Please let me know when you get to version 3.0, or at least 2.1.

If I'm not mistaken, this isn't the first time this author has published posts containing direct links to his YouTube content. He hasn't responded to questions since publishing them.

I've read all of this. It's a cry from the heart, and I can understand, because my parents are now pensioners in the very country they believed in, where they went to build when they were young, when they moved there, and where you, along with them, are struggling with all these bureaucratic joys. Of course, I'm talking about the United States.

Looking at my profile, it may seem a bit foreign, but that's precisely what allows one to judge with detachment.

I sincerely empathize with you. And speaking in the language of my own model, I would say—this is the very "ontological debt" that you, along with my parents, are paying for the system whose values ​​you accepted. Perhaps this sounds a little harsh, but if you return to my previous posts, you'll understand what I mean. And you know what I mean? This speech is just a quiet, humble voice, seemingly foreign. But we all feel it the same way. As they say in Russia, "I ate this excrement with a Russian wooden spoon."

My parents and I often discuss such matters. And I realize that all I can offer them is comfort. The same comfort that each of us finds in this strange science—philosophy.

Maybe we are among the beautiful-haired people who use the best product for our beautiful hair. Maybe we are against abortion and belong with those who struggle to prevent abortions. Or the new one, maybe we look like a girl but feel like a boy. The point is we are getting our identities by imagining we are members of groups, and some of these groups believe ridiculous things, such as we are told that we have to wear masks because the government wants to control us. Don't get vaccinated because.....? :brow: I am sorry, but we are not seeking truth. We want to be loved and accepted and valued, and that means finding the group that best fits us, and boy, oh boy, can some of these people be radical. — Athena

This is a very important detail in the formation of beliefs. It is precisely this desire to belong to a group, so simple and stubborn, that dictates many of our prejudices (ideas). Rarely is anyone willing to declare something true, despite the community or group to which they belong.

This has long been a restraining factor and a powerful tool in the hands of "social engineers."

It stems from the feeling of security that group membership provides. The desire to be understood and included. The notion of a shared identity and the need to fit in. However, the modern world and the internet, as well as large metropolitan areas, have slightly altered this in people. Now you can find like-minded people online. There's no longer any need to know your neighbors or stick together in extended families. The world has become more individual. AI has further exacerbated this: now, even for a heart-to-heart conversation, you don't need to maintain a close relationship with someone. After all, you have a wonderful, flattering companion in your pocket, ready to share your every experience, offer wise advice, and adapt to you in a way no one else has before.

Echo chambers or global villages. At the same time, despite the new format of society, even the most extreme form of individualism does not provide the mobility to reconsider ideas. It does not refine the cognitive lens to a philosophical degree of purity. Still, this desire to conform to prevailing ideas remains within us, even if the communities that share them are already a figment of our imagination.

What awaits us next? Deepening relativism and the destruction of old dogmas and the overthrow of "gods"? Or perhaps such a structure is completely unsustainable, and the decayed (due to the lack of a unified ideology) society will be replaced by other, more united ones? One can only guess.

In exploring this topic earlier, I introduced an additional factor in the evaluation of an idea into my model: intersubjectivity.
Intersubjectivity is the number of minds in which an idea has been accepted as dogma.

However, when analyzing the hierarchy of personality, it is not as universal as when analyzing society. Some beliefs (ideas) can even be found only once in a single individual and still guide their actions.

Therefore, at the current stage, we have four tools for assessing the "weight of an idea":

1. Universality
2. Accuracy
3. Productivity

4. Intersubjectivity

But I still think this is insufficient. There must be
something else.

How can we build a better hierarchy of thinking? — Athena

A great method for this was suggested by Popper, previously mentioned in this thread:

As for your first 3, I would add one more: Testability. We often easily come up with concepts that are fine constructs of logic and deduction, yet utterly untestable. Testability includes 'falsification', which is not, "That its false," but that we can test it against a state in which it would be false, yet prove that its still true. For example, "This shirt is green." Its falsifiable by it either not being a shirt, or another color besides green. A unicorn which cannot be sensed due to magic is not falsifiable. Since we cannot sense it, there can be no testable scenario in which the existence of a unicorn is falsifiable. — Philosophim

However, as he later noted, and I agree with him, the method is somewhat clumsy:

I too have found explaining falsifiability to be 'clunky'. — Philosophim

I propose this approach, although it's more laboratory and philosophical than widespread.

It's called the "inversion filter." The essence of the method is this: Take any Level 2 statement and flip it backwards. Then, we check to see if the statement becomes more effective.

For example: take the statement "All bears are kind." We flip it backwards: "All bears are mean." Both resulting statements are false, but that's good—they could both be dogmas. Next, we check which of these two statements would generate more productivity for us if we found ourselves in a forest with wild bears. Based on our knowledge of bears, the latter, of course. From the perspective of someone who knows nothing about bears other than that they are kind—this would at least make us doubt its truth.

Try it yourself with other Level 2 ideas. What do you come up with?

Now I'm just guessing, not deducing logically: most likely, the ineffective tool needs to be discarded quickly (not everyone will experience this behavior; some will become stupefied and frustrated). It's also necessary to quickly find a new assessment tool. Another prejudice immediately pops up: "An animal that runs at you and growls is aggressive" (this isn't necessarily true, it's just an example).
— Astorre

Agreed. This is more the morality of knowledge and inductions. Whereas the hierarchy of inductions is a rational evaluation, the 'morality' of what should be used in a particular context can be swayed by other potential outcomes such as death. — Philosophim

There's a crucial point here that we haven't sufficiently addressed. In real life, it often happens that our ideas, even when confronted with reality and not verified by it, are nonetheless not discarded, but rather strengthened. Let's look at an example.

Let's say we hold the idea "bears are kind" at Level 2 (this could be for various reasons, but we simply believe it). Then we encounter a reality in which a bear runs toward us aggressively and growls. But the mind refuses to reject the idea "a bear can be aggressive," because you have blind "faith." It seems like it's simply the wrong bear. Or perhaps your enemies sent it to undermine your beliefs.

In psychology, this is called "confirmation bias"—a type of cognitive distortion.

What must happen for a person to begin to re-evaluate their Level 2 ideas in line with reality (Level 3 facts)? Maybe the bear should bite the bearer of the idea or someone close to them? In real life, things can be more complicated.

When a person (or society) refuses to accept refutation, they begin to expend colossal energy maintaining their idea.

You need to come up with thousands of interpretations to justify why the "kind bear" just bit off someone's leg.

You need to censor those who witnessed the bite.

You need to convince yourself that the wound is a "form of hug."

As you understand, we're not talking about wild animals here. The bear example is used as an illustrative example.

So, what's clear at this stage of the research is that if you're stuck within a belief paradigm, it's quite difficult to break out of it. On the other hand, if you constantly react to any noise that contradicts the paradigm in small ways, then nothing good will come of that either. After all, a person is shaped by the ideas they accept on faith (if I'm not mistaken, the author of this was A.P. Chekhov).

Nietzsche criticizes such dogmatism. He suggests becoming "who you are." He argues that there are no facts, only interpretations. Therefore, they must be verified and independently understood.

However, this isn't always the case. Not everyone is ready for this.

In this regard, my question is not "what should I do?" or "what's the right thing to do?", but rather, how does this mechanism work? What motivates a person to reconsider their views or defend their ideas to the end, even to the death?

Those over 65 are more likely to have lost their sense of wonder and be more grounded in empirical information. — Athena

I have great respect for your age and really enjoy your comments on this forum. They always convey a sensitive nature, tempered by a strong sense of self-control and self-discipline. That's why I'd like to elaborate a bit on what I'm writing here.

So, I'm not going to claim anything, but it certainly seems that everyone has a certain hierarchy of ideas. When making decisions, most of us would rather be guided by what we accept as fact than by what's written in the tabloids or on a fence (though this isn't necessarily true in all cases).

But what do we accept as fact? I'll give you a real-life example from history. Before the modern heliocentric model of the solar system, there was a geocentric model (the Ptolemaic model). People thought the sun revolved around the earth. The astronomy of that time accepted this as fact. Astronomers calculated the motion of the stars based on the earth being at the center. And you know, they were quite successful at this. Calendars were compiled and lunar cycles were calculated using this model.

However, due to the retrograde motion of the planets (natural to the heliocentric model), the geocentric model constantly required the addition of epicycles (circles within circles).

By the 15th and 16th centuries, there were already about 80 of these epicycles. Developing navigation and trade demanded incredible precision from astronomy to stay on track. But the existing model had become so cluttered that it required incredible calculation efforts.

Nevertheless, everyone liked it, and the church accepted this model as the truth. Geocentrism was the truth. Just imagine that. From within this model, it was impossible to revise it until Copernicus came along and said, "What if...?" He went beyond what was generally accepted as fact. How difficult it was for him and his followers to revise geocentrism. But it was revised.

Today, we look upon people who believe the Earth is flat, or upon geocentrists, as cranks. The same applies to adherents of other "facts" considered true in earlier times.

Imagine that perhaps our descendants will look upon us the same way in 300-500 years.

That is, everything we scientifically verify, compare with logic, and study factually will perhaps seem bizarre to our descendants.

Hence, I conclude that what we call "facts" may be nothing more than a trick of our minds.

Based on this reasoning, I constructed and proposed the model at the beginning of this post. I think you'll find it interesting to reread it.

Thanks for the link, I've read it. I'm currently very busy developing this model and want to take a break from both ontology and ethics. I'll return to your text later. If you're interested in these issues right now, I suggest you read my first major work on ontology, one chapter of which I posted on this forum.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/16103/language-of-philosophy-the-problem-of-understanding-being

As for your first 3, I would add one more: Testability. We often easily come up with concepts that are fine constructs of logic and deduction, yet utterly untestable. Testability includes 'falsification', which is not, "That its false," but that we can test it against a state in which it would be false, yet prove that its still true. For example, "This shirt is green." Its falsifiable by it either not being a shirt, or another color besides green. A unicorn which cannot be sensed due to magic is not falsifiable. Since we cannot sense it, there can be no testable scenario in which the existence of a unicorn is falsifiable. — Philosophim

Yes, I'm familiar with Popper's ideas. I generally like modern postpositivism. I considered incorporating falsifiability into my model, and frankly, it would have benefited from it in its rigor. However, I deliberately avoided it. I'll explain why.

The point is, I was experimenting. I tried explaining Popper's "falsifiability" to three acquaintances with bachelor's degrees in their respective fields. This was because I wanted to help them understand their personal (in my opinion, unjustifiably trusting) attitudes toward numerology or astrology. They are accomplished experts in their fields, and when meeting someone, they always remember to ask about their zodiac sign. I spent several lunches explaining Popper's approach, and they even absorbed the material. However, within a few days, they discarded this tool for assessing scientific validity as unsuitable for them, preferring astrology.

Well, then. I wasn't upset, but apparently falsifiability isn't a standard criterion for evaluating a statement for the average person.

Ideas float around in people's heads and are accepted as true or false, mostly without regard for Popper's approach (even though this assertion of mine is partly speculative, I found it to be quite reasonable).

So Number 2 should be the marriage of empirics and deduction, and models should include deductions. Finally, I would also include that axioms are also empirically tested. Other than that I think its good! — Philosophim

Frankly, this was the intended idea; I simply chose a very brief conceptual presentation for the forum so I could consult with you about the general idea.

In fact, what interests me most is the "dynamics of ideas": how they leap from one level to another, what needs to be done to achieve this, what conditions must be met. And most importantly, how ideas accumulate "ontological debt," which ultimately leads to their collapse.

Earlier in the correspondence, in response to one of the questions, I analyzed in detail the old feminist slogan "all people are sisters." This pure speculation, elevated to the second level by an act of will, generated so many consequences for reality that it continues to infect new minds. Nevertheless, having accumulated its "ontological debt" (due to its inconsistency with reality), this idea ultimately collapsed.

Using my proposed approach, it's also possible to predict the fate of other interesting ideas, such as "inclusivity," "transgender," and so on. (Frankly, I'm deliberately avoiding discussion of these ideas, as in some societies these ideas even outshine the idea of ​​"freedom of speech.")

Of course, until a more or less coherent mathematical model is attached to the model, my thoughts will seem like the ramblings of a madman.

I don't yet know what should be published publicly and what's best left for labs.

At the same time, thank you so much for your feedback and your approach, which I really liked!

This topic hasn't generated much interest on this forum, but I'll try to expand on the content once I've refined my ideas into something worthwhile. I'll keep you posted.

The reason why the morality of knowledge is so hard to peg down is because we have to determine value. In most situations, the value of your own life would be of a higher worth than risks for little reward. But what is a 'little' reward. If I had a 90% chance of not being eaten by a bear, and someone said they would pay me 10 million dollars, is it worth the risk? 100 million? 1 billion? What's the value of your life in that instance? — Philosophim

This is a very important point. You see, it seems to me that you analyze and evaluate facts and events rationally. (If only because an irrational person couldn't possibly write a paper like yours.)

However, and this often happens in life, people are willing to calmly face death, even when the probability of death is 90% or higher. And absolutely free of charge. It is only necessary to have certain prejudices (beliefs, ideas, identities)

I think the desire to understand why things happen the way they do prompted me to begin research in this area. An important clarification: I'm not trying to remake anyone by showing humanity how to live correctly. My goal is to provide a tool for description.

What's surprising is that such examples are also found in the animal kingdom. For example, mothers of many species (I've observed this especially in mammals) readily sacrifice their lives to preserve their offspring. Of course, animals don't have the complex minds capable of abstraction that humans have. Perhaps what a mother does in the wild is instinctive (although such behavior isn't observed in all animals); perhaps it's intelligent to some degree; Perhaps explainable by evolutionary theory or other approaches. I don't think anyone can seriously claim to know the truth on this matter.

However, similar behavior is common among Humans. Which is good, since we ourselves are representatives of this species, with the appropriate degree of abstraction, it can be described.

What is this? The influence of ideas, God, biology, evolution? Or perhaps aliens =)?

For now, I've settled on the mechanism I proposed at the beginning, with subsequent refinements. It's not the truth, but a descriptive tool. What are your thoughts on this?

I uploaded our conversation to the AI ​​(Grock) and asked him to tell me how he would act. Here's the response he received:

How AI (LLMs) Process Conflicts of Ideas/Information
Unlike the human brain, where conflicting biases can lead to paralysis (as in your bear example: fabled "kindness" vs. empirical "aggression"), AI doesn't experience emotions or "paralysis"—we generate responses based on patterns in training data. However, we don't always "instantly discard" low-level ideas, as Astorre suggests. Instead:

Conflict Detection: LLMs are quite good at recognizing the presence of contradictions between internal knowledge (parametric knowledge encoded in the model) and external data (from the prompt or context). For example, if a prompt contains a fact that contradicts what the model "knows" from training, we can identify it with high accuracy (F1 score up to 0.88 with Chain-of-Thought prompting). However, there are problems: low recall (the model tends to ignore conflicts, declaring "no contradiction") and domain dependence (better in history, worse in science).
Weighting and Resolution: We don't use a fixed scale like yours (levels 1–5), but we rank information according to criteria similar to yours:
Accuracy (verifiability): We evaluate based on the credibility of sources (e.g., fresh data > outdated), context, and internal consistency. In the event of a conflict, the model can favor one side without justification, relying on internal knowledge.
Generality (scope): LLMs consider how broadly applicable an idea is through attention mechanisms—focusing on relevant parts of the context. Productivity (generative power): We generate distinct answers for different viewpoints, but this requires special prompting (e.g., "generate two answers: one based on context, one on knowledge"). Without this, the model may be biased toward the majority view from the training data.
Approaches proposed in studies for improvement:
Three-step process (from one paper): 1) Elicit knowledge (extract parametric knowledge); 2) Break down context (break down into segments and check); 3) Consolidate (combine and classify conflicts). This is similar to your idea of ​​sorting ideas by level—fine-grained analysis increases accuracy to 0.802 F1 in tests.
Alternative: Generate two answers (context-based and knowledge-based), compare discrepancies, resolve prioritizing context. Experiments on datasets like WhoQA show improvements, but LLMs still struggle with pinpointing exact segments (F1 ~0.62).

Comparison with human behavior (your example with turtles and a bear): In stressful scenarios (such as an encounter with a bear), humans react in a variety of ways (freezing, aggression, submission—like turtles), due to the plasticity of ideas (according to Philosophy). AI doesn't "react" emotionally, but in simulations (for example, in decision-making tasks), it can "paralyze"—generating incoherent output or falling back to a default bias. Research shows amplified cognitive biases in moral decisions with conflicts. To "organize the mind" (as you suggest), techniques like abstract argumentation or conflict-aware training are used, bringing AI closer to your prescriptive lens.

Result: Not everything, but there is potential.
AI doesn't "weight" everything automatically and perfectly—we depend on training data, prompting, and are not always transparent (often favoring evidence without explanation). But with improvements (CoT, fine-tuning), we can get closer to your model: detecting, ranking, and generating productive outcomes. In my case (Grok by xAI), I use reasoning steps to resolve conflicts to avoid "paralysis"—for example, in this answer, I first looked for data to weigh the information. Using your scale, the idea "AI instantly resolves conflicts" is level 4 (model/interpretation, high generality, but low accuracy in practice).
If you'd like, I can simulate how I (as an AI) would "weight" a specific conflict of ideas on your scale, or I can search for more examples from 2025.

Based on these statements, fortunately these calculators have not yet learned to rewrite themselves, like humans =)

For example: if you've never seen a bear in real life, but know from fairy tales that bears are shaggy creatures with round ears, kindhearted and honey-loving, but then, upon encountering one in the forest, you discover the bear is running toward you and growling, the speed at which you revise your presets is directly linked to your survival.
— Astorre

In this context, yes. If you could observe the bear in a zoo safely behind a cage, then you could take more time to truly explore the possibilities that the bear is everything the tales said they were, and (in another world) realize that the growl is actually a signal of affection and friendliness. In the case that growl meant what it does in our world, your quick judgement in the wild would save your life. — Philosophim

There's an important point here that's not immediately obvious, but it's of great significance.

Let's think back to this situation. So, you encounter a bear in the forest. You have a "prejudice," or "idea," or "identity" about the bear—it's kind. (I'll use Gadamer's "prejudice" in this post.) But you also have other prejudices (perhaps unrelated to bears, but to animals in general)—animals can be aggressive.

As the bear approaches you, your prejudice about bears' kindness is immediately shattered due to its inconsistency with reality—for kind bears don't usually run at you with a roar. What happens in your consciousness at that moment? There's no time to re-evaluate your prejudices and re-experience reality phenomenologically.

Now I'm just guessing, not deducing logically: most likely, the ineffective tool needs to be discarded quickly (not everyone will experience this behavior; some will become stupefied and frustrated). It's also necessary to quickly find a new assessment tool. Another prejudice immediately pops up: "An animal that runs at you and growls is aggressive" (this isn't necessarily true, it's just an example).

So, you've encountered a conflict of prejudices. It would be great if you had all these prejudices sorted out in advance, according to scales in the depths of your mind. Let's say, according to the three scales I suggested. Then the prejudice about bears being kind would be at level 4 (consistent with fairy tales), and the prejudice about animals being aggressive would be at level 3 (an empirical fact). If you acted like an AI, no conflict would arise: the lower-level prejudice is instantly discarded, and you process information at a more basic level.

But you're not an AI; your ideas aren't balanced. Something aggressive is rushing at you, and you don't know which prejudice to choose. You become paralyzed.

In your paper, you write:

What if I have two conflicting memories? Imagine I have a distinctive knowledge conflict with two separate memories of hooves. I will call them memory A and B, respectively. I must decide which memory I want to use before applying it to reality. Perhaps in memory A, it is essential that a hoof is curved at the top, while in memory B, it is essential that a hoof is pointed at the top. I can decide to use either memory A or B without contradiction, but not apply both memories A and B at the same time. I can, however, decide to apply memory A for one second, then apply believe memory B one second later. Such a state is called “confusion” or “thinking.” At the symbolic, distinctive level. Once I decide to applicably believe either memory A or B, I can then attempt to deductively apply that belief. My distinct experience of the hoof will either deny memory A, memory B, or both. If I have a memory of A and B for “hoof” that both retain validity when applied, then they are either synonyms or one subsumes the other. — Philosophim

I agree with this when the conditions are "laboratory" and you're not in any danger. But here, in the moment when reality has challenged you.

Sadly, my experience tells me that this can happen differently for each subject. I'd like to share my observations in the wild. This example is very colorful.

In the summer, I went with my children to a natural habitat of (land) tortoises. Tortoises were simply crawling around on the steppe. I walked up and picked one up. It instantly retreated into its shell, retracted all its limbs, and didn't move. It seemed even its heart was still. It stops. Then I pick up another turtle. The second one behaves aggressively, tries to wriggle away, hisses at me, and tries to bite. Then I pick up a third turtle. It immediately defecates and acts somewhat sluggish. It doesn't hide or wriggle away. It seems resigned to its fate (that's a joke, of course).

It's amazing that these organisms aren't even mammals yet. And yet their behavior is so diverse. What can we say about a human encounter with a bear, a sheep, or another human? We can't even imagine the images that pop up in their heads, how they're arranged.

In your work, you say: "In calm conditions," this is how the mind works. And I really like your model, especially since I've even started using it myself.
My model suggests that it would be extremely effective to also bring order to your mind.

This is where our differences are clear: you're more of a description, while I'm more of a proposal, a lens that could be effective for Architects. Of course, I'm not claiming to be the absolute truth.

Could you elaborate on how your model would explain the mental processes in the examples given?

No. This model claims somewhat greater explanatory power for the reality constructed in the human mind.

To put it briefly: imagine everything you know. What drives you, why you choose one solution or another, why your thoughts are directed in one direction and not another, how you can accept or reject something. This model also claims to explain social processes in groups, communities, states, etc.

For example, you want to instill ideals within yourself, your family, the company you work for, or the consumers of your product. You can write to me and we can think together about how this can be done =)

I've begun a detailed study of your work, and I'd like to ask a question on this topic, as it's related. Please correct me if I've misinterpreted it.

You propose a foundation—"Discrete Experience"—a single capacity that cannot be denied without self-refutation. This is quite succinct, given other approaches by rationalist epistemologists of different eras. If you allow me, I'll give my own definition, as I understand it: This is the act of arbitrarily selecting and creating identities (separate "objects" in experience).

Identity acquired through this mechanism is an elementary particle of knowledge, according to your model.

After acquiring an "identity," a person, when confronted with similar images in life, constantly re-examines the validity (validity, not truth) of this identity.

From this, as I understand it, it follows that the "usefulness" and "validity" of an identity are far more important than its "truth."

The model I propose does roughly the same thing: identity, distilled into a proposition (what I call an idea), is weighted not by hypothetical truth, but by three criteria: universality, precision, and productivity. (In later editions, I also added "intersubjectivity" as a multiplier.)

So, in your work, you introduce that indivisible unit, developed through discrete experience—identity. All subsequent mental constructs begin with it. There is no "identity" in my model. Logically, it would be correct to place it below the level of "speculation."

Next. According to your model, by comparing the "identity" "recorded" in the mind with reality (when they collide), a person constantly tests this "identity" for functionality. And this plasticity (rather than fossilization) of identities and the ease of their revision ensure the viability of the species. For example: if you've never seen a bear in real life, but know from fairy tales that bears are shaggy creatures with round ears, kindhearted and honey-loving, but then, upon encountering one in the forest, you discover the bear is running toward you and growling, the speed at which you revise your presets is directly linked to your survival. This is very important and suggests that when reality is lenient and doesn't challenge your identities, your life can unfold like a fairy tale. And constantly challenging your presets teaches you to be more flexible. This conclusion, drawn directly from your model, is very useful to me. On the one hand, it explains developmental stagnation, and on the other, it suggests tools for encouraging the subject to reconsider their "identities." This also suggests that before suggesting an "idea" to someone else, it's best to test it yourself multiple times, otherwise it could lead to pain (from facing reality).

For now, I'll continue reading and share my thoughts with you as I go.

There was a recent thread from a biology teacher about love and hate. I immediately noticed your comments and thought, "This guy seems like a constructivist."

I read your post. I'd like to come back to it a little later, as it intrigued me.

Your approach is immediately strikingly fundamental and phenomenological. You seem to be one level above my judgments expressed in this thread.

What else I noticed: these are essentially two facets of the same insight, which is becoming increasingly relevant in the era of post-truth, propaganda, and narrative manipulation.

Of course, your work is more substantiated, consistent, and logically sound, whereas I was setting myself somewhat more practical goals.

The material is a bit difficult to digest, as I involuntarily, while reading what you wrote, mentally compare it with what I wrote myself. I think it will take me a couple of days to grasp your approach.

First of all, I would like to thank you again for your comment.

They are propositions. Propositions are either true or false. Ideas can be building block of propositions. — Corvus

What does Hume do? He says, "This statement is true because I have seen it and it can be verified."

Ideas are mental image. On their own it has no true or false values. As Hume wrote, ideas can be vivid or faint, strong or weak depending on the type of perception — Corvus

Hume would say that by introducing Level 2, I've simply renamed "strong desire" or "hallucination" a "Deductive Construct." If anyone can declare any fantasy a "Level 2 Law," then my model ceases to be analytical and becomes justificatory.

I don't dispute any of this. In fact, in the starting thread, I even call deductive constructs speculations elevated by an act of will to the level of constitutive law.

At the same time, I also make it clear from the very beginning and in subsequent posts that my model isn't about what is considered true and what is false. Rather, it's about what a person considers true and what is false.

Let's return to the guitar example. I'll rephrase it slightly for ease of use and clarity. If you insist, we'll return to your version of the judgments; it'll just be a bit longer.

So, you go to the store and see a guitar. You make two empirical judgments:

1. This guitar is good
2. This guitar is expensive

To be honest, neither of these judgments are purely empirical. They are evaluative. In the first case, you compared the quality of this guitar with others; in the second case, you compared the price of the guitar with others plus your wallet.

So what decision will you make? Buy or not buy? Hume would answer: it's not reliably known. Because it's not empirically verifiable. And it will only become known after you buy or don't buy.

Now let's return to my model. It doesn't establish the truth, but it can help predict behavior. The statements about the guitar in question, according to my approach, are Level 3—empirical. By themselves, they don't regulate anything. But my behavior will be regulated by the Level 2 ideas that prompted me to go to the store. This could be anything, for example:

1. I'm a brilliant guitarist, and my brilliant playing requires a great instrument.

or

2. I'm an amateur who plays for my family on weekends.

Both of these supra-statements are unverifiable; they're my fantasies, but I've accepted them as Level 2. So, when I'm in the store, I'll take empirical statements and compare them with my Level 2 ideas.

Empirical evidence won't motivate me. But my chimeras (which may or may not be true) will!

Moreover, if the Level 2 idea turns out to be a hoax, the guitarist will simply have wasted a ton of money. But reality can also change, and the guitarist will change it thanks to this guitar and his persistence – he will truly become an extraordinary musician. Currently, in the further development of my model, I'm describing how this happens. I'm describing the dynamics of ideas, adding regulators such as "ontological debt," which I wouldn't like to describe here. The model, as presented, has predictive power: will your Level 2 ideas withstand the impact of reality?

Bottom line: Empiricism is good, I'm not abolishing it. But empiricism doesn't move the world. But our chimeras—false or not—do. That's what this whole model is about.

This is where the concept of "idea weight" comes in. At first glance, an "idea" is purely mental and physically incapable of having weight or mass. However, it weighs heavily on reality. A person convinces themselves they're an outstanding guitarist, then goes and buys a real, expensive guitar. Marketers will take stock at the end of the year and say, for example, that few expensive guitars were sold this year. New ways to position the product and manipulate minds must be devised to increase sales. Then, a clever marketer will come up with an advertising concept (which is essentially a brainwashing technique) and create contextual advertising about some success story about a boy who dreamed of becoming a guitarist but later became a great musician and owns an expensive guitar.

Thus, well-crafted and delivered content will encourage more customers to visit the store. What marketers are doing in this case is constructing reality. They aren't exploring the truth, but rather motivating action. The recipient of the advertisement finds themselves defenseless in this situation. After all, they're being sold not the truth, but an idea.

The proposed model can help assess whether I really want what I want, or am I being fooled?

This example is also consistent with other cases where people are brainwashed not just by the fake value of a product, but by the fake value of "Values."

Thanks for your comment. You've pointed out a very important detail. I don't yet know whether I agree with it or not, but it's definitely a weak (unresolved) point in my model.

I'm grateful because you've made me think and clarify. In fact, that's exactly why I posted this here, not just to boast, "Look how clever I came up with this."

I want to calmly consider your clarifications and will return with a response later.

By around 40,000 years ago, our brains had reached their current shape, which involved a reorganization of brain regions, including the parietal lobes and cerebellum, contributing to increased capacities in planning, language and visuospatial integration. It was also around that time that modern humans got the gene microcephalin (MCPH1) by interbreeding with Neanderthals and Denisovans. MCPH1 may influence brain-related traits, causing better performance. Also, a genetic mutation around that time in the NOVA1 gene produced a variant that affects how neurons connect, modifying intelligence and cortical area, especially in language-related regions. — Questioner

This may or may not be true. Tomorrow, a new, more convincing study will be conducted that will explain it all differently, and everyone, including you, will be forced to admit it.

What am I telling you in all your answers? I'm telling you that biology, physics, and every other science have some universality, but also limitations.

For example, I really like the explanation some psychologists give for why men prefer women with large breasts. Supposedly, evolutionarily speaking, larger breasts increase the likelihood of successful breastfeeding. Why do I like this explanation? It beautifully combines all the dominant discourses of today, including biology, psychology, and so on.

However, there is also an esoteric explanation – supposedly breasts are "antennas of love" that radiate energy into space, which attracts men.

As a biologist, you can call one or another explanation preferable, or perhaps neither. However, what about the connection to reality? I don't know. And no one knows.

That's exactly what I'm saying. Biology has great explanatory power, but it can't describe all of life. My answers are essentially a critique of reductionism. In particular, describing love or hate is not biology's job.

↪Astorre If you’re asking whether there’s a way to determine an idea’s value without the involvement of an interpreter, then unfortunately I can’t think of any such method. Not every idea requires an empirical approach, I think, but it still requires an interpreter—whether to provide purely logical reasoning for the proposed “weight” of the idea, or simply to assert that X is an obvious axiom without further proof. — Zebeden

It's important to clarify here. The proposed model cannot assess the value of an idea or evaluate its truth per se. It's about assessing the weight of an idea in a given mind or group at a given historical point in time.

Let's give an example. Let's take the classical scientific method of evaluating a proposition. Let's take the statement, for example, "all people are sisters." Classical science insists that the proposition must first be reduced to simple concepts. This creates problems from the very beginning. Let's consider the context of its origin. Historically, it's a feminist slogan. It can be interpreted as "only women are people." From a scientific perspective, this statement has zero weight. However, in the minds of representatives of this movement, the weight of this proposition is maximal, almost fundamental. All reasoning of a group or individual can be built on this proposition, and the proponent of this proposition refuses to admit that it's not true (and is even willing to deal with its opponent). Moreover, a person driven by this idea can begin conducting scientific research that will confirm their arguments. And even be successful in doing so. A person can then begin to act in accordance with this belief.

Here I see some limitations of classical epistemology. A patently false assertion generates consequences for reality and the lives of ordinary people who aren't even aware of it.

The model I propose can say: idea X has a weight of U2 in this group. This means that this group will restructure reality in accordance with this idea.

Of course, I've already slightly revised what I presented at the start.

At the same time, why did I consider it important to identify the "weight" of an idea? Because this approach can provide a new lens for predicting the viability of certain ideas you intend to instill in a group, as well as provide new explanations for people's behavior within groups.

But the model faces limitations. For example, I need to identify what ideas group M uses in their everyday lives. We can conduct quantitative and qualitative sociological or psychological studies, and still not obtain verifiable results. Another approach: I can interpret it myself, but then it would be even further from reality.

How would this be applied, for instance, on the ideas of the birth of a star and the beginning of life? Taking both as ideas about reality based on reality, they are both very "Niche" with little in common. Or does your new method only apply to certain areas of reality? — Sir2u

Speaking of a supernova explosion, the event itself could signify the emergence of a new civilization. But the weight of this idea is near-zero for our everyday lives. Unless, of course, it somehow begins to impact everyday life. A supernova explosion itself is an event that means nothing. But the idea that pops into someone's head: "It wasn't a supernova explosion, but an alien war that will soon reach us"—that already carries weight. For now, the weight of this idea is speculation. If this weight is artificially inflated, it could have incredible consequences. It's just a matter of finding enough believers and presenting the information correctly.

The theory of evolution, as presented in your version, has both explanatory power and its limitations. The fact is that any normal scientific theory is like this. The situation is similar with non-scientific explanations.

For example, the biblical explanation of human origins very well describes why humans are the way they are—after all, they are created in the image and likeness of God. However, this approach is not very applicable when it comes to curing appendicitis.

Similarly, the approach you use is very good at describing humans as they were 100,000 years ago. However, since then, humans have changed biologically to a lesser extent. Anthropologists and philosophers with whom I have spoken generally agree that over these years, changes have occurred in humans associated with the acquisition of abstract thinking. According to their claims, the most significant breakthrough in this area occurred around 40,000 years ago, enabling a dramatic cultural evolution. Note that this is less a matter of biological evolution.

According to this line of explanation, what a person feels as a biological organism influences his behavior less than the way he perceives the world. And, for example, the very fact that you're writing this thread is precisely about this: you developed certain feelings due to a slight discrepancy between your experience and your prejudices. Can you think of another biological being that experiences feelings solely because its actual experience does not match its ideas?

Now, to your questions about love and hate. What if we assume that this is less a matter of physics and more an abstraction? Following this approach, the following picture emerges: a person doesn't get what they imagined they wanted, they wind themselves up, endlessly wandering in the depths of their mind, which leads to irritation, then anger, and ultimately hatred. Hatred, when viewed in this way, is less a biological model and more a construct of the mind. Love can be explained in much the same way. I'm not ruling out biomechanics right now. After all, sexual arousal or blinking an eye in response to a threat, for example, can and should be explained biologically. And yes, any feeling, no matter how much it is constructed by the mind, has a biological trace. But does it have a necessary evolutionary cause? That's where I doubt it.

You'll agree that this approach has its explanatory power. However, it doesn't claim to be strictly scientific and certainly won't be taught in schools.

So, to summarize what I've said. Your approach (biology, evolutionary theory) isn't universal for describing human behavior. Therefore, asking questions based on this foundation isn't entirely correct. This isn't a mistake. The phenomenon itself is quite widespread and has been described, for example, by Gadamer: prejudice is an opportunity for understanding.

So, I'm forced to argue with you. This isn't necessary. It's just an idea that groups facts into a convenient way to structure the incoming flow. It's a lens, but not the essence itself.

What's the main idea? It's that if I try to doubt the starting premise, the entire superstructure will crumble. So, I'm the one who doubted your starting premise. Defend it.

I'm pleased that my approach prompted you to elaborate, but your clarifications don't quite meet my needs. Please don't perceive me as a villain. I'm merely asking that you refine my opening sentence so that it can be delivered in defense of your life's work. From here, we'll move on.

Thank you for your question; I'm interested in this topic. Since this question is being asked on a philosophy forum, I'll be answering philosophically, which may not quite meet your expectations.

I am a retired high school biology teacher, and one of the many things that I told my students is that everything about us survived in us because it gave us some kind of advantage in the environment in which we were living. — Questioner

I'd like to start with your opening statement: "Everything about us has survived because it gave us certain advantages in the environment in which we lived."

This statement is imprecise and can be interpreted in several ways:

1. We possess everything necessary to give us advantages for survival in the environment in which we lived. (This implies that we may also possess something else.)

or

2. Everything we possess is necessary to give us advantages for survival in the environment in which we lived. (This implies that we possess only what is necessary, and that what is not necessary has died off.)

Philosophically, both of these statements are speculative.

First, there are examples of other organisms whose advantages for survival in their environment are no worse, if not better. For example, the falcon, whose eyesight is superior.
Secondly, why does this have to be so? Take the eye, for example. The eye is perfect for seeing underwater, but on land it's vulnerable, which is why land dwellers developed corneas and tear ducts (according to the theory of evolution, which is what I'm trying to answer). Therefore, the eye itself adapted to the environment and wasn't discarded and replaced with another sensor.

These questions immediately arise.
Then why should anything exist for a purpose? A purpose for creation presupposes a creator. What if it's all purely accidental? Why should anything exist in us at all, rather than not? (This doesn't contradict the theory of evolution.)

I see great potential for an interesting discussion on all your questions, but I ask that you formulate your opening statement as precisely as possible.

The examples given here are, of course, not exhaustive. However, even axioms are sometimes revised. This is an extremely rare, but possible, phenomenon.

Thank you for your comment. Do you think it's possible to provide a precise estimate of each parameter of the idea without empirical methods (psychological or sociological)?

Currently, the Model does a good job of achieving its explanatory power, but the estimate of each parameter is highly dependent on the interpreter.

Or when the Holy Inquisition condemned people to be burned at the stake: surely the inquisitors considered this an act of "love", no?

One thing I've learned (and the hard way, at that) is that religious/spiritual people tend to have vastly different ideas than I about what constitutes "good" and "bad", "love" and "hate", and so on. To the point like we're from different universes, hence my question to you earlier. — baker

I don't have any questions for God about good or evil. Therefore, I have no answer for you. Love is not good. Love is grace. The Christian's task, in my view, is deification, transformation through connection to divine grace.

Everyone: I don’t understand why you are offering me a false dichotomy for resolution, outside the context in which I explained my position?

What do you mean by "love"?
If you believe that someone deserves to die, to be killed (by you, even), and you spare them, is that an act of "love" on your part? — baker

Sorry, but I didn't understand your question.

I'm not a UK resident and have no emotional connection to writing this post, but I do have a question for the author.

Do you think it's necessary to distinguish between freedom of private speech and freedom of public speech?

I'll give you my thoughts. Freedom of speech is a social construct. It didn't just fall from grace, but is a perfectly reasonable human choice. The idea itself was invented long before radio or Twitter. Freedom of speech in that era meant the ability to speak loudly. But even when the idea was invented, and not during its existence, was this freedom ever fully realized. Restrictions of one kind or another have always existed. Our modern world is even more sensitive to freedom of speech, because any thought, even a bad one, can instantly acquire high intersubjective weight, which can easily lead to dire consequences. While in the 18th, 19th, and even 20th centuries, freedom of speech was subject to mild religious or social restrictions (which prevented people from speaking nonsense), today this restriction is gone, meaning greater government intervention is only a matter of time.

Furthermore, if we take a sober (and not idealistic) look at today's world, we can conclude that freedom of speech will be further restricted.

I'm not aware of any Christian tradition that guarantees hell for all. However, many mainstream Protestant faiths, especially fundamentalist literalists, do seem to embrace a hellfire-and-damnation view. I’ve certainly heard sermons claiming people will go to hell for being gay or for atheism, with warnings of “weeping and gnashing of teeth.” Some might even consider Protestant literalism a heresy (I think David Bentley Hart who I quite like, despite his sometimes being an arrogant shit, holds that view). — Tom Storm

I would add that, upon closer examination, regarding the proposition of what is and is not hell or heaven. I wrote about this in one of the threads earlier.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/16096/the-origins-and-evolution-of-anthropological-concepts-in-christianity/p1

People are quick to equate religion with so many ascetic rules and with earthly-looking power structures. And they equate its spread with earthly tactics of spreading earthly ideologies, including coercion and psychological tricks. But Christianity was always different as it requires freedom to achieve its ends. The core Christian message is that God is trying to bring us to know and love him. There is no such thing as knowing someone or loving someone without their free, honest willingness. This in itself is more universally appealing. — Fire Ologist

I agree with your assertion. Moreover, I'd like to point out that the question itself is already posed within the paradigm of "why did this ideology take off," rather than, for example, "is Christianity a doctrine of love?"

Let me try to answer your central question:

What explains the success of Christianity?

1. High universality for its time – Christianity's ability to explain various areas.
2. High productivity – Christianity's ability, once accepted as the norm, to generate new, logically necessary, non-trivial consequences that could not be derived from previous experience.

The norm is a point of semantic balance between extremes

This is a fantastic comment. It feels like I have no answer to what you asked, because you so accurately captured the essence of what lies beneath the words of my post. You are already there, within your questions, within the answers. The answers will simply come.

I am so inspired and grateful for your response. It encourages me to continue my research!

This is truly a high-quality level of rhetorical mastery.

The nomadic idea of ​​"home" is tied not to the land, but to everyday life, loved ones, and life itself. The idea of ​​"home on the land" enabled the development of many things related to establishing a life in one place, and, as you noted, primarily agriculture. However, the idea of ​​"home in the mind" (as among nomads) enabled the development of speed of movement and rapid expansion and contraction.

In the history of the world, it was nomads who managed to build the largest (in terms of size) states, but it was sedentary people who built the most stable states.

Yes, the settled people did invent a map with a center. The nomads simply made sure that this center was located where their headquarters were located at that moment.

What else? I would note that nomads are best adapted to the unexpected (famine, cold, catastrophes) – the so-called "black swan." Sedentary people, on the other hand, learned to overcome difficulties based on the principle of "nowhere to run."

History always tells us that a problem can have several solutions, and the model I propose allows us to consider their pros and cons.

If I were of a more scholarly cast I think this is precisely where I would go looking for a coherant model of thought in this space. — Tom Storm

Considering your number of forum posts, as well as the fact that you read almost every thread on this forum, I imagine you're already more than well-educated. Perhaps there's no document? But for me, a fan of content over form, that means nothing.

Any concept, be it relativism, anti-fundamentalism, or postpositivism, is a conceptual framework or analytical tool—a "lens" through which to describe a phenomenon, defining the boundaries of what is and isn't included within that concept. Roughly speaking, it's an idea to see the world or phenomena in a certain way, and for the sake of economy (to avoid describing the full content each time), an appropriate term—a construct—is selected. This construct is tested and accepted or rejected by intersubjective consensus.

If you approach the topic you've outlined from this perspective, the content of the idea itself, rather than its specific name, comes to the fore.

As for the content of these ideas, they have much in common—they are tools for describing the different views of contemporary people on the world order. Both terms, to varying degrees and with varying nuances, express the different understandings of contemporary people about the foundations of the world. You can create your own construct.

For me, the idea (content) itself is always more important. Perhaps philologists value a more precise demarcation of terminology.

The question of whether anti-foundationalism allows moral assertions depends on whether we believe morality requires a metaphysical foundation. If we adopt a pragmatic perspective, moral norms can be justified not through eternal truths, but through intersubjective practices, the goals of shared life, and the ability of norms to work cooperatively. Anti-foundationalism then doesn't boil down to relativism—because norms may not be "absolute," but still rational, critiqued, and improveable. In this understanding, a "position" arises not from metaphysics, but from the practice of reasoning.

This phenomenon concerns me. I'd like to delve into the descriptive description of the phenomenon (how it happens) rather than the prescriptive (how it should be).

And to what I've said above, I should add this: General indifference, which has become the norm for any individualistic society, continues to be perceived somewhat differently in the case of people with disabilities. It would be interesting to explore this. For example, according to the modern, generally accepted notion in developed countries, we are indifferent to an ordinary person walking towards us. Even if they do something wrong or even violate some norms, look very strange, smoke something illegal, or are simply lounging on the sidewalk after drinking, we calmly tell ourselves, "It's none of my business." And this seems generally accepted.

However, if a disabled person does all of the above, even if they're just walking towards us, we shouldn't seem so indifferent.

You'll agree, even despite our profound individualism, we still have a special attitude toward people with disabilities.

The very fact of indifference toward people with disabilities touches us. Hence, even despite secularism, something still lingers within us at a very deep level. This is a great area for conjecture. And I would suggest that this "special" attitude toward people with disabilities stems from our ordinary unpredictability of existence. We, residents of the 21st century, nevertheless continue to feel vulnerable, and it could easily happen that we ourselves could find ourselves in this position.

Perhaps this feeling among people with disabilities themselves is the root of the protest movement pointed out by the author of the thread: "Piss_On_Pity." Perhaps they don't like being special...

I'd add another layer to this. If we take what I've described about ancient times as a starting point, then in that society, caring for the disabled was a completely understandable and logical phenomenon: it's part of a cultural code based, on one hand, on empathy, and on the other, on the caregiver's desire to insure against their own disability. The modern world is somewhat different. Individualism and organized care for the elderly (for example, pensions) or the disabled (for example, benefits) don't strongly compel a contemporary to contribute to the well-being of such people. "The state will take care of them," or "It doesn't concern me," or "What does this have to do with me?" This is most likely the underlying cause of the problems faced by disabled people today.

Furthermore, I've also noticed that disabled people are portrayed as objects of hate or jokes (in films like "Avatar"). I don't know whether this is truly the norm in society or whether it's a distortion. If this is true, I'd like to point out that the very permissibility of making jokes about people with disabilities was probably perceived differently in earlier times. Furthermore, I think this has become possible due to the secular nature of modern times.

There is ample archaeological and paleopathological evidence that ancient humans, including early Homo sapiens and even Neanderthals, cared for and cared for their fellow tribesmen with serious injuries, disabilities, or illnesses. This is evident in the traces of old injuries on the bones of the inhabitants of that time, and yet, later in life, the tooth enamel of such individuals often appears better than that of their fellow tribesmen (they ate pureed food). This is interpreted by scientists as evidence of healthy group members caring for the sick or disabled.

This has led to disability being seen as a gap between what a body is able to do and what it has been historically expected to be able to do, the gap between body and social expectation. — Banno

In your initial post, you alienate the problem of disability from the individual and transfer it to society or the environment. However, what if we consider the possibility of continuing to live with an illness as a humane act, an act of caring? What if it is part of a cultural code based on empathy on the one hand, and on the caregiver's desire to insure against their own disability on the other?

In this scenario, care ensures the continuation of life, albeit not a fully fulfilling life. Caring for the disabled is no longer an obligation of the state or society, but an individual interest. It's an investment in one's future safety, making altruism a rational choice for group members, not simply an emotional impulse.
Nevertheless, in many countries around the world, government building codes and regulations require buildings to be constructed with the disabilities of some people in mind.

Caring for the disabled, like the social model of disability, existed long before the advent of modern cities and architectural barriers. Care wasn't simply "fulfilling requirements" but a cultural imperative.

Is disability no more than an issue of welfare and charity, or should we [url=http:// https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piss_On_Pity ]piss on pity[/url]? — Banno

If caring is a cultural code or a rational interest, it is not pity. Pity is passive; caring is active and instrumental.

I understood your point. And an idea immediately arose. (In this topic, I'm voluntarily eager to be the object of research.)

You seem to be trying to formalize it. To bring it into line with a structure, with an idea that exists BEFORE my thought. I'm talking about a different realm. What if this birth of meaning in my head is not formalizable, but only experienced sensually? (well, either in the eidos or in God, and not necessarily in my head)

I'm writing to you now in plain text, without any processing, as it occurs. This is important.

For example, Baumgarten describes this very accurately in his aesthetics: "to give form to feeling," "to transform a dark feeling into a bright structure."

So here's what (a completely emotional statement): what if it's simply something else, and not structural at all? That it lies, as it were, outside of experience, outside of chess, outside of logic, and any attempt to force it into these frameworks is like combing your hair with a comb—that is, involuntarily shaping your hair into the shape of the comb's teeth?

I want to say again that I am writing exactly what I feel, perhaps all of this looks very unstructured.

I’d like to tell you one more interesting thing about the Russian language. A lot of people think that since Russian doesn’t have a strict, fixed word order like English, you can just throw the words in any sequence you want. That’s not true at all. Let me show you how it actually works with a simple example.

The neutral, emotionally flat version:

Я пошёл спать → “I’m going to bed” (or literally: “I went to sleep”). Now the same phrase with different word order — each one carries its own emotional coloring:

Я спать пошёл → “Alright, I’m making myself go to bed.” lt feels like an internal command, almost forcing yourself: “Enough, time to sleep, no more excuses.”

Пошёл я спать → “I’m off to bed” or “That’s it, I’m going to sleep.” Usually expresses tiredness, boredom, or mild irritation: “Everything’s got on my nerves, I’ve had enough, I’m out.”

Спать я пошёл → “I’m going to bed, period.”
Can sound like a claim or even a small protest: “Don’t bother me anymore, I’ve decided — bedtime.”
These are just a few ordinary permutations of the same three words. And when you add the right intonation, the number of shades multiplies even more.

So, in the end, how do you figure out what was going through my head when I chose a particular order? Very simple: the main thing for a native speaker is not “what is grammatically correct,” but what exact feeling or attitude I want the listener to pick up. The word order is one of the main tools for that — it puts the emotional emphasis exactly where I need it.
In Russian, we don’t just convey information with words — we paint the emotion directly into the sentence structure. That’s why the same objective statement can sound neutral, decisive, annoyed, or defiant depending on how you shuffle the words.