The apple sitting on the table is the same apple that I pick up and take a bite out of a few seconds later. That is what is meant by identity.

It doesn't matter that the apple's atoms may be replaced by other atoms of the same kind over time or that the apple's appearance changes. Those aspects are not what our ordinary notions of identity and existence refer to. — Andrew M

Now my point, Andrew M. Appeals to identity do not support the real existence of the apple. "Identity" claims, asserts, or presupposes existence, but what we need here is the principles by which such a claim of existence is justified. Then we can apply these principles in an attempt to justify the existence of the particle, as an identified existent.

For example, suppose that you eat the apple. We must agree that at some point, the apple no longer exists. What comprises this passage from existence to non-existence of the apple? What distinguishes, or separates its existence from its non-existence. If we claim that it is our ability to identify the apple, as "the apple", which validates the existence of the apple, then we have nothing real, nothing objective here to support our claims of existence, we have only a subjective principle, that if the apple can be identified, it exists. Therefore to support our claims that the identified object, the apple, has real objective existence, we need to look for something real, inherent within the apple, which we can refer to for justification of its claimed existence. That's what Aristotle called the matter.

As implied in my discussion with you already and in my discussion with apokrisis, in modern physics we have switched this principle out. It is no longer assumed that matter, which is inherent within the object, is the principle which justifies the existence of the object. The existence of the object is justified by its relationships to other objects (relativity). That's what I discussed with apokrisis as "context". But then each context itself must be justified so we get a wider and wider context until we end up with the largest context, what apokrisis called the Cosmos.

In simple terms, we have an assumed "world", or "universe", and if the identified object has a valid position within this world, it has context and therefore existence. But the existence of that object is only valid within the context of that assumed world. So I asked apokrisis, what validates the existence of the "Cosmos", or in this case the "world" and the answer was "mathematics".

So here's the problem. The logical system at work here is set up with the premise that the existence of the object is justified if, or, "the object exists if", it has contextual relations with other objects (relativity). So any mathematics used will produce conclusions from this premise. If we desire to assume a "Cosmos", "universe", or "world", to objectify such relationships, and validate the existence of any particular object, that very premise, will not allow that the assumed "world" has existence except in relation to other worlds.

My point is that you can only do it via some kind of dichotomistic "othering". You will only have a metaphysically strong argument if you can describe the situation in terms of some mutually exclusive/jointly exhaustive pairing.

And so it is the kind of separation that in fact encodes a co-dependency. Each needs the other as the negation which underpins its own affirmation. And thus really any categorical separation is merely towards complementary limits. It becomes the disunity of a symmetry breaking which reveals the existence of a unitary symmetry. — apokrisis

I don't agree with this. A categorical separation is not a distinction of co-dependency or complementary limits. The opposing terms, which describe the limits, hot and cold, big and small, for example, are always within the same category. If we describe two distinct categories with two distinct words, these are not opposing terms of co-dependency or complimentary limits, as you suggest, because those necessarily fall within the same category.

The argument is familiar to you. The proper opposition is not between substances (actual physical things) and (immaterial) ideas, It is between (physically general) potential - prime matter or Apeiron - and (mathematically general) forms. — apokrisis

So here we have a categorical separation, the distinction between matter and form. But notice it is not a "proper opposition", it is not an opposition at all, it is a categorical distinction. The opposition, of being and not-being is contained within the category of form.

The categorical separation I actually make - using systems jargon - is between constraints and freedoms. And then that separation in fact gets triadic or hierarchical development. That is how we end up with the hylomorphic "sandwich" of possibility, actuality and necessity. — apokrisis

But constraints and freedoms are just the two limits of form, they describe the two complimentary limits, and as such, are of the same category.

So in the beginning there is just vagueness - the perfect symmetry of the ultimately indeterminate. — apokrisis

All right, now this is a different category, "vagueness". So we have one category which consists of constraints and freedoms, and another category which consists of vagueness. Have you any principles whereby you establish a relationship between these two categories? Is one prior to the other? It appears like your claim is that vagueness is prior, but how could constraints and freedoms emerge from pure vagueness? That doesn't make sense, there is a categorical separation between these two.

But if the writer wrote them in a certain way, with a certain meaning, then, I mean, that would be their meaning, right? — Sapientia

That's not their meaning though, that the writer wrote the symbols in a certain way. The meaning is not the "way" that they are written, because this just refers to the specific symbols used, and the patterns formed with them. The "meaning" is what is intended by the author, and this is something other than the symbols themselves, and the patterns, it is what they refer to.

And if you or anyone else interpreted them in any other way, then that would be assigning them a different meaning. It would be to misinterpret them. And if the writer and everyone else died, then wouldn't it remain to be the case that there is - or would be - a correct way, as well as, by implication, incorrect ways, to interpret them? This would be what the writer meant when he or she wrote them - and this seems to be just as true today, even after the writer has ceased to exist, as it would be in the hypothetical scenario, when the writer, as well as everyone else, has ceased to exist. Of course, in the hypothetical scenario, there wouldn't be anyone there to do the interpreting - but why would there need to be? — Sapientia

So I agree with all of this, that there is a correct "what the writer meant" etc., with one fundamental difference. "What was meant" is something other than the symbols themselves, and the pattern itself. And so, as much as we can assume that there is a "what was meant", it's really not there in the symbols themselves, it's in the assumption of the mind which apprehends the symbols. A mind apprehends the symbols and assumes that there is a "what was meant". There is no "what was meant" within the symbols themselves, there is an assumption in the mind which apprehends the symbols, that there is a "what was meant". Therefore there is no "what was meant", without a mind which assumes that there is a "what was meant". The "what was meant" is only an assumption.

I find this idealist way of thinking to be logically unsound and rather bizarre. It's like there's a school, and the school has rules, but the idealist thinks that whether or not the kids break the rules depends on whether or not there is a teacher there watching over them, rather than simply whether or not the kids break the rules. I mean, sure, you can add premises to make that a logically valid argument, but you'd be doing so at the cost of logical soundness. — Sapientia

Where would these rules exist? Let's say that they are written somewhere in a book or something. Whether or not a kid breaks a rule requires that someone interprets what is written in that book, and interprets what the kids do, and draws a comparison. It is your argument which is unsound. You think that you can make a conclusion about whether or not any kids broke any rules without a statement of what the kids did, and a statement of what the rules are.

Don't you realize that whether or not someone breaks a rule is something which is subject to interpretation? That is why we have trial by jury, to give the defendant a fair trial. It is not a case of either the person broke the law or did not, it is a case of how the person's actions are interpreted in comparison to how the laws are interpreted.

For them to state a truth requires that the symbols have a meaning which corresponds to reality. Why would it need to be determinate?

And even if it does, then for the symbols to have a determinate meaning is for the symbols to have a meaning which is capable, in principle, of being determined. Which is to say that if they were interpreted, then there would be a meaning to be determined. Which doesn't necessitate any interpreter or determiner. So, the question would then be: why are you adding this unnecessary condition that there be an interpreter or determiner? — Sapientia

OK, for the sake of argument, let's say that "determinate" implies "capable, in principle, of being determined". It actually means definite, and let's assume that definite necessitates that it is possible to determine it, and therefore determinable. The problem is that we have nothing more than an assumption that the symbols have determinate meaning. In order for them to state a truth, they must actually have a determinate meaning. How do we get beyond this gap, from assuming that the symbols have a determinate meaning, to them actually having a determinate meaning? We might say, that the author, gave the symbols a determinate meaning through intention, as what was meant. But how is this something which is actually determinate, rather than just us assuming that the author gave them a determinate meaning?

Why? The burden would be on you to justify that. It would mean something to a mind, if a mind was there, doing whatever it does for it to mean something to it. — Sapientia

Do you understand the meaning of "meaning"? It is what is meant. And what is meant refers to what is intended. It is only minds which have intention. Therefore meaning only exists in relation to minds. We can go back, and insist that the meaning was put there, in those symbols, through the intention of the author, but this is just an assumption. And assumptions only exist in minds. So, that there is meaning within the symbols, put there by a mind, is just an assumption, so even this meaning relies on a mind, because it is just an assumed meaning.

Once we get to the cosmic scale, then things turn mathematical. We can start looking for the inescapable truths of symmetry and symmetry breaking. That - as ontic structural realism now realises - becomes the larger context that restricts physical possibility in rather radical fashion. — apokrisis

Isn't that switching categories though? If we put a thing into a context of other things, to validate its existence, isn't it a category error to attempt to validate a thing's existence by putting it into a mathematical context? In other words, mathematics cannot validate a thing's existence, because it cannot give the thing context, because there is a categorical separation between physical things and mathematics.

But I also generalise the notion of apparatus so that the Cosmos is "an apparatus". It does have a past history that acts as a constraint on quantum indeterminacy. — apokrisis

The "existence" of the particle is validated by its context, within the apparatus. The "existence" of the apparatus is validated by placing it within another context. If the "Cosmos" is the apparatus, then to validate its existence requires that it be positioned within a context. The past history of the Cosmos does not provide us with this context, because its history is actually part of the Cosmos. To put it into context is to relate it to something external to it.

It may seem a subtle point, but what I said was there was no (classically-imagined) particle. There was "an evolving wave of probability of detecting a (classically-imagined) particle that reflects the shape of the apparatus".

So I was trying to highlight the irreducible quantum contextuality of the existence of any "particle". — apokrisis

Fair enough. If you read my earlier posts, I suggested we could question the existence of the "particle", just like we can question the existence of objects in general. Andrew M took exception to this.

While of course there are philosophical issues here, the fact is that most people reasonably do think that many things exist and also think that standard scientific explanations are applicable to those things. So that really needs to be the starting point for any meaningful discussion. — Andrew M

As you describe, apokrisis, the particle exists only in the context of the apparatus. Now, we assign a larger context of "existence" in general to the apparatus, and this is supported by its relationship to other things, and in particular, the observer. So the existence of the particle is supported by the existence of the apparatus. If we remove this assumption, that the apparatus exists, then it follows that the particle no longer is assumed to exist. In order to understand the existence of the particle therefore, it is necessary to justify the "existence" of the apparatus, and this is to formulate an understanding of what it means to exist as an object.

Do you get the complementarity principle? Is one description right and the other wrong? Or are both a reflection of some chosen measurement basis? — apokrisis

Complementarity applies to the attributes of an object. To say, as you did, 'there is no particle travelling through the apparatus" is to say that there is no object called "the particle" to which the complementarity principle may be applied. To then speak of the paths of the particle is simple contradiction. The object being referred to exists as a wave particle duality, so if there is no particle travelling through the apparatus it really doesn't make any sense at all to ask questions concerning which way the particle goes.

So, it is analogous to the interference of waves in a medium, but here there isn't a medium! So the reason it is perplexing is because, there are waves, but nothing for the waves to be 'in'. The 'waves', so called, really are probability distributions, not actual 'waves' at all. — Wayfarer

This is the dilemma which special relativity gives us. The principles of this theory deny the possibility of a real medium for electromagnetic waves. It is impossible that there is a medium for light waves, or else the special theory of relativity would be an incorrect representation. Light must always maintain the same velocity relative to objects, so there cannot be a medium, or else the object would have its velocity relative to the medium, rather than relative to the waves.

But the physicists who interpret special relativity do not allow for the possibility that the medium may actually be attributed to the object, that the object might actually be the medium itself. This would allow that the object maintains a constant velocity relative to the light waves, and also that these waves have a medium. Instead, physicists produce an artificial medium, space-time, which is completely separate, conceptual, it is unreal, and this unreal medium is the only place where the waves can exist. I think that this is an unreal representation of reality which creates false models. Instead of understanding electromagnetic waves as a property of objects, they are understood as the property of a conceptual medium, space-time, and this produces a categorical separation between the waves and the objects. The object itself, the real mind-independent object, has no real position in this conceptual medium.

But such caveats aside, there is no particle travelling through the apparatus. Instead there is an evolving wave of probability of detecting a particle that reflects the shape of the apparatus. If there are two slits that the wave has to pass through, then it "goes through both" and you get the resulting wave-like interference effect. — apokrisis

Ok. so let's assume that there is no particle, I'm cool with that. Isn't that what you say here, "there is no particle"?

Well you are wrong. It is an important point that the particle "goes both ways" even if it was a one-off, never to be repeated, experiment. — apokrisis

Wait a minute, I thought the assumption was that there is no particle. Where did the particle come from?

It doesn't contradict it. This just comes down to Wittgenstein's private language argument which, as I recall, you reject.

The term "existence" has a public referent. We point to an apple and say that that is what we mean by something existing. Even though we update our knowledge about apples from time to time, we are still referring to the same ordinary, familiar, existing apples that we were before. — Andrew M

When one refers to "the apple", that individual is referring to a particular instance of temporal continuity in which the similitude of an apple is of the essence. In order that one can refer to 'the apple", it is necessary that this similitude appears for a duration of time. What constitutes the "existence" of that apple is that this similitude persists through a duration of time. If the similitude seemed to flash upon the scene for a simple yoctosecond of time, then was gone, we could hardly assign "existence" to the apple. "Existence" requires that the described thing has a temporal duration

My apple, at the moment, may have a well-defined position. So it therefore will be in a superposition of momenta. This just means it's not a classical object, it's a quantum object. — Andrew M

There is no such thing as your apple at "the moment", because as soon as you mention this moment, it is then the next moment.. You only have "an apple", if the same identifiable thing persist through an extended period of time, so this "existence" is not defined by a moment of time, it is defined by an extended period of time.


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If you're trying to make a point, you should explain yourself more clearly, because what you have said so far appears as irrelevant nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you consider your work, the work for which you are paid, a net contribution to your life, or a net subtraction? — Bitter Crank

My time spent working, earning a living, is a significant part of my life. If that hugely significant portion of my life was not somehow making a contribution to my life, I don't know how I could live with myself. This would be a massive contradiction. I would be spending this huge part of my life, in an effort to subtract from my overall experience of "my life". How could I ever maintain such an existence, which would be to spend much of my existence in an effort to negate my existence? It doesn't make sense.

The problem I see here, is that you have attempted to separate "psychological income" from "financial income", and this can't be done in any clear cut way. Work is necessary for financial income, and financial income is necessary to maintain psychological stability. So one must view one's work as a necessary ingredient in psychological stability, and therefore necessarily "psychological income". To vary from this is to invite psychological instability.

Sure, but try making a fantasy or fictitious EXPLANATION. — tom

A fictitious explanation is even easier than a fictitious description, because empirical evidence relates directly to the description, not the explanation. So I could provide a fictitious description of what I see out my window, suppose I describe a bicycle chained to a post. But this could be verified empirically, and determined to be fictitious. My explanation of why there is a bike chained to the post, a man put it there last night, or a woman put it there this morning, is an occurrence in the past, and therefore cannot be empirically verified. The explanation can be denied as fictitious only when it is determined that some elements of the description are fictitious. Either the description, "there is a bicycle chained to a post" is determined as fictitious, or the description of the man putting it there is determined as inconsistent with what is empirically determinable. The conclusion that the explanation is fictitious can only follow from empirical determination of fictitious elements in the description. Therefore any sort of fictitious explanation can pass as a possible truth, so long as consistency with the empirical evidence is maintained.

If you're trying to make a point, you should explain yourself more clearly, because what you have said so far appears as irrelevant nonsense.

How do you explain quantum interference if the other path does not "exist"? How can things that don't exist be physically causal? — tom

If you read my posts, what I contest is the assumption that the particle, or any object in general exists. To talk about any paths of the object is pointless before we've established the existence of the object.

How can things that don't exist be physically causal? — tom

Causality is a description, and there is nothing which prevents us from making imaginary or fictitious descriptions.

It's not an either-or. MW is just the ordinary language interpretation of QM.

That doesn't imply that things will therefore exist in the way that we might intuitively think. Who knew that things wouldn't have a precise position and momentum at the same time? They still exist, but we've learned new things about them. — Andrew M

It is an either-or, you're just in denial. You're claiming that the only possible starting point for meaningful discussion, is the premise that things exist in the intuitive, common sense notion of "things exist". And you want to maintain this premise, while introducing the QM premise that things do not "have a precise position and momentum at the same time". Do you not see that this QM premise contradicts the common sense notion of "exists"? When there is contradiction, we have an either-or situation.

If you want to proceed in understanding the quantum reality, you must drop this ancient, outdated, notion of existence, which is inherently contradictory to the quantum reality. When "matter" was superseded by "energy" as the principle of continuity in the physical world, "existence" in the common sense notion of the word, was lost. Berkeley demonstrated that there is no necessity to the assumption of matter, it's just a useful premise. Aristotle introduced it as a way to account for continuity in an ever changing world. The assumption that "matter" is real makes continuity real. That is what is at issue here, what assumptions will we make to account for continuity?

Aristotle posits matter as the principle of continuity, it's the continuous thing which is real. Newton adapts the principle of continuity, in his first law of motion, to allow that the continuous thing is moving. Notice that the formulation of Newton's first law is such that the motion of the thing is that which is continuous, not the "matter", which refers to the very existence of the thing. the very existence of the thing is no longer addressed, just the motion of the thing is said to be continuous. Now, the continuity of existence is assigned to a description of the object, a formula, which describes its motion. Here, the continuity of existence is attributed to a form of the object, its motion, rather than using the Aristotelian principle which assigns the continuity of existence to the object's matter. Matter and form are two completely distinct aspects of the object.

Are you ready to proceed into the realm of "energy", in which the continuity of existence is firmly established to be inherent within the formula, the description which applies to the movement of the object? If so, we cannot turn back and try to assign to the object itself a continuity, without some mathematical principles, because this is to relate one continuity to multiple continuities. We've given up the Aristotelian notion of individual continuities for each and every object (matter), in favour of one universal continuity, energy. This continuity is expressed now as a wave function, and to relate the wave function to individual continuities, of individual particles, requires field mathematics.

Do you AndrewM, recognize that there is a fundamental incompatibility between the premise that there is just one continuity, and the premise that there is multiple continuities? These two premises are incompatible, contradictory. So, when we progressed from Aristotle's principle of matter, which assumes a continuity for each individual object (multiple continuities), to modern physics' principle of "energy", which assumes just one universal continuity for all objects, we crossed a gap of incompatibility. There are principles of relativity which bridge this gap, but the fact remains that there is an inherent incompatibility, and the bridge is just an illusion. This illusion creates a misunderstanding in those people who believe that the gap has been bridged. Now, when we proceed back across the bridge, to relate the wave function, which represents the one single continuity, to the multiple continuities of individual particles, through the means of field mathematics, we have that very same incompatibility. There is no bridge there, the bridge is just an illusion created by relativity theory.

OK, but then QM would not be applicable to anything since it only applies to things that exist.

While of course there are philosophical issues here, the fact is that most people reasonably do think that many things exist and also think that standard scientific explanations are applicable to those things. So that really needs to be the starting point for any meaningful discussion. — Andrew M

I think the issues with QM, especially the MWI, indicate quite clearly that things do not exist in the same way "that most reasonable people" think that they exist. Therefore your claim that this "really needs to be the starting point for any meaningful discussion" is completely unjustified. In fact, that claim only demonstrates your ontological prejudice.

How can you take MWI seriously, yet at the same time, claim that the existence of things, as most reasonable people use "existence", needs to be the starting point for any meaningful discussion? The two are contradictory. Either we take QM, and MWI seriously, as a premise, to see what conclusions may be produced, and forget about the "existence" which most reasonable people refer to, or we take the "existence" which most reasonable people refer to, and forget about QM and MWI.

So, which do you choose? Do you want to discuss MWI, or do you want to adhere to the "existence" which most reasonable people refer to?

I don't understand your difficulty. Memory doesn't have to draw any boundaries: it's not like it can choose a different scope or perspective than that which is given by the conditions in which its bearer finds itself. To put it simply, you can't have memories of what you (your body, for lack of a better term) haven't experienced. — SophistiCat

I don't think this is true. Our memories are often inaccurate, especially concerning things distant in time. It's as if we tend to remember things the way we want to remember them, then when we check to corroborate with others, we find big discrepancies. The imagination may be actively involved in the memorizing process. So it's quite false to say that we can't have memories of what we haven't experienced. And I think csalisbury's point is accurate, that there is a type of selection process involved in remembering. When whatever it is which is selecting, selects from the imagination, then we have the problems I refer to.

As far as I'm aware, you haven't done that so far. — Sapientia

Let me explain very slowly and carefully then. There's a bunch of symbols written on a piece of paper. These symbols could mean absolutely anything. For them to state a "truth" requires that the symbols have a determinate meaning, which corresponds to reality. For the symbols to have a determinate meaning requires a mind to determine that meaning. Therefore without a mind there is no truth to those symbols.

Here's another way of looking at it. There's something written on the paper. Whatever it is which is on the paper cannot be a "truth" unless it means something. It only means something to a mind. Therefore, only from the perspective of a mind, can what is on the paper be a "truth".

I've outlined an alternative theory which can explain that without the need of positing any mind being there. — Sapientia

I don't recall your alternative theory, I'd be interested in seeing it though.

But even if you disagree, firing single electrons will also produce an interference pattern. In fact the double-slit experiment has been performed with molecules comprising 810 atoms. — Andrew M

But in my post, I questioned the existence of all objects, so referring to molecules doesn't change anything. It is likely that the appearance of an object is something which is created by the mind. If this is the case, then we have to ask, what is it about the world which our minds interpret as objects. In the most simple, fundamental form, an object is the appearance of a temporal continuity of stability, something which stays the same, or can be described by laws of inertia, for a period of time.

The mind sees thing in terms of objects, which is a temporal continuity of the same, such that a change to the same, must be accounted for, by causation. The mind "chooses" aspects of reality which demonstrate a continuity of sameness, and produces the appearance of objects. We can challenge this, is it real this temporal continuity of the same, and if so, what are those aspects of reality which the mind chooses to seize upon, and create the appearance of objects.

If we remove this assumed temporal continuity of the same, then we have no support for the appearance of objects. In order to validate the existence of objects now, we must determine what produces the appearance of a temporal continuity of the same, what produces the appearance of stability in time. It is this appearance of stability which produces our conclusions that something should be like this, or should be like that. But if this is simply taken for granted, then we have no understanding of the reasons why it should be like that. Therefore it is necessary to determine what causes temporal continuity, the sameness from one moment to the next, in order to validate the real existence of any object.

The original question was just an example question, as I made quite clear. But you chose to answer it of your own accord.

...

I'm interested in an explanation or an argument. — Sapientia

OK, I gave you my explanation, concerning the nature of statements and symbols. What more do you want?

One meaning of the word "statement" is to use it to refer to the symbols themselves as they exist. Another meaning of the word "statement" is to use it to refer to what the symbols mean. We should not conflate these two or equivocate.

All you are doing is conflating the two and equivocating. Look:

That's a very naive attack on the correspondence theory of truth. No, it doesn't work like that. Perhaps you should look it up. It's about a certain sort of statement, not a word. — Sapientia

Then to my claim that that statements are composed of symbols, you said:

Yes... — Sapientia

So, which are we talking about, a statement as a bunch of symbols, or a statement as the meaning, such that we can have "a certain sort of statement"

I want to know how there can't be mathematical truths without a mind, yet it remains truth there is paper with symbols on it. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It surely wouldn't be true. Did anything I said imply that it would be?

An answer isn't the same as an argument, whether it's firm or not. — Sapientia

You asked me to answer the question, that I did. I also gave you the reasons for my answer. if you wanted an argument you should have asked for it. That's what I do, I ask you to justify your numerous assertions, which you very seldom are capable of doing.

Why would it need to be interpreted, at the time, for it to be true? That is demonstrably not the case now, so why would it be any different in the hypothetical future scenario? — Sapientia

A bunch of symbols on a paper is neither true nor false without an interpretation. How many different ways must I spell this out?

I have made countless statements on here, and elsewhere, and they are either true or false, as the case may be - even when no one is interpreting them. There obviously isn't someone or other there constantly interpreting every statement that I've made. Yet, nevertheless, they are true or false, in correspondence with what is or isn't the case. — Sapientia

These statements that you've made here and elsewhere, consist of symbols. Why do you believe that these symbols correspond to anything without a mind to judge what they correspond to? Can you justify this? Does this symbol "to", automatically correspond to something without a mind to determine what it corresponds to?

Yes, categories have fuzzy bounfaries. (I don't think imaginary nymbers is anywhere near such a boundary, btw.) — Brainglitch

OK, so let's take imaginary numbers for example. I think that this is a convention which is disputable. You seem to think otherwise. Therefore it would seem that you think that my disputing them is unreasonable.

A major indicator of the categorical difference between established math, logic, and science claims on the one hand, and moral claims on the other, is that dispute about the truth or falsity of a math, logic, science claim, is readily resolvable by appeal to the clear, universally agreed-upon rules and standards, but there is no resolution, even in principle, for dispute about the truth or falsity of whether or not most actual instances of given behaviors are moral or immoral. — Brainglitch

To justify your claim, it should be the case that we can resolve our difference concerning imaginary numbers, by appealing to universally agreed upon standards. So let's see if we can. The square of 4 is 16. The square of -4 is 16. The square of i4 (imaginary 4) is -16. The mathematical principles and universal standards, which I go by, deny the possibility that there can be a square root of a negative number. That is because any time that a negative number is multiplied by a negative number, the result is a positive number. There is very simple logic behind this. You take a negative number, a negative amount of times, and you are always going to end up with a positive. Therefore it is impossible that a negative number has a square root, and the principle of imaginary numbers is contrary to universally agreed upon standards, and should be rejected.

However, for some reason unknown to me, some mathematicians allow this convention of imaginary numbers, which is contradictory to universally agreed upon conventions, to exist. Here's the issue, one mathematical, logical, or scientific convention may be contradictory to another convention, yet they are allowed to coexist, being used in different applications. Sure, we can appeal to universally accepted standards, and readily demonstrate contradictions, in such standards, from one field of study to another, but this will not convince those who maintain the contradictory conventions to resolve the differences, they will just claim some other reason why contradictory principles are allowed to coexist in different fields of study. Different applications require different conventions, and it doesn't matter if the conventions contradict, as long as the applications stay separate.

The fact that some moral prescriptions and proscriptions, such as murder and stealing, are found across many societies does not provide a way to judge whether a given instance of killing counts as "murder" or not, whether the killing was justified or not, whether there are there are mitigating factors that reduce the immorality or obviate it entirely or not, whether a preventive strike is morally warranted or not, whether a revenge murder is immoral or not, whether an instance of the taking of property counts as stealing or not, whether such taking is morally permissible or not, the cobditions under which it is morally permissable to take without permission. — Brainglitch

Well that is the way such judgements are made, we have to keep referring to further principles to determine the exact specifics of any situation. Some acts of killing might not be clear cut cases of murder or not-murder, so we have to turn to further principles. It is no different in science, with the acts of measurement. If I have a hundred grams of water, this will not indicate precisely, without possibility of error, how many molecules I have. I have to turn to a more precise form of measurement, moles. But measuring the moles won't indicate without the possibility of error, how many electrons are there. So in each case, moral judgement, and scientific measurement, there are borderline cases which cause us to seek further defining principles.

Furthermore, there is unresolved dispute about whether the remedy for such behaviors is moral or not. Is it mroal to cut off the hand of a thief? Put him in prison? For how long? Hang him? Transport him to the wilds of America or Australia? Is it moral for the murderer to surrender a daughter to the family of the victim in recompense? — Brainglitch

I think that this is a slightly different issue, it is the question of how to produce morality, the purpose of punishment. This would be similar to the question of the application of mathematical and scientific principles, the conventions by which these are applied. But contrary principles for application, in varying fields of study, would be comparable to varying punishments for the same crime.

The conventions by which we judge the truth or falsity of established math, logic, and science claims are universally agreed upon and once established persist. The conventions by which we judge the morality or immorality of behaviors are not universally agreed upon, but rather are situated historically and culturally, and are disputed between social groups, and demonstrably can evolve from being moral to immoral and vice versa. — Brainglitch

OK, let's assume that you've created a proper equivalency here. Let's say that conventions which are universally agreed upon are necessarily of one category (math science logic category), while conventions which are commonly debated are placed in another category, moral category. Since they are all of the same essential character, as conventions, we can say that there is likely a scale of degree separating these, such that the boundary is a sort of grey area. Or, as I prefer, some of the moral conventions such as those concerning murder and stealing, approach the level of universal acceptance, and some of the mathematical conventions, such as "imaginary numbers" are quite debatable.

If some mathematical conventions are debatable, and some moral conventions are not, as I believe from those examples, then your equivalence is not valid, and this is not what truly characterizes the categorical separation between math and morality. But let me put that issue aside, to focus on that "grey area", which makes the boundary between "universally agreed" and "debatable", because I think that determining the nature of the boundary will expose the true nature of the categories.

The grey area consists of conventions which are neither universally accepted, nor are they commonly debated. These are the conventions of common language use. They are not universally accepted, because they vary across languages, yet we simply use the ones which we are familiar with, without commonly debating them. (They are debatable though, as the discourse between Sapientia and I indicates).

Do you agree that when we accept conventions without debating them, these conventions are the ones which pass into the category of universal acceptance, and this is generally speaking, the category of math, science, logic? When we are inclined to dispute and debate conventions, these are conventions of the moral type. Does this indicate to you, as it does to me, that the conventions of the moral category are more important to us than those of the other category? We perceive them as having more influence over our lives, affecting us more, having bearing on our own personal freedoms, thus we are more inclined to dispute and debate them. So the fact that the conventions of the math category are universally accepted, is a reflection of the fact that they are inherently unimportant to us individually. Our acceptance of them has very little impact on our daily lives, so we accept them, as they are offered, without dispute. Moral conventions, on the other hand, appear to us as to have great significance over our daily lives, so we debate and dispute them, not wanting to allow someone else's principles to have control over our own lives.

So this is what I see as the true nature of these categories. One, the moral, consists of conventions which appear to have significant influence over us, and therefore we are inclined to debate them at any opportunity, and not accept them openly. The other, the science, math, logic conventions do not appear to have significant influence over our personal freedoms, they only affect the way we intellectualize, therefore we freely accept them. Then, what has happened in reality, is that the conventions of the science, math, logic category have been so universally accepted, that they have been empowered, by this universal acceptance, to actually have significant impact over us.

If a single photon is fired in the double-slit experiment, the probability that it arrives at any particular position on the back screen is a function of the sum of the paths it could take.

There are really only two options available. Either the paths are real or they are not. — Andrew M

You forgot one important option. Is the photon real?

(One other option is that QM is false, but I don't think anyone is arguing for that.) — Andrew M

The option is not that QM is necessarily false, the option is that the interpretation of the photoelectric effect, which inclines people to describe light energy in terms of photons, is not a good interpretation.

Similarity is a combination of sameness and difference; it cannot be derived just from sameness. — John

That's true, but what I was pointing to was the importance of sameness, as the basis of equality, as a moral principle. Sameness is an assumed absolute. Similarity is the recognition that only the perfect One is the same, and all other cases of individuals partake of difference.

No, the question was whether it would be true. — Sapientia

I gave a firm answer to that. No, it would not be true, and gave reasons for that answer. You dismissed my reasons, which refer to both past and future, by claiming that my reasons just refer to the past. Then you proceeded to claim that I did not answer the question.

A statement can be true or false. A statement is composed of symbols. — Sapientia

If a statement is just a bunch of symbols, how can it be true or false without an interpretation? Where do the symbols derive a meaning from?

There are two very distinct meanings for the word "statement". One is the expression in words, which you refer to here, the second is the thing stated, which is the assumed meaning of those words. It appears like you are trying to equivocate.

What if probability waves are exactly what they seem - distributions of possibilities? So the patterns will appear along the lines of possibility, but when an object is measured, then they're no longer subject to probability, so the wave "collapses". But really nothing collapses because nothing was there in the first place other than a potentiality.

I think the issue with that, is that so-called 'realism' can't accomodate the notion of a 'real possibility'. It wants to assign existence in terms of a binary value - something either exists or it doesn't. But Heisenberg recognised that on the sub-atomic level, things 'kind of' exist. The parallel, in metaphysics, is the distinction between potential and actual existence - so the observation 'actualises' the potential existence of the object. — Wayfarer

All material existence can be reduced to potential. The concept of energy does this. If this is reality, that all material existence is simply potential, then the appearance of an actual object is a creation of the mind. But I'd say that's a faulty premise, that all material existence is simply potential. If we assume this premise as faulty, we have to question what the reality of "an object" is based in..

I don't think that's the case, as I don't think that difference and similarity can be properly opposed such as to have co-dependent or reciprocal relationship. Similarity is derived from same. Same is an ideal, an absolute, an assumed oneness, while difference is relative, being based in a relation between particulars. So there is a categorical separation between them.

Does (not "did") a mathematical truth obtaining depend on any mind? — Sapientia

Yes, it depended on a mind to be produced, written on the paper, and without a mind to read and interpret it in the future, it is just symbols on the paper. Even if we assume that there is meaning inherent within the symbols on the paper, there is no truth there unless a mind judges that meaning for correctness.

What would happen to mathematical truths if there were no longer any minds? — Sapientia

if there were no longer any minds, there would be just symbols on the paper. There is no truth to these symbols without a mind to interpret them, hence there'd be no mathematical truths without any minds.

Saying that some math principles persist through time sidesteps the fact that the vast majority of established math principles persist, and will continue to persist. That new math knowledge such as zero, calculus, non-euclidian geometries, etc are added to the math corpus is not the same phenomenon as the demonstrable evolution of moral conventions (such as slavery, divine right of kings, stoning adulterers and homosexuals, burning heretics at the stake ... .) — Brainglitch

I don't see the difference which you are claiming. Mathematical principles come into existence, they have in the past come into existence, and from the point that they come into existence, they spread from acceptance amongst a small group of people to a large more widespread group, then they may persist, onward into the future. Moral principles, such as the abolishment of slavery, and the abolishment of stoning adulterers and homosexuals, have come into existence in the past, they start from a small group of people, then spread to a larger group, and may persist onward into the future. Where is the basis for your claim of a "false equivalency"?

Because the ability to make distinctions is fundamental to being able to argue a case. — Wayfarer

Your neglecting the fact that the ability to establish similarities (identify), is even more fundamental. Focusing on differences while neglecting similarities cannot produce an adequate understanding.

Moral conventions demonstrably are culturally and historically situated.

Historically situated means operant in a given culture during a given time span.

On the other hand, the conventions for judging the truth or falsity of arithmetic, as well as other well-established math, logic, and science operate cross culturally, and are not likely to change, precisely because these conventions are clearly specified and universally agreed upon. — Brainglitch

We know that mathematical conventions come into existence. There was a time when there was no zero, no algebra, no calculus. So it's not true to say that they are not likely to change, because evidence demonstrates that they do change. What I suggested is that we could look for particular fundamental principles which persist through time. But couldn't we also find some fundamental moral principles which are cross-cultural, and persist through time? If some mathematical principles are cross-cultural, and persist through time, and some moral principles are cross-cultural and persist through time, how does this proposal provide a valid method for differentiating between the two?

For heaven's sake, because 'literature' and 'history' are different subjects. Imagine enrolling in Eng. Lit. and on your first class, the lecturer says, right, today we commence on the History of the American Civil War. Don't you think you might feel you were in the wrong class? Or would you say, 'hey, what's the difference, it's all just literature anyway'? — Wayfarer

Why do you insist on focusing on the differences rather than the similarities? "Wayfarer" and "Metaphysician Undercover" are two distinct subjects, but within the category of moral responsibility, we are the same, that's what gives rise to the concept of human equality. Within the context of morality, what validates your claim of difference between the subjects "literature" and "history" ? This principle of difference which you are proposing is that wich supports "might is right".

If you assign difference to subjects such as mathematics and science, as a separation from ethics and
philosophy, you allow the possibility that one is superior to the other. Are you ready to accept the consequences of such a proposed differentiation? I do not think that the belief that science is superior to ethics is a healthy belief, and I think you're with me on that. So if you desire to maintain equality between the subjects, why do you propose such a separation without also proposing a means for maintaining equality?

That is why I say that we focus on similarity rather than difference. It is by establishing individual subjects as the same, members within the category, that we establish equality. Once equality is firmly established as the principal, we can consider the differences, all the time maintaining the primary principle that the two are the same, but with differences. If we approach from the perspective of assumed difference, we will never find a principle of equality, and due to the natural inclination of human beings to judge with respect to value, one will be judged as superior to the other.

We can readily see though, that we can differentiate two distinct categories of conventions relevant to this discussion:

(1) conventions that are established across cultural and societal bounds, such as those we invoke when we judge the truth or falsity of math and logic and science and everyday empirical claims and ...

(2) conventions that are situated historically and culturally, such as those we invoke when we judge the morality or immorality of a given behavior. — Brainglitch

OK, I think I see what you mean, some conventions are more universal than others. There are some conventions such as those of mathematics and logic which are accepted by the vast majority of humanity, while other conventions are accepted by a smaller proportion, and some by an even smaller proportion, and some which might only be accepted by a few people.

But this appears to assume a static point in time, at which time the conventions are judged for universality. X convention is accepted a by certain population at time T, and Y convention by a certain population at time T, etc. Don't you think that we need to add a temporal dimension? Say Z convention is a newly discovered mathematical principle. Since it is new, it is only accepted by a few. It doesn't fulfill the conditions for universality, it is just being accepted by a very particular, and extremely limited culture, despite the fact that within a hundred years or so, it might obtain universality.

So I don't think that explaining the difference between mathematical and moral conventions, in this way, properly represents reality. By looking at a static point in time, and judging the universality of a convention, one doesn't account for the evolving nature of conventions. I think that we should establish universality by referring to temporal extension, the longevity of the convention, rather than by looking at how widespread a convention is at any particular time. In this way, we don't get fooled by fads and fashions, which appear to have great universality, but from the perspective of temporal extension, they do not.

Objectivity doesn't obtain via conventions. If anything about mathematics is objective, it's because it's mind-independent. — Terrapin Station

Well I've been trying to get a good description of what constitutes "objectivity". I think we've all agreed that it has to do with being external to the mind. How is mathematics mind-independent? Doesn't mathematics consist of humanly produced symbols, and rules? Either you must believe that the human beings didn't produce these symbols, or you believe that what is symbolized is not humanly produced. The former appears to be clearly false. And with respect to the latter, when I write an equation, doesn't it symbolize what I am thinking? How could the equation symbolize something other than what I am thinking?

There's a world of difference. You're obfuscating a really basic difference in moral philosophy in a way that will inevitably entail relativism. It's like saying 'there's no difference between novels and history, they're both simply types of books'. — Wayfarer

Right, they're both books. So how do you justify "there's a world of difference"? You could just as well say they have different titles, or different covers, how does that entail a world of difference?

When we define or describe something, we move from the most well known (the more particular) to the less well known (the more general). So for instance, a human being is an animal, is a living thing, is an existing thing. The most particular "human being" is the most well known because the particular is present to our senses, while the more general is abstract, and often difficult to grasp. Despite this fact, that the abstract, the general, is less well known, it still serves as the defining feature.

You may claim that there's a world of difference between a book of fiction, and a book of fact, but the defining feature of each, is that it is a book, so I think your claim is unjustified. Books are all written by human beings, so they're all classed as artefacts, and that's a big similarity in the world. And that they are of the same type of artefact, a book, is an even bigger similarity. Your claim is like claiming that there is a world of difference between a human being and another animal. There is not. That they are both living is a big similarity, and that they are both animals is an even bigger similarity. We have to pass through all these categories before we get to the most general. And even of two existing things, if "existing thing" is the most general category, there is not a world of difference between them, because they necessarily have that in common.

What? So, if it's illegal, then it's immoral. Even if the law itself is immoral. So, if the law says it's illegal not to kill someone who insults your family, then it is immoral not to kill that person. But you don't have to believe that, even though it would be irrational not to, given your premise. — Sapientia

I've provide my definition of moral, as concerning goodness or badness, right or wrong, of human behaviour, in all forms of right or wrong. You appear to be using "immoral" in a different way, which is very confusing.

Look, if it's illegal, then from the perspective of those who uphold the law, it is immoral. If you think that this law is immoral, then from your perspective, the illegal act is morally correct.

There are right and wrong answers to mathematical problems, but getting a maths problem wrong is not normally regarded as morally culpable. — Wayfarer

The point though, is that it is through the very same type of training process whereby we learn to judge all the different types of correctness. This is entirely a matter of learning the relevant conventions. So if all forms of learning how to judge correctness can be classed together like this, we need a name for this classification. This judging of correctness is what we call, morality.

There is very little difference between learning to judge Johnny's politeness as correct behaviour, and learning to judge "4" as the correct answer to "2+2". You learn to recognize "2+2=4" and apply the symbol "correct". Likewise, you learn to recognize the appropriate behaviour and apply "good". Yes, while I agree that one deals with the behaviour of the subject, so it is subjective, and the other deals with an assumed objective reality, I believe the process of judging X as correct, or incorrect, is very similar. So if the subject here is this judgement process itself, whereby we judge between right and wrong, not the judgements being made, then these two, objective and subjective judgements should be classed together.

It is the absence of those kinds of moral codes that gives rise to today's relativism and subjectivism, or BrainGlitch's 'meta-ethical nihilism'. That really amounts to saying that all such judgements are ultimately personal or subjective, which again implies that there is no objective morality. By contrast, I think the obtain to an objective morality is to believe that there are 'real moral consequences'. — Wayfarer

Yes, so that's the point, all judgements are inherently subjective. That is why we can class all forms of judgements in one category, as human judgements. Objectivity, we can see, comes about through producing conventions and adhering to them. It is through this adhering to the meaning of the symbols "2", "+", "=", etc., that mathematics gives us objectivity. And other forms of logic operate in the same way, there is a need to adhere to conventions. So we can extend that need, to adhere to conventions, right down to issues of human behaviour.

Are there "legal issues" (what we're actually talking about is legislation, but maybe that's a "legal issue") that do not distinguish between right and wrong and thus are not moral issues? — Terrapin Station

Perhaps, I don't know law very well.

Really? Does it then follow that Ohio Quakers who hid fugitive slaves in 1850 were acting immorally because they were acting illegally? — andrewk

Those who had respect for that law clearly would have believed that they were acting wrongly, and therefore immorally, by disobeying the law, but here we approach the issue of subjectivity. There's lots of laws which I believe are wrong, therefore I believe they're immoral. But that's the thing with morality what I say is wrong, someone else might say is right. When the law says "it's morally wrong to do X", (park on that side of the street), I do not necessarily believe that X is morally wrong, that's free will.

..anyone who deviates from it - even if for good reason - is changing the definitions,,, — Sapientia

I haven't seen any good reasons here yet, just a whole lot of assertions, along with the odd facepalm.

So how about it, where are the good reasons? Why should any judgement, of good or bad, right or wrong, correct or incorrect, be outside the category of morality?

What's at issue in this tangent with Metaphysician Undercover, though is whether "illegal"necessarily implies "immoral" or "morally wrong." — Terrapin Station

Any judgement of "wrong" necessarily implies morally wrong, because that's what a judgement of right or wrong is, a moral judgement.

What I'm asking you about is your analysis of "law." Are you claiming that you're appealing to some common way in academic philosophy of defining "law" as being necessarily moral? — Terrapin Station

What I'm saying is that morality deals with our capacity to differentiate between good and bad, right and wrong. So, it follows that any type of decision making which is such as to distinguish between right and wrong, and this includes correct and incorrect, is inherently a subject of morality. Therefore all legal issues which distinguish between right and wrong are moral issues, and even the principles of mathematics and logic, where it is considered that there is a right answer, are issues of morality. Have you read Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics" where he discusses the intellectual virtues, and contemplation as the highest virtue?

I'm looking at how the word "moral" is defined, and what philosophers in the past have determined concerning the reality of this subject. Look at Plato's "the good" in "The Republic". The good is responsible for the intelligibility of all intelligible objects.

The fact is that the faculty of decision making, in human beings is the same faculty whether or not they are judging not to steal, or to park on the wrong side of the street, or whether it is true that water boils at 100 degrees Celsius. These are all judgements as to what is right or wrong. How could we single out one type of judgement, and attempt to claim that it is radically different from others, when they are all instances of human beings making judgements?

Morality deals with this faculty of deciding what is right and wrong, and to build a good character in a human being is to produce good decision making capacities within that person. The ability of a scientist, to make good objective decisions concerning the empirical evidence, is a moral capacity.

So would you say that it's morally wrong to park on a particular side of the street for a couple hours a couple days per week? — Terrapin Station

If it's not legal to park there, of course it's morally wrong to park there.

Do you understand that "moral" is defined as concerned with the distinction between good and bad, or right and wrong. This means that all instances of judging between right and wrong are moral cases. Any time that someone makes a judgement of right or wrong, this is by definition, a moral judgement.
Morality is concerned with our ability to make good judgements, in general, that is why good moral principles are fundamental in society.

Unlawful doesn't necessarily imply immoral, and the latter is the only interpretation of "wrong" that would be relevant. — Sapientia

In case you forgot how to read, I said that "unlawful" necessarily implies "wrong". We were discussing ethics, which I referred to as rules for human actions. I do believe that laws fall into this category.

See what I mean, you just define words as you please, in order to avoid facing the objective fact that you're wrong. When you can define words willy-nilly there are no objective facts, and you can never be proven wrong. But what's the point in such a semantic exercise?

Are you and Sapientia the same person?