This stuff comes out as an act of whistleblowing, which is an act of alerting attention to a perceived wrongdoing. — Sapientia

How is the act of spying, by the CIA, perceived as wrongdoing, isn't that their mandate? Oh I think I understand, when you're a member of the party being spied on, then it's clearly wrongdoing.

Not at all. I went to the University of Sydney, never encountered such an attitude. Again, it can happen anywhere, but not because of anything peculiar to 'our society'. — Wayfarer

What I am referring to is younger education, grade school through high school. This is the primary learning, where we learn our intellectual habits. We learn to accept the beliefs which are handed to us, by the authorities. We are not encouraged in the habits of being critical of the beliefs, nor are we encouraged to ask why. The educational institutions are structured such that there is consistency across the society and children are not exposed to competing beliefs, so that they might need to learn the skill of comparing and evaluating beliefs. The beliefs of the authorities are the only beliefs handed to us, so we learn to accept them as true. An environment in which there are competing beliefs in relation to fundamental issues, is one in which I think neither you nor I were exposed to as children. I agree, that in university we are encouraged to pursue our own directions, but that is only on top of the established foundation.

naturally am inclined to agree but the reality of communicating such a subtle understanding requires that there is an institutional 'exoskeleton' to carry forward the idea. In fact that is very much what I think has been lost from Western religious institutions since the advent of modernity. It has become more and more externally focussed rather than an authentic 'encounter with the unknown'. The 'encounter with the unknown' is much more characteristic of modern spiritual movements than traditional Christianity, nowadays. — Wayfarer

Alright, to "encounter the unknown", isn't it necessary to go beyond the institutional exoskeleton? Wouldn't this be exactly what such an encounter would consist of, being confronted with whatever it is beyond our common speak, where words fail us. If words apply here, it must be in an innovative way, or else it is not really the unknown. To describe this experience we reach for metaphor, using words in new and creative ways. \

So to make this voyage, to encounter the unknown, and I believe you are talking about the spiritual approach to the inner experience, isn't it necessary first, to as much as possible, release ourselves from all the constraints of the institutional exoskeleton? We cannot encounter the unknown while holding preconceptions. Perhaps after the encounter, when we wish to communicate our experiences, we must turn to that exoskeleton, but then it is used metaphorically. Isn't this exactly the way of Skepticism, to free ourselves of preconceptions, then knowing nothing, anything approached is the unknown, so we can proceed with the desire to learn and understand?

The meditation I practice has no particular format. It's simply a matter of learning to sit still, being aware of the body-mind, and returning to the breath. It's not a matter of isolation, but really the complete opposite. There is a sense that the life and breath in me, is the same life and breath in every other being. The sense of separateness is precisely what is being dissolved by such a practice. — Wayfarer

I haven't found this "complete opposite". In any meditation I've tried, I am overwhelmed with the sense of isolation. If sounds interfere, they are so distant. Every other being seems to be so distant, a simple voice is so far away. Where does the idea that "the life and breath in me, is the same life and breath in every other being" come from? I just can't find it in my inner experience, there is no other being there. Any other being is so distant, so separate.

No. Hence my argument, which you seem to evade. — jkop

Sorry, I didn't notice any argument, perhaps you could repeat it in a way which I might be able to understand.

Sure. So how about you get the image into paint and zoom in on that apparent red pixel until that pixel fills your screen. Then get back to me with which colour it has.

EDIT: I'd like to point out that the colour of that faux-red pixel doesn't change because of the surrounding blue, we are not "mixing" them in our perception. We're quite capable of seeing individual pixels at these resolution (1080p, just stick your nose in the screen).

The blue merely influences how we perceive it due to false signal it gives us that we ought to white balance the image for outdoor circumstances. Then our brains filter out blue from the grey, which makes the grey appear red. Taking a closer look (literally!) shows the error. — Benkei

If I understand correctly, it is not the case that there are red pixels in the composition, there are none, and that prompts the claim that there is no red in the picture. However, I understand that there are grey pixels, and the grey pixels are composed of some red. So it is not really the case that there is no red wavelength in the picture, there is, but it is hidden within the grey. When our brains filter out the blue, as you suggest, if this is really what is happening, then the blue within the grey is also being filtered out, and this brings out the red in the grey.

You admit above, that there is grey in the picture. What wavelength do you think the grey is if there is no red in it?

So what would seeing its atoms and molecules be an interpretation of? — jkop

You don't see them.

The presence of a single, coloured shape is set by the objective facts of seeing. Hence seeing precedes interpretation. — jkop

isn't it objective fact that seeing is interpretation?

There isn't a Platonic Form, there's consensus on the wavelengths associated with colours when an object absorbs light and reflects light back. And I mean this in the sense of spectrum. The science is pretty clear on this. If we then "think" we see red, when in reality there are no colours emitting with a wavelenght between 622nm to 780nm, then we've been fooled by our very fallable perception. — Benkei

As I said, what we see as colour is a mixture of wavelengths, not a pure wavelength. I read some of the discussion on the strawberry picture, and apparently there are grey pixels which are composed partially of red wavelengths. So despite the fact that there is red wavelength within the composition of the pixel, the pixel itself is grey, and therefore is not called red. But grey is not a particular range of wavelength itself, it is a mixture.

(Also the answer is a bit more subtle because the picture does emit light in that wavelength range of red as part of the white/gray areas but something is red or reddish due to a concentration of a particular spectrum of wavelength in a particular area but that is more about chromacity). — Benkei

This only indicates that you are wrong in defining colour based on particular wavelengths. There is no particular wavelength for the various greys, they are combinations of wavelengths, And, since the grey pixels do emit red wavelengths, it is contradictory for you to say that there is no red in the picture, according to your definition of red. You refer to the other definition of colour to say that the pixels are grey, then as Michael indicates, it is only by equivocation that you can say there is no red in the picture.

I agree we can use the word "red" in different contexts but when we disagree on the redness of something, how are we going to arbitrate this question? I have no problem with you referring to the strawberries as appearing red but if we want to definitely answer the question whether they are red, we have to conclude they aren't irrespective of our subjective experiences of seeing. — Benkei

It all has to do with the mixtures of wavelengths, and how our eyes detect them. If red mixed with other colours, within a tiny pixel makes a colour called grey, then we are justified in saying "colour", in general, is a mixture of wavelengths. If mixing these grey pixels with certain blue pixels in a larger scale makes the colour red, then we are justified in saying that the strawberries are red.

The problem has always been that beliefs are ultimately very personal things. Once you start to regiment them and dictate them the institutionalisation can't be too far behind. 'Orthodox' really means 'right belief' (or strictly speaking 'right worship' but it is very similar in meaning.) — Wayfarer

There are two distinct aspects of "the institution", which are closely related in practise, but are separable in theory, such that an institution may focus more on one than on another. The one is to instill within the student beliefs which already exist in others. I'll call this dogmatic. The other is to instill within the student the sense of wonderment, or philosophy, which is the desire to understand, and create one's own beliefs. You can understand the former as a matter of dictating, and the latter as a matter of cultivating the inquisitiveness of the mind.

It might appear like it is necessary to give priority to the former. Children must learn the fundamental beliefs, numbers, letters, basic words, in order that they have a foundation, allowing them to go forward with principles of understanding, to expand their minds into the theoretical world. Then the theoretical world itself, can only be approached with a sound foundation. But I think the latter, which is a cultivating of the mind to be inquisitive, to be able to create beliefs, and to be properly receptive of existing beliefs is more fundamental, and therefore of priority. That is because even to accept into your mind, the existing dogma which is fed to you, one has to have been cultured in a particular way. But there's another particular way, which goes way back to Pyhrronism, skepticism, which is to thoroughly analyze each belief before it is accepted.

You'll notice that our society, with its institutions, is completely focused on advancing dogmas. Yes, we allow highly educated scientists to develop new theories, new ideas, but only after they are thoroughly educated in the existing scientific dogma. We have nothing within our educational institutions which aims at cultivating inquisitiveness. There are no provisions which would encourage one to question the existing beliefs, to be skeptical. In fact, as described by Wittgenstein, such skepticism is considered to be unreasonable. However, we know that it is possible to be mistaken in our beliefs. And unless we take this possibility seriously, we will not allow ourselves to reassess our beliefs, and find the mistakes which undoubtedly exist.

Let me relate this to the op now. What Rohr refers to as dualist thinking, the "I'm right and your wrong" type of thing, is derived from divisive dogmas. The feeling of "I'm right" is produced by being trained within a certain dogma, to accept as true, those beliefs. When two divergent dogmas meet in the form of two distinct individuals holding those beliefs, what Rohr describes, occurs.

But Rohr does not describe true individualist thinking, the way I do, as inquisitiveness, and skepticism. So what I would refer to as the individual separating oneself from the dogmas of society, in order to thoroughly examine the beliefs, Rohr assumes to be a type of unity. Where does Rohr derive this unity from? I see it as a true separation, a true individuation, whereas Rohr sees some form of unity here.

Where is this unity derived from? The only possible principle of unity here is the unknown, which becomes the source of the apophatic way of knowing. But there is no unity in unknowing. Unity comes about through shared principles, shared knowledge, so I think that this assumption of a fundamental unity is faulty. If an individual puts oneself into a fundamental position of unknowing, this requires one to necessarily isolate oneself. There is no fundamental unity which inherently lies there, it is pure isolation and unknowing. The unity only comes about if we assume a principle, something to unify us, and this may be God. But once we assume this, we assume something known, God, and the apprehended unity is the result of this assumption of knowledge, it is completely separate from the apophatic unknowing.

But in any case, the Buddhist model is very different to the Christion one - instead of a powerful father figure (Pope) controlling the levers of ecclesiastical power, which radiates out through a hub-and-spoke model, a networked movement, which is centripedal rather than centrifugal. But then, the whole basis of the religion is also different, Buddhism being grounded in insight in the nature of experience, rather than believing according to what you're told. — Wayfarer

But Richard Rohr's approach is more about finding the truth of spirituality through meditation. Of course, that requires openness to the possibility of there being something to be found; that too is belief of a kind. — Wayfarer

Let me question you on this point for a minute, Wayfarer. In your experience with Buddhism, meditation, and "the nature of experience", how do you relate to this separation between yourself and others? Suppose you meditate, and contemplate the nature of your own experience. Do you find yourself completely isolated from others, in need of assuming a principle of unity, in order to create a feeling of unity, as I describe? Or do you find that there is a principle of unity already inherent within this experience.

Wikileaks has had 100% publication accuracy and always has, — discoii

What does this mean?

It looks all blue and green to me. But what do I know?

Say the cloud above me is a white cumulonimbus. When I say "there exists a white cumulonimbus cloud several thousand meters above me" I seem to be making a true claim. — darthbarracuda

Actually, if there was a cumulonimbus cloud directly above you, it would be dark grey, and not white, because they're very thick, dense, and block out the sun. To someone standing many miles away, the cloud would appear to be white.

There seems to be an objective fact that is exemplified by this statement or any statements of similar structure. — darthbarracuda

What would be the objective fact then, that the cloud is grey, or that the cloud is white? Perhaps the fact is that the cloud appears to be grey to you, and appears to be white to someone else. But what does this mean?

You've forgotten The Spanish Inquisition? The persecution of the Cathars? I think the time of religious institutionalism has past. But in any case, the Buddhist model is very different to the Christion one - instead of a powerful father figure (Pope) controlling the levers of ecclesiastical power, which radiates out through a hub-and-spoke model, a networked movement, which is centripedal rather than centrifugal. But then, the whole basis of the religion is also different, Buddhism being grounded in insight in the nature of experience, rather than believing according to what you're told. — Wayfarer

The problem is not religious institutionalism itself. But I think, as I tried to describe, the problem lies in the idea that, correct belief, and morality in general, is something which is caused to exist in a person from an external cause, rather than coming from the internal cause, which is desire or willingness. The former progresses along with the development of the scientific mind, which seeks external causes for things.

Belief itself comes from within, and though we discuss "beliefs", as if they were some sort of external objects which we pass around between us, these so-called beliefs are actually useless, or meaningless, unless they are actually believed. Believing only occurs willingly, so belief within an individual, cannot be enforced, or caused by external sources. Successful religious institutions aim at growing morality from within the individual, culturing and propagating good belief, not dictating it.

But we don't get to interpret its presence, nor the coloured shape. — jkop

Why not? I would say that all these things are interpretations. That there is a presence, that there is a colour, that there is a shape, all of these are interpretations. If you consider that the coin consists of atoms and molecules, then ask yourself why do you see it as the presence of a single, coloured, shape, instead of individual molecules, or atoms. Interpretation is inherent within seeing.

Your logic seems to be a little bit faulty. I see no indication that law based on the human condition is the only way to avoid the "Hobbesian state of war", even if that state is an accurate description. And if law based on the human condition is one way of avoiding a "Hobbesian state of war", it is not necessarily the only way. Nor is it necessarily the best way.

Afraid to face the truth now?

To understand law, we must start with the first principles of law: we are mortal, we require food and water, we require families, and we require shelter for ourselves and our families. Those are the laws of nature which define the human condition. We cannot escape the human condition. No human can change those facts through our own faculty of reason alone. — ernestm

I do not agree with your premise, that law should be based in the human condition. I think that law should be based in morality. And from the perspective of morality, these things which you designate as "the human condition", are viewed from the question of "why?", "for what reason?". Why do we require food and water, why do we require families, and why shelter?. It is by validating the reason for these things that we justify their position as fundamental. Otherwise, it's just an arbitrary assertion.

Quantum interpretations does not inherit any of this in any form. In fact the Bohm interpretation wants nothing of it as it adopts non-locality. — Rich

Do you understand quantum field theory, and how non-locality relates to field theory? Look it up.

All that matters is that the symbol, or representation, of that light is consistent - that the effect is always the same per the cause for that particular person. — Harry Hindu

Don't we need some consistency between individuals as well? This consistency gives us what some people call inter-subjectivity, which in some cases it is argued, qualifies as objectivity. It's interpretation. If we all agree as to the meaning of a particular word, then that word has "objective" meaning (in the sense of inter-subjective), though it might not have an ideal objective meaning in the sense of an independent Platonic Form. The independent Platonic Form could allow us to theoretically judge the inter-subjective meaning, if we had access to that Form.

Isn't this the same with colours? Seeing is a mode of interpretation as well. There is an inter-subjective meaning of "red" which provides us with the common meaning of the term. Benkei appears to be claiming that there is a truly objective "red", an ideal definition of red, and even to know this Platonic Form, through science. It is suggested that we should judge our inter-subjective interpretation against this Form. But I think Benkei derives this ideal in a faulty way. There may be such a Platonic Form of red, but Benkei has not described it.

As far as I understand, they are separate and distinct theories that have yet to be unified. — Rich

I believe that there is quantum uncertainty, which was originally not well understood. I also believe that field theory was developed as a means of applying relativistic principles to quantum uncertainty. So if we are not satisfied with relativity theory, as you and I are, then we should reject field theory, as an inappropriate way of dealing with quantum uncertainty.

As I indicated above, even if morality requires an external force to impose it upon us (who, then, imposes it upon the imposers, I wonder?), ceding this control to organized religion would be a catastrophic mistake. — Arkady

The answer to your question (who, then, imposes it upon the imposers, I wonder?), is inherent within your statement. Organized religions assume the existence of God, and for them, God is not just some imaginary super-being, God is very real. Therefore the real God imposes morality upon us.

Without the real God, there is nothing to impose morality upon the imposers. Morality is defined according to whatever the imposers are capable of convincing the imposed, is rational. But we know that morality cannot be defined as "rational" according to "rational" as defined by scientific principles, so the scientifically minded individual might not have the capacity to properly judge what is rational in relation to morality. It appears to be totally irrational, that if one believes truly in a real God, this real God will act to impose morality on this person.

The real catastrophic mistake then, is to be found in taking this control away from organized religion, which has inherent within it, the means for self-control, by recognizing the true, real existence of God, as the ultimate imposer. That is because all of those who believe that morality is imposed by an external force, must be forced to be moral according to that belief. Because they believe that they must be forced to be moral, then they must be forced to be moral. Therefore we must assume an external imposer, God, as that which will force these people to be moral.

Those who do not believe that morality is forced by an external force, who believe that morality comes from within, from an internal self-control, are in a completely distinct category. They seek reasons for self-control and morality in a completely different way from those who believe that they must be forced, by an external imposition, to be moral. If we all naturally, and instinctually believed that morality comes from within us, is not caused by an external force, and we apprehended the need to be moral, then perhaps we would not need the organized religion. But this is contrary to our instinctual selfishness. Furthermore, it is contrary to the ever-pervasive scientific way of thinking, which assumes external forces as the causes of things. So how can we convince everyone that morality is one's own responsibility, and that it must come from within oneself, as a strong desire (stronger than the desire for anything else) to be moral, without some sort of organized system? That's what organized religion is meant to be, the external force, which causes one to apprehend, and therefore believe, that morality must come from within.

Actually, your method for determining colour proceeds from a faulty premise. You assume that a particular colour has a corresponding range of wavelengths. That this is a false premise is evident from the fact that most of the different colours which we talk about have no such corresponding range of wavelengths.

Furthermore, it appears like you want to reduce "colour" to a specific set of primary colours, each having a corresponding wavelength. But any such reduction is known to be purely arbitrary, and abstract. So all you've done is produced an arbitrary, ideal "red", and you are claiming that if an encountered instance of red does not match this ideal red, it does not qualify as "red".

So you have a false premise, that any particular colour, such as red, can be defined by a particular wavelength, and from this you produce a false "ideal red", which is define as a range of wavelengths. Then you proceed to argue, from this false conclusion, that if a particular instance of colour does not match your ideal, it does not qualify as being the referred to colour.

And your mode of justifying your false premise appears to be pure assertion. I'm right and your wrong, because science supports my position. But if you looked closely, you would see that science does not support your false premise. Science has produced a specialized definition of "red", which is suitable for use within the instrumentation which you refer to, but is not suitable for use when referring to human perception.

It was unnecessary, uncalled for, and ruined what might have otherwise been a productive discussion. — Chief Owl Sapientia

Actually I think it was quite evident that we were beyond the possibility of a productive discussion. We were nowhere near agreement on the meaning of words like annihilate. And we couldn't even agree that there is a relationship between the name of the object and the named object. I think it was demonstrated that in the context of that discussion, words are useless. But I suppose this might be just another example of us disagreeing.

For this reason, I reject the idea that Relativity in any form has any ontological basis. All they do is resolve some measurement problems with the Lorentz Transformations. — Rich

Why do you like quantum field theory then, as this is relativity based?

You are making an assumption that such a thing as 'the drinking class' actually had any objective existence at all. — ernestm

Yeah I know, it's all assumptions, that's where we started in this conversation in the first place. That a thing has a continuous existence in time, is just assumed, and what constitutes this continued existence is a matter of convention, like the conventions of language. I said it's a matter of agreeing on conventions, and Sapientia asked me if it were possible that we could agree on such conventions.

I don't see why you need to be so insulting. — ernestm

I look at the insult as coming from the other way. Sapientia continually rejected my proposals, of reasonable definitions, and in an insulting way suggested that we define "annihilate" as reducing to nothing in an absolute way, without any bits or pieces remaining, then justifying this nonsense suggestion with a blatant lie. Also, there was the nonsense suggestion that we should talk about an object without naming or identifying that object in any way. Both of these nonsense suggestions, if they are supposed to be real proposals, are an insult to my intelligence.

That's part of the very first definition that comes up if you google "destruction", but whatever. — Chief Owl Sapientia

What's the point in lying? I thought we were doing philosophy. What comes up from google is this: "the action or process of causing so much damage to something that it no longer exists or cannot be repaired." There is no mention of "so that nothing is left", not even bits and pieces.

There are plenty of others which define the meaning of the verb "destroy" as to put out of existence, and other similarly worded definitions. — Chief Owl Sapientia

That's exactly what happens when the drinking glass breaks, it no longer exists. It is put out of existence. What exists is a bunch of bits and pieces of glass. You do not want to accept that it ceases existing unless there are not even any bits or pieces left, but that's ridiculous. As soon as the drinking glass breaks into pieces, it is no longer a drinking glass, it does not exist.

Do you know what? I'm not even going to read any further. Your accusation that I am making this up is too stupid and uncharitable for me to want to continue. — Chief Owl Sapientia

Good, now I won't have to read your blatant lies.

Right. So we can stop trusting telescopes that there really are more stars in the sky than we can see with the naked eye. — Benkei

I don't see what instrumentation has to do with this. The fact is that the vast majority of colours which we see, talk about, refer to, and describe, are combinations of different wavelengths. The various reds which we see are no different from this. Have you ever seen someone mixing red paint? So your restricted definition of red, to a particular range of wavelength, while it might be useful for some scientific purposes, is not a true representation of what the average person refers to as "red".

You have restricted your definition of "red" to a particular type of red, some sort of pure red. When do you ever see pure red? There are many other instances of red, different combinations of wavelengths, which do not qualify as "red" under your definition, and it is not wrong to call these particular red objects, instances of red. But it is wrong to say that we shouldn't call any instance of colour "red" unless it conforms to your restricted definition. It's like you've determined the "ideal" red, and you do not think that anyone should call anything "red" unless it fits this ideal.

You also can't throw me the ideal gas law, but I think you'll have a hard time convincing folks that the ideal gas law can't be an object of cognition. — Aaron R

This is a subject of knowledge, not an object of cognition. We need to be careful to keep this distinction. There are pure ideals, such as mathematical principles, which if we follow Platonic realism would be known as objects, intelligible objects. But the intelligible object is purely ideal, and a law is an application of the ideal toward the physical world. From the application of ideals we derive subjects of knowledge, but we must maintain a separation between the law, as a subject of knowledge, and the aspect of the physical world, (the object) which the law represents.

Isn't it simpler to suppose that these are properties are all actual or potential properties of matter. — Cavacava

To assume that these are actual properties of matter, and to assume that they are potential properties of matter, is two distinct things. This is the difference between panpsychism and substance dualism, which I referred to earlier. Panpsychism would assume that they are actual properties of all matter. Substance dualism apprehends a necessity for a separate actuality, the soul, which is required to actualize these potential properties of matter. With substance dualism, there is a separate immaterial substance, soul.

Human eyes can see millions of different shades of colour. This is not because there are millions of different wavelengths between 400 and 740.

EDIT: the strawberries only appear red but in reality the colour red isn't present in the picture. — Benkei

As I pointed out earlier, to define "red" as a particular range of wavelength is unacceptable, because the vast majority of instances of seeing a particular colour, are instances of a combination of different wavelengths. So the fact that a particular wavelength of light is not present, does not mean that the strawberries are not red.

Being moral requires self-control. No, you don't agree? Do you think that we are caused to be moral by others, not ourselves? If so, then wouldn't you see this as justification for a religion's oppressive actions? Or do we apprehend morality as self-control, and see a religion's oppressive actions as unjustified?

How can one adopt a middle ground on this position? Either morality comes from within, or it is caused by external forces. If it's the latter, then how are religions not justified in using force to create morality.

To destroy something completely so that nothing is left. — Chief Owl Sapientia

I don't see anything like "so that nothing is left" in my dictionary definition. I think that's impossible and ridiculous, rendering "annihilation" a completely useless word, if I accept your definition of it. So I still disagree with your definition. I reject it because this definition isn't consistent with any definition I've read, and it refers to something I've never seen happen, nor heard of, and contradicts the laws of physics. So I think you're just making it up. And unless you can explain some special metaphysical us for it, why you're making up this definition and asking me to adhere to it, I don't see the point. Perhaps you are insisting on a metaphorical use of the word? What's the point?

What do you think makes that so? Why new? Why objects? These objects were part of the previous structure, so what makes them new, and what made them one (before you acknowledge them as many)? — Chief Owl Sapientia

Each piece exists separately and independently of the others, it has its own shape and form. It is an entity, a thing with distinct existence, an individual. Therefore I think each piece is an object. Prior to the original object being broken, these entities did not exist as such, therefore they were not objects. So I conclude that at the time of being broken they are produced as new objects.

3. I had in mind the object. My objection, as I thought I had made clear, was not so much the glass part, but that you are naming it a drinking glass, which brings with it the baggage of functionality, which, as I said, is not inherent in the object itself. quote]

I don't understand your resistance to functionality. The object was created, produced with a specific purpose, to drink from, that's why it's called a drinking glass. Of course the functionality is inherent within the object, that's why it was made. When an object is clearly made for a specific purpose, to divorce its functionality from its existence doesn't make sense. It's existence is dependent on its functionality. Without that purpose it would not have been made, and would not exist.
— Chief Owl Sapientia

By the object, I mean the object, and nothing else: not your conception of it as a tool, and not how you relate to it as such. — Chief Owl Sapientia

Right, the object is a drinking glass. Why do you keep insisting that the object is something other then this? It's been identified as a drinking glass. Why do you insist on being contrary, and identifying it as something else. That doesn't make sense, it's my example, I identified the object.

4 & 5. You could simply call it a glass, and that might just resolve the issue that I've explained to you. We don't have to talk about a nameless object and I'm not trying to play a game, I'm just trying to do a bit of philosophy here. — Chief Owl Sapientia

No, as I said, I wanted to avoid the ambiguity of calling it a "glass". That might refer to a looking glass, or any other form of glass. I've identified a very specific type of glass, but for some reason, you want to create ambiguity. I've intentionally tried to avoid this ambiguity. Why are you intentionally trying to create ambiguity. The only reason to intentionally create ambiguity in an argument is to facilitate equivocation. And then you suggest that creating such ambiguity might resolve the issue. That's nonsense. You are arguing that you cannot identify the object I named, but you are intentionally being obtuse, trying to create ambiguity, to justify your nonsense.

6. Drinking is not part of the object. I don't know why you apparently aren't getting this. You haven't really addressed what I've said about this. If you disagree, then you should explain why. Simply asserting that the object is the drinking glass doesn't explain why you think that, it doesn't clarify much, and it doesn't explain why you think that my criticism of that claim is wrong. — Chief Owl Sapientia

Of course drinking is not a part of the object. That's ridiculous. Just because it's a drinking glass, do you think that it should actually be drinking? See what I mean by your obtuseness. It's ridiculous. "Drinking" is part of the means for identifying the object. It's a glass made to drink from.

7. Apparently you haven't noticed, but I have not been consistently calling it that, and have purposefully avoided doing so. I'll call it that when that is what it is, and when I have good reason to do so. That's fine if you want to go no further than this ordinary practical assumption, and do not want a deeper philosophical examination, but that'd just be sticking your head in the sand. I am trying to talk about the object itself, which is distinguishable from the purpose you see in it. If dropping the name "drinking glass" will get you to do that, then let's drop that name, shall we? — Chief Owl Sapientia

It's my example, and that's what I called the object! Feel free to reject the example and claim that you don't know what I mean by a glass that's drinking, or some other nonsense. But it's nonsense for you to say "I'll call it that when that is what it is". That is what it is! It's been stipulated as part of the example. If you can't understand what a drinking glass is, then fine, we'll move on. But I think your actions are intentionally obtuse.

How can we talk about the "object itself" by dropping the name. If we drop the name, we won't have any idea of which object we are talking about. We have to name the object so that we can talk about it. As I said, we could name another object, and particular rock or something, and have the same discussion. When the rock is obliterated into whatever elements we want to extract from it, it no longer exists as an object. What exists are the new objects which were derived from it.

No, that's not in the dictionary definition. That's something that you're reading into it. I acknowledge that the context may be unusual, but that doesn't mean that this terminology cannot rightly be applied in this context. — Chief Owl Sapientia

Are you saying that to "reassemble" something does not require putting the parts back in the same place?

This motion constantly changes everything. — Rich

I would need to see some proof of that. I have a hard time believing that the movements of electrons, which have a very tiny fraction of the mass of an atom, changes everything.

I'm not talking about the electron cloud. I recognize that it is somewhat unstable. I'm talking about the distance between my fridge and my stove. That's what I mean, you should learn to recognize that some things are changing, and others are not, I think that would make you a much better observer.

So you think that you could observe the distance between my fridge and stove changing from one minute to the next? Are you sure this wouldn't qualify as an hallucination?

What, you think that a casual observer would notice that the distance between my stove and fridge changes from one minute to the next, when I can't even detect that change with my tape measure?

It is quite clear to me that everything is changing in one manner or another all the time. There is nothing I can say or do to convince you of this. — Rich

If this were true, then how do you explain the fact that the layout of things in my kitchen is the same still as it was ten years ago? Everything is in its proper position. It's easy for you to assert that everything is changing, even if what you say is false, because people state untruths all the time. So if you want me to take you seriously, you should be prepared to explain to me how there are all these relationships around me which appear to stay the same. I can take a tape measure, and measure things, minute after minute, hour after hour, day after day, and show you that they are staying the same. Do you really believe that the distance between my fridge and my stove changes from one minute to the next? Why are you so convinced that these things aren't really staying the same for any length of time? If you could explain to me how the distance between the fridge and the stove changes from one minute to the next, when my tape says that it stays the same, then perhaps I might believe you.

You can be mistaken about the real thing you are perceiving, but how can you be mistaken about a perception? To use the specific example, how can you mistakenly call a desk a table if you are perceiving a desk? The only way I see how is because the person doesn't speak english very well and thus thought that a desk was called "table" in english. But this would be an error in language, not in perception. — Samuel Lacrampe

Perceiving, and giving words to what is being perceived are tied together in an act of interpretation. So if I see something at a distance and perceive it as a table, and call it a table, but I walk closer and see that I should call it a desk, don't you think I was mistaken in my perception? If I hear a baby crying, then I find out that what I heard was a cat, was I not mistaken in my perception? The mistake is in the interpretation of what is going on, what is happening, and that is the act of perception. How is it that you think that this is not a mistaken perception?

What you say "you can be mistaken about the real thing you are perceiving" says nothing more than "you can be mistaken in your perception".

I believe that the earth is moving, but that fact is irrelevant to the fact that the layout of my kitchen remains the same. That's the point, we have to have respect for what is staying the same, as well as what is changing.

He says in many places that he believes religion is evil or the source of evil. — Wayfarer

This appears to be a commonly expressed opinion now. Especially with the rise of religious fanaticalism, there are many people who openly state, and most likely truly believe, that religion is the source of evil.

Ethics has been one long, miserable slog from humanity treating each other extremely horribly to treating each other very slightly less-horribly. — Arkady

There is a lot more to ethics than learning how to respect others, there is also learning how to respect oneself. And with that comes learning how to think and be intelligent. Respect for others is dependent on knowing how to be reasonable.

The object is the sum of its parts, yes? So if the object is destroyed or annihilated, then by implication, so are the parts. — Chief Owl Sapientia

You can't reduce something to nothing, I believe that's impossible. By your logic there is no such thing as annihilation, because you say it's not annihilated if there are still parts left. I don't agree with your definition of annihilation.

But you also refer to the object, and there is nothing in the object itself which makes it a drinking glass. So it seems that your attachment to your conceptualisation of the object as a tool is getting in the way of talking about the object itself. — Chief Owl Sapientia

No. it's not my conceptualization of the object as a tool, which is the issue here, it is just my conception of "an object". I believe that when an object is broken up into bits, it no longer exists. So it could be a rock, or any other thing which is broken up. I would say that when it is broken up it no longer exists. What exists is some new objects, the pieces.

So, are we talking about the drinking glass or the object? If the former, then yes, the drinking glass has ceased to be. But what about the object? — Chief Owl Sapientia

Obviously, the drinking glass is the object. That's what's named, and that's what we're talking about, the drinking glass. What did you have in mind as the object, a thing which hasn't been named yet? Why would we be talking about an object which hasn't been named yet, unless we were playing some sort of game? Are you trying to play a game? "Drinking glass" refers to an object, and that object is the drinking class. If you are thinking that the object is something other than the drinking glass, then it probably has another name, and we would be calling it by that other name rather than "drinking glass".

The answer to this earlier question of yours would be that it hasn't been completely annihilated and it has all the same parts, and they are the criteria being used to conclude that it is the same object. — Chief Owl Sapientia

I can see that in TheMadFool's example given to me, the ship was taken apart with the intent of rebuilding it, so I assume the parts were labeled and everything was put back the way that it was, so we might be justified in calling it the same ship. But in the instance of the drinking glass, there are just bits of glass, which are remolded into a new drinking glass. Why would you assume that it is the same drinking glass?

The glass that is smashed into pieces and then rebuilt from those pieces is an example of something being dissembled and reassembled. — Chief Owl Sapientia

No it's not such an example, because when we disassemble and reassemble, we remember where the parts go, and put them back in the same place.

This provides an actual observation of your own duration and the impossibility for you to describe it. I am asking for a more direct experience. — Rich

If that's not an example of my experience of duration then I don't know what you are asking. To me it's an example of my experience of duration. What more are you asking for?

However, if I was to be put in the same kitchen, I would observe everything changing on the macroscopic level (the dust in the air, the deterioration in the wood, your life itself, the ink on the paper), and at the microscopic level (the energy of all quanta). — Rich

As I said already, I don't deny that some things are changing, but I also don't deny that some things are staying the same. You, for some reason seem to be intent on denying that there are some things around you which are staying the same in time, and that we can describe these things, and notice that the things described remain the same.

This is why I say, philosophers need to be constantly exercising their observation skills via the arts. I first learned of the skill in the art of observation when I studied photography many years ago. A philosopher must always be exercising and refining the art of observation. — Rich

If you cannot see that there are things around you which remain the same through a duration of time, then I don't think that you are very good at the art of observation.

Descriptions are necessarily limited, inaccurate, imprecise, and provide no avenue to understand the nature of nature in themselves. They are simply a tool for communication which may or may not help two explorers to better understand. To this end, I have always felt metaphors to be far more helpful. — Rich

I don't understand how a metaphor is a better means for understanding the nature of nature than a description is.

Have you ever tried describing duration in words or mathematics? — Rich

OK, this is how I describe duration. I recognize a difference between past and future by means of memory and anticipation. This gives me a sense of being present. As I am aware of being present, I notice that things are changing while I am present, and I can refer to duration through describing these changes which occur.

Stop duration, create a state, and describe it while still observing your efforts to describeit in the same duration. with such an attempt you should witness the impossibility of what you are suggesting as should anyone who believes that mathematics, words, logic, or any symbol is adequate to describe the nature of experience in duration. — Rich

So at the same time that I am noticing changes, which enable me to describe duration, I also notice things which are not changing. I can describe these things as not changing, for the entire duration of the change which I am describing.

A single example? — Rich

So for example, I have the blueprint for the layout of my kitchen, and this is a description of the things which are not changing in my kitchen. It describes where the cupboards, counters, the sink, the stove, and the fridge are, and this is a static description which persists and remains true through this day. I can stand in my kitchen, frying eggs in the frying pan, and this is a change which I can focus on to give me a sense of duration, because it always takes about the same amount of time to fry the eggs. But at the same time I can notice that the location of all the cupboards, counters, sink, stove and fridge, remain static, in the same place, throughout that duration of time.