"Oh I'm sorry you're to ignorant for me to explain please educate yourself". — Echarmion

What an absolute asshole move. — Echarmion

When has Putin stated he intends to turn Ukraine into a satellite?

Yes, there was a massive invasion. — Tzeentch

Note that I didn't refuse to explain. You'll find all the explanation you need in this very thread, with links, sources and all. I've probably written about a book's worth and can't be arsed to repeat it all. If you're unaware of US involvement in Ukraine I would suggest starting at page 1. — Tzeentch

Sometimes being an asshole and simply being honest look very much alike. — Tzeentch

Fantastic arguments. “No, opposite.” How tedious. — Mikie

The European countries — from Britain to Germany to France, have basically taken orders from Washington for years.

It’s like asking if the US “controls” the UN. — Mikie

Except that was never said. I realize that’s what your mind has created, yes. — Mikie

Except I don’t say that. I’m not talking about “fault,” I’m discussing what Russian’s have stated over and over again, and which you ignore. — Mikie

No— Crimea did that. — Mikie

And so we’re back to the beginning. What was the imminent threat from Russia in 2008 that NATO needed to expand to its borders? None. — Mikie

The claim you’re making is that Russia would have invaded anyway, regardless of US influence. Well, we won’t ever know, will we? But it’s a nice, unfalsiable story to tell to justify US imperialism. “Hey, they would have done it anyway, so might as well go ahead with it despite dire warnings.”

Perhaps the US should talk about including Taiwan as part of a military alliance, start training troops, offering supplies, etc. China has been clear about where it stands, but we should go ahead with it regardless, since China would probably start a war anyway. — Mikie

“Ukraine will be a member of NATO”. This is at the NATO summit. Plans were set to be put in motion. It’s true that they weren’t, yes. But that set the stage for where we are today.

You’ve provided nothing equivalent prior to Bucharest. — Mikie

I don’t see how this is confusing. The Russian position on NATO was very clear — for years. So yes, a reaction to a renewed intent (even referring to the 2008 summit) to have Ukraine join NATO, as communicated in 2021, shouldn’t be a shocker. Quite consistent, in fact. — Mikie

That is exactly how this whole discussion with you: the only thing that you can bring to this dicussion are your strong beliefs, which do not seem to be supported by much evidence. — Jabberwock

Again: I was asking for evidence that the US controls the membership of the EU. Instead you just give your assertions again. — Jabberwock

The exact words you have used were: 'But there wouldn’t have been invasion'. You seem to think that if you do enough backtracking, your previous statements should be erased: no, that is not the way it works. — Jabberwock

So you acknowledge that the main support of your argument: Ukraine's military arming and training with NATO countries between 2014 and 2021 is not the US doing, but reaction to Russia's invasion. We are making a progress then. — Jabberwock

The threat was not imminent, but it was definitely there, — Jabberwock

The claim you’re making is that Russia would have invaded anyway, regardless of US influence. Well, we won’t ever know, will we? But it’s a nice, unfalsiable story to tell to justify US imperialism. “Hey, they would have done it anyway, so might as well go ahead with it despite dire warnings.”

You acknowledge yourself that NATO was only one of the causes of Russia's aggression. — Jabberwock

So your nice story that Russia would not invade if not for the US influence is even more unfalsifiable. — Jabberwock

If Taiwan entered a military alliance, and started training troops and getting supplies, it would be the Taiwan's decision, not the US, just like it was Ukraine's decision after 2004, which you have acknowledged yourself. — Jabberwock

You’ve provided nothing equivalent prior to Bucharest.
— Mikie

That is an obvious and blatant lie, there is no putting it differently. I have given you about half a dozen of quotes and excerpts from the document which have shown that Ukraine was preparing to join NATO since 2002. — Jabberwock

Russian internal politics — Jabberwock

NATO expansion is not over for the Russians. It’s a reality. NATO is sitting on its borders. It’s not about future NATO expansion; it’s about current.

NATO expansion represents the following to Russia: It represents a profoundly broken promise to Russia, made by the first Bush, that in return for a united Germany in NATO, NATO would not expand eastward. This is beyond any dispute.

People say they never signed a treaty. But a deal is a deal. If the United States gives its word—unless we’re shysters, and if you don’t get it in writing, we’ll cheat you—we broke our word. When both Putin and Medvedev say publicly, to Madeleine Albright and others, “We, Russia, feel deceived and betrayed,” that’s what they are talking about.

So NATO represents on the part of Russia a lack of trust: You break your words to us. To what extent can we trust you?

Secondly, it represents military encirclement. If you sit in the Kremlin and you look out at where NATO is and where they want to go, it’s everywhere. It’s everywhere on Russia’s borders.

But there’s something even more profound that is a taboo in the United States. NATO expansion represents for the Russians American hypocrisy and a dual standard. They see it this way, and I can’t think of any way to deny their argument.

The expansion of NATO is the expansion of the American sphere of influence, plain and simple. Where NATO goes, our military force goes. Where NATO goes, our arms munitions go, because they have to buy American weapons. Where NATO goes, Western soldiers go, who date their women, who bring along their habits, and all the other things. It’s clearly, undebatably, indisputably an expansion of America’s sphere of influence.

So there has been a tremendous expansion of America’s sphere of influence since the mid-1990s, right plunk on Russia’s borders, with all the while, every American administration saying to Russia, including the Obama Administration, “You cannot have a sphere of influence because that’s old thinking.”

The Russians may be cruel, but they’re not stupid. In other words, what they say [America is saying] is, “We can now have the biggest sphere of influence the world has ever seen, and you don’t get any, not even on your own border. In fact, we’re taking what used to be your traditional sphere of influence, along with the energy and all the rest. It’s ours now”—again, this idea of a winner-take-all policy.

This is the enormous resentment in Russia. The relationship will never become a stable, cooperative relationship until we deal with this problem.

Does it mean Russia is entitled to a sphere of influence? I don’t want to think for Jack Matlock, but Jack thinks yes, depending on what you mean by “sphere of influence.” They can’t occupy countries. We had a Monroe Doctrine. But the point is that until this is worked out, the relationship will never truly be post-Cold War.

The problem is, it’s taboo in America to talk about this issue of who has a sphere of influence, who is entitled to it. I think there are solutions, but you can’t even get the question asked.

shows that US involvement was all over this conflict, and that Putin has been a very reactive leader — Mikie

Additionally, Ukraine wouldn't be accepted into the EU if there was a genocide going on. — jorndoe

[...] into the EU if [...]

1. Constitutional Court   Good progress
2. Judicial governance    Completed
3. Anti-corruption        Some progress
4. Anti-money laundering  Some progress
5. De-oligarchisation     Some progress
6. Media legislation      Completed
7. National minorities    Some progress

Progress on 7 required reforms 2022 Feb 28 - 2023 Jun 22 (wartime) — jorndoe

It seems to me, and I suspect others here feel the same, that to call Putin's action "very reactive" is essentially absolving him of a significant share of blame. That, imho, is unacceptable. — Echarmion

Edit: I would guess everyone here has seen at least one of Mearsheimer's talks. I don't think the disagreement is about the basic analysis of the situation so much as about what the Russian leadership actually thinks and intends. — Echarmion

Because it’s so obvious to me I feel that a) you’re being disingenuous or b) are so unaware of US power that explaining it in detail is a diversion. But as quickly as possible: no, there US doesn’t directly control membership in the EU. Europe does rely, however, on the US for their defense. That alone is a pretty big deal, to say nothing of economic leverage. — Mikie

What I’ve been trying to emphasize is the Russian perspective, right or wrong. That means whether the Ukrainians support NATO membership or not, whether the US is simply giving them what they want, whether the US is justified in arming Ukraine, etc. Maybe they are, maybe they aren’t, maybe it’s opportunistic — a good pretext for fighting a proxy war it wanted all along. I have my opinion on all of that. But that wasn’t the topic.

Right or wrong, I think the evidence — from our own government, from statements from the Kremlin, from scholarship — shows that US involvement was all over this conflict, and that Putin has been a very reactive leader. — Mikie

Of what? Not of what’s only retroactively claimed now, of Russian imperialist ambitions. — Mikie

You’re doing a lot of assuming. But there’s no evidence suggesting Russia was planning on conquering Ukraine or annexing parts of Ukraine prior to 2008. Making the push of NATO expansion rather odd. But we know why: the US had explicit plans for Eastern Europe. The goal was to make it a Western-style democracy. — Mikie

Yes. The main cause in 2022— a secondary cause in 2014. These things are interconnected, as I’ve demonstrated repeatedly, with plenty of evidence. — Mikie

They applied for MAP in Bucharest, 2008. That’s very serious, for reasons articulated by Burns and others. I don’t see anything equivalent to that prior to Bucharest. However much you want to pretend 2008 was nothing different. It was different. — Mikie

To take a broader view for a second. Perhaps it’s worth asking yourself why the US cares so much about Ukraine, to the tune of billions of dollars? Would it be fighting such a proxy war in Sudan?

Ukraine is strategically important to the US, as it is for Russia. Despite your dismissals, this is indeed a fight between two powers. Ukraine is caught in the middle, and wouldn’t survive a week without US military aid (or training). This bigger picture shouldn’t be overlooked.

We can go on believing in US benevolence and love of democracy, and that Washington really cares about the Ukrainian people. Or we can take the less comfortable path and take seriously what Russia says, and has said all along, about NATO’s actions and US influence. I see a lot of truth in it, despite my being against Russian aggression.

(The same is true of the current war in Israel, incidentally. It’s worth listening to the Palestinian people. Or we can take the easier route and claim there’s simply evil, similar to the story about Russia.) — Mikie

You come back, over and over, to Russian “internal politics.” Let’s see what that means exactly, and get some evidence. Because otherwise it’s yet another vague claim. — Mikie

There also is no question that many Russians view the loss of Ukraine and Belarus, which for centuries formed part of their country, as a tragic and temporary aberration that has split families while weakening Russia's military and economic might. Oleg Soskin, a Ukrainian economist, said that Russian nationalists such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky are not alone in decrying Ukrainian independence as a "misunderstanding"; many of his most liberal colleagues in Moscow universities and research institutes do so as well. — UKRAINIAN VOTE RESULTS: NO MANDATE FOR MOSCOW

The most immediate and urgent goal of the Russian people is the restoration of the mighty Russian state in its historical borders (in practical terms, the restoration of the Russian Empire). Since the West in general, and the United States in particular, strive to prevent Russia from achieving this goal, Russian foreign policy should become anti-Western and anti-American. In all, the political program of Russian nationalism is not only anti-democratic and illiberal, it is also revanchist. — Contemporary Russian Nationalism between East and West

To this less democratic regime, the Kremlin has now added nationalism as the principle ideological theme, and helped to empower nationnalists as the political leaders on the rise. Under the control of the more moderate, Western-oriented Putin, the increasingly centralized, less pluralistic political regime in Russia today has not been deployed to carry out massive repression against the Russian people or threaten countries on Russia 's borders. But who takes power after Putin? The electoral results from yesterday suggest that the liberals have no chance, while the nationalists of a more virulent sort than Putin are up and coming. In their hands, the regime that Putin has built could become really threatening to the people of Russia , to Russia 's neighbors, and eventually to the West. — The Era of Liberalism versus Communism in Russia Is Over

Within the framing of his realpolitik approach, I think the argument works. — Echarmion

I don't see how Russia's ability for offensive operations can recover, and yet clearly the calculus is that "more must be taken to make it worth it." — Count Timothy von Icarus