Ahh, i see where you're going. Ok, it may just be that we disagree about hte limits of the concept of experience (as opposed to what Kant is treating in the CPR - actual limits of possible experience). Nice catch on that.

The ding an sich as I understand is intended to denote whatever the thing is in itself beyond its potential to affect our senses — Janus

The underlined is where I, not so much as disagree, but can't understand how this could refer to anything, inferred or otherwise. It seems to want to obtain certainty of the existence of something which is claimed to have zero effect on our experience - which, clearly, cannot be the case. If we have literally no connection, whatever, to the thing, it doesn't exist. But it is required for Kant's system to get off the ground, so it seems(on my reading, and account) that Kant would not accept this, but instead say:

it may be the case there is a ground for it, we have no means to determine anything about it, so …..like….who cares? — Mww

That's what I was trying to illustrate Kant actually said, as opposed to claiming there's no connection (which I think is counter to reason, Kant and sensibility viz It would result in no experience, or nothing to be said about it anyhow - and there's an entire CRP LOL.

It must, necessarily, be that from which experience derives rather than arises, to have any aspect whatsoever. The only aspect is it's logical necessity as a grounding for experience, whether or not we can cognize anything at all beyond the necessity for it to exist. Add in the a priori's and we can, at least, see "ding en sich->perception->experience" holds for Kant, regardless of the murkiness, and potentially un-speakable nature of hte first "->". It's this, which the a priori categories are required to fill. And, i think Kant does a good job.

If the thing-in-itself is known to us as appearing objects, why is it said things-in-themselves are unknown to us? — Mww

I think a better version would "Known to exist but nothing about it need, or could be known". Not 'known' in the sense phenomena are known - It's just logically sound to infer it (the above goes some way to elucidating why that's the case).

I will ask you, with respect, at the end of this reply, to do something very specific with your response to me... Please try to do as I ask, because if not, I have no idea what you're talking abotu and can't engage further...

Life on earth is interesting, and art and morality, in turn, are also interesting to the extent they remain connected to life. So existence without life is not interesting and besides, no human knows anything about it. — ucarr

This seems to be just your opinion. I think distilling this, though, we can say that existence is. Life can be. When they coincide in time, interest arises. That said, not all life carries interests in the way you're using it here. So, as with my conclusion here, it's hard to see 'about what' you want to speak... But, i take your point, excepting that we often care about hte interests of non-humans. Even non-living things.

This is a useless supposition because no human lives in a world without human minds. That being the case, the world outside of human minds is irrelevant to us. — ucarr

Yet, it dismantles your premise. So, clearly, its relevant to us in demarcating what is moral. Anything other than ideas in human minds carry nothing moral. You seem to admit this, but deny its relevance? How could you do such a thing! :P (i am joking, this is fun!)

Since we can't escape morality — ucarr

We can, though (in a roundabout way) By realising it's not something to be escaped, or anything actionable. It is, simply put, your attitude towards any given thing. Yes, we can't escape this. But that doesn't butter your bread. I would need to know that Morality is something aside from my attitudes to care.

What I claim to be interesting is the proposition life is bigger than moral life, its derivative — ucarr

Hmm. Well, this is trivially obvious. I'm not sure why it's interesting. Obviously, life exists outside of moral proclamations. What do you find interesting? Genuine question - can't quite grasp what you want to be talking about, in this area.

Now, if art is sinful by nature — ucarr

...it isn't...

humans are likewise sinful by nature — ucarr

We aren't...

then the fight between a more inclusive narrative of human reality and the edited version that's morality-friendly — ucarr

I don't know what you're talking about. This seems to refer to things not present in the conversation. what is "the edited version" and, of what? What is a "more inclusive narrative of human reality"???

Can you please, not lecture, but clarify these for me? I want to say more about your previous statements, but without knowing what these are, I have no idea where you're deriving them, and that might be why they seem nonsensical.

Once you've done so, feel free to then reply to all i've said, in whatever way you please :)

I considered, but that would be very bad faith. I'm unsure Mikie needs to cloak anything. Pretty outwardly incapable of being civil. Maybe time will tell..

If 'the thing in itself' denotes the thing "independent of any experience of it" then how can it be "the thing that excites our senses"? To say that is to contradict yourself. — Janus

There is absolutely no contradiction to say that something in the world triggers a set of processes, the end-result of which are our experience, and denying that we experience the thing that triggered it. This is hte case with plenty of actual objects. We don't experience something by it's shadow. Yet, under certain conditions, we have a fully sensible representation of the thing. It just leaves open error. Obviously. I think Kant scholars are trying, erroneously, to claim we can't even accept the error - there just is nothing. But this would preclude having any experience at all, if we can't infer a cause. It's an over-read of Kant and is just stupid. It's the same as claiming God is the inference from the Kalam instead of 'a cause of some kind'. Just.. silly.

Funnily, you've posted an image that (if taken at face value) proves my account accurate? Thank you Banno :) Ha...ha? Why not just say "Yes, I was wrong. It's not a cyst. But it's still not a person" ??

And again, the point that seems to escape you, these are not images of people. — Banno

It didn't escape me. It wasn't relevant to the correction I've provided. I agree - that's not a person. But that's not relevant as to whether the above is a cyst or not (it isn't). At least try not to totally misread, conflate and ignore.

Or, which is the same thing, representation is always and only of things of possible experience. — Mww

But clearly incorrect. Otherwise, our experiences would be of nothing. And that's not Kant's position.

You said when you stop laughing you’ll take the claim that climate deniers are braindead seriously. — John McMannis

No i didn't.

Thanks for playing.

What you’re really doing is being immature, which according to your post history you often criticize others for. I guess that’s my fault. — John McMannis

Ah. baby Mikie. You'll be fun.

The persistent error I see with this, is the idea that the ding an sich is a 'thing behind the thing', that it's 'the real thing' as opposed to 'the apparent thing'. And the reason why I think that's an error is that it attempts to take a perspective from which you're able to compare them, which, according to Kant, you can never do. — Wayfarer

This seems the only relevant, or rational inference from Kant. Otherwise we're left with ding en
sich- ???????? - experience. Rather than ding???en??sich - perception - experience. Which is what he outlines, filling the ????'s with a priori concepts. That's actually the exact problem he explicitly states is his intention to solve, after Hume. And, I think that's what happens in the book... Whether i agree is different.

What, in your view, is Kant trying to say excites the senses?? The sense data subsequent to a ding en sich in the presence of a human???

Yes, being a person entitles me to define a person. How else would it work? It's neither incoherent or circular. The argument is quite simply that since I'm the one that needs to decide on a moral framework, I need to figure out how to judge who is a person and who isn't. Since the only fixed point I start out with is that I am a person, I need to proceed from that. — Echarmion

My further response applies to everything you've just said. I think it's possible you're not getting me:
That you claim to be a person begs the question, but even if it didn't, it provides absolutely nothing as to a 'necessary or sufficient' set of criteria. You're just saying 'look at me!!'. I could make the same claim about being black. But, as you know, I'd be either laughed at or charged with racism. Fair enough, too. My point is you have to have a set of criteria, prior to your claim to fit them, and then assess whether you fit them (I imagine this can be easily done, it's just not happening here). I'm wanting your criteria. If that is just 'what I, in fact, am' I'll leave it there and just say I'm not convinced.

I agree — Echarmion

Haha nice, perhaps I misunderstood the point of that passage then. Apologies if so!

we determine personhood based on certain cognitive similarities and their expressions in behaviour. — Echarmion

Which ones? And are they derived from your conviction that you're a person? Seems to remain somewhat circular, if inter-personal.

By doing that it seems pretty obvious that a person needs some kind of thinking apparatus. — Echarmion

I wouldn't disagree, and we're getting somewhere now - but following from the previous comments about consciousness, We would want to know at what level does the consciousness reach the level of a 'personal' consciousness - in the sense that an alien species could have cognitive abilities the same as humans, and not be humans. Are they persons, nonetheless? Yes or no is fine, I'm just curious as to where these ideas go... Not sure where i'd land.

I'm not necessarily arguing my own position in those comments. — Echarmion

Fair enough. It feels that way, so you're being a really good sport if not. Appreciate that!

I think it's useful though to consider the possibility that there's no mystical essence to the human form that somehow turns it into its own category. — Echarmion

I think this is likely part of the answer(given we need to assess personhood, and identity, it's a doozy so I'm loathe to think there's anything but a very complex answer). I don't think there's anything mystical, but I do think there might be a moveable moment. This might be the moment hte heart beats for the first time, as a trivial example, which would be different for different fetuses. I don't think it's hard to offer several possibilities for hard-and-fast rules. Just, i don't see anyone agreeing given either (meaning, depending on your view) a life is being ended, or prevented.

And would we consider the equivalent of a three week old human child a person if it happened to not look like a human? You did ask for a fun discussion, did you not? — Echarmion

VERY fun!! I like these lines. I think if a fetus looked like a dog, and lost its hair, drew in its mandible and slowly became bi-pedal over the first six months, we definitely have to make an arbitrary call as to when it 'morally' becomes 'human'. What would you want to say there?

A cyst is a sack of fluid. — Banno

Lucky we're talking about blastocysts which are not sacks of fluid. They contain the groups of cells totalling around 200, including stem cells which are required for the cascades of development a fetus needs to become viable. It also contains an outer layer of protective cells called the trophoblast. This becomes the placenta. You're talking about one aspect, called the blastocoel. This means, funnily enough, that a blastocyst is a structure, in which a cyst sits. It is not a cyst. Onward..

What is NMorality? — ucarr

A typo ;)

However, some things in life bump against the filter with more force than other things. — ucarr

Yes, but that changes from person to person, culture to culture, institution to institution. Says nothing moral, of itself.

Pain. It may not be moral in of itself, but let a human individual experience it beyond a certain level of intensity and s/he becomes hard-pressed not to scream out in rage and despair against that heartless neutrality. — ucarr

Can't figure out what you're saying here. People cry out in pain. That's just a state of affairs. There's nothing moral in this observation. "Rage and despair" is usually not present.

Thich Quang Duc set himself on fire and burned up in protest against political oppression. Although a superb demonstration of life's indifference, it was used as an alarm awakening the minds of the complacent public who are, after all, simply life, albeit life aware of itself. — ucarr

Don't know what you could be tryign to say here, but it didn't move any kind of needle in any direction (the act of self-immolation). So this isn't giving me anything either...

I’d ignore any attempted refutation that does not arise directly from Kantian philosophy. — Mww

This is the crystalisation of what I think is wrong in your approach... And perhaps explains some of the deader-ends you've met in discussions about Kant/CPR.

But I'm not a dog. I do know what I am. That's one of the things that makes me a person. — Echarmion

This is just an elaborate restatement of the initial, incoherent claim, though. So, my response would be the same. It's circular and gives no argument. Just you believe that being a person entitles you to define a person. Which begs the question. *matt walsh voice* "Ok, but what is a person?"

fetus is relevant because it's a future person — Echarmion

This can't possibly be the case. It is , in fact, a fetus. It isn't some future person. I understand what's being got at and am sympathetic, morally speaking, but could you clear up how it is that you could hold a view counter the facts, and hold it morally relevant?

I'm arguing in favour of an evidence-based judgement of personhood. — Echarmion

What evidence? That's the point I'm trying to get across - no level of 'evidence' would satisfy a conflict of conceptual analysis (though, i recognise this lends itself to idiots simply moving hte goalposts, so maybe im being a bit too analytical here).

You're commenting on this discussion without the relevant context of the previous posts/replies. — Echarmion

I'm commenting only on your comportment, not hte discussion. That said, I do have the relevant context in mind. My comments aren't (well, not significantly) askance from the discussion. Though, treat it is a new one if you want to. It would work as such.

Presumably because "relation R", whatever that is, obtains at that time. — Echarmion

Sorry, 'relation R' is psychological continuity, in Parfitean terms. A child of three weeks does not have this relation in either direction, it seems. And so, could not be considered a personality. Not a personality=not a person? That's hte corner I'm trying to canvas.

Are you asking me what the evidence is that a newborn is a person? — Echarmion

No. There couldn't be 'evidence' I am, though, challenging the concept and offering other ways to look at it. I would want to know how you are claiming a newborn is a person. 'evidence' wouldn't help, without this well-understood. If it's a concept I can jive with, and the evidence for the facts are there, we're off to a great start.

I look at the news of extreme heat and floods and stuff like that and it doesn’t seem funny. — John McMannis

Feel free :) You're now talking about somethign other than this thread. Which is why I find funny. I don't really care about the 'climate crisis' but I don't deny the majority of what's claimed about it. It's the reactions I find funny.

But what does Mikie have to do with my question? Is climate change funny because of one person’s posts? — John McMannis

You're not reading very clearly, it seems. No one said climate change is funny.

Morality is a filter for life. Certain elements of life are acceptable, other elements are not. Morality sets itself the task of filtering out the unacceptable from social life. Morality cannot filter out the unacceptable from life itself. — ucarr

Hoo-boy.

NMorality is a mental habit; social pressure is the filter and the elements of life considered moral pass through this filter and are thus categorised by the individual, culture or institution. Morality is not an aspect of the world outside of human minds.

I'm not sure what you could mean by 'the unacceptable of life itself'. Life simply is.

And of course this tired claim has been shown to be unsupportable any number of times in the recent thread — Leontiskos

Having gone back to this after a long break: Absolutely not and it seems totally ridiculous you could claim so.

The thing as a whole excites such that we perceive, but it isn’t the whole thing we intuit from that perception. The thing as a whole is not the same a a thing in itself. — Mww

The exact type of incomprehensible non-statement that CPR parochialism leads to, all too often. This tells me, as similar things do with many other 'classical' works and writers, that you have inhabited this world to such a degree as to write sentences that do not make sense outside of your interpretation of the one work (or, perhaps one philosopher). There is nothing wrong with doing this, but you would need to make this make sense outside of that for it to hold much water. How does this translate to non-Kantian language?

Kant makes clear that he knows there is a mysterious link between the thing-in-itself and our perception. We can't know, other than the a priori categories, how there's a connection between the two, but that is enough to know it exists by logical inference. Without hte connection between our perception, and the thing, there is nothing to infer and no transition to make between anything, and anything else. Perception would be completely and utterly arbitrary. But Kant is clearly, and unequivocally not claiming that they are not related. Your positions here would require that either:
1. thing-in-itself and our perceptual experience are entirely unrelated; or
2. The fact we cannot access thing-in-itself is somehow a reason to utterly ignore that previous issue.

I see nothing, anywhere, that could support either position. Do you read other work?

Yes, because I am a person. — Echarmion

That gives you no authority to that claim. Dogs don't know what Dogs are.

They aren't person though. — Echarmion

There is no settle consensus on this. All claims of this kind are personal, and don't adhere to any particular argument in biology. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beginning_of_human_personhood#:~:text=In%20the%20college%20text%20book,silent%2C%20secret%2C%20unknown%22 . the complete chaos of this page should be illustrative.

It's not helpful to simply implore others to take your concept on, and argue on that basis. It's the concept that's in question. I should be quite clear that I am in no-way "pro-life" politically, but I notice that pro-choice people tend to have really, really shitty arguments. The only reason i'm pushing back on them (and to rark Banno up) is that they aren't good arguments, and often are counter to the facts. Such as here - personhood isn't a fact.

You want us to consider them based on their future personhood, not the current one. — Echarmion

He believes otherwise. You would need to fully ignore this to make a claim, as if it were an objection to his position. If personhood starts at conception (a fully acceptable formulation, just not one I personally think helpful, even if true) then the position is fine. Silly, imo, but fine. He's asking you to consider his position that personhood starts at conception. These are just competing theories of personhood. Should be fun to discuss LOL.

Which brings in the much much more interesting question: If personal identity doens't obtain other than through relation R, how is it possible that a child of three weeks could be considered 'a person' and be afforded the rights of a person? Hehehe.

Both aspects of this reply are awesome.

even your quips are nonsense.

Weird. What’s funny about it? — John McMannis

It arouses my humour mechanisms.
Have you tracked Mikie's posts through this thread? Several attempts have been made to catalogue his inane, insulting tirades that he seems to take pride it.
HIlarious he's a mod.

Oh Banno, lol. Just avoiding the issue again. What constitutes a 'human being' is what matters in the distinction you're discussing. Given your initial, unedited reply: Should have left it unedited to show your colours. You’re not any good at this and that would have served the dual purpose of making this clearer, and not giving that reply which should probably be a bit embarrassing:

not a human being with memories, needs, and preferences. — Banno

Most things with these attributes aren't humans and all humans go through at least one post-womb phase where they have only needs (which are, unless you're genuinely stupid, insufficient - and even then, arguable. The needs are institutional, not intrinsic). Your cart is literally before the horse. Your criteria for "human being" (which is here, undefined, and exactly what is being discussed) is baked-in to your objection. This kind of failure of either creativity, or clarity of writing is not helpful. Barely asserting your position is not helpful. On your account plenty of people aren't human beings, and vice verse. That's a cool move, i guess..

The day I come in here, and don't laugh, is the day I'll start bothering with stuff like that claim from Biden.

A blastocyst is a cyst. — Banno

Not in the way you need it to mean for your glibbery. A blastocyst is specifically a state of zygotic development, and not comparable to say, an ovarian cyst. It requires an embryoblast - which gives rise to the potential to become a human being. It is set apart, and Bob's gripe was legitimate, if in hte wrong place and about the wrong part of hte account.

Clearly, 'cyst' is not what's being talked about. We know this because ovarian cysts are sometimes mistaken for zygotic blastocysts. You seem, oddly, to be entirely aware of this.

My objection to it is that infinite regress isn't an issue, and magicking up an uncaused cause is a fucking wild move for a Fantasy novel.

Why is the latter shunned, or is it? — schopenhauer1

(if i'm reading right) I think the latter is shunned in practice as considered 'bigoted' (top tip: It's not) and the former is shunned in theory because we couldn't possibly land on "everything is permissible by it's own group". No one seems to think that moral theory works (otherwise, Rotherham rape gangs are acceptable, if you see where i'm taking this...)

I do think there's an 'essential' tension there. Cultures should be able to protect themselves. But people should be able to move through cultures without demand.

because there is no one there to witness it or not enough at least to really do much about it except shake their heads or tacitly accept this is their way... — schopenhauer1

I think I've addressed with this in mind. For instance, we don't, generally, look to the mid-East and want to do anything the stark cultural differences. But, if it were a group within our borders, we would want to. So, if there's geographical separation, I think it needs to be of a kind that crosses jurisdiction for my point to make sense. That said, I think the version of yours that I think actually happens is simply 'hiding'. Once found, we don't shake out heads - we prosecute.

Not sure what you mean.. — schopenhauer1

What I mean (I thought his was clear above, so apologies) is that this confrontation necessarily precedes any geographical separation giving the appearance of multi-culturalism. It's a literal rejection of multi-culturalism.

Why would safety not be considered valuable for the sake of child/animal? — schopenhauer1

Because (and this really is the rub, to me) that culture either doesn't possess the concept, or rejects that account. There's no real argument if that's the case..

So in a way, the multiculturalism does persist, it is reconciled by geographic separation. — schopenhauer1

These seem to run up against each other?

This starts getting muddled when things like "gentrification" happen and the old-subgroups and the new subgroups may clash a bit.. — schopenhauer1

I think this precedes the geographical demarcation above. I think it works by initial acceptance, until this (the clash) occurs, and hten over time, either there's violent confrontation, or geographical separation. This, to me, is not multi-culturalism and it seems, to me, that its a bit of a red herring. We want cultural acceptance so we're not invading each other. I can't see much more than this being achievable cross-culturally.

There are dozens of other examples where things get entangled. Let's say you have a subgroup that allows their kids to essentially run amok in a neighborhood.. They let 3 year olds run in the street, but that is part of their culture.. But let's say in the major culture it would be frowned upon to let a three year old run back and forth on a street. — schopenhauer1

This is the exact issue which is going to, likely, prevent any real multi-culturalism every working. We would need to be blaming hte other culture to support those positions. THe 'home' culture wins, on principle alone. But this doesn't have anything to say morally, if you want a reasoned position, as opposed to 'this makes sense to me culture'. And back we are to the first issue.. It just wont work.

What things are you wanting to assign blame for? I think that would preclude certain versions of this, and allow others, depending on which.

I don't think any specific behaviour can be excused by/ blamed on culture.

Not sure how it could be. The concept of God, in any defendable form, is unfalsifiable from within the Universe - seems baked-in to it, and the reason it gets taken seriously.

they tend to still think that how we perceive reality is predominantly a reflection of reality in-itself. — Bob Ross

This, itself, is based on a tendency for experience to converge in its narrative though, as doesn't do much at all for hte problem itself. Searle is a perfect example of ignoring hte problem, for a more palatable exegesis ("I think "go up" and my hand goes up" is all he has to offer in terms of securing hte inference as knowledge). That doesn't make it any more or less 'true' - It could be the case that our experience is a relatively close match, ignoring biographical impediments to psychological interpretation for ease, to what we 'actually look at'. But it could equally be nothing of hte kind. It seems to be more a result of hte modern turn toward 'continental' or 'post-modern' philosophy as it presents less conflict when presented to non-philosophers, largely because it turns on not having to answer difficult questions (in my view) and can simply be word-gamed away ala Hegel, Witty etc... such that a question of 'Do we really see things as they are?" becomes a non-question. Its ammo for bad-faith discussions about meaning and intentionality. This is, to be 100% sure, an illustration of my personal bias in these ways - but i think I'm pointing out either legitimate distinctions, or legitimate gripes.

To my mind, being a naive realist because its easier (it undeniably is easier, regardless of plausibility) is as useless as not taking a position.

It is very complicated because you have no thing nor structure nor any formation to point to that can proven to be connected to your body, and that can be labelled with such a pronoun, other than the things, structures, and formations already in there. — NOS4A2

Which makes it extremely simple. If this connection doesn't obtain, then the other possible connection we could either observe, or care about, is a psychological one. And that clearly does not obtain, if a person 'who would be you' then has it's own experiences. They are not you, any longer. No trouble with this; it's just really uncomfortable for people who want to say they have a definable, observable identity in the sense meant here (rather htan some kind of social character).

As regards abortion, I cannot wrap my head around you knowing, as a fact, that a non-living clump of living cells (by almost any definition of 'living' that isn't arbitrarily academic (i.e tells us nothing about our experiences or intuitions, but could be called 'correct')) could be considered morally important, yet at some arbitrary point along that line, you're happy to make the call - Why is not the same for anyone else? Some call it at conception, some call it at viability with margins of error, some call it at birth.. Where's the catch?

Added later because I read another of your comments:

Why do you think it's alright to kill any invasive being in the human body, but a zygote/fetus? Is there some distinction (other than 'human') you would want to put here to explain it? Legit question - i'm sure there are good answers. I take it you don't have an issue eviscerating a tape-worm, eg.

this is what I am talking about. — Dan

I was trying to clarify what you think the Bold is. It is getting less clear as this discussion goes on. I've taken long leave, re-read the parts I was involved in, continued through pages and still cannot grasp exactly what you're getting at.

It may be the case that you are, in fact, being insufficiently clear, or not noticing hte flaws in your grounding such as to make it really, really difficult to actually discuss what you're trying to discuss (because it is insufficiently clear what that is, in the same sense as the 'this' above).

Onward, I guess..

I love watching cats fight over the remote to a TV they can't turn on.

False. It was taken up as a slogan by a rather detrimental portion of the male populace of the USA for a short period. That said, this also contributes to the ledger you mention lol.

I don’t know if I condone getting drunk and slapping women. Not a good look. — NOS4A2

Yeah, wtf are you talking about my dude. You 'don't know' if you condone this? What's hte hold up?

Doesn't seem relevant, other than as a contributor to my dissatisfaction LOL.

Insofar as it was ever taken up as a slogan, yes.

I see no one has grown beyond teenage sloganing yet. Cool.

I would say that morality is the way in which persons ought to be or act, where "ought" is understood in a universal and objective sense. — Dan

Can i clarify something here (not realated to any previous discussions)?

Is this to insinuate that you can only conceive of "universal or objective" morality, or simply that the concept of Morality is this - and so, whether or not any theory obtains is irrelevant?

I support, in other words, your interpretation. I also hope this helps Tom avoid similarly circular arguments.

Treating the universe as an object is a category error. — noAxioms

This is highly likely to be the case. Makes for some really interesting Philosophy Club debates.

It is, because is-ought isn't about specific prescriptions but the nature of prescription itself. — Vivek

THis wouldn't get you closer to solving it, and it isn't the case. It's a preference of yours for reading hte term 'the good'. This violates its applicability to anyone else, but the person who assents to this reading of 'the good' as a relationship property. This is the entire issue in a nutshell, seemingly ignored, as it is in the Objectivist Ethics by commanding assent to a particular desire ("To Live! To Surive! To Thrive!"). Its not relevant that rejecting that desire might be irrational (whatever else could be so rational as to continue being?). But incredulity doesn't help. More on that below..

As soon as that assent is denied, the relation fails.

Have a read of Moore's Principia Ethica. Then Philippa Foot. Then Martha Nussbaum. — Banno

Good suggestions, but I don't think referring to other people is a good way to answer a direct question about your conceptions, is it? If the idea is that your view is directly derivative, providing three sources across two, arguably three generations, might not be as helpful as you think. Then again - it's TPF lol.

I need others with some deeper reading/interest to talk about it. — Tom Storm

It is useful for understanding human behaviour, but it essentially is a position (in all versions I've seen, from Moore to Harris) that relies on mere incredulity in the face of denial. This, to me, is left wanting and doesn't inform me at all.

Brilliant! So the is-ought problem is not solved. :)