"To be seen" is not a proper way of putting it. "To be apprehended by a mind" is better. That is because we can conceive of things without seeing them.

The hinge beliefs Wittgenstein primarily focused on were those required for reason itself. Skepticism and doubt are inherently rational. They depend upon the ability to reason. You can't have global skepticism because that would entail doubt of reason itself. We can doubt the fruits of reason, sure, but reason itself cannot be doubted on pain of contradiction. It is always a given. — darthbarracuda

I think you may be mistaken here. Why do you think that we cannot doubt reason itself? You describe a distinction between reason and "the fruits of reason". Your claim that to doubt reason itself would be contradictory is a fruit of reason, and can be doubted. So your claim that reason itself cannot be doubted appears to be baseless. I see no reason to believe that this would be contradictory, it's just a matter of one doubting one's own ability to do something, and this we do all the time.

I don't use "ontological dependence", that's why I asked you what you meant by this? So how would I be the one causing confusion? If someone else thinks that I said what I didn't say, that's not me causing the confusion.

Why would I believe that God could create a rock bigger than he could lift? That sounds contradictory. Doesn't creating imply that God has lifted it, in order that it be where it is?

A quick glance of that article reveals that "ontological dependence" appears to be all smoke and mirrors. They define it as something other than a causal dependency or a logical dependency. But the examples given seem to all be understandable in terms of either causal or logical dependency

Even God can't see the back of his own head without using a mirror. — wuliheron

That scares me.

I think it's actually just a rhetorical question.

Doesn't the opposite of what you said follow logically? If the uncategorized whole is the Memory of God, then to claim that there is such a thing is to claim to be united to God through one's memory. This would imply knowing the mind of God.

Of course, some versions of idealism are looser stances where folks are simply emphasizing the importance of ideas. Those are a different issue. Those stances are not making exhaustive ontological inventory claims. — Terrapin Station

Classical idealism assigns priority, or a higher level of reality, to the realm of ideas than to the realm of material existence. You might consider that idealism and materialism both developed as forms of dualism. As dualisms, they would each accept the reality of both ideas and matter. However, idealism would assign priority to ideas, claiming that Forms are a necessary condition for material existence, and materialism would assign priority to matter, saying that matter is a necessary condition for the existence of ideas.

It is only under the modern trend toward monism, which attempts to simplify things, that a materialist might dismiss the reality of ideas altogether, or some forms of solipsistic idealism might attempt to dismiss material existence altogether. It should be quite evident that monism is the cause of these problems, not idealism or materialism per se. So to choose monism over dualism, as a way to avoid the question of which is prior, matter or Forms, is a mistaken choice.

Based on the definition, it seems like the opposite: where apperception involves the classing of an object into a learned object category-- understanding the object within the context of this old information (e.g. all men are mortal; this new object I see is a man; therefore he must be a mortal). I always thought gestalt just involved the perception of a discrete whole -- an uncategorized whole. — aporiap

I am doubtful of this idea of perceiving an uncategorized whole. It may well be the case, that to perceive something as a whole, a unit, is necessarily to perceive it as something, even if it is just to categorize it as a whole. Then to perceive something as an uncategorized whole is an impossibility. To perceive something as an object may require that it be recognized, and to recognize it is to associate it with another perception, and this is to categorize it. It need not even be the case that one puts a name to the object, just to recognize it is to categorize it, and this is to see it as having a particular identity.

The point being, that I cannot conceive of what it would mean to perceive something as "an uncategorized whole". Imagine the possibility of a perception which is completely unrecognizable. How would the unrecognizable aspect of the perception be individuated from the recognizable aspect of the perception, such that it could be assigned the status of an individuate whole, if it is completely unrecognizable?

To be is to be perceived. I perceive a rock, so it exists. But it doesn't exist outside being perceive. I perceive you so you exist, at least while I'm perceiving you. — Marchesk

To be is to be apprehended with the intellect, not to be perceived by the senses. There is a big difference here. I understand with my mind, that other minds exist. I do not perceive other minds with my senses. However, I do apprehend that there is a separation between my mind and other minds, and I need my senses to navigate this separation. But real being is what lies beyond this separation, that which can only be apprehended with the mind.

"Co-dependent" is the term I've actually encountered here at tpf. To me, it is used in a way which differs from "interdependence". Interdependence implies two distinct things with some type of reciprocating relationship between the two. "Co-dependent" is used to signify something stronger than that, such that the two named things are really just two aspects of one and the same thing, inseparable in principle. There is no "bond", or "relationship" binding the two, as they are one and the same thing. In other words, it is claimed that analysis has determined that the two named things are not actually two named things, but two different facades, or perhaps "dimensions" of the same thing.

It is claimed that special relativity demonstrates that time and space are really one and the same thing. The problem there though, is that this is produced by synthesis rather than analysis. However, you could consider wave/particle duality as such a co-dependence produced by analysis, two distinct names with two distinct descriptions, which are believed to be two facades of the same thing.

By the way, what do you even mean by ontological dependence?

We could start a thread to explore different sorts of ontological dependence. — Mongrel

I think that might be a good idea. Here's an issue I've come across a number of times already in the philosophy forums. It is the idea of co-dependence, and the claim is that one thing is dependent on another, while the other is dependent on the first. It is used to put an end to analysis.

"We cannot analyze these things further, because there is a co-dependence here which prevents us from separating these two things."

So for instance, the claim would be that we cannot analyze space and time separately because there is a co-dependence between them which prevents us from separating them, even in theory. The insistence would be that "space" and "time" really do not refer to separate things, so it would be a faulty analysis to separate them.

My opinion is that there is no such thing as a real co-dependence, and the term is simply used to disguise circular logic, or to make circular logic appear to be acceptable.

But this "sense of otherness" appears to be very real. In fact I think it is real. If it is, then to overcome it simply by assuming the existence of a unity called "the world" is to create an illusion, a fiction. It would be like if, when you wish that something isn't so, you simply assume that it is otherwise, in order to avoid facing the facts. If that is the case, then the only real way to overcome otherness is to actually create the relationships necessary to produce the world. It requires real effort to bring about what we want to be the case. Simply assuming that it is the case does not suffice.

The latter statement is based on the obvious fact that as a being, an organism, we have to differentiate ourselves from what is not ourselves. That is not an ability that we're born with, but is learned in very early stages of infancy. — Wayfarer

The differentiating of ourselves, to see oneself as a thing separate from other things, is not the real problem I am having here, this seems to come naturally. As you describe, it is a sort of learnt thing, but it is highly intuitive as we deal with individual objects, and see ourselves as individuals, separate from others. The real issue is the assumption that I am part of something, "the world", some larger whole.

To be a part of something implies that I have a role, a function, or purpose. Why should I assume that such is the case with respect to my relationship to this thing called the world? I can justify the notion that I am a part of a larger thing called my family, because I can understand real relationships here. My siblings have the same mother and father as I do, my cousins have shared grandparents, etc.. If I extrapolate, I can extend this such that I am part of the local society, the human race in general, and I can even say that I am part of life on earth. How does "the world" fit into this though? That's where I find difficulty. I can see myself as part of life on earth, because I can see a certain relationship between myself and other living things, in the fact that we are all alive, but I'm really not sure how I'm supposed to conceive of myself as part of the world.

Whenever I think of the world, I seem to be faced with this division, this separation. "The world" seems to signify all that is other from me, and I cannot seem to force it to signify something that I am a part of.. Whenever I try to establish a conceptual relationship between myself and the world, I do so by means of the relationships described above. But I don't ever get to "the world" because there is a disjoint at the end of the living, which causes the world to loom on the other side, as the other.

How do I get beyond those particular relationships which justify the notion that I am part of something bigger, life on earth, to the conclusion of a most general relationship, that each and every thing animate or inanimate, is a part of the same thing which I am a part of, the world? This is so completely counter-intuitive to what comes naturally, and what we learn, to differentiate and separate individual things, as if things really have separate existence. Why would we be learning to differentiate and separate individual things, as if individual things each have their own separate existence, if they were really all part of one, the world? .

My question is what substantiates these inference rules. And I'm using this word - 'substantiate'- in two ways. The first being 'epistemically' -- i.e. What justifies the legitimacy of these rules? Considering that raw experience consists in a continuous field of relatively-positioned, free standing incongruities, why assume that reality contains anything more than that? The second being 'semantically'. Clearly the rules ascribe meaningfulness to certain arrangements of features? But is that 'meaningfulness' intrinsic to reality itself? Or is it just something that carries meaning only in reference to minds? — aporiap

What substantiates our assumption of the reality of objects, is the comparison between numerous different senses. You refer to the visual field, seeing different colours, and surely we perceive boundaries which separate out objects through visual perception. But we also move around, touch and feel these same differences, we even taste, smell and hear some differences. So the assumption that we apprehend individual objects is supported by more than just the sense of sight.

If the fleece could persist beyond the removal of the hay. It's not the definition of "world" you should be preoccupied with here. It's "dependent." — Mongrel

I don't see how that's relevant. That something could persist in time (the fleece), beyond the point in time in which something was a part of it (the hay), does not negate the fact that this thing is a part of that thing's existence. Existence necessarily has temporal extension. If your original claim is that the hay is a part of the fleece, you can only remove this fact by limiting the temporal extension of the existence of the fleece to a time when the hay is not a part of the fleece. You would claim that the temporal part of the fleece's existence, during which the hay is a part of the fleece, is not actually part of the fleece's existence. But then you contradict the original claim that the hay is a part of the fleece.

Back to the original point. If I am part of the world, how is it possible that the world exists independently of me? That is the explanation I am waiting for, in order that I can understand what is meant by "the world". As far as I can see, either the world is completely independent from me (in which case I am not a part of it), or I am part of the world (in which case it is nonsense to speak of the world as something independent from me). Otherwise I need a firm definition of what "part" means.

The original paradox of knowledge is set out in Plato's Meno; Here is the question Meno asks Socrates: "And how will you inquire into a thing when you are wholly ignorant of what it is? Even if you happen to bump right into it, how will you know it is the thing you didn't know?"; In other words, if you didn't have a knowledge of the thing already, how would you know what you're looking for? — StreetlightX

There is an inverted form of this paradox which is central to Plato's Theaetetus. What happens is that Socrates, with his group, seek to define "knowledge". What happens though, is that they already have amongst them, a preconceived notion of how "knowledge" ought to be used. This is, that it ought to be used to refer to something which excludes falsity. So they go through many examples, different descriptions of what knowledge is thought to be, and find them all to be incapable of fulfilling this condition. At the end, they are ready to give up, and concede defeat in there quest to find knowledge, when Socrates suggests, perhaps we have been looking for the wrong thing.

This takes the opposing extremity to the position stated in the quote from Meno. In that quote, if you don't have an idea of what you are looking for, you can never find it. In the Theaetetus, the condition is that if you have a description of what you are looking, but the description is somehow wrong, then again, you will never find what you are looking for.

What is at issue here is the nature of identity. And what is exposed by these two extreme examples, is two distinct approaches to identification. In the case of Meno, it is necessary that we have within the mind, some sort of description, or even just an image of what "X" refers to, in order that we can proceed with our senses to identify an occurrence of X. In the example of Theaetetus, we must rid ourselves (forget) of any such preconceived description, or image, of what "X" refers to, and proceed to observe how "X" is used by people, to formulate an understanding (learn) of what X refers to. The latter is the basis of Platonic dialectics.

So here we have two sides of the coin. There is the claim from Meno, that we must know what X is, prior to being able to identify any instances of X. But this creates the problem of infinite regress in reminiscence, such that the Idea of X necessarily would precede each and every instance of using "X" as an identifier. That implies an eternal Idea. The position in Theaetetus, and what is proper to Platonic dialectics, is that the Idea of X is learned, and developed from observing the use of "X". Such "learning" is beautifully explained in Plato's Symposium. This principle, exposed by Plato, that the Idea is produced by learning, is what allows Aristotle to refute Pythagorean Idealism. The Idea is now understood as coming into existence, a type of becoming, which is dependent on the human mind. Any existence of the Idea prior to being "discovered" by the human mind, is not actual existence, it is determined by Aristotle to be potential only.

A bit of hay may adhere to the fleece. It doesn't mean the fleece is hay-dependent. (I'm shopping for a spinning wheel. Woo Hoo!) — Mongrel

What part of the word "part" do you not understand? To say that the hay adheres to the fleece is not the same as saying that the hay is part of the fleece. How could the fleece be hay-independent if the hay is part of the fleece.

I'm not overly fond of your wording here. Partitioning the world invites questions about whether its boundaries are finite or infinite. World here means a domain and I believe it's an abstract object because it's a set. — Mongrel

I was just stating my observations. Things which I observe to be independent from me are independent things. By the same principle that I hold them to be independent from me, I also hold them to be independent from each other. What makes one thing a "part" of another? If I am supposed to be a part of this thing, "the world", is this thing not independent at all?

There was no suggestion that the world is a domain, and I don't know what you mean. Is "the world" just meant to signify a domain name? I don't get it.

It was suggested that the world is something which exists independent of minds, and also that I am a part of this world. To begin with, that appears contradictory to me, unless I don't have a mind.

Also, what I observe is many objects independent from me. They are separate from me, and I am not part of them. I am "part" of many things, groups and organizations, mostly by choice, though I am part of my family, and part of the greater society, not by choice. What is this "world" which I am supposed to be part of?.

That's what I am asking. I'm not the one claiming the reality of "the world", I'm the one asking what that means.

You can't talk about whether some definition or another is correct if you don't even have any idea what the term refers to. — Terrapin Station

Exactly! How can you know what the word refers to if there are multiple definitions to choose from and none of them can be considered to be the correct one?

The latter. The way I would put this is to say that if the apple has form and matter then it is substantial. That is, it exists. — Andrew M

OK, I'm going to try to relate this to what you say about the apple, and about QM. I hope you understand, that to say the apple consists of matter and form, in the Aristotelian sense, is to invoke a type of dualism. You are saying that the apple consists of two distinct aspects, its matter and its form.
Under Aristotelian physics, the form of an object is what is active and changing, while there is an underlying matter which persists, and does not change.

At some point the apple grew on a tree and before that the tree grew from a seed. And in the other direction, at some point the apple will be eaten or decompose and perhaps its seeds will grow into into new trees. This is just matter changing form such that we can identify substances like apples. So the boundaries at the coming-into-existence and going-out-of-existence of an apple can be vague or ill-defined. But the apple is clearly identifiable when it is fully formed. And so we can develop language to talk about it. — Andrew M

Let's say that the apple is growing, ripening on the tree, so it is changing colours. It's form is changing. Do you believe that there is an underlying matter which is not changing? Of all the nutrients that the tree is putting into the apple, while it becomes sweeter and sweeter, is there really some underlying, "matter", which is not changing? If there is not some underlying "matter", which establishes continuity, the continued existence of the apple is not substantiated. We can call it "the apple" at one moment, but since it is changing, then unless we assume something underlying which is not changing, our claim that it is "the apple" at a later moment is unjustified.

When the molecular structure of the apple is changing over time, how can you say that 'this is just matter changing form"? Everything is changing, where is the "matter" which we assume is changing form? You can justify the claim that there is matter, by saying that there must be matter, because it remains "the same" apple. But the problem is that the existence of matter is just assumed in order to account for the apparent continuity of existence. So to now say that there must be such continuity, because there is matter, is circular reasoning. If we cannot validate the existence of matter, then we cannot justify that the apple continues to be the same apple despite changing, because we know that even the molecules and atoms are changing. When an apple tree comes into existence from a seed, and grows, how can this be matter changing form, if even the atoms and sub-atomic particles are changing?

To relate this back to QM. The formalism is the Schrodinger equation. The primary dispute is whether the equation is substantial. That is, is the wave function real? If it is, then that explains why we see interference effects. — Andrew M

Let me suggest to you that the concept of energy has replaced the concept of matter in most modern applications of physics, as the underlying thing which persists, and doesn't change, while the form which energy takes, actually changes. So we have the energy of the apple, rather than the matter, as the principle of continuity, this is firmly established by special relativity. Energy may come into the apple, and it may leave the apple, and as long as the amount is conserved, we have an underlying thing which doesn't change, the existence of that thing is substantiated through its energy.

I am not extremely familiar with the Schrodinger equation. I understand that it is closer to classical mechanics than it is to special relativity. Classical mechanics, being based in mass rather than energy, as the principle of continuity, is closer to the Aristotelian conception of matter, than the conception of energy in special relativity. Since substantial existence can be validated by any principle of continuity, whether it be mass (matter) or energy, then there should be no question as to whether or not the equation is "substantial". However, there may be inconsistencies between what is believed to constitute "substance".

Unfortunately, a lot of people think that philosophy amounts to "playing stupid." (I can explain why a lot of people misinterpret it that way.) Philosophy really isn't playing stupid though. This is a case where either you're playing stupid or you effectively really are. — Terrapin Station

No such thing as the world! That's a good one. — Sapientia

Well, I'm involved in the "Many Worlds Interpretation" thread. What makes you think that your assumption of "the world" is the correct one, and these speculative physicists who believe in many worlds are wrong?

If you believe in "the world", and they believe in "many worlds", then why should I believe in any "world" until someone explains to me what it means to be a world.

Often when someone says something like that I just think that it's not worth bothering to even attempt communication with them. It always strikes me as akin to, say, if I owned a cab company, and someone were to approach me about a job, but then they say, "I don't even know what a car is." Sometimes it's just not worth bothering. — Terrapin Station

This is philosophy, and it's customary ask others to explain and justify the concepts they use. That's how we learn what the others are talking about, and what the others believe. If you're not interested ...

Sure, "the world" is a construct, but the world isn't. The world is not "the world". The world is the world. — Sapientia

Let me phrase that another way then. You can use "the world" all you want, but I do not know what this refers to, other than something imaginary, in your mind, like a unicorn. You can say the unicorn is not "the unicorn" all you want, but that doesn't resolve anything.

But you are part of the world, regardless of how you see yourself. — Sapientia

OK, so that tells me a little bit, the world is something I'm part of, whether I like it or not. I suppose it will punish me if I don't pay attention to it? That would appear like it is separate from me. What makes you think that I am part of it? Why would it hurt me, if I am part of it, then it would be hurting itself? Does "the world" refer to the same thing as "God"?

If you say so... :-d — Sapientia

And what you say is somehow better than what I say?

Well, of course the idea is a construct.

Is it that time again? Irrelevant idealist truism time? — Sapientia

OK, I see you at least understand what I'm saying. You're doing better at understanding what I am saying than I am doing at understanding what you are saying. Now tell me where I can find this thing called the world. I want to see if it's really there, to see if you know what you're talking about.

Asking for justification for the existence of the apple is misplaced here. The thing on the table that we can publicly point to is what we mean when we talk about apples. And part of what we mean is that they exist. (As opposed, say, to our talk about unicorns - we can only point to pictures of unicorns.) — Andrew M

But don't you agree that if you eat the apple, at some point it will no longer exist? And, don't you think that the apple came into existence at some time? Unless you can describe what marks the difference between the existence and the non-existence of the apple, why do you feel so confident that the apple exists? I mean, to me, it appears like you just take it for granted that the apple exists, without even knowing what it means to exist. If you knew what it means to exist you could probably tell me what constituted the apple coming into existence, and what constitutes the apple going out of existence.

I agree that is the problem. A scientific theory such as QM is a description of the world, not a mere formalism. And it is testable on that basis. We can plug in particles (or, in principle, apples) and compare what the theory predicts with our subsequent observations. — Andrew M

OK, if we agree here, then let's go back and take a look at the Aristotelian principle, to see the difference. Instead of defining the existence of the object through its relations with other objects (relativity theory), or as I discussed with apokrisis, defining the object as being in a context, Aristotle defined a principle of existence (matter) which is inherent within the object.

Do you agree that these are two very distinct ways of defining existence? The way of modern physics is to define the object's existence through its relations to other objects. The way of Aristotelian physics is to assume that there is existence inherent within any object, regardless of its relationships with other objects, it has substance. Now let's consider the apple on the table. Which do you think is the truth concerning the existence of the apple? Do you think that the apple only has existence because it has relationships with other objects, the table etc., or do you think that there is something inherent within the apple itself, which constitutes its existence?

What I say is that (metaphysical strength) categories are in fact boundaries. They are limit states. And they come in dialectical pairs. They are the opposing extremes of what could definitely be the case. — apokrisis

I disagree with this, in a number of ways. First and foremost, you haven't distinguished between the category itself, and the defining features of the category, such that the defining features, the limits, are the category for you. I believe this is a mistake. So for example, if the category is temperature, you haven't distinguished this from the limit states, the opposing extremes, hot and cold. Therefore you no longer have the category of temperature, you have hot and cold. If you want to allow that temperature exists as a category, you must accept that it is something other than hot and cold.

So if a metaphysical separation is possible - such as the discrete and the continuous - then the separation "exists" to the degree it is crisp ... or not-vague. — apokrisis

But your claim was that there are degrees of in-between, between discrete and continuous. How is this possible, if discrete and continuous are different categories? What would it mean to assign to a thing as a property, that it is in between discrete and continuous?

As an Aristotelean you should see how this is the same as Aristotle's own argument for substance as the ur-category - the argument from contrariety. — apokrisis

I don't see your argument. The contrarieties which Aristotle refers to are each of the same category, black and white, hot and cold, good and bad. Each pair of contrary terms represents the extremities of the category. When we assign to a substance, a property according to a category, we cannot say that the substance has contrary properties of that category, though it can at different times. The same substance can be at one time hot and at another time cold, but it cannot be both hot and cold at the same time.

So I think you are fixed on thinking about categories in terms of contradiction where to get down to primal being, you have to apply contrariety as the deeper principle. — apokrisis

It seems quite clear to me that you have this backwards. Categorization is the deeper principle. Contrariety exists within each category, but there is no contrariety between the categories, only a type of difference.

So, there is a situation in which the Earth exists, but "the Earth exists" is not true, viz. the situation I just presented to you. — The Great Whatever

As Michael explained, the proper way to phrase this is that the statement today, "the Earth existed at that time", is true. But at that time, millions of years ago, the statement "the Earth exists" did not exist. So at that time, it was not the case that "the Earth exists" was not true, nor was it true, "the Earth exists" did not itself exist. So to speculate about whether or not "the Earth exists" was true at that time, is nonsense, because there was no such thing as "the Earth exists" at that time.

With regards to the last part, I simply ask: why would there need to be a mind to assume that something was meant? Either it would or would not be the case that something was meant. — Sapientia

Maybe something was meant, or maybe there wasn't something meant. But if we assume that something was meant (and that requires this assumption I referred to), we still do not have the means to say that what was meant at that time, exists as meaning today.

It meant something then, and unless that meaning has somehow changed, it would mean the same thing now. — Sapientia

Here's your mistake. The author meant something, not "it meant something". You've somehow transferred what the author meant, into the words, to say that the words meant something, and therefore still mean something.

It depends what is meant by having a meaning. I think it makes sense to say that it has a meaning, and that this is what the author meant. — Sapientia

I already went through this. The author meant to write down the words. The author also meant for those words to signify something. These are two distinct intentions of the author. They must be distinct so that we can account for the existence of misleading, and deception. The intention of the author is within the mind of the author at the time of the writing. How do you propose that the author's intention gets into the written words, to exist there as what the author meant, or meaning?

Did the kid speak? Does that count as speaking? What does the rulebook say? That is what matters, not what you or I think. If the kid spoke, then the rule was broken. — Sapientia

Exactly, these questions need to be answered before there's any truth about whether or not the kid broke the rule. Who's going to answer those questions? If they are unanswerable, there is no truth. If there is no mind, they are unanswerable. Therefore without a mind there is no truth.

So, what's the problem then? That in itself needn't be a problem. None of that necessitates a mind being there. It necessities that there was a mind there. It means that there had to have been a mind there doing that - which I haven't denied, and need not deny. The dependence relation isn't about the past, as I've already said. — Sapientia

You seem to have missed a key point Sapientia: "we assume that there is something which was meant". Minds are the things which make assumptions, so "we assume" implies minds. This is not concerning the past, this is right now, when we look at the symbols, we assume that there was something meant. If there are no minds, there is no assuming that there was something meant.

The latter entails that so long as there was a meaning intended by the author, then there is a meaning. The meaning would have been intended, so there would be a meaning. — Sapientia

See, you're mixing up the tenses, like you accused me of doing. That there was a meaning intended by the author indicates that something was meant by the author, at that time, in the past. You have provided no premise whereby you can say that because there was something meant, at that time in the past, this, "what was meant", persists today as meaning. You seem to have an undeclared premise, that once something was intended at a particular time, this persists indefinitely in time, as meaning

It is an assumption for argument's sake, for the sake of the hypothetical scenario that we've discussed. But in the hypothetical scenario, no, it isn't an assumption. The author meant something with those symbols. That is a given if you're going to properly engage in this thought experiment. It also need not be an assumption outside of the context of our discussion, since, obviously, there really are - and have been - authors who meant something with a bunch of symbols. I am one of them, as are you, and as is everyone else in this discussion, so, that obviously isn't an assumption. It's a fact. And there's a big difference between the two. — Sapientia

I have no problem with saying that the author meant something. The assumption which I disagree with is your assumption that what the author meant, at that particular moment in time, persists indefinitely through time, as meaning. You assume that there is a real "what is meant" by the words, right now, as "meaning", and you support this with the claim that there is a real "what was meant" by the author. What I want to know is how you establish a temporal continuity between the two. Unless you can do that, then "what was meant" by the author at that time, and "what is meant" by the words now, are completely distinct, unconnected. If they are distinct, then you cannot use what was meant by the author, to justify the claim that the words have meaning now. So we must turn to a mind which interprets, to give meaning to the words now.

Why do you keep using scare quotes like that?! It isn't necessary. — Sapientia

I use quotes when the words I use refer to a thing which is conceptual only. So, above I refer to "what was meant", and "what is meant". "what is meant" is the supposed meaning which the words have. These are two distinct concepts, and unless you can show how the two are connected, we do not have a relationship between them. So far, your claim is that the author meant something at a particular moment in time, and this persists infinitely, or eternally through time, as 'the meaning". how do you justify this claim?

To make it interesting, let's make it a given in the thought experiment that the author meant something, which is a perfectly reasonable assumption, and quite possible. — Sapientia

Right, let's assume as a given, that the author meant something. This is what occurred at that particular moment, in the past when the author wrote the words. At that time, there was meaning, because at that time, the author meant something. The question for you, is how does this necessitate that there is meaning now, or at some future time?

You should indeed allow that something was meant be the author. Otherwise you'd miss the point. The controversy only arises once we've assumed for argument's sake that something was meant. The thought experiment is about what would happen next in a particular scenario. — Sapientia

Again, I'll reiterate, I have no problem accepting that the author meant something. This was an occurrence in the past. What I have a problem with is your claim that this occurrence in the past, continues to exist today as meaning. How do you support this claim?

To deny the fact that there is a world that is the cause of what appears, which exist separate from us is not logical. You cannot treat the lion charging you as an assumed premise, it's real and it is about to kick your butt. — Cavacava

The appearance of a thing charging me is the appearance of a thing charging me. It could kill me. This thing affects me, how does that produce the logical conclusion that there is a world separate from us?

The truths we derive from what appears are our best effort to say what could possibly be the case to allow for such appearances, but there is no guarantee that what we derive on this basis is what actually is. — Cavacava

Yes, this is exactly the problem I am pointing to. The so-called "truths" are derived from what appears, and we have no way of confirming that this is "what actually is". How do we know that there is such a thing as "what actually is". And the basis of the assumption of "a world" relies on this assumption.

If Person A judges Proposition P to be true, and Person B judges P to be false, then either P is true and false, which is a contradiction, or P is true relative to A and false relative to B. But that isn't truth, that is merely judgement, which you are calling "truth". — Sapientia

Ever heard of God? Human judgements are fallible, God's are not. What your example here demonstrates, is that there is no truth without God. There may not be any God, and there may not be any truth. Would that thought influence the way you live your life?

If say discrete and continuous are the two ultimate ways things could be, then the more definite it becomes that things are categorisable as either discrete or continuous, then also you get all the various in-between states of connectedness, or disconectedness, that go along with that. — apokrisis

Your understanding of categorical separation is incompatible with mine. To me, if things are separated categorically, there is no crossing over or in between states, they are separated. Crossing over occurs in differences within the category. This is how I distinguish a categorical separation from a separation of opposition. The separation of opposition occurs within the category, like hot and cold, such that there are degrees of crossing over, in between. If the separation of hot and cold was a categorical separation, they would refer to different types of things, like temperature and size for instance, so there would be no such in between or crossing over.

My question to you, is do you respect that there is such a thing as categorical boundaries? It appears like you do not. You allow vagueness to be the principal, such that it permeates all boundaries, then there is fuzziness, degrees of separation, or in-betweenness even at the boundaries of categorical separations. This entails that the categorical separation becomes a separation of opposites, with degrees in between. In other words, there are no categorical separations. This allows your claim that mathematics permeates all boundaries, because there are no qualitative boundaries, they have been reduced to separations of degree, and these principles allow you to mix apples and oranges.

So take the above quote for example. You mention the separation between discrete and continuous as if it is a categorical separation. But if it were a true categorical separation, it signifies two different types of things, a qualitative difference. There could be no crossing over, such that a particular property of reality is both discrete and continuous, though there might be things which if we failed to understand them well, we wouldn't know which category to place them in.

Now, by saying that there are "various in-between states" you seem to deny that this is really a categorical separation, reducing it to a separation of degree (denying the qualitative separation between apples and oranges to speak metaphorically), such that you can justify your claim that the entire Cosmos exists in a context of mathematics. You have reduced the categorical separation between discrete and continuous to a separation of degree by assuming that there are in between states.

I realise that this triadic, three dimensional, approach to categorisation is difficult and unfamiliar. It allows "rotations" through an extra dimension that normal categorisation - based on strict dialectics - fails to see. — apokrisis

There is no "extra dimension" in your triadic approach, all you have done is reduced the categorical separation which by definition separates two incompatible types of things, to a single category. You are left with two opposing terms, such as hot and cold, with a separation of degrees in between. By redefining the names which dialectically indicate separate categories, to indicate a dichotomy of two opposing terms, rather than a categorical separation, you reduce the two categories to a single category.

But then I would want to rotate the view to remind that vagueness is defined itself dichotomously as the dynamical other of crispness. And it is never left behind in the developmental trajectory as development consists of its increasing suppression. — apokrisis

This indicates that you do this with all categorical separations. Even vagueness, which is the principle by which you dissolve the categorical separation into a separation of degree, itself has an opposing term, such that there is now a vagueness in the categorical separation between vagueness and crispness, then an infinite regress of vagueness is implied.

The logic of this would be circular if it weren't in fact hierarchical or triadic. — apokrisis

Actually, it's an infinite regress.

The world exists without us, we have the remains of previous life forms that inhabited the world for millions of years. The world does not contain truth in itself, it is factual. We construct 'a world', a view we share with others that is comprised of what we and others have learned. — Cavacava

The point was, that this "the world" is something which is produced, and assumed by us. We assume that there is something out there which exists independently of us, and we call it "the world". So "the world" refers to that which is assumed to be independent, through the means of a concept, which is how we presently understand this assumed entity.

So we have a constructed "world", which is conceptual. There is also an assumption, that there is a real world which "world" refers to, an assumption that "world" is not just a fictitious, fantasy concept. We justify this assumption by referring to the remains of previous life forms and other scientific beliefs.

But this is all backwards. We should really deny this assumption of "the world", until it is justified, and produced as a logical conclusion, rather than taken as an assumed premise. This means that we should go through all the evidence from all the various fields of science, and other forms of knowledge such as theological knowledge, then we can start to make conclusions about mind-independence. If this evidence produces a conclusion that there is a "world", then the assumption is justified. if not, then we move on to a new conception.

The point is that this facticity, what is in-it-self, is different from what is for us. The existence of thought is contingent, the world exists without it. The factual world must have a structure which is independent of us, which exists even if we do not. — Cavacava

Even this statement which you make here, acts as evidence that there is no such thing as the world. You say "what is in-it-self is different from what is for us". So for us, there is such a thing as the world. If, what is in-it-self, is different from this, shouldn't we conclude that in reality there is not a world?

Truth is not in the factual world as such, it is a constuct we lay over the world to make it intelligible, but clearly there is no guarantee that our maps correspond to what the world is in itself. — Cavacava

When we are so convinced, that there is a good possibility that our maps do not adequately represent what is in itself, that our constructed "world", and the things which we believe as truths concerning this world, don't adequately correspond to the assumed independent reality, then why not drop this assumption until it can be justified?

But that is implicit in acknowledging we are limited to interpretations. So there is always going to be uncertainty about what is left out. — apokrisis

I don't think that it is the case that "interpretation" implies necessarily that there is a truth to that which is interpreted. Since we live in a world of change and motion, it may well be the case, that what is, depends on perspective, such as what is indicated by the relativity of simultaneity. If the truth is perspective dependent, and each perspective is capable of producing an interpretation, then how can there be such a thing as "the truth' which is beyond our interpretations?

And yet also - at least for pragmatist accounts of truth - it is an important point that we are also only trying to serve our own purposes. We can afford to be indifferent about "the Truth" in some grand ontic totalising sense. — apokrisis

Now you introduce a temporal aspect to the interpretation itself, suggesting that when we interpret, now, we have a view toward the future, and this may influence one's interpretation. This really complicates matters with respect to 'the truth", because now judgements concern what will be, or ought to be, just as much as what is. And if we extend this toward the past as well, we have judgements about what was as well as what is.

If there is a radical difference between what was (that it cannot be changed), and what will be (that it may or may not occur), how could we reconcile these two distinct aspects of reality with a "truth" which concerns what is.

Whether any particular proposition a sentence might express is true isn't mind-dependent unless that proposition is specifically about or involves minds essentially.

...and what a sentence expresses, is dependent on a linguistic practices in turn dependent on minds in some way. — The Great Whatever

Aren't these two statements somewhat contradictory? How can it be the case that "what a sentence expresses" is mind dependent, but whether or not "what the sentence expresses" is true, isn't mind dependent. If there is no such thing as "what the sentence expresses" without a mind, then how could there be a truth or falsity concerning "what the statement expresses" without a mind?

But then - if we stop to think about it more carefully - all we really "know" is that these are the signs we interpret in such and such a way. So we can ascribe truth to that habit of interpretation. We can point to the robustness of a relation. But the territory itself stands beyond the map. And we might not really "know" it at all. It is only our particular habit of relation that is ever actually tested, and so has its "truth" demonstrated, by some act of interpretation. — apokrisis

Don't you think that we mostly assume that there is some kind of "truth" which is beyond our interpretations? So despite the way we interpret things, we assume that there is a truth of the matter, which our interpretations cannot grasp the entirety of. And as much as we might use 'truth" to refer to consistency in our interpretations, between multiple individuals, we still assume a 'truth' which is beyond this, standing in relation to the territory itself.

The world exists separately from us, this is its facticity. What happens in the world happens regardless of our presence. Sure we can learn about it, study fossils, the cosmos, learn how the world works, but since we are also part of the world, our viewpoint has to be circular. — Cavacava

But "the world" is a construct, and the idea that what happens in the world happens regardless of our presence is a construct as well. So it's really not useful to take this type of realist position because it lacks in what we would call "truth". And once you dismiss this position as ill-founded, something which is commonly believed but not true, you no longer will see yourself as part of the world, but the world as part of yourself. The true territory is not external.

Alcohol makes people do stupid things, its addictive, kills people, AND is involved in some 80% of all fatal car accidents and violent crimes. — wuliheron

Where I live, using the phone is involved in more fatal accidents than alcohol. The statistic for alcohol is far less than 80%.

Is this supposed to be why you don't drink, or an argument why no one should drink? You know, what works for one doesn't necessarily work for everyone.

Yes and no. If we assume that what the author meant is what they mean, then yes. And that is what I was assuming, so that's not a problem. The author intended to write them in a certain way, with a certain meaning. — Sapientia

Here's the difficulty right here. Let's say that the author intended to write all the symbols exactly as they appear on the paper. That is exactly what the author meant, to produce exactly those symbols in that exact pattern or order. We still assume that there is something which was meant, beyond this expression of symbols. We assume that there is something which was meant by the author, which is represented by the symbols, that the symbols represent something. Therefore we attribute "what was meant by the author" not directly to the pattern of symbols, but to that which lies beyond, what is represented by the symbols.

I have to call you out on your use of present-tense here, though. You say that the meaning is what is intended by the author. But that isn't necessary, and, as a necessity, is demonstrably false. The meaning can be what was intended by the author. It is demonstrably the case that the author doesn't need to constantly intend that meaning. What would happen when the author dies, and can no longer intend anything, let alone the meaning of what he wrote? What he wrote would instantly become meaningless, and remain meaningless ever after? That is absurd. — Sapientia

I have no issue with this problem of tense. I can replace "meaning" with "what was meant", as in the paragraph above, if that makes it easier to understand. We still have to deal with the distinction between "the author meant to write down these symbols", and what the author meant to represent with these symbols. These two are distinct, but related intentions. Following from what you argue here, what this phrase refers to, "what the author meant to represent" never had any existence. That's fine, and not at all absurd as you would claim here. As per my last post, that there is such a thing as "what the author meant to represent", is just an assumption held by the reader. Without this assumption, all the symbols on the paper are meaningless, as you say, but contrary to your claim, there is nothing absurd about that.

The problem here isn't so much in what you've taken issue with. The problem here is that the above contains more tense errors. If, in key parts of your text, you were to speak in past tense ("was"), or in conditional tense ("would", "were", "could"), where appropriate, then that would remove the controversy. Your failure to do so basically means that you're begging the question again. So, you'd still need to provide an argument. — Sapientia

As I said, I'll adhere to proper tense use, replacing "meaning" with "what was meant". The point I'm trying to make though, is that there is nothing real, which exists as "what was meant", other than a pattern of symbols. But this pattern of symbols does not constitute meaning for a reader. The reader must assume that there is a "what was meant" beyond the pattern of symbols, what the symbols represent. So the symbols have no meaning without a reader to assume that there is a "what was meant".

Yet it doesn't follow from any of this that there would need to be a mind for the symbols to have a meaning. So, that is what you'd need to support. — Sapientia

It is you who is making the tense errors. There is only "what was meant", at the time which the author wrote the symbols. You, for some reason, assume that this continues in time as "meaning", such that the symbols have meaning at the present time. This is what needs to be justified. "What was meant" is in the past, "meaning" is in the present. The difference between these two, past and present, justifies my claim that the symbols have no meaning. What you need to do is to show how "what was meant" continues to exist at the present, as meaning. First, you need to justify that there is such a thing as "what was meant".

Following your stated principles, as I explained, the symbols have absolutely no meaning unless there is a mind which assumes that there is a "what was meant". If we remove your conditions, and allow that there is a real "what was meant by the author", and this "what was meant" is not restricted to the past, but continues to exist as "meaning", within the statement, then we can dispose of the need for a mind to assume that there is a "what was meant". However, doing this produces a temporal absurdity, which must be dealt with. An intention at a particular time in the past, "what was meant", is assumed to continue in the present, as "meaning". I know that intention has an odd sort of relation to time, but how do we validate this claim? How do we justify that what was meant, at a particular point of time in the past, when the author writes the symbols, exists as meaning today, without a mind to assume that there is a what was meant?

What was meant doesn't have to be in the symbols. It is a fact that the author intended a meaning. It is a fact that the author meant something with the symbols. When talking about this, one shouldn't use scare quotes. But if you're talking about what another mind guesses to be what the author meant, then yes, use scare quotes. That way one can distinguish between what was meant and "what was meant". What was meant isn't only an assumption, but "what was meant" might be. — Sapientia

Even if we assume that it is a fact that the author intended a meaning, that act is in the past. How does the act of having intended a meaning, in the past, ensure that a meaning exists now at the present. I use quotes on "what was meant", because these words refer to something conceptual only, something within the mind, as intention. There is the intent itself, "what was meant" and this was only in the mind of the author, at that time of writing, in the past. There is also an interpretation of "what was meant", and this is in the mind of the reader. You seem to assume that there is such a thing as "what was meant", in order to claim objective meaning, but that's just an assumption.

Nonsense. If, for example, one of the rules is not to speak, and a kid speaks, then that kid has broken that rule. There doesn't need to be an interpreter. — Sapientia

Actually, your claim is what is nonsense. Of course there needs to be an interpretation, otherwise your supposed rule, "not to speak" is just symbols. Who interprets what it means "to speak" and "not to speak", in order to determine whether the kid has actually broken the rule? If the kid hums or starts making all kinds of unintelligible gibberish noises, has the rule been broken?

You are ignoring the fact that I said the category from which complementary distinctions originate is the third category of vagueness. All categorisation has this triadic (that is, semiotic) organisation in my book ... if not yours. — apokrisis

Let me get this straight then, you have one mother category "vagueness", and any other category is assumed to exist as a subset of this category.