But aren't these also examples of "prescriptive rules"? For example, doesn't this prescribe what ought to happen to objects when dropped? — Luke

That's prediction, not prescription. We use descriptive rules to make predictions. Prescriptions are commands of what one ought to do, predictions are statements about what one believes will occur in the future.

I think before answering, I'd better ask what you imagine these standards to be. — Srap Tasmaner

Standards are principles or rules often used for comparing one thing to another. A straight forward example would be a rule of measurement. What type of existence standards have is an unresolved philosophical question, often debated. So there are a number of different views on that.

You're simply conflating 'this is truly my belief' with 'this is a true belief'. — John

No I'm not conflating the two. The first says "I am certain that this is my belief". The second says "this is a belief which I am certain of". Do you see the difference?

Well, the problem is that the word "truth" in ordinary usage is simply not well-understood. — tim wood

I don't see a problem with "truth" according to ordinary usage. It's very clearly "that which is true", or "the state of being true. The issue with ordinary usage, where the problem is, and the thing which is not well understood is what it means to be "true". So the difficulty is not with "truth", which ordinarily refers directly to 'true", the difficulty is with "true".

It appears to me. like you think that you can bypass the difficulty of "true", by defining "truth" in some other way, which does not refer to "true".

My definition is a test, a hypothesis: can it stand; is it useful? Or does it fail, and why? As such it is not the conclusion of an argument, instead it is an early waypoint in a discussion. You object to it. Were it a conclusion there might be merit in the objection. But it's a premise, a for-the-sake-of-argument presupposition: objecting to that simply short-circuits the discussion. — tim wood

I disagree with this. A hypothesis, or proposition, which is a premise "for-the-sake-of-argument", is a proposal, and like any other proposition it needs to be properly supported before we proceed to the argument. This way the true meaning of the proposition, will be fully understood, and any conclusion derived will be fully understood. "Reality is truth" has no straight forward meaning, so it's meaning must be explained in a clear way.

My argument runs this way: given definitions of "truth" all have problems. Is it possible to find for it a substantive and non-trivial definition that is simple and problem free, even if the meaning is constrained as compared with the problematic definitions. I find one in regarding truth as reality (and reality as truth). The constraint is that in-so-far as reality does not speak, so truth does not speak. But like reality, it grounds, evidences, reveals, is; and in these, it is secure, simple, non-problematic. You don't like it because it's not the way you understand truth, but that's the whole point! Incumbent on you if you're engaging is to show where it fails on its own terms. — tim wood

I don't see any such problems with definitions of "truth". They are very straight forward, but they refer directly to "true". So that is where your argument clearly fails. You insist that there is a problem defining "truth", when no such problem exists. Then you use this as an excuse to produce your own definition of "truth". For what purpose, I do not yet know, but I'm sure there's a reason why you want to define "truth" in this way.

And as I said, the problem is in defining "true" not "truth". "True" is often used to mean "in accordance with reality". So the difficulty is in determining what is meant by in accordance with reality. If we proceed with your definition of "truth", in which truth is reality, then "true" simply means "in accordance with truth". You might claim to have solved the problem, but all this does is create a vicious circle, and avoids dealing with the difficult question of what is meant by "in accordance with reality".

It is the in the nature of conventions that it barely matters how it got started. — Srap Tasmaner

I really don't think this is true. In each instance of there being a conventional way of doing things, there is a reason why that convention was adopted. As time passes things change, knowledge progresses and society evolves. The technology of the modern society may render the conventional way, as not the best way of doing things. So we ought to revisit the conventions periodically to determine why those particular ones are used, and whether a better way has come to light.

I'd talk of reasons rather than causes here, but at any rate conventions generally are normative. My reasons for following the convention will always be connected to others following suit. If for some reason people start driving on the other side of the road, I had better do that too. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't know about this. "Normative" is a word often used in strange ways, so I wouldn't agree that conventions are necessarily normative without some explanation of what you mean by that term. A norm is a standard, a convention is an agreement. If there is a type of convention which is an informal agreement, then there cannot be a standard to be adhered to with this type of convention. Therefore, strictly speaking, this type of convention cannot be normative. Many philosophers will argue that the use of words, and perhaps even agreements like the social contract, are this type of "informal" convention. To those philosophers, I would argue that it is impossible that these so-called conventions are normative. To maintain the proposition "conventions are normative", we'd have to dismiss things like common word use as non-conventional, allowing that only word use in logical exercises is truly conventional.

You're taught to drive on the right rather than the left just because that's how we drive around here. — Srap Tasmaner

Actually I think it's you who is missing the point. You misuse the word "because" here. The thinking which you demonstrate is a vicious circle. The cause of us driving on the ride side of the road is other people driving on the right side of the road. You express no understanding of how such a convention could come into existence. If you had such an understanding you would not say "we do X like this because that's the way we do it around here". This is the problem which Socrates demonstrated when he asked people if they knew what they were doing. They said of course we know what we are doing, because we are doing it, doesn't that demonstrate that we know what we are doing? But they could express no understanding of what they were doing, and Socrates was able to convince them that they really didn't know what they were doing. Saying that we do X like this "because" that's the way we do it around here, demonstrates that you do not know why we do X like this..

Your argument here is that this must be either a prescriptive rule (your view) or a descriptive rule (what you wrongly take to be my view). I'm telling you it's both and has to be both. It only makes sense to tell people to do it if it's what everybody does. If you lived in the UK, you wouldn't teach your kid to drive on the right. — Srap Tasmaner

I agree that there is both a descriptive and prescriptive rule concerning this issue, that's not at question. The point is that to conflate these two is a category mistake. The prescriptive rule has causal impetus which the descriptive rule does not. To ask how a prescriptive rule has causal power is a very important philosophical question. To answer this question by referring to the descriptive rule, "we do what we ought to do because that's the way that we do it" is to give the wrong answer. It is the wrong answer because it is an answer designed to avoid the issue. It does not answer the question of why we drive on the right side of the road around here. Instead of following the inquiry into the reasons for the rule, the motivations behind doing what one ought to do, and the issue of how the prescriptive rule may cause the existence of such conventions, the entire question, which is a very important philosophical question, is dismissed with the assumption that we do what we ought to do because others are doing it that way.

Yeah. What's more, you expect them to. — Srap Tasmaner

No, I have no such expectations, the thought never enters my mind until I see bad drivers driving on the wrong side of the road in inappropriate situations. But this just makes me realize that if I had them, such expectations would be unfounded.

There is a general expectation that people in the USA drive on the right ...[/quote

Of course such an expectation exists, but this expectation is produced by the descriptive law. That is what is observed, and we expect it to continue. What we are discussing here is the prescriptive rule which tells us that we ought to drive on the right side. This is taught to us in training, by the authorities, prior to them giving us a driver's license. We don't just decide to drive on the right because we expect that others will be doing this, we are trained to do it.
— Srap Tasmaner

Do you really think your choice of which side of the road to drive on has nothing at all to do with other drivers? — Srap Tasmaner

I think that other drivers make this choice in the same way that I do, they are trained to do this, just like me. We are all trained to drive on the right. We all see it as the correct thing to do, and expect to get the privilege of being allowed to drive if we do it correctly, and so we do. I don't think we learn to drive by observing others, and using the invalid deduction "if others are doing it this way, then I ought to do it this way too". That's the attitude which learns us bad habits, not the correct habits. The correct way is learned by training from the authorities, following the training precisely, and learning to resist the temptation to follow others in their bad habits.

This isn't for you to understand or see; it is a definition, or hypothesis - a starting point.

The point - my point - is to attempt to ground the meaning of the word "truth" in something secure and unequivocal. If truth just is reality, per definition, then, it seems to me, the only attack possible on truth is to attack reality. — tim wood

You can define a word however you please, but if it's not a good representation of how the word is used, then what good is that definition? In other words, if you want to talk about what truth is then we should refer to the way that the word is used, the thing which is referred to by "truth", not some made up thing. If you just make up a definition, then truth will be just that, whatever you've made up. But what kind of truth is that, one you can just make up?

And because I assert it, it needs no justification. — tim wood

See, what kind of truth is this? This is what truth is, and I don't need to justify this, because I assert it, this is truth.

Do you challenge that hypothesis? My hypothesis is that, "there is a reality; reality is real." Are you arguing that it is not the case that there is a reality, or that there is a reality, but that it is not real? It must be one of these, else why mention it? — tim wood

My challenge is this, if it is a hypothesis, "there is a reality", as you claim, then what justifies your claim that it is truth. In order that a hypothesis be recognized as truth, it must be justified. So yes, I challenge your hypothesis, "there is a reality". In order that reality is truth, your hypothesis must be justified or we risk the possibility that there is no such thing as truth. Are you prepared to proceed on an unjustified hypothesis, defining "truth" accordingly, but risking the possibility that there is no such thing as truth, due to the possible failure of your hypothesis?

But maybe we have to start with more primitive notions. Answer yes or no: Is there reality? Is there knowledge? — tim wood

I believe there is reality, and I believe that there is knowledge. But if I claim that reality is truth, as you do, then I must have certainty in my belief that there is reality. If I have certainty in my belief, then I ought to be able to justify this certainty, or else the certainty is just an illusion, false certainty. That's why I asked you for justification, because you have claimed that reality is truth, implying that reality is a certainty for you. So if it's a certainty for you, you ought to be able to justify it, and make it a certainty for me.

I agree that it's not "inherently right". I would have a hard time believing that there is anything which is inherently right. Right and wrong are judgements which we make concerning actions. If I designate an action as the right action, I will proceed with that action, based on this judgement. When I make the decision to drive on the right side of the road, it is because I have been taught that this is the correct thing to do, and I have come to believe this.

In my training, it was expected of me, that I would come to this conclusion. So I make the decision to drive on the right hand side, based on what I believe others expect of me. The expectations are not mutual, because if I expect something back, for behaving in the correct way, it is some type of benefit, reward (my license, the privilege of driving, my safety). My expectation is not that others will behave in the same way as me. That claim is artificial, a falsity, created to support the vicious circle of circular reasoning.

There are many reasons why I drive on the right side of the road, the possibility of an accident or a fine, to begin with. And mostly, it's what I'm supposed to do. But I definitely do not do it on the condition that everyone else does it. That seems kind of childish to me, like "I'll only do what's right if you do what's right". The number of bad drivers that I see on the road demonstrates clearly to me, that the reason I try to be a safe driver is not because everyone else is a safe driver. Your "condition" that we only behave ourselves on the condition that everyone else does, seems very unrealistic.

But the problem is precisely here: the people who all say "2+2=4" have access to its meaning, if you like, and they all do say it because they all ought to. And they all ought to because they all do -- that's what it means to be part of speech community. You're in a loop flipping between prescription and description. — Srap Tasmaner

The loop is not necessary though it's a vicious circle imposed upon one's own thinking, by oneself, circular reasoning. If we really look at what "ought" means we see that when there is something which we ought to do, there are reasons why we ought to do it, which go far beyond :"because everyone else is doing it".

In PI, Wittgenstein asks this question of what does "ought" mean from the perspective of what does it mean to obey an order. What does it mean to follow the rules in a game? What does it mean to be guided by a sign? Instead of describing this as a case of doing what one ought to do, and proceeding toward examining what it means for a person to do what one ought to do, he describes it as a case of doing what everyone else is doing. This category mistake sets up the vicious circle, as "correct" is defined as acting in a way which is in accordance with a descriptive rule, rather than as doing what one ought to do. Doing what one ought to do really cannot be defined by doing what everyone else is doing, and to do so is a category mistake.

The approach that makes the most sense to me at the moment is Lewis's: we each prefer to conform on the condition that everyone conforms, and it's easy to get from there to normative conventions. — Srap Tasmaner

This condition, "the condition that everyone conforms" is artificial though, it's made up as a way to make sense of the problems created by the category error. There really is no such condition at play here. What is the case, is that we conform because we want to conform, we apprehend conformation as beneficial to ourselves. There is no such condition. We want to do what we ought to do, because we apprehend it as good. In the case of language, doing what we ought to do allows us to be understood, and this is apprehended as beneficial.

For example, in the same way (not sense) we say a lemon is yellow, we are, for the moment, saying that reality is truth (let's call it T1). — tim wood

I don't understand this meaning of "truth". I don't see that "truth" is ever used in a sense which makes it equivalent to reality. "Truth" is related to "true", and "true" is related to "reality", but I don't see how you can relate "truth" directly to "reality" without going through the medium of "true". Is this what you're trying to do, relate "truth" directly to reality independent of "true"?

It happens that "truth" also has meaning and significance with respect to "true." My point here is that this is a simply a different sense, not to be confused with truth as reality, a distinction not always maintained in this thread. This second truth (T2) appears to derive its meaning from how it employs T1. T2 differs from T1 is that T2 is T1 in use propositionally. — tim wood

So I really think you have this reversed. T1 is "truth" in relation to "true". If you think that there is such a thing as "truth as reality" (T2), then you need to justify this claim, and this justification will determine exactly how this "truth as reality" relates to "true", and if it is truly independent from "true".

Fair enough. I'd go further. (I think) we're starting with the hypotheses that there is a reality; reality is real; and we're content for the moment to let a brick informally represent what "reality" means. And that "truth" is a word that we define, for the moment, as naming a quality that reality has. For example, in the same way (not sense) we say a lemon is yellow, we are, for the moment, saying that reality is truth (let's call it T1). — tim wood

See, you have only hypothesized that there is a reality. If we say that this hypothesized reality is truth, then it is independent from "true", because we have no means to judge the hypothesis as true. But what good is a "truth" which is independent from "true"? It's just a hypothesis which we have no means for judging whether or not it's true. Why even hypothesize such a "truth", it seems utterly useless?

Your "descriptive rules" are not prescriptive then? Or are you conflating the two? — Luke

No, descriptive rules are not prescriptive rules, to conflate the two is category error. That's the point I'm making. This is the is/ought separation, we cannot derive a rule for what we ought to do, from a description of what is the case. In the case of language use, we cannot derive rules for how we ought to use symbols from descriptive rules of how symbols are used.

Suppose that everyone says "2+2=4", such that this forms the descriptive rule, "human beings say 2+2=4". There is nothing here to imply the prescriptive rule, "human beings ought to say 2+2=4". To produce that prescriptive rule we must refer to something further, and this something further, might be found in the meaning of "2+2=4". We may though, as Wittgenstein explains, declare that the person saying "2+2=4" is "correct". But "correct" here means acting in a way which is consistent with the descriptive rule. It does not mean "doing what one ought to do". To assign that meaning to "correct", "doing what one ought to do", from how Wittgenstein defines "correct", would be a category mistake.

Is an inductive conclusion the same as a "descriptive rule", or does an inductive conclusion produce a "descriptive rule"? — Luke

Inductive reasoning produces descriptive rules, so an inductive conclusion is often stated as a descriptive rule.

don't think what you are calling a "descriptive rule" is actually a rule. — Luke

Sure it's a rule, inductive conclusions create rules. All human beings are animals. Objects fall when dropped. These are rules produced by inductive conclusions. The laws of physics are "rules" aren't they? Ever hear the expression "exception to the rule"? And that's how Wittgenstein defines "rule". When someone is observed as doing something in the way which is designated as the correct way (the way described by the rule) they can be said to be following a rule. I think that this is very clearly what I am calling a "descriptive rule". Remember W says philosophy may only describe things.

Furthermore, there are no prescriptive rules of language. No rules say that we must use this word in such and such a way, or that we cannot use that word in such a way. The only rules in reference to language use are what I call descriptive rules, inductive conclusions concerning the way that people use words, like dictionary definitions. So it is impossible that what Wittgenstein refers to as "rules", in relation to language use, is prescriptive rules, because there are none.

The fact that one must think/believe that something is there prior to thinking/believing that that something is called "a tree", shows that not all belief is believing that something is true. — creativesoul

Well now you're just redefining "belief". But this doesn't avoid the issue of judgement. That one can sense something, and identify the thing sensed, when sensed at a later time, implies judgement. I don't see how you can place belief as prior to judgement, when belief clearly requires judgement.

OK, then how were these beliefs formed without a judgement of truth, since belief implies a conviction that the thing believed is true? How does one form the conviction, or belief, "X is true" without having judged that x is true?

Then how is learning how to refer to a particular type of thing as a tree, a belief? Learning language is just learning how to use words, like any other form of learning how to use a tool, it is habituation, not belief.

Truth is the property of the judgement, in the same way that red is the property of the person who sees a red object and judges that it is red. The person judges the object as having the quality, but that quality is apprehended within the mind of the person judging.

During language acquisition, one has no ability to perform such an assessment, and yet s/he is acquiring thought/belief via purely adoptive means. — creativesoul

I don't understand why you would say this. Since belief is the conviction that what is believed is true, I would think that belief requires the deliberate assessment as to whether something is true. Can you imagine believing something without such an assessment, even in a child learning language? You do realize that a child goes through a lot of trial and error in learning language, before the beliefs concerning language use are formed, don't you? Don't you think that this trial and error is an act of performing such an assessment. Why would you say that a child has no ability to perform such an assessment prior to learning language?

What I wonder, is why you think one can have a belief without performing a deliberate assessment (judgement) as to whether or not the thing believed is true, when the word "belief" implies that one has decided that the thing believed is true.

I wrote about "sidestepping" with you in mind, MU. Two problems I have with your way of looking at this are 1) it seems you will never have truth, or really any gold-standard proposition about pretty much anything. If we accept or offer a definition, that's always equivocal. If we just say the heck with it and define it ourselves, then how do we know it's right. I acknowledge the point, but it has narrow application, and beyond that quickly becomes absurd. After all, its atomic structure is always whizzing around, therefore from moment to moment it's never the same brick - we cannot even give it a name. — tim wood

The point I am trying to make is that we must get past this issue of definition if we want to move on toward what "true" really means, or what truth really is. If we begin with the assumption, that there is "brickness", "being-as-a-brick", then we are basing or understanding of "true", and "truth", in this assumption. But this assumption is not necessarily true. Any definition may be justified, and accepted, but justification does not make it true. So when we base our analysis of true, and truth, in the assumption that there is a correct definition of things like "brick", then our truth is based in justification.

But this is not a true representation of truth, because "true" refers to things beyond justification, things which are not necessarily justified, and also things which are justified are not necessarily true. That is why we need to get beyond this assumption of "brickness", or "being-as-a-brick", because beginning with this assumption will necessarily restrict us to justification, and other things like justification (correct and right) which are to use creativesoul's terms "existentially contingent" on language. From this beginning, this assumption, we will never get to this form of truth which creativesoul insists goes deeper than language.

And 2), in our encounter with the brickness-of-(what we call)-the-brick we did not use any definitions at all. At the building supply store, for example, we might just as well have asked for a pallet of these. — tim wood

OK, so this is the point right here, why we are lead to certainty in our inquiry into "true" and 'truth" rather than assumptions of correctness. Do you recognize the difference between assuming that something is right or correct, and being certain that something is true? When someone says "that is a brick", or "it is true that that is a brick", what is meant is that the person is certain that that is a brick. This certainty is not based in an assumption that there is such a thing as "brickness", or "being-as-a-brick", it is based in something else, some sort of attitude of confidence.

Therefore what makes us say "true", is this attitude of confidence, not the assumption that there is a correct definition of "brick", and that satisfies the definition. The assumption that there is a correct definition of brick is the assumption that someone else has made a correct judgement, someone has correctly judged what it means to be a brick. The attitude of confidence is the assumption that I have made the true judgement. So this is where we find truth, in the assumption that I have made the true judgement, not the assumption that I am following the judgement of someone else, because it is correct.

And all of this is why I mentioned some time previously the ideas of right focus and right magnification - right understanding. It's getting pretty clear that the absolute quality of true is a product solely of the criteria in force; and of truth, its exemplification in something outside of itself. Admittedly this surrenders any notion of absolutes or ultimates apart from application, but for the price it secures both truth and true. Did I just win? (Did you have a moment to look at the brief article referenced above?) — tim wood

So I really beg to differ here. We do not find truth in the criteria in force, this is where we find justification. Truth is not necessarily aligned with right, what is aligned with right, is what is justified, but what is justified is sometimes false. We find truth as aligned with one's own personal conviction, the confidence and certitude in one's own power of judgement, to judge the truth, regardless of what others, or society taken as a whole, have designated as "right".

With regards to the referenced article, I think Kant is in a way correct. I base truth in personal certitude. So if anyone like Kant says, we cannot be certain of the truth, then this individual takes a position of skepticism, and lacking that certitude, there is no truth for that person. The non-skeptic, who is confident, has truth.

The disused probe will be garbage when it falls into the Sun, even by the common ordinary definition of garbage: Disused material. — Michael Ossipoff

The probe will not be garbage when it is finished with its mission, it will be incinerated. And incinerated garbage is no longer garbage, that's why they incinerate garbage. So your argument that the probe will end up as garbage is itself garbage, because the probe will be useful until it is incinerated, and then it will not be garbage. It will never be garbage. You should perhaps direct this argument at all the unused satellites, and other things orbiting the earth, which are garbage, and not yet incinerated.

I didn't say that using materials and manmade things is offensive. I said that sending them into the Sun's corona, and then letting them eventually fall into the sun, is offensive and objectionable. — Michael Ossipoff

I don't think you've stated very clearly why you think that this is offensive. At some point you said that it is offense to put garbage near the sun, but this is an untenable claim because the garbage will be incinerated. At another point you said that the earth, and all life derives from the sun, so the sun is somehow sacred, but this has also been shown to be untenable. You seem to believe that the sun should be, for some reason, regarded as inviolable. But how can you support this claim?

The difference is that the Earth was never inviolable. We never expected the Earth to be inviolable. — Michael Ossipoff

Why do you expect that the sun should be inviolable? If we live on the earth, and make use of all that is the earth, to support our comfortable existence, why should we not do the same with the sun as well? We already use the sun in many ways, beginning with the photosynthesis of plants, which in turn, we use for nutrition. Why do you not view the sun as there for us to use responsibly, like we tend to look at everything else? You really have not laid out clearly and explicitly why you think that this probe is an offensive, irresponsible act.

Judgment is deliberately assessing whether or not some claim is true, whereas thought/belief can be as rudimentary as the mental correlation required for initially attributing meaning to objects within experience. — creativesoul

Isn't belief existentially contingent on judgement? I mean, in order to believe something, don't you have to do some sort of deliberate assessment as to whether or not it is true? Without that judgement, how can it be a belief, which means to accept something, and acceptance implies deliberate judgement?

Thinking, on the other hand, is the process whereby we pass such judgements, and form beliefs. Thinking is not existentially contingent on belief, because we can think with a content of images and memories, which are not per se beliefs, because they are not created through deliberate acceptance.

So don't you think that we need a separation between thought and belief, to represent this situation where belief is existentially contingent on thought, but thought is not existentially contingent on belief?

Incidentally, that is why we cannot associate "true" with "correct" as Srap is trying to do. "Correct" is associated with "justified", meaning to be consistent with what others believe. "True" is associated with "certain". So if I say "that is a brick", and "it is true that that is a brick", what I mean is that I am certain that that is a brick. And if we proceed to ask, what makes me certain that that is a brick, often the answer is that I am certain because my belief is justified, but sometimes I can be certain even when my belief is not justified. And this is why we need to look beyond justification to determine what truth is.

When we look at the definition of "brick", this assumed "brickness ...being-as-a-brick", we can ask, is the definition accepted because it is justified, or is it true. Then we must confront the issue of what makes a definition a true definition, rather than a justified definition.

Its brickness just is; and it is its isness, its being-as-a-brick, that allows judgment to create a proposition with respect to its brickness. — tim wood

The difficulty with this perspective is that when you assume such a thing as "Its brickness ... its being-as-brick", it is implied within this assumption that there is a single correct, or objective definition of what it means to be a brick. If there is no such correct definition of "brick", then brickness is just a bunch of various different ideas, held by different people, and "that is not a brick", is true or false according to these various ideas.

We're supposing truth is just reality. We select a sample of reality, a brick. In doing so non-critically we sidestep a lot of questions - problems - about how we know it's a brick, and what a brick is anyway, and so forth. I think it is correct in this context to ignore/suspend/bracket for the moment all of those questions. There's no law against coming back to them, but if we cannot get to reality or a sample of it, then we really cannot get anywhere. — tim wood

See, it's not correct to ignore or sidestep theses questions, because these are fundamental issues, and there is no such thing as correct without first resolving the issue of definition. So you want to say:
"let's just assume that there is a brick, without first considering whether it is possible that there is a brick".
If it is impossible that there is a brick, and this might well be the case if there is no correct definition of what it means to be a brick, then the assumption that there is a brick is necessarily a false assumption.

In that case, you would be sidestepping these difficult questions, in order to proceed with a false premise, that there is a brick. In an enquiry such as this, what would be the point to sidestepping difficult questions, in order to proceed from a premise which mat be false?

Consider this example Πετροκότσυφας.

1. Prescriptive rule: Stop your car at every red light, or suffer penalty.
2. The act of following a prescriptive rule: What goes on in my mind when I approach a light which has turned yellow, or is red, which inclines me to make the car stop. This is following a prescriptive rule, what goes on within one's mind.
3. Observation of human beings who follow prescriptive rules: The human beings are observed to stop their cars at red lights.
4. Descriptive rule: Human beings stop their cars at red lights.

Notice that between 1 and 4, 2 and 3 exist as necessary intermediaries. There is a separation between 1 and 4, which cannot be removed in order to make 1 and 4 refer to the very same thing. The real existence of 2 and 3 imply that 1 and 4 are distinct. If you think that Wittgenstein in PI has removed 2 and 3, to make 1 and 4 the very same thing, then you have interpreted Wittgenstein wrongly, because what he has done is to shed light on the existence of 2 and 3, and the separation between 1 and 4.

I'm pretty sure LW thought all he had to do was show us how foolish we were being and we would quit it of our own accord. There would be no need for him to tell us what to do (prescribing) so long as he could show us what we were doing (describing). — Srap Tasmaner

Wittgenstein's overall project in PI is to obscure the distinction between a descriptive rule and a prescriptive rule. Perhaps he believed that he could conflate these categorically distinct things, making them one and the same. But looking for the one essence of "rule" is just to make the mistake of philosophers. "Rule" is commonly used in these two categorically distinct ways, "rule" in the sense of a descriptive rule, and "rule" in the sense of a prescriptive rule. The ambiguity created by his writing style will lead an uninitiated philosopher into apprehending descriptive rules as if they were prescriptive rules.

So for instance, we describe the way language is used, and one might refer to this as "rules". These rules are a type of inductive conclusion (similar to the "laws" of physics) and form the basis for dictionary definitions. Dictionary definitions are descriptive rules. If we refer to these descriptions of how language is used, as "rules", they are, de facto, descriptive rules. Notice, it is very clear when Wittgenstein defines "rule" in PI, that in order to say that one follows a rule, that individual must be observed to be acting in accordance with the rule. There can be no private rule.

The unsuspecting reader, who is perhaps not well trained in interpreting philosophical language use, might perceive that the described activity of rule-following, is the activity of human beings obeying a prescriptive rule. But Wittgenstein clearly excludes this possibility with his definition of "rule following" (observed to be acting in accordance with a rule). He furthers this exclusion with the so-called private language argument, such that there can be no reasonable doubt that "rule" according to Wittgenstein's description in PI, refers to a descriptive rule.

However, Wittgenstein introduces the word "game" to refer to the way that language is used by human beings. We all understand games as having prescriptive rules, dictating the way that one must play the game in order to avoid expulsion from the game. The unsuspecting reader, who is not rigorous in interpretation, will think that the descriptive rules of language, which Wittgenstein refers to, are actually the prescriptive rules of a language "game". This is a category error which results in a massive quantity of misinterpretation of Wittgenstein's work

He clearly says at 124:

"Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it."

Do you believe that it is possible to remedy a problem without interfering with it? To remedy the problems caused by the unruly language use of some philosophers, would require interference. Where does Wittgenstein say that any philosopher should interfere with the actual use of language?

You do not seem to be distinguishing between prescription and description, and this is category error. If Wittgenstein insists that philosophy can only describe, and you claim that he goes on to prescribe, then if you are not saying that Wittgenstein contradicts himself, you are at best, accusing him of hypocrisy.

The section of the book quoted does not describe a method for resolving any confusions or problems. Wittgenstein says a lot about a particular type of problem which philosophers have, but he offers nothing as a remedy for this problem.

Your claim, that there is a way to dissolve these confusions implies that there is a resolution for this described problem, which is being offered. Remember he claims very strongly that this is all philosophers can do, describe things, not resolve problems. Their attempts to resolve problems only created problems.

Perhaps one could form the assumption that he believes that the problems shouldn't have been created in the first place, but he is describing a problem with philosophy which is already there. So the belief that philosophers ought naught to have created this confusion in the first place, is not an option for resolving it.

The first refers to the original language game, the other to the philosopher's thesis. No contradiction. — Πετροκότσυφας

You still haven't addressed the contradiction. The "original language game", and "the philosopher's thesis", are mutually exclusive. The latter implies confusion, the former a lack of confusion. If there is confusion to be dissolved, then what is present is the philosopher's thesis, not the original language game. If the original language game is what is present, then there is no philosopher's thesis, and no confusion to be dissolved.

The statement implies that there is confusion present, by referring to confusion to be dissolved. Therefore the philosopher's thesis is what is present, as the confusion which needs to be dissolved. The confusion cannot be dissolved by referring to the original language game, because this would require taking the words out of context (the philosopher's thesis) and putting them into a contradictory context (the original language-game).

Do you see the contradiction involved in interpreting words by referring to the meaning of those words in a context which is contradictory to the context in which the words actually occur? Would it not be contradictory to you, to refer to a context where "black" refers to something black, to understand the way that "black" is being used in a particular instance, if it's being used in this instance to refer to white things?.

Now you want to argue that there's no original lagnuage-game and that W. is more or less wrong. Well, he might as well be. But that was not what we were discussing. — Πετροκότσυφας

Yes, my argument is that if what you presented, is an appropriate interpretation of what Wittgenstein said, then he was wrong. But it is not necessarily my opinion, that Wittgenstein was wrong. This is not what I am arguing. What I am arguing, is that this interpretation which you have offered is inherently contradictory, and therefore wrong.

Their goal is to select answers that will be marked correct. In selecting what they believe is the right answer, they must also have confidence that this is the answer the test-preparer will consider the right answer, that the test has no misprints, that it will be graded correctly, etc. In short, that if they do their part in selecting the right answer, the test-givers will do their part in marking it correct. — Srap Tasmaner

Do you agree that you have made a distinction here between what the student believes is right, and what the student believes will be marked as right? So the goal of the student is to answer consistently with what the teacher will be marking, not with what the student actually believes is "correct". I say this because we learned in school, from experience, that there are tricks to taking multiple choice tests, starting with the process of elimination, which allow you to improve your grade without actually knowing the right answer.

Now suppose that in addition to selecting an answer, you rate your confidence in selecting that answer, say on a scale from 1 to 5. You could imagine the test-givers using this as a sort of wager, and giving students more points for confidently selected right answers than for guesses, but otherwise it wouldn't change much for them. — Srap Tasmaner

This appears like a theoretical which is actually nonsense. If the student is getting marked on one's own claim to confidence, then wouldn't every student claim complete confidence on each answer? How would you enforce an honest rating of one's own confidence level? Perhaps you could penalize a student for claiming high confidence and getting the question wrong, but that would be very complicated. The confidence scale seems to require honesty, and if the goal of the student is to get a high mark, why would there be honesty here?

Furthermore, you have stipulated that the student is attempting to give an answer consistent with what the teacher would mark as correct, not with what the student believes is correct. So without the assumption that there is a "correct" answer which is independent from what the student or teacher believes, which will form the basis for the marking, confidence can never be high. So in this scenario you have presented, "confidence" is nothing better than a random proclamation by the student.

In reality, confidence is produced by the assumption that there is a real "correct" answer, independent of the student's and teacher's belief, and that the chosen answer, as well as the teacher's marking, are consistent with that real correct answer. But in your scenario, there can be no such real confidence, because the student is attempting to establish consistency with how the teacher will mark, and unless there is assumed some standard which the teacher will follow, there will be no confidence.

But with the confidence mechanic, things can get weird, because students can collude to move the answer. As I tried testing this, it looked like it only took two students out of ten so colluding to make a noticeable difference, and three was overkill. (The idea is for the conspirators all to confidently select the same answer; they'll pick up some help from whoever believed this answer actually to be right, and often enough swamp other answers, including the right one, selected with only random confidence. Thus their choice tends to win more than it should.) — Srap Tasmaner

Now, in this scenario, when the student colludes with another, or others, "confidence" has some real basis in the relationship of trust which the student has with the others, because giving the same answer as another, is what is being marked rather than giving the answer the teacher wants, or any assumed correct answer.

I wanted to see if we could build up a community's idea of truth from scratch. Test-taking makes a good stand-in for truth because there is a mechanical sense of correctness here, which we can exchange via voting for something like consensus, and we have a way of adding in confidence or certainty as a factor -- socially this would be something like reputation. The goal is to model a speech community without using the concept of truth, but rather explaining their concept of truth. — Srap Tasmaner

The problem I see is that you haven't properly modeled confidence. You don't seem to see that confidence is based in the assumption that there is a real correct answer, which is the one given, rather than in the assumption that the answer is consistent with what the teacher wants. This allows you to make the switch, such that the answer which the teacher wants is the one which the other students give, not any assumed correct answer. Then confidence may be produced through collusion, rather than conviction that one has the correct answer, because "correct answer" now becomes whatever answer the students have agreement on.

But the test-taking example leads naturally to the idea of cheating. In broader social terms, you can imagine cheaters as people who value prestige and standing above truth, and it turns out even a smallish group can collude to manipulate the community's consensus. And by manipulating the consensus they can reinforce their reputation as the people who know and speak the truth, despite having other goals entirely. — Srap Tasmaner

This is why "true" is so closely related to trust, honesty, and sincerity. It is based in what one truly believes is the correct answer. And this comes from the assumption that there is a correct answer, independent from whatever anyone else believes. The correct answer must be the one believed by the oneself, not by anyone else. So when I am confident that I have the correct answer, I am confident that the answer I have is the correct answer, regardless of how the teacher will mark it. Once you allow, as you do, that the correct answer is to be consistent with someone else's answer, you forfeit the true nature of truth, which is to be true to oneself. And this allows for cheating (selecting an answer to be consistent with others rather than one's true belief). So it is imperative to truth, to allow that there is a correct answer, which I alone might have, independent of whatever anyone else believes. Truth is dependent on the idea that the correct answer is proper to what I believe, myself. And this is not a case of me forcing myself to believe in what others believe, it is me believing in what is true.

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Nope, I think I got the point, which was what W. means when he says that he leaves everything as it is. I've shown you what he means (or at least what I think he means) and now you just changed the subject. — Πετροκότσυφας

Yes, you've shown what Wittgenstein means by "leaves everything as it is". But "dissolves confusions" remains contradictory to this. And when I speak of dissolving confusions you charge me with changing the subject.

If there is a larger context than the life and world that we know, then the life and world that we know could have an overarching meaning in terms of that larger context.That larger context doesn't have to be the "author", or in other words, the creator, I suppose; but it must nevertheless be a transcendent bestower of meaning; an overarching meaning that goes beyond the meanings that are contingent upon the context of immanent life and world. — John

Well that larger context is the inanimate thing we call the universe. Don't you agree? It isn't living, and there doesn't have to be an author of it, even though it is meaningful to us. I'm glad you've come to terms with this. What makes you think that there must be a "transcendent bestower of meaning" for this inanimate thing? As I explained already, the meaning we see in these inanimate things exists relative to us, and our intentions, not relative to some author, creator, or bestower. Nevertheless, that inanimate thing gives us a context larger than life.

Sure, but you continue to ignore that little word: "overarching". — John

No, I'm not ignoring "overarching" you are simply misusing the word "overarching", and that's what I'm trying to demonstrate. The "overarching meaning" would be the broadest, most general sense of the word. And the overarching meaning of "meaning" allows that we can speak about meaning without an author. It is only a restricted, more limited sense of "meaning" which requires an author, the type of meaning found in language, and this is clearly not the "overarching meaning".

So, confusions (i.e. philosophical theses, theories) are dissolved once we show their meaninglessness by describing the original language-game from which the philosopher borrowed the words (about which he constructs theories). The original language-game remains intact, the thesis advanced by the philosopher is shown as non-sense, a pseudo-thesis. — Πετροκότσυφας

You seem to be missing the point. In the original language-game, better referred to as "games", the words are commonly used in many different ways, perhaps corresponding to many different games, with many different objects (end goals). The category error, which the philosopher has to deal with involves taking the word as it is employed in one language-game, and assuming that it has the same use in another language-game, as it has in that original game.

There is no such thing as "the original home" for most words, and even if there was, to designate that the meaning of the word is according to its original home, when it is being used in a categorically different way, is to commit a category error. So in actuality, the philosopher has to deal with the confusion created by those who assign meaning according to some presupposed "original language-game" rather than according to the context (game) in which the word is being used.

Except if leaving everything as it is specifically refers to discoveries, theory building etc; which is where it refers. Philosophy does not invent, it does not discover, it does not make novel contributions to the content of what it describes, it is just describing it. It is in this sense that it leaves everything as it is. — Πετροκότσυφας

If this is the case though, it contradicts "dissolves confusions". Because "dissolving confusions" implies that the descriptions, theories, concepts etc., which are encountered, are confused. If everything is left as is, how are the confusions dissolved?

To avoid the contradiction implied by the statement, one must clarify what is referred to by "leaves everything as is", and what is referred to by "dissolves confusions", because the two phrases cannot refer to the same thing without contradiction. So "leave everything as is" must refer to the things which are being described, and "dissolves confusions" must refer to the descriptions. This requires a category separation between the things and the descriptions, to avoid the contradiction which appears at first reading.

If there is no "outside" to life (which would mean that there is nothing intentional which is not contingent upon being a part of life), then life cannot be coherently said to have an overarching meaning. — John

There are two ways in which "intentionality" relates to things. Intentionality can be within the thing, like when human beings act purposefully, they act with intention. But intentionality may also be projected onto the thing from an external source, such as when a tool has purpose. In this case, the object (the tool) is created with intention, it has an author. But objects do not necessarily need to be created to have a purpose, many natural things (things without an author) are purposeful. This is the case in my example of the geologist who finds meaning in the structures of rock. The structures are purposeful in relation to the geologist's intentions, to understand. Likewise, the structures of life are purposeful in relation to the biologist's intentions, to understand, and therefore meaningful, despite the fact that the biologist is not the author of life, nor does the biologist assume that life has an author. In relation to the biologist's desire to understand, the variety in the forms of life, has meaning.

By the way, to assume that anything with meaning must have an author is a category mistake. Some things with meaning have an author, some do not, but try not to mix up those categories.

The question about the meaning of life (meaning, that is, in an overarching sense) is coherent if your premise is that life has an "author" who intended it to have such a meaning, and the question is incoherent otherwise. — John

We can look for the meaning of something without assuming that the thing has an author. Geologists determine the meaning of rock structures.

If you want to worry about a long term problem, worry about plastics. — Bitter Crank

All right then, let's load all that plastic onto that spacecraft and get it incinerated.

You didn't say "the Kremlin", you said "the Russians". And to my understanding, there is a long history of Trump getting cash from Russians.

To prove this true, or even support it as likely, you have to show what Trump has gotten from the Russians... — Thanatos Sand

A big whack of cash. Follow his sales.

It does so without inventing new concepts. — Πετροκότσυφας

This incompatibility of "leaves everything as found" with "dissoIves confusions" is not related to creating concepts though. To dissolve confusion implies that things were found in a confused state, so to dissolve the confusion is not to leave everything as found.

In the case of category error, a single word may be used in different ways, so this may result in the confusion of category error. To dissolve the confusion does not require creating concepts, but clarifying existing ones. So, in SX's example, "life" might mean 1: "the condition which distinguishes active plants and animals (living things) from inanimate things", as in "plants have life" or 2: "life" might mean simply "living things", as in "life on earth". So when someone asks about the meaning of life, if we take life in sense #2, the question might very well appear as nonsense. But if we take life in sense #1, then the question makes sense because we are concerned with the meaning of "the condition" which distinguishes animate from inanimate things. Since sense #2 does not make sense in this context, and sense #1 makes sense in this context, it is very clear that to interpret using sense #2 is to make a category error, as 1 refers to a description which we are looking for the meaning of, and 2 refers to things .

In Wittgenstein's PI, he brings up the notion of "same". Is the chair the "same" chair which was here yesterday, or not? If the chair today has the same description as the one yesterday, we'd be inclined to say that it is the same chair. Now what if someone switched it over night? Then despite having the same description, it is not the same chair. Suppose that the chair wasn't switched out, but it was somewhat changed, damaged, or painted, such that it doesn't have the same description. We still call it the "same" chair despite the fact that it doesn't have the same description. So there are two distinct ways in which we use "same", 1) having an equal description, and 2) having a temporal continuity of existence. If we mix these up, it's category error, 1) "same" refers to a description, 2) "same" refers to a thing.