to with "time" is something different from what we refer to with "change", despite the fact that these two are commonly related. Therefore you have produced a faulty functional analysis.

No one is arguing that the stick literally touches your eye or that the same lightwaves/photons that touched the stick also touch your eyes. (Even though the latter isn't precluded.) That's not what anyone is saying by "seeing the stick in the water." — Terrapin Station

According to what Bittercrank wrote though, it is not the same "lightwaves/photons" that touch the stick as which touch your eyes. The ones that leave the stick get absorbed into the water. Then the water releases new ones. If this is true, then this supports dukka's claim that what we are seeing is the water, not the stick. But the photons must also get absorbed into the air, and new ones released into your eyes, so really, you don't even see the water, you see the air.

Sure, "time is passing" = "change/motion is occurring." — Terrapin Station

OK, you have two distinct phrases, "time is passing", "change/motion is occurring". My question is, on what premise do you equate these?

You have justified "time is passing" by referring to change, the clock changes from 10:42 to 10:43. How do you know if time hasn't passed with no change occurring? Perhaps the clock still says 10:42, time has still passed without change, seconds went by without a change in the clock's registry of minutes. And if your clock registers seconds, there would still be a shorter period of time. And so we go on to the shortest period of time which can be measured by change, and we can still assume the possibility of a shorter period of time, in which no change occurred.

How does "time is passing" necessitate "change/motion is occurring"?

I'm talking about dukka's claim, that what we see is the water, not the stick inside the water. If the light after it leaves the stick within the water, is absorbed by the water, and re-emitted by the water, to be absorbed into the eye, then we see the water, not the stick. The problem then is that the same thing must happen with the air as well, the light is absorbed into the air, and re-emitted into the eye, so we really see the air, not the water. And the air literally is in contact with one's eyes.

T1 is the first time variable. T2 is the second time variable. — Terrapin Station

Yes, now do you agree that "T1" and "T2" implies a difference in time? And, that the difference described by T1 and T2 can only be supported by an assumption such as "time is passing"?

We can't call them both T1, as the values are different. And we want a way to distinguish the values. Is that clear to you? — Terrapin Station

It's very clear to me, but is it clear to you that the difference in the values of T1 and T2, is due to the fact that time is passing? If not, then can you propose some other reason why T1 is different from T2? Please, don't say that it is a change in the clock, from 10:42 to 10:43, which supports this assumption, because then we have that circular reasoning.

What the science blogger says is this: A light wave passing through glass is absorbed and re-emitted as it passes through the substance. — Bitter Crank

This seems to support dukka's position. In the stick in water example, what we are seeing is the light being emitted from the water, not from the stick itself. We see the water, not the stick, and the water is not properly "see-through".

Sure, but how is "No" coming into this. Why isn't that T1 and T2? Why do you "need another premise"? — Terrapin Station

I don't know how to make it any clearer, except to explain to you that 1 is not the same as 2. 10:42 is what the clock reads. Then 10:43 is what the clock reads. We could assume that the clock indicates "the time". Then we have, "the time is 10:42", and then "the time is 10:43". Now you propose that we replace "the time" with T1 and T2. On what principle do you replace, something identical, "the time", with something different, 1 and 2?

You could say that you never assumed the identity of "the time" in the first place, but what does "T" stand for then? And if we remove time, then all we have is the shear difference of 1 and 2. And we are not discussing time at all.

So to support your assumption of a T1 and a T2, we need some difference between these. That difference is the assumption that T is not the same at T1 as it is at T2. What, other than the assumption that time is passing, supports the claim that T1 is different from T2? It is necessary that T1 is different from T2, otherwise we would just refer to them both as T. The proposition of T1 and T2 is a proposition of difference.

What?? It's no assumption. You, for example, look at a clock. The clock reads "10:42" and then it reads "10:43". That's all the justification you need. "10:42" is T1. "10:43" is T2. The clock with "10:42" displayed is x, the clock with "10:43" displayed is x'. "10:42" is different than "10:43" — Terrapin Station

No, the clock indicates "10:42" is, the clock indicates 10:42, just like the clock indicates "10:43" is the clock indicate 10:43. You need another premise, to allow you to say that one is T1 and the other is T2. I suggest we premise that time is passing. You do not like this premise, care to suggest another?

This is conceptualism, right? I wouldn't argue against this. Poor word choice on my part, I should have said our understanding of straight lines is ''ideal'' rather than perceptual. — dukkha

You seemed to be arguing against the possibility of a priori knowledge. You argued that we can only produce conceptions through the means of sense experience, like we sense something and produce a concept in representation of the sense image. So are you now ready to acknowledge that this isn't actually the case? Do you acknowledge that the concept is something other than a representation of what is sensed, that sensing aids us in producing concepts within our minds (education for example), but the concept is actually something other than a representation, it comes from somewhere else.

Are you prepared to go where this leads in the Platonic dialogues? Do you apprehend that external objects, things which are sensed by you, are merely representations of concepts, or ideas? This is very evident in artificial things, the sensible things exist as representations of the ideas in the minds which created them, just like the words, numbers, and sensible demonstrations of our teachers exist in the sensible world as representations of the concepts which we are supposed to learn. What about natural things though? How do they achieve their existence?

"Continuation of existence through time" is a matter of genidentity--it has to do with (a) how contiguous, causally-connected development occurs, and (b) conceptual abstraction with respect to what an individual's criteria are for calling x T1 and x' @ T2 "the same x." — Terrapin Station

This is the point of the op though. What allows you to assume a T1 and a T2? Unless you can justify your premise that T1 is separate, or different from T2, then you have no basis for the claim that x is different from x'. So it is only by taking the position described in the op, that there is a real separation between T1 and T2, that they are actually individual objects, with separation between them, that you can support such a claim, as a difference between x and x'. So it is only by means of the unstated premise, that there is a real difference between T1 and T2, that you can support your claim of a real difference between x and x'.

Now that earlier statement of yours, is supported only by circular logic:

Time doesn't pass insofar as something doesn't change. Insofar as it does, time passes. — Terrapin Station

According to this earlier statement, time can only pass if something changes. But according to this latest statement, that x @ T1 is different from x' @ T2 unless proven otherwise, it is the assumed difference between T1 and T2 which allows you to premise that x is actually different from x'. This is a clear cut case of circular logic. Your notion of change is support by the assumption that there is a difference between T1 and T2 (i.e. time passes), yet you insist that time can only pass if something changes.

So, I'll reiterate. This assumption, that time can only pass if something changes, is unsound. Your conclusion, that x is different from x' ,i.e. that change has occurred, is based in the assumption that there is a difference between T1 and T2, time has passed. Where is the premise which allows you to say that time only passes if change occurs?

I'll suggest that this unsound premise is based in empirical evidence, and inductive reasoning. In all your instances of experience, if time is passing, change is occurring, so you conclude inductively that if time is passing, then change is occurring. But inductive reasoning cannot rule out the possibility that things could be otherwise. Therefore, if this proposition is supported only by inductive reasoning, then to properly proceed in analyzing this subject, time, you must allow the possibility that time could pass without change occurring.

So on my view it's no conflation, of course, it's rather a matter of ontological verisimilitude rather than myth-building based on mistaken or misconceived views such as buying logical identity through time. — Terrapin Station

What is "buying logical identity through time" supposed to mean?

There's also a conceptual issue with the notion our everyday perceptions being veridical to an external world, and that's that how can conscious experience somehow accurately match what is not conscious experience? So lets take that arrow illusion, where one arrow appears shorter than the other when both lines are the same size. So what we'd be holding here is that there are two lines in an external world which exists separate to our conscious experience of two lines (and the two lines are the same size). But our understanding of lines is perceptual, is it not? A line is something which *looks* straight. I believe what's happening when we think of lines in an external world, is we're imagining how straight things appear to us (horizontal lines) as existing in the absence of a perceiver. What's our justification in thinking that lines in an external world are basically like visual perceptions of lines but existing without someone perceiving it? I mean when I think about external world lines I am imagining a straight thing existing beyond my visual perception (I might imagine it as say lacking colour, or 'being made of atoms', etc, but the point is these are all still my imaginings). But, my understanding of what a 'straight thing' is, comes about through conscious experience (I see straight lines, I feel straight edges, I do maths with its notion of parallel, non curved, etc). It doesn't even really make sense to imagine what the external world is like, because the external world is devoid of imagination. — dukkha

Seeing straight lines, such as ones draw on paper, or occurring on manufactured things, gives you a representation of a straight line. From this representation you can imagine a straight line. But these representations are only tools which guide you in learning what a line really is. The true line is ideal, existing in conception only, as a defined thing, like the true circle is ideal, existing only through definition.

So our understanding of lines is not perceptual. It is aided by perception. This is important to understand, because then you can start to see that the straight lines in the world were put there through construction and manufacturing, and these are processes of producing within the world, a representation of what's in the mind. It is common for people to believe that concepts are produced as representations of what exists in the world, and this is what you imply in that passage. In reality though, concepts are produced as tools which help us to understand, and use the world, while the artefacts, the artificial parts of the world, are reflections of these concepts. That's from Plato's cave allegory. So we understand the line, which is a concept, by means of perceiving representations of it, in the world.

OK keep cool

That's not possible on my view, since time is identical to change. — Terrapin Station

Well, time and change are quite clearly two distinct things. Change refers to difference, and time refers to a continuance of existence. So they are closer to being opposed to one another than to being the same. And this conflation of yours is totally unwarranted and unjustified.

. Time doesn't pass insofar as something doesn't change. Insofar as it does, time passes. — Terrapin Station

I'm saying that this statement is not sound. One is the means by which we measure the other. But a thing does not have to be measured, or even measurable, to be real.

When you measure something (temporally, I'm assuming we're saying), you're quantifying changes. We can imagine that we're temporally measuring something not changing for some period, but the only way that makes sense is if something (else) IS changing--say that a clock is ticking or whatever we might be looking at for our change quantification base. — Terrapin Station

What you describe here is using time to measure something, this is definition 1). The second definition is that time is something which is measured. We measure time passing by referring to change. But it is possible that time could pass so fast, an extremely short period of time for example, that no change could possibly occur in this short period of time, so we'd have time passing with no change occurring.

I don't agree with "change is the means by which we measure time passing" because I'd say that "time passing IS change" (and then we simply quantify those changes--that's the measurement). — Terrapin Station

That's why you disagree with what Aristotle said. I do not disagree with that. It assumes that time is a real, objective thing, which is everywhere, and which can be measured.

Re the last sentence, sure, changes can occur without us being capable of quantifying those changes. — Terrapin Station

That's not what I'm talking about though. I'm talking about time passing without change occurring. I could word it differently for you. Let's say that time passing is itself a change. But time is not a physical thing, it is everywhere, as Aristotle said, so this is not a physical change. Now we have a change which we are not capable of quantifying, because it is not a physical change. This is the change which is called time passing. The problem though, is that we do quantify time passing, so this is not a good representation. Instead, we should represent time passing as something other than change.

You can say what you like, but that won't change the fact that it is not impossible for water to boil at a different temperature. And because your position entails otherwise, it is therefore false. — Sapientia

Didn't I tell you that the boiling temperature of water is dependent on the pressure? Where do you get these strange ideas of what my position entails?

Well done, Metaphysician Undercover. Your debate skills are clearly superior to mine. — Sapientia

Thank you, I'll take that as a compliment, though it really doesn't say much.

(Your arguments, if they can be called that, frequently contain fallacies, Metaphysician Undercover: whether it be straw men, contradictions, missing the point, quoting out of context, false analogies, begging the question, wishful thinking, non sequiturs...) — Sapientia

Wow! What's with the inconsistency?

We obviously learn, especially in relation to ethics, through empathy and experience, not just by learning the meaning of words, and this happens at a very young age. — Sapientia

We learn about ethics through empathy?

We judge behaviours as right or wrong based on experience of those behaviours. — Sapientia

Are you saying that I have to experience murder before I can judge it as wrong? No one that I have ever been close to has been murdered, yet I still judge murder as wrong. Why do you think that is?

think that that doesn't give people enough credit. If we learnt, by some realisation that had been hitherto unrealised, that by virtue of the meaning of the word, murder was in fact good, then there would be a whole load of people that would reject it nevertheless, and certainly not go out and murder people. Would you? I want you to answer that question, because it is very important. And bear in mind that it is a thought experiment. — Sapientia

Since murder is defined as wrong, how could one ever learn that murder is good by learning the meaning of the word? You have just proposed a contradiction. So if the meaning of "murder" was such that it is defined as a good action, of course I would murder, but this action would be something very different from what that word refers to now. Maybe it would mean the same thing as "generous" means right now, so I would attempt to be murderous as much as possible.

His second sentence is incorrect. Time doesn't obtain insofar as something doesn't change/isn't in motion. — Terrapin Station

As the thing which is measured, there is no necessity for something to change when time passes. Change is the means by which we measure time passing, and it is possible that time could be passing without us being capable of measuring it.

In his Physics Aristotle describes time in two different ways, 1) as the thing by which we measure, like number, and 2) the thing which is measured.

Speculation is not philosophy — wuliheron

What? To dismiss speculation as unphilosophical is a big mistake.

Ah, but then you are a physicalist. I suspect dukkha is not. And therein lies the rub. — Real Gone Cat

No. I'm dualist.

Since other consciousnesses cannot be experienced, it is logical to doubt their existence. Sure, I experience qualia suggestive of other minds - text on a screen, voices, the movement of other bodies, etc. - but these may be nothing more than illusions produced by Descartes' demon. Or the actions of a clever computer program. The existence of other minds can never be more than speculative. — Real Gone Cat

Assuming a demon still assumes something external, and my point is that once you assume something external, you have what is required to separate other minds from your mind.

Okay but what we humans want to say and believe, is that the people we interact with in the world we perceive have conscious experiences. It is the actual people around us that are conscious, and not say, that the people around us are internal representations of conscious people in the world beyond my conscious experience. It is the people that I see which are conscious, but it's hard to reconcile this because the people that I see and interact with are *within* my conscious experience (the people I see are within my conscious experience of a visual field). — dukkha

It appears like you want to experience another's experience in order to validate that experience. You cannot, and this is due to the separation between you and the others. So all you can do is imagine, or think of what another is experiencing. And all you have is an internal representation of another's experience. All you have to do, is allow that there is more to reality than just your conscious experience, and you have the basis for assuming that others' conscious experiences are just as real as yours. Why would you insist that your conscious experience is the totality of reality? That doesn't make sense to me.

The trouble is that if other people's bodies are objects which I perceive, then it doesn't make sense to locate the other persons conscious experience within that object. — dukkha

You need not do this though. As I said in my last post, you need only to consider the external world as a separation between you and the consciousness of others. There is no necessity to consider that this separation consists of objects, and that the consciousness is within an object. But if you start to understand yourself as an object with a consciousness within that object, you will relate to others that way. How do you conceive of yourself?

I believe this problem arises *because* I am conceiving of other people's bodies as if they are much like the other objects I experience in the world around me. As in, other peoples's bodies is the object which the biologist describes - a combination of physiological processes, or a collection of organs, a thing comprised of flesh, blood, and organs. Or even how the physicist describes, an object with mass, dimensions, etc. People's bodies must exist in a fundamentally different way than objects in the world like cars, cups, or roast legs of lamb (which *are* like the biologist describes - an object of flesh, bone, and blood, a mass of cells). It's as if, for the people around me to be conscious, they must be separate from my conscious experience (other people's conscious experience is not located inside my own), and yet other people's bodies are within my conscious experience (I see them, I feel them, etc).

So if people's bodies are not the objects described by biologists, what are they? — dukkha

Try to conceive of another's body in the same way you conceive of your own. If you don't think that the biologist's explanation properly represents what you think is your own self, I suppose you have reasons for that. I agree that a living thing is completely different from an inanimate thing, and biology should not be conflated with physics, as if these two are the same. What do you think is the purpose of your body? I think that understanding the nature of my own body helps me to understand the nature of the separation between my consciousness and the consciousness of others.

Because the world around me is constituted by my own perceptions/conscious experience. So I'd be locating a whole another conscious experience within my conscious experience. — dukkha

So long as you allow that there is a real separation between you and others, there is no such problem. The world around you is not constituted by your own perceptions. Your perceptions are within you, and as long as you allow that there is something real outside you, then this reality acts to separate what's within you from what's within others. It is only if you insist that there is absolutely nothing outside of your own conscious experience, that you would have the problem which you describe. But why would you think that your conscious experience comprises all that is?

Why this is so is a very complicated question involving philosophy, semiotics, and cognition. — Wayfarer

"Why this is so" is not at all complicated. It's a rather simple thing called intention. It so happens though, that most people deny the existence of intention. And, by trying to explain matters of intention without referring to intention, they produce a very complicated issue.

I don't get the end of chapter 7 at all, where he starts to say that the infinite différance is itself finite. Then he says absolute knowledge is closure, the end of history, and that this closure has already happened. Then he goes on to talk about what "begins", "beyond" absolute knowledge. Then he goes on to look for "old signs", older than presence, older than history, older than sense, more ancient than originary, etc.. Anyone have any idea of what that's all about?

The world bends to our deepest wants. Not because we are on a pre-destined path and it is simply accomplishing its role in that path: but because we are shaping a path with our mind and our surrounding reality with it. — Miguel

Let me see if I have this straight. We are part of God, and everything else is part of God. When we want something bad enough, we can cause it to happen by influencing God who acts with free will, and may make that which we want to happen, happen. Is this the same thing as prayer?

Sorry, but I never claimed to have anything more than fanciful speculation. However, that should never be equated with gibberish. Are mathematics and geometry gibberish to you, because they're abstract? Come on now, do you know what gibberish means?

Either you can show how it makes any difference with empirical evidence or its nothing more than fanciful speculation. — wuliheron

I already explained the empirical difference that it makes. Since it makes an empirical difference, it ought to be testable. Were you listening, or do you simply reject, and forget, everything which is not consistent with your belief?

it has no spatial extension then what's the point? To a physicist if you say something has no properties then it just doesn't exist. Either you can describe it in some demonstrable terms or its gibberish. — wuliheron

Now I think we're getting to the point of the op. The geometrical "point", being non-dimensional, and occupying no space, really can't exist, in the sense that a physicist would say "exists", it is purely conceptual, theoretical. But we can describe it in a demonstrable way, like the exact centre of a circle, or the point where a tangential line meets the arc of a circle, so it is not gibberish. It's good theory, but cannot have physical existence.

Now the op proposes that unlike the point in space, the point in time has real physical existence. What exists at a point in time can be nothing other than a state, because no time is passing, so no change occurs. What we observe as change and motion is a series of such states, like the still-frame movie. Real change occurs between these still frame moments, such that we do not observe real change. It's what happens between the still-frame states which we observe in rapid succession as movement.

OK, I should have something to contribute. Sorry, I guess I got bored of the op topic and went off track.

The difference is that scientific "judgments" are based on clearly defined, universally agreed upon criteria, and are publicly observable.

...

Whereas, in the case of moral/ethical judgments, there may or may not be agreement about the criteria for judging the begavior as moral or immoral, there may or may not be agreement that the behavior at issue is an instance of the behavior covered by the criteria, and there is no way to publically demonstrate that the behavior really is moral or immoral. — Brainglitch

So objectivity is defined by agreement?

No, we can predict what temperature water boils at, but not because the scale is built around that. It is because it has been successfully tested. It is possible that if you go to boil water under normal conditions, it will boil at 30°C. But that is extremely unlikely. — Sapientia

I disagree. I think it has been demonstrated and learnt, that water boils under similar conditions. These conditions are described as the same temperature at the same pressure. That temperature is designated as 100 degrees Celsius at average sea level pressure. We could designate something else as the temperature which water boils at, like 212 degrees. So the reason why we can say what temperature water boils at is because we have designated specific numbers to represent the temperature which water boils and freezes at, and built a scale around it. We could take something like alcohol, and determine what temperature it boils at, and this would be an act of comparing it to the temperature which water boils and freezes at, placing it within that scale.

This is a bad argument, because there are other definitions for murder and theft, and they don't have to be defined that way. (And to rule out one possible interpretation, I'll note that we are talking about science vs. ethics, not science vs. the law). So, that you have chosen to define them that way is trivial. — Sapientia

Actually, it's yours, which is the bad argument. By the same principle that you can define "murder" in another way, which is according to some other convention, I can say that according to some other convention, water doesn't boil at a hundred degrees, it boils at two hundred and twelve. All you are doing is saying that I'm going to define "murder" according to another convention, in which murder is not necessarily wrong, then you provide your convention, your definition, just like I would say that according to the Fahrenheit convention, water does not boil; at one hundred degrees. So, to match your claim, that my defining murder as wrong, is trivial, I would likewise have to say that the fact you've chosen to say that water boils at 100 Celsius is just as trivial. One difference though, unlike you I don't believe these choices to be trivial. One might just as well define the boiling point of water in another way, like you would define murder in another way, but that doesn't mean that these choices are trivial. I think such choices have great consequences.

And even if murder and theft were immoral by definition, that in itself would trivialise the ethics of it, as we would just need to learn the meaning of the words to know that murder and theft are immoral - irrespective of anything else, which misses out the whole importance of ethics. And you yourself have said that ethics is about consequences, so this would lead you once again into contradiction. — Sapientia

Yes, this is exactly the case, we learn the meaning of these words, "murder" and "theft", what it means to murder and to steal, and in doing so we learn that these are wrong. That's how we learn ethics. Why do you think that this is trivial and misses the importance of ethics? We must learn which behaviours are wrong, so we have words for them, and meanings for those words, which indicate not only what the behaviour is, but also that it is wrong. The meaning of the moral word does two things for us, describes the action and tells us whether it is a virtue or a vice. So we have other words like temperance, honesty, courage, etc., which refer to good character, and these are likely to lead to good actions. Many ethicists would argue that we should focus on the words which have meanings that are understood as good character, rather than the bad, as this will encourage good behaviour. Why does this lead me into contradiction, with respect to consequences? The consequence of learning these words is that we avoid doing the things which are defined as being bad and move toward doing things which are defined as being good.

It isn't a matter of reducing qualities to quantities, but of quantitative measurement. Whenever you wish to subject a question to scientific analysis, you need to be able to quantify it. 'Show me the data', will be the response from a scientist. Whatever is going to be studied or analysed must be amenable to quantification in that sense. What quality has been reduced to quantity in that step? — Wayfarer

The thing being measured is a quality of the physical world. The act of measuring is to represent that quality as a quantity. The size of an object is a sensible quality of that object, it appears to be either big or small. To measure it is to represent the size in an intelligible form, as a quantity

'That killing is wrong' is a completely different kind of question. Certainly every culture thinks that murder is wrong - but what about killing in self-defense? As an act of war? To prevent someone kllling someone else? What about all the legally prohibited acts other than killing? There are countless ethical and moral judgement that need to be made in law and other non-scientific subjects. It is the basis of those judgements which are problematical nowadays, insofar as if cultural norms are deprecated for various reasons, and only science remains authoritative, then it does inevitably entail some form of moral relativism, it seems to me. — Wayfarer

But I didn't say "killing", I said "murder". That's the point. To assign a word to an act, is to represent that act in an intelligible form, just like assigning a number to an object in measurement. To say "murder" is to indicate that the act being described has been judged, (or "measured") as wrong, just like to say the object is 25 centimeters is to indicate that the object has been measured. If the act is murder, it is by definition, wrong.

So I have to agree with your opponents on this score. I think there really is a 'fact-value' dichotomy, that is deeply part of modern cultural discourse, but you're not going to come to terms with it by saying there's 'no real difference' between quantitive and qualitative judgement. Making a scientific observation and an ethical judgement are very different kinds of acts. — Wayfarer

The point is, that any act of judgement is an act of applying a value system, whether that value system is numerical or ethical. There is no "fact-value dichotomy", because whether or not a fact is produced is dependent upon the method by which the value system is applied. If I make a faulty measurement, then the measurement which I give is not fact. If I incorrectly judge a killing as a murder, then it is not a fact that the act was murder. But if I carry out those judgements correctly, then the measurement can be said to be a fact, and that the killing is a murder can be said to be a fact.

Producing a fact is to use the proper symbols or signification to represent the object, or act. What makes the application of numbers to measure the object more "objective" than the application of ethical words "wrong and right", or "good and bad", as a form of measurement?

The normal boiling point for various substances has been scientifically tested to such a high standard that we can objectively predict at what temperature a particular substance, under normal conditions, will boil. We know, for example, that the normal boiling point of water is 100°C. It is objective because it doesn't depend on how you feel about it or what you think about it and so on. — Sapientia

We can predict what temperature water boils at, because the scale is built around that. When water boils, this is one hundred degrees, by definition. So it is true by definition, just like it is true by definition that murder and theft are wrong. That murder is wrong does not depend on how you feel about it, it is defined as wrongfully killing, just like one hundred degrees is defined as the temperature water boils at.

I agree that objective refers to the external vs. internal, and this is consistent with what I said about the scientific argument and data being put on the table so that any independent observer can judge for themselves.

People's behavior is indeed external, but any claim that behavior is or is not ethical is a value judgment. And value judgments are decidedly internal. We can express our value judgments in language and share them with others, but we cannot show them any entity that they can observe for themselves. They can only observe the behavior and make their own internal value judgement about whether that behavior is ethical or not. — Brainglitch

Your argument doesn't make sense. Scientific judgements are "internal", and value judgements just as much as ethical judgements are. The difference is in the value system used. Scientific judgements use numerical values, reducing qualities to quantities. Ethical judgement judges quality directly without converting the quality to quantity. This extra step, of conversion, whereby quality is converted to quantity, is an extra internal judgement process. Therefore scientific judgement is likely less objective than ethical judgement because it requires a twofold internal judgement system. The more internal judgements required to decide something should make that decision more subjective.

Everybody understands how much counts as a cm, or a volt, or a newton, etc. And any dispute about whether or not a given object, say, weighs 50 kilos, is objectively resolvable. But there is no way even in principle to resolve dispute about whether or not a given behavior really is ethical, because there is no universal agreement about the criteria, or about mitigating factors, or exceptions, or degrees, and the like — Brainglitch

All these scientific terms you refer to, volt, newton, etc., are true by definition. There are many acts such as murder and theft, which are wrong by definition. To argue against the fact that these acts are wrong is to go against the convention, just like arguing that an object which everyone says weighs 50 kilos, does not weigh 50 kilos.

Right, moral ethics are not supposed to be "influenced by personal feelings or opinions", they are supposed to be objective. Do you think that scientific theories are less influenced by personal feelings than ethics? If so, can you justify this claim, which I think is just a personal opinion itself, and therefore not objective?

Still don't understand how a moment can be timeless. Either it has duration or it infinitely short, which case, its difficult to see why its worth distinguishing. — wuliheron

Do you understand how a point has no spatial extension in any direction? If so, then why can't you understand a point in time with no temporal extension? The point in space is not infinitely short, whatever that's supposed to mean, nor is it infinitesimal. An infinitesimal point is not a true point, and if we assume to be able to divide a line infinitely, we don't derive a point.

Hey Metaphysician Undercover - I know this discussion is between yourself and Sapientia, but I did try and address that very point in this post, referring to Hume's 'is/ought' problem. — Wayfarer

Yeah thanks, I saw your post. What I'm wondering is how knowledge of what is is supposed to be more "objective" than knowledge of ought.

For a proposition, hypothesis, etc. to be demonstrated scientifically typically means something along the lines of presenting logically rigorous argument (possibly incuding the math) and methodologically robust empirical data from which any independent observer can judge for themselves whether or not the propositions, hypotheses, etc. are sound. It is this, more or less, that people mean by "objective." — Brainglitch

I don't think that this is at all what people mean by "objective". I think Sapientia, and now you, are trying to create a new definition of "objective", one that suits the purpose of the claim that science is more objective than ethics. "Objective" generally means of the object, the external, as opposed to of the subjective, the internal. Ethics deals with how we ought to behave in relation to others, within the community, so it is clearly something external to the individual subject, and therefore objective.

A moment that consists of no time is a contradiction in terms and there's no way to tell what you might mean by that other than to guess you are possibly suggesting that time is illusory and everything is fated. — wuliheron

I don't see why you say this. "Moment" is used in a number of different ways. 1) it is used to signify a brief period of time, as you say, 2) it is used to signify a point in time. Under the second way, it is a point in time, just like a point in space. The point in space is dimensionless, free from spatial extension, just like the "moment", as a point in time is free from temporal extension.

That means there is no way to ultimately distinguish between one moment and the next and indeterminacy applies to everything because its a universal recursion in the law of identity. — wuliheron

Now you are the one contradicting yourself. If the moment consists of a period of time, as you say, then it consists of whatever changes are proper to that period of time. Therefore each moment is ultimately different, and so there are distinguishing features between different moments. To remove these differences from the moment itself, we have to consider the moment as a point in time.

We perceive moments as separate and discrete, yet also flowing and indivisible, because a context without significant content is a physical and conceptual impossibility along the lines of insisting you can have an up without a down or a back without a front. — wuliheron

Content and context are not ideal opposites, like up and down, which are absolutes that are defined by each other. Content, is in principle, separable from context, and that is why the same content can exist in many different contexts. Or, we can describe a context without any content, such as a fiction. But we cannot do that with ideal opposites.

You can't use this (or Brexit) to "prove" that democracy is a bad form of government. You need to compare it to other forms of government. Do non-democratic countries tend to be better? — Michael

I don't believe that's true. You do not need to show that something is worse than something else, to prove that it is bad. You just need to describe the thing, and explain why the described thing is bad. That there may be other things which are worse, is not relevant.

So, please, don't tempt me to reply, as I'm now doing, unless you can demonstrate an improvement. — Sapientia

Ok, let me try again. You said that something which is demonstrated scientifically has a better chance of being objective, than ethics. You say that "because" it is demonstrated scientifically, it has a better chance of being objective than ethics, which is not demonstrated scientifically. You imply that it is the scientific demonstration which causes objectivity.

So I ask, can you justify this? Can you demonstrate to me why a scientific demonstration would cause something to be more objective than ethical principles are?