Ok, thanks. I think I can agree with that.
In many religions/philosophies there is the idea that we have an innermost desire/implicit knowledge of the 'highest good'.

Well isn't it going to be a case of gradual divergence like most things, which change and morph over time? At some point they would have been one, when closer to the Buddha's original teachings temporally, then over time, and maybe distance, with less communication, they would split away from each other. — unimportant

I agree... of course each school claims to teach the 'true version' of Buddhism and see others as detective or corruptions. Over time, differences have been more and more remarked. As you say, this seems a common phenomenon in religious traditions and not only in religions.

That does beg the question which is 'right' if any to try and bring it back to some semblance of my OP which seems to have long been abandoned in the debate in the last few pages. Lol. — unimportant

I can see that. But to be fair, these 'deviations' can help to understand what might count as 'supernatural' elements in Buddhism and see if the belief in them is relevant or not in order to reach the state of enlightenment as promised by Buddhist traditions.

The fact that there are differences in the doctrinal contents among schools might suggest that 'what one believes' might be important to reach the goal. For instance, before stopping the participation in this thread I argued that:

1) the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth was regarded as an important motivator for practice. Can one achieve the same goal without this motivator? How?
2) the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth perhaps influnced the understanding of what counts as suffering (e.g. 'birth is suffering') and what is the cessation of suffering. Notice that Buddhist believed that insight in the nature of suffering and its cause was a condition for enlightenment. So, how can we be certain to achieve the same goal if our understanding of suffering differ?
3) the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth coheres pretty well with anatman. Can one really achieve an insight in 'not self' if one holds the view of 'one life only as this or that person'?

Note that all these questions make sense even if the traditional Buddhist doctrine of rebirth is false. I was wondering about what role might the belief in it might have in practicing and achieving the goal. They are IMO legitimate questions one can ask if one claims that belief in rebirth (or any other 'supernatural' doctrine) isn't needed to achieve the goal.

I think we do know the answer to my question, but just can’t put it down on paper, it always misses the mark. — Punshhh

Well, I don't :sweat: indeed, given the variety of opinions Buddhists seem to have hold about the 'ontology' of Nirvana, it is difficult to say that they had the same 'state' in mind.

But perhaps you meant something different.

Note that in Buddhist thought rebirth is sustained by desire of either continued existence or annihilation. So, in order to avoid that, one shouldn't have any attachment or aversion to existence (that's why incidentally, I think that both negativistic that consider Nirvana as mere cessation or positivistic views that consider Nirvana in terms too similar to a blissful 'personal' state are inconsistent with the broader context of Buddhist thought).

Also, rebirth is quite consistent with anatman. If the male human John Smith can become in the future a female ant, then there is little in John Smith that can be considered an underlying essence.

In the Mahayana, there is an aspiration to liberate all sentient beings without, however, the guarantee that it will happen.

In the Theravada, there is the idea that while Buddhas and arhats stop helping when they reach Nirvana without reminder, but also the idea that cyclically the Dharma will be rediscovered and taught and there will be more occasions of liberation.

Interestingly, there is a sutta in the Pali Canon in which the Buddha is asked on how many will be liberated and the Buddha replied that one shouldn't ask about that, basically. He just put the question aside.

So, imo generally in both traditions you'll find the idea to act for the benefit of all (within one's limit) but there is no guarantee that such an 'universalist' ending will come to fruition. Perhaps you cam say that the Mahayana is more hopeful but even there you generally find emphasized of how rare is reaching liberation.

BTW, last post for today, here in my timezone is quite late!

ok, so you seem closer to 'Theravadin' reading.

BTW, you find both views espoused by supporters of both traditions. So perhaps calling Theravadin and Mahayanist is incorrect.

Yes, that's a possible way to interpret the three forms of suffering and, indeed, this seems to have been the interpretation that is taken up by the Mahayana: perfect insight itself extinguishes (Nirvana literally mean extinguishment) suffering at the very moment it occurs.

The Theravadin commentary I quoted however says that the true end of suffering happens when all conditioned phenomena cease. So, perfect insight itself doesn't extinguish suffering the moment it occurs but it leads to the eventual end of arising conditioned phenomena.

IMO you can find support of both views in the suttas.

Edit: "The Theravadin commentary I quoted however says that the true end of suffering happens when all conditioned phenomena cease" - of course not literally all the conditioned phenomena. I meant all conditioned phenomena of the series relative to an individual. Of course, Theravadins do not claim that when one arhat 'reaches' Nirvana without remainder, conditioned phenomena stop for everyone

:up:

Also: intelligibility is the property of being understandable, at least in principle, by an intellect. So, arguably, anything in order to be 'intelligible' should require the possibility of the existence of an intellect.

So if physical reality is intelligible, the potential existence of an intellect is requied from an essential feature of physical reality. This would be indeed an odd thing to say in naturalistic views.

I believe it is also about the problem of explaining reason from purely naturalistic terms. How can, for instance, logic necessity be explained in terms of physical causation, laws etc?

Then there is the issue of "skillful means". Again, doing things that are ordinarily considered immoral or wrong, but when done for some "higher purpose" and/or by a "spiritually advanced person", considered perfectly right.

So in the light of this, I'm wondering whether the Crusades and the Holy Inquisition (with the stake burnings and all that) were actually examples of such "spiritual advancement" that we ordinary folks simply cannot even begin to comprehend. — baker

I see. Sorry for the misinterpretation. However, this presupposes a very strong 'discontinuity' between the 'perfected state' and the 'imperfect state' that is IMO indeed a problem.

For instance, if a 'perfectly good person' can make clearly bad acts from an 'imperfect' perspective, then arguably 'good' loses its meaning. In many ancient philosophies and traditions, the 'perfected realization of virtue' is the ultimate realization of something that is 'already present' in those are still in an imperfect state and everytime that vritue is exercised, it is a manifestation of such a 'potential to perfection'.

All of this to say that if 'love of your neighbour' for 'ordinary folks' means that one should care for the other, treat him or her with respect and so on, it is reasonable to expect that if one is 'perfect in virtue' then he or she would treat the 'neighbour' in an analogous way but better than the 'ordinary folks'.

If, however, one accepts that there is strong discontinuity between the 'perfected' and the 'imperfect' states, then yeah I can see how one might end up justifying what is unjutifiable, calling 'an expression of goodness' what would generally regarded as the opposite and so on. The problem with these kinds of views is that the language they use can't be trusted.

Yes, I think I’m getting the feeling for it now. My first thought is a reference to a transfiguration of the aspect of the self which is constituted of/in the aggregate. Also if there is a reference to ultimate meaning (paramattha), the self and not-self may lose their distinction, while in a sense remain, reconciled. — Punshhh

It's hard to know what that text meant for 'paramattha'. In the developed abhidharmic/abhidhammic thought, 'paramattha sacca' was the 'ultimate truth' as opposed to the 'conventional truth', i.e. 'how reality truly is' vs 'what is provisionally true but ultimately illusory'. I know that various scholars have suggested that this distinction wasn't made at the time of the earliest commentary but of course traditionalist Theravadins I would say that think there is a continuity between 'early' and 'later' commentaries.

Anyways, the developed Theravadin tradition suggested that there are 'ultimately real dhammas' ('cognizable objects'): 81 types of conditioned (both mental and 'material') and only 1 unconditioned dhamma (i.e. Nibbana). All these 'objects' are irriducible, have no components. Indeed, all 'composite objects', like tables, chairs, trees and so on were seen as ultimately illusory, but conventionally/provosionally real. This was also the case for the 'selves'. Other 'abhidharmic' systems developed their lists of conditioned and unconditioned dhammas but the idea was essentially the same (the Sautrantika denied the 'reality' of unconditioned dhammas, including Nibbana, and believed that they are just absence of conditioned dhammas).
So, indeed, in these systems the 'self' was simply a wrong (albeit useful) idea. No ultimate reconciliation.

Interestingly, in the Madhyamaka thought, if I understand it correctly, this 'ultimate/provisional' distinction collapses in the sense that there are no 'ultimate dhammas'. All 'dhammas' are provisional and, therefore, not more real than the 'selves'. So, in a sense, here you find a 'reconciliation': at the end of the day, while the 'abhidharmic views' were reductionistic ('ultimate irreducible objects' are real, 'composites' aren't), Madhyamaka doesn't posit an 'ultimate' set of 'real dhammas'.

Not sure if this helps (also, don't trust what I'm saying too much).

Whom is experiencing the exalted state? — Punshhh

For most Buddhist traditions is regarded as wrong-posited. Consider this excerpt:

“Venerable sir, who feels?”

“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One feels.’ If I should say, ‘One feels,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who feels?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, with what as condition does feeling come to be?’ this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘With contact as condition, feeling comes to be; with feeling as condition, craving.’” — SN 12.12, Ven Bodhi translation

Indeed, ultimately, both the 'enligthened' and 'unenlightened' experience is self-less. It would be interesting to see how the ancient 'personalist' (Pudgalavada) Buddhist school, which posited a sort of 'indeterminate self', would read that passage but unfortunately, their literature is lost (and the same goes for many other ancient Buddhist schools).

I know this might sound like a simplistic question, but there is a deeper issue in it. Or rather if there is total annihilation, such that all is left is a state of non-existence, whom, is, present, in it? Who, or what remains? — Punshhh

I believe that the 'commentarial Theravada' would answer, 'the Nibbana element' remains. Given that it isn't understood as anything material or mental, I have no idea of what would mean. But no, based on the quotes I found it isn't simply 'non-existence' or an 'absence'.
I think that the Madhyamaka instead would answer you that even asking this question is premised on wrong presuppositions about reality.

Note that even the Sautrantika wouldn't say that 'Nibbana without remainder' is annihilation because they would tell you that since there is no self, there is nothing to annihilate. But, yeah, their view of 'Nibbana without remainder' is well 'non-existence' IIRC (I think that some scholars questioned that this was true for all Sautrantikas but I can't recall their arguments).

I’m not expecting an answer to it, particularly. Just expressing the question that immediately occurred to me on learning the Buddhist conception of nirvana. — Punshhh

Me too. I gradually found the 'abhidharmic' (the Sautrantika included) views less and less convincing over time. However, interestingly, I would say that the Madhyamaka perhaps would be right if there is no metaphysical Absolute that 'grounds' the reality of the conditioned - if there is no 'Absolute', then neither the conditioned nor the unconditioned are ultimately real.

Honestly, I'm not sure. I compiled that list in 2018 but even at the time I wasn't sure about that. Notice that Harvey mentions that in some instances Nirvana is described as the opposte of the aggregate even with the respect of 'not-self'.

My hypothesis is that the text means that you can know Nirvana only when you have an insight on not-self. Indeed, in one sutta the Buddha is reporter to have said that notions of self can only arise when the aggregate of feeling is present:

Ānanda, the one who says ‘Feeling is not my self, but my self is not without experience of feeling. My self feels; for my self is subject to feeling’—he should be asked: ‘Friend, if feeling were to cease absolutely and utterly without remainder, then, in the complete absence of feeling, with the cessation of feeling, could (the idea) “I am this” occur there?’.”

“Certainly not, venerable sir.” — DN 15, Ven Bodhi translation

So since in Nirvana without remainder all aggregates stop, Nirvana can't be regarded as a 'self' in any meaningful terms.

In that list I also forgot to mention in the post that there is a post-canonical text that explicitly refutes the idea that Nirvana is some form of consciousness while commenting a sutta that seems to say the opposite. So, Nirvana is not just a 'mere absence', it is an unconditioned ultimate (i.e. non illusory) 'entity' (for a lack of a better word) but neither a form of consciousness according to the 'commentarialTheravada'. Certainly a peculiar view.

The Theravadins traditionally rejected this 'negativistic' view but nevertheless maintained that there is no consciousness in Nirvana — boundless

For those interested on this peculiar view of Nirvana, I compiled some textual evidence on this post: https://ancientafterlifebelifs.blogspot.com/2026/02/on-nature-of-nibbana-nirvana-in.html

I believe that one of the late-canonical commentarial books in the Pali Canon clearly say that even arhats and Buddhas experience dukkha while alive in the forms of physical pain and this third 'mysterious' type.
...
The Theravadins would generally reply that this is wrong and the final cessation of suffering is 'Nirvana without remainder' — boundless

Ok, I found the source:

"Dukkha is [the world's] greatest fear."
(Ajita Sutta, Sn. 1033)

"Dukkha is [the world's] greatest fear" is the Blessed One's reply to [Ajita's question] "and what will be its greatest fear?"

Dukkha is of two kinds: bodily and mental. The bodily kind is pain, while the mental kind is grief. All beings are sensitive to dukkha. Since there is no fear that is even equal to dukkha, how could there be one that is greater?

There are three kinds of unsatisfactoriness (dukkhatā): unsatisfactoriness consisting in [bodily] pain (dukkha-dukkhatā), unsatisfactoriness consisting in change (vipariṇāma-dukkhatā), and the unsatisfactoriness of formations (saṅkhāra-dukkhatā).

Herein, the world enjoys limited freedom from unsatisfactoriness consisting in [bodily] pain, and likewise from unsatisfactoriness consisting in change. Why is that? Because there are those in the world who have little sickness and are long-lived.

However, in the case of the unsatisfactoriness of formations, the world is freed only by the Nibbāna element without remainder (anupādisesa nibbānadhātu).

That is why "Dukkha is [the world's] greatest fear", taking it that the unsatisfactoriness of formations is the world's inherent liability to dukkha.

(Nettipakaraṇa 12; bolded mine, source: https://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?p=6539#p6539 )

It seems obvious to me―it means suffering due to negative thought complexes or patterns. — Janus

And yet, you find different interpretations of it. The third type of dukkha is most often interpreted as a form of suffering/unsatisfactoriness/ill-being that permeates all conditioned states. I believe that one of the late-canonical commentarial books in the Pali Canon clearly say that even arhats and Buddhas experience dukkha while alive in the forms of physical pain and this third 'mysterious' type.

The Mahayana schools would generally agree with that but they have a different 'twist'. For instance, in the Madhyamaka school, given that all conditioned (and unconditioned) phenomena are unestablished, that is illusion-like, dukkha is too illusion-like. Hence the doctrine of 'emptiness' is central to the idea that Buddhas can take rebirth 'out of compassion' while being enlghtened and having transcended suffering. The Theravadins would generally reply that this is wrong and the final cessation of suffering is 'Nirvana without remainder' (with endless discussions about what this state entails. Another non-Mahayana school, the ancient Sautrantika even claimed that 'Nirvana without remainder' is basically eternal oblivions, a mere absence (this view is IMO increasingly popular among the Theravadins today). The Theravadins traditionally rejected this 'negativistic' view but nevertheless maintained that there is no consciousness in Nirvana).

(Sorry if I'm going with memory, I am pretty confident that what I said above is right and I said above I have already mentioned various things I have said in this thread with links...)

This notion of transmigration could be consistent with the idea that Atman is Brahman. That it is Brahman who is endlessly transmigrating and suffering in many different forms, without retaining the idea that Atman (in the sense of a personal soul or even karmic accumulations) is in any kind of (even illusory) personal sense reincarnating. — Janus

It is also consistent with the 'self is an illusion' position you find in most forms of Buddhism and the 'indeterminate self' of the Pudgalavadins. After all, if you keep having rebirth no quality associated with any of these 'lives' defines 'what you really are'. So, indeed, rebirth actually, when you think about it, weakens the sense of personal self and attachment.

Why should belief in rebirth be motivating in a context that denies personal rebirth? Or even in the Vedantic context where reincarnation of the personal soul (which however is seen as ultimately an illusion) and where it is in any case exceedingly uncommon to remember past lives, and hence establish any continuity of self? Why would attaining peace of mind, acceptance of death and the ability to die a good death not be more motivating? — Janus

The first thing you have to note is that they asserted that the very same 'continuity' you have between 'you as an infant' and 'you as an adult' is the same as when you consider 'you as John Smith' and 'you as a Deva'.

Secondly, traditionalists would tell you that while you aren't enlightened you exprerience this 'succession of lives' as truly 'something you yourself are experiencing'. It's like, say, when in the same night you continue to have nightmares and you can't control them or awake from them. You might have the suspicion that they are dreams but you still experience a lot of anguish. In order to cease anguish, you have to 'wake up'. But until you do, you have to take seriously your nightmares.

Of course I agree that one cannot rationalise their way to enlightenment but still, just like there are routines they follow in Buddhism to act as breadcrumbs to get there, I would just be looking at how one would do it as a secularist. — unimportant

Perhaps the best way to do you in your case it to take seriously those teachings you find 'unbelievable' at least as good allegories that say something true about the human condition (as @Punshhh suggests). Also, in order to sustain the practice you can still contemplate the numerous forms of suffering that are present in this world and one can see without any spiritual attainment (illnesses, wars, loss of loved ones, the fact that our life is uncertain and death can happen anytime and so on)* and see other humans and other sentient beings as 'being in the same boat', so to speak, to develop compassion.
Nowadays, I am no longer a 'Buddhist' in any good sense of the word but I see the above approach to it as a good way to give it value. As much as I would like to have the compassionate, calm, patient etc mind that Buddhists promise, I find it exceedingly hard to sustain a serious practice however. It would certainly help if I could believe also what I find 'unbelievable' in it. Nonetheless, as a 'sympathetic outsider' of (both Mahayana and Theravada) Buddhism, I still find their doctrine and practice useful.

*Incidentally, I believe that if one truly believes that there is no afterlife and still gives so much relevance to 'suffering' as Buddhists do, the only coherent conclusion one would get is to become an antinatalist. I mean: given how much suffering can happen during anyone's life and that no matter what we all die and we do not even know when and how, if there is no afterlife would it be worth the risk to bring other human beings in this world?
Interestingly, Buddhism and other Indian religions see the human realm as positive and 'being born as a human' as a very good thing precisely because it is the one that give you the highest chance to escape samsara.

Were the Inquisition and the Crusades an abuse of power, or a mere use of power? What if the popes in the past did what they did because they were "further along than you"? — baker

Sorry, but I don't understand your point here. Are you claiming that if a behaviour that is blatantly in contradiction with a religion's 'code of conduct' is done by a large number of those who hold a authority position in that religion it is evidence that the religion in question is false (or it is at least a reason to be skeptical of it)?

Surely Wayfarer will answer for himself. But this was about a pretty standard theme: According to Theravada, one person cannot save another, ever, one person cannot do the work for another, ever. And this goes back to intention being kamma, and kamma being what matters; and one person cannot intend for another, instead of another. — baker

It is pretty standard but it should be noted that there are differences in how Mahayanists see the Theravadins. Indeed, it seems that the earliest times, the ancestors of modern Mahayanists and Theravadins were less polemical than in later times.

Anyway, sectarianism has always been a problem both in Buddhism and other religions.

Interestingly, I think that the Mahayana notion that Buddhas can in some way still 'help' explains better why Buddhas are said to arise cyclically. In the Theravada, it is never explained why Buddhas keep re-occurring. That said, the Pali suttas can't be read as asserting that past Buddhas can actively help. So, of course, Mahayana and Theravada are indeed different religions.

Not disqualify, but certainly demotivate. From what I've seen, people who believe this one lifetime is all there is just don't explore much Buddhism; they just don't. Apparently they're so put off by any mention of rebirth that they lose their ability to pay attention or something. — baker

Yes, I agree. Buddhist practice in Buddhist monasteries is indeed taxing. It demands a degree of renunciation, 'spiritual struggle' and so on that many outsiders might underestimate (incidentally, I think the same is true for other religions).

I've seen some Buddhists who hold a view that rebirth applies on a moment-to-moment basis (and not to multiple, serial births); and the proponents of the "momentariness" view have put in considerable effort to interpret all teachings in line with that (recasting some of those that don't seem to fit as "metaphorical", others as "later additions", and yet others as "corruptions"). — baker

I find odd that a surprising number of people would think that rebirth is a later addition when it is the less disputed belief among Buddhist schools. As I said, you find disagreements on how to interpret Nirvana, anatman etc but I never found historical evidence of historical Buddhists that questioned rebirth. Indeed, you even find in quite early texts like the Kathavatthu, a debate about the reality of the wardens of the terryfing Buddhist 'purgatories' (naraka) , which is an insanely precise detail to debate on that would surprise people who think that rebirth is marginal (incidentally, the 'orthodox Theravada' view is that the guard are real; the idea that they are projection was later adopted by the Yogacara school...).

Nevertheless, I believe that one can doubt rebirth and yet believe that 'enlightenment' is possible (altough, I believe that the Buddhist descriptions of enlightenment are only coherent with a belief in literal rebirth).

IIRC, momentariness, moment-to moment rebirth and literal rebirth are all affirmed in the 'Theravada commentaries' (I'm going with memory however).

Exactly, as I've been trying to tell the OP. — baker

:up:

Of course. There are also those who just stick around, go through the motions with the "practice", and who don't seem to be all that concerned about the doctrinal stuff one way or another. — baker

Yes.

Or else, one may realize that motivation is not enough and that one also needs the right external conditions. In my case, I realized there was a limit as to what I can attain, spiritually/religiously, given my current physical, social, and economic status, and that persisting longer and trying to push further would just be a case of diminishing returns. — baker

That's also true, unfortunately. When I was considering joining Buddhist traditions, I certainly had to confront certain 'ordinary life' circumastances that discouraged it. And one should take these circumstances seriously.

Mahayanis and their fans keep saying that. It's not true, though. It's that Theravada doesn't believe that one can save another, and this goes back to the workings of kamma. Not some kind of "selfishness" or "small-mindedness" or some such as Mahayana likes to accuse Theravada of. — baker

I believe that @Wayfarer meant that the end goal for Theravada is a state in which the 'enlightened' can't help other sentient beings. Buddhas and arhats can help sentient beings while alive but they can't keep help after 'Nirvana without reminder'.

Personally, I consider Mahayana and Theravada separate religions. They of course share a lot in common but they have radically different beliefs.

Or just read Thanissaro Bhikkhu's The Truth of Rebirth And Why It Matters for Buddhist Practice. — baker

Yes, that's a good source. However, I don't see how a disagreement about rebirth would disqualify one to try and see for himself or herself.

Personally, I think that if rebirth isn't real, then also the Buddhist (of all schools) conceptions of Nibbana/Nirvana, anatta/anatman and so on become incoherent. In my previous posts in this thread I explained why I think so and why I can't make sense of these doctrines (in all their 'variations' among historical Buddhist schools I know of) without the belief in traditional rebirth.

However, I can understand why someone who can't accept the traditional belief of rebirth might still want to achieve 'the mind at peace' that Buddhist traditions promise (a mind that is freed from all hatred, anxiety etc is certainly a desirable goal not just for Buddhist). At the end of the day, despite what I have said before, I do believe that the 'only way to know' is actually try to practice and see for oneself. Philosophical and exegetical arguments can get us up to a point.

1. People believe nibbana (a complete cessation of suffering) is impossible.
2. People believe nibbana is a matter of luck.
3. People believe nibbana requires very little work and can be attained easily.
4. People believe they are already enlightened.
5. People believe they will certainly become enlightened, at the very least at the moment of death. — baker

Yes, I tend to agree with you that without the belief in rebirth long-term practice is difficult to maintain and one might become convinced of one or all these things. However, since we are in a philosophical forum, I would point out that this outcome is not logically necessary. It is arguable that without a strong motivator, one can't sustain the practice (such was my case, just to make an example) but that doesn't imply it is the necessary outcome.

Have a read of the suttas contained in SN 15. Belief in literal rebirth was indeed seen as a motivator. — boundless

You haven’t read the chapters and can’t point out where it says that? — praxis

Ok, I'll quote some of those suttas. I leave the judgment for the reader. It seems to me evident that these suttas treat the belief of literal rebirth in samsara as a strong motivator for practice but I'll let the reader to judge for himself/herself (again, in order to avoid misunderstanding, I don't think that this proves that rebirth is logically necessary to get enlightnened).

“Good, good, mendicants! It’s good that you understand my teaching like this. The flow of tears you’ve shed while roaming and transmigrating is indeed more than the water in the four oceans. For a long time you’ve undergone the death of a mother … father … brother … sister … son … daughter … loss of relatives … loss of wealth … or loss through illness. From being coupled with the unloved and separated from the loved, the flow of tears you’ve shed while roaming and transmigrating is indeed more than the water in the four oceans.

Why is that? This transmigration has no known beginning. … This is quite enough for you to become disillusioned, dispassionate, and freed regarding all conditions.” — SN 15.3, bhikkhu Sujato translation

At one time the Buddha was staying near Sāvatthī.

“Mendicants, this transmigration has no known beginning. No first point is found of sentient beings roaming and transmigrating, shrouded by ignorance and fettered by craving. When you see someone in a sorry state, in distress, you should conclude: ‘In all this long time, we too have undergone the same thing.’ Why is that? This transmigration has no known beginning. … This is quite enough for you to become disillusioned, dispassionate, and freed regarding all conditions.” — SN 15.11, bhikkhu Sujato translation

The Buddha said this:

“Mendicants, this transmigration has no known beginning. No first point is found of sentient beings roaming and transmigrating, shrouded by ignorance and fettered by craving.

What do you think? Which is more: the flow of blood you’ve shed when your head was chopped off while roaming and transmigrating for such a very long time, or the water in the four oceans?”

“As we understand the Buddha’s teaching, the flow of blood we’ve shed when our head was chopped off while roaming and transmigrating is more than the water in the four oceans.”

“Good, good, mendicants! It’s good that you understand my teaching like this. The flow of blood you’ve shed when your head was chopped off while roaming and transmigrating is indeed more than the water in the four oceans. For a long time you’ve been cows, and the flow of blood you’ve shed when your head was chopped off as a cow is more than the water in the four oceans. For a long time you’ve been buffalo … sheep … goats … deer … chickens … pigs … For a long time you’ve been bandits, arrested for raiding villages, highway robbery, or adultery. And the flow of blood you’ve shed when your head was chopped off as a bandit is more than the water in the four oceans.

Why is that? This transmigration has no known beginning. … This is quite enough for you to become disillusioned, dispassionate, and freed regarding all conditions.”

That is what the Buddha said. Satisfied, the mendicants approved what the Buddha said. And while this discourse was being spoken, the minds of the thirty mendicants from Pāvā were freed from defilements by not grasping. — SN 15.13, bhikkhu Sujato translation

At Sāvatthī.

“Mendicants, this transmigration has no known beginning. … It’s not easy to find a sentient being who in all this long time has not previously been your mother.

Why is that? This transmigration has no known beginning. … This is quite enough for you to become disillusioned, dispassionate, and freed regarding all conditions.” — SN 15.14, bhikkhu Sujato translation

That said, all of this doesn't disqualify bhikkhu Analayo's quote in this post:

Lol, ok looking at my own thread title I see the focus on Buddhism is largely my own fault, but my thoughts developed as a product of the discussion so far. It would probably be better to revise the question to: Can enlightenment be achieved without appeal to any supernatural elements? — unimportant

Given your clarification, I think I might return to this thread. To be honest, I don't think you'll find a satisfying answer to your question here. Unless somebody is actually 'enlightened', how could one answer with certainty to your answer?

In my posts where I presented evidence of the presence of the belief rebirth in Buddhism and the apparent universal acceptance of that belief in Buddhist traditions, my point was to make an argument that a traditionalist Buddhist would make to answer your question in the negative.

So, certainly my point wasn't to tell you this:

This is exactly what the 'you must completely adhere to the teachings or you are going to get nowhere' folks in the thread, and the usual mindset I see when I have asked similar questions elsewhere in the past, are like imo. Fundamental uncritical faith or you are not practising at all. — unimportant

It was just the traditionalists apparently believed that the belief of rebirth was a strong motivator for practising and that it was taught by people who they deemed to be enlightened.

However, I believe that it is impossible to give a philosophical argument to answer either in the positive or in the negative to your question:

Can enlightenment be achieved without appeal to any supernatural elements? — unimportant

The only possible way is, as you yourself say:

I just realised this is actually really ironic and the opposite of what the Buddha himself suggested. In his sutras he would talk about how you should not believe him, but practice and see for yourself through experience. — unimportant

i.e. try and see if it is indeed possible for yourself. Apologies if I came across as asserting this kind of view:

This is exactly what the 'you must completely adhere to the teachings or you are going to get nowhere' folks in the thread, and the usual mindset I see when I have asked similar questions elsewhere in the past, are like imo. Fundamental uncritical faith or you are not practising at all. — unimportant

It certainly wasn't my intention.

Yeah, it was an interesting typo lol. I'll fix it now.

Hope all goes well, I too will be taking a few days out. — Wayfarer

Thank you very much!

Kant never refers to the transcendental subject or transcendental ego. That comes with later philosophers. But also, notice that in singling out the subject as an individual being, you're already treating this as an object of thought. That is what I mean by taking an "outside view". — Wayfarer

I am merely stating an hypothetical: "if I am a transcendental subject and my existence is contingent, there must be an explanation of my own existence. Being contingent, my existence is explainable, in principle, in terms of something other than me."
If the above phrase is coherent - as it seems to me - this implies that the 'perspective' assumes that there is something beyond it, which is also necessary to explain the existence of the 'perspective' itself. I can't make sense of saying that 'we can't say that there is anything beyond' if it is accepted that the subject's existence is contingent, unless it is said that the subject is also an 'useful map', i.e. that the subject is ultimately an useful abstraction rather than a real entity (which would then leave us to a non-dualism of some form).

his is, precisely something like 'the Cartesian anxiety' — Wayfarer

Perhaps, yes. But the point of my argument is that these transcendental models seem to be naturally incomplete. Good as starting points and good to avoid dogmatisms but they can't structurally be 'the last word'. They seem to point to some conclusion and just stop before asserting it. In other words, these approaches seem to point beyond themselves naturally.

And perhaps, now, the 'useful map' analogy is a good one. In presenting this OP, I didn't set out to offer a 'theory of everything'. Really the point is to call out the naturalistic tendency to treat the human as just another object — a phenomenon among phenomena — fully explicable in scientific terms. This looses sight of the way that the mind grounds the scientific perspective, and then forgets or denies that it has (which is the 'blind spot of science' in a nutshell). — Wayfarer

Ok. I was just stating, however, that it is reasonable to go beyond it.

The point is not to replace scientific realism with something else, but to recall that the very intelligibility of scientific realism already presupposes what it cannot itself objectify: the standpoint of the embodied mind. So I'm not presenting it as 'the answer' but as a kind of open-ness or aporia. — Wayfarer

Ok, I see.

BTW, I'll probably stop posting for a while. I'll have surgery the day after tomorrow (a low-risk operation). Anyway, thanks for the discussion to all.

Kant is saying we can’t know anything about the noumenon with rational thought. Basically it is veiled from us. This does not negate our knowing it by other means. Kant is only talking about reason, rational thought. We are acquainted with the noumenon through our presence in the world. — Punshhh

Yes, but note that his own philosophy leads to the inevitability of admitting the existence of the noumenon. By his account, the transcendental subject cannot be a 'creator' (I believe that Kant would say that it has not an 'intellectual intuition'). So, the empirical world must originate from something outside the subject.

So, indeed, it seems that reason, according to Kant, can say something about the noumenon: there is 'something beyond' the subject and this 'beyond' is also related to the 'empirical world' (i.e. the world of appearances ordered by the cognitive faculties). That's why I think that there is an unresolved tension in Kant's model.

Kant argued that the transcendental conditions for the possibility of the intelligiblity of time, space and empirical causality are not contingent but a priori. Hegel argued instead that these conditions are contingent, and the phenomenologists followed his lead. But according to Hegel and phenomenology , subjective consciousness is not contingent. This may sound confusing, but it’s a matter of of the difference between thinking about subjectivity in terms of a fixed set of conditions of possibility (Kant) vs as a site of interaction with the world in which schemes of intelligibility undergo historical change (Hegel) . — Joshs

Interesting. I would class Hegel among those who redefine the 'transcendental subject' as a singular non-contingent subject. Indeed, Hegel was a panentheist of sorts. I think that this is indeed a possible way to 'solve' the antinomy but I am surprised to see the phenomenologists grouped with Hegel here.

So it is, not consciousness, but pure speculative reason in its transcendental use, from which the subject in its transcendental meaning originates, and that is a faculty of individual rational beings in general. — Mww

Ok. But it is instantiated in individual rational beings? I don't think that Kant would say that it can be found elsewhere. So, if individual rational beings are contingent so is pure speculative reason.

No. The framework is speculative, hence all its conclusions are contingent on the premises from which the conclusions are inferred. — Mww

Not sure what you mean by 'speculative' here. Yes, I can see how the conclusions are contingent on the framework. However, if I am right in what I said above, it also seems that the framework is speculative.

@Wayfarer, @Joshs and @Mww,

The 'main reason' why I think that Kant's 'transcendental idealism' and those 'transcendental approaches' advanced by some phenomenologists are mistaken because they are positing that the 'framework' in which it makes sense to speak of an intelligible world is contingent.
Am I wrong about this?

Is the transcendental subject (or an analogous concept in those views that are similar to Kant's but not exactly the same) contingent? Do you think that asking if it is contingent doesn't make sense? If so, why?

Do I need to remind you that this is a Philosophy Forum, not a Physics Seminar? — Gnomon

No, you don't. But, again, a vital part of philosophy of physics is, in fact, clarify the meaning of the concepts that are used in physics.

As I said various times, I am not, in fact, making a critique of your metaphysical view from a purely meyaphysical standpoint. Rather, what I am trying to say is that it is not correct, in my opinion, to use out of their proper context terms that have a defined meaning in a given particular context. By doing this, there is a problem of (at least possible) equivocation that it is needed to be addressed.

As an example to be fair, I also believe that when even some scientists say that, for instance, the "68% of the constituents of our universe is unknown" because "dark energy is the 68% of the total energy of the observable universe" I believe that they are misusing language. Indeed, 'energy' can't be said to be a 'constituent' of anything. At best, you can say that, for instance, the 'rest energy' (which can arguably identified with its 'mass' via the famous mass-energy equivalence) of a muon is more than the 'rest energy' of an electron (both of which are to our knowledge elementary particles without 'parts'). However, it is can't be said that the muon has 'more stuff' of the neutrino. Hence, you can't say that 'most stuff' of the observable universe isn't unknown because it is 'dark energy'. You can say that most energy is in some unknown physical component of the observale universe but it isn't the same as saying that "most constituents are unknown".
Again, kinetic energy increases with the increase of velocity. Since this means that an object acquires energy with increasing its velocity this means that energy can't be 'stuff'. Further, the value of kinetic energy also clearly depends on the reference frame. So, 'the energy contained in a system' is, in fact, dependent of the reference frame. So, again, this suggests that energy can't be an intrinsic property of a system.

However, 'properties' like, say, 'being a thermal machine' are something different. In this case you aren't considering the 'energy content' but the way the system behaves. It says something of its structure, its order and, therefore, if anything, it is how a system transfers and stores energy that gives you information about the 'nature' of a physical system.

Anyway, I believe that we are talking past of each other now. So, I'll give you the last word if you wish.

In any case, I truly enjoyed the chat. Thanks for the exchange.

Constitution here is not a causal relation. Appearances are not freely invented by us, there is something independent of our spontaneity involved in experience. But Kant denies us any right to describe that involvement in causal terms. Within experience, every appearance stands under causal laws. What Kant denies is that we can step outside that framework and demand a further causal story about why the framework itself exists. — Joshs

Is the framework's existence contingent or necessary? If it is contingent, it seems to me that this implies that it is possible, in principle, to explain its existence. If it is necessary, such an explanation doesn't exist. However, this framework would be, in fact, a metaphysical absolute. Given that all sentient beings in this world don't seem to exists necessarily, the framework seems contingent.

Or, perhaps, you might say that the framework is neither contingent nor necessary.

I think Joshs previous comment (above your reply to me) holds, I hope that what I've been arguing so far conforms with it. — Wayfarer

I somehow missed @Joshs' post. However, I am not sure how even that reply really addresses my points.

Here, you are treating the transcendental subject as if it were an entity that could itself be viewed from an external standpoint and compared with a “world without it.” But the whole point of the transcendental analysis is that there is no such standpoint. The subject here is not a being in the world, but the condition under which anything can appear as world. So asking how the world would be “without reference to it,” or how it “comes into existence,” already presupposes what the analysis rules out. — Wayfarer

I get that. However, the perspective of each transcendental subject becomes inconsistent (not sure about the world?) IMO. On the one hand, in transcendental idealist views, it seems that the transcendental subject is seen as the precondition in which, as you say, anything can appear as a world. On the other hand, however, if the transcendental subject is identified with a mind of any sentient (or rational) being which existence is contingent.

So the pre-condition of any 'world' is itself contingent. If, however this is valid of any perspective (i.e. any possible 'transcendental subject') you have to assert that there is an explanation of the existence of those perspectives which in turn presupposes that there is 'something that is transcendent of any given perspective'.

Note that if, instead, you say that the transcendental subject is a 'pragmatic model' used to 'make sense' of the world without asserting that it is 'real', then you imply a non-dualist view (i.e. the very distinction of 'subject-object' is provisional). In these kinds of view, there is no need to explain how the subject came into existence. It is, after all, an useful 'map' at best.

And what world would that be? Presumably, the earth prior to the evolution of h.sapiens . But then, you're conflating the empirical and transcendental again. Notice that even to name or consider 'the world without any sentient/rational being' already introduces the very perspective that you are at the same time presuming is absent. — Wayfarer

No, I wasn't implying that the 'world without any sentient/rational being' must coincide with the world as depicted by the perspective of a given sentient/rational being. On the contrary, I am merely pointing to the weirdness of the picture advanced from the 'transcendental idealists/phenomenologists' in which the very precondition of, as you say, of any 'world' is also contingent. But if it is contingent, there is an explanation for its existence. So, this puts us beyond that perspective.

The transcendental subject, being nothing but the consciousness of every thought, A346/B404, cannot be subject or predicate in a composed logical proposition. — Mww

Is the 'consciousness of every thought' the consciousness of a given individual sentient/rational being? If so, this means that the transcendental subject is identified with a particular being.

I won't reply to all your points because I believe that there is a deeper difference between our positions and I think it is possible we will simply "agree to disagree".

Personally, I see our debate as one of the various consequences of an IMO questionable choice among historical scientists, i.e. having called the physical quantity 'energy' with that name. Its etymology, its use before the advent of science as well as the earliest scientific conceptions of it unfortunately have suggested that 'energy' has an intrinsic 'potentiality' to act or even is itself an 'entity' or at least of 'kind of staff' that constitutes physical systems. However, when one sees how the concept is defined in physics, it is evident for me that it is merely a property of a system ('realist' view of energy) - or, rather, even an useful way to 'quantify' such a property ('anti-realist' view of energy). When one sees this, it is not possible to think that 'energy' can have a structure, an order and so on. Physical systems might have such an order, but energy itself doesn't.

To make another example. A thermal machine clearly can be described as a physical system that exchanges energy in the form of work and heat. However, what really defines the thermal machine as such isn't the mere transfer of energy. Rather, it is the way it transfers energy. So, really, it is the structure, which determines how the energy is transferred, that we might say is the 'defining characteristic' of a machine (its 'formal cause' we might say). Energy even doesn't 'constitute' the machine. Even if we understand energy as a 'real' property of a physical system (rather than an useful 'way to describe' it), we can't say that energy is 'the stuff' that constitutes the machine (or any other physical system).

To be honest, I'm not even sure that the 'stuff' (what, again using Aristotelian metaphysics, we might call 'material cause') can be identified with any physical quantity. So 'energy', like 'mass', 'momentum' and so on can't really be either the 'material cause' nor the 'formal cause' of anything.

I think that this point I am making addresses both of your posts, so I'll write a single response.

From what I have understood so far, the 'transcendental idealist' (and I believe this applies also to similar positions generally regarded as forms of 'phenomenology') position seems to assert the following things:

(1) the form of the 'empirical world' is due to the cognitive activities of the 'transcendental subject'. So, for instance, 'time' is a feature of the empirical world, not of a 'world independent from the (transcendental) subject'. So, the 'transcendental idealist' argues, it is not possible to talk about 'time' without reference to the 'transcendental subject'.
(2) the content, however, of the 'empirical world' is not 'due' to the 'transcendental subject'. So, the 'transcendental subject' isn't a 'creator' of the 'empirical world'. However, due to (1), it is not possible to know "how the world is without reference to a transcendental subject, who/which provides the form of the empirical world".

The issues I see here, however, are these:

(A) Apparently, the 'transcendental idealist' takes the 'transcendental subject' as being an individual sentient (or rational*) being. So, it is not possible to know "how the world is without taking a perspective of a given sentient (or rational) being". However it seems clear that each individual sentient/rational being is contigent. If the existence of each sentient/rational being is contingent, it seems to me that there should be an explanation of how they come into existence. However, if there is an explanation, it seems to me that this implies that "the world without reference to any sentient/rational being" is intelligible and, in principle, it can make sense to talk about it.

(B) Assuming that the 'transcendent subject' is a particular 'sentient/rational being', however, it is clear that whatever "the world without reference to any sentient/rational being" in its interaction (?) with any 'sentient/rational' being gives the content to the latter to form the 'empirical world'. This strongly suggests that the 'content' has already an order before being 'formed' by the subject. Therefore, "the world without reference to any sentient/rational being" has an intelligibility.

There is a clear tension here. On the one hand, the transcendental idealist wants to deny that "the world without reference to any sentient/rational being" has any intelligibility and is completely unknowable even in principle. On the other hand, however, these two points above suggest the contrary.

So, if one wants to go beyond the 'tension', the possible solutions I see here are (note that there are many precedents IMO in Indian traditions):

(1) Re-define the 'transcendental subject'. Perhaps, it is an Individual Mind, which isn't contingent, that transcends all particular 'sentient beings'. In other words, there is only one subject and each sentient being is a 'mode/manifestio/part' etc of this Subject or even that the multiplicity of the subjects is ultimately illusory. This points towards a pantheist view or even an acosmist view (i.e. multiplicity is illusory, there is only the 'Divine Mind'). This is similar to Spinoza's God, Advaita Vedanta etc.
(2) The 'subject-object' distinction is ultimately illusory. So, ultimately, one can't speak of a 'transcendental subject', it is only a provisional reality. This is more like Buddhist nondualism.
(3) There are a multiplicity of non-contingent Minds. Again, there is an Indian precedent IIRC: the Samkya school.
(4) The "world without reference to any sentient/rational being" is indeed intelligible (at least in principle), i.e. we get a form of realism**.

Personally, I don't view the 'Kantian view' and Kantian-like views as a stable unity. The above two issues (A) and (B) above IMO imply that we go beyond them.

*Kant's own model seems to suggest that the transcendental subject must be a rational being IMO. Others might disagree.
**Some proponents of this view posit, for instance, a Divine Mind as the foundation of this intelligibility (so really, even if one rejects the solution (1), one can still IMO embrace a form of theism, pantheism, panentheism etc - so this topic has clearly nothing to do with the existence of the Divine). However, intelligibility alone doesn't by itself require that Divine Mind.

Edited for clarity

When I said that Mind is what the Brain does, thinking & feeling, I was taking a Functionalist stance instead of a Substance position on the Hard Problem. — Gnomon

Strangely enough, many physicalists would actually say that you agree with them. If the mind is merely "what the brain does" it is ontologically not different from, say, digestion, which is a process that the digestive apparatus does.

The "inner aspect" notion could mean that Mind is like the Soul, an immaterial add-on (spiritual substance) to the material body ; or it could merely refer to a feature or function of the human body/brain. — Gnomon

In a sense, yes. I do believe that by looking to the body you can know, at least to some extent, what a person is 'feeling' (if not, even empathy would be impossible). However, the 'feeling', the qualitative experience itself is not accessible to a public perspective. It is private.

When you say "its form is incompatible with life", I read that its conceptual design is lacking some essential feature or factor (the right stuff) — Gnomon

If you think about it, a dead body differs form a living body in the structure rather in the 'stuff' it is made of. The same goes for energy. It is not the energy content that distinguishes a living organism than a dead one but the structure, the order. If you think about it, this is more or less the meaning of 'form' or 'formal cause' of Aristotle. Also, interestingly, the 'physical constituents' seems to have the potency to be 'organized' in such a way to 'constitute' a living body. Again, Aristotle IMO was right in thinking that 'matter' is potency ('material cause').

Another analogy is a cake. Unless the ingredients are organized in a certain way, there is no cake even if the 'unorganized mass' of ingredients has the same material components of the cake itself. The ingredients are the 'material cause', which has the potency to constitute a cake. However, the cake appears only when the ingredients are organized in a certain way.

I prefer to combine causal Energy and meaningful Information into a vital force (EnFormAction)*2, that evolved from a primordial burst of Energy (Big Bang) into the living & thinking features of our current reality. — Gnomon

I don't think that 'vital force' can be thought to be a 'physical quantity'. As I said, rather than a 'force' or a 'substance' it is more useful to think about an 'order', a 'structure'.

Our modern understanding of Energy is not as a material substance, but as a wave pattern in the universal quantum field of relations. — Gnomon

I disagree. Energy is merely a physical quantity that is conserved under certain conditions, is transferred in some ways under determined conditions and so on. I wouldn't really read into it too much, just like I wouldn't read into too much in 'momentum', 'angular momentum' and so on.
What really matters, in any case, isn't 'energy' but the fact that 'energy' is 'transferred' and 'stored' in certain ways.

He didn’t believe it; he stated for the record that nothing can be known of noumena as a logical deduction in accordance with a theory he himself constructed. I’d rather think he trusted in the logical construction of the theory, rather than only believed in its conclusions. — Mww

Yes, if we can make valid statements only about the transcendental a-priori and the empirical world, then, yes, the 'noumenon' is unknowable. But that's the problem, IMO.
Since Kant doesn't say that the empirical world is a mere projection of the transcendental subject, I believe his 'system' implies that it arises from the 'interaction' between the subject and the 'noumenon'.

Kant would then say that we shouldn't say anything about the noumenon. However, I can't see how his system doesn't say that: the noumenon is in part the 'basis' for the arising of the empirical world. But this is already saying that something about the noumenon, which would then contradict Kant's view that nothing can be known about it.

Also it is hard to me to think how could the noumenon be 'structureless/inintelligible' if it is the basis for the arising of the empirical world. If not, the 'order' we see in the empirical world would only be due to the subject. But this would actually mean that the subject the facto is the 'creator' of the empirical world and this is absurd given the apparent contingency of the subject (it is interesting that 'non-dualist' thinkers, who shared with Kant the view that the 'subject' has an active role in organizing experience, believed that in some way the individual subject is also 'ultimately unreal'...).

Notice that I do agree with Kant that the 'empirical world' arises also from the cognitive faculties of the subject. However, I believe Kant overreaches in saying that we can't know absolutely nothing about the noumenon.

Yes. Intelligence comes from the subject; intelligibility is that to which the subject’s intelligence responds. — Mww

Ok. But how is this different from an indirect realism that say we can have only a distorted knowledge of the noumenon?
I thought that Kant believed we could know nothing of the noumenon.

Does that help? — Ludwig V

I'm not sure. Intelligibility of an entity merely means that, in principle, the entity has some kind of structure that can be known by an intellect. So even claiming that an entity has a structure implies saying that it is intelligible IMO (not necessarily by you or me but in principle).

It seems to me that you aren't denying that the world independent from us has a structure. To me this means that you're saying that it is intelligible. However, this intelligibility might be a 'given' that isn't necessarily 'due to' something more fundamental. I would say that it is 'due to' something more fundamental but intelligibility alone doesn't force that conclusion.

So you do distinguish between the material (plastic) and it's function (bottle). Materialism does try to "reduce" mind (function) to brain (matter). But we don't have to deny the substantial role of Brain in order to discuss the essential role of Mind. Holism is Both/And not Either/Or. :smile: — Gnomon

I wouldn't say that 'mind' is a 'function'. Rather something more like an 'inner' aspect of an entity. In other words, you can't detect qualitative experience ('qualia') precisely because the mind isn't 'public' like the body.

I agree. A Soul without a body is a Ghost. And a ghost is an incomplete person. I've never met a person with only a body/brain, or without a soul/mind. But Christian dualism views the Soul as distinct from the body*1. In other words, a body without a soul is dead meat. In my own musings though, I try to avoid getting into theology, by using scientific terms where possible. Hence a human Person is more than a body/brain, she is a complex adaptive system of physical Matter and metaphysical Mind. So, mind without body is a disembodied spirit, and body without life/mind is road kill. Note that I combine Life & Mind to imply that those two functions are on the same continuum of Causation. :cool: — Gnomon

The ancients viewed the 'soul' as the 'life principle'. So, a 'soulless' body is a dead body because its 'form' is incompatible with life, not because the body has lost 'something material' that could be detectable.

In other words, a purely 'beaviourist' account of, say, a human being is in a sense correct but incomplete as it neglects the 'private' aspect of experience. However, this doesn't mean that we can't say if, for instance, someone is dead even if we can't strictly speaking the detects his or her mind.

Regarding Christian dualism, in a sense yes body and soul are distinct but conceptually they are also for Aristotle, for instance. However, notice that for them the human being is 'complete' if it has both soul and the body. And the 'human being' is 'perfected' at the resurrection in which the body also is perfected. In other words, Christianity clearly sees human beings as embodied creatures and not just 'souls trapped in bodies' as Plato (or Descartes) would say (however, I would avoid to go off-topic and discuss about the specifics of Christian 'dualism').

Are you aware that scientists have recently discovered that mental Information & physical Energy are interchangeable? — Gnomon

Are you sure that they aren't comparing perhaps information to the 'patters' in which energy is stored and transferred rather than to 'energy' itself.

Photons are often imagined as particles of Matter, even though they are holistic Fields of Energy — Gnomon

Photons are just particles with zero rest mass/energy. They aren't said to be 'material' because it has been arbitrarily decided to call 'material' only what has rest mass/energy (or what isn't a mediator of an interaction). However, photons are just as 'natural' or 'physical' as electrons. So, I'm not sure why people do not want to call them 'material' (the word 'matter' also comes from 'mother', i.e. 'Mother Nature'... so 'material' and 'natural' seems to mean the same except in technical language of the physicists).

Anyway, I too understand both physical arrangements and metaphysical patterns as different configurations of Platonic Form. — Gnomon

Platonic forms are thought to be transcendent from the natural world. Do you think that these 'arragnements and patterns' would still exist if there was no world?

I don’t want to give the impression that I doubt science’s capacity for extraordinary accuracy in the measurement of time (and distance). — Wayfarer

Yes, I know.

The point is that this quietly undermines the assumption that what is real independently of any observer can serve as the criterion for what truly exists. That move smuggles in a standpoint that no observer can actually occupy. It’s a subtle point — but also a modest one. It doesn't over-reach. — Wayfarer

It seems to me that you're saying that the intelligible structure of the empirical world comes from the interaction between the subject and the world. From this interaction, you get the empirical world with its intelligible structure. OK.

However, this clearly raises the question of how the subjects come into being, if you also accept that the subjects are contingent (i.e. that both their existence and their non-existence is a possibility). If you say that there is an explanation of their coming into being (albeit perhaps unknowable for us) you would say that there intelligibility 'prior' (not necessarily in a temporal sense of the word) to the subjects, i.e. independent from them. If, however, you say that there is no explanation (even if unkowable for us) for their coming into being, you have either to admit that (1) independendently from the subject the world isn't intelligible and therefore the coming into being of the subjects is also unintelligible which, however, would raise the question of how consistent such a claim can be or (2) that intelligibilty simply doesn't apply outside the context of the subjects and the problems that a view like (1) would raise do not apply because ultimately there are no subjects (i.e. non-dualism).

In other words, the 'weaker', non-committal view is IMO unstable. It either 'degenerates' into an indirect realism in which the world independently of the subjects has an intelligible structure. Or it 'degenerates' into a non-dualist view in which, ultimately, the subjects, the empirical worlds and so on are seen as ultimately illusory.