Apparent from reading reports by the ISW, Oryx, or various commentators who cite their sources. — Echarmion

I do not find where ISW makes any tally of Russian losses.

Oryx methodology is an absolute joke; they count any piece of video provided by Ukraine with zero context purporting to show a Russian loss as a "verified" Russian loss.

Anyways, with the end of the war we'll get a better picture of what the losses have actually been.

I demand argument mostly, and some reference to facts on the ground rather than airy declarations.

You, I might remind you, have provided zero evidence yourself. — Echarmion

I've provided plenty of evidence throughout this discussion to support my points.

For the matter at hand however, it's not under dispute that Russia is the larger force. You don't dispute that, neither does anyone else. The argument is straightforward that the larger force is likely to win, especially in a a war of attrition that is the current configuration of the war.

The argument is so obvious based on so obvious facts that asking for references just highlights your confusion as to where you are, what your purpose in life is and what is happening generally speaking. For, you, nor anyone else, disputes these facts, so there is no need to support them with citations.

I point out that actual evidence is needed to believe the contrary: that despite being a smaller country with a smaller military and less capabilities, that Ukraine is going to win or there is even a viable path to victory.

You, nor anyone else, can now present such evidence that Ukraine is "winning" against the odds, or even a remotely plausible theory of how Ukraine could potentially win.

The best that is offered is that it's hypothetically possible for a smaller force to defeat a larger force or then larger forces have tired of war and gone home in the past.

Failing to answer such questions and find any evidence, you feebly retreat to demanding I provide evidence to support my position.

You really want evidence that Russia is the larger country with the larger military? Or do you really want evidence that the war at the moment, and since a while, is not a war of manoeuvre but of attrition?

Or do you want me to through the basic arithmetic required to understand that in any attritional process of even remote parity (of which there is no reason to believe any asymmetry is in Ukraine's favour), the larger of the abrading assemblies has the advantage.

Or do you want me to cite CNN citing Ukrainian top officials saying exactly the same thing?

Two articles published this week give a stark assessment of Ukraine’s prospects in its war with Russia. One – by the commander in chief of the Ukrainian military – admits the battlefield has reached a stalemate and a long attritional war benefiting Moscow beckons. The other portrays Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as exhausted by the constant effort to cajole and persuade allies to keep the faith.

Ukraine’s military chief, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, says in a long essay and interview with the Economist that “just like in the First World War we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate.”

He acknowledges: “There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough,” but instead an equilibrium of devastating losses and destruction. — Exhausted and disappointed with allies, Ukraine’s president and military chief warn of long attritional war - CNN

So are the Ukrainians fools for strategically deciding which front to defend? Because earlier you lauded Finnland for that strategy. — Echarmion

I lauded Finland for using military action to support feasible political objectives and conserving their military force through defending rather than working themselves up into a delusional war frenzy and promising to "retake every inch of Finnish lands" before recklessly throwing themselves at prepared Soviet Defences.

Now, it just so happens that Finland had suitable geography to defend against a larger force, one reason to gamble on costly military defence rather than capitulate.

Ukrainian political leaders are fools for not using their military leverage (before it is exhausted) to negotiate the best possible terms for peace.

These are the kind of airy statements unmoored from facts on the ground that I meant earlier. — Echarmion

What are you disputing exactly? That Ukraine won the battle of Kiev in 2022?

Or are you disputing the basic principle that military power should be used to achieve political objectives (either by physically implementing them or leverage in negotiation) ... rather than express wanton hate and strive for pointless destruction?

Hahaha, yeah the famed second russian army they kept in reserve. Too bad it never made it to Ukraine... — Echarmion

I'm referring to the fact that Russia has far larger professional standing army, far more reservists and conscripts that can be mobilized. Are you disputing this fact? That Russia, being larger, has far more manpower available?

And this famed second army does exist and is still in reserve. It may simply be used to simply continue the attritional fighting and rotate and replenish troops or maybe it will be used for some large offensive maneuver anywhere along the border with Ukraine / Belarus.

You're discussing a strawman. The russian army has demonstrated ability to learn in various areas. That said it still seems to suffer from C&C flaws, which aren't surprising in an autocratic regime.

But anyway what's the point of discussing when you're clearly have a very different picture of reality but don't seem interested in naming your sources. — Echarmion

What straw man? I'm discussing the propaganda pervasive at the start of the war that the Russian army was incompetent and easy to defeat. Propaganda that was essential to convince the West and Ukraine to rush into total war.

For, if you paused to reflect that Russia is far larger and the degree to which, man for man, Ukraine would need to outperform Ukraine with less military capabilities (air, sea, armour, drones, electronic warfare etc.) the doubt may creep in that maybe Ukraine cannot win a total war with Russia and it would be much better for the Ukrainian people and Europe to negotiate a peace, compromise with the Russians to save lives and as much Ukrainian sovereignty as possible.

Of course, no need for such sober deliberations if the Russian soldier is some hapless retarded child wandering around the battle field in a blissfully ignorant whimsy.

Again, the position that requires evidence is the idea that Ukraine can inflict massively asymmetric losses required to win.

My position is based on the facts that are not in dispute: Russia is larger and has more military capabilities and there is no reason to believe Ukraine can somehow win in such a disadvantaged position.

Of course, US / NATO could have tried to even the odds by pouring in advanced capabilities, but they didn't because they fear nuclear escalation, which even if the risk is small is not a risk worth taking for Ukraine.

You can't win against quislings. It's just a game of whack-a-mole; every time you knock down some bullshit claim, they pop-up with another one. Then, when you've handed them their ass on that one, they circle back to the original bullshit, and claim they were right all along.

My guess would be something along the lines of:

- Occupy strategically vital areas, ergo landbridge to Crimea.
- Try to force the West to negotiate a quick end to the war through a show of force around the capital. — Tzeentch

Why would "the West" be the one negotiating in such a scenario?

In March/April 2022 the West blocked a peace treaty that was in the final stages of being signed, signaling the end of the first 'phase' of the war. The Russians shifted gears, rearranged their lines to cover vital areas and be able to withstand a long war since they were probably overextended initially.

And that's pretty much the war in a nutshell.

The media has been propping up this war to no end, but it really isn't much more complicated than that. — Tzeentch

Which is still an unsourced claim that's only repeated by people with a known pro-Russia bias.

Clearly. All that connects Crimea to Russia is the Kerch bridge, which would not last a day under normal war-time conditions but was probably spared due to political reasons. (i.e. the Americans pressuring the Ukrainians not to push the Russians too far, as per ↪boethius
arguments).

Imagine what the Russian situation would have looked like had the US been able to continue their militarization of Ukraine. — Tzeentch

So the Americans are holding the Ukrainians back, but at the same time the Americans are the one threatening Ukraine's neutrality. Yeah makes sense....

For example, only 20,000 Russian troops participated in the battle of Kiev. Woefully inadequate to effectively occupy a city of nearly 3 million inhabitants, not to mention the some 40,000 - 60,000 Ukrainian defenders. It's just not feasible by any stretch, considering a 3:1 advantage is pretty much the bare minimum for large-scale offensive operations.

There was a 3:1 advantage alright, in favor of the Ukrainians. — Tzeentch

Not the answer to my question.

Also no idea where you're getting your numbers from. Per Wikipedia Ukraine had 20.000 regulars and 18.000 irregulars across the entire northern front, while Russia had some 70.000 regular troops.

And finally you're assuming perfect information and foresight on the part of Russia.

Of course, this was spun as a heroic defense by Ukraine. It obviously wasn't. — Tzeentch

Obviously. It can't be because that would disagree with your narrative.

The Russians rolled up to Kiev and then stood there for about a month to see if the negotiations would bear fruit. Skirmishes took place and of course the Russians took losses. That's what happens during war. The Russians aren't afraid to break a few eggs in order to bake an omelet. — Tzeentch

Yes, let's ignore the entire well documented battle and go with your fantasy of russian forces leisurely rolling up to the capital to wait for negotiations. Maybe the unicorns also came down to greet them?

It's just sad at this point.

No, I'm not.

The US was investing billions of dollars into Ukraine even before the Maidan and the 2014 Crimea invasion. That's what they're openly admitting. — Tzeentch

Changing the goalposts. Not a surprise.

The US is admitting to giving the Ukrainians billions in military aid - a country that had a critical role of neutral buffer between East and West, and you say "so what"? — Tzeentch

It was not the point under discussion. But do keep changing the subject whenever one of your so called arguments fails.

To put it in academic terms; the US fucked around and found out. — Tzeentch

How many US soldiers died? And how many Russians?

He does not. In his 2022 lectures he says something along the lines of 'the Russians intended to capture or threaten Kiev' (which was already a controversial statement at the time). In more recent lectures he states outright he doubts that the Russians ever intended to capture Kiev, and that's the argument I am making. — Tzeentch

You're not making an argument, you're repeating a claim. If he changed his tune that's too bad, but only illustrates he's loosing his grip on reality. It happens all too often to people who get too drunk on their own theories.

That's not my claim. I just think that's an extraordinarily weak explanation, probably borne of lazy thinking by lesser minds, and not really worth considering. — Tzeentch

Oh, lesser minds, is it? Unlike your, extraordinary mind, which knows all there is to know, without even having to deal with pesky reality on the way.

If the Russians are a bunch of dummies then why are we even discussing? Victory is surely right around the corner. I can't wait to see it. — Tzeentch

Strawman. Not a particularly interesting one either.

Ah, but here's the strategy.

The Russians bit off a strategically relevant chunk that is small enough for them to pacify.

I would not be surprised if there is going to be a second invasion of Ukraine which follows roughly the same pattern. Mearsheimer seems to believe as much. He expects the Russians to take another belt of oblasts to the west of what they have occupied now. — Tzeentch

Using it's secret, second army, which will no doubt ride into battle on their magic unicorns.

But of course you don't think so because Putin the master strategist has already decided he has enough.

War requires sacrifices and military friction supposes failures small and large. That's the nature of war. — Tzeentch

Unless you're Ukraine. Then military friction is actually a sign of imminent collapse and every loss is a devastating defeat.

Anyways, with the end of the war we'll get a better picture of what the losses have actually been. — boethius

And in the meantime you'll just ignore the evidence because it suits you. Because that's proper epistemology, apparently.

I've provided plenty of evidence throughout this discussion to support my points.

For the matter at hand however, it's not under dispute that Russia is the larger force. You don't dispute that, neither does anyone else. The argument is straightforward that the larger force is likely to win, especially in a a war of attrition that is the current configuration of the war.

The argument is so obvious based on so obvious facts that asking for references just highlights your confusion as to where you are, what your purpose in life is and what is happening generally speaking. For, you, nor anyone else, disputes these facts, so there is no need to support them with citations.

I point out that actual evidence is needed to believe the contrary: that despite being a smaller country with a smaller military and less capabilities, that Ukraine is going to win or there is even a viable path to victory.

You, nor anyone else, can now present such evidence that Ukraine is "winning" against the odds, or even a remotely plausible theory of how Ukraine could potentially win.

The best that is offered is that it's hypothetically possible for a smaller force to defeat a larger force or then larger forces have tired of war and gone home in the past.

Failing to answer such questions and find any evidence, you feebly retreat to demanding I provide evidence to support my position.

You really want evidence that Russia is the larger country with the larger military? Or do you really want evidence that the war at the moment, and since a while, is not a war of manoeuvre but of attrition?

Or do you want me to through the basic arithmetic required to understand that in any attritional process of even remote parity (of which there is no reason to believe any asymmetry is in Ukraine's favour), the larger of the abrading assemblies has the advantage.

Or do you want me to cite CNN citing Ukrainian top officials saying exactly the same thing? — boethius

I didn't ask you to prove any of these, but I'm glad you got all that anger off your chest.

I lauded Finland for using military action to support feasible political objectives and conserving their military force through defending rather than working themselves up into a delusional war frenzy and promising to "retake every inch of Finnish lands" before recklessly throwing themselves at prepared Soviet Defences.

Now, it just so happens that Finland had suitable geography to defend against a larger force, one reason to gamble on costly military defence rather than capitulate.

Ukrainian political leaders are fools for not using their military leverage (before it is exhausted) to negotiate the best possible terms for peace. — boethius

I guess we'll see when the war is over. After all Finnland did loose, while Ukraine hasn't lost yet.

I'm referring to the fact that Russia has far larger professional standing army, far more reservists and conscripts that can be mobilized. Are you disputing this fact? That Russia, being larger, has far more manpower available? — boethius

Yes actually, in terms of effective manpower. It does not have "far more". It has far more population, but it's ability to train and equip effective frontline forces, while still superior to Ukraine's, is not decisively larger. As evidenced by the fact that there's a stalemate and Russia has been struggling to rotate degraded units.

And this famed second army does exist and is still in reserve. It may simply be used to simply continue the attritional fighting and rotate and replenish troops or maybe it will be used for some large offensive maneuver anywhere along the border with Ukraine / Belarus. — boethius

Oh god you're actually serious...

What straw man? I'm discussing the propaganda pervasive at the start of the war that the Russian army was incompetent and easy to defeat. Propaganda that was essential to convince the West and Ukraine to rush into total war. — boethius

At the start of the war everyone assumed the russian army would overrun Ukraine in weeks, as far as I remember.

For, if you paused to reflect that Russia is far larger and the degree to which, man for man, Ukraine would need to outperform Ukraine with less military capabilities (air, sea, armour, drones, electronic warfare etc.) the doubt may creep in that maybe Ukraine cannot win a total war with Russia and it would be much better for the Ukrainian people and Europe to negotiate a peace, compromise with the Russians to save lives and as much Ukrainian sovereignty as possible. — boethius

Maybe it cannot, but for one Russia is not as of now fighting a total war in Ukraine and, for another, military capabilities seem to be about at parity for now, which means that Ukraine certainly has not lost the ability to negotiate from a position of strength.

Of course, no need for such sober deliberations if the Russian soldier is some hapless retarded child wandering around the battle field in a blissfully ignorant whimsy.

Again, the position that requires evidence is the idea that Ukraine can inflict massively asymmetric losses required to win.

My position is based on the facts that are not in dispute: Russia is larger and has more military capabilities and there is no reason to believe Ukraine can somehow win in such a disadvantaged position. — boethius

Again apart from the fact that they have alredy suffered three major defeats in this war and have had obvious problems replacing both men and materiel.

To be sure I'm not claiming Ukraine is certain to win, but so far the war has certainly not demonstrated Russia's overwhelming superiority.

Well, so what? The Russians told us, over the course of some 20 years, that they view it as a threat to their vital security. We, the West, snubbed them at every turn because we thought they were weak. — Tzeentch

I'd like to elaborate on this for the benefit of people who have been confused by Western propaganda that spins military hardware and assistance as non-threatening.

The propaganda is based on the bait-and-switch fallacy of first establishing providing military assistance is legal and then switching out legal for "non threatening", then any rational discussion of this error in reasoning simply being met with endless confusion as to what "threat means", essentially concluding with the argument that since NATO does not intend to attack Russia that therefore military hardware moved close to Russia is not threatening.

The analogy required to understand how stupid this propaganda is, is to consider the scenario where I put a loaded gun to your head and then tell you I'm not threatening you because I don't intend to pull the trigger.

That a gun to your head is a threat to your safety is independent of the intention to shoot you.

Military hardware is by definition a threat to one's safety and by definition moving said military hardware closer is moving said threat closer and the party it's being moved closer to will naturally feel more threatened than if that hardware was further away.

This was a critical piece of propaganda as without accepting moving military means closer to another country is by definition moving a threat closer to that country which may provoke said country to reduce the threat, makes any rational analysis of the situation impossible.

Of course, you can argue that the military hardware moved further and further East towards Russia has nothing to do with Russia and is just a fun exercise.

Likewise, you can argue that even if Russia should feel threatened by NATO moving hardware East it shouldn't respond by invading West; that "defending national interest" is only a US prerogative, for example.

Or one could argue that despite the hardware being an obvious threat that a rational actor should try to diminish, that NATO is so far more powerful than Russia that there is no effective response.

The problem with all these arguments is of course it begs the question of why move military hardware further East if the West has no intention to threaten Russia as it claims and maybe it's just better to negotiate peace rather than do destabilizing things, in the best light, to not really achieve anything. Did moving NATO missile bases into Eastern Europe make Eastern Europe safer and a better place? If not, what was the point again?

Fanatical fighting, however, is incompatible with rational analysis.

Ok, so what do you believe those limited objectives were? — Tzeentch

First and foremost, the battle for Kyiv wasn't some kind of fake attack. Yet the fall of Ukraine didn't happened and Putin (correctly) then withdraw. Yet it's obvious, starting from Clausewitz, that this was one of the most important objectives: either take or surround the capital.

And in the meantime you'll just ignore the evidence because it suits you. Because that's proper epistemology, apparently. — Echarmion

Ignore what evidence?

I went and looked for ISW tally of Russian and Ukrainian losses, as even if heavily biased towards supporting Western narratives, I'd nevertheless be surprised if they were arguing Ukraine is inflicting the many multiple times more losses required to win a war of attrition with the Russians.

I ask you to actually cite the evidence you're referring to in the context of you complaining about the lack of evidence to support facts you don't dispute ... and you just claim I'm ignoring your evidence by asking for the actual evidence??

Oryx I also did not ignore but pointed out their methodology of just looking at videos published by Ukraine and taking them at face value is not even moronically intellectually dishonest but pure propaganda; it's essentially just relabelling Ukrainian propaganda and then considering it independent. Absolute rubbish.

I didn't ask you to prove any of these, but I'm glad you got all that anger off your chest. — Echarmion

What anger. I ask you questions.

That the questions don't need answering because the answers are so obvious closes the case that you are a complete fool.

You ask for "the evidence" to support my arguments, I ask you what evidence you want to see, and then you say you aren't asking me to prove any of the facts needed to make my argument that: bigger army with more capabilities is very likely to win a war of attrition.

Oh god you're actually serious... — Echarmion

Since the invasion, Russia has mobilized hundreds of thousands more troops thus essentially creating another army compared to the first army that invaded.

Again, what are you disputing? That Russia has mobilized hundreds of thousands additional troops? Or just you'd quibble about calling such a mobilization another army?

At the start of the war everyone assumed the russian army would overrun Ukraine in weeks, as far as I remember. — Echarmion

This is just false. Plenty of military analysts pointed out that 200 000 troops is not enough to overrun Ukraine, that Ukraine is huge, that Ukraine has the largest Army in Europe, can mobilize hundreds of thousands of additional troops, is supported by US / NATO weapons, logistics and intelligence.

Go and find even one expert pre-war military analysis that concluded Russia would overrun Ukraine in weeks, then contrast your failure to find even with "everybody".

Academic, think tank, and even talking heads in the media all agreed that essentially the maximum aim of the Russians would be to create a land bridge to Crimea compared to a minimalist incursion to simply protect the Donbas separatists. The idea Russia would be conquering all of Ukraine in weeks did not exist.

Of course, Ukraine could capitulate, but all there was pretty wide consensus that if Ukraine decided to fight it can put up a serious fight and would not be easy to defeat.

Maybe it cannot, but for one Russia is not as of now fighting a total war in Ukraine and, for another, military capabilities seem to be about at parity for now, which means that Ukraine certainly has not lost the ability to negotiate from a position of strength. — Echarmion

For someone who complains about a lack of evidence to support facts you don't doubt to begin with, you say a lot of baseless obviously false things.

Ukraine still has no air power remotely comparable to the Russians, and their top general complains about it regularly that air power is required for modern warfare.

Air power has been essential for conventional warfare since WWII. The entire US military strategy and force composition is centred around achieving air supremacy.

What parity?

As for negotiating from a position of strength ... Russia was offering Donbas to remain in Ukraine, just with some political autonomy so as to protect Russian speakers, both before the war and during the first phase. You seriously believe Ukraine will be able to get such a deal now?

And even if that was somehow in the cards (which it's not) what could possibly justify over a year more of fighting and such devastation to a deal that was rejected?

However, your focus on capabilities again simply highlights your complete ignorance of military affairs and total lack of understanding of "facts on the ground" you allude to.

The smaller party is going to lose a war of attrition even with parity in capabilities.

Russia does not need to fight a total war to fight with Ukraine, it needs only match Ukraine in man power and then rely on replenishing its forces and greater capabilities to grind down the Ukrainian military to the point of total collapse.

Since it's far larger, Russia can match Ukraine's total war and also keep running its peace time economy at the same time.

The fact that you understand Russia is not at total war but there is a "stalemate" (aka. war of attrition) should be enough in itself to conclude Ukraine is in a disastrous position.

Again apart from the fact that they have alredy suffered three major defeats in this war and have had obvious problems replacing both men and materiel.

To be sure I'm not claiming Ukraine is certain to win, but so far the war has certainly not demonstrated Russia's overwhelming superiority. — Echarmion

Russia needs to balance the war effort with maintaining a functioning economy and also domestic support for the war.

This is what the West was betting Russia would be unable to do, especially under the "nuclear option" of massive sanctions.

That was the theory of victory, some sort of internal Russian collapse. Since that didn't happen, Ukraine is now screwed as there was no military backup plan. Ukraine fighting was supposed to trigger some sort of Russian revolution and so there was no need to defeat the Russian military in the field.

There was never any evidence this theory of victory could likely work (of course, in "hypothetical land" nearly anything can work) but it was an easy sell to a Western audience.

First and foremost, the battle for Kyiv wasn't some kind of fake attack. Yet the fall of Ukraine didn't happened and Putin (correctly) then withdraw. Yet it's obvious, starting from Clausewitz, that this was one of the most important objectives: either take or surround the capital. — ssu

That there was no intention or plan to occupy Kiev does not mean it was a fake attack.

The purpose was to pressure Ukrainians / Zelensky into negotiating a settlement while also fixing troops while the South was conquered and pacified (and Azov battalion destroyed in Mariupol and prevent some sort of heroic rescue of them).

Pointing out 20 000 troops isn't enough to conquer in urban combat and occupy a capital city of a few million does not mean the attack was "fake", just that there was obviously no intention to do something so obviously impossible.

The Russians also shelled everything of military value in Kiev, such as war industries, so it accomplished that too.

Yet it's obvious, starting from Clausewitz, that this was one of the most important objectives: either take or surround the capital. — ssu

If taking Kiev was the principal Russian objective, how come the fighting around Kiev resembled nothing like we saw in places where actual bitter fighting took place? And how come they only deployed 20,000 troops to participate in the battle and they never made any serious effort to surround the capital let alone capture Kiev? We would expect massed firepower.

I agree with you to the extent that there was obviously a point to the attack on Kiev, but in my opinion this was a show of force meant to facilitate negotiations, and it served a double purpose in pulling troops to the north to faciliate the advance in the south.
_

I agree with you. The West (i.e. the United States) knew exactly what it was doing by arming Ukraine, and it did so specifically to flip Ukraine, as they said they would do at the 2008 Bucharest Summit.

It requires an extraordinary amount of naivety to believe western intentions were benign, and even more in the case of the Russians who clearly voiced their security concerns over the course of more than a decade.

Why would "the West" be the one negotiating in such a scenario? — Echarmion

The Russians are responding to a western action, namely the militarization of Ukraine. They probably expected 'the West' to be more reasonable.

Instead, the United States is completely content to sacrifice Ukraine, and the EU is too dimwitted to understand what is even going on.

Which is still an unsourced claim that's only repeated by people with a known pro-Russia bias. — Echarmion

Nonsense. Jeffrey Sachs gave us clear accounts of what the people involved told him happened. Are you really going to argue he is 'pro-Russian'? The guy is as genuine as they come.

Noam Chomsky, Seymour Hersh - all pro-Russian too?

Accusing the other side of partisanship is intellectual poverty.

Also no idea where you're getting your numbers from. Per Wikipedia Ukraine had 20.000 regulars and 18.000 irregulars across the entire northern front, while Russia had some 70.000 regular troops. — Echarmion

The Ukrainian general staff reported 31 BTGs moving on Kiev. That's roughly 21,000 soldiers. This figure never changed over the course of the month-long battle.

The Wiki article actually says ~20,000 irregulars + 'an undisclosed number of regular fighters' - Yea, I wonder why it's undisclosed? Perhaps the Battle of Kiev couldn't be spun into an 'heroic Ukrainian victory' if the Ukrainians were actually outnumbering the Russians on the defense, eh?

The 60,000 figure comes from a Seymour Hersh interview in which he suggests 40,000 regular troops + 20,000 irregulars, but even if we take your figure and suppose 40,000 defenders, that still puts the Ukrainian forces at a 2:1 advantage.

For urban fighting a city like Kiev we'd expect 3:1 in favor of the Russians as the bare minimum - we'd expect as much as 10:1 in one were planning for success.

It can't be because that would disagree with your narrative. — Echarmion

More like, it's impossible to twist the numbers to fit an 'heroic Ukrainian victory' narrative even if you wanted to.

Yes, let's ignore the entire well documented battle... — Echarmion

You mean the propaganda you've been binging on over the last year?

Yea. Let's ignore that.

Casualty figures do not suggest the type of bitter fighting we have seen elsewhere in the war. If the Russians intended to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses with massed force and firepower, we would expect an entirely different picture.

Changing the goalposts. Not a surprise. — Echarmion

It was not the point under discussion. But do keep changing the subject whenever one of your so called arguments fails. — Echarmion

Blah blah.

I hear an exhausted mind. You're just having a hard time coping.

How many US soldiers died? And how many Russians? — Echarmion

I know a few people in the Biden White House who are going to lose their jobs though. But yea, the US did a great job at making the Ukrainians do the dying for them. Good for them!

If he changed his tune that's too bad, but only illustrates he's loosing his grip on reality. — Echarmion

This is toddler level.

I figured you deserved a chance at a normal discussion, but alas, it seems I was wrong.

Ignore what evidence?

I went and looked for ISW tally of Russian and Ukrainian losses, as even if heavily biased towards supporting Western narratives, I'd nevertheless be surprised if they were arguing Ukraine is inflicting the many multiple times more losses required to win a war of attrition with the Russians.

I ask you to actually cite the evidence you're referring to in the context of you complaining about the lack of evidence to support facts you don't dispute ... and you just claim I'm ignoring your evidence by asking for the actual evidence??

Oryx I also did not ignore but pointed out their methodology of just looking at videos published by Ukraine and taking them at face value is not even moronically intellectually dishonest but pure propaganda; it's essentially just relabelling Ukrainian propaganda and then considering it independent. Absolute rubbish. — boethius

Right, you don't ignore it, it's just all rubbish, presumably compared to some mysterious source you have yet to reveal to us.

What anger. I ask you questions.

That the questions don't need answering because the answers are so obvious closes the case that you are a complete fool. — boethius

And you would know from experience.

You ask for "the evidence" to support my arguments, I ask you what evidence you want to see, and then you say you aren't asking me to prove any of the facts needed to make my argument that: bigger army with more capabilities is very likely to win a war of attrition. — boethius

Perhaps you should reread what I wrote, since I did not ask you for evidence.

Since the invasion, Russia has mobilized hundreds of thousands more troops thus essentially creating another army compared to the first army that invaded.

Again, what are you disputing? That Russia has mobilized hundreds of thousands additional troops? Or just you'd quibble about calling such a mobilization another army? — boethius

So you do agree that Russia has lost it's entire peacetime army after all?

This is just false. Plenty of military analysts pointed out that 200 000 troops is not enough to overrun Ukraine, that Ukraine is huge, that Ukraine has the largest Army in Europe, can mobilize hundreds of thousands of additional troops, is supported by US / NATO weapons, logistics and intelligence.

Go and find even one expert pre-war military analysis that concluded Russia would overrun Ukraine in weeks, then contrast your failure to find even with "everybody". — boethius

I can find plenty of references ot people saying Ukraine will be overrun within weeks, but no direct claim by any military analyst.

https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-invasion-predictions-wrong-intelligence/32275740.html
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2022/03/the-will-to-fight-lessons-from-ukraine.html

So maybe you are right and military analysts did not actually predict this and I merely remember baseless claims from the media.

Can you support your claim of what military analysts said?

Academic, think tank, and even talking heads in the media all agreed that essentially the maximum aim of the Russians would be to create a land bridge to Crimea compared to a minimalist incursion to simply protect the Donbas separatists. The idea Russia would be conquering all of Ukraine in weeks did not exist.

Of course, Ukraine could capitulate, but all there was pretty wide consensus that if Ukraine decided to fight it can put up a serious fight and would not be easy to defeat. — boethius

I think I just provided some evidence to the contrary, but feel free to provide your own.

What parity? — boethius

The parity on the actual battlefield, where Russia is not actually winning currently.

Since it's far larger, Russia can match Ukraine's total war and also keep running its peace time economy at the same time. — boethius

Hence it hiked it's military spending to 6% of GDP which, given the profusion of shadow budgets, translates to somewhere between 10 and 20% of total GDP in terms of actual spending. That's Soviet Union levels of military expenditure.

Russia needs to balance the war effort with maintaining a functioning economy and also domestic support for the war. — boethius

Exactly. Hence why it cannot simply declare total war.

This is what the West was betting Russia would be unable to do, especially under the "nuclear option" of massive sanctions.

That was the theory of victory, some sort of internal Russian collapse. Since that didn't happen, Ukraine is now screwed as there was no military backup plan. Ukraine fighting was supposed to trigger some sort of Russian revolution and so there was no need to defeat the Russian military in the field. — boethius

The plan is merely to increase the price of the war for Russia to a point where the russian regime is no longer willing to pay it. A "collapse" is not required.

If taking Kiev was the principal Russian objective, how come the fighting around Kiev resembled nothing like we saw in places where actual bitter fighting took place? And how come they only deployed 20,000 troops to participate in the battle and they never made any serious effort to surround the capital let alone capture Kiev? We would expect massed firepower. — Tzeentch

You're merely claiming they did not make a serious effort. But maybe they were simply intending their plan to actually work, take key points around Kiev with an airborne assault and then quickly overrun the defense with air power and one massed column.

They did employ massed firepower, particularly from the air, but apparently underestimated Ukrainian air defense.

The Russians are responding to a western action, namely the militarization of Ukraine. They probably expected 'the West' to be more reasonable.

Instead, the United States is completely content to sacrifice Ukraine, and the EU is too dimwitted to understand what is even going on. — Tzeentch

Straight out of the propaganda playbook. Of course the actual invader who is actually responsible for the wave of death and misery unleashed by the invasion is the good guy. It's all the fault of the evil and stupid West.

It's russians who are doing the killing, not the US. Perhaps you ought to remember.

Nonsense. Jeffrey Sachs gave us clear accounts of what the people involved told him happened. Are you really going to argue he is 'pro-Russian'? The guy is as genuine as they come. — Tzeentch

Yes, actually. He was fucking hosted by Vladimir Solovyov during wartime...

Noam Chomsky, Seymour Hersh - all pro-Russian too? — Tzeentch

Yes on Noam Chomsky, his position against US imperialism mean he will always tend to portray the US as the villain, though he does not actually claim the negotiatians failed because of US and UK intereference, he merely considers it a possibility.

Seymour Hersh is not, though he is perhaps a bit too reliant on sensational anonymous sources in recent times. Still, he has often been proven right at the end. I could not find anything about Hersh repeating that particular claim though. He is mainly known for his theory that the US sabotaged Nord Stream.

Accusing the other side of partisanship is intellectual poverty. — Tzeentch

Looking at the source of a claim which cannot otherwise be checked is basic due dilligence. You wouldn't believe a US press release about them discovering Putin's secret Ukraine plan, dating from 20 years ago, either.

The Ukrainian general staff reported 31 BTGs moving on Kiev. That's roughly 21,000 soldiers. This figure never changed over the course of the month-long battle.

The Wiki article actually says ~20,000 irregulars + 'an undisclosed number of regular fighters' - Yea, I wonder why it's undisclosed? Perhaps the Battle of Kiev couldn't be spun into an 'heroic Ukrainian victory' if the Ukrainians were actually outnumbering the Russians on the defense, eh? — Tzeentch

You're guessing though.

The 60,000 figure comes from a Seymour Hersh interview in which he suggests 40,000 regular troops + 20,000 irregulars, but even if we take your figure and suppose 40,000 defenders, that still puts the Ukrainian forces at a 2:1 advantage. — Tzeentch

I'd have to see the actual interview, since again Hersh has been known in revent years to rely on anonymous sources which tell sensational stories.

For urban fighting a city like Kiev we'd expect 3:1 in favor of the Russians as the bare minimum - we'd expect as much as 10:1 in one were planning for success. — Tzeentch

It is obvious the Russians did not expect Ukraine to fight seriously. That doesn't mean they did no want to take control of the city.

More like, it's impossible to twist the numbers to fit an 'heroic Ukrainian victory' narrative even if you wanted to. — Tzeentch

Russia is an overwhelming superpower that is impossible to defeat. Except when it is defeated, then it was actually weak and it's not really a victory even.

You mean the propaganda you've been binging on over the last year?

Yea. Let's ignore that.

Casualty figures do not suggest the type of bitter fighting we have seen elsewhere in the war. If the Russians intended to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses with massed force and firepower, we would expect an entirely different picture. — Tzeentch

And you would know, because you're the military expert and we'll just have to believe you. The only thing we have actual evidence for, as far as I can see, is that Ukrainian losses were quite light, while the russian advance elements suffered heavy casualties.

This is entirely consistent with Russia abandonning the operation after failing to secure necessary preliminaries, and realising the Ukrainian army was going to stand and fight.

Blah blah.

I hear an exhausted mind. You're just having a hard time coping. — Tzeentch

I figured you deserved a chance at a normal discussion, but alas, it seems I was wrong. — Tzeentch

Whatever. If you want to quit just do it.

In addition to Iranian kamikaze drones, Chinese "multi-purpose" gear and North Korean bombs, Pakistan Egypt Belarus Brazil buybacks:

Russia Turns to Longtime Arms Customers to Boost War Arsenal
^{— Thomas Grove, Summer Said, Luciana Magalhaes, Gordon Lubold, Saeed Shah, Chao Deng · WSJ · Nov 8, 2023}

Russia spent decades building its arms trade. Now they're going back in secret to their customers trying to buy back what they sold them.

Concerns about running out of means to terrorize Ukraine?

Occupiers report missile attack on Skadovsk: Russian base supposedly hit
^{— Ukrainska Pravda via Yahoo · Nov 9, 2023}

Surgical strike in the south? Either way, Saldo seems to be in a precarious situation.

, the Kremlin gets their way, or it's the nuclear way...?

The analogy required to understand how stupid this propaganda is, is to consider the scenario where I put a loaded gun to your head and then tell you I'm not threatening you because I don't intend to pull the trigger. — boethius

The stupidest analogy you could come up with. Military threat needs to be assessed in relative terms:
- Russia is a nuclear power, Ukraine not.
- Russia has a stronger military than Ukraine (it was/is claimed to have "2nd-best military in the world").
- Russia has historically oppressed Ukraine way more than the other way around.
You even keep repeating ad nauseam the first two points to argue that Ukraine has no chance to win Russia, after being aggressed by Russia and being deprived of 20% of its territory!
Do you even read what you write?!

"Drip Feed theory" (DFT) is that what is sent to Ukraine depends on what kind of help will prop up Ukraine in the short term while not being a real threat to Russia nor piss them off "too much".

You're guessing though. — Echarmion

You are wasting your time. He simply repeats the same claim which I have already shown to be false. In short, he does not understand the structure of a BTG - they do not operate alone, but need significant support forces (if you look at the structure, they are missing key elements of regular army deployments). Thus '21 BTGs' in no way means that they were all the troops that were deployed. The correct figure, which I have already given him, was about 60-70 thousand.

I have also corrected him repeatedly on the actual accounts of negotiations, as reported by an actual participant, not someone who heard something (i.e. Sachs). He just regurgitates the same false claims that have already been debunked repeatedly in this very thread.

I have also corrected him repeatedly on the actual accounts of negotiations, as reported by an actual participant, — Jabberwock

Would it be possible to link the post where you reported this?

If taking Kiev was the principal Russian objective, how come the fighting around Kiev resembled nothing like we saw in places where actual bitter fighting took place? And how come they only deployed 20,000 troops to participate in the battle and they never made any serious effort to surround the capital let alone capture Kiev? We would expect massed firepower. — Tzeentch

Nonsense. For example, the Russians deployed the 1st Guards Tank Army to take Kharkiv. It didn't take Kharkiv.

According to you that also might been a fake! :blush:

Consider how the Russians fought the battle of Bahkmut, or the siege of Mariupol.

Kiev and Kharkiv are several times larger, so we would expect to see comparable movements only larger in scale. Yet, nothing in the behavior of the Russian forces suggested they were preparing for a lengthy siege or months of grueling urban combat.

I know what your explanation is for that; Russian incompetence, but I think that's a weak explanation.

It needs to be pointed out that the whole theory of 'just threatening Kiyv' with an army that was supposedly obviously and clearly incapable of threatening Kiyv, is simply incoherent. In order to make a threat you have to be visibly capable of employing a force that is able to fulfill that threat. In fact, usually when you make a threat, you try to exaggerate the projected force.

So: how exactly can you strenghten your position in negotiations by sending against a city an army which is obviously incapable of taking or surrounding it?

Would it be possible to link the post where you reported this? — neomac

It was based on the quote of Bennett, which I believe you have provided. Should I still look for it?

No, it's fine, thanks.

It needs to be pointed out that the whole theory of 'just threatening Kiyv' with an army that was supposedly obviously and clearly incapable of threatening Kiyv, is simply incoherent. In order to make a threat you have to be visibly capable of employing a force that is able to fulfill that threat. In fact, usually when you make a threat, you try to exaggerate the projected force.

So: how exactly can you strenghten your position in negotiations by sending against a city an army which is obviously incapable of taking or surrounding it? — Jabberwock

There seems to be some strange compulsion to imagine secret knowledge, that only a select few are privy too. Things cannot simply be how they look. Everyone can infer intentions and goals by looking at the actions taken and statements made.

But some people need to be different. They need to see beyond the veil that ordinary minds cannot pierce. And so there must be shadowy forces that really move everything. You can treat US imperialism just as much as some metaphysical form of evil as imaginary demons. Apparently this even happens to otherwise sane and well informed people.

I suppose this shows the danger of being out in the open:

Wherever a 155mm projectile will not reach, a missile launched from HIMARS will reach. (Armed Forces of Ukraine · 16s · Nov 10, 2023)

Effective coordination between the aerial reconnaissance of a separate artillery brigade of the Russian Air Force and the HIMARS calculation for the destruction of the enemy "Gradu".

Offensive and movement in monitored areas are very unsafe, hence hunkering down and longer-distance bombing.

Zelensky Rebuke of General Signals Rift in Ukrainian Leadership
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/04/world/europe/zelensky-rebuke-general-zaluzhny.html

It needs to be pointed out that the whole theory of 'just threatening Kiyv' with an army that was supposedly obviously and clearly incapable of threatening Kiyv, is simply incoherent. In order to make a threat you have to be visibly capable of employing a force that is able to fulfill that threat. In fact, usually when you make a threat, you try to exaggerate the projected force. — Jabberwock

What's incoherent about applying political pressure, a fixing operation, shelling targets of military value for 2 months as well as causing a flood of refugees out of Ukraine?

It's also completely ignorant of the history of war. Laying siege to a city rather than trying to storm it right off the bat is a pretty old and common sense tactic, essentially as old as fortified urban centres themselves.

Of course modern cities are not fortified on purpose but it turns out lots of concrete buildings serve that purpose, and applying pressure by purposefully starving urban populations is no longer "a thing" (except if you're Israel of course), but a siege applies significant pressure nonetheless and created a significant barrier to moving people that are in Kiev to the southern front.

Even if Ukraine knew (i.e. informed by the US) that the Russians did not have enough forces to take and occupy Kiev, they still have to direct significant forces to defend the capital as it's a politically critical target. Furthermore, few things are certain in war, so likely Kiev did not "know" Russian troop numbers and disposition or then what man power Russia could divert to Kiev on short notice.

Meanwhile, during the battle of Kiev, Russia took the land bridge to Crimea and then pacified those regions they are still occupying today.

Another indication of Russian strategy to take the South and not Kiev is that Russia not only did not engage in fierce Urban combat in Kiev but bypassed most urban centres on the way to Kiev, which was a significant weakness in terms of maintaining their position around Kiev as Ukrainians could go out from these bypassed urban areas and ambush and harass the Russian supply line.

Then there is the political pressure of the capital being gotten to from both sides in short period of time and siege starting.

Now, would surrounding the capital without being able to take it and occupy it apply enough pressure to cause a complete unconditional surrender? No, obviously not, if the defence of the city was holding up there would be little reason to just completely capitulate.

However, the Russians were not asking complete capitulation, but at that time there main demands were a neutral Ukraine, recognizing Crimea as part of Russia and an independent Donbas, so occupying the South of Ukraine and slowly surrounding the capital and shelling significant parts of it and causing a refugee crisis etc. was significant pressure to accept Russian demands.

It's certainly a reasonable strategy that facilitates taking the South in the event Ukraine refuses peace terms and wants to continue fighting.

What is completely unclear is what scenario the Kremlin viewed as more likely, Ukraine accepting peace terms or then a longer war. It can be argued both ways. The story emerges, in both the West and Russia, that Russian intelligence underestimated Ukraine, but there's no hard evidence for this. It's pretty typical for countries starting a war to promise their population a quick victory even if the leaders know there is significant risk it can take a long time.

One could also argue that the operation to lay siege to Kiev had serious drawbacks such as creating the perfect scene for Zelensky to rally Ukrainian and Western support, hardening the Ukrainian will rather than weaken it and since the positions could not be maintained long term then setting up a Ukrainian victory.

Pointing out that the Russian strategy made sense and clearly on the whole delivered the result of conquering the Ukrainian lands Russia now occupies, and that the Northern operation achieved plenty of purposes other than storming and occupying Kiev, does not imply it's some optimum military maneuver.

In my view, militarily it was a good strategy and prevented Ukraine from organizing any sort of counter offensive in the South, especially to try to rescue the trapped Azov guys and destroying or capturing Azov Battalion was a significant victory for Russia in terms of consolidating their gains, but also domestic and international politics.

Politically it did have the draw backs mentioned above, but I don't think Ukraine would have been any closer to agreeing to peace terms without sieging the capital.

What's incoherent about applying political pressure, a fixing operation, shelling targets of military value for 2 months as well as causing a flood of refugees out of Ukraine?

It's also completely ignorant of the history of war. Laying siege to a city rather than trying to storm it right off the bat is a pretty old and common sense tactic, essentially as old as fortified urban centres themselves. — boethius

'Shelling targets of military value for 2 months'? I suppose you mean shelling of residential suburbs from March 4 (when the main convoy got close enough) till March 24, when they were pushed out of artillery range, not so much because Ukrainians pushed so hard, but because they were out of resources (with the most shelling, which was even then not that intense, lasting about ten days)? That is three weeks... care to list the supposed targets of military value that were hit? All i can find are residential areas on the outskirst of the city. And it is hilarious to write about 'siege' of a city - have you even looked at the map? If you get to a city and it is open in three directions, it is not a siege. Especially if you do not get closer than 25 km from it (that is farther than Ukrainians now have to Tokmak).

Even if Ukraine knew (i.e. informed by the US) that the Russians did not have enough forces to take and occupy Kiev, they still have to direct significant forces to defend the capital as it's a politically critical target. Furthermore, few things are certain in war, so likely Kiev did not "know" Russian troop numbers and disposition or then what man power Russia could divert to Kiev on short notice. — boethius

The supposed evidence is Tzeentch quoting an Ukrainian general in the days BEFORE the attack, so take it up with him.

Another indication of Russian strategy to take the South and not Kiev is that Russia not only did not engage in fierce Urban combat in Kiev but bypassed most urban centres on the way to Kiev, which was a significant weakness in terms of maintaining their position around Kiev as Ukrainians could go out from these bypassed urban areas and ambush and harass the Russian supply line. — boethius

So their plan was obviously NOT a long-term 'siege' of Kiyv, contrary to your claims, because you rightly conclude that it would open them to attacks from the rear and they would not be able to maintain the siege at all.

Then there is the political pressure of the capital being gotten to from both sides in short period of time and siege starting.

Now, would surrounding the capital without being able to take it and occupy it apply enough pressure to cause a complete unconditional surrender? No, obviously not, if the defence of the city was holding up there would be little reason to just completely capitulate.

However, the Russians were not asking complete capitulation, but at that time there main demands were a neutral Ukraine, recognizing Crimea as part of Russia and an independent Donbas, so occupying the South of Ukraine and slowly surrounding the capital and shelling significant parts of it and causing a refugee crisis etc. was significant pressure to accept Russian demands. — boethius

They needed just a bit of pressure, so they just laid one fourth of a siege? From the military point of view that theory goes beyond bizzare.

The 'blitz' taking of Kiyv, while risky and obviously unsuccessful, at least has some strategic merit. The northern operation as a 'siege' would be an even greater Russian failure - when you prepare for a siege, you do not issue your troops fuel for four days and you do not bypass major resistance centers (as you pointed out). The loss of material suffered there (not destroyed, but mostly abandoned, which for a long time was the main source of Ukrainian supplies) in no way justifies the supposed profit of vague 'political pressure' from one-fourth of a siege.

'Shelling targets of military value for 2 months'? I suppose you mean shelling of residential suburbs from March 4 (when the main convoy got close enough) till March 24, when they were pushed out of artillery range, not so much because Ukrainians pushed so hard, but because they were out of resources (with the most shelling, which was even then not that intense, lasting about ten days)? That is three weeks... care to list the supposed targets of military value that were hit? — Jabberwock

Although of course far more focus was paid to damage to civilian zones, the shelling of industrial zones was covered even by the Western media.

This is from the Hindu Times, just because it's not behind a paywall but it's simply repeating what was reported by AP, Reuters et al.

In this one article you have shelling of industrial zones, such as the airplane factory:

Ukrainian authorities said two people were killed when the Russians struck an airplane factory in Kyiv, sparking a large fire. The Antonov factory is Ukraine’s largest aircraft manufacturing plant and is best known for producing many of the world’s biggest cargo planes. — Kyiv areas shelled but ‘hard’ Ukraine peace talks go ahead - Hindustan Times

as well as how negotiations were to a peace deal:

[Kyiv areas shelled but ‘hard’ Ukraine peace talks go ahead - Hindustan Times;https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/kyiv-areas-shelled-but-hard-ukraine-peace-talks-go-ahead-101647309135539.html]The latest negotiations, which were held via video conference, were the fourth round involving higher-level officials from the two countries and the first in a week. The talks ended without a breakthrough after several hours, with an aide to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky saying the negotiators took “a technical pause” and planned to meet again Tuesday.

The two sides had expressed some optimism in the past few days. Mykhailo Podolyak, the aide to Zelensky, said over the weekend that Russia was “listening carefully to our proposals”. and that the negotiators would discuss “peace, ceasefire, immediate withdrawal of troops & security guarantees”.[/quote]

Now obviously a peace deal was not reached, but shelling industrial zones (of which the military value is repurposing to ) was clearly one purpose of the push to Kiev.

As you note yourself, Russian forces reached residential areas of which many industrial zones will be similar distance, if not farther, from the town centre. And even if you simply refuse to believe Russia got close enough to shell significant industrial zones it was clearly a priority for them, doing so with missiles as well:

[Russia says ammunition factory near Kyiv destroyed by missile strike - Reuters;https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-ammunition-factory-near-kyiv-destroyed-by-missile-strike-2022-04-17/]April 17 (Reuters) - Russian armed forces destroyed an ammunition factory near Kyiv, Russian Defence Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov said on Sunday.

"Overnight, high-precision air-launched missiles destroyed an ammunition factory near the town of Brovary in Kyiv region," Konashenkov said.[/quote]

So obviously advancing to Kiev would also accomplish this purpose of being able to destroy factories of various kinds.

The supposed evidence is Tzeentch quoting an Ukrainian general in the days BEFORE the attack, so take it up with him. — Jabberwock

You have trouble with reading comprehension. I state that even if Ukraine knows Russian troop numbers approaching Kiev they still have to defend Kiev. Furthermore, even if this was your belief you could not be 100% certain the intelligence is accurate or then that Russia cannot move in more troops on short notice, so you'd need to price that risk into your defence of the city as well.

Russia does not require Kiev to believe they are genuinely attempting to take Kiev to accomplish various objectives. These explanations of pretty obvious things is in response to your thesis that:

It needs to be pointed out that the whole theory of 'just threatening Kiyv' with an army that was supposedly obviously and clearly incapable of threatening Kiyv, is simply incoherent. In order to make a threat you have to be visibly capable of employing a force that is able to fulfill that threat. In fact, usually when you make a threat, you try to exaggerate the projected force. — Jabberwock

Which for all the reasons I explain, is clearly not true. It's completely coherent to send a small force to fix a large amount of troops, destroy plenty of factories and infrastructure, apply significant political pressure, while 15% of the country is conquered in the meanwhile.

It's a pretty common sense manoeuvre and if Ukraine "called the bluff" and sent significant resources to the south and undermanned their defence of Kiev, then maybe Russia would have taken the opportunity to pour in troops and storm the city.

Now, if you want to argue the Northern operation was had more drawbacks then achievements, that shelling Kiev simply increased resolve and Western support and allowed Zelensky to play the hero and ambushes on overstretched supply lines make the Russians look bad and beatable, and so on, such arguments make sense. There was certainly pros and cons to the Northern operation to siege Kiev and a lot could be considered.

For example, I'd have no problem accepting an analysis which concluded that short term the siege of Kiev nearly achieved a negotiated peace (but ultimately failed) while assisting the conquest of the Southern land bridge, and in the medium term made increased Ukrainian and Western resolve while making Russia look bad when they needed to retreat, but in the longer term creating a refugee exodus significantly weakens Ukraine structurally (economically, new soldiers aging into fighting age for a long war, less people to do things generally speaking, etc.) which aids in winning a war of attrition.

I'd even be willing accept that had Russia not sieged Kiev and simply took the land bridge that ultimately it would be more likely Ukraine would have accepted Russia's peace deal, as there would be less "bad blood".

However, that may not have been predictable from the outset, it certainly seems logical that pressuring the capital would maximize pressure for a political settlement. Furthermore, if Ukraine was able to fully focus on the South then perhaps it would have been able to counter attack and relieve Mariupol, stabilize the lines far less favourably for the Russians and that would have encouraged further fighting as much as the siege of Kiev.

The Russian strategy makes obvious sense. Certainly there is always a better strategy available, but the idea that the army that has taken and held critical land for its stated and common sense war objectives (land bridge to Crimea, protect Russian speaking separatists) is somehow incompetent or that sieging Kiev has no relation to the accomplishments in the South, is just dumb.

So their plan was obviously NOT a long-term 'siege' of Kiyv, contrary to your claims, because you rightly conclude that it would open them to attacks from the rear and they would not be able to maintain the siege at all. — Jabberwock

"Long-term 'siege' " is a nice but lame strawman. Where do I say a long term siege is necessary to apply political pressure?

Russia sieges Kiev until Mariupol is fully taken (the withdrawal is the week after the surrender of the remaining Azov forces), tries to negotiate a peace during this time, a peace deal is not reached, they can't maintain their positions, so they are forced to leave.

There was clearly many advantages to the Russians of the push to Kiev as well as disadvantages. I have zero problem with the argument that in some final analysis there was more cons than pros, but clearly the strategy made sense and did achieve some key military objectives.

The 'blitz' taking of Kiyv, while risky and obviously unsuccessful, at least has some strategic merit. The northern operation as a 'siege' would be an even greater Russian failure - when you prepare for a siege, you do not issue your troops fuel for four days and you do not bypass major resistance centers (as you pointed out). The loss of material suffered there (not destroyed, but mostly abandoned, which for a long time was the main source of Ukrainian supplies) in no way justifies the supposed profit of vague 'political pressure' from one-fourth of a siege. — Jabberwock

The Russians are not routed and captured but have an orderly withdrawal when they retreat, so they obviously had enough fire power to hold their positions and get resupplied.

If it was a risky mad dash blitz the capital with only 4 days of fuel, then they would have all been captured when that failed.

Now, I have zero problem with the idea that the ideal scenario for the Russians is that the Ukrainians simply fall apart in terms of C&C and there's a near complete capitulation, or then no defence of the city is organized and they're able to take the city with a small force and the population accepts a total Russian victory. However, they do commit enough resources to maintain the positions they take around Kiev the time to accomplish full occupation of major cities in the south, particularly Mariupol.

However, what is clear even in your scenario is that there is not enough man power to take Kiev waging urban combat even against a small amount of defenders.

I of course agree that total capitulation by Ukraine would be the a preferred outcome of blitzing to Kiev, and if that was plan A then the Russians clearly had a plan B, but we seem to agree that their plan is not conquest of Kiev against any significant resistance.

I think it is a reasonable supposition that Putin thought he was attacking a comedian of a leader, and could do what he liked in Ukraine at little cost, and I think it is also reasonable to suppose he wanted Odessa, and a puppet government in Kiev. I think he planned to be sucking the profits from the grain harvest by now.

Installing a puppet regime in a country that has been militarized by the United States over the course of 10 years, with an intact and capable army that enjoys extensive support from the US and its European neighbors? That is not really a feasible proposition. I think such a puppet regime would last a few days at most.

It should also be noted that the Russian military did not make any large push towards Odessa. After they captured Cherson they made a few incursions north / northwest ward and retreated upon meeting resistance.

T I think such a puppet regime would last a few days at most. — Tzeentch

I think Putin thought the same about Zelensky. A puppet he could knock over in a few days.Do you think Russia began this prepared for a long war of attrition?

I think Putin thought the same about Zelensky. A puppet he could knock over in a few days.Do you think Russia began this prepared for a long war of attrition? — unenlightened

I doubt the Russians expected a quick military victory, considering the fact that they invaded with a force that was way too small to fully defeat the Ukrainian military and occupy all of Ukraine.

The operations in the north and around Kiev were intended to pressure Ukraine into negotiations, which we know did take place in March/April of 2022 and were subsequently blocked by the United States and Britain. So at the very least the Russians believed there was a possibility of a quick negotiated settlement through a show of military force. I guess at this time the Russians still believed the European desire for peace in eastern Europe and normal economic relations with Russia would trump neocon interests in Ukraine, but they were wrong.

Since negotiations failed, the Russian plan is probably to sit on the territory they now occupy and leverage their military advantage until either a negotiated settlement is reached or the war turns into a frozen conflict.

A quick negotiated settlement was obviously the preferred outcome, but it's pretty much unthinkable that the Russians did not plan for a situation in which negotiations failed.

Lastly, "war of attrition" is not necessarily an accurate characterization of this conflict even though the term is used a lot. It is more like a prolonged stand-off with occasional, relatively small-scale offensive actions. I don't think it is nearly as taxing on the Russian system as western media likes to suggest, and that the Russians can sustain these types of operations pretty much indefinitely.