Well, perhaps that's why science is not omniscient! But I think you've made a valid point, and one often forgotten. Maybe that is why Aristotelean physics, though obviously incorrect in fundamental ways, wished to arrive at a more holistic understanding which includes the reason that things happen - in a teleological sense, rather than just because of a chain of efficient causation. In leaving that out, perhaps much else is left out besides. (Check out this book.) — Wayfarer

When we concentrate on descriptions of what is, we tend to take for granted the "what is" part, and proceed in an attempt to describe it. But as Aristotle explained, the fundamental ontological question is why is there what there is rather than something else. So if we look around us at plants and animals, rocks and hills, the earth and the sun, we can wonder, why do these things exist as the things which they are, and not as some other things.

The chain of efficient causation doesn't answer this question because it just gives an infinite regress, so that no matter how far back we go in the chain, we will always wonder why was there that instead of something else, ad infinitum. So the chain of efficient causation, being infinite according to its own requirements, cannot provide us with a complete explanation for any existence. That's why the Neo-Platonists turned to Forms, and the Christians turned to the will of God, as final cause, because this adds the necessary element to "complete" the explanation.

The book looks interesting, I like the topic of how science separated off from the Church. I kind of look at modern science as the child of the catholic church. It's pretty well grown up now and gone in its separate way, but it still learned a lot from the parents.

Under arguments like final cause, people make the mistake of thinking of the whole as a part. They try to understand it as a distinct state that can be named, that sets efficient causation in motion. People don't take the time to realise the whole must be more than this, something which cannot be grasped in terms of a part at all, extending beyond any point (including "final" ) of causation or state. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I don't think you understand final cause too well Willow. Final causation is the only thing which could cause the existence of a whole. When a whole is defined as all the parts existing in particular relationships, such that each has a particular function, or purpose with respect to the whole, then it is self-evident that final cause is the only thing which could cause such an existence.

Modern process philosophers will sometimes deny the real existence of wholes, negating the need for final cause in the classical sense. But they still apprehend the need to account for the observed relationships between particles, and this pushes many of them toward panpsychism.

I suppose on the same principle you object to rulers that pretend to be straight, and clocks that pretend to be regular. — apokrisis

As I said, it's very useful for determining the different ways in which the thing being measured varies from the standard of measurement, but the straight ruler wont tell you why the thing you are trying to measure is crooked. Nor will you get an accurate measurement of the crooked thing using the straight ruler. That's why we must devise other means for measurement. But first we must figure out why the straight ruler is not giving an accurate measurement.

You latched on to a phrase in a way that shows you don't understand the physical argument. Relativity would model the gravitational curvature as perfectly spherical, yet the definition is still asymptotic - the approach to a limit. — apokrisis

Well, we differ in opinion clearly, because I think you will necessarily get a mistaken result if you start from the premise of the perfect symmetry, and work backward away from this, to describe something which is not a perfect symmetry. It's like starting from a false premise.

So I believe that what you describe in the Kerr geometry is very useful for determining the ways in which the real black holes may differ from the perfect symmetry which is derived from the theory. But the real black holes will never be properly understood unless we can establish premises for the reasons why it does not conform to a perfect symmetry, then represent it with theory which starts from those premises, rather than the premise of perfect symmetry. The latter being only useful for determining how the real black hole differs from the perfect symmetry. To determine the true nature of the real black holes would require further speculation, not being accessible through the principles of GR.

I think that I have understood what you've been trying to say, but the point is that I disagree. You think that it is impossible for one to be mistaken about one's perceptions, but I think that to perceive, by itself is essentially an act of interpretation, and like any other act of interpretation, it is possible that one could be wrong in such an act.

I admit that there is a mode of argument on this subject which claims that an interpretation is never right or wrong, it is always purely subjective, and the rightness or wrongness of an interpretation is something imposed by a further judgement. But who would make that judgement, God? And this may be what you are arguing, but I think if we follow this principle, it leaves us with no principles to assume any objective knowledge, without referring to God, as all knowledge involves interpretation. I think we are better off to assume that inherent within any act of interpretation is a judgement of correct, and the interpretation is produced based on this judgement. An interpretation consists of choosing from possibilities, so there is some sort of inherent judgement of correctness. But then we need to accept that this judgement may be mistaken.

So your example of the twinkling star does really address the problem, because it doesn't deal with the issue of person who doesn't perceive the way that one should perceive. If I have bad eyes, and do not see the stars as twinkling, which does happen because my eye sight is bad, and then I put on my glasses, and see them twinkling, am I not correct to say that I was mistaken in my perception, before I put on my glasses?

From wikipedia, it is based in the assumption of a speherical symmetry. But this simply assumes the traditional Newtonian representation of gravity, as a point particle at the gravitational centre of the massive object. I don't believe that such a symmetry has any basis in reality, it's just a theoretical convenience. So there is no reason to believe that the phenomena known as black holes are really similar to the theoretical black holes.

Another flat earther. — apokrisis

Not a flat earther, but a perfect circle denier. The ancient astronomers who wanted to replace the flat earth principles with perfect circles were just as wrong as the flat earthers. They described the sun, planets and moon as orbiting the earth, in perfect circles. The true reality was apprehended only through the realization that the so-called circles were not really circles. Dropping the idea of circles forced them have to figure out what was really the case.

It follows from this lawful relation (i.e. Einstein's field equations) that whenever a spherical distribution of mass achieves a density such that it is contained within its Schwarzschild radius, then the escape velocity at the surface attains the speed of light. — Pierre-Normand

So the Schwarzchild principle does not follow directly from GR then, it follows from the assumption of a "spherical distribution of mas" in conjunction with GR. Such a spherical symmetry is just an ideal, like a perfect circle, there is no such thing in reality.

So the equations did exactly that - obliged us to posit ontologically real outcomes (of which black holes are one of many now empirically supported examples). — apokrisis

Are you claiming that a description which is based in the assumption of an ideal spherical symmetry is ontologically real? You are just committing the very same error as Aristotle when he assumed perfect, eternal, circular motions for the orbits of the planets. Such perfect circles are not ontologically real.

Balls don't know how to roll downhill. If there's a hill, balls will roll down it. It's not as if they can do anything else. Your comment more or less reinforces the notion that panpsychism is anthropomorphic, or attributes intention to inanimate objects. One can well explain the motions of objects without any reference to intention; the problem that panpsychism is trying to solve, is how some 'configurations of matter', like the brain, 'produces' consciousness. — Wayfarer

Describing the motions of things, and explaining the motions of things, are two distinct things. So, you can describe the situation, the ball is set on the hill, and it rolls, just like you can describe the water placed in the sun evaporates, and these are descriptions of those activities. However, the descriptions don't ever completely answer the question of "why?", so they never provide a complete explanation.

That is why I think we need to maintain the distinction between a description and an explanation. We can produce a description, "the ball rolls down the hill", and ask "why?". Then we create an explanation, gravity. But if the explanation is itself just a description "gravity acted on the ball", we will never have a complete explanation because there will always be a further "how" or "why" question. The description represents what is the case, and does not provide us with an explanation for this.

When these why questions are all answered without reference to intention, then we have a complete explanation without reference to intention. But until we can answer all the why questions without referring to intention, then it is false to say that we can explain motion without referring to intention. All you can really do is describe motion, and this is not the same as explaining motion. I believe that some forms of panpsychism may be offering us a potential explanation without referring to intention. Then again, the relationship between consciousness and intention is what is really at stake here.

As for the arts, Coyne does allow that the arts can be "ways of knowing" in certain ways, in that the arts can, for instance, tell us what certain historical figures looked like via their portraits. But for the most part, why should the arts be regarded as a truth-seeking or knowledge-generating endeavor? This is clearly a case of humanitiesism: the encroachment of the humanities on the domain of the natural and social sciences. — Arkady

There is a long history of belief in the mystical relationship between musical principles (consonance and dissonance), and the secrets to the universe. This extends back through Christianity, Platonism, Pythagorean cosmology, and further. This belief is based in sound principles which manifest today in the difference between just, or pure intonation, and equal temperament tuning. Within this little problem, which deals with the fundamental relationship between wave frequency and time, lies the secrets to the nature of time. This problem is laid bare by the Fourier transform which exposes the frequency time uncertainty relation, which is dealt with in a particular way by physicists, producing the quantum uncertainty principle.

But an artist is inclined to face a problem with the attitude of "the way those people dealt with that problem is not the way that I am going to deal with it". And this is the benefit of the subjectivity, which we find in the artist's "way of knowing". The artist has to know in one's own way, not the way of another, so the artist is always seeking more accuracy, more efficiency, just overall "better" ways of knowing the same thing. Just take a look at the "What Colour are the Strawberries?" thread, to see a discussion on the importance of subjectivity. Creativity is the means by which we advance from the unknown, expanding the realm of knowledge. Therefore artistry is the true knowledge generating endeavor.

I think you are just creating a fictitious, impossible scenario, for your example. You are saying, suppose I feel sick, and there is absolutely no reason why I feel sick. Do I really feel sick or not? I believe that if you feel sick, there is necessarily a reason why you feel sick, so the premise of your example, that you feel sick, and there is no reason for this, is an impossibility.

Therefore, I still think that your separation between being mistaken about the real thing perceived, and mistaken about the perception itself, is false. You only support it by referring to an impossibility.

So the issue here, appears to be that since there are such objects, black holes, whose mass is contained within the Schwartzchild radius, doesn't this indicate that GR is inadequate for understanding some aspects of the universe?

No. As you said, you first perceived it as a table. You were not "mistaken in your perception" because a table is what you perceived. — Samuel Lacrampe

How is this not a mistaken perception? When I perceive a table, then I later realize that what I perceived is really a desk, that is called a mistaken perception. I have bad eye sight, and quite frequently have such mistaken perceptions. I might see someone in a crowd, and think it's person X, only to find out soon, that it is not. How is this not a mistaken perception?

Again, you were not "mistaken in your perception" because a desk is what you perceived. Let's say the real thing was in fact a rock (that looked like a table from afar). Then both your perceptions were wrong in identifying the real thing, but you were not "mistaken in your perception", because even though we are not certain about the real thing that we perceive, we are certain about the perception itself. I think you are using the term "perception" incorrectly. — Samuel Lacrampe

I really don't understand what you are trying to say. You seem to be trying to give some odd definition to "certainty". I know I have bad eye sight, so I am never certain concerning my perceptions of distant things, I am always doubtful. You seem to think that you are always automatically "certain" concerning your perceptions, but I don't think that this is possible. To be certain requires conscious effort, justification, reasons to convince yourself of your certitude. If something just comes to you in a perception, you cannot be certain of that, until what you think, concerning your perception, has been justified. This is more evident with sounds. It's very often that we hear sounds, and are not certain of what the sound is. You have to go over in your mind, the sound, in your memory, to determine what it is. Hearing sound is just hearing sound, there is no reason to think that there is certainty involved in this. But if the sound is understood as something particular, this could be mistaken.

As a compromise, let's assume that there is such a thing as perceiving, seeing for example, without recognizing, or in any way associating what has been perceived, with something in memory, because this is where there could be a mistake. What would this simple act of perceiving, or seeing consist of? It surely could not consist of any form of certainty.

Another example: Let's say I perceive a purple unicorn. I am not certain if it is an illusion or reality (though likely an illusion). One thing is certain though: I am perceiving a purple unicorn, and not a green dog. — Samuel Lacrampe

Don't you see this as nonsense? You are claiming that you could be perceiving a purple unicorn, and you are not sure whether you are really perceiving a purple unicorn or not, yet you are certain that you are perceiving a purple unicorn. You just contradict yourself. You respect the fact that your perception might be an illusion, and therefore mistaken, yet at the same time you claim to be certain of your perception.

That doesn't indicate that there is anything inherent within GR which would make you expect to find a black hole, it indicates that certain types of stars when understood under GR make you expect to find a black hole.

Black holes are what we can expect to see, given GR. — SophistiCat

I don't see how this could be true. What is it inherent within GR which would make you expect to see a black hole?

Panpsychism is refuted by the knowledge argument. — tom

Your definition of "knowledge" is tailored for the purpose, so this argument is only begging the question.

The Fundamental Problem is the problem of the creation of (explanatory) knowledge. — tom

Explanatory knowledge, (knowing-that), is just another form of knowing-how, involving knowing how to communicate. When you recognize this, you'll realize that all living things know how to do various different things. The fundamental problem therefore, is not the creation of explanatory knowledge, which is just an extension of know-how, it is the creation of knowledge in general, in the sense of knowing how to do anything at all.

The reason why panpsychism is a valid ontological position is that we notice in our studies of the physical universe, that matter "knows how" to follow the laws of nature. There are two ways that we can account for the fact that matter follows laws. We can assume a transcendent God type of thing, which created matter intentionally, to follow laws, or we can assume that the tendency to follow laws is some sort of habituation within the matter itself. The latter involves panpsychism. We cannot assume that the capacity to follow laws is just some random occurrence, because following laws is directly opposite to random occurrence.

That they're consistent with GR doesn't make them a prediction of GR. We invented them so that they'd be consistent with GR, otherwise we'd need to retool our gravitational theory. — Terrapin Station

I agree with this. There are areas where GR has difficulties, one being the phenomenon which is called a black hole. It's not that GR predicted these things, more the opposite, it's a place where GR cannot predict. This indicates that GR is an incomplete, or deficient theory for representing gravitation.

So we have a gray image with a particular teal chosen to make the gray strawberries red. This is after having asked what are the possible conditions of experience -- the experience being this notion of color constancy. The brain adding colors to appear constant is the necessary conditions for colors remaining constant, or in this case, not doing so. We see that colors are constant(generally) and modified(when exploited) in experience, therefore this precondition is necessary. — Moliere

I really don't think that the brain is "adding colors". I think that's a mistake, thinking that the brain is adding red. I believe the red is there, as part of the mixture within the grey. I would say that the brain "subtracts" or otherwise tries to account for the teal, because it appears like there is a lens of teal between the eyes and the strawberries. So the teal is subtracted from the grey, and we can see the red within the grey.

I experience the strawberries as looking red from a non close up view. I experience the strawberries as looking grey when I zoom in very close on the pixels. A scientist with an instrument measuring the wavelength of light coming from the strawberry would measure the same wavelength from both close up, or far away. — dukkha

Sure, but what colour is grey? In primary school art class we could make greys and browns by mixing all sorts of colours. Grey might be defined as black (whatever colour that is) mixed with white (which is every colour), but "grey" is a very ambiguous colour. So the grey in the picture, no doubt, has red in it.

Now, put a wash of blue on the grey, and surroundings. The blue is lost in the grey, and that's what you see when you zoom in close up to the grey. You see grey. When you zoom out, the blue in the surrounding area creates a contrast with the grey, bringing out the red which is in the grey. The point being, that mixed colours, such as grey, look different under different conditions,

It's about the scale and covert nature of this cyber warfare arsenal. Think how many people own a smart car or TV. How many of these people are just ordinary citizens and not criminals who warrant the attention of the CIA? That's a game changer. — Sapientia

The CIA has always had the capacity to tap my phone, find out whatever information they want about me, and I'm sure they could have me killed if they wanted. How is this any different? Why do you think it's a game changer? It's just a fact that I live with, that there are people out there with power over me. The best solution is to try and live peacefully, in the eyes of the law.

Passivity just normalises what they're doing, and sends them the signal that what they're doing is okay, so perhaps they'll test the waters again, and go even further next time. Where do we draw the line? Or should we just not bother? — Sapientia

I think that it's already been normalized long before I came into the world. If you want to stop it, what do you propose, revolution? I see that as a much higher risk than allowing the CIA to proceed with their covert activities.

The cheating is having this secret arsenal. — Sapientia

How is having the secret arsenal cheating? We know that they have, and use, such technologies, they have been doing so since before I was born. We just hope that they use it for good. We know from past experience that they do not always use it for good, there's a lot of politics involved.

Talk about crime becomes relatively meaningless if the authorities can legitimise the kind of thing that we're talking about or if they can keep it under wraps. — Sapientia

I think we're talking mainly about international intelligence gathering. If you and I, and the rest of the country, think that this is wrongful activity, and refrain from doing it, how is this going to prevent others from using it against us? You'll never get Geneva type conventions to oppose intelligence gathering because it's seen by too many people as fair activity. Interfering in communications is seen as fair play. If the activities of computers are communications based, then how would you outlaw interfering with your enemy's computers?

I'm certainly willing to consider that argument as opposed to passive acceptance or apologetics. And this is just what we know about, thanks to Wikileaks. Imagine what else they could be up to. Imagination is all we'd have to rely on if it weren't for organisations such as Wikileaks. — Sapientia

I've been imagining this for all my life, it's nothing new to me. Imagine if there was a God, and God knew every activity you were up to, and everything you said, and to whom, and how to access everything in all the computers, and even how to reprogram those computers to do whatever He decided they should do. Now imagine that your enemies might gain the capacity to tap into God's knowledge, to a degree, and use this information against you. Wouldn't you want to tap into God's knowledge first, and use that information against your enemies? The only way to avoid this is to outlaw enemies. How are we going to do that?

Indeed the spectrometer doesn't see red, it measures wavelengths.

...

We don't have a problem trusting a ruler over our own sense of distance but somehow colour is an issue for some. — Benkei

The problem with colour is not as straight forward as measuring with a ruler. The colours which we see are combinations of different wavelengths, and the way that our eyes deal with combinations may not be straight forward mathematics.

Here grey is included as part of a picture that causes us to white balance it causing the grey to appear red. Nothing happened to the grey that it all of a sudden became red. It's the surrounding teal that causes us to perceive it as red. — Benkei

"Grey" is not a straight forward wave length, it is a combination of wavelengths. So the issue here is how are we to define a "combination". We might produce a grey colour by combining wavelengths at the very same location. Or, we might produce a grey by having tiny points of different colours side by side. From a close up perspective, the latter could not be called grey, it is points of different colour. But from a distant perspective, that object would be grey. The colour of the object is perspective dependent. From one perspective it is points of different colours, but from another perspective, it is mixed wavelengths.

In the analogy, the dangerous waters are the cyber warfare arsenal under the control of the CIA referred to in the opening post. Dangerous waters are a problem regardless of whether or not the passengers are aware, so if reporting it is a problem, it is an additional problem. — Sapientia

Well I don't think you can prevent governments from having a "warfare arsenal". That's just a matter of fact that we must live with, and they claim that the arsenal is justified as defence. There are weapons all over the world. I believe that the special problem here is that releasing the information, is itself the danger, because it puts the arsenal in the hands of others. The information is the weapon. So releasing this information is analogous to releasing the information of how to make a nuclear bomb, along with the necessary elements to do such.

But how is it a problem? It is a problem for the CIA, but some would question whether they should have done what they did in the first place, and will think that it is a good thing that we have found out. It's a bit like letting a friend know that their partner has been cheating on them. It wasn't the whistleblower that did the cheating. The partner shouldn't have cheated in the first place. — Sapientia

How can you say that it wasn't the whistle blower who did the cheating, in this case? If the whistle blower paid for the leaked information, then the whistle blower caused the leak.

Even if Assange himself created the cyber warfare arsenal, the CIA took ownership of it for potential use. They are complicit, and they maintain ownership and control. That's what many people see as a problem. Assange does not have ownership or control over this arsenal, as far as I'm aware, and I doubt that his intention was to do something which would lead to himself being implicated. — Sapientia

The CIA amassed the arsenal, where they got the individual parts, I don't know. But we can look at it as part of the government's warfare arsenal. The CIA is a federal government agency. You might argue that it is a crime for the government to own weapons, but what good would this argument do? You might argue that the CIA is incompetent and should have weapons, but what good would that do? Clearly if they got these weapons they're not completely incompetent. Where they've demonstrated incompetence is in keeping these weapons. But the crime is to steal those weapons and pass them around. We cannot really argue that having the weapons is a crime, unless you're prepared to argue that it's a crime for governments to have weapons. Perhaps, you're prepared to argue that this particular type of weapon should not be possessed, as they do with WMD.

Tom is trying to backtrack, and tone down that rhetoric, now saying that animals lack a certain "type" of knowledge. But that's a rather meaningless statement. The type of knowledge which dogs have is different from the type which cats have, and this is different from the type that beavers have, which is different from the type that crows have, and so forth. In fact, that's pretty much what distinguishes one species from another, that each one has a different kind of knowledge.

What Tom appears to be saying, is that since human beings have language, and the ability to communicate, this gives them the capacity to say "what is", and this is a special sort of knowledge. So perhaps we could put all the other "types" of knowledge into one category, and keep this type of knowledge as separate, as special. But I don't think that's justified, because this type of knowledge, the capacity to say "what is", is just one of the many types, and nothing has been demonstrated to give it particular distinction, such that the others might be classed together, and this one separated out to have its own class.

What does it mean to say [1] that an image is different from what it is made up of, and [2] that experience and perception are bound up in what an image is made of? Where does that leave the image we see? It makes no sense to me. — jkop

That's what I've been trying to explain to you, an image is a representation. Since the image is never exactly the same as the thing represented, it is always an interpretation of the thing represented.

The analogy with the iceberg isn't very accurate. It's more like a situation where, unbeknownst to the passengers, but known to the higher ups, the Titanic is sailing through dangerous waters, and there's a whistleblower who blows the whistle. You then concentrate on criticising the whistleblower for doing what he did, even though you admit that the higher ups cannot be trusted with the task of ensuring that the ship gets to its destination with all the responsibilities that that implies. — Sapientia

You haven't considered the possibility that the whistle blower has created the "dangerous waters" which is being reported, just like the fireman who lights fires to give himself work. If the problem here is that the information has been leaked, then the guilty party is the one which takes the information. Dealing in stolen goods is just as much a crime as stealing, because of complicity. Your approach is like trying to pin the blame for a robbery on the victim, saying that the victim's goods weren't properly secured.

So you need to consider the possibility that the whistle blower has created the "dangerous waters" with the intent of reporting it, either to make oneself look good by foreseeing a problem, or to make the other look bad, for sailing in dangerous water.

The metal has a light-reflecting surface with recognizable properties. So we see a silver oval, because that's what there is for us to see, and which we then can interpret as a coin. — jkop

I don't know about this "surface" you refer to. The coin consists of molecules which consists of atoms. What constitutes this so-called "surface"? And I don't even think it's proper to say that the object reflects light. If I understand the physics correctly, the electrons absorb the light, and reemit it. Electrons exist in some kind of cloud formation, so how cloud there be a surface? Does a cloud have a surface? So unless your speaking metaphorically about this surface, I'm going to turn that charge of bullshit back on you.

I don't know why you're mischaracterising this again as simply destroying confidentiality, as if what was done was done for no reason. These secrets haven't been revealed for no reason. It isn't that simple, so you should stop trying to simplify it. You might not agree with the reason, but there is a reason. — Sapientia

I really haven't seen "the reason" yet, so I can't say whether I agree or disagree. Perhaps we can clarify this reason, so I can make a decision.

One reason has already been suggested, which is that the authority in question can't be trusted to be responsible. — Sapientia

So the reason is that the CIA is irresponsible. I would say that the leak itself proves a degree of irresponsibility. But it's not clear where that irresponsibility lies. The question is who is responsible for the leaks? Are you sure that Wikileaks isn't revealing the information for other (confidential) reasons, and that they're not actively involved in the leaking? If so, then isn't it Wikileaks who is responsible, or should I say irresponsible?

Actually I have tried short sessions in the past, 10 or 15 minutes, I liked to make a short go, take a break and then another go. I might have done that for thirty minutes or an hour some times but most of that was probably break time There was a time when I tried to practise, but didn't make the effort to get onto a regular basis. I had a place where I liked to isolate myself. The reason I mentioned a long isolation, is because I was getting something from the short sessions and liked spending the time in isolation. The long isolation was something I wanted to try, as a challenge, to really commit myself. I wanted to force upon myself the food deprivation, to see how it would affect the meditative experience. Since I didn't ever try that particular experiment though, it is as you say, just a particular stream of consciousness, speculation.

I find that sitting, and focusing my mind, so as not to have any particular stream of thoughts, for a short period of time, probably around a minute, is not difficult. I think of it as a mental cleanse. The mind wants to think though, feelings and sensations are interferences, distractions, especially sounds. You can close your eyes but not your ears. Here's the odd thing. I always wanted to meditate in a totally isolated, and quiet place, I thought that it would be more conducive. And maybe that's why I see it as an isolating activity, because I isolated myself to practise, just like I isolate myself to practise a musical instrument, it's a sort of shyness. But since I quit trying to meditate, I've found that it's easier to get the desired mental affect in a very noisy, busy place. I suppose that's because I don't hear every little sound as a distraction, and a reminder. But maybe it's part of that feeling of unity you refer to.

With a microscope, molecules can be "seen", so they must be reflecting or emitting some light, or electrical charge. Anyway, that's beside the point. Human beings evolved to have eyes which see the whole object, they did not evolve to have senses which are distinguishing individual molecules. So we can assume that this was a good way to interpret the things out there, it is a beneficial interpretation for survival, so we evolved this way. Don't you agree, that this must be a good way to interpret what's out there, as individual objects, so that's why we evolved to sense things in this way? Nevertheless, we can still interpret what's out there as individual molecules. We do this in science

I don't see why you would think I am bullshitting. Clearly there are individual molecules, which could be sensed, but we didn't develop the means to do this. So our eyes interpret things in that particular way.

It's not at all being 'reduced to nothing', it's simply seeing through your own stuff. — Wayfarer

This is where I can't get to, seeing through my own stuff. Suppose I want an extended period of meditation, so I tell my wife I'm going on the mountain for three days, don't expect me back until then. She says you'd better bring some food, but I don't want to bring any food, I don't want any "stuff" to interfere with my meditation. Anyway, it doesn't take long before I'm hungry, so I think about this stuff. What is this stuff, food? Why do I want it? Why do I suffer when I don't have it?

I assume you've had some training in meditation, so you may see this right away with breathing. What is breathing? Why must we breathe? What is this stuff we breathe in and out? As you described already, you see breathing in a way like it's something you have in common with others, so you make this breathing as a source of unity with others. And probably all our other dealings with stuff, like eating, you look at them in the same way, as evidence of unity.

But this is where I see things differently. I see activities like breathing and eating, as wanting to take stuff and bring it into my body, making it my very own. And that is a very selfish activity. This selfishness leaves me mystified. I want to feel, experience this unity which you refer to, but all I really feel is that suffering, that pain of hunger, which I interpret as the need for a selfish activity. How do I get beyond what I perceive as the selfishness of this activity, to apprehend it as an act of unity? That's the revelation I need.

Exactly, you don't see the individual molecules, because your sensing system is interpreting what's there as one object, not a whole bunch of objects. Get the picture?

Whatever state a dog happens to be in, it cannot know it is in that state. If it could know it is in a particular state, then what stops it knowing anything? A conscious being - i.e. a person - knows what state it is in. — tom

I think you're mixing up conscious with self-conscious.

How could the projection of an oval that you see be just an alternative way for how it could be seen? — jkop

Instead of sensing the coin as one oval shaped object, it could be sensed as many individual molecules.

Yeah, sure, I agree. It's just that the concept "black hole" itself might be misleading.

At some level, there is no difference in kind between a life form colliding with an object and changing course with an atom colliding with another atom and changing course. Both behaviors are probabilistic, even if one is more predictable than the other. One may make the argument that the life form has far greater mind than the atom, but it is incorrect to say that the atom has no mind at all, unless mind is defined to have specific characteristics such as the criteria for biological life. — Nerevar

Is this really the case though? Is the outcome of an atom colliding with another atom really probabilistic, or is it deterministic? And are the actions of living matter simply probabilistic, or are they intentional? It appears to me, like your whole claim, that there is no "difference in kind" between the actions of inanimate matter, and living beings, is based in the assumption that physicists and biologists have not been able to determine that difference. On both sides though, there is an inability to understand actions at the fundamental level, so you describe both of these types of activities as "probabilistic". That is the basis of your claim of similarity. But the human being's inability to determine the exact nature of a specific difference, is not proper proof that the difference is not there.

Something is there that's being described by the math, given the massive gravitational effects on nearby objects. And it's condensed to a small area for that much gravity. It also doesn't give off light beyond a certain point. There is real data about the objects we model as black holes. — Marchesk

That's assuming general relativity provides us with an accurate model of things at this scale. But we can consider that the concept of "event horizon" is evidence that general relativity doesn't provide us with an accurate model.

Apparently, God does forgive. I think that human forgiving is an extension of the divine forgiving. The "going to hell" statement is not well defined. I think Christianity was, in its formative years, working toward phasing out the concept of "hell". Hell is only for the ultimate sin, the sin of Satan.

I still remember my religious roommate when we were discussing "love thy neighbour" in relation to our gay roommate. "I love him but he's going to hell". I never could wrap my mind around that statement. — Benkei

That's what's called forgiving. In Christianity forgiving is a very important aspect of how one approaches "the sinner". To forgive is to accept the fact, you cannot change the actions which a person is guilty of, right now, and this is the label which might be given to the person, what that person has become, and is designated as being "a ...", based on those actions. If that person has done wrong in your eyes, you have no choice but to accept this fact, as a fact, it cannot be changed, so you forgive, and love that person, as a person, like you would love anyone else. From this point, of forgiving a person's past behaviour, one can consider how the person is likely to behave in the future. If it is important to you or to others, that the person not behave in the same way again, then it is important to ensure that the person releases the desire to behave in this way. In Christianity, the attitude of forgiveness is the only reasonable approach to the sinner.

Guilty as charged. — Wayfarer

Well, I admit it is impossible to do that in any absolute sense. We each do it in our own little way, but that's why subjectivity is so important, we can get completely different perspectives of the very same thing. From my perspective, each person stripped down to the bare essentials, is a separate oasis, a point of something, existence, in a world of nothing (perhaps its the Cartesian tradition which instills this in me). From your perspective, it appears like the person actually gets reduced to nothing, and one can only find one's own being, by being a part of something.

It was these very cyber-attack tools that were used to wire-tap Trump and his transition team during the election and during the transition. It was these very tools that were used to masquerade as Russian hacks, to provide probable-cause to get the FISA warrant to spy on Trump. Furthermore, Obama seduced the security clearance of the wire-taps on Trump and ordered their wide dissemination among the security community - basically facilitating the leaks. — tom

If there was evidence of Russian hacking, and interfering in the U.S. election, then isn't it the responsibility of the CIA to determine the specifics about this activity? Wire tapping is a standard procedure isn't it? I think your claim that the Russian hacks are fictitious is a little far-fetched.

Have you ever sought instruction in meditation? — Wayfarer

No, I have never had any formal instruction on meditation. But the question is, should I approach meditation with the preconceived idea that I am going to find within meditation, what some instructor tells me is there, and therefore I am looking for that particular thing, or should I approach it with a free mind, to find what is really there, within myself? In other words,, is instruction purely on the method of meditating, how to obtain the meditative state, and perhaps make the known cease to be known, or is instruction telling you what to look for, (that life and breath are the same for everyone); in which case, you haven't really rid yourself of the known.

The argument should be obvious: we don't see the atoms and molechules of a coin, so there is nothing to interpret as a coin prior seeing its coloured shape. Therefore, seeing precedes interpretation. — jkop

Ok, I see you completely missed the point, so I'll explain it more clearly. You are sensing something, seeing it. You sense it as a round coloured shape, not as a bunch of molecules, or as a bunch of atoms. Since we know that it exists as molecules, and as atoms, then these are real possibilities, alternative ways, for how it could be sensed. But it is not sensed as molecules or atoms, it is sensed as a round coloured shape. Therefore the act of sensing is itself an act of interpreting what is there, bringing out one of the numerous possible ways of representing it.