But is ‘identity’ being challenged? — Wayfarer

If only 'self-existence' was seen as a problem, why would the Buddha say that one shouldn't think in terms of 'I', 'mine' and 'myself'? To me it means that the very belief in the 'self' is what was being questioned, not just a way to conceive it.

The two 'practical' tension I was pointing to are:
(1) how can I believe that I will be the owner of my actions if I don't believe that, ultimately, it is correct to think in terms of self, 'me', 'mine' etc?
(2) how can I have truly have compassion to other beings if, at the same time, I also believe that their 'selves' are not ultimately real?

Perhaps an enlightened Buddhist can, but I can't.

It's also important to understand what the Buddha dismissed as 'eternalism'. This was the belief that the self could be indefinitely reborn ad infinitum in favourable circumstances due to right discipline and ritual actions. Literally to 'live forever'. But that doesn't undercut the principle of identity or agency. — Wayfarer

I don't think that this covers the entire spectrum of eternalist views criticized by the Buddha. Consider this passage:

“Bhikkhus, since a self and what belongs to a self are not apprehended as true and established, then this standpoint for views, namely, ‘That which is the self is the world; after death I shall be permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change; I shall endure as long as eternity’—would it not be an utterly and completely foolish teaching?” — MN 22, bhikkhu Bodhi translation

Here there is no mention of being continually reborn. Rather, the belief being questioned is a belief in the possibility of reaching a peaceful forever persistent state after death.

I don’t think this was what Buddhism is really about. Western metaphysics and Buddhism are orthogonal to each other in this respect. The Aristotelian 'essence' arose in a very different cultural context and against the backdrop of a very different question. — Wayfarer

Yes, I can see that but at the same time you have Buddhists text that distinguish conventional/ultimate dharmas, discuss the former being an illusion and so on. And, indeed, those texts who seem to uphold the belief in an existence of ultimate dharmas explain the latter as being 'real' and bearing defining characteristics. I don't think that this is too far from 'Western' talk of substances and essences.

Also Taoism I read in the past has the similar idea of meditation being purely the act of sitting, nothing more. — unimportant

I believe that @Wayfarer made a good reply about zen. Regarding Taoism, unfortunately, I don't know much of it. I did read the Tao Te Ching and parts of the Zhuangzi, but at the same time the historical development of 'Taoism' is far less clear than that of Buddhism and I don't know how Taoists relate their practice with the statements in the texts.

The part you quote is certainly interesting:

Yen Hui said, "I smash up my limbs and body, drive out perception and intellect, cast off form, do away with understanding, and make myself identical with the Great Thoroughfare. This is what I mean by sitting down and forgetting everything." — Zhuanghzi, chapter 6

I do believe that the metaphysics of Taoism is the closest to Buddhism (especially texts like this or chapter 2 of the Zhaungzi as well as some portions of the Tao Te Ching). However, I can't say much about the practices.

BTW, this is my last post in the forum. Hope to see you all around in the future forum.

This seems to be part of the problem: Thinking that it's about becoming convinced through an explanation. You know how it goes: Don't go by reports, traditions, logical conjecture ... — baker

Yes, in order to be absolutely sure one should 'walk through' the path in a very serious way and see for oneself. However, our lifetime is limited and we can't practice all spiritual traditions. We have to make our own judgments about which tradition (if any) seems more reasonable and choose accordingly. I do envy sometimes those who are absolutely convinced of the validity of their tradition. If one become very convinced, i.e. truly believes in the validity of a tradition one has to wrestle to far less mental impediments. However, I can't be like that, so I'm still in the process of questioning, exploring, studying...

There's absence of evidence. That's not yet evidence of absence. — baker

Yes, but IIRC even in the suttas I believe that there is a statement that compared those who seek an unknowable 'self' as those who sought something impossible to find. So, a total absence of evidence is a very strong argument of an evidence of absence.

Well, what would it do to you to consider yourself in those ways, and to base those considerations solely on reports, traditions, logical conjecture, deference to authority? — baker

No. In fact, I do believe that a 'self' exists. However, I do accept that it cannot be a 'static' entity. But it somehow persists as the same entity (like the river example I made), i.e. something that remains identically the same through changing. After all, when a child becomes a teenager the 'child' dies and the teenager 'is born', when the teenager becomes an adult, the teenager 'dies' and the adult 'is born' etc. Without positing a persisting identity, the process of growth becomes unintelligible to me. So, I also have emprical evidence for my position (I don't consider such an evidence logically compelling however).

With an emphasis on the Visuddhimagga being a later text. — baker

Sure. It is about the 5th century CE. However, the Theras who considered the Visuddhimagga authoritative also preserved the Pali Canon and decided which works were canonical and which weren't. Also, the Visuddhimagga quotes earlier commentaries a lot.
Furthermore, I can't make sense of the early canonical Abhidhamma if they weren't positing an ontology similar to the later. Why even try to find a set of 'more fundamental' dhammas if one is convinced that such an enterprise doesn't lead to you to a set of ultimate dhammas?

Anyways, whether we like it or not, these 'post-canonical' commentaries have more or less been the official interpretation within the Theravada for much time. So, I'll guess that their opinions should be taken seriously.

There is still the possibility of a placeholder self, for example. A placeholder that can be filled later on, insight permitting. — baker

I never understood Thanissaro's position to be honest. This to me seems like an agnosticism, i.e. that the self might exist but you have to put aside the question. Insight will clarify. So thank you for this perspective that seems to explain his position. However, if insight causes one to cease to think in terms of 'I', 'me' and 'mine', isn't this a very strong argument for the 'no self view'? I mean the 'no self' view primarily denies that there is something that can be taken as 'I', 'me' and 'mine'. If this claim is true, the assumption that there is an 'I' is illusory. So the self is the content of an incorrect assumption.
So, again, I don't think I find a practical difference between the Thannissaro's position and the standard one unless one takes an agnostic position and allows the possibility of the existence of the self.

Or perhaps that currently being unenlightened one might not fully understand it yet ... — baker

Perhaps, yes. I do not claim spiritual achievements.

And yet one can also stop oneself from thinking that way. — baker

However, and this is a problem, if there is a self and I stop thinking in terms of a self, I would be wrong. So, unless I'm sure that there isn't a self, why should I stop thinking in terms of it? Yes, you can say that those 'enlightened' said that suffering stops if I stop thinking in terms of self/'I'/'me' etc. However, can I be sure that they are right?

By focusing on the present moment ... — baker

Thanks for your perspective and, indeed, I believe that you made good advices on how to engage Buddhism for those who were raised outside it (and perhaps even to Buddhists themselves). I think I agree. Sometimes I ask myself if my later 'distancing' from Buddhism was due also to my own improper earlier attempt to accept it at a stage when I wasn't ready to do that. I'm trying to mantain an open mind about religions (not just Buddhism) and try a 'slower' approach.

I don't know what else to say to your question ... — baker

No problem. I was trying to reach the conclusions that a belief in the lack of differentiation might lead. Anyway, I do incidentally believe that, if there is no unconditioned ontological support for the conditioned, Madhyamaka is perhaps the best model of reality.

If you currently don't know what exactly your true nature is, this means you have to go by what someone else told you or what you concluded through reasoning. Meaning that at the core of your spiritual practice you're placing something that is uncertain. Sure, it may look nice and worthwhile, but is it true? You don't know that yet. It is my thesis that this has a demotivating effect, and that according to the suttas, there is a way around that. — baker

Yes, I admit that. I can't claim to have a true understanding of what my 'true nature' is. Neither I do claim to know that it exists. However, I do believe that the belief in a 'true nature' fits better to my own experience.

P.S. This is my last reply to you in this thread. Hope to see you around the new forum!

If "it" (energy) is not a cause, what is it? As I view "it", Energy is the Efficient Cause (force, agency), Matter is the Material Cause (substance, clay), Natural Laws are the Formal Cause (design concept), and Creation is the Final Cause (purpose, goal, teleology, effect). EnFormAction is all of the above. :nerd: — Gnomon

I'll reply only to this. Energy cannot be the efficient cause because it is a property of something. Given that, in Aristotelian philosophy, properties are parts of the 'formal cause', at best energy is part of the formal cause.

BTW, this is my last post on this topic. Hope to see you all soon on the future forum!

References to Einstein are related to discussions of Energy because he re-defined the old philosophical concept of Causation in mathematical & quantitative terms, to suit 20th century physics. If you prefer to talk about Qualia related to Energy we can do that, but it will be missing a physical foundation. And my philosophical thesis begins with Quantum Physics and Information Theory. So, if you are not up to speed with those technical concepts, you may not understand the thesis. :smile: — Gnomon

I think I understand your point but I'm not sure it is helpful for the discussion we were having about energy, matter and so on. BTW, Spinoza held that the Substance/God had both 'extension' (i.e. 'matter') and 'cognition' (i.e. 'mind') as attributes. Perhaps your point is that the world is a bit like that, i.e. that the physical and the mental are two aspects of the same reality?

Are you implying that I'm just "making sh*t up"? I was simply making a philosophical distinction between ex nihilo and ex materia*1. So, I'm not using words "as you like", but as previous philosophers have used them. In this case to distinguish a theological doctrine from a philosophical meaning. :nerd: — Gnomon

TBH, yeah I thought you're were redefining the term 'creatio ex nihilo'. Thanks for the clarification. Anyway, it was IMO important to say that 'creatio ex nihilo' excludes any pre-existing entity except God (which by classical theist is understood as conciding with 'Being' rather than an entity among others).

Would you attempt to prove the savory existence of the Flying Spaghetti Monster? — Gnomon

The 'Flying Spaghetti Monster' has no relevance for human lives. God is supposed to have the highest relevance. My point about the 'empirical proofs and disproofs' was something like "you can't have conclusive evidence about the topic by mere reasoning even if it is informed by empirical data".

This is a philosophy forum, with lots of non-believers. So, barring a miraculous manifestation of the deity, how else would you "exclude or prove" the existence of a metaphysical god-concept, other than by philosophical arguments? — Gnomon

You can at best argue which is the most reasonable hypothesis. TBH, I have seen interesting arguments from both sides of the debate but honestly, I don't want to initiate a debate about that.

I agree. Energy is not something you can see or touch, but an invisible property or quality (essence) that is inferred from observed physical effects. Energy is not a material Object, but a metaphysical Cause. Energy is considered by physicists to be "fundamental" to the physical world*3. But they probably try to avoid words like "essence" due to its metaphysical connotations. :wink: — Gnomon

In standard philosophical parlance, 'essence' is what makes an entity that entity. If physical objects in order to exist must have energy then I would say that it is proper to say that energy is an essential property of physical objects.

If you want to interpret energy as a real property and you want to make a non-circular definition, though, it is more likely "how much a physical object can affect other physical objects" or something like that. I'm not sure that describing it as a 'Cause' is right, unless you mean something like a 'formal cause', i.e. (part of) what a 'physical object' is.

I think Einstein's philosophical openness to non-religious-God-concepts does have something to do with the OP. :smile: — Gnomon

I can see that but I'm not sure how it is related with the discussions about energy and other physical quantities we were having.

My use of ex nihilo means "nothing material". Some versions of creation say that God made the universe out of Her own metaphysical stuff. And I have a theory about what that immaterial "stuff" might be. :wink: — Gnomon

You are free to use words as you like. But usually that phrase is understood as being about "nothingness" or "nothing apart God" (not just a reference about 'matter'). Despite that the author is a conservative Catholic philosopher, you might like this post: Creation: Ex Nihilo or Ex Deo?

Philosophical debates typically hinge on the subjective meaning of some notion. I agree that a creator God should be able to produce an infinity of worlds. But our local universe is the only one we have physical evidence for. And the Cosmos is both Logical and Temporal. :grin: — Gnomon

Right, that's why I don't believe one can exclude or 'prove' the existence of God (or at least many version of 'God') by purely philosophical arguments and especially by purely empirical informed philosophical arguments.

EM is not a material "container" of energy ; it is Energy. A photon is a measure (quantum) of energy. Metaphorically, it's like a gallon bottle of water that is made of water. :joke: — Gnomon

I disagree. Think about this: electromagnetic radiation travels at the speed of 'c' in vacuum. This is a measurable quantity. Photons also have 'spin 1' (and two possible states of spin). I don't see why I have to say that "photons are energy" or "electromagnetic radition is energy" if, indeed, they also have other physical properties, alongside energy. Why is energy so special?

No, it's a scientific distinction. It's the key factor that differentiates Matter from Energy. And yet, it's a spectrum with Energy on one end, Mass in the middle, and Matter on the heavy end. It's a distinction like giving different names to the colors of a rainbow : a continuum of wavelengths & frequencies. :cool: — Gnomon

I was a bit too 'harsh' in my choice of the word 'arbitrary'. It makes some sort of intuitive sense to call 'material' what has rest mass/energy. Indeed, the objects with nonzero rest mass can be stopped and one can in relativity abscribe to them a reference frame (which isn't possible for a zero rest mass object).

However, at the same time, the word 'material' is in fact a synonym of 'physical', 'natural' or even 'corporeal'. 'Physicalism', 'naturalism' and 'materialism' should be synonyms.

The only reason I can think to treat 'energy' as fundamental is because everything detectable must have a quantity of energy. At the same time, however, energy is clearly defined as a property of physical objects and not as a substance on its own. To be true, it seems you can't have physical objects without energy but at the same time it seems you can't have energy without physical objects. So at best you can IMO say that 'energy' is an essential property of 'physical objects'. But a property is still a 'property of' something and not a 'something'.

I am careful about quotes from any authority figure, because people will interpret the words in the context of their own beliefs. . . . and that includes Materialist interpretations of Einstein's "god" quotes*1. :wink: — Gnomon

Yes, Einstein's wasn't the 'regular materialist atheist' but quite close to Spinoza. But this has nothing to do with what we were discussing.

But, I have to agree with those who say it does look exactly like a creation ex nihilo*1 event. — Gnomon

Note that also various Christian theologians accept the notion of 'ex nihilo nihil fit', i.e. nothing can came out of nothing. So, after all, 'creating out of nothing' in their view can't mean that God 'transformed' 'nothing' into being. One view that you might find interesting is that God created out of nothing separated from God, i.e. 'ex deo' (which goes into a panentheistic direction).

So, anti-Christians have postulated a variety of creative counter-interpretations of the astronomical evidence, to "prove" hypothetically (without evidence) that our physical universe could have always existed, and had the potential for creation of New Worlds : e.g. Multiverse theory. :chin: — Gnomon

I honestly find this whole debate meaningless. God's existence could also be compatible with a 'multiverse' if one accepts a 'starting point' for the multiverse or if one interprets the ontological primacy of God in logical rather than temporal terms.
At the same time, the Big Bang isn't generally presented as a true 'coming into existence from nothing'. Rather, it is either said that we can't know what 'was there before' or the Big Bang was actually caused by some physical process.

Yes. But his attempts to make Quantum Physics seem more deterministic --- by postulating hidden variables and intelligent pilot waves --- have not convinced many of his fellow physicists. And after many years, no evidence for occult determinants. However, interest in Bohm's work has experienced a revival in recent decades. And my thesis acknowledges some of his less radical ideas. :meh: — Gnomon

Also note that Bohm's later models weren't deterministic. Even in the 1950s Bohm provided a stochastic, probabilistic version of his 'interpretation' and in his later life (from the late 70's onwards) he made a model in which subatomic particles are in fact able to process 'active information', he tried to make a scientific model that included his philosophical ideas of implicate and explicate orders and so on. He wasn't certainly a 'classical determinist'. He was an extremely interesting and underrated philosopher IMO, however I don't think he was successful to provide a viable scientific model that encapsulates his more interesting ideas.
Anyway, note that these deterministic interpretations - like the original version of Bohm's model (which is still his most famous contribution) makes the same predictions as standard QM, so it is no wonder that 'no evidence' has come.

Electromagnetic radiation (light, radio waves) travels through empty space without needing a container. Furthermore, energy exists in vacuum fields, and gravitational fields can contain pressure (like in stars) without a physical barrier. — Gnomon

Elecrtomagnetic radiation is a container of energy.

It was Einstein who defined Energy as "fundamental"*5. And photons are massless, hence matterless*6. :nerd: — Gnomon

OK, I see. IMO photons are carriers/containers of energy and not just 'energy'. Energy is a property of physical systems, including photons and other particles without rest mass.

I never understood why so many physicists decided to restrict 'matter' as indicating objects with 'nonzero rest mass'. This is a rather arbitrary distinction. Photons are not less 'natural' or 'physical' than electrons despite having zero rest mass. Hence 'materialist'/'physicalist' views allows the existence of zero rest mass objects without problems.

Also, 'matter' comes from 'mater'/'mother', a probable reference to (Mother) Nature. So, 'materialism' and 'naturalism' are synonyms.

And where is there denial? — baker

The denial is apparent when you consider that the text clearly asserts that the aggregates, sense bases etc and Nirvana are 'known' whereas the 'self' isn't. Just to make an example from the Kathavatthu:

At dissolution of each aggregate.
If then the “person” doth disintegrate,
Lo! by the Buddha shunned, the Nihilistic creed.
At dissolution of each aggregate.
If then the “soul” doth not disintegrate.
Eternal, like Nibbāna, were the soul indeed.

If the Theravadins (or rather, their 'ancestors') believed that a third option was possible, it was good time to make it clear but they didn't. Either the self is knowable and can be described as permanent or impermanent or it is unknowable precisely because it doesn't exist (except as an illusion). And I don't believe it is a chance that the very first chapter of the book is devoted on this topic. They clearly believed that this topic was particularly important to have it in the very first chapter of a quite ancient text that is devoted to 'controverted points' among Buddhist schools. If your point is that provisionally the self can be said to exist then OK. I mean I never disputed that this is true for all Buddhists. However, provisional/conventional truth is generally regarded as ultimately illusory.
BTW, here is another excerpt from the later commentarial text Visuddhimagga:

So in many hundred suttas it is only mentality-materiality that is illustrated,
not a being, not a person. Therefore, just as when the component parts such as
axles, wheels, frame poles, etc., are arranged in a certain way, there comes to be
the mere term of common usage “chariot,” yet in the ultimate sense when each
part is examined there is no chariot—and just as when the component parts of
a house such as wattles, etc., are placed so that they enclose a space in a certain
way, there comes to be the mere term of common usage “house,” yet in the ultimate
sense there is no house—and just as when the fingers, thumb, etc., are placed in
a certain way, there comes to be the mere term of common usage [594] “fist,”—
with body and strings, “lute”; with elephants, horses, etc., “army”; with
surrounding walls, houses, states, etc., “city”—just as when trunk, branches,
foliage, etc., are placed in a certain way, there comes to be the mere term of
common usage “tree,” yet in the ultimate sense, when each component is
examined, there is no tree—so too, when there are the five aggregates [as objects]
of clinging, there comes to be the mere term of common usage “a being,” “a
person,” yet in the ultimate sense, when each component is examined, there is
no being as a basis for the assumption “I am” or “I”; in the ultimate sense there
is only mentality-materiality. The vision of one who sees in this way is called
correct vision.

(same chapter quoted in the previous post of mine, par. 28)

It is evident to me that this is saying that the 'self' is illusory because it is a composite entity and all the composite entities are illusory. Only what is irriducible is regarded as ultimately real. I can't see how this is saying anything different.

Mahayana texts can be even more reductionist, to say nothing of the reductionism of pop Buddhism. — baker

Yes, but I wasn't arguing from the Mahayana simply for time reasons. Yes, reductionism is also prevalent in the Mahayana. However, in Madhyamaka you'll get to the view that 'reductionism' is used to show that the 'self' (and other composites) is illusory but at the same time this branch of Mahayana doesn't posit a set of 'ultimate dhammas'. So, in some sense, Madhyamaka isn't reductionist because there aren't dhammas that are 'more real' than the composites.

No, it's says just that: that a self and what belongs to a self are not apprehended as true and established. Which I agree with. For the life of me, I can't apprehend as true and established a self and what belongs to a self. What I see is the body of a person, I'm aware there is a concept that this is a person, I'm aware that there is a popular consensus that this is a person. But can those things properly be regarded as the self? I don't see how. — baker

I agree with you that the suttas are less 'clear' on how to interpret anatman than the commentarial texts and a pragmatic view that you seem to endorse is perhaps compatible with them. And yes, I agree with all you're saying that the point of the teaching of anatman/anatta is to dis-identify with what normally we identify without however identifying with something else. This is compatible with a 'pragmatic view' of anatman, a denial of it and perhaps even the Pudgalavada's indeterminate self view. I believe that it is not a chance that even Buddhists disagree on how to interpret the suttas. They aren't clear as one would think them to be. However, the explicit denial of the self is a time honoured interpretation, not just a bad 'Western reading' that introduces extraneous metaphysical categories.

So does the theory of kamma. — baker

That's my point. Kamma simply breaks down if you don't assume persisting agents. So one can have reasonable doubts about the consistency of Buddhism. Rather than 'rebirth', the thing that is IMO at odds with anatta is kamma itself. If one takes kamma very seriously then and also accepts that Nibbana is the end of kamma, one automatically thinks of Nibbana in annihilationist terms. This is a bit of a problem because annihilationism is one of the extremes to be avoided. So, how can one truly arrive to a state that supposedly is freed from thinking in 'personal' terms if one takes kamma seriously?

Who would deny it? Most people in general, or most Buddhists? — baker

I meant most Buddhists.

This is actually in line with the Buddhist notion of self as a process, an activity, changing throughout rebirths, but somehow staying the same. — baker

I disagree because in order to have a persisting identity something must remain the same. However, this doesn't imply that an object of experience that remains the same.
Think of a river. It remains a river only if its material contents change but, at the same time, some of its properties remain the same (like the starting and the ending points, the number of its affluents, and other physical properties).

A pithy saying says that differentiation is an illusion, and that for things to exist separately, it is only necessary to name them. — baker

This is very good for a monistic view where all differentiations collapses in one real entity (like Advaita Vedanta) or even a Madhyamaka view where all differentiations ultimately are negated without however an 'ultimate entity' that remains. I'm not sure that this can be accepted by a 'traditional' Theravadin that follows the 'Abhidhammic' tradition.

This is still assuming a "true nature" throughout it all. How can you not conclude that the 'final state' entails a replacement of 'you' with 'something else'? Because you believe that you have your own nature. — baker

Yes, I see three options:
1) there is a 'true nature' that is real and spiritual practice aims at perfecting it
2) there is a 'true nature' that is real and spiritual practice aims at replacing it with something else
3) there is no 'true nature' and the aim of the spiritual practice aims at recognizing it

Alternative (2) would imply an annihilation, so I'm not sure how it can be motivating unless one wants to annihilate oneself. (3) seems to be closer to the Buddhist view. However, I believe that conceptually has its problems (how to explain regularities, responsibility/karma) and so on. (1) has the big advantage that sees spiritual life as a sort of 'perfecting' oneself even it that means to 'die to oneself' in some sense.
To be honest, I see (1) as the most motivating here because it explicitly says that there is a continuity between 'me' and the 'final state'. I still can't see why you think that it automatically leads to 'laziness'. I mean, you can still have to make much effort to reach the 'final state' even if it is somehow the fulfillment of the 'true nature'.

(1) also has the advantage to make more sense of daily life. I can refer to 'myself', 'me', 'you', 'he', 'she' etc without also believing that in some sense these terms are incorrect. If I help someone I'm not just 'reducing' an 'impersonal' suffering but I'm truly helping someone who is perhaps like me in some important sense. One should remember that asserting (3) also implies (3) for all others.

I honestly see in Buddhists texts a lot of tensions between (1) - which seems to be implied by Buddhist ethical teachings both at the individual and the communal level - and (3) which is more doctrinal. However, if (3) is accepted, (1) is false.

Edited for clarity

Denial of self, denial of atman, denial, denial, denial. Where do you get this? What is your source for learning about Buddhism? — baker

If we restrict ourselves only to the Theravada, what about the very long first chapter of the Kathavatthu, a commentarial text included in the Pali Canon (TBH, I haven't read the whole thing but it is a lengthy denial of the existence of the 'person')?
The fifth century Visuddhimagga also has this impressively reductionist view about this topic and quotes an equally reductionist earlier commentary (now lost):

Therefore, just as a marionette is void, soulless and without curiosity, and
while it walks and stands merely through the combination of strings and wood,
yet it seems as if it had curiosity and interestedness, so too, this mentality-materiality
is void, soulless and without curiosity, and while it walks and stands
merely through the combination of the two together, yet it seems as if it had
curiosity and interestedness. This is how it should be regarded. Hence the
Ancients said:

"The mental and material are really here,
But here there is no human being to be found,
For it is void and merely fashioned like a doll—
Just suffering piled up like grass and sticks."

(Visuddhimagga, Part 3, ch.28, 31; bold mine)

(As a side note, this is different from modern reductionism that deny the reality of consciousness. Here it is denying the existence of the self. But still, when I read it I was surprised on how reductionist Buddhist texts can be)

And what about this passage from an early sutta: "Bhikkhus, since a self and what belongs to a self are not apprehended as true and established" (from MN 22)? Isn't this after all a denial of atman?

Of course, you can go on with a Pudgalavada view or perhaps bikkhu Thanissaro's practical view of anatta but telling that Buddhism hasn't usually deny the existence of the self is weird.

Kamma is what makes you. — baker

If so, then, when kamma ceases, I am annihilated. Provisionally, this is might true for Buddhists. But ultimately, most would deny it.

It looks like you're trying to fit Buddhism into the metaphysical categories you're already familiar with. — baker

I disagree. I can't exclude it but to be honest Buddhist themselves seem to have debated in similar terms.

Held accountable by whom? A Jehovah-like judge god? A galactic court of law? Whom? — baker

I'm not necessarily positing it in legalistic terms. But any kind of moral theory seems to posit persistent (either temporal or everlasting) agents.

Of course. But are those things fit to be regarded as your self? Is, say, the amount of melanin in your skin somehow definitive of who you are? — baker

Perhaps not. However, TBH, I think that Buddhist critiques of the self assume that their opponents accept a static self of some sorts. What about thinking the self as a river, i.e. something that stays the same precisely because in some respects it is always changing in some ways?

In about the same way as you can make differently shaped biscuits out of the same dough. — baker

I see, but then one might ask why there is a multiplicity in the first place. This is not an objection to what you have said here and it tells more about me than anything else. But one is left wondering about how differentiation originated in the first place.

Things like that make me think there is something about the big picture of Buddhism that I don't understand, even though I'm quite confident that I have a measure of understanding of the teachings from the Pali Canon. — baker

Same goes for me and not only about Buddhism but also about other religions. I am impressed on how certain people are so familiar with their religious texts and hold views in other topics that seem to me in open contradiction with what the texts say.

Sure. But the true-nature theory would have us believe that we don't have to make any big, life-changing decisions, that it's somehow enough if we just "follow our hearts", and that if we "do our best", this will somehow suffice and we are sure to become enlightened. — baker

Well, yes, perhaps this is a danger for the 'true-nature' views. But what about the opposite view? If I believe that the 'final' state is something 'alien' to my own nature, how can I not conclude that the 'final state' entails a replacement of 'me' with 'something else'? To me this other view would completely render spiritual life meaningless because, at the end of the day, the 'realized' would be a different 'entity' from me.

Regarding what you say about Protestants and Roman Catholics, it is arguably the reverse. I believe that even someone like Thomas Aquinas would say that the 'visio beatifica' is the ultimate fulfillment of human nature, whereas many protestants would retort and say that there is a greater discontinuity between our fallen nature and the state of the blessed, in a way to imply a sort of complete and discontinuous transformations. But to be honest, I think that you can't make such a kind of general statement for both traditions (in the same way that one can't say that, for instance, all Theravadins nowadays agree on how to interpret Nibbana, anatta etc).

Are you the same person at the age of 80 as you were when you were 20? Only provisionally. — baker

I personally think I am truly the same person. If not, holding the 80 years old me accountable wouldn't make sense.

Yes, when they develop agency. — Punshhh

Right. I can even attribute them some kinds of rudimental responsibility/accountability but not to the type of enough mature human beings.

Animals and plant’s do have agency because they act as an entity, an agent. — Punshhh

I can see what you mean.

For reasons that I don't know, Buddhism doesn't attribute the status of sentient beings to living beings different from animals, humans (and other realms). Plants for them aren't sentient beings. To be honest, I don't think I can agree with that. It seems to me that a rudimental sentience is present even in plants and perhaps even in fungi and single-celled organisms.

Although that agency is largely defined by the group (species) in how it adapts to the environment and the responses and karmic actions of the individual entity is largely dictated by instinct, or biologically programmed behaviour. — Punshhh

:up: Interestingly, spiritual traditions link virtue to 'freedom' and vice to 'enslavement'. Vice makes humans 'brutish', animal-like because it corrupts rationality. So a 'brutish' behaviour is normal for animals but a corruption (and a result of a corruption) for humans. That's the reason why, in my opinion, 'moral responsibility' or 'accountability' in their proper sense is too loaded for animals. At the same time, however, animals IMO have the ability to choose among options and perhaps even have something that 'approximates' rationality.

So, true freedom in this view isn't merely an ability to choose among options but rather an ability to choose in a truly free, i.e. rational way. 'Spiritual growth', then, might be seen as a way to become 'more free' (I'm reminded of some passages of John's Gospels "the truth will set you free" (Jn 8:32) and "everyone who sins is a slave to sin" (Jn 8:34) as well as a passage in a Buddhist discourse that states: "Just as the great ocean has one taste, the taste of salt, so also this Dhamma and Discipline has one taste, the taste of liberation." (Udana 5.5)).

While not saying that exact quote, Einstein did express, "What we have called matter is energy, whose vibration has been so lowered as to be perceptible to the senses ". — Gnomon

Again, one should be careful to not attribute quotes to Einstein or other figures. This too appears to be a 'new-agey' commentatry of sorts. You can find Einstein's quotes about, say, his belief about the illusoriness of the distinction between past, present and future (which, in a way, accords quite well with a literal interpretation of his best known theories, special and general relativity) but these kinds of statements misrepresents his views. Also, in my opinion, they show an insecurity of those who feel the need to attribute to Einstein or other top famous scientists quotes that they never said (to be clear, I'm not accusing you of this. I'm accusing those who 'concoted' these quotes from their own reading of Einstein's theories).

Years ago, without knowledge of that specific quote, my Enformationism thesis concluded that Matter is slowed-down Energy, and that Energy is the carrier of Information. Does that make any sense to you? — Gnomon

TBH, no precisely because I don't think that 'matter is slowed-down energy' but that energy is a properrty of something 'material'. I agree that contemporary physics doesn't give us the same picture of 'matter' as in Newtonian mechanics for instance. Indeed, I don't think that physics in general gives us a metaphysical picture.

There are some results in physics, like Bell's theorem, that appear to have some metaphysical readings, by excluding some metaphysical models, but even in these cases one has to be careful to avoid to 'overreach' in metaphysical conclusions.

Honestly, I'm just saying that it is better to follow the example of someone like Georges Lemaitre who refused to say that the theory of Big Bang 'proves God' (despite being a Christian). Physics remains a fascinating subjects even if one isn't convinced that it 'proves' or 'disproves' a given metaphysical view.

I get the impression that philosophers who hold a Materialist worldview, prefer the black & white Certainty of the ancient (6th century BC) notion of Atomism (fundamental particles of matter) to the fuzzy gray Uncertainty of the 20th century view of Quantum Physics — Gnomon

And yet, ironically, someone like David Bohm, who wasn't certainly the stereotypical 'materialist', never accepted a probabilistic interpretation of QM, just saying. The world isn't so black and white as you are assuming here.

What Mass is, is a mathematical measurement of the Energy content of Matter. — Gnomon

This is better. If, however, energy is 'contained' in matter, you have to ask yoursef: can energy exist without a 'container'? If not, energy isn't more fundamental than matter.

Think about this point. It is essential to my critique. Energy (or even the more comprehensive quantities like the four-momentum etc) is always defined as a property of something else and not an independent entity on its own.

It can be expressed in terms of Newtons of Force, as in the atomic bomb. — Gnomon

Nope, an explosion is a sudden release of energy not a (single at least) force.

But what is "spiritual growth"? — baker

This is an extremely interesting question. I think that it is something like 'maturity'. The aim of education IMO should be the perfecting of character, i.e. the establishment of virtue and the avoidance of vice. It seems that most ancient cultures (in both the East and West) accepted this kind of idea but, of course, disagreed about what 'perfect character' would be and how we should reach such goal. However, I believe that there are similarities between some important ethical teacings of the said traditions and also how in the descriptions of how the 'perfected' are said to behave and so on.
At the same time, I also share your perplexity about the efficacy of the 'traditional teachings' when we observe the behaviours of supposedly trained practicioners or even revered figures. This perhaps means that the 'visible' demarcations between 'official' traditions (both within the same religions and between different religions) do not reflect the exclusivist readings of the teachings contained in those traditions. At the same time, it seems that all religious traditions contain seemingly explicit statements that the 'goal' is to be found only if one follows the 'right' path and if one adheres to the 'right' tradition.

"Selflessness" (in a practical sense, not the Buddhist doctrine of 'anatman') and "non-attachment" for instance are said to be a sign of 'spiritual maturity' in many traditions. This to me suggest that one becomes more 'spiritually mature' if one becomes less concerned with, say, one's social status, possessions etc.

At the same time, I don't claim to have a 'proof' that 'spiritual growth' is indeed real. However, I see enough evidence of it being real even if the evidence itself is ambiguous.

And they are, for thousands of rebirths-- just not forever and not absolutely. — baker

If there is no unchanging identity, how can one be held accountable? Mere continuity isn't enough (see the above reply I made to @Wayfarer for this point and the point I made about essences).

Because such is the nature of experience. — baker

OK. I know that. I stil however have to see a fully convincing explanation of this.

Even ordinary worldy psychology doesn't grant people such uniqueness.
We are unique for various legal and taxation purposes, but otherwise, systemization, categorization, depersonalization are the norm. — baker

I can see that but indeed we are 'unique', right? Individual differences are undeniable even among animals, let alone humans. This does suggest that there is 'something' that distinguishes individuals.

And to be honest, if there isn't anything essential to individuals, how differentiations in separate 'mind-streams' is even possible?

I'm not a Buddhist either.
I don't specifically take any issue with any of the teachings, but on the whole, from my dealings with Buddhists and with religious/spiritual people in general, I can't escape the impression that religious/spiritual teachings somehow aren't supposed to be taken all that seriously. — baker

I do respect Buddhism and find it fascinating - both Theravada and Mahayana. However, I have intellectual and practical doubts and concerns that keep me outside.
Regarding the last sentence, I see it more as evidence that people hardly take some teachings seriously rather than they shouldn't be taken seriously even if those people belong to a tradition and perhaps are even 'intellectualy' convinced that these teachings should be taken seriously. In other words, cognitive dissonance seems to be very widespread.

There is no denial of moral agency in the Buddhist teaching. This is made completely clear in the Attakārī Sutta: — Wayfarer

I wasn't denying that Buddhism accepts moral agency and moral responsibility. I was questioning how the latter concept can be consistent with a denial of unchanging (either temporary or eternal) identity. If there is such unchanging identity I can't see how one can attribute accountability. TBH, all the arguments that I have encountered from Buddhists have failed to persuade me. I have found them as more like attempts to rationalize the denial of an unchanging self by trying to explain moral responsibility in terms of mere continuity. For instance, if I do a 'bad action' I leave a damage in the successive instances of my mind-streams which might ripen in a future lifetime. However, if I at the same time hold that "it is incorrect to say that it will be me that suffer from these consequences because there is no fixed identity" I would be correct to say that if there is no unchanging self, it would be not 'just' for the 'future being' to experience the results of 'my' actions.

The Pudgalavada posited an indeterminate self to explain these issues. However, I think that my other argument also applies to them.
If there are no essences that constraint the ways in which a sentient being might exist, why are there regularities at all? If there are no essences, why does an acorn give rise to an oak tree rather than an apple tree? In other words: if anatman is interpreted as denying essences or even essences with determinate defining characteristics, why do we observe regularities?

@Janus and @Punshhh, in Buddhism animals are subject to karma and their intentional actions can have good or bad fruits like human's. So, while I can agree that 'moral responsibility' is a too loaded term for animals, Buddhism accepts that they can do things that are relevant for karma.

It was not my idea to cast Energy in that fundamental role. It was that "weirdo" Albert Einstein. :wink: — Gnomon

I saw that quote as part of a larger quote attributed to Einstein that clearly doesn't seem to be genuine.

Even if that part was genuine, however, one should take into consideration the fact that it is customary to present scientific ideas with different degrees of accuracy in different contexts. If I say, for instance, 'mass is the quantity of matter' is perfectly justified when I present the concept of 'mass' to for instance middle-schoolers. But already in high school one learns that mass in physics is defined as 'inertial' and 'gravitational' mass. So mass isn't 'stuff' but rather a property of 'stuff'. However, it is often and reasonably presented in the first way because, after all, in many applications it can be useful to think about mass as the 'quantity of stuff' and because a given audience might find that conception of mass more familiar. However, if one goes on to say that mass in physics means 'quantity of matter' that would be a questionable or even completely erroneous statement.

Also, Einstein's special relativity (SR) treats energy as the first component of a four component vector, called 'four momentum' (the other three are linear momentum). So, it is pretty weird to think that acording to Einstein energy is 'fundamental' when it is a component of a more comprehensive physical quantity if one takes seriously the theories for which he is most famous.

Anyway, I think that on this point it is clear we are talking past each other. My point is that it is not correct to use a concept that has a meaning in a given context to support its use in a different context without justifying that in both contexts means the same thing. You disagree, fine, it happens even in the best families.

Regarding the 'third principle of dynamics' I wasn't of course disputing its validity in physics but I was disputing its use as a metaphor when describing things that it wasn't clearly intended to describe (e.g. humans actions and their consequences).

If enlightenment is somehow a part of our nature, then this means that it's inevitable that we will somehow become enlightened and that no effort is required of us in this direction — baker

Just wanted to comment on this. I think this is wrong. Consider for instance the potency of an infant to grow up in an adult or the potency of a person to learn a skill or a subject. You can say that such a potency is intrinsic to the infant but can't be actualized without the agent efforts and also the aid of others. Likewise for the second example.

So I can totally see how even if the potency for 'enlightnment' is essential to a person's nature, the person still needs a lot of effort and arguably the aid of others is needed (hearing the Dharma, joining the Sangha and so on).
In mos Christian traditions too, to be 'saved' you still need personal effort not just the necessary help of Grace (except for those who think that salvation is due to purely God's actions).

However, if 'potency for enlightnment' isn't an essential property of a being, then arguably 'enlightnment' would be like transforming a rabbit to a volcano, i.e. doing a transformation that completely lacks any intelligible continuity. And to be honest I can't say how you can avoid the possibility that these transformations might happen without positing an essence, an atman... this is another reason why I can't accept the Buddhist denial of atman. If there are no essences how can regularities be present?

I would say that a similar thing IMO happens with moral responsibility. It doesn't seem possible to me to consistently believe that 'provisionally' you remain tbe same person and hence responsible for past actioms and also believe that ultimately this is illusory. Others might disagree but I just can't.

I hope to address the rest of your points in the weekend. I'll be busy in the coming days.

Yes. That's why I said, for the purposes of this thread, I'm more interested in the meta-physical*1 interpretations of Philosophy : as in Metaphysical Causation*2 — Gnomon

I get that, but to me seeing a link between the physical concept of energy and the meaning you are giving to that word is like using the concept of force and the third principle to claim that "all actions cause an opposite consequences", which is wrong.

If causal Energy is not fundamental to physics, what is? Do you think atomic Matter is the basic "stuff" of Reality? — Gnomon

I don't know and I'm not sure physics can say something about that. In fact, it seems to me, that it is precisely the belief that physical quantities have some hidden, ulterior metaphysical meaning that can be a problem for the progress of science.

What are those "unknown physical systems" that store*1 Energy? How do you know? :wink: — Gnomon

By observing detectable effects that seem to ssuggest their existence.

I don't know. There are models of particles that, for instance, have been suggested to explain the 'dark matter'. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weakly_interacting_massive_particle

However, my point is that both mass and energy (like, really, all other physical quantities) are presented as properties of physical systems (either imputed by us or seen as belonging to them). Saying that 'energy' is fundamental, is like saying that lenght is more fundamental than objects that 'have lenght'.
TBH, singling out 'energy' from all other properties like linear momentum, angular momentum etc and claiming that it - and just it - is somehow more fundamental than all others seem to me quite weird.

If intelligibility is not intrinsic to reality, then “success” can be explained causally, but it becomes unclear what licenses the further inference to correctness or truth. And that’s exactly where normativity enters. — Esse Quam Videri

I more or less agree with you. But I'm not sure that you can 'explain' anything without positing intelligibility. Rather, intelligibility seems to be the ground for any explanation.

Very interesting reply, thanks! I find these similarities between traditions fascinating, considering how doctrinally different they are.

Since this is a philosophical forum, I'm more interested in the the metaphysical way philosophers use the term "Energy" than the physical way scientists define it. And yet, the way both scientists and philosophers conceive of Energy changed dramatically in the 20th century : from a physical substance (phlogiston) to a mathematical statistic (probability)*1. The man-on-the-street probably finds the new notion confusing or ambiguous. But do you think making that Math vs Matter distinction is a case of "equivocation" or "prevarication"? :brow: — Gnomon

I wouldn't use QM to argue for a particular interpretation of 'energy' as being a 'potential' in an Aristotelian sense. In probabilistic interpertations of QM, basically all physical quantities (at least in 'unobserved' states) can perhaps be framed as 'potentials', not just energy.

The 'equivocation' I'm referring to is something like this. Consider the 'third principle of dynamics', the so-called 'action and reaction principle'. I heard some that use it as an inspiration to say that all actions have an equal but opposite consequence. However, this is not of course what the priciple says, i.e. that interaction between two objects can be described by the presence of two forces which each on one interacting object and have the same magnitude, direction but opposite verses.

Furthermore, if you want to read 'energy' as a real property, it is nevertheless a property of physical systems and, therefore, not more fundamental than 'physical systems' themselves. If the universe can be regarded as a unitary physical system (notice the 'if'), the 'total energy' of the universe would be a feature of the universe not something that is more fundamental than it.
If, instead, you interpret energy as an useful conceptual tool for us to describe processes, then of course there is no real discontinuity between, say, how contemporary physics understands it and how 'classical physics' did.

Do you object to the 21st century scientific consensus that invisible Energy is fundamental to the knowable universe*2? — Gnomon

Again, the 'consensus' merely says that most energy can't be found within the known physical systems. This doesn't imply that energy is the 'fundamental stuff'. Rather, than there are unknown physical systems/objects that 'store', for a lack of a better word, most of the energy.

Very much so. Presumably that is why we are here, to educate us in our spiritual growth? — Punshhh

Yes, I hope and tend to think this is the case.

Interestingly, I believe that it is a somewhat classical teaching in Christianity that the 'spiritual life' is a process of growth and the state of the 'blessed' in Heaven is the ultimate realization of human nature. IIRC, Gregory of Nyssa in his book 'On the Making of Man' distinguishes three types of aspects of the 'soul': vegetative, animal (perceptive) and rational and saw the process of physical growth both in the womb and in the physical growth process as a gradual fulfillment of the first two aspects. The third is cultivated through virtue. However, this process is completed in the afterlife.

Also, in Christianity, in a similar way to Buddhism and Hinduism, you find reference that the fulfillment of spiritual life entails some kind of 'death' (even in the New Testament passages like: John 12:24, Galatians 2:20, Ephesians 4:22-24; also the metaphor of the 'sown seed' is used to describe the relation between the earthly body and the 'spiritual' body in 1 Corinthians 15:42-44). This to me makes sense even from a purely 'religious neutral' point of view: when we, say, grow from childhood to adolescense and then adulthood we might conceptualize the process of growth as a succession of metaphorical 'deaths' and 'rebirths' and resisting to these 'deaths' is actually detrimental to our spiritual health even if they can be quite scary. I'm not surprised therefore that 'dying to oneself' or similar expressions are used as a positive sign for spiritual development.

This is where my thinking differs from Buddhist theology and I move back to the Hindu tradition. I find the dissolution of the individual upon death as incoherent in the way it is generally presented. I am aware of the explanation for it, but see it as part of an apology for the wholesale rejection of atman and a presence of the divine world in our world. — Punshhh

Buddhists would argue that the termination of a particular lifetime is just a more evident instance of change that also happens during a lifetime. They would argue that if there is an atman, change would be impossible. I can see why they say that but IMO their rejection of atman assumes that their opponents think that selves like concepts are changeless. I don't know how one can 'remain the same' while also 'changing' but to be honest it's not that the rejecton of atman isn't free of conceptual difficulties like that of moral responsability.

I am unsure about the identity of the Bodhisattvas and enlightened beings. Also there does seem to be some equivocation around this point. There is a universal consciousness, but each individual is one drop of water in an ocean of water drops. There is a denial of a permanent self, or identity, but a permanent self, a universal self is smuggled in and plays the same role. — Punshhh

I believe that generally Buddhists would assert that all the enlightened minds share the same nature of mind but not the same mind. Just like, say, all fires are instance of 'fire' doesn't imply that all fires are manifestation of a cosmic fire.

Hinduism is saying the same thing, but in atman the individual retains some individuation ( not the Jungian definition) while similarly being a drop of atman in the sea of atman. — Punshhh

Or even something like a wave (a mode of existence) in the sea. I don't think the part-whole language should be taken too literally.

There seems to be equivocation around Karma too, that it shapes one’s next life, while denying that the individual remains after death. And how can the karmic debt be repaid, when the agent who took out the karmic debt does not any more exist. Again, I understand there is a explanation given, but it comes across as apologetics again. — Punshhh

Perhaps a traditional Buddhist answer would frame the problem in the distinction between the 'provisional/conventional' and the 'ultimate' truth. In the ultimate truth, there is no karmic continuity even in the same lifetime. In the provosional truth, individuals persist from life to life. However the provisional is ultimately illusory. So, again, the problem perhaps even worsens: not only there is a problem to explain how karma works from life to life. But there is a problem of how to explain it even within a lifetime once one questions the existence of the atman.
So, to be honest, I was never convinced of Buddhist defenses that I read.

Interestingly there was an ancient Buddhist school (the Pudgalavada) that affirmed the existence of 'indeterminate selves' perhaps to explain karma and compassion.

In Hinduism, the divine world is here with us, walking alongside, interacting with us and the theology delineates it’s presence. — Punshhh

:up: Also, if 'understranding' collapses to 'pragmatic success', then we would have no reason to trust our most successful models. Why our conceptual models, theories etc work? If you don't assume intelligiblity, there is no answer to this question. If there is no answer to this question, you have no rational reason to trust models and theories no matter how useful they are.

The Buddhist teaching on rebirth does not say that you — understood as a persisting personal subject, ego, or bearer of identity — will be reborn. — Wayfarer

I have never been able to make sense of how one can build a coherent moral philosophy about this (Disclaimer: I'm not saying that one cannot live a virtuous life!).
I mean, any concept of 'moral responsibility' that I find coherent assumes that the agent of an action and the bearer of moral responsibility of that action is the same person. If, for instance, a man is caught because he stole something, if there is no 'real moral agent' that is the same as the agent that did the theft, it would simply be unjust to punish the thief.

Right, but it seems undeniable that each entity is unique and that there will never be another the same. In our thinking about the one, I think we should not dis-value or deny the reality of the many. — Janus

I personally agree with this. At the end of the day, even Buddhists would say, for instance, that Buddha and Ananda were, in some sense, different individuals and when the Buddha reached enlightenment it was an event that had an effect on him and not on others. Simply saying that their individuality is merely a product of different 'causes and conditions' seems too reductive to me. If selves are ultimately illusory, why are all the 'fruits' of practice experienced 'individually'?

The very fact that we can distinguish between individuals IMO implies that, as you say, each being is unique and this points to an underlying essence that is, ultimately, what distinguishes that being from other beings.

(I stop posting for today...)

The reason why I objected to your use of the physical concept of 'energy' in this discussion is because I believe that, by doing so, there is a danger of equivocation. While it might be true that scientists in the modern era developed the concept while inspired by something like the Aristotelian concept of 'potency', the way it is actually used in physics is different.

I'm not really sure why many scientists* see in 'energy' something more than a concept that is useful to make predictions, applications and so on. However, if one wants to go with a 'realist' interpretation of 'energy', you end up with considering it as a quantifiable property of physical objects or systems the value of which varies or stays the same according to precise 'regularities'.

Perhaps, the recent insistence on seeing 'energy' as a sort of metaphysical 'entity' that somehow is foundational of 'reality' is due to what, in my opinion, is a misinterpretation of Einstein's mass-equivalence that rests on a further misinterpretation of what 'mass' is.

Of course, 'mass' is often introduced as 'the quantity of matter'. But even in high school physics, such a definition is gradually replaced by subtler defintions like 'inertial mass', i.e. the resistance of an object to change its state of motion, and 'gravitational mass', i.e. the 'degree' of how much an object interacts gravitationally (i.e. it has an analogous role of the electric charge in electromagnetic interaction).

It would be very odd to me to attribute such a foundational role to something like the above descriptions of mass or something like energy one form of which is 'kinetic energy' which depends on the speed of an object (and the speed depends on the reference frame).

*At least when they seem to present energy as the 'stuff' that in some sense 'makes up the universe'.

Yes, the birth of independent, or transcendent agency*. Quite a responsibility, hence the requirement for us to act responsibly. Indeed religions might well have sprung up as a way to corral our new found agency. To head off our new found powers inevitably being used destructively. — Punshhh

I think the best way to see 'moral teachings' of religions is to try to see them as a way to cultivate our own nature. While a 'legalistic' way of seeing them has perhaps its purpose, the deepest way to see them is IMO to see them as aiming to our education and assist our (spiritual) growth.

:up: I would add that if intelligibility is merely 'pragmatic', then our beleif in our capacity to understand reality would be an illusion. It would seem as if we can understand (in part) but we would be wrong to believe we do.

I don't see how that helps the case unless universal liberation were achieved at the end of the life of each universe. By the way, do you have a citation from the scriptures to support that cosmological view? — Janus

When my mind had become immersed in samādhi like this—purified, bright, flawless, rid of corruptions, pliable, workable, steady, and imperturbable—I extended it toward recollection of past lives. I recollected many kinds of past lives. That is: one, two, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, a hundred, a thousand, a hundred thousand rebirths; many eons of the world contracting, many eons of the world expanding, many eons of the world contracting and expanding. I remembered: ‘There, I was named this, my clan was that, I looked like this, and that was my food. This was how I felt pleasure and pain, and that was how my life ended. When I passed away from that place I was reborn somewhere else. There, too, I was named this, my clan was that, I looked like this, and that was my food. This was how I felt pleasure and pain, and that was how my life ended. When I passed away from that place I was reborn here.’ And so I recollected my many kinds of past lives, with features and details — MN 4, bhikkhu Sujato translation

If there is little (nothing?) in John Smith that can be considered to be an underlying essence, then the idea of him becoming a future female ant seems unintelligible. I've heard the "candle flame" analogy, but it seems simplistically linear and naive in the context of a vastly interconnected world. — Janus

I see your point. I think that a more 'modern' analogy would be something like a movie. There is 'nothing' that passes from a snapshot to another but there is continuity.
Of course, you can still say that snapshot have a material frame and follow a plot that characterizes the movie. But IMO you can say that nothing is truly 'going to' the following snapshot.

At the same time, however, I believe that when we try to describe it conceptually we inevitably posit an essence. That's why 'enlightenment' is not seen as merely intellectual.

Notice, however, that an 'essence' limits the changeability of something (edit: because an essence would imply a defining characteristic that cannot be changed without annihilating the entity that bears the essence).

But with a caveat. The concept of Buddha nature can be taken to mean that all one needs to do is get to some primeval, pure state, and that's that. But we have this: — baker

To be clear, I wasn't saying that 'essential goodness' is an initial state and spiritual practice aims to 'go back to that' but rather to an intrinsic potential present and that the aim of spiritual practice is the fulfillment of one's nature.

I was simply saying that in both (groups of) traditions:

(1) 'evil' (either framed as sin, defilments etc) is seen as an extraneous addition to the mind, i.e. something that is parasitic to it.
(2) given the former point, one can reasonably interpret that the aim of spiritual practice is, in fact, to fulfill one's nature and this fulfillment entails the purification from these extranous 'additions'.

Notice that while in Christianity there is, of course, much emphasis to a return to a state of original purity, there is also the idea that the 'blessed' in Heaven will reach a state that admits no further fall. So, it isn't like the state of humans before the fall (however interpreted) but a better state in which human nature is perfectly fulfilled. I'm not saying that you find the same idea in Buddhist traditions but I see a similarity here.

He's right of course, if we've always—literally alway and for all time—been ignorant then it can't be our fault that we're ignorant. Original sin? That similarity is the sort of thing I mean when I say Buddhism is fundamentally the same as other religions. — praxis

Yeah, I agree. Despite their vast doctrinal differences, most forms of Christianity and most forms of Buddhism agree on two points:

(1) The 'ordinary' state of human beings* is a state in which our nature is, in some sense, 'wounded', we are born in a condition of weakness, tendency to do what is actually harmful to us and so on (we might use the expression 'original sin' for this feature).
(2) This 'wounded state', however, isn't an essential state for human beings. Both religions, indeed, proclaim the possibility that we can reach a state of 'being healed' by these wounds (we might call this feature 'essential goodness').

Note that, in both cases, ontologically the 'essential goodness' is more fundamental than the 'original sin'. If it wasn't, liberation would be impossible for both religions.


*after the 'original fall' in Christianity.

Not sure why you did raise this objection. Let's say that, as you say, 'enlightenment' can be reached outside the dispensation of Buddhist traditions. Even if it is true, in order to get 'enlightened', you need to live in a time and place that allows the possibility of you becoming aware of these 'paths' and practise them. Even then, in order to become 'enlightened', you'd need to practice personally 'well enough' the teachings of one of these 'paths'.

So, merely saying that the cycle of rebirth is beginningless gives us no guarantee that one has already practised 'well enough'.

Personally, one of the reasons I'm not convinced by the traditonalist Buddhist account of a beginningless cycle of samsara is because Buddhist doctrine says that ignorance, the root cause of rebirth, isn't an essential property of the mind. At the same time, however, we are told that, despite this, our minds (or 'mind-streams') have always be tainted by 'ignorance' and other 'defilements'.
However, no explanation is given on why the mind-streams of sentient beings have been always 'defiled' when, in fact, according to the same Buddhist traditions, the mind can be freed from one's defilments shows that they aren't an essential feature of the mind (i.e. minds can exist without defilments).

Yes, so my intuition is actually an acceptance (or realisation) of a deeper understanding underlying these religions. That they are playing a role in a process of purification of the self. That the self is not required, to go anywhere, to do anything, achieve anything in reconciling (becoming liberated from) their incarnation. But rather to relinquish, to lay down the trappings of our incarnate selves. — Punshhh

Yes, I think I can more or less agree.

If 'evil' is a corruption of the good, we are at the deepest level good. Hence, the 'spiritual life' doesn't 'transform' us in something that is 'alien to us' but, rather, it aims at the ultimate fulfillment of our nature.

'Saṃsāra has no beginning, but it has an end. Nirvāṇa has a beginning, but it has no end' ~ Buddhist Aphorism (quoted on Dharmawheel.) — Wayfarer

That's a good way to summarize things, altough I believe that if one really wants to be 'pedantic', one would say: "Samsara has no beginning but it can end. Nirvana is unconditioned, but conventionally has a beginning" or something like that.

But we’re not looking forward, we’re looking infinitely backwards, and in the past ignorance has necessarily never been removed because we are here in ignorance. — praxis

I understood that. But, again, my point is that the mere infinite succession of lifetimes doesn't guarantee that either of us has already practise seriously the Dharma. Indeed, as I said, it is generally emphasized that being born as a human is a rare event and being born a human and live in a time when it is possible to practise the Dharma is even rarer. But even in the best conditions, at the end of the day one has still to choose to practice.
So even if samsara is beginningless, it doesn't follow that you have already practised the Dhamma in a serious way.

This isn't necessarily the case. Traditional buddhists would reply that the ultimate cause of the cycle is ignorance. If ignorance is removed, samsara stops. If ignorance is never removed, the cycle will go on forever.

BTW, this problem was one of the reason why I ultimately ceased to try to become a Buddhist. If the cycle is beginningless, then the very existence of the 'cycle' is unintelligible. As youb remarked, each instance of rebirth is intelligible in principle, it is a regulate phenomenon. It would be weird if the very existence of the cycle is an unintelligible 'brute fact'.

If, however, the cycle began, this means that if other traditional Buddhist claims are true it must end:

“Whatever is subject to origination is all subject to cessation.” — SN 56.11, bhikkhu Bodhi translation

However the traditional Buddhist view is that it doesn't necessarily end. Rather it ends if ignorance is removed.

Hart’s point, as I read him, isn’t that natural processes couldn’t in principle produce intentional states, but that any attempt to explain reason, truth, or meaning already presupposes intelligibility and normativity. Scientific explanation itself depends on distinctions between true and false, valid and invalid, better and worse reasons. Those norms aren’t themselves causal properties, and so can’t coherently be treated as merely derivative features of otherwise non-intelligible processes. — Esse Quam Videri

Excellently put! I would also add another implicit conclusion: if intelligibility is real, then necessarily it follows that there must be at least the potential of an intellect that can understand it.
So, if one tries to derive reason from an intelligible world one is already assuming reason in two ways: the way you're describe here and the potential existence of a reason that can understand the intelligibility.

In a naturalist framework, however, reason should be explained in terms of natural processes. In order to avoid circularity, naturalist view have to deny intelligibility. If however we deny intelligibility we deny the possibility to make explanations.

I already stated that I'm not a Buddhist and I don't believe in the Buddhist teaching of rebirth. I am very interested in Buddhism, however.

s there an idea like this in Buddhism? as it’s an important idea for me. — Punshhh

As @baker remarked, the idea is quite explicit in some strands of Mahayana with the concept of 'Buddha nature'. However, it can be said that it is implied by the fact that the Buddhist practice is seen as a way to purify the mind, i.e. removing all the 'impurities'. So, rather than a transformation into something 'alien', the Buddhist path actually seems to have been presented as a way to bring the mind-stream to its 'purity'.
This idea is IMO recurrent in ancient religious and philosophical traditions. You can find analogous idea in Christianity, for instance, when sins are depicted as an impurity or an illness that 'stain' the purity (yes, there is original sin but as you probably know the interpretation of that concept wasn't the same among all Christian traditions... and, anyway, there is the idea that all God's creations are originally good and, therefore, evil is a corruption that came about later).

I mean, if we're going to delve into the supernatural and metaphysical (the otherwise traditionally non-logical), it's theoretically possible it wasn't that way at first but later became that way through some way or means. If I'm not mistaken that's essentially a major tenet of Christianity. — Outlander

I believe that most Buddhist traditions accept the idea of a beginningless samsara. I recall to have read that some Tibetan schools allowed the belief of a beginning of samsara but I can't recall where I read it.

Interestingly, I believe that some scholars have noted that the Pali texts actually do not explicitly say that samsara is beginningless. Consider this excerpt of an already quoted sutta:

“Mendicants, this transmigration has no known beginning. No first point is found of sentient beings roaming and transmigrating, shrouded by ignorance and fettered by craving. What do you think? Which is more: the flow of tears you’ve shed while roaming and transmigrating for such a very long time—weeping and wailing from being coupled with the unloved and separated from the loved—or the water in the four oceans?” — SN 15.3, bhikkhu Sujato translation

Also, speculating about the question of the world being eternal or not was discouraged:

Thus have I heard: at one time the Lord was staying near Sāvatthī in the Jeta Grove in Anāthapiṇḍika's monastery. Then a reasoning of mind arose to the venerable Māluṅkyāputta as he was meditating in solitary seclusion, thus: “Those (speculative) views that are not explained, set aside and ignored by the Lord: the world is eternal, the world is not eternal, the world is an ending thing, the world is not an ending thing; the life-principle is the same as the body, the life-principle is one thing, the body another; the ITathāgata is after dying, the Tathāgata is not after dying, the Tathāgata both is and is not after dying, the Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying; the Lord does not explain these to me. That the Lord does not explain these to me does not please me, does not satisfy me, so I, having approached the Lord, will question him on the matter. — MN 63, I.B. Horner translation

I don't know how the traditionalists explain this.

Opapātika means only not born through parents or biological reproduction. It is still rebirth and causally conditioned. — praxis

Yes, it is still a form of rebirth and, as you say, it is still causally conditioned. Rebirth is a process that follows precise 'rules'.

I'm thinking that this, if nothing else, is the reason rebirth is not claimed to be a motivator for practice. We've have literally been practicing forever without end. — praxis

Even if samsara is beginningless, it doesn't follow that you have practised since beginningless times and you have already practised with diligence infinite times and you somehow always failed.
Indeed, in Buddhist traditions you find a lot of emphasis on how rare a human birth is and how rare is a human birth in which you are exposed to the teaching of the Dhamma and can practice it. There are many, many more activities you can do in your 'journey'. You can't even exclude the chance that you never encountered the Dhamma previously.

On the other hand, if you believe in the Buddhist traditional account of rebirth, you can get a lot of motivation by contemplating the vastness of the sufferings of the 'lower realms' (purgatories (naraka), hungry shades and animal) as well as the fact that no 'realm' is without suffering and death. And, again, if you believed in the traditional account you also would believe that you shed more tears than the waters of the ocean for the losses of your loved ones like it is written in the sutta I quoted above. As the quoted sutta says, all of this is 'enough' to become disillusioned and actively try to 'go out'.

Ok, thanks. I think I can agree with that.
In many religions/philosophies there is the idea that we have an innermost desire/implicit knowledge of the 'highest good'.

Well isn't it going to be a case of gradual divergence like most things, which change and morph over time? At some point they would have been one, when closer to the Buddha's original teachings temporally, then over time, and maybe distance, with less communication, they would split away from each other. — unimportant

I agree... of course each school claims to teach the 'true version' of Buddhism and see others as detective or corruptions. Over time, differences have been more and more remarked. As you say, this seems a common phenomenon in religious traditions and not only in religions.

That does beg the question which is 'right' if any to try and bring it back to some semblance of my OP which seems to have long been abandoned in the debate in the last few pages. Lol. — unimportant

I can see that. But to be fair, these 'deviations' can help to understand what might count as 'supernatural' elements in Buddhism and see if the belief in them is relevant or not in order to reach the state of enlightenment as promised by Buddhist traditions.

The fact that there are differences in the doctrinal contents among schools might suggest that 'what one believes' might be important to reach the goal. For instance, before stopping the participation in this thread I argued that:

1) the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth was regarded as an important motivator for practice. Can one achieve the same goal without this motivator? How?
2) the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth perhaps influnced the understanding of what counts as suffering (e.g. 'birth is suffering') and what is the cessation of suffering. Notice that Buddhist believed that insight in the nature of suffering and its cause was a condition for enlightenment. So, how can we be certain to achieve the same goal if our understanding of suffering differ?
3) the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth coheres pretty well with anatman. Can one really achieve an insight in 'not self' if one holds the view of 'one life only as this or that person'?

Note that all these questions make sense even if the traditional Buddhist doctrine of rebirth is false. I was wondering about what role might the belief in it might have in practicing and achieving the goal. They are IMO legitimate questions one can ask if one claims that belief in rebirth (or any other 'supernatural' doctrine) isn't needed to achieve the goal.

I think we do know the answer to my question, but just can’t put it down on paper, it always misses the mark. — Punshhh

Well, I don't :sweat: indeed, given the variety of opinions Buddhists seem to have hold about the 'ontology' of Nirvana, it is difficult to say that they had the same 'state' in mind.

But perhaps you meant something different.

Note that in Buddhist thought rebirth is sustained by desire of either continued existence or annihilation. So, in order to avoid that, one shouldn't have any attachment or aversion to existence (that's why incidentally, I think that both negativistic that consider Nirvana as mere cessation or positivistic views that consider Nirvana in terms too similar to a blissful 'personal' state are inconsistent with the broader context of Buddhist thought).

Also, rebirth is quite consistent with anatman. If the male human John Smith can become in the future a female ant, then there is little in John Smith that can be considered an underlying essence.

In the Mahayana, there is an aspiration to liberate all sentient beings without, however, the guarantee that it will happen.

In the Theravada, there is the idea that while Buddhas and arhats stop helping when they reach Nirvana without reminder, but also the idea that cyclically the Dharma will be rediscovered and taught and there will be more occasions of liberation.

Interestingly, there is a sutta in the Pali Canon in which the Buddha is asked on how many will be liberated and the Buddha replied that one shouldn't ask about that, basically. He just put the question aside.

So, imo generally in both traditions you'll find the idea to act for the benefit of all (within one's limit) but there is no guarantee that such an 'universalist' ending will come to fruition. Perhaps you cam say that the Mahayana is more hopeful but even there you generally find emphasized of how rare is reaching liberation.

BTW, last post for today, here in my timezone is quite late!

ok, so you seem closer to 'Theravadin' reading.

BTW, you find both views espoused by supporters of both traditions. So perhaps calling Theravadin and Mahayanist is incorrect.