So it was not 'two-month shelling of military targets' and 'Russia sieges Kiev until Mariupol is fully taken', just two of your claims that were patently false, now it turns out it was never those things you have claimed they were! It was a 'fixing operation'! A 'diversion'! You have made very specific claims and was proven wrong. You cannot even get the dates right. You can own up to it or pretend that it has never happened, it is up to you.

Although of course far more focus was paid to damage to civilian zones, the shelling of industrial zones was covered even by the Western media. — boethius

It is reported that about 150 people died in the 'shelling' of Kiyv in that period. It is hard to estimate, but it seems most of those were victims of missile strikes (executed from Belarus), which as we know at worst can kill up to 20-50 people at a time, if it strikes heavily populated area. So as far as artillery shelling is concerned, it is hard to estimate the effect, but it must have been rather negligible. E.g. Kharkiv, actually WAS shelled and the number of victims was about three-four times greater (although even here many attacks were with missiles, not from ground forces).

Now obviously a peace deal was not reached, but shelling industrial zones (of which the military value is repurposing to ) was clearly one purpose of the push to Kiev. — boethius

Nice backtracking here... So we agree there was no 'two-month' shelling of miltiary targets? The Antonov factory was hit, because it is on the outskirts of Kiyv, as I have acknowledged, Russians got in range that allowed them to shell far suburbs of Kiyv. Still, the effects of that shelling were rather insignificant.

"Overnight, high-precision air-launched missiles destroyed an ammunition factory near the town of Brovary in Kyiv region," Konashenkov said.

So obviously advancing to Kiev would also accomplish this purpose of being able to destroy factories of various kinds. — boethius

Russians needed to advance to Kiyv in order to use air missiles, which were launched by planes from the territory of Belarus? Would you agree that knowing the difference between artillery shelling and air-launched missiles is rather important if you want to discuss such matters? Or is is all the same to you?

Which for all the reasons I explain, is clearly not true. It's completely coherent to send a small force to fix a large amount of troops, destroy plenty of factories and infrastructure, apply significant political pressure, while 15% of the country is conquered in the meanwhile.

It's a pretty common sense manoeuvre and if Ukraine "called the bluff" and sent significant resources to the south and undermanned their defence of Kiev, then maybe Russia would have taken the opportunity to pour in troops and storm the city. — boethius

Defenders, especially with limited means, assign such resources which are required for defence. Fixing a larger force against a supposedly smaller force which is obviously not able to accomplish its goals is not a prudent military move. And, again, Russians, did not destroy 'plenty of factories and infrastructure' from ground attacks. So far you were able to name one factory, located in the suburbs.

"Long-term 'siege' " is a nice but lame strawman. Where do I say a long term siege is necessary to apply political pressure? — boethius

Because 'short-term siege' is very unlikely to work. It is not a siege if the resource flow is practically unrestricted and there is no significant attrition involved. Russians did not surround the city, they did not threaten the supply lines in any way and they were not able to apply significant attrition. 'Blitz siege' is a contradiction in terms - you cannot achieve the goals of a siege quickly.

Russia sieges Kiev until Mariupol is fully taken (the withdrawal is the week after the surrender of the remaining Azov forces), tries to negotiate a peace during this time, a peace deal is not reached, they can't maintain their positions, so they are forced to leave. — boethius

What? Russians have already withdrew from Kiyv suburbs by March 27th, i.e. before the talks have concluded, with most of the force gone from the north by April. The Azov forces have surrendered on May 20th. You clearly have no idea what you are talking about...

The Russians are not routed and captured but have an orderly withdrawal when they retreat, so they obviously had enough fire power to hold their positions and get resupplied.

If it was a risky mad dash blitz the capital with only 4 days of fuel, then they would have all been captured when that failed. — boethius

No, because Ukrainians did not have enough forces to attack them and it would still be a risky manouver. And yes, they had enough firepower to hold against Ukrainian attacks for some time, but not to put pressure on Kiyv from afar - the composition of the force itself assumed quick ground attack, not barrage of the city. Still, they had to leave Bucha, Irpin (the towns closest to Kiyv) after about two weeks (not two months), not because they have accomplished anything (the talks were still underway), but because they had to. Most of the northern force has already stalled midway by the middle of March (the infamous 'Kiyv convoy'), Ukrainians began counteroffensive maneouvers and liberating villages back from March 15th.

Now, I have zero problem with the idea that the ideal scenario for the Russians is that the Ukrainians simply fall apart in terms of C&C and there's a near complete capitulation, or then no defence of the city is organized and they're able to take the city with a small force and the population accepts a total Russian victory. However, they do commit enough resources to maintain the positions they take around Kiev the time to accomplish full occupation of major cities in the south, particularly Mariupol.

However, what is clear even in your scenario is that there is not enough man power to take Kiev waging urban combat even against a small amount of defenders.

I of course agree that total capitulation by Ukraine would be the a preferred outcome of blitzing to Kiev, and if that was plan A then the Russians clearly had a plan B, but we seem to agree that their plan is not conquest of Kiev against any significant resistance. — boethius

Except they did not commit enough resources, that is why they could not maintain the positions they took around Kiyv and had to leave quite soon after they have arrived. The supposed 'siege' lasted about fifteen days and has accomplished very little - they have overstretched their supply lines significantly and simply could not hold their positions. They were not routed, but had to leave a lot of equipment. So no, there was no plan B at all - they have made a quick strike, they have failed and they had to leave. To say that the 'Kiyv convoy' was somehow planned is insane - no battle plan assumes forming a 60 km column of troops most of which were never deployed.

What's incoherent about applying political pressure, a fixing operation, shelling targets of military value for 2 months as well as causing a flood of refugees out of Ukraine?

It's also completely ignorant of the history of war. Laying siege to a city rather than trying to storm it right off the bat is a pretty old and common sense tactic, essentially as old as fortified urban centres themselves. — boethius

'Shelling targets of military value for 2 months'? I suppose you mean shelling of residential suburbs from March 4 (when the main convoy got close enough) till March 24, when they were pushed out of artillery range, not so much because Ukrainians pushed so hard, but because they were out of resources (with the most shelling, which was even then not that intense, lasting about ten days)? That is three weeks... care to list the supposed targets of military value that were hit? All i can find are residential areas on the outskirst of the city. And it is hilarious to write about 'siege' of a city - have you even looked at the map? If you get to a city and it is open in three directions, it is not a siege. Especially if you do not get closer than 25 km from it (that is farther than Ukrainians now have to Tokmak).

Even if Ukraine knew (i.e. informed by the US) that the Russians did not have enough forces to take and occupy Kiev, they still have to direct significant forces to defend the capital as it's a politically critical target. Furthermore, few things are certain in war, so likely Kiev did not "know" Russian troop numbers and disposition or then what man power Russia could divert to Kiev on short notice. — boethius

The supposed evidence is Tzeentch quoting an Ukrainian general in the days BEFORE the attack, so take it up with him.

Another indication of Russian strategy to take the South and not Kiev is that Russia not only did not engage in fierce Urban combat in Kiev but bypassed most urban centres on the way to Kiev, which was a significant weakness in terms of maintaining their position around Kiev as Ukrainians could go out from these bypassed urban areas and ambush and harass the Russian supply line. — boethius

So their plan was obviously NOT a long-term 'siege' of Kiyv, contrary to your claims, because you rightly conclude that it would open them to attacks from the rear and they would not be able to maintain the siege at all.

Then there is the political pressure of the capital being gotten to from both sides in short period of time and siege starting.

Now, would surrounding the capital without being able to take it and occupy it apply enough pressure to cause a complete unconditional surrender? No, obviously not, if the defence of the city was holding up there would be little reason to just completely capitulate.

However, the Russians were not asking complete capitulation, but at that time there main demands were a neutral Ukraine, recognizing Crimea as part of Russia and an independent Donbas, so occupying the South of Ukraine and slowly surrounding the capital and shelling significant parts of it and causing a refugee crisis etc. was significant pressure to accept Russian demands. — boethius

They needed just a bit of pressure, so they just laid one fourth of a siege? From the military point of view that theory goes beyond bizzare.

The 'blitz' taking of Kiyv, while risky and obviously unsuccessful, at least has some strategic merit. The northern operation as a 'siege' would be an even greater Russian failure - when you prepare for a siege, you do not issue your troops fuel for four days and you do not bypass major resistance centers (as you pointed out). The loss of material suffered there (not destroyed, but mostly abandoned, which for a long time was the main source of Ukrainian supplies) in no way justifies the supposed profit of vague 'political pressure' from one-fourth of a siege.

Would it be possible to link the post where you reported this? — neomac

It was based on the quote of Bennett, which I believe you have provided. Should I still look for it?

It needs to be pointed out that the whole theory of 'just threatening Kiyv' with an army that was supposedly obviously and clearly incapable of threatening Kiyv, is simply incoherent. In order to make a threat you have to be visibly capable of employing a force that is able to fulfill that threat. In fact, usually when you make a threat, you try to exaggerate the projected force.

So: how exactly can you strenghten your position in negotiations by sending against a city an army which is obviously incapable of taking or surrounding it?

You're guessing though. — Echarmion

You are wasting your time. He simply repeats the same claim which I have already shown to be false. In short, he does not understand the structure of a BTG - they do not operate alone, but need significant support forces (if you look at the structure, they are missing key elements of regular army deployments). Thus '21 BTGs' in no way means that they were all the troops that were deployed. The correct figure, which I have already given him, was about 60-70 thousand.

I have also corrected him repeatedly on the actual accounts of negotiations, as reported by an actual participant, not someone who heard something (i.e. Sachs). He just regurgitates the same false claims that have already been debunked repeatedly in this very thread.

Some interesting posts from Murz (you can google translate them):
https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2860
https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2861
https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2865

While he always was a bit on the pessimistic side (although not completely into doomposting, like Girkin), his observations seem consistent with what is happening on the ground.

Well, there is this delicate problem that nobody in Russia knows what exactly they have annexed. On the anniversary of the 'referendum' different media published rather different maps...

If the annexed territories are supposedly within the former administrative borders of oblasts, then from their point of view Ukraine is occupying a large swath of them. That would mean that Russia does not have much choice but to fight until they are 'liberated'. (This interpretation also carries the unfortunate consquence that it clearly shows the supposed 'referendum' was bogus - there is no way the numbers could add up to what was officially announced, not that many people care).

On the other hand, if the new territories are within the borders of Russian occupation, then the state from what day should be taken into consideration? Is Kherson officially Russian in the Russian eyes or not? No official will say a word about it, Peskov asked about that has evaded the question, I think three times.

Because it’s so obvious to me I feel that a) you’re being disingenuous or b) are so unaware of US power that explaining it in detail is a diversion. But as quickly as possible: no, there US doesn’t directly control membership in the EU. Europe does rely, however, on the US for their defense. That alone is a pretty big deal, to say nothing of economic leverage. — Mikie

So the answer is:
a) it is obvious b) actually, it does not

Your backtracking is definitely getting better! Because, as it has become the norm in our discussion, you have no means to support your bold theses. On the other hand, countering them is quite easy: you say that Germany and France are 'taking orders from the US', yet in Bucharest, in the supposedly most important matter for the US, they did just the opposite what the US wanted, which you have acknowledged.

But even if taken at face value, this claim goes against your argument: if membership in the EU is just joining the US camp (because it is so obvious!), then the great support of Ukrainians for joining the EU means that they wanted to be under the US hegemony, contrary to what you said. Is that correct?

What I’ve been trying to emphasize is the Russian perspective, right or wrong. That means whether the Ukrainians support NATO membership or not, whether the US is simply giving them what they want, whether the US is justified in arming Ukraine, etc. Maybe they are, maybe they aren’t, maybe it’s opportunistic — a good pretext for fighting a proxy war it wanted all along. I have my opinion on all of that. But that wasn’t the topic.

Right or wrong, I think the evidence — from our own government, from statements from the Kremlin, from scholarship — shows that US involvement was all over this conflict, and that Putin has been a very reactive leader. — Mikie

It was very much the topic - we are dicussing whether the US involvement is the root cause of the conflict or not. And you seem to acknowledge that it is not - you finally begin to see that the main issue is Ukraine distancing itself from Russia. Sure, the US helps it to support its own interests, but removing the US influence would not remove the conflict itself.

Of what? Not of what’s only retroactively claimed now, of Russian imperialist ambitions. — Mikie

That claim only shows your total ignorance. It would not be so annoying, that happens, if not for the fact that I have tried several times to correct it. At the end I have given several articles that show how utterly incorrect you are.

You’re doing a lot of assuming. But there’s no evidence suggesting Russia was planning on conquering Ukraine or annexing parts of Ukraine prior to 2008. Making the push of NATO expansion rather odd. But we know why: the US had explicit plans for Eastern Europe. The goal was to make it a Western-style democracy. — Mikie

But it is not about evidence of imminent invasion, it is all about feelings, have you forgotten? In your argument it is enough for Russia just to feel threatened. By what you are saying now, Russia should not be threatened by NATO at all, because there is no evidence suggesting NATO was planning on conquering Russia or annexing part of it! The double standard is preposterous.

For your argument to hold water you would need to argue that Russia was more threatened by NATO aggression than Ukraine was threatened by Russia. But that is simply absurd. After 1990s the West did not have politicians demanding conquering Russia. Russia very much did have politicians demanding 'reunification' with former republics, who had significant impact on its policies.

Yes. The main cause in 2022— a secondary cause in 2014. These things are interconnected, as I’ve demonstrated repeatedly, with plenty of evidence. — Mikie

So Russia has invaded Ukraine in 2014 for the main cause which was not NATO expansion. The conflict was ongoing since then, with different intensity. Your argument is now that Russia would likely not escalate it further if Ukraine did not arm itself in response to Russia's aggression. Do you realize how absurd that sounds?

They applied for MAP in Bucharest, 2008. That’s very serious, for reasons articulated by Burns and others. I don’t see anything equivalent to that prior to Bucharest. However much you want to pretend 2008 was nothing different. It was different. — Mikie

The MAP would be the expected and planned third step in the ongoing process continuing since 2002. So yes, logically there was nothing equivalent before, because first the other two steps had to be taken. But it is absurd to say that step one and step two are not worth talking about, while the third step is suddenly a 'provocation'. That simply does not make sense.

To take a broader view for a second. Perhaps it’s worth asking yourself why the US cares so much about Ukraine, to the tune of billions of dollars? Would it be fighting such a proxy war in Sudan?

Ukraine is strategically important to the US, as it is for Russia. Despite your dismissals, this is indeed a fight between two powers. Ukraine is caught in the middle, and wouldn’t survive a week without US military aid (or training). This bigger picture shouldn’t be overlooked.

We can go on believing in US benevolence and love of democracy, and that Washington really cares about the Ukrainian people. Or we can take the less comfortable path and take seriously what Russia says, and has said all along, about NATO’s actions and US influence. I see a lot of truth in it, despite my being against Russian aggression.

(The same is true of the current war in Israel, incidentally. It’s worth listening to the Palestinian people. Or we can take the easier route and claim there’s simply evil, similar to the story about Russia.) — Mikie

No, Ukraine is not 'caught in the middle'. It is for you, because you are so used to talk about imperlaiism, that you treat it nothing like a pawn, with no agency of its own. Ukrainians have voted for independence in 1991 and since then they try to get out of Russia's influence (of course, with some differences in opinions, especially between the regions). Many in Russia are opposing that, as they see Ukraine as part of the 'greater Russia', over which Moscow should dominate. That is the root cause of the conflict. The US decided to support them, for its own selfish interests, of course, I have never denied that. But the actual question is: without the US influence, would there be no conflict at all or simply there would be a conflict in which Ukraine would have less chance to succeed? I have strong reasons to believe the latter: the nationalistic (which in Russia is practically synonymous with 'imperialistic') tendencies in Russia have grown stronger since the fall of the USSR, which Putin has used to consolidate his power. 'Losing' Ukraine would be hard to swallow for many Russians - but it should not be their call.

You come back, over and over, to Russian “internal politics.” Let’s see what that means exactly, and get some evidence. Because otherwise it’s yet another vague claim. — Mikie

Well, I have already given you a gist, which you have seemed not to absord. But sure, more sources are always better.

An article from 1994, when Russian nationalism was very much in the background (but still present):

There also is no question that many Russians view the loss of Ukraine and Belarus, which for centuries formed part of their country, as a tragic and temporary aberration that has split families while weakening Russia's military and economic might. Oleg Soskin, a Ukrainian economist, said that Russian nationalists such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky are not alone in decrying Ukrainian independence as a "misunderstanding"; many of his most liberal colleagues in Moscow universities and research institutes do so as well. — UKRAINIAN VOTE RESULTS: NO MANDATE FOR MOSCOW

And this is from 2002. While it focuses mainly on those republics which remained within the RF, it is quite insightful as far as the possible directions of the politics are concerned. Note this particular passage in which the author describes the goals of what he calls the nationalistic mainstream (yes, there were worse):

The most immediate and urgent goal of the Russian people is the restoration of the mighty Russian state in its historical borders (in practical terms, the restoration of the Russian Empire). Since the West in general, and the United States in particular, strive to prevent Russia from achieving this goal, Russian foreign policy should become anti-Western and anti-American. In all, the political program of Russian nationalism is not only anti-democratic and illiberal, it is also revanchist. — Contemporary Russian Nationalism between East and West

This one, from 2000, is also quite interesting:

https://www.hoover.org/research/lingering-dream-empire

And here one from 2003. Note that it ends with the following:

To this less democratic regime, the Kremlin has now added nationalism as the principle ideological theme, and helped to empower nationnalists as the political leaders on the rise. Under the control of the more moderate, Western-oriented Putin, the increasingly centralized, less pluralistic political regime in Russia today has not been deployed to carry out massive repression against the Russian people or threaten countries on Russia 's borders. But who takes power after Putin? The electoral results from yesterday suggest that the liberals have no chance, while the nationalists of a more virulent sort than Putin are up and coming. In their hands, the regime that Putin has built could become really threatening to the people of Russia , to Russia 's neighbors, and eventually to the West. — The Era of Liberalism versus Communism in Russia Is Over

Ironically, the author sees Putin as moderate and Western-oriented and predicts that Putin's successors would adopt even more nationalistic (i.e. imperialistic) line. But Putin would have none of that: he himself reoriented his policies (as evidenced by the differences in his statements, which began our discussion) in that direction.

I remind you, the latest of those three is from 2003, when Putin has still appeared quite friendly and cooperative: so much for the 'retroactive story'. But those also pose the question: did Ukraine had a reason to consider Russia a threat, given the trends described there? I would very much say so.

Fantastic arguments. “No, opposite.” How tedious. — Mikie

The actual arguments were right after that. Maybe you should read the whole paragraphs instead of just the first sentences, that would make our discussion much more efficient, as I would not need to repeat the same arguments and sources over again.

The European countries — from Britain to Germany to France, have basically taken orders from Washington for years.

It’s like asking if the US “controls” the UN. — Mikie

Again: I was asking for evidence that the US controls the membership of the EU. Instead you just give your assertions again. That is exactly how this whole discussion with you: the only thing that you can bring to this dicussion are your strong beliefs, which do not seem to be supported by much evidence.

Except that was never said. I realize that’s what your mind has created, yes. — Mikie

The exact words you have used were: 'But there wouldn’t have been invasion'. You seem to think that if you do enough backtracking, your previous statements should be erased: no, that is not the way it works.

Except I don’t say that. I’m not talking about “fault,” I’m discussing what Russian’s have stated over and over again, and which you ignore. — Mikie

Russians have stated quite different things, as I have shown in our discussion, and their actions show something yet different, so maybe you should not focus only on what they said and in just particular periods.

No— Crimea did that. — Mikie

So you acknowledge that the main support of your argument: Ukraine's military arming and training with NATO countries between 2014 and 2021 is not the US doing, but reaction to Russia's invasion. We are making a progress then.

And so we’re back to the beginning. What was the imminent threat from Russia in 2008 that NATO needed to expand to its borders? None. — Mikie

The threat was not imminent, but it was definitely there, because nationalistic and imperialistic tendencies were always part of the Russian internal politics. In fact, as I have shown, the nationalistic rhetoric in the propaganda has significantly increased from 2004.

The claim you’re making is that Russia would have invaded anyway, regardless of US influence. Well, we won’t ever know, will we? But it’s a nice, unfalsiable story to tell to justify US imperialism. “Hey, they would have done it anyway, so might as well go ahead with it despite dire warnings.”

You acknowledge yourself that NATO was only one of the causes of Russia's aggression. This drove you to such absurd argument that the EU trade agreement is 'the US influence' as well. So your nice story that Russia would not invade if not for the US influence is even more unfalsifiable. Still, cries from the Russian propaganda 'Ukraine should not exist because it is an artificial country' do not seem to be related to the US influence, are they?

Perhaps the US should talk about including Taiwan as part of a military alliance, start training troops, offering supplies, etc. China has been clear about where it stands, but we should go ahead with it regardless, since China would probably start a war anyway. — Mikie

And here you go again... You have this absurd idea that whatever happens in the world it is a doing of the superpower, 'because influence'. If Taiwan entered a military alliance, and started training troops and getting supplies, it would be the Taiwan's decision, not the US, just like it was Ukraine's decision after 2004, which you have acknowledged yourself. Ukraine did not start training troops and getting supplies because the US made them, but because of Crimea, which significantly increased the popular support for such actions.

“Ukraine will be a member of NATO”. This is at the NATO summit. Plans were set to be put in motion. It’s true that they weren’t, yes. But that set the stage for where we are today.

You’ve provided nothing equivalent prior to Bucharest. — Mikie

That is an obvious and blatant lie, there is no putting it differently. I have given you about half a dozen of quotes and excerpts from the document which have shown that Ukraine was preparing to join NATO since 2002. It has entered the Action Plan, which was the first stage of structural and organizational preparations, it has entered the Intensified Dialogue in 2005, and the NATO-Ukraine Commission has been established, which main purpose was coordinating its accession. And you yourself said that the plans were the same since 1991, so how could they be 'set to be put in motion' in 2008? You keep contradicting yourself.

I don’t see how this is confusing. The Russian position on NATO was very clear — for years. So yes, a reaction to a renewed intent (even referring to the 2008 summit) to have Ukraine join NATO, as communicated in 2021, shouldn’t be a shocker. Quite consistent, in fact. — Mikie

Lol. So now it is not 'the push', but 'the renewed intent'. But the intent was not 'renewed' either, as NATO was working with Ukraine on accession since 2002, with a short pause in 2006, as I have already shown.

It wasn’t fast — it was the same position all along. It was the same position in the 90s, in 2002, in 2004, and in 2008. As I’ve shown multiple times now. — Mikie

No, it was not the same position. Your claim was that it was always a 'red line', which is not true, as I have shown multiple times now.

Okay, so your quote from 2002 is useless. He was opposed then, he was opposed in 2008. Did the harshness of the rhetoric change? Of course— as situations change. The position remained exactly the same. — Mikie

No, it is not useless, like the other quote from 2004 it shows the change in the attitude. Unless you do not see the difference between 'I oppose it, but it will not change much between us', which is exactly what the quotes say, and 'I oppose it, but the consequences will be terrible', which is the later stance. You have try not to look real hard to not see the difference.

I have, again and again. You simply wave your hand and say I haven’t— or that it doesn’t count. Too bad. — Mikie

No, you have not. In fact, you cannot even decide whether first the US was 'not serious' and then came the big push in 2008 or whether the push was always there. So, was there a big push in 2008, i.e. did the US change its position then, as you have claimed from the beginning (but for which you have given no evidence and which I have easily countered with clear evidence that the US position has not changed much)?

No mention of 2014. If you want to be clear, then state “it was shelved UNTIL 2014,” not “has been,” which implies up to the present. — Mikie

Because I have mentioned it many times before, when we have discussed the issue of training, arming etc. and when I have clearly stated that it was the reaction to invasion and ongoning conflict in Donbas.

I hate to be the one to tell you, but theUS has a massive influence in the world, including the EU. — Mikie

Can you provide any evidence that the US decides who joins the EU? Or is that another of your assertions?

I said the complete opposite, in fact. It was not a completely separate threat from NATO— it was related, in fact. From the Russian point of view.

But how nice it must be to save your hand in complete disregard for that perspective, and declare “no, sorry, you’re not threatened— because it’s simply not a threat.” Cool.

It was a threat, and was stated as such. Your dismissals are as worthless as your judgments of evidence. — Mikie

That is rather funny from someone who not long ago claimed that not joining NATO would prevent the war. So the trade cooperation with the EU threatens Putin ('BECAUSE NATO!'). If Putin sees everything as a threat, there is no point in appeasing him, is there?

Yes, true. “Independence from Russia,” and into the sphere of US influence. Which according to you was opposed by Russia, but not a threat— that part they were just lying about or using as pretext. — Mikie

If Russia sees Ukraine's independence as a threat, how is that Ukraine's fault, not to mention the US? Your argument has now devolved to the point that if Ukraine joined trade cooperation with the EU, then it would still be the US fault. It is simply absurd.

Speaking of polls, since 2014 the Ukrainian support for NATO membership has risen from 50% to 70% (from 20% before that). Did the US did that as well? If so, how exactly? It also shows how absurd your argument is - if the NATO membership was the main point of the conflict, then for Ukrainians to actually want to join it would be completely irrational, bordering on suicidal. Joining NATO should be the last thing they wanted. On the other hand, if they have expected that Russia would escalate the ongoing conflict anyway, then such attitude would be quite reasonable - they would join the only organization that could provide them protection. That also explains why they have sought closer military cooperation, training, arming etc. So: is an Internet guy seeing things much clearer than 30 millions of Ukrainians, or possibly they have better idea what is the cause of the Russian agression than you?

Yes, exactly. “I strongly oppose Ukraine joining NATO, but that opposition shouldn’t mean we stop talking.”

It doesn’t mean “Hey, I strongly disapprove of this— but if it happens, no big deal, and shouldn’t affect relations.” You’re just misreading it, in an attempt to support a strange narrative. — Mikie

Sure, I am reading it wrong and you are reading it right. Because 'He does not see it as something that could cloud the relations between Russia and Ukraine.' actually means 'This is a great threat, a big red line and he will start a war over it'. That must be it, it is just that you alone that are capable of seeing this. Right.

The US always wanted Ukraine and any other Eastern European nation in NATO (true, “push” is an ambiguous term here) — but pressed for it at various strengths at various times. Russian opposition was always there as well, very consistent— but it’s rhetoric differed in tone at various times.

You want to point to different years, context free, in an attempt to show inconsistencies. The reality is that the US plan for Eastern Europe since 1991 and Russia’s position on those plans have been very stable indeed. All the smoke that’s been blown notwithstanding. — Mikie

That is the most sorrowful attempt at backtracking I have seen in a while. You wrote literally that the US 'was not pushing' and that it was 'not serious' about Ukraine's membership. When I have given clear quotes that completely contradict those claims, instead of admitting it, you have made a complete turnaround and now try to pretend that you never claimed it and claimed just the opposite. Seriously... 'There was no official US push until 2008', that is what you wrote, because you were completely unaware of the issues you are trying to discuss. 'The US was pushing for NATO forever', that is what you wrote when you have realized how wrong you were. No amount of verbal gymnastics will change that.

Of course, you are still unable to tell what it was exactly that the US did in 2008 (it could not be the 'push', if the push was forever, right?), which was supposed to be your argument...

See above. His position was the same — true, he grew more outspoken and the rhetoric differed at various times. No kidding. So what? There was also a war started over this, and there wasn’t a war in 2004. That’s very different as well, I’d say. — Mikie

So now you say that Russia began a war in 2022 over the exact same positions which both the US and Russia held since 1991. Right... Yet somehow I remember you writing 'prior to 2008, when the NATO provocation began'... This gets funnier with every post...

Except Russia’s own statements, Burns’ memo to Rice, Germany and France’s statements, etc. All of which you dismiss. So your judgment of what constitutes “evidence” is worthless to me. — Mikie

No, I have quoted them as the explanation of what happened in Bucharest. Due to Russian protests, Germany and France's objections and lack of support from Ukrainians Ukraine was denied the MAP which was the expected step on the path to NATO and instead was given a very vague promise with no specific timeline, i.e. literally 'someday'.

Funny— I too have quotes from Putin. Several and, more relevant, from 2008. In fact I also give quotes from the US ambassador, and can provide statements from Germany and France leaders at the time as well. Yet you “insist [they] thought something else.” In fact you just ignore all of it, since it’s inconvenient to your preferred narrative of a sudden “irrational” change. — Mikie

That is a blatant misrepresentation of what I wrote. I have already acknowledged two or three times that Putin has strongly objected to the expansion in 2008 (and somewhat earlier), last time I did was at the end of my last post. So no, I do not ignore any of it, I have talked about it in very specific detail - that the Russian stance has significantly hardened since 2002 and what were the reasons for that change. And yes, the change was somewhat fast, but it was not irrational by any measure, it was caused by the internal political changes in Russia itself, which I have already explained twice.

What does that mean to you? What “position” do you think he’s referring to? — Mikie

As I have already written, he was opposed to it, just like he was opposed to joining Poland, the Baltics and now Finland. In fact, the statements concerning Finland are practically the same as they were concerning Ukraine in 2002. But there was no talk of red lines whatsoever, on the contrary, Putin's communique at the summit in 2002 clearly states his hopes for closer cooperation with NATO (despite Ukraine entering the Action Plan).

There is abundant evidence. Again, your judgment of what counts as evidence is totally worthless. — Mikie

Again, asserting the existence of evidence is not evidence. If it is 'abundant', you should have no problem with providing it. Yet somehow you do not.

Which is another threat. But no, it hasn’t been “shelved.” It continues right to today. It was made especially egregious in 2021. Google the September US announcement on Ukraine, or Wikipedia “Operation Sea Breeze.” — Mikie

I have SPECIFICALLY written that the process was shelved between 2008 and 2014, and I did it several times, so what 2021 has to do with it? Sometimes it seems you do not even read what you respond to.

Maybe you’re just playing games at this point.

I’ll repeat once again: NATO is one threat. Not the only threat. Can’t get much clearer.

And if you can’t recognize that EU expansion was seen as a Trojan horse for NATO, by Russia, then you have zero interest in understanding this situation. — Mikie

Oh, so now the EU cooperation is also the US fault. Is that your 'understanding of the situation'? No, the EU cooperation (not expansion, you are confused again) was not a 'Trojan horse' and it was not a separate 'threat' from NATO, as you believe. These are (as I have already written many times) just aspects of the same root cause of the conflict, i.e. the Ukrainian drive toward independence from Russia. For a moment it seemed you began to understand this, but now the hope is lost.

Ask the Russians what the issue was if you don’t believe me. The US was pushing for NATO forever, and Russia’s position has been the same forever— since 91. The difference, however, is that it looked like it was truly going to happen, and soon. With both Ukraine and Georgia. — Mikie

That is hilarious... 'The US was pushing for NATO forever'? Yet just a page ago you wrote 'But regardless, the US wasn’t pushing at that point and wasn’t serious about Ukraine membership'. So the US was pushing forever, except at times when it was not pushing and was not serious... It is rather clear who is not serious. And confused.

It doesn’t matter if you can’t get your head around the reaction. It doesn’t matter if you dismiss or discount their very real warnings because they “changed their minds” in 2004/2005 (Putin in 2004: “'Russia's position toward the enlargement of NATO is well known and has not changed”). It doesn’t matter if you consider it irrational. This was the Russian position. — Mikie

BBC still has a report concerning the very meeting that quote comes from. It is reported that 'Russian President Vladimir Putin has said the expansion of Nato will not help meet security challenges facing the world today. But he told Nato chief Jaap de Hoop Scheffer that his disapproval should not affect relations with Russia'. He is also quoted:

We hope the expansion will foster the strengthening of trust in Europe and around the world and will be an instrument and component in strengthening international security. — Putin calls new Nato 'unhelpful'

So yes, he clearly disapproves, but says it should not affect the relations (which is almost the same as the quote from 2002). Does that sound like a red line to you? in fact, it seems Ukraine (which has already entered the Action Plan by this time) was not even mentioned at the meeting.

Is there CFR a Russian propaganda outlet? They too get the story completely wrong, according to an internet guy. — Mikie

They literally write that 'In the YEARS that followed, Putin GREW INCREASINGLY outspoken in his displeasure at NATO’s inroads into Eastern Europe', so if that was supposed to show that Putin's position did not change, you have picked just the quote that says the exact opposite. It confirms what I have written many times: over the years Putin's disapproval grew from rather mild to quite strong.

Hardly. But nice that you change it up to the EU when convenient. — Mikie

No, I do not 'change it up', I consider both, so do Ukrainians and obviously so do Russians. It is your problem that you are fixated on the NATO issue and you see nothing else.

And I think you’re underestimating it. — Mikie

You claim that the US very much wanted for Ukraine to join NATO in 2008, Ukraine still is not in NATO. That is not evidence of very strong influence, if you ask me.

I was very clearly responding to the above quotation you provided, where Bush said NATO membership was open to the “Ukrainian people if they choose it.” As already has been established, the people didn’t choose anything of the sort. — Mikie

That is desperate clutching at straws. The US support for Ukraine in NATO was unwavering at least since 2001, as evidenced by plenty of documents, and you still have provided NO EVIDENCE that it was otherwise.

Which part of “someday” statements is hard to understand? If you can’t tell the difference, from Russia’s point of view, then you’re not paying attention. Bucharest was much more threatening, and that was obvious at the time. — Mikie

The declaration from 2002 is worded almost exactly the same as the one from 2008. And there is a lot of documents in between that show increased cooperation and working toward Ukraine's membership, including those I have already quoted. If that is not enough, there are plenty of records of the workings of the NATO-Ukraine Commission between 2002-2005 that show this. And it is you who is not paying attention, because I have already given you plenty of evidence that the Russian stance has changed BEFORE 2008. So your claim that 'Bucharest was much more threatening' is pure assertion, not based on any evidence. You have just entered the discussion with such belief and no amount of evidence is going to change it.

Yes, Bucharest was different from the Russian point of view. Why? Because it was made unambiguous and immediate: “We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.” — Mikie

Which was exactly the same as all the declarations which have been made since 2002, as a heap of documents from NATO itself attests. There is a string of well documented declarations and actions from 2002 to 2008 which clearly shows that the preparations for the accession were ongoging, with a slowdown in 2006 due to arising disputes among Ukrainians themselves. Still, Ukraine has expected to receive the MAP in Bucharest - that would begin the real and immediate process of accession. Instead it was specifically denied that, due to protests from Germany and France, and was only told it will become a member, with no specific deadline. So you got it completely backwards, if there was a 'someday' declaration, then it was the one from Bucharest. Which is further confirmed by the following events: after 2008 the integration efforts have slowed down and the path toward Ukraine's neutrality has been followed.

Which is a pity. But apparently, you can see into the soul of Putin, and can legitimately disregard these statements because Russia is a bad imperial power, and the US a good one— which supposedly had little influence in all this. — Mikie

No, I cannot see into soul of anyone and do not even attempt to, you do. I give you direct quote from Putin, yet you insist he thought then something else. I try to base my knowledge on the available documents, which you simply ignore, because you simply know better.

I reject that thesis. The US has had massive influence— over other European countries, over financial incentives, over shaping public opinion, and over military training. NATO, along with the general push to make Ukraine a “liberal democracy,” and the integration into the EU, were seen — rightly or wrongly — as a threat to Russia. No obfuscation will change that fact. — Mikie

Except there was no particular push, as you are obviously unable to provide any evidence for it. Ukraine has decided to join NATO in 2002 as shown in the documents, with lukewarm reaction from Putin at that time, and followed that process, as shown in the documents. The US position has not changed a bit since then, the Russian position did, which prompted the reaction of Germany and France (and the internal support in Ukraine), as shown in the documents. Because of this the process has been shelved, neutrality has been chosen and the focus turned to trade integration with the EU. Given that you say the US is not interested in democratization and betterment of the Ukrainian people, at that moment, the US have failed miserably in its plans.

If what you said was true, then at that time Russia should not care much about what happened in Ukraine, as the main threat, in your opinion, has been removed. But we know that is not what happened - Russia has seen the EU integration at least as an equal threat and decided to derail that process, which spectacularly backfired.

The one quotation, which is questionable, also contains the opposite sentiment. But in any case, it was stated long before 2008. Notice what I said: “at the time.” Do you not accept that at that time— 2008 at Bucharest—Russia was very clear about its position on Ukraine joining NATO? Burns seemed to think so— and I’ll go with his expertise, and Putin’s statements at the time (along with others), over ONE questionable, contradictory statement from 6 years prior. That you pin your hopes on that, and totally avoid 2008, is just avoidance. — Mikie

But I have already acknowledged that Russia strongly opposed Ukraine's NATO membership and have given evidence that it has started after 2002 but before 2008, around 2004-2005. But that does not suit your narrative that the US somehow changed its policy and 'did' something in 2008 to which Russians only reacted at that time (for which, it should be again noted, you have given no evidence and for which I have given plenty of counterevidence), so you just ignore it, as usual.

Yet the polling indicated the opposite, and had for years, up to and including 2008. So what Ukrainians are you talking about? Not the people. — Mikie

The support for joining NATO was about equal in 2002 and decreased from then (as the Russian opposition increased), but the support for closer ties with the EU was much higher, starting with 60% in 2000. So yes, the people.

Good. So just know that the US has a hand in this as well, for decades. This wasn't an accident, and it was done with the full knowledge that it would provoke Russia. That was a mistake. It also wasn't being pushed by the people of Ukraine at that time.

The reason for NATO expansion is obvious. It's part of an overall strategy for Eastern Europe, mostly to do with, ultimately, money. To argue the US cares about democracy or the people of Ukraine is laughable. So the question is: was it worth it, knowing full well that it would eventually provoke a response -- as our own ambassador had warned about? I don't think so. — Mikie

It is becoming frustrating that you simply ignore all the sources I provide, because you know better. Kuchma has pushed for NATO membership and so did Yushchenko. Their declarations are quite clear and numerous. Ukraine was on the path to joining NATO since 2002, which Putin himself has acknowledged. Sure, US supported it more than some other countries, but so what? NATO is an organization, the US is influential there, but you are clearly overestimating its power, as the Bucharest summit shows - the US did not get what they wanted.

And they didn't choose it. But regardless, no. This is not the same as the statement "Ukraine and Georgia will join NATO." That occurred at Bucharest. — Mikie

Yes, both Kuchma and Yushchenko did choose it, they have adopted the Action Plan in 2002 and acted accordingly. Ukraine made all the necessary steps required for membership, closely cooperated within the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the only snag was the disagreement between Yushchenko and Yanukovych in 2006, but then they got back on track. In Bucharest Ukraine actually got less than it expected, so you are completely wrong about that and documents show it.

In view of Ukraine’s foreign policy orientation towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration, INCLUDING ITS STATED LONG-TERM GOAL OF NATO MEMBERSHIP, Ukraine will continue to develop legislation based on universal principles of democracy and international law. — NATO-Ukraine Action Plan

That is the exact statement from 2002 from the site of NATO. Again, which part of LONG-TERM GOAL OF NATO MEMBERSHIP is that hard to understand that I have to repeat it over and over?

It's the US position I was talking about. Prior to Bucharest, there were only the vague statements you provided -- "Someday." That day became much more real, to Russia, in 2008. — Mikie

No, that is laughably false. Exactly the opposite has happened.

At a meeting in Vilnius on 21 April (2005), NATO invited Ukraine to begin an ‘Intensified Dialogue’ on Ukraine’s ASPIRATIONS TO MEMBERSHIP and relevant reforms, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision. — NATO launches ‘Intensified Dialogue’ with Ukraine

NATO has invited Ukraine. Got it? To discuss in detail its aspirations to membership. Got it? In 2005. That is a year which came BEFORE 2008. Is that clear enough?

As to the US position prior to Bucharest:

Congress [...] endorses the vision of further enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization articulated by President George W. Bush on June 15, 2001, and by former President William J. Clinton on October 22, 1996, and urges our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to work with the United States to realize a role for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in promoting global security, including continued support for enlargement to include qualified candidate states, specifically by entering into a Membership Action Plan with Georgia and recognizing the progress toward meeting the responsibilities and obligations of NATO membership by Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia (FYROM), and UKRAINE. — NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007

Is the act of the US Congress serious enough for you?

I see you have carefully omitted the part where I ask you for evidence that the US did not treat the Ukraine's membership seriously before 2008. Is that because you are unable to do it? Can you give ANY evidence that the US position has somehow changed in 2008? Because I can give you a ton of other quotes that show it has basically remained the same for decades.

No -- their position was quite clear, for years, concerning Ukraine membership in NATO.

Unless you're seriously arguing that Russia was in favor of Ukrainian membership in NATO, this discussion is pointless. If you accept what the US's own experts said at the time regarding Russia's position, then let's move on. — Mikie

I have already given you the quote from Putin where he says it will not particularly influence the relations with Ukraine. Have you already forgotten it?

And it is your claim that the US supposedly did something in 2008 that caused Russian reaction. It seems you are completely unable to support it. In fact, you are so far unable to articulate what it exactly was.

Exactly. One is the good guy, one isn’t. And that’s the fundamental upstream issue by which you interpret everything else. — Mikie

It is not a matter of my interpretation. Belarussians are dying and are jailed to get out from the rule of 'one guy' and do not mind the other one. People in those countries in the Eastern Europe who did join the West are quite happy about, it is about the single issue they agree on. And their distrust of Russia remained high even when they have already did. They freely vote and choose those politicians who maintain that course. It is those who remain under Russian rule who must be suppressed, that is why all the colored revolutions happened.

Except I never once said that. The US actions in central and South America are certainly comparable — if not far worse. To say nothing of the atrocities in the Middle East, Indonesia, Southeast Asia, etc. If you want to be serious about “imperial aggression,” comparing the US and Russia is indeed absurd — the US is far worse. — Mikie

I will not argue about that, the very simple fact is that in the region we talk about leaving Russia and joining the West has significantly improved the lives of those people, in their own opinion. Ukrainians, Georgians and others were witness to that and wanted to join them. So no, as far as the Eastern Europe is concerned, there is no comparison.

Kuchma’s declaration was an attempt to gain favor with NATO. But regardless, the US wasn’t pushing at that point and wasn’t serious about Ukraine membership. It had its own problems at the time, and knew very well that this would provoke Russia. There was no official US push until 2008. And it’s US involvement that Russia reacted against, and what’s relevant. — Mikie

'Gain favor with NATO'? Which part of the 'its aspirations towards full integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures' is not clear to you?

Also, can you provide any evidence that the US did not treat Ukraine's membership 'seriously'?

The United States supports Ukraine's NATO aspirations and is prepared to help Ukraine achieve its goals by providing assistance with challenging reforms. The United States supports an offer of an Intensified Dialogue on membership issues with Ukraine at the meeting of Alliance Foreign Ministers in Vilnius, Lithuania later this month. — Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Viktor Yushchenko

Was that a joke?

Our position is clear: As democracy takes hold in Ukraine and its leaders pursue vital reforms, NATO membership will be open to the Ukrainian people if they choose it. — President Bush Discusses NATO Alliance During Visit to Latvia November 28, 2006

Is he joking or is he pushing?

The United States is actively engaged at NATO to help Ukraine achieve its NATO goals, including, I should note, support for the Membership Action Plan that Ukraine is interested in. — David Kramer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs June 22, 2006

Is he serious?

Ukraine officially started its path toward NATO membership in 2002 and followed more or less the same path as other countries joining NATO before it - for Poland it took eight years from the Rome summit. Ukraine (and Georgia) gradually fulfilled the required criteria concerning the army size, structure, etc. Saying that the preparations for Ukraine's joining were 'not serious' simply ignores the historical record. What is worse, it even ignores our previous discussion, which started with the Putin's quote - at the time he was not that concerned with the expansion, but there is no indication he does not treat it 'seriously'.

In 2008 the next expected step for Ukraine, Georgia an Croatia was entering the MAP - Ukraine asked for this in January. It was denied that mostly due to opposition from Germany and France, the U.S. tried to convince them, but obviously failed. So you are saying Russians suddenly turned from a peaceful nation to a belligerent one because Bush has tried to convince Europeans of basically sticking to the plan established in 2002, even though he failed miserably? That makes no sense at all.

Alright, so by your definition we have two countries with competing geopolitical goals, and thus two “imperial” powers. If that is indeed what is meant, than the US is winning, by far, and from the Russian point of view is quite threatening.

Your claim is that Russia should have no control over Ukraine, a significant piece of the overall power game. I mostly agree — it should be the people who decide. On the other hand, do you also agree the US should exercise no control? That they shouldn’t have pushed for NATO membership in 2008, for example, when the polls showed the people did not want to join it and Russia was posing no threat? Was Russia supposed to just sit back and watch, no matter what happens? Would the US be expected to do so in similar circumstances?

Seems to me you’re just fine with imperialism, provided it’s the good guys doing it. — Mikie

Not exactly, the two are not even simliar. While the US did many things which should be condemned (like the war in Iraq), the influence it has in its allied countries is incomparable to what Russia is doing or tries to do. Saying that the US controls, say, Poland or Lithuania in the same way like Russia controls Belarus is simply absurd, the simple difference being that in Poland and the Baltics people can just vote out their governments. Lack of or significant deficit of democracy is necessary for Russia to exert control.

And I still do not understand what exactly do you mean by 'pushing for NATO membership' in 2008. Reading you one might think that Ukraine was being dragged into NATO by force... As we have already discussed, Ukraine had plans to join NATO long before that, with signing the Action Plan and official Kuchma's declaration in 2002. After the Orange Revolution Yushchenko confirmed those aspirations (here is his speech from 2005). In 2008 Ukraine and Georgia hoped to enter the Membership Action Plan, which the US supported, but Germany and France blocked, so Ukraine and Georgia were rebuffed (so much for the US hegemony!). So in fact, in 2008 Ukraine got less than its government wanted and expected - instead of the specific measures they only got vague promises. Comparing the accession paths of other countries, I would say for Ukraine in 2008 the accession process has been actually slowed down, not accelerated.

And yes, since 2002 (when the number of supporters and opponents was about equal) the policy of joining NATO lost popularity in Ukraine (unlike joining the EU), which was one of the reasons why it was scrapped when Yanukovych was elected. Still, until that time it was the official policy of Ukraine.

Okay— this is an important difference. I don’t buy this.

You said a second before that imperialism isn’t restricted to conquering a region — fine. Now you fall back on the position that Russia does want to take over former republics. Not sure what “wants it back” would mean otherwise. — Mikie

Maybe I was not clear - when I wrote Russia 'wants it back' I meant the control, not the physical territories. In fact, in many ways it is more convenient for Russia to control them from the back - when the protests erupted in Belarus, they turned their anger toward Lukashenka, not Putin (even though Russians had significant part in suppressing them). If the protests succeeded, Lukashenka would bear the consequences. The Warsaw Pact worked similar in many aspects.

I do— but I’ll repeat myself again: what’s relevant isn’t what I think, it’s what the Russians think. Is there any reason for them to be concerned? What do they say? Do they believe Western forces were involved? Do they mention NATO at all (which you claimed they didn’t)? Yes. Now— is there any truth to those claims? Turns out, yes. Turns out the US was funding pro-democracy groups for years.

Now I’m in favor of democracy. I’m in favor of Ukrainians deciding for themselves what to do. But the topic here is also what Russians perceive, because we’re discussing the causes of their aggressions.

The US would love to have us believe they had no hand in any of this— totally blameless. But we should question whether that’s true. We should listen to the Russians, to our own ambassadors, to dissent scholars, etc., and see if it holds any weight. I think it does, especially given the United States’ role as a world power the last 60+ years. — Mikie

The difference is that if Russians oppose the Ukrainian independence in general, then the conflict would likely arise sooner or later anyway, as Ukrainians became more and more uncomfortable in the Russian mir. Not to mention that a threat toward one's country can be seen as a legitimate reason for an armed conflict. Desire to keep a neighboring sovereign country undemocratic - not so much.

Imperialism was not given as a reason for NATO expansion. But Poland and others already joined— with no invasion, regardless. Ukraine was and is a red line for Russia, as they stated clearly for years. If not wanting NATO on your doorstep is imperialism, so be it. But that’s a stretch, I think. I wouldn’t hear many claiming the US as being imperialist if it annexed Baha in reaction to a Chinese-backed regime change in Mexico. — Mikie

Poland and other countries have joined specifically because they considered Russia as a potential threat. And having NATO in the Baltics or Finland is exactly having it on one's doorstep. Ukraine is different for other reasons.

Russia had and has no intention of conquering Ukraine. The logistics don’t add up, among other reasons. The goal us conquest or re-forming the USSR.

If Russia wanted to “call the shots” in all its former territories, it failed miserably. Having some say in whether a neighbor along your borders —with historical and cultural ties to Russia, especially in the east — joins western military alliances and gets dominated by western interests is a little different. — Mikie

And again, you do not understand the Russian imperialism, if you believe it must 'conquer' anything. I have given you already an example of Belarus, has it been conquered? If you are unfamiliar with the situation there, have the countries of the Warsaw Pact been 'conquered' during the time of the USSR? No, they were supposedly 'liberated', which does not change the fact that they were victims of the Russian imperialism. Only at that time the West preferred to look the other way.

Yes, Russia has lost its grip over the former republics after the fall of the USSR, but that is the exact problem: it wants it back. That is the root problem of conflicts of which Ukraine is only the biggest one.

I’m in favor of Ukrainian freedom. They should put it to a vote and work it out. But let’s not pretend that Russia hadn’t been screaming about this for years, even before 2014 when the polls started to change. — Mikie

But that is exactly what they did. That is why the conflict has much less to do with the Western machinations and much more with the Ukraine's desire to reorient itself. As I wrote here before, Ukrainians stood before a choice between being like the Baltics and being like Belarus. It is not surprising that they chose what they did.

No, he was ousted by an uprising with plenty of social engineering and funding from the US — which had been happening for years, in fact. To the tune of billions of dollars (with a B).

You can blame Russia for this — fine. I don’t care to squabble. I’m happy to blame Russia. But again, if we’re interested in their perspective — in what they consider threats, in reasoning for their actions, etc — it’s good to know the full story. Turns out there’s some truth to it.

In any case, whether it was solely Russia’s fault for the uprising is irrelevant— maybe they did push too far, etc. Doesn’t have any bearing whatsoever on what we’re discussing here. Yanukovych’s overthrow was not something Russia wanted or liked, and they considered this a time when they could lose Ukraine completely to Western influence— the EU, NATO, etc. So they invaded Crimea. Shouldn’t have been a surprise.

Now it’s true a story has been fabricated since then, about Russian imperialism and Putin’s ambitions and so forth— wanting to take over all the old Soviet territories, etc. But that’s only been the official Western-propagated story since 2014, and ignores a great deal of history. It wasn’t the story in 2008, when they pushed for NATO membership and started the ball rolling with our current situation. — Mikie

Oh, so now it is 'social engineering', because you simply cannot accept the fact that it is Ukrainians themselves that finally want to leave the Russian sphere of influence, just like many other countries in the region. You absolutely do not care what Ukrainians think about that.

And now you are just contradicting yourself. First you acknowledge that Russia's reaction was caused by its refusal to let Ukraine leave its influence and then claim that the imperialism is a 'fabricated story'. But that is one and the same - Russia's imperlalism is exactly the demand to call the shots in its former republics, it is not necessarily about physically annexing the lands. Belarus is the prime example of how that works in practice. You renounce the claim of Russian imperialism without actually understanding what it is. This is evident just from the claim that it is 'Western-propagated'. No, it is not, the most vocal opponents of Russian imperialism are of course Russia's neighbors, who have been telling about it for centuries. It is just that the West has realized what they are talking about after the Crimea invasion.

When Yanukovych was in office, no. When he was thrown out? More so, of course— but still not the main driver. — Mikie

Great, so finally we agree that at that period NATO was not seen by Russia as a direct threat. But Yanukovych was ousted due to the course of events initiated by Russians, not by NATO or the US. Russians overplayed their hand, coerced him to abandon the EU trade deal and sparked the protests in the Maidan demanding his ouster. Ukrainians were so outraged meddling that they have chosen a much more direct pro-Western course. Sure, the US has supported it, but it started without the West and rather caught it by surpise. So how exactly is that US/NATO fault?

But that’s not what happened. Crimea occurred after the coup, not before and not during. Once it was known that Yanukovych was gone and replaced by a pro-Western leader — yes, they had reason to annex Crimea at that point.

I’m not saying their reasons are “good” reasons or that I agree with them. — Mikie

You are evading the question: was Russia threatened by NATO enough to invade when it had a pro-Russian president and legislated Ukraine's neutrality?

So yes, it was very much a factor. EU expansion was also a factor. US-backed coups was also a factor. Add it up, and US influence is all over these events.

But we’re supposed to believe Russia shouldn’t have been worried, that their fears were completely unwarranted, and that NATO was irrelevant — because you say so. — Mikie

Did Russia have a reason to attack Ukraine, when it had a pro-Russian president at the helm and its neutrality confirmed by the pariiament?

My claim is that NATO membership, after years of training, arms supply, and drills, was the main cause of the invasion. There are others, of course. The US has many reasons for its actions in Eastern Europe, as do the Russians. — Mikie

Again, you completely ignore why Ukraine has started training, arms supply and drills - because it has ALREADY been invaded and there was still ongoing conflict with Russia. Russia has attacked Ukraine and has maintained the armed conflict for eight years, so Ukraine began to arm itself - that was the sequence of events, which you consistently ignore.

A better analogy would be: were the British responsible for the revolution, given its actions leading up to it? I’d say yes. — Mikie

But that was not the point. The point was that mere support is not sufficient to be cited as a cause. You have given no support why we should think Russia would not attack Ukraine without US/NATO actions and you are desperately ignoring the evidence that Russia did start the armed conflict for other reasons.

Russia attacked in 2014 after the US-back coup, yes. NATO did not abandon its plans after 2014. In fact it increased its involvement— now under the invented “imperialist ambitions” cover. — Mikie

No, Russia attacked after it has messed up, because its meddling has sparkled a popular uprising. ANOTHER point that you desperately ignore in your analysis.

Your thesis that Ukraine abandoned its NATO ambitions in 2014 is proof that Russia would attack Ukraine no matter what, and that NATO was just the latest cover story, confuses two things: 1), US influence, and 2) one such influence: NATO. You also ignore the fact that the NATO threat was in the background since 2008. It did not disappear as a threat simply because one leader was against it. But when that leader is removed, with US support, in favor of the pro-EU and pro-NATO, US-approved Poroshenko — yes, I’d say NATO is still a factor in Russian decisions. — Mikie

No, it was not 'one leader', it was legislation adopted by the whole parliament. That basically neutralized the NATO threat. And the leader was removed because Russia has messed up in a different matter. Without Russian meddling Yushchenko would remain in power and Ukraine would be militarily neutral, just as it was decided by the parliament.

Again, the actions of Russia took place AFTER the coup, not before— so I’m really not seeing your point that NATO couldn’t possibly factor into Russian aggression in Crimea. Sure, it wasn’t the main factor in this case— and I never said it was — but it was not irrelevant either. — Mikie

Well, I have evidence why it would not be very relevant - Ukraine has pledged neutrality and Russia did not mention NATO when it has invaded Crimea. On the other hand, you say NATO was definitely a factor, because you say so. See the difference?

However, given that you have acknowledged that it was not the main factor for the agression, that is all I need to reject your argument: given that NATO expansion was not the main factor in starting the conflict, all we have to do is to consider whether that main factors have ceased to exist before the further escalation of the conflict (which has never ceased, contrary to your claims). And the answer is, of course, no - Russia still had the same reasons, so it started the full-scale war.

55 civilians dead in a Russian missile attack on a cafe/shop in a small village near Kharkiv:

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67025706

Sure, did not realize there was a separate topic.

Well, yes, the influence of Russia was diminished, because it has been previously increased by wars and occupation. Occupied countries do tend to distance themselves from the occupiers. But the whole Europe was pretty comfortable with trading with Russia even when it has invaded Ukraine in 2014. Nobody wanted its 'destruction'. They stopped being neutral when Russia has attacked Ukraine and started to bomb its cities. Russia is the agressor here, unless you have noticed. So yes, countries are not supposed to attack their neighbors, it is not that hard to understand.

I said: I think you do not understand how the Soviet Union used to work. Between 1917 and 1991, Ukraine and Russia didn't exist at all. They were the Soviet Union altogether, a single and unique nation.
You said: I understand perfectly well how the Soviet Union worked - mostly Russians forced other nations under its boot, militarily, like with the Baltics, or by other means, like Holodomor in Ukraine. And no, being in one state does not make them one nation, which even the legislation of the USSR confirmed. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/842651 — javi2541997

Obviously by that I meant Ukraine as a region, not as a state. And yes, you do not understand what 'nation' is.

On the other hand, I personally think that if you want to understand my position, you have to stay away from the Western media more often. I know that there were hundreds of treaties where countries or states lost part of their territory because of losing a war or other issues. Nonetheless, most of those treaties always abused the position of the loser. This was one of the main causes of the ascence of Hitler. Does Alsace-Lorraine ring a bell to you?
When the Soviet Union split apart in different nations, the Western world saw it as a good opportunity to make the Russian position weaker. Divide and you will win, you know. And having Yeltsein as President was a terrible mistake because he didn't have respect for others, making Russia's position like a circus. — javi2541997

When the Soviet Union fell apart, the citizens of the Russian SFSR decided to establish the Russian Federation within the borders of that republic. How hard is that to understand? The Russia has the borders it has because that were the borders of the SFSR. And it is rather ironic that you claim Yeltsin's election was a mistake, because he had no respect for others. Does Putin have respect for anyone?

The Alma-Ata protocol means nothing to me and to Putin either - as much as the USA regarding international criminal court ha! - If Russia hadn't signed the treaty or protocol, the Western media would say: Oh wow look at them, they are not a democracy and bla, bla. It is obvious that sooner or later this conflict will arise because the Western world never respected the soul of Russia. It is a clear threat to put NATO headquarters closer to Ukraine or even allow this country to join the group. Would you feel safe if Russia put their navy next to your coast? — javi2541997

At least you are honest and drop the false pretense: you do not care about the international treaties, law or decency in general. You believe that Russia should take what it wants by force, if it wants it. Well, fortunately it is not strong enough.

If Empire Russia never recognised the independence of Latin American countries, why do we have to recognise Ukraine's sovereignty in Crimea? Because the USA goes mad and blocks us financially? By the way, why cannot the Europeans act as neutral countries instead of being enemies of Russia? These are the questions you should wonder about, and stop wondering about Crimea, because it is clear that - at least for those who are not influenced by CNN or BBC - it will be part of Russia. I bet they will remain as part of theirs! — javi2541997

If you do not understand why international treaties should be respected, I see no point in further discussion. Europeans are not neutral, because they do not want to be attacked by Russia one day. If Russia is not stopped now, it would have to be stopped some time in the future. And whether Crimea will be part of Russia - well, we will see.

Boris Yeltsein's Russia and not the modern Russia as we know nowadays. This is the point I want to defend at all costs. I doubt that Russia signed those treaties freely and Ukraine is a poor beautiful bunny surrounded by evil. I must admit that I am wrong when I said 'for centuries', but 174 years is a long duration for me. It is true that they transferred the administration to the 'Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic' — javi2541997

So we should ignore treaties from thirty years ago, because Russia has changed, but we should honor the treaties from two hundred years ago, even though the modern Turkey is not the former Ottoman Empire. Which also did not sign the treaty freely, because it has just been beaten in a war. Half of borders in Europe are the result of some war, therefore one of the sides did not accept them freely. Germany did not accept freely the loss of Alzatia, Konigsberg and Breslau, Poland did not accept freely the loss of Lvov, Finland did not accept freely the loss of the Karellian Strait, I go on on this way forever. The British did not accept freely the American Independence and Charles is certainly not George. Does that mean they have a right to demand America back? Somehow you insist only Russia has a right to demand its former lands, because for some reasons treaties do not apply to it.

Nonetheless, Ukraine didn't exist as a nation yet. The Russians shared the management of Crimea with good faith and when the Soviet Union split apart, the Ukrainians thought that there was a unique opportunity to take Crimea. It is not my problem if you can't see it, but I would use an example: imagine you giving me your house as a lease, but recognising that you are the owner, while I just manage your house. The years pass by, and then I decide to take your home because one day 'you transferred me the possession' — javi2541997

Another issue in our discussion is that you lack understanding of even the most basic terms. You confuse 'nation' with 'state', 'state' with 'republic' etc. Ukrainians did not 'take' Crimea. Ukraine was established as acountry at the dissolution of the USSR, according to a joint agreement known as the Belovezha Accords, within the then current borders of the former republics. If the current Ukraine has no right to the territory of the former Ukrainian SSR, then the current Russia has no right to the territory of the fomer Russian SFSR, because they have received their legal status in the exact same way. That is why your analogy is completely false, you simply do not understand the legal framework involved.

This is from the Alma-Ata Protocol (which supplemented the Belovezha Accords):

The activities of the Council of Heads of State and of the Council of Heads of Government are pursued on the basis of mutual recognition of and respect for the state sovereignty and sovereign equality of the member-states of the Agreement, their inalienable right to self-determination, the principles of equality and non- interference in internal affairs, the renunciation of the use of force and the threat of force, territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for human rights and liberties, including the rights of national minorities, conscientious fulfillment of obligations and other commonly accepted principles and norms of international law. — The Alma-Ata Protocol

Which part of the 'the renunciation of the use of force and the threat of force, territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders' do you not understand?

Don't be dishonest. You never claimed that it was a federation of republics. You stated that Ukraine already existed, which not. — javi2541997

Can you provide the exact quote where I state that?

The hell, no! You claim that I am not looking into reliable sources, I would say the same regarding you and your arguments...

The Soviet Union was nominally a federal union of fifteen national republics; in practice, both its government and its economy were highly centralized until its final years. It was a one-party state governed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with the city of Moscow serving as its capital as well as that of its largest and most populous republic: the Russian SFSR.
Historian Matthew White wrote that it was an open secret that the country's federal structure was 'window dressing' for Russian dominance. For that reason, the people of the USSR were usually called 'Russians', not 'Soviets', since 'everyone knew who really ran the show. — javi2541997

But that is exactly what I am writing about: it was never 'one nation', as you claim, it was a federation of republics ruled by Russians, often more like colonies.

Mate, the point here is not whether the treaties fit me or not. I am showing you evidence of why Crimea belongs to Russia. I was not part of those treaties, but I think it is obvious that Crimea had belonged to Russia for centuries, and it was confirmed both internationally and legally. These facts are not undermined just because, in the Soviet Union, Crimea was managed by Ukranians. When the USSR fell, the Ukrainians proceeded with bad faith and said: 'Hey, if we managed Crimea for only 34 years - in comparison to Russia, which managed it for centuries - then it belongs to our artificial new nation. — javi2541997

You are hilarious. Just a moment ago you claimed it 'always' belonged to Russia, because you were blissfully unaware that Russia got it in 1783. Now it is supposedly 'for centuries', which still is rather dubious, given it was 174 years. Then you have claimed that it was given 'under administration', because you were blissfully unaware that it was formally transferred to the Ukrainian SSR. Did those two examples of your argumentation from complete historical ignorance teach you anything? No, because you know better, historical facts notwithstanding.

Yes, Crimea belonged to the tsarist Russia from 1783 to 1919, then it belonged to Russian SFSR, then in 1957 was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR, which was legally confirmed. Then, with the dissolution of the USSR, it remained with Ukraine within the borders of the former republic, according to the Belovezha Accords, which Russia has signed. Then in the Budapest Memorandum and finally in the Russian–Ukrainian Friendship Treaty Russia has solemnly confirmed that Crimea belongs to Ukraine . So it was not something that 'Ukraine said in bad faith', that is what Russia internationally and legally confirmed and which the international community, the UN included, recognizes.

The evidence: https://books.google.es/books?id=i1C2MHgujb4C&pg=PA194&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false — javi2541997

It does not load.

I think you do not understand how the Soviet Union used to work. Between 1917 and 1991, Ukraine and Russia didn't exist at all. They were the Soviet Union altogether, a single and unique nation. So, Khrushchev didn't give Crimea to Ukraine. I think he shared the management of the Oblast with other authorities far from Moscow. If Ukraine didn't exist until 1991 - or what we understand as Ukraine nowadays... - how was it possible to give a territory to a non-existing nation? It seems illogical to me. — javi2541997

I understand perfectly well how the Soviet Union worked - mostly Russians forced other nations under its boot, militarily, like with the Baltics, or by other means, like Holodomor in Ukraine. And no, being in one state does not make them one nation, which even the legislation of the USSR confirmed.

And maybe instead of just thinking, you should consult historical sources, which clearly state something different?

The Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet with the participation of the executive committees of the Crimean Oblast' and Sevastopol' City Soviet of Workers' Deputies has examined the proposal of the RSFSR Council of Ministers about the transfer of the Crimean Oblast' to the Ukrainian SSR.

Considering the commonality of the economy, the territorial proximity, and the close economic and cultural ties between the Crimean Oblast' and the Ukrainian SSR, and also bearing in mind the agreement of the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet considers it advisable to transfer the Crimean Oblast' to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. — Meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

And the Belovezha Accords, signed by Russia, clearly established that the dissolution of the USSR established new countries within the borders of the former republics. which Russia confirmed with two treaties, as noted above.

It does count because it is written and signed in the treaties, my mate.
Later that year, the Ottoman Empire signed an agreement with Russia that recognised the loss of Crimea and other territories that had been held by the Khanate. The agreement, signed on 28 December 1783, was negotiated by Russian diplomat Yakov Bulgakov. — javi2541997

Oh, so the Budapest Memorandum and the border treaty were 'forced' and they do not count, but the treaty with the Ottoman Empire, signed after the war, does. We should consider only treaties that suit you and ignore all the others, is that correct?

You agree with me, then. Or... you just follow up the basic argument that 'Western countries can claim territories, but Russia doesn't.' — javi2541997

No, the point is I do not agree with you, just like Russians would not agree with you that Germans have the right to Kaliningrad.

Most of the 1990s treaties signed by Russia were forced, or they didn't have a good back-up to Russia's interests or borders. Boris Yeltsein was obsessed with showing to the world that the Soviet Union had ended and Russia started to become a democratic/Liberal country. As I stated to ssu and Tim wood previously, Crimea has always been part of Russia, but the Ukrainians took it forcibly in 1997. So, the Russians got catfished in the new map of their borders.

You state that we should not give credit to Russian constitution, but why we have to do so regarding Ukrainian? It is funny how the Ukrainians expropiate Crimea from the Russians between 1992 and 1997, when that peninsula was part of Russian Empire for centuries. Frankly, the Ukranians acted with bad faith and Putin is taking back all that belong to Russia. — javi2541997

You should be aware that repeating the assertion does not prove it. Can you provide evidence that the treaties were forced?

And the claim that Crimea has 'always' been part of Russia is wildly incorrect. 174 years is not 'always', is it? It was much longer under the Khanate and the Ottoman Empire than under Russia. And whether you like it or not, Khrushchev gave it to Ukraine 1957, so formally it has been with Ukraine since that time.

Russians have less claim to it as Turks, and they have less claim to it than Tatars. You basically claim that Catherine's conquest somehow made it Russian forever, while all the other changes are irrelevant. That is rather silly.

You state that we should not give credit to Russian constitution, but why we have to do so regarding Ukrainian? It is funny how the Ukrainians expropiate Crimea from the Russians between 1992 and 1997, when that peninsula was part of Russian Empire for centuries. Frankly, the Ukranians acted with bad faith and Putin is taking back all that belong to Russia. — javi2541997

So we agree that the constitution argument is pointless. And between 1992 and 1997 Crimea did not belong to the Russian Federation, It tried to gain independence, but was not formally recognized by anyone. DId Chechenya stop being part of the Russian Federation, because it had self-declared independent government?

In the context of the Seven Year War, all of East Prussia was conquered and partly occupied by the Russian Empire (1758–1762).Immanuel Kant is famous for having sworn allegiance to Empress Elizabeth of Russia. — javi2541997

And in the context of Khruschev decision Crimea has been Ukrainian since 1957. Again, you seem to believe that only Russian conquests count.

The annexed territory was populated with Soviet citizens, mostly ethnic Russians but to a lesser extent also Ukrainians and Belarusians. What a paradise it seems!
In 2010, the German magazine Der Spiegel published a report claiming that Kaliningrad had been offered to Germany in 1990 (against payment). The offer was not seriously considered by the West German government which, at the time, saw reunification with East Germany as a higher priority.

Hmmm... It doesn't seem that the German authorities are as interested in Kaliningrad as Russians are as much in Crimea... — javi2541997

But if they do get interested, they have every right to seize it, is that correct?

How exactly was the Budapest Memorandum 'forced'? Russia signed it, because it wanted to get rid of the Ukrainian nukes. Moreover Russia has also signed the Russian–Ukrainian Friendship Treaty, which confirmed inviolability of the borders - was that forced, too?

Also the constitution argument makes no sense at all: those regions were added to the Russian Constitution AFTER they were annexed (i.e. in 2014 and 2022), so in the time of the Budapest Memorandum and the Russian–Ukrainian Friendship Treaty the Russian Constitution clearly stated those regions are NOT Russia. On the other hand, according to Ukrainian's constitution from 1992 Crimea already WAS part of Ukraine. Why exactly the Russian constitution is supposed to trump the Ukrainian constitution?

And what about Kaliningrad? Historically it was not part of Russia, can Germans just take it, provided they add it to their constitution after annexation?

Exactly. But respecting the Russian sovereignty on Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea. It is written in the Russian constitution: — javi2541997

The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE [Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Final Act, to respect the Independence and Sovereignty and THE EXISTING BORDERS OF UKRAINE. — The Budapest Memorandum

So your entire argument rests on the fact that I can only give an opinion, not definitive proof, of what might have happened. An odd line to take.

Yes, you got me. Maybe had I not driven to work yesterday, my car would have still run out of gas. I can’t definitively prove otherwise — but I view it as unlikely. — Mikie

The issue is, as I have mentioned, that you select just a few facts that suit your theory that Russian intensification of the conflict was unlikely and ignore all others. You simply ignore the underlying roots of the conflict and focus solely on its single aspect. The issue is that this approach leaves you comically unable to explain major facts of the Ukraine-Russia's relations. The prime example is your constant pretending that the Donbas rebellion did not happen.

Why pretext? A pretext that was known and warned about for years, and such even several experts agreed would likely happen if such activities continued?

Seems like a very elaborate ruse. — Mikie

Because it allows to 'sell' the war to people less familiar with the history of the region, as can be seen even in this thread. That in turn helps to undermine the support for Ukraine - as can be seen, in many cases quite effectively.

Appreciate the effort.

NATO is one line of US influence, and an important one. There are others. Why does the US want to expand NATO, support overthrowing a president, etc.? It's part of a very clear strategy for eastern Europe. — Mikie

Sure, that is the US strategy, but that does not mean the US is the main cause of the processes. That is what you got completely wrong. Given that you are an American, maybe an analogy from the American history will help: France has supported the American Revolution, provided weapons and even troops to Americans, because it suited France's interests in the conflict with the British. Yet if I wrote that France has organized the American Revolution, therefore should be blamed for it, nobody would take me seriously. Sure, France has suported it, but it was the Americans who were the main force behind it, they wanted to be independent from the British and they would seek independence sooner or later, with France's support or not. That is exactly the case with the Eastern Europe. It is the former Russian satellites and former republics who want to get out from under the Russian influence - sure, the US supports it, because it suits its purposes, but is not the force behind the movement. Here is an article from the Polish state poll-taking agency from 1997. Not only it shows the overwhelming majority supports membership in NATO, but it clearly shows that Poles considered NATO to be a security guarantee against Russia:

Moreover, the majority of the respondents disapprove of the intentions of Russian policy concerning NATO extension, sharing the view that Russia's opposition towards Poland's entry into NATO was caused first of all by her desire to regain influence in our country. — CBOS

Eastern Europeans have always considered Russia as a threat and for very good reasons. And it was not a matter of long past history - the last Russian troops (generally viewed as the occupiers) left Poland in 1993. In 1968 some Czechs and Slovaks, after Russia crushed their freedom with its tanks, promised to never shave until the Russian troops left - they did so in 1991:

https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-06-25-mn-1335-story.html

so the memory was still rather vivid.

In the Baltics the memory of the Russian interventions were even more fresh: Russians tried militarily to suppress their independence in 1991. The clashes were small and they failed, but only because Russians were too weak, not because they were not willing. For the Baltics joining NATO was a question of survival: they had every reason to believe that once Russia gets stronger, it might want to thwart their independence again.

Your view that the EE countries did not perceive Russia as a threat is completely, utterly wrong. It was their fear of Russia that made them desperately seeking the membership in NATO. Sure, the US was eager to complyl, as it suited their geopolitical interests, but they were not the main force for the expansion. They could only either allow it or prevent it. That does not mean that the West did not want to normalize the relations with Russia - they surely hoped that maybe Russia abandons its imperialistic tendencies. Still, it would be unwise not to prepare for the worst, especially that the political situation in Russia was far from stable.

When did I say that? Your citation is correct: he was against NATO membership. Very clear. I don't see where the confusion is. — Mikie

Well, you have claimed that NATO expansion was the major factor in the regime change, when it was clearly not. Yanukovych, when elected, promised two things: economic integration with the EU and abandoning NATO aspirations. Ukrainians were fine with that - due to the Russian reaction in 2008 NATO the prospect of quick admission were dim, so Ukrainians decided neutrality was the best course - the relevant legislation was accepted by the pariiament with public acceptance. Thus your claim that the NATO perspective was 'never underground' is clearly false - Ukraine did abandon its NATO aspirations. However, that was not enough for Russians - they have coerced Yanukovych to abandon the agreement with the EU, which sparked massive protests, which in turn led to his ouster. if Russians did not meddle at that point, Yanukovych most likely would remain the president, if he was fulfilling his electoral promises, and Ukraine would remain neutral. But even that course of action was not acceptable for Russians, because Ukraine closely cooperating with the EU would gradually move out of Russia's sphere of influence, even if it was militarily neutral and not in NATO. Of course, after Russia invaded Ukraine and started the rebellion in Donbas, Ukrainians have realized that their pledge of neutrality meant nothing to Russia, so they began to prepare for the full-scale conflict with Russia, which they saw as invevitable.

There were two aggressions after 2008, yes. 2014 and 2022. That doesn't prove that they wouldn't have occurred anyway -- but it certainly doesn't disprove that Bucharest didn't have lasting impacts. Which it did. — Mikie

Except that the agression in 2014 and the Donbas rebellion had nothing to do with NATO, as explained above, because then Ukraine's NATO aspirations were abandonded, so at that point Bucharest did not have a lasting impact. That is why Russians during 2014 did not mention NATO at all, because at that point it did not matter. If Russians did not meddle with the EU integration, Ukraine would remain militarily neutral, just like Moldova. But that was not enough for Russians, hence the invasion and the unrest in Donbas which you stubbornly ignore (which is understandable, because it completely contradicts your narrative of 'two different agressions').

So why was there such a delay? Because things changed and escalated. First, Russian military capacity changed. Second, the US supported pushing out a pro-Russian president. Third, and leading directly to all-out invasion, NATO provided training (for YEARS), weapons, and conducted drills -- and then, to top it off, in 2021, reaffirmed its position from 2008.

So if that seems like odd timing, you're just not paying attention. In fact the Russians were screaming about this for months, if not years -- to no avail. Because they're just liars and thugs, after all, so who cares what they say or think? Besides, everyone knows NATO is "defensive," and is no threat to Russia. "Just look at the Baltics." And so forth. — Mikie

Again, you just ignore the fact that things have deescalated with Yanukovych. As you say yourself, he was more pro-Russian than pro-European, unlike most Ukrainians (especially in the Western Ukraine) and he clearly curtailed NATO aspirations, with pariiament's support. And yes, the US supported pushing him out, but they did not cause it. Can you see the difference? The massive protests sparked for a specific reason, which the US had nothing to do with. Ironically, Russians had more to do with his ouster than the US - because for Putin he was pro-Russian, but not enough (as he was still seeking economic ties with the EU). And military training began AFTER Ukraine was attacked and had to fend off the conflict in Donbas.

Mikie: 'Russia would not attack if Ukraine did not want to join NATO!'
Jabberwock: 'Russia has attacked Ukraine in 2014 precisely when it has abandoned its NATO aspirations.'
Mikie: 'Let us talk about something else! How about 2022?'

Ok, I'll put it this way: if they invaded at any point from 2000-2008, or especially after 2004-2008, I'd be wrong. If they cited NATO expansion, that would be very odd. They could have cited US influence, however. — Mikie

But that is not what I have pointed out. Your claim was that in 2008 they had sufficient reason to start a war. Obviously it was not sufficient, given that they have not started it. If it was because they were too weak militarily, as you know say, then that equally applies to the years before 2008.

Of course it runs deeper. Of course there are complexities. To argue the Ukraine invasion of 2022 had IittIe to do with NATO is simply ignoring the facts, in my view. If China were training troops and conducting military driIIs in Mexico, and then China announces it would push for a pact -- despite warnings of the US -- I think the response by the US would be not that surprising, and one would say China's involvement was a decisive factor indeed. True, we could aIso make up other stories, and of course there'd be some truth in them, but to ignore the gIaringIy obvious just isn't serious. — Mikie

Your wording very well betrays your mindset: 'China trains troops in Mexico', not 'Mexicans are trained by China'. 'China pushes for a pact', not 'Mexico wants a pact with China'. For you only 'global players' exist, all others are just pawns with no agency. That is exactly how you consider the countries of the Eastern Europe or the former republics. We should carefully listen to what Russians perceive as a threat, but attitudes of Ukrainians and others are irrelevant. You 'respect' their opinions, but completely ignore them.

So let me rephrase your analogy: Mexico is training troops with China and drives for a pact in China AFTER the US has already attacked it. It does make a difference, does it not?

So military training, weapons, Operation Sea Breeze, and the Joint Statement on the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership (September of 2021) -- aII of this we should ignore because at some point the BBC said -- God knows when -- that Ukraine rejects any ambition to join NATO?

Again, this just isn't serious. — Mikie

That is exactly what I was pointing out. If any fact does not suit your narrative, you just dismiss it. Ukraine has clearly abandoned its NATO aspirations and DESPITE THIS, Russia has still invaded it and organized and sponsored an armed rebellion for eight years. Has it passed your mind that Ukraine's subsequent abandonment of neutrality and military training of troops AFTER 2014 might possibly have something to do with the fact that Russia has ALREADY attacked it and sustained an open armed conflict since 2014? As I understand, you believe Ukraine's reaction should be: 'Oh, yes, they have taken Crimea, and are killing our troops in Donbas, let us pretend none of this is happening, then they SURELY will not attack us in full force, if only we do not mention NATO'. Do you realize how absurd that sounds?

There was no war in Ukraine prior to 2008. So there — I just proved it.

How silly.

NATO was the most direct cause of the war in Ukraine. There’s plenty of evidence for this. Now you ask me to show that in an alternate universe, where NATO expansion wasn’t on the table, that there wouldn’t be war. No, I can’t do that, because I don’t possess the magic. — Mikie

But that was your claim! You wrote specifically:

No one said that. But there wouldn’t have been invasion. Of course NATO is only the most direct cause — but there are others. — Mikie

To which I have asked how do you know that. I am glad now that you do admit that you cannot know that.

NATO was the most convenient pretext this time for increasing the ongoing hostilities. But as we know from the Russian invasion of Crimea, any other pretext will do.

No, it did start at the Bucharest Summit. I mentioned the OR in response to your irrelevant perplexity at why claims differed in 2008 from 2002.

To be clear, by “it” I’m referring to 2022. — Mikie

So you believe the fact that Russia turned hostile toward Ukraine after 2004 has nothing to do with the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, even though the Crimea invasion was directly caused by the events quite similar to the Orange Revolution. Seriously?

And the careful distinction of 'it' very well shows how peculiar your views you are. Let me sum them up: you carefully ignore the fact that Russians got hostile at Ukraine in 2004, then in 2008 NATO supposedly provokes Russia, but Russia does nothing but protest (even though provoking Russia with NATO expansion supposedly causes wars - if it was worth the war then would be the time!), then Russia takes a break from being threatened and provoked by NATO expansion, invades Ukraine for related but distinctly different reasons (without even mentioning NATO expansion!), then goes back to being threatened by NATO expansion and invades again in 2022.

If that summary somehow misrepresents your views, please correct me.

Then I suggest you read about Yanukovych and his position regarding NATO expansion. It’s relevant indeed. So yes, NATO was always in the background as a threat— since 2008. That is not to say it was the most direct cause of Crimea, as I said repeatedly. But it was still a major factor in the regime change. — Mikie

Well, I actually I did read about it. Wiki claims that in his speech he stated:

On 14 February 2010, Yanukovych said that Ukraine's relations with NATO were currently "well-defined", and that there was "no question of Ukraine joining NATO." — Wikipedia

Unfortunately, it does not provide the source.

Also, this article from BBC sums up things nicely, with such passages like:

The Ukrainian parliament has approved a bill that effectively rejects any ambition to join Nato.

The law, submitted by President Viktor Yanukovych, cements Ukraine's status as a military non-aligned country - though it will co-operate with Nato.

President Yanukovych was elected earlier this year, vowing to end Ukraine's Nato membership ambitions and mend relations with Russia.
[...]
The new bill bars Ukraine's membership in any military bloc, but allows for co-operation with alliances such as Nato. — BBC

As I understand, from your suggestion that I read about his position, you have a citation where Yanukovych says something completely opposite? Can you provide it?

Was there a Russian invasion of Ukraine prior to the NATO provocation of 2008?

Notice these things happened after 2008, when NATO was a looming threat— even during a relatively Russian- friendly time under a character like Yanukovych. — Mikie

Was there a war after the 2008 provocation? Because if the war in 2022 is the reaction to 2008 provocation, then it must be... how you put it? Oh, yes: 'Quite a delayed reaction'.

So on your interpretation Russia was under constant threat of NATO's invasion since 2008, yet it started the invasion of Ukraine as late as in 2022, even though in the meantime it has ALSO invaded the very same Ukraine (and supported the armed rebellion) for different reasons... Really?

I never once made that claim, which is ridiculous — because I’m not a wizard. — Mikie

Well, you did write:

But there wouldn’t have been invasion. — Mikie

Was that ridiculous?

The claim I made was that NATO involvement was the most direct cause of the war (the current war).

What would have happened if NATO wasn’t training troops, providing weapons, conducting drills, etc? Your guess is as good as mine. Maybe there would be war still. Maybe Ukraine would invade Russia. Who knows? I don’t see it as being likely— but I don’t have a Time Machine to tell you definitively one way or another. — Mikie

Well, you made that specific claim, 'But there wouldn't have been invasion', so I take it you have changed your position.

And I find it VERY likely that Russia would attack Ukraine again, for the very same reasons it has attacked in in 2014 and supported hostilities since that time.

And, actually, you do not have to have a time machine, you can use historical sources to get to know the situation better, then you can have a better view of the possible outcomes. I heartily recommend it. If you have used them, you would now that the hostilities have never ceased and Ukraine was preparing troops, weapons etc. exactly for the reason that it was ALREADY in conflict with Russia.

I’m not talking about hostile attitudes, I’m talking about actions. — Mikie

And I am talking about actions, 14 thousand people died in Donbas between 2014 and 2021, which you seem to be blissfully unaware of. For you there were two related, but different wars, at two different times, simply because you do not know the facts. Could that lack of knowledge influence your view that it was unlikely Russia would have attacked Ukraine? By the way, you might also not know that there were half-hearted attempts to end the hostilities known as the Minsk Accords. Care to know how much of them is devoted to the supposedly essential issue of Ukraine's membership in NATO?

If Russia invaded Ukraine in 2005, my position would be wrong. — Mikie

Well, by that logic, given that Russia did not invade Ukraine right after 2008, your position is also wrong. NATO provoked Russia with expansion, Russia did nothing for fourteen years (of course, it did invade Ukraine in the meantime, but that does not count). After all, you believe that the threat from NATO was constant from 2008 till 2022, don't you?

So give me the alternative. You clearly don’t care about what Putin or his diplomats say— you don’t care what the US ambassador says. So what’s the “real” reason to suddenly become hostile to Ukraine? Changing internal politics in Russia? Okay — unpack that a little, and give some evidence. Because it seems very obvious NATO expansion was considered a red line, and that reactions would happen the more they pushed. You seem to think they’re lying and it’s just a cover for something else. — Mikie

I care about Putin's pretexts of post-USSR conflicts (because there were many) about as much as I care about Bush's pretexts of Iraq's second invasion. In today's world attacking other countries without casus belli is frowned upon, so they always try to come up with something. Amusingly, Putin's 'official' reasons for invading Crimea were quite different than what you have described (he was supposedly defending the Crimea's Russian minority against the oppresive Kiyv government), so you do not believe him either.

As I wrote, the internal situation in Russia in those years was quite complex and it is difficult to summarize it in a few paragraphs (especially when you say that I am entitled to lectures on history). In general, Putin's predecessor, Yeltsin, after what seemed to be a drive toward democratization, had to face a Communist putsch. The results were somewhat ambiguous: it is true that the putsch was defeated and the vision of the return of hardliners was averted, but at the same time his grip on power was significantly strengthened and the transition to democracy never fully recovered. This was compounded by the fact that his power to a large degree depended on the support of oligarchs, who got rich in the course of 'wild privatization' of the state companies (many of them remained 'state' only in name). Given that his circles were engaged in the rampant corruption, facing end of presidency he chose to 'annoit' a relatively unknown Putin as his successor. Note that his election was most likely legitimate - given lack of democratic traditions, Russians seemingly did not mind being told who to vote for. But it should be noted that he gained a lot of popularity due to his hardline handling of the Chechen conflict (some say it was even started by Russians, but it cannot be proven).

Still, Putin's rule was not that strong during his first term - he was not as popular as Yeltsin (he had just 53% of support) and he did not have a good support base similar to 'Yeltsin's familia' (especially after the fallout with Berezovsky). And after 2000 Russians became very disappointed with the consequences of the fall of the USSR: after initial enthusiasm, they began to resent it, especially that the new economy lacked the social safety nets of the old system, crime was rampant, inflation began to rise again etc. Geopolitically former republics began to distance themselves from Russia. More importantly, the Chechen War was still ongoing, with possible expansion of the conflict to other republics. This in turn activated Russian nationalists, who demanded strong suppression of rebellious republics, especially after the Moscow theatre massacre.

Thus Putin just before his second term elections had to appease both those who yearned for the return of the USSR and those who supported imperialistic rhetoric. Of course, there was no real conflict between the two: USSR was as imperialistic as Russia before, as it basically treated many of its republics and satellites as colonies (but that would require an even longer lecture, even though understanding that is essential to current events).

Putin has actually embraced both, and that is still evident in Russian propaganda. E.g. Solovyov has no problem praising both Stalin and tzarist politics, even though communists have completely renounced tzars (officially, at least). In order to strengthen his support before elections he both praised the USSR (calling its fall 'the greatest tragedy') and taking a much harder stance on the dealings with former republics. That included Ukraine, but was in no way limited to it, as the main focus was Caucasus, which did not even show any NATO aspirations. This coincided with the supposed global war on terror, which conveniently allowed him to frame all the ongoing conflicts as anti-terroristic (to be clear, some of the unrest in the Caucasus was inspired by Islamic extremists). That is why the concept of the Russian MIr has been officially adopted.

However, in the meantime something even worse happened: the Color Revolutions have begun. These were even worse, because they not only caused the former republics to move away from Russian influences, but threatened Putin directly: around 2004 his rule was already much more authoritarian (and corrupt) than in 2000 and 'exporting' of the protests to Russia could end in his ouster or worse. This of course increased the already heightened tensions between Russia and other republics. After the elections in 2004 Putin enjoyed much stronger popular support, but his foreign policy has visibly changed, as mentioned in our discussion.

I also think you mistakenly believe I’m putting the entirety of this war on NATO. I’m not. That happened to be the most direct cause — not the ONLY one. I also focus on it because I’m a US citizen, and so I criticize them more so than other countries, who may indeed share in some responsibility. — Mikie

What you, in my opinion, fail to see is that the conflict runs much deeper and NATO expansion is just one of the points, not decisive one. The underlying issue is that Putin is no longer willing (or cannot afford) to allow losing Russian influence in the former republics, even against the will of their populations.

NATO never “resurfaced” because it never went underground. It was there all along — in fact more so after Crimea. — Mikie

So when BBC wrote that Ukraine 'effectively rejects any ambition to join Nato', they were completely wrong. I see.

So I’m supposed to argue for something that didn’t happen. No thank you.

No, I don’t think there would be a war today if it weren’t for NATO involvement in Ukraine — if that’s what you’re asking. But you keep switching topics. Above I was referring to the current war in Ukraine, the invasion of 2022— not 2014, which is related but not the same. — Mikie

No, you are supposed to argue to support your claim: that there would be no war without the talk of NATO expansion. That is essential if you also claim that the war was provoked by NATO. 'I don't think' is not an argument.

And no, I am switching the topics, if you think the 2014 invasion and and the 2022 are unrelated then it is just bizarre and clearly shows you are missing the bigger picture, the background of what was actually happening in Russia during Putin's rule. These are not two different wars, these are just the stages of the same conflict. As you are seemingly unaware, the hostilities have never really ceased, they just had different phases of intensity.

It started at the Bucharest summit and escalated from there. But if you’re referring to Crimea, then yes— that occurred for a different reason which you deliberately ignored: the ouster of Yanukovych, which the United States supported. All the while, in the background, NATO membership was of course still on the table.

The connection here is obvious, and you want to gloss over with word games: “Well NATO wasn’t directly involved with overthrowing Yanukovych, so clearly it wasn’t a factor in annexing Crimea.” But you know very well what Yanukovych’s stand was regarding NATO. — Mikie

No, it did not start at the Bucharest summit, which you yourself have acknowledged, citing as one of the causes the Orange Revolution, which happened in 2004. I have shown you the article about the many sources of the Russian propaganda from 2004-2005 which clearly denied Ukraine's statehood, demanded that Ukrainians be 'liberated' etc. That was the time when the Putin's rhetoric changed, partially due to the hardliners' influences, but not only that, the evolution of the Russian internal politics is a rather complex subject.

And how exactly I have 'ignored' the ouster of Yanukovych, given that I have cited the Euromaidan as the reason, twice, because you have accused me of the same once before? Let me guess, you do not even know what the Euromaidan is, and you are unaware that Euromaidan and the ouster of Yanukovych are the same thing?

Sure, the US supported the Euromaidan, so what? It was still a grass-root movement protesting the abandonment of tighter integration with the EU. Are you saying that Russia would not react to the Euromaidan if the US did not support it? That is rather unrealistic, to put it mildly. The 2014 invasion was over the loss of influence of Russia on the internal politics.

And no, Yanukovych's stand was not regarding NATO, it was about the European Union–Ukraine Association Agreement. I understand you do not make huge distinctions, but you are aware that the EU and the US are not the same?

So much for Crimea. What I’ve been discussing, however, is the current war. The prospects of NATO were there all along, and played a significant (but varied) role in various events prior. The most direct result of the current war was NATO provocation, in the years after 2014 but especially 2021.

The most direct cause of Crimea was Yanukovych‘s overthrow. But again, that’s not the same thing— and in any case, NATO was still a significant factor. The world is complex, and these things are connected. I don’t make a huge distinction between NATO and general “US influence,” as I’ve said. If that’s confusing, fine — I’ll be more precise. But anyone who can’t see how these things are at least interrelated isn’t paying attention. — Mikie

As I wrote, these are not two different wars, this is the same Russia trying to exert its influence on the same Ukraine by any means it seems fit. It has invaded Crimea, then it supported an armed rebellion on the territory of Ukraine for eight years (which you are seemingly unaware of) and then moved to open hostilities again. So yes, you still need that argument that Russia would not invade Ukraine again if not for NATO.

And sure, everything is interrelated, that is the exact point I am making. It is you who is making a claim based on separate, selected facts ignoring all the others, Russian internal politics in particular.

I assume you saw “after Crimea.” So by “Ukraine invasion” you’re referring to 2022, which is a reaction to Euromaidan? That’s your explanation? Very odd. Quite a delayed reaction. — Mikie

Sigh. You wrote:

So nothing else happened in 2014 that may be relevant to this story, huh? Putin just decided, out of the blue, to invade Crimea — Mikie

So you have impiled that I have not given the reason for the invasion of CRIMEA, as you wrote yourself.

To which I have responded:

No, Putin did not invade Ukraine out of the blue, as I wrote, it was the reaction to Euromaidan. Did you skip that part? — Jabberwock

So clearly I have referred to your own quote about Crimea.

I don’t have to, since it didn’t happen. Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 — which was different from 2022. Both involved US influence, but the latter’s cause (of the much larger war) was mostly NATO.

So we can see the differences based on reaction. When the EUUAA was signed — a pretty big deal to Russia— there wasn’t the level of reaction of 2022.

Maybe there would be one if Ukraine tried to join the EU— who knows? If so, then that would be the direct cause of the reaction. But since it hasn’t happened, there’s no point discussing it. — Mikie

Yes, you do have to, because it is your claim that without NATO expansion the war would NOT happen. That the cause was NATO is just your assertion, which is seriously undermined by the facts: the hostile attitude toward Ukraine started at least after the Orange Revolution, not after 2008 as your claim, Russia has once already invaded Ukraine for its drive to integrate with the EU (or the drive toward independence in general) and it has organized and supported an armed rebellion long before any talks of NATO resurfaced again.

Because it was stated explicitly, for years, that there would be consequences and that Russia would react to further provocation. When they actually did, it should have come as no surprise -- especially after Biden administration actions in 2021. (Which we could go over if you like -- but I'm not getting into the weeds on any issue when the general argument isn't even understood. If this gives the appearance that I am "unaware" of history, I don't care.)

That's the most direct cause. But there are others, as I've repeatedly said. Incorporating Ukraine wasn't restricted to NATO. That was simply the most threatening. Attempts to liberalize and join the EU were others. — Mikie

But that does not answer the question. You are supposed to argue that Russia would NOT attack Ukraine if not for NATO expansion. If Ukraine's increasing independence and its EU aspirations are also the reasons, you have to give a proper argument that Russia why none of those would be a reason for invasion. That might be a bit hard, given that Russia did invade Ukraine in 2014 exactly for those reasons.

NATO membership is one part of overall US influence, yes. How you think I'm changing my mind on this is baffling. NATO isn't part of United States influence? I see them as one and the same thing -- but even if we're to separate the two somehow, NATO expansion on it's own was the main driver of the Ukraine war. — Mikie

No, it was not, because the conflict started when Ukraine's prospect of joining NATO were dim.

For someone who feels entitled to give lectures on history, you sure do leave out of a lot when it's convenient. So nothing else happened in 2014 that may be relevant to this story, huh? Putin just decided, out of the blue, to invade Crimea. Is this supposed to be serious? What were the reasons given, and should we at least know them, if not take them seriously? Do you know what they were? Or do you not care, given that you have a direct line to Putin's soul?

In any case, the events after 2014 are also interesting. Was this also a time when NATO expansion was off the table? You would think so, after Crimea. But no -- the push continued, even stronger. — Mikie

No, Putin did not invade Ukraine out of the blue, as I wrote, it was the reaction to Euromaidan. Did you skip that part?

And sure, Ukraine rejected its neutrality pledge after Russia has invaded it, in hope of seeking the protection. How is that unreasonable?

What change in policy? — Mikie

You argue that there was no change in the policy between 2002 and 2008 based on the quote from 2002? You do know that 2002 happened before 2008?

But again, it's really not worth arguing over that. I've already granted you that point. So I hardly am "pretending" otherwise. What I've repeatedly said is that it has nothing to do with 2008. The position then was quite clear. You want to pretend that position, in 2008, can be ignored because of the 'sudden change of heart' from 2002. I think that is and was a grave mistake. — Mikie

No, I fully acknowledge the change of the policy and the rhetoric, I was just pointing out that it was part of a bigger process in which the stance of NATO was only a minor point. Yes, Russians used fierce rhetoric about the NATO expansion, but at that time they used similar rhetoric about Ukraine's and other republics' independence, status of minorities, state integrity and other topics. Picking just NATO expansion and arguing as if it was the only one point in that rhetoric is missing the bigger picture.

So, again: make the argument that Russia would NOT invade Ukraine if it e.g. tried to join the EU or broke its ties with Russia.

Russian imperialists? I guess that’s just assumed. Given that, we can make up a nice story that removes any US responsibility. How convenient. — Mikie

I have made up Zhirinovsky? Is that your poor attempt at masking your lack of knowledge on the subject?

Here is an article covering Russian propaganda, mostly on Ukraine. You can see on the charts that the demands to 'liberate Ukraine' have peaked after 2004 (i.e. the Orange Revolution). 'Ukraine is a fake country' has a pronounced peak around 2005:
[url]http://file:///C:/Temp/Downloads/EJTS_2022_Vol_10_No_2+(5)+(3).pdf[/url]

I can provide quite a few other examples, including from Russian TV.

No one said that. But there wouldn’t have been invasion. Of course NATO is only the most direct cause — but there are others. — Mikie

How exactly can you know that?

US influence isn’t restricted to NATO. The US’s plans for Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, had several aspects. The “democratization” pretext is always there. Making the world safe for freedom, etc.— like Iraq and every other country we interfere with. — Mikie

Your claim was that the expansion of NATO was provocation to war. If you want to change your mind and say that it was actually general US influence and not the expansion as such, just say so.

But irrelevant. Why? Because we don’t continue plans to welcome Ukraine to NATO when Russia, and our own ambassador, warns explicitly (rather than reading minds) that it would be considered a provocation. That is very clear. Which is why all you have in response that’s concrete — and not a nice story — are reports from 2002, six years prior. — Mikie

And that is exactly what happened - after 2008 the plans of Ukraine joining NATO were shelved and in 2010 Ukraine adopted legislation that would prevent it from joining military alliances. Yet in 2014 Russia has still invaded it, taking Crimea. Given that NATO expansion could no longer serve as a pretext, they have made up different ones. So it seems giving up on NATO does not prevent Russian invasions.

So your entire point was to fill in the “gaps” with the typical United States propaganda. I figured.

“Hey Russia is telling us Ukraine is a red line. Our ambassador agrees. Let’s go ahead and push for it anyway, because they were fine with it years ago and they’re real motive is that they hate freedom.” — Mikie

No, I have filled up the gaps with specific facts from Russian history which you were blissfully unaware of, as is quite evident. You just pretend that the change of the policy did not happen, because the explanation for that change undermines your whole narrative.

You have claimed that Nuland's conversation was before Euromaidan, which is factually incorrect. That the worst violence happened on 20th February does not change the fact that they have continued since November, long before Nuland's conversation. You may lol as much as you want, the fact is that you know very little about things you discuss.

The Maidan protests began on 21 November 2013, first clashes with the police happened on 24 November. So yes, you are not well-informed enough.