It's quite possible the US had a Ukrainian team carry out (a part of) the operation. This would provide the US with plausible deniability. Considering the scale of the operation, I find it unlikely the Ukrainians did this completely on their own, though. Considering the impact geopolitically and the implications of bombing allied (German) infrastructure, it's almost unthinkable they did this without consulting the US.

Given that we have Seymour Hersh's story, the US incriminating a 'Ukrainian group', and of course the US incriminating itself by constantly threatening to end Nordstream if war were to break out, I think the picture is starting to come together.

I'll give that documentary a watch later. Thanks!

One of the main things which pisses me off the most, is the way the Western world is cancelling Russia on literally everything: from economics to the arts.

The following week starts the Nobel laureates ceremony. I think it is a beautiful and vivid place to appreciate interesting and intelligent people. Well, as a reminder, the Nobel Foundation cancelled the Russian ambassador, and this means that there will not be Russian laureates, although it is a country full of intelligent and cultural people...
Nobel Foundation reverses decision to invite Russia to prize ceremony.

On the other hand, can you imagine a world without Dostoyevski or Shólojov? It is a disgrace the efforts to cancel Russian culture. There are some universities - like Milan - or symposiums which avoid Russian participants. It is pathetic. For example, there was a symposium about Dostoevsky in Nagoya (Japan) and the Russian specialists were cancelled. :roll: https://elpais.com/opinion/2023-09-04/dostoievski-y-ucrania-en-japon.html

Although sooner or later Ukraine will be irrelevant to most people, the 'Karamazov brothers' will remain. Culture is above economics and politics!

I gave the documentary a watch.

Honestly, the idea that an operation of this magnitude was carried out from a sailing yacht I find unlikely, bordering on the impossible.

Performing underwater demolitions is obviously a highly specialized job. Precision navigation equipment, seabed scanning equipment, diving equipment, a crane of some sort - these are things I would expect a vessel to be capable of to be used in for this type of operation.

The documentary tackles some of the criticism, but in my opinion doesn't go into enough detail to make this unlikely story any more likely. A 100m dive is something that experienced, civilian divers can do, but the diving depth is not the extraordinary part.

The documentary also claims that the demolitions could have been done using a small amount of explosives, but the Nordstream explosions measured between 2.1 - 2.3 on the Richter Scale. So yea, obviously not a small explosion. Quite a massive one, in fact. 2.0 on the Richter Scale is equivalent to one ton of TNT.

Personally I don't believe it.

Lastly, the documentary says no one takes Hersh's story seriously. That statement reeks, because it's by far the most logical scenario to have taken place, and it is obviously SOP to have a cover story in place if the US did do it. To say 'no one takes it seriously' is typical deflection.

It sounds to me like this story was made up to deflect blame from the US. Ukraine is not a NATO ally, so Ukraine bombing Nordstream would be slightly less outrageous than the US bombing its allies' infrastructure. Maybe it was carried out by Ukrainian divers, but if that's the case it wasn't without US involvement. No way.

A while back people linked a Swedish documentary with all sorts of experts insinuating Russia was the likely culprit. So yea, I take these documentaries with a grain of salt to begin with, especially if the 'experts' are people I never heard of and will probably never hear from again.

That's all based on a hunch though and other than Hersh's unidentified sources there's no evidence for it at this point in time. The estimates was hundreds of pounds of TNT btw, so not at impossible as you might think, and I don't know what your list of equipment is based on.

In any case, I'm not in favour of any specific scenario since the information simply isn't there but I do assign a decent probability to this group of people being involved. How much deeper it goes is another question.

That's all based on a hunch though [...] — Benkei

That the US is responsible is certainly just an educated guess of mine. But I tried to focus more on the absurdity of the theory that's being presented.

The estimates was hundreds of pounds of TNT btw, so not at impossible as you might think, [...] — Benkei

The issue here is that there's no way to get hundreds of pounds of explosives to the seafloor without specialized equipment. I think we can agree that they didn't just kick a few hundred pounds of C4 overboard and hoped for the best, so there's an explanation lacking of how they did this off the back of a yacht.

Handling these types of weights underwater (let alone explosives) is a delicate task that requires absolute precision, but let me get to the next point:

I don't know what your list of equipment is based on. — Benkei

- The precise location of these pipelines isn't public knowledge, so some form of seabed scanning equipment is required to locate the pipelines before the operation can take place. Trial and error is not realistic. It's possible they got the information from a third party.

- Ships don't lie still in the water (and neither do explosive packages for that matter). They drift. And when one is lowering hundreds of pounds worth of explosives into the water that people have to handle at a 100m depth, a vessel is required that can maintain its position with a high degree of accuracy.

- I don't know how one would handle hundreds of pounds of explosives without atleast a crane.

- And diving equipment is self-explanatory. Presumably the divers had to carry out some actions at the bottom, so decompression would be a time-consuming process that could take several hours. Communication equipment, safety equipment, bare necessities unless you're suicidal.

Without some kind of explanation of how they worked, it's hard to take the yacht story seriously.

One of the main things which pisses me off the most, is the way the Western world is cancelling Russia on literally everything: from economics to the arts. — javi2541997

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn,
Boris Pasternak,
Dmitry Muratov.

Just for starters. The Russians do pretty well cancelling their own, including more of their own than Hitler ever did.

This would hardly be the technological challenge you make it out to be. The depths at which the pipeline was damaged are within technical scuba diving range. The pipeline is likely easy to spot on a modern 'fish finder'. GPS controlled autopilot makes holding a position relatively simple...

If I am not wrong, you were off from this forum for months. I recommend you stay away again, because wasting the space and time of others is one of the worst things ever. Are you capable of reading three paragraphs, or do you just stay on the surface of everything? Answer to yourself, because I will not waste my time on you. 

The depths at which the pipeline was damaged are within technical scuba diving range. — wonderer1

The depths of the pipeline (80m - 110m) are well within what is considered 'technical diving' range (60m+). Things like oxygen toxicity and decompression sickness become life hazards, and these dives are only to be undertaken by trained, experienced and well-equipped divers. It will be hard for civilians to even find training for dives below 100m, but it is possible.

The pipeline is likely easy to spot on a modern 'fish finder'. — wonderer1

No - at least not with something you can simply strap to a small sailing yacht. Again, the depths of the pipelines is between 80m - 110m. You would need something sizable to reach that deep.

Furthermore, sound doesn't travel in straight lines underwater, so "spotting" is easy. Pinpointing to the degree of accuracy required for an operation like this is a whole other ballgame that would require extensive surveillance.

GPS controlled autopilot makes holding a position relatively simple... — wonderer1

On the type of sailing yacht purported to have carried out the operation? Nah.

You may be confused by measurements in meters instead of feet. Or maybe you don't understand the technical implications of dangling a few hundred tons of explosives from a wire and having people work on it at a depth of a 100m.

So I’m supposed to argue for something that didn’t happen. No thank you.

No, I don’t think there would be a war today if it weren’t for NATO involvement in Ukraine — if that’s what you’re asking. But you keep switching topics. Above I was referring to the current war in Ukraine, the invasion of 2022— not 2014, which is related but not the same. — Mikie

No, you are supposed to argue to support your claim: that there would be no war without the talk of NATO expansion. That is essential if you also claim that the war was provoked by NATO. 'I don't think' is not an argument.

And no, I am switching the topics, if you think the 2014 invasion and and the 2022 are unrelated then it is just bizarre and clearly shows you are missing the bigger picture, the background of what was actually happening in Russia during Putin's rule. These are not two different wars, these are just the stages of the same conflict. As you are seemingly unaware, the hostilities have never really ceased, they just had different phases of intensity.

It started at the Bucharest summit and escalated from there. But if you’re referring to Crimea, then yes— that occurred for a different reason which you deliberately ignored: the ouster of Yanukovych, which the United States supported. All the while, in the background, NATO membership was of course still on the table.

The connection here is obvious, and you want to gloss over with word games: “Well NATO wasn’t directly involved with overthrowing Yanukovych, so clearly it wasn’t a factor in annexing Crimea.” But you know very well what Yanukovych’s stand was regarding NATO. — Mikie

No, it did not start at the Bucharest summit, which you yourself have acknowledged, citing as one of the causes the Orange Revolution, which happened in 2004. I have shown you the article about the many sources of the Russian propaganda from 2004-2005 which clearly denied Ukraine's statehood, demanded that Ukrainians be 'liberated' etc. That was the time when the Putin's rhetoric changed, partially due to the hardliners' influences, but not only that, the evolution of the Russian internal politics is a rather complex subject.

And how exactly I have 'ignored' the ouster of Yanukovych, given that I have cited the Euromaidan as the reason, twice, because you have accused me of the same once before? Let me guess, you do not even know what the Euromaidan is, and you are unaware that Euromaidan and the ouster of Yanukovych are the same thing?

Sure, the US supported the Euromaidan, so what? It was still a grass-root movement protesting the abandonment of tighter integration with the EU. Are you saying that Russia would not react to the Euromaidan if the US did not support it? That is rather unrealistic, to put it mildly. The 2014 invasion was over the loss of influence of Russia on the internal politics.

And no, Yanukovych's stand was not regarding NATO, it was about the European Union–Ukraine Association Agreement. I understand you do not make huge distinctions, but you are aware that the EU and the US are not the same?

So much for Crimea. What I’ve been discussing, however, is the current war. The prospects of NATO were there all along, and played a significant (but varied) role in various events prior. The most direct result of the current war was NATO provocation, in the years after 2014 but especially 2021.

The most direct cause of Crimea was Yanukovych‘s overthrow. But again, that’s not the same thing— and in any case, NATO was still a significant factor. The world is complex, and these things are connected. I don’t make a huge distinction between NATO and general “US influence,” as I’ve said. If that’s confusing, fine — I’ll be more precise. But anyone who can’t see how these things are at least interrelated isn’t paying attention. — Mikie

As I wrote, these are not two different wars, this is the same Russia trying to exert its influence on the same Ukraine by any means it seems fit. It has invaded Crimea, then it supported an armed rebellion on the territory of Ukraine for eight years (which you are seemingly unaware of) and then moved to open hostilities again. So yes, you still need that argument that Russia would not invade Ukraine again if not for NATO.

And sure, everything is interrelated, that is the exact point I am making. It is you who is making a claim based on separate, selected facts ignoring all the others, Russian internal politics in particular.

I assume you saw “after Crimea.” So by “Ukraine invasion” you’re referring to 2022, which is a reaction to Euromaidan? That’s your explanation? Very odd. Quite a delayed reaction. — Mikie

Sigh. You wrote:

So nothing else happened in 2014 that may be relevant to this story, huh? Putin just decided, out of the blue, to invade Crimea — Mikie

So you have impiled that I have not given the reason for the invasion of CRIMEA, as you wrote yourself.

To which I have responded:

No, Putin did not invade Ukraine out of the blue, as I wrote, it was the reaction to Euromaidan. Did you skip that part? — Jabberwock

So clearly I have referred to your own quote about Crimea.

I don’t have to, since it didn’t happen. Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 — which was different from 2022. Both involved US influence, but the latter’s cause (of the much larger war) was mostly NATO.

So we can see the differences based on reaction. When the EUUAA was signed — a pretty big deal to Russia— there wasn’t the level of reaction of 2022.

Maybe there would be one if Ukraine tried to join the EU— who knows? If so, then that would be the direct cause of the reaction. But since it hasn’t happened, there’s no point discussing it. — Mikie

Yes, you do have to, because it is your claim that without NATO expansion the war would NOT happen. That the cause was NATO is just your assertion, which is seriously undermined by the facts: the hostile attitude toward Ukraine started at least after the Orange Revolution, not after 2008 as your claim, Russia has once already invaded Ukraine for its drive to integrate with the EU (or the drive toward independence in general) and it has organized and supported an armed rebellion long before any talks of NATO resurfaced again.

you are supposed to argue to support your claim: that there would be no war without the talk of NATO expansion. — Jabberwock

There was no war in Ukraine prior to 2008. So there — I just proved it.

How silly.

NATO was the most direct cause of the war in Ukraine. There’s plenty of evidence for this. Now you ask me to show that in an alternate universe, where NATO expansion wasn’t on the table, that there wouldn’t be war. No, I can’t do that, because I don’t possess the magic.

if you think the 2014 invasion and and the 2022 are unrelated then it is just bizarre — Jabberwock

Uh…

not 2014, which is related but not the same. — Mikie

These are not two different wars, these are just the stages of the same conflict. — Jabberwock

True — they are all a result of 2008 and US influence in the region.

No, it did not start at the Bucharest summit, which you yourself have acknowledged, citing as one of the causes the Orange Revolution, which happened in 2004. — Jabberwock

No, it did start at the Bucharest Summit. I mentioned the OR in response to your irrelevant perplexity at why claims differed in 2008 from 2002.

To be clear, by “it” I’m referring to 2022.

And how exactly I have 'ignored' the ouster of Yanukovych, given that I have cited the Euromaidan as the reason — Jabberwock

Yes, which is different than specifically mentioning Yanukovych and his stance on NATO, which is the connection you claim doesn’t exist (“NATO had no involvement”).

And no, Yanukovych's stand was not regarding NATO, it was about the European Union–Ukraine Association Agreement. I understand you do not make huge distinctions, but you are aware that the EU and the US are not the same? — Jabberwock

Then I suggest you read about Yanukovych and his position regarding NATO expansion. It’s relevant indeed. So yes, NATO was always in the background as a threat— since 2008. That is not to say it was the most direct cause of Crimea, as I said repeatedly. But it was still a major factor in the regime change.

So yes, you still need that argument that Russia would not invade Ukraine again if not for NATO. — Jabberwock

Was there a Russian invasion of Ukraine prior to the NATO provocation of 2008?

Notice these things happened after 2008, when NATO was a looming threat— even during a relatively Russian- friendly time under a character like Yanukovych.

It has invaded Crimea, then it supported an armed rebellion on the territory of Ukraine for eight years (which you are seemingly unaware of) and then moved to open hostilities again. — Jabberwock

I’m happy to get to events after 2014. But you’re the one who diverted the conversation back to Crimea, not me.

So clearly I have referred to your own quote about Crimea. — Jabberwock

:up: I won’t argue it — if that’s what you meant, fine. I must have misread it.

Yes, you do have to, because it is your claim that without NATO expansion the war would NOT happen. — Jabberwock

I never once made that claim, which is ridiculous — because I’m not a wizard.

The claim I made was that NATO involvement was the most direct cause of the war (the current war).

What would have happened if NATO wasn’t training troops, providing weapons, conducting drills, etc? Your guess is as good as mine. Maybe there would be war still. Maybe Ukraine would invade Russia. Who knows? I don’t see it as being likely— but I don’t have a Time Machine to tell you definitively one way or another.

That the cause was NATO is just your assertion, which is seriously undermined by the facts: the hostile attitude toward Ukraine started at least after the Orange Revolution, not after 2008 as your claim, — Jabberwock

I’m not talking about hostile attitudes, I’m talking about actions.

If Russia invaded Ukraine in 2005, my position would be wrong.

So give me the alternative. You clearly don’t care about what Putin or his diplomats say— you don’t care what the US ambassador says. So what’s the “real” reason to suddenly become hostile to Ukraine? Changing internal politics in Russia? Okay — unpack that a little, and give some evidence. Because it seems very obvious NATO expansion was considered a red line, and that reactions would happen the more they pushed. You seem to think they’re lying and it’s just a cover for something else.

I also think you mistakenly believe I’m putting the entirety of this war on NATO. I’m not. That happened to be the most direct cause — not the ONLY one. I also focus on it because I’m a US citizen, and so I criticize them more so than other countries, who may indeed share in some responsibility.

long before any talks of NATO resurfaced again — Jabberwock

This is incorrect. Which is why I asked about NATO activities after 2014. If you’d like to move on to that now, I’d be happy to. Because it’s very relevant to the 2022 invasion and thus what’s happening today.

NATO never “resurfaced” because it never went underground. It was there all along — in fact more so after Crimea.

My reply to you was edited, which was too bad, because harsh as it was, I thought it accurate and appropriate. If we start c. 1905, Tsar Nicholas wants to expand in east Asia, against the Japanese, who object and prevail. Then 1917, et. seq., when the Soviets set about their own ideas of world conquest, in the process "cancelling" millions of their own citizens. WW2, and I've read that the Soviet army would clear mine-fields by driving at gun- and bayonet-point entire local populations through them. And the Russo-Finnish "Winter" war. Post WW2 and the iron curtain, with all of its abuses. Since Gorbachev, a kinder and nicer Russia, so it seems, but with Putin, back to its murderous ways. Russia isn't interested in the Nobel prize, notwithstanding the merits of some of its citizens. As to the Swede's non-invitation, that seems to me just their desire not to have an ill-mannered pig in their parlor, one that especially does not value it.

But as you seem to be an apologist for things Russia, perhaps you might assay an answer to a question I've had for a while. Arguably Russia should be the richest country on the planet and its citizens enjoying the highest standard of living. Why isn't it; why aren't they?

https://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/technology/technical/technical.html:

While the recommended maximum depth for conventional scuba diving is 130 feet, technical divers may work in the range of 170 feet to 350 feet, sometimes even deeper.

https://www.saltwatersportsman.com/story/gear/how-to-choose-the-best-fish-finder-frequency/:

“Low frequency is practical to depths of 2,500 feet,” Cushman says. “Its booming signal makes this a good choice for fishing wrecks in excess of 350 feet, West Coast rockfishing, deep-dropping and daytime swordfishing.” The wider beam angle of a low-frequency model such as the B175L 1,000-watt chirp-ready transducer (about $1,100)—which ranges from 32 degrees at its lowest frequency of 40 kHz to 21 degrees at its highest of 60 kHz—lets you search a wide swath for fish, which proves especially helpful when offshore game like marlin, wahoo and tuna are holding deep.

Clearly you don't know what you are talking about.

Clearly you don't know what you are talking about. — wonderer1

Nah. What you're suggesting is a joke, really.

But as you seem to be an apologist for things Russia, — tim wood

Reading and having an admiration for Russian writers, is an apology to Russia. Wow! We are living in the era of stupidity and 'cancel culture'. Yet, I would like to highlight my words again: 'Karamazov brothers' or 'The Don' will remain in the passage of the years, because these are pieces of culture and not your brainwashed propaganda. According to your own basis, I bet you never read Don Quixote because it comes from a bloody imperialist country as well, right? Pathetic.

On the other hand, I will try to answer to your following fallacious assessment: 'Arguably Russia should be the richest country on the planet and its citizens enjoying the highest standard of living. Why isn't it; why aren't they?'

I do not know where you get the premise that Russia should be the richest country and its citizens the happiest. But I will not hesitate in using data to contradict your position. I will use a comparison between my country and Russia. I act with good faith and humbly, at least. You will be amazed.

GDP: $2.36 trillion (Spain) / $4.77 trillion (Russia)

GDP per capita: $31,223 (Spain) / $33,263 (Russia)

Unemployment ratio: 11.6% (Spain) / 5.2% (Russia)

Suicide ratio: 6.1 per 100,000 people. (Spain) / 10.7 per 100,000 people.

Well, showing those facts, it is proven that Russia is a better country than some - at least than mine -. The suicide ratio is high but is even higher in Spain if we compare the proportion of numbers of citizens.

There was no war in Ukraine prior to 2008. So there — I just proved it.

How silly.

NATO was the most direct cause of the war in Ukraine. There’s plenty of evidence for this. Now you ask me to show that in an alternate universe, where NATO expansion wasn’t on the table, that there wouldn’t be war. No, I can’t do that, because I don’t possess the magic. — Mikie

But that was your claim! You wrote specifically:

No one said that. But there wouldn’t have been invasion. Of course NATO is only the most direct cause — but there are others. — Mikie

To which I have asked how do you know that. I am glad now that you do admit that you cannot know that.

NATO was the most convenient pretext this time for increasing the ongoing hostilities. But as we know from the Russian invasion of Crimea, any other pretext will do.

No, it did start at the Bucharest Summit. I mentioned the OR in response to your irrelevant perplexity at why claims differed in 2008 from 2002.

To be clear, by “it” I’m referring to 2022. — Mikie

So you believe the fact that Russia turned hostile toward Ukraine after 2004 has nothing to do with the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, even though the Crimea invasion was directly caused by the events quite similar to the Orange Revolution. Seriously?

And the careful distinction of 'it' very well shows how peculiar your views you are. Let me sum them up: you carefully ignore the fact that Russians got hostile at Ukraine in 2004, then in 2008 NATO supposedly provokes Russia, but Russia does nothing but protest (even though provoking Russia with NATO expansion supposedly causes wars - if it was worth the war then would be the time!), then Russia takes a break from being threatened and provoked by NATO expansion, invades Ukraine for related but distinctly different reasons (without even mentioning NATO expansion!), then goes back to being threatened by NATO expansion and invades again in 2022.

If that summary somehow misrepresents your views, please correct me.

Then I suggest you read about Yanukovych and his position regarding NATO expansion. It’s relevant indeed. So yes, NATO was always in the background as a threat— since 2008. That is not to say it was the most direct cause of Crimea, as I said repeatedly. But it was still a major factor in the regime change. — Mikie

Well, I actually I did read about it. Wiki claims that in his speech he stated:

On 14 February 2010, Yanukovych said that Ukraine's relations with NATO were currently "well-defined", and that there was "no question of Ukraine joining NATO." — Wikipedia

Unfortunately, it does not provide the source.

Also, this article from BBC sums up things nicely, with such passages like:

The Ukrainian parliament has approved a bill that effectively rejects any ambition to join Nato.

The law, submitted by President Viktor Yanukovych, cements Ukraine's status as a military non-aligned country - though it will co-operate with Nato.

President Yanukovych was elected earlier this year, vowing to end Ukraine's Nato membership ambitions and mend relations with Russia.
[...]
The new bill bars Ukraine's membership in any military bloc, but allows for co-operation with alliances such as Nato. — BBC

As I understand, from your suggestion that I read about his position, you have a citation where Yanukovych says something completely opposite? Can you provide it?

Was there a Russian invasion of Ukraine prior to the NATO provocation of 2008?

Notice these things happened after 2008, when NATO was a looming threat— even during a relatively Russian- friendly time under a character like Yanukovych. — Mikie

Was there a war after the 2008 provocation? Because if the war in 2022 is the reaction to 2008 provocation, then it must be... how you put it? Oh, yes: 'Quite a delayed reaction'.

So on your interpretation Russia was under constant threat of NATO's invasion since 2008, yet it started the invasion of Ukraine as late as in 2022, even though in the meantime it has ALSO invaded the very same Ukraine (and supported the armed rebellion) for different reasons... Really?

I never once made that claim, which is ridiculous — because I’m not a wizard. — Mikie

Well, you did write:

But there wouldn’t have been invasion. — Mikie

Was that ridiculous?

The claim I made was that NATO involvement was the most direct cause of the war (the current war).

What would have happened if NATO wasn’t training troops, providing weapons, conducting drills, etc? Your guess is as good as mine. Maybe there would be war still. Maybe Ukraine would invade Russia. Who knows? I don’t see it as being likely— but I don’t have a Time Machine to tell you definitively one way or another. — Mikie

Well, you made that specific claim, 'But there wouldn't have been invasion', so I take it you have changed your position.

And I find it VERY likely that Russia would attack Ukraine again, for the very same reasons it has attacked in in 2014 and supported hostilities since that time.

And, actually, you do not have to have a time machine, you can use historical sources to get to know the situation better, then you can have a better view of the possible outcomes. I heartily recommend it. If you have used them, you would now that the hostilities have never ceased and Ukraine was preparing troops, weapons etc. exactly for the reason that it was ALREADY in conflict with Russia.

I’m not talking about hostile attitudes, I’m talking about actions. — Mikie

And I am talking about actions, 14 thousand people died in Donbas between 2014 and 2021, which you seem to be blissfully unaware of. For you there were two related, but different wars, at two different times, simply because you do not know the facts. Could that lack of knowledge influence your view that it was unlikely Russia would have attacked Ukraine? By the way, you might also not know that there were half-hearted attempts to end the hostilities known as the Minsk Accords. Care to know how much of them is devoted to the supposedly essential issue of Ukraine's membership in NATO?

If Russia invaded Ukraine in 2005, my position would be wrong. — Mikie

Well, by that logic, given that Russia did not invade Ukraine right after 2008, your position is also wrong. NATO provoked Russia with expansion, Russia did nothing for fourteen years (of course, it did invade Ukraine in the meantime, but that does not count). After all, you believe that the threat from NATO was constant from 2008 till 2022, don't you?

So give me the alternative. You clearly don’t care about what Putin or his diplomats say— you don’t care what the US ambassador says. So what’s the “real” reason to suddenly become hostile to Ukraine? Changing internal politics in Russia? Okay — unpack that a little, and give some evidence. Because it seems very obvious NATO expansion was considered a red line, and that reactions would happen the more they pushed. You seem to think they’re lying and it’s just a cover for something else. — Mikie

I care about Putin's pretexts of post-USSR conflicts (because there were many) about as much as I care about Bush's pretexts of Iraq's second invasion. In today's world attacking other countries without casus belli is frowned upon, so they always try to come up with something. Amusingly, Putin's 'official' reasons for invading Crimea were quite different than what you have described (he was supposedly defending the Crimea's Russian minority against the oppresive Kiyv government), so you do not believe him either.

As I wrote, the internal situation in Russia in those years was quite complex and it is difficult to summarize it in a few paragraphs (especially when you say that I am entitled to lectures on history). In general, Putin's predecessor, Yeltsin, after what seemed to be a drive toward democratization, had to face a Communist putsch. The results were somewhat ambiguous: it is true that the putsch was defeated and the vision of the return of hardliners was averted, but at the same time his grip on power was significantly strengthened and the transition to democracy never fully recovered. This was compounded by the fact that his power to a large degree depended on the support of oligarchs, who got rich in the course of 'wild privatization' of the state companies (many of them remained 'state' only in name). Given that his circles were engaged in the rampant corruption, facing end of presidency he chose to 'annoit' a relatively unknown Putin as his successor. Note that his election was most likely legitimate - given lack of democratic traditions, Russians seemingly did not mind being told who to vote for. But it should be noted that he gained a lot of popularity due to his hardline handling of the Chechen conflict (some say it was even started by Russians, but it cannot be proven).

Still, Putin's rule was not that strong during his first term - he was not as popular as Yeltsin (he had just 53% of support) and he did not have a good support base similar to 'Yeltsin's familia' (especially after the fallout with Berezovsky). And after 2000 Russians became very disappointed with the consequences of the fall of the USSR: after initial enthusiasm, they began to resent it, especially that the new economy lacked the social safety nets of the old system, crime was rampant, inflation began to rise again etc. Geopolitically former republics began to distance themselves from Russia. More importantly, the Chechen War was still ongoing, with possible expansion of the conflict to other republics. This in turn activated Russian nationalists, who demanded strong suppression of rebellious republics, especially after the Moscow theatre massacre.

Thus Putin just before his second term elections had to appease both those who yearned for the return of the USSR and those who supported imperialistic rhetoric. Of course, there was no real conflict between the two: USSR was as imperialistic as Russia before, as it basically treated many of its republics and satellites as colonies (but that would require an even longer lecture, even though understanding that is essential to current events).

Putin has actually embraced both, and that is still evident in Russian propaganda. E.g. Solovyov has no problem praising both Stalin and tzarist politics, even though communists have completely renounced tzars (officially, at least). In order to strengthen his support before elections he both praised the USSR (calling its fall 'the greatest tragedy') and taking a much harder stance on the dealings with former republics. That included Ukraine, but was in no way limited to it, as the main focus was Caucasus, which did not even show any NATO aspirations. This coincided with the supposed global war on terror, which conveniently allowed him to frame all the ongoing conflicts as anti-terroristic (to be clear, some of the unrest in the Caucasus was inspired by Islamic extremists). That is why the concept of the Russian MIr has been officially adopted.

However, in the meantime something even worse happened: the Color Revolutions have begun. These were even worse, because they not only caused the former republics to move away from Russian influences, but threatened Putin directly: around 2004 his rule was already much more authoritarian (and corrupt) than in 2000 and 'exporting' of the protests to Russia could end in his ouster or worse. This of course increased the already heightened tensions between Russia and other republics. After the elections in 2004 Putin enjoyed much stronger popular support, but his foreign policy has visibly changed, as mentioned in our discussion.

I also think you mistakenly believe I’m putting the entirety of this war on NATO. I’m not. That happened to be the most direct cause — not the ONLY one. I also focus on it because I’m a US citizen, and so I criticize them more so than other countries, who may indeed share in some responsibility. — Mikie

What you, in my opinion, fail to see is that the conflict runs much deeper and NATO expansion is just one of the points, not decisive one. The underlying issue is that Putin is no longer willing (or cannot afford) to allow losing Russian influence in the former republics, even against the will of their populations.

NATO never “resurfaced” because it never went underground. It was there all along — in fact more so after Crimea. — Mikie

So when BBC wrote that Ukraine 'effectively rejects any ambition to join Nato', they were completely wrong. I see.

Sorry that I respond quite late, have had much work.

I've explicitly stated multiple times that one of my purposes in the thread is to explain Russia's perspective as mutual understanding is required to negotiate peace. — boethius

And what kind of peace do you think Russia will opt for?

We are told by the Ukrainian perspective that the Russians are all low morale and not motivated etc. — boethius

Are we told that, actually by the Ukrainians? Compared to Ukrainians, how much stories of young Russians living abroad going back to Russia to fight the war? I think it's obvious that for Russians this more like an experience of Vietnam, even if the occasional explosion happens in Russian territory.

Seems the confusion was caused by above statement, by referring to them as conscripts it would seem to mean they are conscripted, but I have not found explanation of why the age of registration was lowered. — boethius

Yeah, to be registered is not the same as to be drafted into the army. I assume the Ukrainians do anticipate this war going possibly for many years still.

In other words you agree that NATO was not and is not prepared for the kind of war Ukraine is fighting and so unable to supply Ukraine to fight said war it's not prepared for. — boethius

NATO has nuclear weapons, hence any kind of confrontation with another nuclear armed foe (like Russia) makes the war extremely dangerous. But actually we do have a precedent: Last time Pakistan and India clashed in their border regions, you had both sides having a nuclear deterrence. What was obvious was that both side treated every escalation of the conflict with huge attention.

And do notice that the West can change. Were there rolling blackouts in Germany last winter because of an energy crisis? No, but remember how Russian propaganda was excited how bad Germany will have it during the winter 2022-2023... Hence NATO countries can get their act together and can alter their military-industrial base. As I've stated, the rearmament program that Poland has gone for is quite huge.

I do not know where you get the premise that Russia should be the richest country and its citizens the happiest. But I will not hesitate in using data to contradict your position. I will use a comparison between my country and Russia. I act with good faith and humbly, at least. You will be amazed.
GDP: $2.36 trillion (Spain) / $4.77 trillion (Russia)
GDP per capita: $31,223 (Spain) / $33,263 (Russia)
Unemployment ratio: 11.6% (Spain) / 5.2% (Russia)
Suicide ratio: 6.1 per 100,000 people. (Spain) / 10.7 per 100,000 people.
Well, showing those facts, it is proven that Russia is a better country than some - at least than mine -. — javi2541997

Population of Russia about 3x that of Spain. 48 M v. 144 M

Spain $2.4T / 48M = $50,000

Russia $4.8T / 144M = $33,000

Geologically, Russia has pretty much as much or more of pretty much everything than everyone else. . Oil, gold, diamonds, etc., etc., etc. But very, very few Russians have benefitted from this natural wealth. To be sure, western countries have been far from perfect in managing their own natural treasures, but still are doing a lot better than Russians. And think the answers are obvious, so-called communism and corruption.

And you appear to believe that criticism of something that deserves it is "cancelling." If only!

Comment?

So are you denying that “non sequitur” means “it doesn’t follow” or that it is used as a label for a “logic fallacy”, prof? — neomac


I'm sorry that your reading comprehension is poor. But that's not my fault. I assume you're not a native English speaker, and in that case I'm not making fun -- I certainly wouldn't be good at understanding the nuances of Russian or Spanish. — Mikie

“Non sequitur” is a Latin expression not English, Russian or Spanish.
In logic, “non sequitur” refers to a deductive fallacy.
Understanding if this claim of yours “Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so” is or not a non sequitur has nothing to do with native English speakers’ nuances you’re raving about, and all to do with understanding what constitutes a logically valid deduction. So in any language you would translate your argument, your argument as it is formulated is an obvious “non sequitur”.
My point wasn’t meant to be pedantic though, but to solicit you to EXPLICIT the IMPLICIT premise. This premise should sound something like “If Russia feels provoked by NATO expansion, then there is NO reason for NATO expansion” for you to draw that conclusion. This premise is not self-evidently true AT ALL, so you have to argue to support it, that is why I objected: “At most you can argue that there was a ‘very strong’ reason NOT to do so (Russia’s strong opposition). Not that there was NO reason to do so.” This objection is particularly pertinent in geopolitics because, as explained, in a domain where there are strong competing interests and mistrust (like during great powers’ struggles), defensive measures (like military alliances) can be perceived as aggressive and can likely escalate tensions. That’s why you can take “President Putin felt provoked by NATO expansion” at best as ONE relevant premise of your reasoning for concluding “there was NO valid reason to do it”. But unless you make explicit the other relevant implicit premises enabling you to draw your conclusion, your argument has no force. As it is, it sounds dogmatic and very myopic about geopolitical reasons.

So it’s false your claim that NATO didn’t expand because of the “Russian threat” . — neomac


What was the threat in 2008, and why was it never mentioned? If kept quiet about, where is the evidence that Russian invasion or aggression was imminent at that time?
I won't hold my breath -- because there was none. Just vague appeals to old tensions, most of them within Ukraine itself (which was deeply split, as is seen from election results/language distribution comparisons).
So if there was no imminent threat from Russia, why did NATO expand? Well, they told us why at the Bucharest Summit. No mystery. — Mikie

1 - I never said that “Russian invasion or aggression” was “imminent” (and notice that even “imminent” doesn’t equate to a timestamp like “4 April 2008 at 13:45:12 UTC”). Indeed geopolitical security dilemmas are not primarily focused on IMMINENT threats (that’s why I repeatedly asked you what you mean by “such a threat”, remember?). AND OBVIOUSLY SO, because when the military threat is IMMINENT, it may be already TOO LATE to counter it. BTW even Ukraine joining NATO wasn’t about IMMINENT threats against Russia either but on prospective/historical threats any ex-KGB spy Russian president from the Cold War, worried about NATO-encirclement, Russian hegemonic status and broken promises by the West to Soviet Union leaders, can VERY WELL perceive!. Besides perceived IMMINENT threats like Islamic Terrorism in years 2000-2008 may indeed cloud politicians’ perception of not IMMINENT but way more DESTABILIZING prospective/historical threats. Again, geopolitical security dilemmas are primarily shaped by historical trends, geographic/demographic constraints and actual military and non-military resources to effectively engage in power struggles, NOT by declared intentions from President X at a given time Y. BTW even the hegemonic competition between China and the US is not an imminent military threat either but a prospective/historical threat, which for the US might be more decisive than the threat from Russia. That is why the US is establishing and strengthening military alliances in the Pacific. And China is vocally opposing them and it feels “provoked”.

2 - The Bucharest Summit doesn’t mention the Russian threat as much as the "Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS " doesn’t mention the Chinese threat (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/), yet everyone with a functioning brain, including China, are aware that is about the perceived Chinese threat as much as
everyone with a functioning brain, including Russia, are aware that “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO” is about Ukraine and Georgia’s perceived historical threats coming from Russia.

3 - The Bucharest summit brings the distinctive signature of the Bush administration committed to the free world and to counter the imminent threats (like Islamist terrorism) but it hides under the carpet of free-world rhetoric and promises or the concern from the imminent threat from Islamic terrorism or the infamous Bush-Putin bromance and assurances (remember Putin’s words “And we cannot be satisfied with statements that this process is not aimed against Russia”?) the notorious motivations for those who joined or wanted to join NATO, the reiterated vocal Russian concerns and the reiterated American national interest advisors vocally warning about it. But, as I argued, this move didn’t come without MASSIVE BENEFITS instrumental to Russia hegemonic ambitions as well as to the invasion/aggression of Ukraine: like good business with the West, free-pass for military projection in Middle East, free pass for political/media channels/allies in the West for spinning anti-NATO narrative.

4 - It doesn’t suffice to say Putin got motives (he got provoked in 2008!) to explain this war, one has also to explain how he got the means and the confidence to invade Ukraine only 14 years later in 2022 snd despite the fact that Ukraine still didn’t join NATO. It doesn’t suffice to acknowledge that Putin got motives (provocation from the West) to morally justify why he used his accumulated power to hit back at Ukraine and the West, one has to morally justify why Putin shouldn’t have had STRONGER motives to use his accumulated power to improve welfare, freedoms, industries, public services in Russia like Germany did after the end of WW2. It doesn’t suffice to acknowledge that Putin got motives (provocation from the West) to geopolitically justify this war, one must also be able to explain how the Western threat against Russian hegemonic ambitions could be BEST contained by annexing Crimea in 2014 and invading Ukraine in 2022.

Brzeziński — neomac

Shouldn't that be "your guru Brzenzinski"? — Mikie

Not really. First, I read both Brzenzinski’s AND Mearsheimer’s (among others) geopolitical analysis primarily to understand geopolitics, I do not cherrypick only the analysis of the one that best supports my preconceived popular condemnation of the American foreign policies no matter how poor my understanding of the American geopolitics is. Second, I’m putting a different weight on the two not because the former promoted NATO-expansion for Russian threat containment (however critical about how Clinton and Bush administrations dealt with it!) while the second was against it (yet certainly not because the Russian hegemonic ambitions over Ukraine or the Russian historical/prospective threat didn’t exist!), but because Brzenzinski was an actual prominent national security advisor of American administrations, heavily involved in the debate about NATO or NATO expansion within political administrations, Mearsheimer no.

why NATO’s Article 5 [1] (which is clearly defensive) is a security threat aimed against Russia? — neomac

Ask the Russians. They’ll tell you. And it’s they who get to determine what’s threatening to them and what isn’t— not you and me.
— Mikie

No no I’m asking you, because you take Putin’s alleged rationale to actually have not only explanatory but also justificatory power for the origin of this war, not as a convenient lie just to persuade “useful Idiots” in the West, right? — neomac


So you ask me, not the Russians, because you assume I'm going to repeat what the Russian's have said about this?

Your logic is baffling. — Mikie

I’m asking you because “you take Putin’s alleged rationale to actually have not only explanatory but also justificatory power for the origin of this war, not as a convenient lie just to persuade ‘useful Idiots’ in the West, right?”.
Imagine this: an angry dude comes at you asking a refund because you hit his car while driving. Now, you can see he is angry from his body language, but you honestly believe you did not hit his car (e.g. you noticed that there is no dent nor scratch in your car nor his, nor you can recall your car trajectory being near enough to the angry’s dude or noise of an accident), so you want to know why he thinks you hit his car, wouldn’t you? Now imagine your wife by your side telling you: “But don’t you see how angry he is?! He is repeatedly telling you hit his car, not only once, but repeatedly, it is your fault if he is so angry! And now you have to refund him”. You protest: “he might be angry, but I don’t think I’ve hit his car so I want to know why he believes this, maybe he is mistaken. Do you know why he thinks I hit his car by any chance?”. And your wife shocked by your obtusity replies: “What?! Why are you asking me?! You should ask him, not me. I’m just saying it’s your fault if he is angry at you because he repeatedly said you repeatedly hit his car, so you shouldn’t have hit his car even once, it was your mistake, and now he’s justified to ask for a refund. Stop hitting his car and making him angry!”.
Unless there is a huge trust issue (like your wife has strong reasons to believe you are a systematic liar and the stranger is honest beyond any reasonable doubt), wouldn’t you think your wife is definitely a nut case to divorce from as soon as possible? I most certainly would.
By analogy, if YOU want to sensibly claim it’s US/West/NATO’s fault to provoke Putin because he perceives Ukraine joining NATO as a security threat, then YOU (not the Russians) have to provide strong reasons to support such threat perception.

What would the threat be if China offered a military pact to Canada, trained Canadian troops, supplied weapons, and conducted military drills along the US border? Why would the US consider this pact a threat? Can you guess? Or would you dismiss that claim as well? If so, I applaud your consistency. If not, what's the difference? — Mikie

1 - I expressly asked you to give Putin’s most unequivocal quotes specifying nature of the threat and its consequences if red lines were crossed, you didn’t provide any yet. And I also explained why I needed them: “there are some evident rhetoric benefits in making vague threats for alleged defensive reasons: playing the victim and therefore justify self-indulging behaviour (even the Nazis played the victim to justify their preventive aggressions), scare easy-to-impress people (but political leaders of a hawkish hegemonic country are not the first people that would come to mind right?) and discourage minimalist solutions (I’ll give you an example: the Cuban crisis. What was the security threat to the US? The deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba. What was the solution? Not put nuclear missiles in Cuba. This didn’t require to have the US annexing or invading Cuba, changing regime in Cuba, changing the Cuban system of alliance, nuclear bomb Cuba, etc. It sufficed to find an agreement on nuclear missiles deployment)”.

2 - If not Putin’s quotes, you could still use concrete historical analogies to illustrate your point, as I did (i.e. the military cooperation between Cuba and Soviet Union that led to the Cuban missile crisis). Instead you parroted your guru Mearsheimer’s hypothetical analogy which is ONCE AGAIN vague about nature of the threat and consequences in case declared red lines are crossed. Besides the problem with a hypothetical analogy, is that it is constrained only by the explicit AND IMPLICIT assumptions one thinks are relevant to construe the analogy. This approach can more inadvertently bias the hypothetical analogy. The shared assumption between me and you here is that a defensive military alliance with a hegemonic archenemy in the US backyard would be likely perceived as a worrisome security threat that would need to be prevented or contained as it is the case with Russia and NATO expansion in Ukraine. What I further argue however is that the choice for best prevention and containment strategies depend on the specific perceived threats. A security threat unspecified with respect to its nature and affordable countermeasures in case red lines are crossed is hard to assess in the case of Russia as much as in it is in the hypothetical case of the US. On the other side there are AT LEAST two strong and very concrete reasons why Russian perceived security threat from NATO expansion in Ukraine is HIGHLY questionable: A) Russia is a heavy-weight military nuclear power nobody wants to mess up with for the fun of it (who in Europe would easily agree on Ukraine’s call for art.5 after aggressing Russia proper when they could be nuclear bombed by Russia, exactly?) B) the US de facto and consciously HELPED boost Russia military capabilities through concessions (see Budapest memorandum) and financing military ramp-up (through a good decade of abundant business with the West), among others. IF US administrations were definitely hostile against Russia, they couldn’t possibly help Russia the way they actually did, and didn’t do during the Cold War for the USSR. Besides this is true INDEPENDENTLY from Putin’s whining over generic security threats from NATO/US/West meddling in Ukraine.

In this case, how could you even complain about Western dirty propaganda, if you fall so candidly to foreign dirty propaganda? — neomac

Perhaps the rationale for the Monroe Doctrine is indeed "dirty propaganda." That's worth exploring, sure. But it's still very real, and I wouldn't advise China or Russia to go testing the United States on it -- however flimsy the reasoning behind it is, however much I think it to be based on unfounded fears, or whether or not I feel I have a direct look into the soul of Washington — Mikie

.

To assess if your fears are rational, you have to be at least able to reconstruct the reasons of your fears. To assess if China or Russia’s reactions to “the Monroe Doctrine” are rational, you have to be at least able to reconstruct their reasons for their reaction. And be also careful to not conflate your reasons to fear “the Monroe Doctrine” with their reasons to fear “the Monroe Doctrine”.

As I argued I’m TOTALLY convinced that Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be “threatening” to Russian security — neomac

Okay…so what’s the issue?
In that case, 2008 was a mistake. The US should not have continued pushing NATO membership for years. Period.
— Mikie

Another non sequitur. — neomac


And again you don't know what that means, or you fail to see the connection. I'll assume the latter, so I'll make it clearer:

(1) If it is true that Russia considered NATO expansion to be a threat (and a "red line"), then
(2) The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake. — Mikie

And again you don't know what “non sequitur” means, or you fail to see why your argument is a “non sequitur”. I’ll assume both. I'll make it clearer how embarrassingly poor your reasoning is from a logic point of view, step by step. Ready?
As a starter, either we understand that boldened “If… then…” as a logic propositional operator or we understand it as a logic deduction.
In the first case, the propositional logic form of your comment is something like: “p -> q” or “if p then q” (where p = “it is true that Russia considered NATO expansion to be a threat (and a ‘red line’)” and q = “The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake.”). In this case you are not offering an argument, but just a conditional proposition which could either serve as a premise for some argument or result as a conclusion from some argument. If it’s a premise for some argument, that argument won’t be proven to be sound until the premise is proven to be true along with other premises. On the other side, if it’s a conclusion drawn from some argument, where is the argument? It’s missing. Not to mention that this conditional proposition is evidently not analytically true (its truth doesn’t depend on the meaning of the words of p and q), and I questioned its empirical truth as well. In other words, you would just be offering a statement you happen to believe in, without a solid argument to support it. But I do not care about your beliefs as such, I care about the arguments that are supposed to support them. So where are the arguments?
In the second case, the propositional logic form of your comment is something like: “p ⊢ q” or “q (syntactically) derives from p”. In other words, from the premise p one can syntactically derive q by applying transformation rules governing logic propositional operators. This is not a conditional proposition, but a formal deductive argument between atomic propositions (indeed neither p nor q contain propositional logic operators). Unfortunately, in propositional logic, the rule is that atomic propositions can not be derived from atomic propositions. So, in propositional logic, your argument would be definitely false (q doesn’t follow from p, non sequitur).
Furthermore, the casual combination of “if.., then…” that could be easily taken as a propositional logic operator (by those familiar with propositional logic) to talk about the truth of certain propositions, as if you were performing some truth-functional calculus over propositions (like a deduction), with the declared intention to “make it clearer” to me because I don’t get the nuances of English as I’m not a native English speaker, strongly suggests that you are catastrophically conflating conditional propositions with deductive arguments, likely because you are too ignorant about logic to understand how logically confused your claim is.

Apparently you're arguing it wasn't a mistake, that somehow pushing for NATO expansion, despite Russian warnings, was a good move. — Mikie

Not really. So far I was arguing that Russian warnings are not a strong reason to believe that NATO expansion was the most relevant factor to explain the current war or to justify blame-attribution for the war (as your guru Mearsheimer claims “the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault").

I suppose you believe it was wise for the USSR to put nuclear weapons in Cuba, right? That wasn't a mistake either, by your logic. — Mikie

As far as I’m concerned, it was a nightmarish risky move, but not escalatory in the sense that it was proportional to the nuclear threat the US was exposing USSR to. However Soviet Union’s bold move turned out to be effective in the end: “On Saturday, October 27, after much deliberation between the Soviet Union and Kennedy's cabinet, Kennedy secretly agreed to remove all missiles set in Turkey and possibly southern Italy, the former on the border of the Soviet Union, in exchange for Khrushchev removing all missiles in Cuba” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis).

As I said one can take “Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be ‘threatening’ to Russian security” as a premise to support NATO expansion as well. — neomac


So when a war finally breaks out because of this expansion, we still think it's just fine?

You'd fit right in with the Washington crowd. — Mikie

As far as I’m concerned, it is understandable to feel anguished by wars and threats of wars, whose horrible consequences one perceives to be likely or unavoidably exposed to. And uncertainties about it can feel as an intolerable psychological torture.
Unfortunately reality may differ from our preferences in all sorts of nightmarish ways like e.g. an incurable cancer. So instead of whining over it, go in denial, blame the convenient scapegoat or
look for help from holy gurus and snake-handlers, I find it more helpful to cope with my anguishes and uncertainties to try to understand the reality I’m facing, especially concerning events much bigger than me (as an incurable cancer or a escalatory competition for hegemony), and then to see what I can afford in that scenario to serve my preferences (for example, I prefer for me and people I care to live like an avg American, European, Japanese, South Korean, Canadian or Australian, than to live like an avg Russian, Chinese, Iranian or North Korean, you?).

Until you raise the quality of your arguments, I'll leave you at that.

To which I have asked how do you know that. I am glad now that you do admit that you cannot know that. — Jabberwock

So your entire argument rests on the fact that I can only give an opinion, not definitive proof, of what might have happened. An odd line to take.

Yes, you got me. Maybe had I not driven to work yesterday, my car would have still run out of gas. I can’t definitively prove otherwise — but I view it as unlikely.

NATO was the most convenient pretext this time for increasing the ongoing hostilities. But as we know from the Russian invasion of Crimea, any other pretext will do. — Jabberwock

Why pretext? A pretext that was known and warned about for years, and such even several experts agreed would likely happen if such activities continued?

Seems like a very elaborate ruse.

Let me sum them up: you carefully ignore the fact that Russians got hostile at Ukraine in 2004, then in 2008 NATO supposedly provokes Russia, but Russia does nothing but protest (even though provoking Russia with NATO expansion supposedly causes wars - if it was worth the war then would be the time!), then Russia takes a break from being threatened and provoked by NATO expansion, invades Ukraine for related but distinctly different reasons (without even mentioning NATO expansion!), then goes back to being threatened by NATO expansion and invades again in 2022.

If that summary somehow misrepresents your views, please correct me. — Jabberwock

Appreciate the effort.

NATO is one line of US influence, and an important one. There are others. Why does the US want to expand NATO, support overthrowing a president, etc.? It's part of a very clear strategy for eastern Europe.

President Yanukovych was elected earlier this year, vowing to end Ukraine's Nato membership ambitions and mend relations with Russia. — BBC

As I understand, from your suggestion that I read about his position, you have a citation where Yanukovych says something completely opposite? Can you provide it? — Jabberwock

When did I say that? Your citation is correct: he was against NATO membership. Very clear. I don't see where the confusion is.

Was there a Russian invasion of Ukraine prior to the NATO provocation of 2008? — Mikie

Was there a war after the 2008 provocation? Because if the war in 2022 is the reaction to 2008 provocation, then it must be... how you put it? Oh, yes: 'Quite a delayed reaction'. — Jabberwock

There were two aggressions after 2008, yes. 2014 and 2022. That doesn't prove that they wouldn't have occurred anyway -- but it certainly doesn't disprove that Bucharest didn't have lasting impacts. Which it did.

There were other impacts as well. Remember, NATO was one part of US strategy in the region. Just happened to be the "red line" for Russia -- which you disregard.

So why was there such a delay? Because things changed and escalated. First, Russian military capacity changed. Second, the US supported pushing out a pro-Russian president. Third, and leading directly to all-out invasion, NATO provided training (for YEARS), weapons, and conducted drills -- and then, to top it off, in 2021, reaffirmed its position from 2008.

So if that seems like odd timing, you're just not paying attention. In fact the Russians were screaming about this for months, if not years -- to no avail. Because they're just liars and thugs, after all, so who cares what they say or think? Besides, everyone knows NATO is "defensive," and is no threat to Russia. "Just look at the Baltics." And so forth.

If Russia invaded Ukraine in 2005, my position would be wrong.
— Mikie

Well, by that logic, given that Russia did not invade Ukraine right after 2008, your position is also wrong. — Jabberwock

Ok, I'll put it this way: if they invaded at any point from 2000-2008, or especially after 2004-2008, I'd be wrong. If they cited NATO expansion, that would be very odd. They could have cited US influence, however.

I care about Putin's pretexts of post-USSR conflicts (because there were many) about as much as I care about Bush's pretexts of Iraq's second invasion. In today's world attacking other countries without casus belli is frowned upon, so they always try to come up with something. — Jabberwock

True, and we should listen and see if there's any truth to it.

What you, in my opinion, fail to see is that the conflict runs much deeper and NATO expansion is just one of the points, not decisive one. The underlying issue is that Putin is no longer willing (or cannot afford) to allow losing Russian influence in the former republics, even against the will of their populations. — Jabberwock

Of course it runs deeper. Of course there are complexities. To argue the Ukraine invasion of 2022 had IittIe to do with NATO is simply ignoring the facts, in my view. If China were training troops and conducting military driIIs in Mexico, and then China announces it would push for a pact -- despite warnings of the US -- I think the response by the US would be not that surprising, and one would say China's involvement was a decisive factor indeed. True, we could aIso make up other stories, and of course there'd be some truth in them, but to ignore the gIaringIy obvious just isn't serious.

So when BBC wrote that Ukraine 'effectively rejects any ambition to join Nato', they were completely wrong. I see. — Jabberwock

So military training, weapons, Operation Sea Breeze, and the Joint Statement on the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership (September of 2021) -- aII of this we should ignore because at some point the BBC said -- God knows when -- that Ukraine rejects any ambition to join NATO?

Again, this just isn't serious.

“Non sequitur” is a Latin expression not English — neomac

I know what non sequitur means. You apparently don't. You've also proven my point about misunderstanding English nuance.

everyone with a functioning brain, including Russia, are aware that “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO” is about Ukraine and Georgia’s perceived historical threats coming from Russia. — neomac

I'm not talking about Ukraine or Georgia's perceptions. I'm sure they have their reasons, which I respect. To argue it was mostly about "historical threats" is at best haIf-truth. But try to stay on topic.

I'm talking about Russia's perception, right or wrong. Everyone knew they considered NATO expansion a threat.

but because Brzenzinski was an actual prominent national security advisor of American administrations, — neomac

And this is a reason to take him more seriously?

You do you.

By analogy, if YOU want to sensibly claim it’s US/West/NATO’s fault to provoke Putin because he perceives Ukraine joining NATO as a security threat, then YOU (not the Russians) have to provide strong reasons to support such threat perception. — neomac

I already did. China making the exact same moves in Mexico that the US/NATO has done in Ukraine, and you bet your ass the US would react. I would consider that playing with fire on China's part.

And I don't have to give reasons for the threat perception, any more than I have to give reasons for Georgian threat perceptions of Russia. I simply look at what they say, and if it makes some sense, I take it seriously. In this case, it seems to me Russia has some reason for concern. But in any case, it's not what I think -- it's what THEY think. Which I've repeated several times.

What would the threat be if China offered a military pact to Canada, trained Canadian troops, supplied weapons, and conducted military drills along the US border? Why would the US consider this pact a threat? Can you guess? Or would you dismiss that claim as well? If so, I applaud your consistency. If not, what's the difference? — Mikie

I noticed you couldn't answer this. Too bad.

Perhaps the rationale for the Monroe Doctrine is indeed "dirty propaganda." That's worth exploring, sure. But it's still very real, and I wouldn't advise China or Russia to go testing the United States on it -- however flimsy the reasoning behind it is, however much I think it to be based on unfounded fears, or whether or not I feel I have a direct look into the soul of Washington
— Mikie
.
To assess if your fears are rational, you have to be at least able to reconstruct the reasons of your fears. — neomac

Good god, can you read?

I'll repeat: Regardless of what *I* myself believe about the Monroe Doctrine, it is in fact a foreign policy of the US. So the question isn't about "rationalizing" fears, especially not my own. If you had taken a few extra seconds to read what was written, you'd quickly see your response was irrelevant.

And again you don't know what that means — Mikie

And again you don't know what “non sequitur” means — neomac

:snicker: How original.

(1) If it is true that Russia considered NATO expansion to be a threat (and a "red line"), then
(2) The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake. — Mikie

I'll make it clearer how embarrassingly poor your reasoning is from a logic point of view, step by step. Ready? — neomac

:lol: I can't wait.

In the second case, the propositional logic form of your comment is something like: “p ⊢ q” or “q (syntactically) derives from p”. In other words, from the premise p one can syntactically derive q by applying transformation rules governing logic propositional operators. — neomac

lol. Oh how smart! I guess you're really showing me a thing or two!

So, in propositional logic, your argument would be definitely false (q doesn’t follow from p, non sequitur). — neomac

You really are embarrassing yourself.

I'll repeat, again, what was said:

(1) If it is true that Russia considered NATO expansion to be a threat (and a "red line"), then
(2) The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake.

The numbering was not meant to imply this is a syllogism. What I'm saying is obvious, but let's change the labels:

If the US considers nuclear weapons in CUBA a threat, then the USSR doing so anyway, despite these warnings, is a mistake.

If you're struggling with WHY it's a mistake, I'll tell you: because it'd be nice not having World War III. In the case of Russia, it'd be nice not having Russians and Ukrainians killed and billions of dollars spent on weapons.

Now maybe it would have happened without NATO involvement, as Jabberwock seems to believe, but at least the US would be nearly blameless.

too ignorant about logic to understand how logically confused your claim is. — neomac

Intellectualizing something rather straightforward doesn't have the affect you think it does.

It makes you look like this guy:

Comment? — tim wood

I am not accusing you of 'cancelling' Russian culture. I just wrote those paragraphs because I thought it was unfair to mix up things. 'Karamazov Brothers' and a normal/regular Russian citizen is not guilty of Russian oligarchy. The latter doesn't represent the real Russia and it is unfair. To be honest, I think I have sympathy with them because I understand what it feels like living in a country with a dictatorial background. My point is that there is an abyss between the Russian Kremlin and the citizenship of Moscow or the rest of the Oblasts. Most of the statistics - which come from the Western media - showing that most of the Russians support this war are twisted and these are not reliable to me.

On the other hand, I agree with you in the point that the Russian natural resources have always been poorly managed. Since 1991, the oligarchy members are the only ones who make profits on it. Then, this causes a dysfunctional social structure. The Russian middle-class is not perceiving everything that they deserve. But it is important to highlight that the middle-class of every Western country has experienced a decrease in their purchase power because of Zelensky's childish behaviour of not allowing us to buy Russian natural resources. I wonder whether they will pay us back one day (as well as Japan and Germany did after WWII), or if our budget went to unclaimed funds...

Nonetheless, what about the unfair financial block from the Western world? This attitude only harms the Russian citizens we are debating about, and has zero effects on the Russian oligarchy. So, I can't see the point in not having financial relationships with them. Even with all the blocks from the Western world, they are still the 9th economy of the world and we - the European hypocrites - still buy them oil and gas. Amazing! I am jealous of the resistance of the Russian state.

To be honest, Brzezinski deserves to be taken seriously.

In 1997 he wrote an influential book called 'The Grand Chessboard' in which he detailed American geopolitical strategy post-Cold War.

Here's a post I wrote months ago with some juicy quotes from Brzezinski's book that will give a glimpse into the mindset of the Washington elite. It paints a rather bleak picture.

Why someone would refer to Brzezinski to deny Washington's culpability remains a mystery.

Without some kind of explanation of how they worked, it's hard to take the yacht story seriously. — Tzeentch

I agree that the "experts say it's possible" is weak and it would be great if they'd give some more information on it why they say so. But that statement is lifted from the official investigators intermediary reports so probably isn't disclosed because they're not done yet with the investigation.

The damage on the loading bay was consistent with "heavy equipment/machinery". I think forensic research can probably tell what damaged it if they really wanted to. Traces of explosives and other things could have been found as well.

But even if that all bears out, it still doesn't answer whether this was a false-flag operation or not.

So your entire argument rests on the fact that I can only give an opinion, not definitive proof, of what might have happened. An odd line to take.

Yes, you got me. Maybe had I not driven to work yesterday, my car would have still run out of gas. I can’t definitively prove otherwise — but I view it as unlikely. — Mikie

The issue is, as I have mentioned, that you select just a few facts that suit your theory that Russian intensification of the conflict was unlikely and ignore all others. You simply ignore the underlying roots of the conflict and focus solely on its single aspect. The issue is that this approach leaves you comically unable to explain major facts of the Ukraine-Russia's relations. The prime example is your constant pretending that the Donbas rebellion did not happen.

Why pretext? A pretext that was known and warned about for years, and such even several experts agreed would likely happen if such activities continued?

Seems like a very elaborate ruse. — Mikie

Because it allows to 'sell' the war to people less familiar with the history of the region, as can be seen even in this thread. That in turn helps to undermine the support for Ukraine - as can be seen, in many cases quite effectively.

Appreciate the effort.

NATO is one line of US influence, and an important one. There are others. Why does the US want to expand NATO, support overthrowing a president, etc.? It's part of a very clear strategy for eastern Europe. — Mikie

Sure, that is the US strategy, but that does not mean the US is the main cause of the processes. That is what you got completely wrong. Given that you are an American, maybe an analogy from the American history will help: France has supported the American Revolution, provided weapons and even troops to Americans, because it suited France's interests in the conflict with the British. Yet if I wrote that France has organized the American Revolution, therefore should be blamed for it, nobody would take me seriously. Sure, France has suported it, but it was the Americans who were the main force behind it, they wanted to be independent from the British and they would seek independence sooner or later, with France's support or not. That is exactly the case with the Eastern Europe. It is the former Russian satellites and former republics who want to get out from under the Russian influence - sure, the US supports it, because it suits its purposes, but is not the force behind the movement. Here is an article from the Polish state poll-taking agency from 1997. Not only it shows the overwhelming majority supports membership in NATO, but it clearly shows that Poles considered NATO to be a security guarantee against Russia:

Moreover, the majority of the respondents disapprove of the intentions of Russian policy concerning NATO extension, sharing the view that Russia's opposition towards Poland's entry into NATO was caused first of all by her desire to regain influence in our country. — CBOS

Eastern Europeans have always considered Russia as a threat and for very good reasons. And it was not a matter of long past history - the last Russian troops (generally viewed as the occupiers) left Poland in 1993. In 1968 some Czechs and Slovaks, after Russia crushed their freedom with its tanks, promised to never shave until the Russian troops left - they did so in 1991:

https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-06-25-mn-1335-story.html

so the memory was still rather vivid.

In the Baltics the memory of the Russian interventions were even more fresh: Russians tried militarily to suppress their independence in 1991. The clashes were small and they failed, but only because Russians were too weak, not because they were not willing. For the Baltics joining NATO was a question of survival: they had every reason to believe that once Russia gets stronger, it might want to thwart their independence again.

Your view that the EE countries did not perceive Russia as a threat is completely, utterly wrong. It was their fear of Russia that made them desperately seeking the membership in NATO. Sure, the US was eager to complyl, as it suited their geopolitical interests, but they were not the main force for the expansion. They could only either allow it or prevent it. That does not mean that the West did not want to normalize the relations with Russia - they surely hoped that maybe Russia abandons its imperialistic tendencies. Still, it would be unwise not to prepare for the worst, especially that the political situation in Russia was far from stable.

When did I say that? Your citation is correct: he was against NATO membership. Very clear. I don't see where the confusion is. — Mikie

Well, you have claimed that NATO expansion was the major factor in the regime change, when it was clearly not. Yanukovych, when elected, promised two things: economic integration with the EU and abandoning NATO aspirations. Ukrainians were fine with that - due to the Russian reaction in 2008 NATO the prospect of quick admission were dim, so Ukrainians decided neutrality was the best course - the relevant legislation was accepted by the pariiament with public acceptance. Thus your claim that the NATO perspective was 'never underground' is clearly false - Ukraine did abandon its NATO aspirations. However, that was not enough for Russians - they have coerced Yanukovych to abandon the agreement with the EU, which sparked massive protests, which in turn led to his ouster. if Russians did not meddle at that point, Yanukovych most likely would remain the president, if he was fulfilling his electoral promises, and Ukraine would remain neutral. But even that course of action was not acceptable for Russians, because Ukraine closely cooperating with the EU would gradually move out of Russia's sphere of influence, even if it was militarily neutral and not in NATO. Of course, after Russia invaded Ukraine and started the rebellion in Donbas, Ukrainians have realized that their pledge of neutrality meant nothing to Russia, so they began to prepare for the full-scale conflict with Russia, which they saw as invevitable.

There were two aggressions after 2008, yes. 2014 and 2022. That doesn't prove that they wouldn't have occurred anyway -- but it certainly doesn't disprove that Bucharest didn't have lasting impacts. Which it did. — Mikie

Except that the agression in 2014 and the Donbas rebellion had nothing to do with NATO, as explained above, because then Ukraine's NATO aspirations were abandonded, so at that point Bucharest did not have a lasting impact. That is why Russians during 2014 did not mention NATO at all, because at that point it did not matter. If Russians did not meddle with the EU integration, Ukraine would remain militarily neutral, just like Moldova. But that was not enough for Russians, hence the invasion and the unrest in Donbas which you stubbornly ignore (which is understandable, because it completely contradicts your narrative of 'two different agressions').

So why was there such a delay? Because things changed and escalated. First, Russian military capacity changed. Second, the US supported pushing out a pro-Russian president. Third, and leading directly to all-out invasion, NATO provided training (for YEARS), weapons, and conducted drills -- and then, to top it off, in 2021, reaffirmed its position from 2008.

So if that seems like odd timing, you're just not paying attention. In fact the Russians were screaming about this for months, if not years -- to no avail. Because they're just liars and thugs, after all, so who cares what they say or think? Besides, everyone knows NATO is "defensive," and is no threat to Russia. "Just look at the Baltics." And so forth. — Mikie

Again, you just ignore the fact that things have deescalated with Yanukovych. As you say yourself, he was more pro-Russian than pro-European, unlike most Ukrainians (especially in the Western Ukraine) and he clearly curtailed NATO aspirations, with pariiament's support. And yes, the US supported pushing him out, but they did not cause it. Can you see the difference? The massive protests sparked for a specific reason, which the US had nothing to do with. Ironically, Russians had more to do with his ouster than the US - because for Putin he was pro-Russian, but not enough (as he was still seeking economic ties with the EU). And military training began AFTER Ukraine was attacked and had to fend off the conflict in Donbas.

Mikie: 'Russia would not attack if Ukraine did not want to join NATO!'
Jabberwock: 'Russia has attacked Ukraine in 2014 precisely when it has abandoned its NATO aspirations.'
Mikie: 'Let us talk about something else! How about 2022?'

Ok, I'll put it this way: if they invaded at any point from 2000-2008, or especially after 2004-2008, I'd be wrong. If they cited NATO expansion, that would be very odd. They could have cited US influence, however. — Mikie

But that is not what I have pointed out. Your claim was that in 2008 they had sufficient reason to start a war. Obviously it was not sufficient, given that they have not started it. If it was because they were too weak militarily, as you know say, then that equally applies to the years before 2008.

Of course it runs deeper. Of course there are complexities. To argue the Ukraine invasion of 2022 had IittIe to do with NATO is simply ignoring the facts, in my view. If China were training troops and conducting military driIIs in Mexico, and then China announces it would push for a pact -- despite warnings of the US -- I think the response by the US would be not that surprising, and one would say China's involvement was a decisive factor indeed. True, we could aIso make up other stories, and of course there'd be some truth in them, but to ignore the gIaringIy obvious just isn't serious. — Mikie

Your wording very well betrays your mindset: 'China trains troops in Mexico', not 'Mexicans are trained by China'. 'China pushes for a pact', not 'Mexico wants a pact with China'. For you only 'global players' exist, all others are just pawns with no agency. That is exactly how you consider the countries of the Eastern Europe or the former republics. We should carefully listen to what Russians perceive as a threat, but attitudes of Ukrainians and others are irrelevant. You 'respect' their opinions, but completely ignore them.

So let me rephrase your analogy: Mexico is training troops with China and drives for a pact in China AFTER the US has already attacked it. It does make a difference, does it not?

So military training, weapons, Operation Sea Breeze, and the Joint Statement on the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership (September of 2021) -- aII of this we should ignore because at some point the BBC said -- God knows when -- that Ukraine rejects any ambition to join NATO?

Again, this just isn't serious. — Mikie

That is exactly what I was pointing out. If any fact does not suit your narrative, you just dismiss it. Ukraine has clearly abandoned its NATO aspirations and DESPITE THIS, Russia has still invaded it and organized and sponsored an armed rebellion for eight years. Has it passed your mind that Ukraine's subsequent abandonment of neutrality and military training of troops AFTER 2014 might possibly have something to do with the fact that Russia has ALREADY attacked it and sustained an open armed conflict since 2014? As I understand, you believe Ukraine's reaction should be: 'Oh, yes, they have taken Crimea, and are killing our troops in Donbas, let us pretend none of this is happening, then they SURELY will not attack us in full force, if only we do not mention NATO'. Do you realize how absurd that sounds?

“Non sequitur” is a Latin expression not English — neomac


I know what non sequitur means. You apparently don't. You've also proven my point about misunderstanding English nuance. — Mikie

OK since you know, for the second time, tell me what “non sequitur” is supposed to mean and prove from that definition that “Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so” is not a non sequitur.

everyone with a functioning brain, including Russia, are aware that “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO” is about Ukraine and Georgia’s perceived historical threats coming from Russia. — neomac


I'm not talking about Ukraine or Georgia's perceptions. I'm sure they have their reasons, which I respect. To argue it was mostly about "historical threats" is at best haIf-truth. But try to stay on topic.
I'm talking about Russia's perception, right or wrong. Everyone knew they considered NATO expansion a threat. — Mikie

Dude, I’m not here to make a survey about your beliefs, I’m here to hear your challenging arguments to support your beliefs, if you have any. If you do not have any, I welcome you to totally ignore me. Now, arguments need premises and conclusions, and it’s on you to clarify your arguments to support your own beliefs, at least those I and you do not share.
“Everyone knew they considered NATO expansion a threat” is a belief that you and me share in the sense that we find it plausible enough, what I’m questioning is how you get from that claim to “The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake”. More precisely, “The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake” can not be logically deduced from “Everyone knew they considered NATO expansion a threat” if you understand propositional logic. You need more premises, all of them have to be true (or at least plausible enough), and logically linked to the conclusion. That’s the only game I’m interested in playing in a philosophy forum, including in this thread.
The topic of this thread is “Ukraine Crisis” and I’m talking about the "historical threats" coming from Russia at the expense of Ukrainian independence and territorial integrity, which the Ukraine Crisis exemplifies, how is my comment not on topic exactly?

but because Brzenzinski was an actual prominent national security advisor of American administrations, — neomac

And this is a reason to take him more seriously? — Mikie

As far as I’m concerned, if one wants to rationally investigate the security dilemmas shaping post Cold-War American foreign policies, one must have a look into how American national security advisors who contributed to shape post Cold-War American foreign policies, actually understood security dilemmas from the American perspective. Unless you are suggesting that consulting a random self-entitled anonymous nobody from the internet is a more reliable method to do that, of course.

By analogy, if YOU want to sensibly claim it’s US/West/NATO’s fault to provoke Putin because he perceives Ukraine joining NATO as a security threat, then YOU (not the Russians) have to provide strong reasons to support such threat perception. — neomac

I already did. China making the exact same moves in Mexico that the US/NATO has done in Ukraine, and you bet your ass the US would react. — Mikie

.

And I made my objections to it, so if you do not address the points I brought up then you still have no strong enough reasons to support your claims, as far as I’m concerned.

And I don't have to give reasons for the threat perception, any more than I have to give reasons for Georgian threat perceptions of Russia. I simply look at what they say, and if it makes some sense, I take it seriously. In this case, it seems to me Russia has some reason for concern. But in any case, it's not what I think -- it's what THEY think. Which I've repeated several times. — Mikie

First of all, nobody is forcing you to give reasons for others’ threat perception, I’m just challenging you to give YOUR reasons for YOUR conclusions. But unfortunately so far you gave only one premise that doesn’t suffice to get to your targeted conclusion, for logic reasons and not only. In any case that’s the game I’m playing , and if you didn’t get it yet, it’s your problem not mine.
Secondly, now I also deeply doubt you understand what you yourself write. If you explicitly specify "and if it makes some sense" that means it’s not enough that what Russian politicians say about Russia’s threat perception is fine whatever they say. It must also make some sense. And I guess that by “makes some sense” you are not referring to grammar rules, but to your own understanding of State’s security concerns, am I right? Namely, such an understanding that could deny for example “Putin’s repeatedly said that Mikie’s picking his nose with his tongue is the highest security threat in Russian history, so Mikie’s picking his nose with his tongue is clearly a mistake” as making some sense, am I right? If so, then your own understanding of the Russian threat perception is not exclusively based on what they say, but it is based on additional assumptions about State’s security concerns which allow you to discriminate which claims about Russia’s threat perceptions make some sense and which don’t.
As far as I’m concerned, to better discriminate which claims about Russia’s threat perceptions make some sense and which ones don’t, it’s better to start with looking into what geopolitical experts say because it’s their profession to study this stuff, and especially if such experts actually contributed to shaping some State’s foreign policies, like Brzezinski. And this is one Brzezinski's quote for you to ponder: Dr. Brzezinski, some critics of NATO enlargement are alarmed by the negative reaction of Russia to this policy. If, as we are led to believe by those critics, Russia has no designs on the territory of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, how does the membership of those countries in NATO impact Russian interests?

Dr. Brzezinski: Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that it impacts on Russian interests adversely at all unless Russia is of the view that NATO is an enemy and that the United States is an enemy. If that is the Russian view, then we have a very serious problem, in which case we ought to expand NATO for that reason as well.
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46832/html/CHRG-105shrg46832.htm
In other words, Brezinski is an example of “Everyone knew they considered NATO expansion a threat” as much as an example of the fact that acknowledging “Everyone knew they considered NATO expansion a threat” is not enough to believe “The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake”. Indeed from the same premise (but not only, of course!) Brzezinski draws exactly the opposite conclusion: “If that is the Russian view, then we have a very serious problem, in which case we ought to expand NATO for that reason as well”. However, the most important reason why I cited Brezinski is not because I take him to be evidently right and you evidently wrong, or simply because he is a prominent geopolitical expert and you are just a random self-entitled anonymous nobody from the internet parroting his guru Mearsheimer’s cherry-picked claims, but because he was actually contributing to shape American foreign policies also in the case of NATO enlargement. That allows me to say that my objections to your arguments are not only plausible for logical reasons but also for geopolitical reasons.

What would the threat be if China offered a military pact to Canada, trained Canadian troops, supplied weapons, and conducted military drills along the US border? Why would the US consider this pact a threat? Can you guess? Or would you dismiss that claim as well? If so, I applaud your consistency. If not, what's the difference? — Mikie

I noticed you couldn't answer this. Too bad. — Mikie

Of course I couldn’t, indeed I also argued why, from a geopolitical point of view, YOU TOO NOR ANYBODY ELSE (including your guru Mearsheimer) can give a conclusive answer to your own questions based on a hypothetical analogy, which we are pretending it is not biased. And I’ll repeat it: “you parroted your guru Mearsheimer’s hypothetical analogy which is ONCE AGAIN vague about nature of the threat and consequences in case declared red lines are crossed. Besides the problem with a hypothetical analogy, is that it is constrained only by the explicit AND IMPLICIT assumptions one thinks are relevant to construe the analogy. This approach can more inadvertently bias the hypothetical analogy. The shared assumption between me and you here is that a defensive military alliance with a hegemonic archenemy in the US backyard would be likely perceived as a worrisome security threat that would need to be prevented or contained as it is the case with Russia and NATO expansion in Ukraine. What I further argue however is that the choice for best prevention and containment strategies depend on the specific perceived threats. A security threat unspecified with respect to its nature and affordable countermeasures in case red lines are crossed is hard to assess in the case of Russia as much as in it is in the hypothetical case of the US. On the other side there are AT LEAST two strong and very concrete reasons why Russian perceived security threat from NATO expansion in Ukraine is HIGHLY questionable: A) Russia is a heavy-weight military nuclear power nobody wants to mess up with for the fun of it (who in Europe would easily agree on Ukraine’s call for art.5 after aggressing Russia proper when they could be nuclear bombed by Russia, exactly?) B) the US de facto and consciously HELPED boost Russia military capabilities through concessions (see Budapest memorandum) and financing military ramp-up (through a good decade of abundant business with the West), among others. IF US administrations were definitely hostile against Russia, they couldn’t possibly help Russia the way they actually did during post Cold-War time, and didn’t do during the Cold-War for the USSR. Besides this is true INDEPENDENTLY from Putin’s whining over generic security threats from NATO/US/West meddling in Ukraine.

Perhaps the rationale for the Monroe Doctrine is indeed "dirty propaganda." That's worth exploring, sure. But it's still very real, and I wouldn't advise China or Russia to go testing the United States on it -- however flimsy the reasoning behind it is, however much I think it to be based on unfounded fears, or whether or not I feel I have a direct look into the soul of Washington
— Mikie

To assess if your fears are rational, you have to be at least able to reconstruct the reasons of your fears. — neomac


Good god, can you read?

I'll repeat: Regardless of what *I* myself believe about the Monroe Doctrine, it is in fact a foreign policy of the US. So the question isn't about "rationalizing" fears, especially not my own. If you had taken a few extra seconds to read what was written, you'd quickly see your response was irrelevant[/b]. — Mikie

I still doubt you fully understand what you yourself write. So let me teach you some English nuances. You wrote: “I wouldn't advise China or Russia to go testing the United States on it”, the question is why on earth China or Russia should hear your advise “however flimsy the reasoning behind it is, however much I think it to be based on unfounded fears, or whether or not I feel I have a direct look into the soul of Washington”?!
Dude, you have to give arguments to even try to score points, not just make emotional appeals in disguise like “But it's still very real”. What on earth is the expression “it’s very real” supposed to mean for great powers in a hegemonic race? What does it imply? What is the specific nature of the threat? The likely retaliatory consequences if red lines are crossed? The affordable measures to counter them? Besides I've already anticipated this pointless objection: To assess if China or Russia’s reactions to “the Monroe Doctrine” are rational, you have to be at least able to reconstruct their reasons for their reaction. And be also careful to not conflate your reasons to fear “the Monroe Doctrine” with their reasons to fear “the Monroe Doctrine."
You look exactly like a random self-entitled anonymous nobody from the internet with less than amateurish understanding of boxing or interest in this sport advising a young heavy weight boxer who, in his professional carrier, reached the point to challenge the world champion for the first time with something like: “Hey Mike Tyson, I wouldn’t try to test the World Champion , you know, because the risk that he is going to kick your ass badly is very real, so very very very real that one can’t imagine more very very very very very very very very real risk in the universe of the actual, possible and impossible worlds -- however flimsy the reasoning behind it is, however much I think it to be based on unfounded fears, or whether or not I feel I have a direct look into the soul of a World Champion (which obviously means I’m so very very very real objectively reliable)”.

If the US considers nuclear weapons in CUBA a threat, then the USSR doing so anyway, despite these warnings, is a mistake[/b]. — Mikie

Why mistaken?! From a geopolitical point of view, USSR’s move was indeed effective to counter the military nuclear threat coming from the US. And besides, this didn’t require the US:
1 - to start a war in Cuba
2 - to annex Cuba
3 - to nuclear bomb Cuba
4 - to force a regime change in Cuba
5 - to force a change in Cuba’s security alliance
6 - to force a demilitarised Cuba
7 - to force a neutral Cuba
So what’s the geopolitical lesson one could get from this historical example?
If placing nuclear weapons in Ukraine was the specific security threat perceived by Putin, a balanced agreement could be found as it happened during the Cuban Crisis. If it’s not that, what else?
The threat from neonazi against Russian minorities? The threat for the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea? The training of the Ukraine troops, supplied weapons, and conducted military drills along the Russian border? Depending on how these specific threats are actually formulated, individually or collectively, one might see if negotiable solutions were possible to avoid this war. On the other side, talking generically of Russian security threats without specifying the nature of such threats and then demand satisfaction for very specific desired solutions (i.e. Ukraine out of NATO, demilitarised, neutral) ain't gonna work smoothly on those who are particularly sensitive about Russian hegemonic ambitions in Ukraine: like Ukraine and the US, to name a few.
Surely the pro-Russian narrative of NATO as a security threat against Russia turned out to be particularly effective in easy-to-impression minds infesting this thread.

If you're struggling with WHY it's a mistake, I'll tell you: because it'd be nice not having World War III. In the case of Russia, it'd be nice not having Russians and Ukrainians killed and billions of dollars spent on weapons — Mikie

.

At last you have made another premise of your reasoning explicit. The problem is that “it'd be nice” is expressing your best wishes, your preferences. As I anticipated the reality may very well differ from what we prefer. So what if geopolitical reality doesn’t work based on people’s preferences? We can’t dogmatically assume it does or it should do. Right? I myself wish the same as much as I wish an incurable cancer of anybody I care to be curable, but I don’t find rational to use my wishes to establish what can be cured or can’t. So the best I can do, is to try to understand better where we are with the medical research on cancer and for example give my support to scientific programmes that look more promising, given my understanding of the status of the medical research on cancer.
The same goes with geopolitics, the best nobodies like me can do (at least in best effort mode) is to place their political support on the current or rising hegemon that is likely the least oppressive to them, depending on our understanding of geopolitical hegemonic races, if they occur. That’s why in my arguments I rely more on geopolitical analysts than on my own wishes.

too ignorant about logic to understand how logically confused your claim is. — neomac

Intellectualizing something rather straightforward doesn't have the affect you think it does. — Mikie

“Intellectualizing”? Dude, maybe you are not familiar with the nuances of propositional logic 101, but that’s pretty embarrassing to read in a philosophy forum by one of its moderators (?!).

am not accusing you of 'cancelling' Russian culture. I just wrote those paragraphs because I thought it was unfair to mix up things.... The latter doesn't represent the real Russia and it is unfair....
Nonetheless, what about the unfair financial block from the Western world? — javi2541997

All fairly said. And I mostly agree. But I should distinguish between this and that individual Russian who may be him- or herself as wonderful as any Spaniard, or American, and likely, it seems, better educated than many Americans (another topic) - and Russians as a nation.

It is a common trope that we never make war against "the people," but only against their evil masters. And the post WW2 histories of Germany and Japan, and post-Korean war of S. Korea, would seem to argue a certain wisdom in that approach. Churchill captured it: "“In War, Resolution; In Defeat, Defiance; In Victory, Magnanimity; and in Peace, Good Will." Which the Russians have seemingly never entertained even the slightest suggestion of.

It seems to me we might say that imperialists, like the Russians at the moment, want to go into someone else's house, take it over, and tell them what to do and how to do it. The West, on the other hand,
mostly just says, if you want to play with us, there are rules....

To be sure, it is my estimation that the Soviets could have created behind their iron curtain a paradise leading to peace and friendship and prosperity around the world. But they didn't/couldn't, and now having sown wind, reap a whirlwind. And I hope, that of all the people hurt, that those who should be hurt are hurt, and sooner rather than later.

Why someone would refer to Brzezinski to deny Washington's culpability remains a mystery. — Tzeentch

Why someone would refer to Mearsheimer to deny Russia' hegemonic ambitions over Ukraine, even prior to any NATO expansion further east, remains a mystery.

I agree with you, except for the following statement:

It seems to me we might say that imperialists, like the Russians at the moment, want to go into someone else's house, take it over, and tell them what to do and how to do it. The West, on the other hand, mostly just says, if you want to play with us, there are rules.... — tim wood

Ukraine is not some one's else house. They don't even claim all their vast territory but three important provinces: Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk. These three 'municipal dumas' have always belonged to Russia, and they have been managed by Russian authorities since the Russian empire.
[...] Saint Petersburg, Moscow, Kyiv, Odesa, Riga, and the Polish cities of Warsaw and Łódź. These elected their delegates to the Duma directly, and though their votes were divided (on the basis of taxable property) in such a way as to give the advantage to wealth, each returned the same number of delegates. State Duma (Russian Empire) Look at the following map of the Russian Empire when they fought against the Ottomans. It is obvious that those territories belonged to Russia, and they were recognised internationally as part of their vast nation. It is written in the treaties:



One of the main errors committed in the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the lack of precision in 'drawing' the new maps for the new republics. Ukraine considered those territories as a subdivision of them, while the Russian Federation stated that they were 'Federal subjects'. More precisely the Russian Constitution says: "1. The Russian Federation includes the following subjects of the Russian Federation: [...] Republic of Crimea http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-04.htm

In 1774, the Ottoman Empire was defeated by Catherine the Great with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca making the Tatars of the Crimea politically independent. Catherine the Great's incorporation of the Crimea in 1783 into the Russian Empire increased Russia's power in the Black Sea area.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Ukrainian independence in 1991 most of the peninsula was reorganized as the Republic of Crimea, although in 1995 the Republic was forcibly abolished by Ukraine with the Autonomous Republic of Crimea established firmly under Ukrainian authority. A 1997 treaty partitioned the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, allowing Russia to continue basing its fleet in Sevastopol, with the lease extended in 2010. https://books.google.es/books?id=i1C2MHgujb4C&pg=PA194&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false