Neither nonsense, nor on stilts.
Your handwaving may rise to that charge, though.

Not particularly interesting, no.

From my reading of CPR, the thing-in-itself is what impacts the senses. — Bob Ross

I’ve posted quotes from CPR proving this is not the case. I would like to see where in your reading of CPR, that it is.

I’ve posted quotes from CPR proving this is not the case. — Mww

For my part, you have previous tried to do this but I have not seen you succeed. The CPR seems to explicitly state that the thing-in-itself is what impresses on the senses, which triggers phenomena, from which we infer the thing-in-itself based on the apparent logical requirements of the phenomena.

If you could find something that directly addresses this (no where is this to be found, so far) that would be helpful. Acknowledging the difficulties interpreting Kant, it's almost certainly best to figure out what you think is doing this job before arguing about whether or not it obtains in the text. As an example of why this is fundamentally important:

"The noumena are not objects of our possible experience; but by the same token, we can neither know how they are in themselves, nor can we know what influence they exert upon our sense perception."

This quote doesn't do what you're wanting, on my view.

Have you read the CPR? In modern times, the idea that we cannot know anything about the things-in-themselves has been largely left behind; and the vast majority of people are naive realists. Even the indirect realists do not tend to be as strong in their position as Kant was: they tend to still think that how we perceive reality is predominantly a reflection of reality in-itself.

The problem is that you are not making any real objection to the idea that we cannot know the things-in-themselves: you are just sidestepping it by noting the uncontroversial fact that we can infer things from other things.

You have to remember, Kant divides the world into the phenomena and noumena (roughly speaking): propositions acquired through empirical observation are only valid as universally true for human experience. The inferences you are talking about are things Kant would place squarely in the phenomenal---not noumenal---world.

I didn't follow that: there's no such thing as a "noumenal a priori concept".

something has to exist for me to question it. You must demonstrate why that something must be an 'I' which is me---a valid critique from Nietzsche.

Sure thing. I don't have time right now to skim back over the whole thing to pull a quote, but the introduction seems to obviously allude to it:

That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience?

--- CPR, p.1

In the Prolegomena, section 32, he also clearly explicates this as well:

In fact, when we (rightly) regard the objects of the senses as mere appearances, we thereby admit that they have a thing in itself as their ground—·namely, the thing of which they are appearances·. We don’t know what this thing is like in itself; all we know is its appearance, i.e. how this unknown something affects our senses. I

If you think about it, it makes no sense to say that the thing-in-itself is not the object which impacted our senses: that's the whole point of the idea of having a representational system based off of sensations.

A thing-in-itself is the concept of an object which we cannot know anything about: so it necessarily is an object. You make it sound like it is purely abstract — Bob Ross

I see, I think this is where a major difference is. Its because it is an abstract. There is nothing to observe. There is nothing to verify. It is a pure logical concept. An object is "A ball" Its something that we can identify, observe, and conclude what it is. A thing in itself cannot be observed, identified, or concluded as anything more than the abstract logical concept that it is.

It seems like you agreed with me, so I am not following why you do not believe in a priori knowledge. If your representative faculties must already know how to do certain things and already has certain concepts at its disposal, then it must have a priori knowledge — Bob Ross

The point that I disagree with in apriori is that we can have knowledge without experience. We have nothing besides instinct and innate potential when born. What we reason with and on is through experience. Without experience, we have suppositions and unverified concepts. Even a 'thing in itself' is verified by the experience of having reality contradict our interpretations of it. If you recall my knowledge theory, I divide knowledge into distinctive and applicable for this reason. At one time, I used the apriori distinction, but found it problematic when I tried to remove experience from consideration.

You may want to start another thread on apriori and see what other people say on it as well. I believe the concept of dividing mental constructs and applied constructs as valuable, but apriori doesn't quite nail how the mental construct of knowledge works.

You cognition must have more than a mere belief to know how to do what it does. E.g., your cognition has a priori knowledge on how to construct objects in space because it clearly does it correctly (insofar as they are represented with extension). The necessary precondition for the possibility of experiencing objects with extension is that your brain knows how to do that. — Bob Ross

Correct, and this aspect of apriori I agree with. As you've noted, I call it 'instinct and intellectual potential'. But its not 'knowledge'. Knowledge can only be gained from experience, even the experience of the self. A baby may have an instinct to want to walk, but it still has to learn how. Instinct propels us to action, but knowledge is only learned by attempting those actions.

and the vast majority of people are naive realists — Bob Ross

Maybe laymen and philosophers, but that's not the view of those who study perception scientifically.

Take Perception#Process_and_terminology for example:

The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object. By means of light, sound, or another physical process, the object stimulates the body's sensory organs. These sensory organs transform the input energy into neural activity—a process called transduction. This raw pattern of neural activity is called the proximal stimulus. These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed. The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.

To explain the process of perception, an example could be an ordinary shoe. The shoe itself is the distal stimulus. When light from the shoe enters a person's eye and stimulates the retina, that stimulation is the proximal stimulus. The image of the shoe reconstructed by the brain of the person is the percept. Another example could be a ringing telephone. The ringing of the phone is the distal stimulus. The sound stimulating a person's auditory receptors is the proximal stimulus. The brain's interpretation of this as the "ringing of a telephone" is the percept.

The different kinds of sensation (such as warmth, sound, and taste) are called sensory modalities or stimulus modalities.

And also this:

Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework. Furthermore, indirect realism is a core tenet of the cognitivism paradigm in psychology and cognitive science.

Whatever "rational" grounds you might have for believing in naive realism, it is incompatible with physics, biology, neuroscience, and psychology.

Maybe laymen and philosophers, but that's not the view of those who study perception scientifically. — Michael

I going even think most philosophers are naive realists. They're mostly non skeptical realists but that's substantially different.

it makes no sense to say that the thing-in-itself is not the object which impacted our senses….. — Bob Ross

Notice in the text it’s “objects which affect our senses”, not thing-in-themselves. Which is to say things-in-themselves are not that which affects our senses.

Then I’d love to know, for you to inform me, what sensation I would receive from a thing-in-itself. If I receive a sensation in conjunction with the sensory device being impacted, then I should be able to smell, hear, taste, etc., a thing-in-itself. How, then, do I distinguish it from a thing?

Section 32 is intended to make clear the thing-in-itself just means not thing-in-us. The thing of the thing-in-itself is that which appears to sensibility, the thing-as-it-is-in-itself(without-influence-on-a-sensory-mechanism) is that which does not. That’s what he means by one being the ground of the other. That things-in-themselves are the ground of things is utterly irrelevant, when it is only things that appear, and of which are the matter of phenomena.

The thing is provided by Nature, appears to us and becomes empirical knowledge; the -in-itself is provided by reason, “….that is, without reference to the constitution of our sensibility….”, representing only non-appearance, and is merely a logical inference.

Obviously, without reference to our sensibility means sensibility has no part to play, hence is not affected, which means it is not an appearance, insofar as it is appearances only that do affect our sensibility. See A28/B44.

Whatever "rational" grounds you might have for believing in naive realism, it is incompatible with physics, biology, neuroscience, and psychology. — Michael

And of course this tired claim has been shown to be unsupportable any number of times in the recent thread, Perception. These blind appeals to "The Science" seem to be just the sort of non-interactive evangelization that the forum rules prohibit.

Besides, the belief that science can adjudicate the Kantian question just belies a misunderstanding of the Kantian question, not to mention the science.

And of course this tired claim has been shown to be unsupportable any number of times in the recent thread — Leontiskos

Let's take the words of Albert Einstein as an example:

This more aristocratic illusion concerning the unlimited penetrative power of thought has as its counterpart the more plebeian illusion of naive realism, according to which things "are" as they are perceived by us through our senses. This illusion dominates the daily life of men and of animals; it is also the point of departure in all of the sciences, especially of the natural sciences.

If you want to argue that naive realism is correct then fine, but it's clearly the unscientific view. The findings of physics, neuroscience, and psychology are firmly opposed to it, despite your insistence otherwise.

they tend to still think that how we perceive reality is predominantly a reflection of reality in-itself. — Bob Ross

This, itself, is based on a tendency for experience to converge in its narrative though, as doesn't do much at all for hte problem itself. Searle is a perfect example of ignoring hte problem, for a more palatable exegesis ("I think "go up" and my hand goes up" is all he has to offer in terms of securing hte inference as knowledge). That doesn't make it any more or less 'true' - It could be the case that our experience is a relatively close match, ignoring biographical impediments to psychological interpretation for ease, to what we 'actually look at'. But it could equally be nothing of hte kind. It seems to be more a result of hte modern turn toward 'continental' or 'post-modern' philosophy as it presents less conflict when presented to non-philosophers, largely because it turns on not having to answer difficult questions (in my view) and can simply be word-gamed away ala Hegel, Witty etc... such that a question of 'Do we really see things as they are?" becomes a non-question. Its ammo for bad-faith discussions about meaning and intentionality. This is, to be 100% sure, an illustration of my personal bias in these ways - but i think I'm pointing out either legitimate distinctions, or legitimate gripes.

To my mind, being a naive realist because its easier (it undeniably is easier, regardless of plausibility) is as useless as not taking a position.

Whatever "rational" grounds you might have for believing in naive realism, it is incompatible with physics, biology, neuroscience, and psychology.

I don’t think direct realism is per se incompatible with science: it depends on the view. Personally, I’ve never heard a good argument for direct realism, but I see no inherent incoherence with it conjoined with science.

Also, Leontiskos is absolutely correct to note:

Besides, the belief that science can adjudicate the Kantian question just belies a misunderstanding of the Kantian question, not to mention the science.

Scientific investigations of how we perceive already, to some extent, presuppose the a priori modes by which we intuit and cognize objects, being that we must study the intuited and cognized version of our own representative faculties, and so the Kantian question is still very much alive and puzzling.

Its because it is an abstract. There is nothing to observe.

Hmmm, I disagree with this inference here: an object which is not a possible object of experience is not thereby no object at all. We are not talking about some abstract thing, like a Platonic form, that exists in a supersensible realm nor are we merely talking about a concept in our brains nor minds—we are talking about a real object, a physical object, which simply is not cognizable by us. See what I mean?

The point that I disagree with in apriori is that we can have knowledge without experience.
…
“You cognition must have more than a mere belief to know how to do what it does. E.g., your cognition has a priori knowledge on how to construct objects in space because it clearly does it correctly (insofar as they are represented with extension). The necessary precondition for the possibility of experiencing objects with extension is that your brain knows how to do that.”

Correct, and this aspect of apriori I agree with

I am not following. If you agree that your brain has to know how to intuit and cognize objects in space independently of any possible experience that it has, then you cannot disagree with the idea that some knowledge our brains have are without experience.

Notice in the text it’s “objects which affect our senses”, not thing-in-themselves. Which is to say things-in-themselves are not that which affects our senses.

But it clearly said it in the Prolegomena! Quite frankly, I am pretty sure it also says it outright in the CRP; but I don’t have time right now to skim through and try to find it—so take that part with a grain of salt.

Then I’d love to know, for you to inform me, what sensation I would receive from a thing-in-itself.

You would receive sensations from your senses of what it sensed of the thing as it were in-itself. I don’t understand how this is controversial. Viz., the ball hits your arm, your neurons fire, intuiting & judging & cognizing & … happen, and then you experience the feeling of getting hit.

You are talking about a thing-in-itself as if it never excites our senses—what then, is the point? That seems like a noumena in that stricter sense of an object which is not a possibly sensed or/and represented by our faculties.

If I receive a sensation in conjunction with the sensory device being impacted, then I should be able to smell, hear, taste, etc., a thing-in-itself. How, then, do I distinguish it from a thing?

Why would that be the case? If the ball hits your arm, you end up experiencing the sensations of the ball that were interpreted by your brain into some sort of perception: the ball as it is in-itself doesn’t get perceived—it gets sensed.

I am not following what you are arguing: are you saying that the thing as it is in-itself does NOT excite our senses such that we perceive something?

are you saying that the thing as it is in-itself does NOT excite our senses such that we perceive something? — Bob Ross

I’m saying I think that’s what Kant wants understood. What do you think the thing-in-itself actually is, what concept is being represented by those words? As far as that goes, what do you think the Big Picture is for CPR? What does he mean by “critique”. And why, exactly, is it that the thing-in-itself ends up as one of the necessary limitations proved for this particular, albeit theoretical, method of human cognition and empirical knowledge?

The A/B pagination listed above is the place to start. If you’d researched it, you’d see what is meant by “that is” (without reference to our sensibility).

The thing as a whole excites such that we perceive, but it isn’t the whole thing we intuit from that perception. The thing as a whole is not the same a a thing in itself.
————-

And make no mistake: by his own admission, but in modern venencular, Prolegomena is “CPR For Dummies”, so if one wishes to critique the one, he must set aside the other.
————

I am pretty sure it also says it outright in the CRP…. — Bob Ross

If it does, and all else unsusceptible to equivocation, I’d be forced to re-think.

And of course this tired claim has been shown to be unsupportable any number of times in the recent thread — Leontiskos

Having gone back to this after a long break: Absolutely not and it seems totally ridiculous you could claim so.

The thing as a whole excites such that we perceive, but it isn’t the whole thing we intuit from that perception. The thing as a whole is not the same a a thing in itself. — Mww

The exact type of incomprehensible non-statement that CPR parochialism leads to, all too often. This tells me, as similar things do with many other 'classical' works and writers, that you have inhabited this world to such a degree as to write sentences that do not make sense outside of your interpretation of the one work (or, perhaps one philosopher). There is nothing wrong with doing this, but you would need to make this make sense outside of that for it to hold much water. How does this translate to non-Kantian language?

Kant makes clear that he knows there is a mysterious link between the thing-in-itself and our perception. We can't know, other than the a priori categories, how there's a connection between the two, but that is enough to know it exists by logical inference. Without hte connection between our perception, and the thing, there is nothing to infer and no transition to make between anything, and anything else. Perception would be completely and utterly arbitrary. But Kant is clearly, and unequivocally not claiming that they are not related. Your positions here would require that either:
1. thing-in-itself and our perceptual experience are entirely unrelated; or
2. The fact we cannot access thing-in-itself is somehow a reason to utterly ignore that previous issue.

I see nothing, anywhere, that could support either position. Do you read other work?

Scientific investigations of how we perceive already, to some extent, presuppose the a priori modes by which we intuit and cognize objects, being that we must study the intuited and cognized version of our own representative faculties, and so the Kantian question is still very much alive and puzzling. — Bob Ross

Right. :up:

Let's take the words of Albert Einstein as an example — Michael

Einstein? The more you post the more evangelistic your approach becomes. This is a site for philosophical argument. Evangelism is literally against the rules.

There is nothing wrong with doing this….. — AmadeusD

YEA!!!!

…..but you would need to make this make sense outside of that for it to hold much water. — AmadeusD

Make sense outside of what….my interpretation? Or outside of one work? The work under discussion is CPR, so there is no other work that matters.

I never said nor implied my interpretations were the case, hence the liberal account from quotation; it’s almost a given they may not be, insofar as the quotes themselves may be misappropriations. If anyone wishes to refute what I say, he should have at it, but I’d ignore any attempted refutation that does not arise directly from Kantian philosophy.

I’d ignore any attempted refutation that does not arise directly from Kantian philosophy. — Mww

This is the crystalisation of what I think is wrong in your approach... And perhaps explains some of the deader-ends you've met in discussions about Kant/CPR.

Think as you wish, and I don’t understand “dead-ender”, so…….

The thing as a whole excites such that we perceive, but it isn’t the whole thing we intuit from that perception. The thing as a whole is not the same a a thing in itself.

I am still not understanding what you are claiming the thing-in-itself is: I am saying it is the thing which excites our senses. Can you put in simple terms what you think it is?

What do you think the thing-in-itself actually is, what concept is being represented by those words?

It represents an object in reality as it is in-itself—i.e., qua itself—i.e., independent of any experience of it—…

As far as that goes, what do you think the Big Picture is for CPR?

Kant is outlining the limits of reason; especially as it relates to rationalism vs. (british) empiricism.

And why, exactly, is it that the thing-in-itself ends up as one of the necessary limitations proved for this particular, albeit theoretical, method of human cognition and empirical knowledge?

Because something representational requires something which was not representational which grounds it.

And make no mistake: by his own admission, but in modern venencular, Prolegomena is “CPR For Dummies”, so if one wishes to critique the one, he must set aside the other.

Haha. I also read the CPR: I’ll try and pull some quotes sometime this week for you.

I am saying it is the thing which excites our senses — Bob Ross

The persistent error I see with this, is the idea that the ding an sich is a 'thing behind the thing', that it's 'the real thing' as opposed to 'the apparent thing'. And the reason why I think that's an error is that it attempts to take a perspective from which you're able to compare them, which, according to Kant, you can never do.

@Mww - do you concur?

The persistent error I see with this, is the idea that the ding an sich is a 'thing behind the thing', that it's 'the real thing' as opposed to 'the apparent thing'. And the reason why I think that's an error is that it attempts to take a perspective from which you're able to compare them, which, according to Kant, you can never do. — Wayfarer

This seems the only relevant, or rational inference from Kant. Otherwise we're left with ding en
sich- ???????? - experience. Rather than ding???en??sich - perception - experience. Which is what he outlines, filling the ????'s with a priori concepts. That's actually the exact problem he explicitly states is his intention to solve, after Hume. And, I think that's what happens in the book... Whether i agree is different.

What, in your view, is Kant trying to say excites the senses?? The sense data subsequent to a ding en sich in the presence of a human???

Can you put in simple terms what you think it is? — Bob Ross

The thing in itself is the thing considered by reason alone. As the referenced quote says.

It represents an object in reality as it is in-itself—i.e., qua itself—i.e., independent of any experience of it — Bob Ross

Nothing independent of experience or possible experience can ever be represented. Or, which is the same thing, representation is always and only of things of possible experience. No human can ever experience an object considered by reason alone.

outlining the limits of reason; especially as it relates to rationalism vs. (british) empiricism. — Bob Ross

Yes, and no. Limits, but not as relates to rationalism vs empiricism.

Because something representational requires something which was not representational — Bob Ross

No. The limitation is proof for the impossibility of an intelligence of our kind ever cognizing the unconditioned.

Or, which is the same thing, representation is always and only of things of possible experience. — Mww

But clearly incorrect. Otherwise, our experiences would be of nothing. And that's not Kant's position.

I am still not understanding what you are claiming the thing-in-itself is: I am saying it is the thing which excites our senses. Can you put in simple terms what you think it is?

What do you think the thing-in-itself actually is, what concept is being represented by those words?

It represents an object in reality as it is in-itself—i.e., qua itself—i.e., independent of any experience of it — Bob Ross

If 'the thing in itself' denotes the thing "independent of any experience of it" then how can it be "the thing that excites our senses"? To say that is to contradict yourself.

If 'the thing in itself' denotes the thing "independent of any experience of it" then how can it be "the thing that excites our senses"? To say that is to contradict yourself. — Janus

There is absolutely no contradiction to say that something in the world triggers a set of processes, the end-result of which are our experience, and denying that we experience the thing that triggered it. This is hte case with plenty of actual objects. We don't experience something by it's shadow. Yet, under certain conditions, we have a fully sensible representation of the thing. It just leaves open error. Obviously. I think Kant scholars are trying, erroneously, to claim we can't even accept the error - there just is nothing. But this would preclude having any experience at all, if we can't infer a cause. It's an over-read of Kant and is just stupid. It's the same as claiming God is the inference from the Kalam instead of 'a cause of some kind'. Just.. silly.