I have been commenting on what the American urban system produces. Should people be morally outraged by such a system? Sure, just as reformers were rightfully outraged over the excesses of the Gilded Age, slavery, etc — Count Timothy von Icarus

In order to be outraged by the excesses of a system like slavery, one has to be positioned within an alternative system of intelligibility. Most adherents of slavery, including prominent philosophers, were convinced it was morally justified, and this wasnt simply self-serving. This doesn’t mean a critique couldn’t arise from within the system of thought that justified slavery, but it would consist of reform within this system rather than an overthrow of it. Those advocating for such reforms generally agreed with the overall premise concerning the intellectual inferiority of slaves. To overthrow the system one needed to replace it with a way of thinking according to which whatever differences separated slaves from their owners did not indicate any innate traits marking them as less than completely human.

The issue of structural injustice arises in the context of the effect the perpetuation of the system has on reinforcing its grounding assumptions. If the result of treating a group of people as inferior and not fit to be integrated into society is to prevent them from attaining the very privileges that would allow the dominant society to recognize them as equals ( access to education and assimilation into the fabric of the community) , this will perpetuate the stereotypes even if it’s unintentional.

With respect to old-line liberal values among the urban elite, a critique from within this system would advocate for reforms along the lines of an increase in the minimum wage and more hiring quotas. But a critique capable of overthrowing this system would have to question the very assumptions grounding it , such as Lyotard’s notion of the differend, which asserts that there are certain wrongs that cannot be rectified within the terms of language set by a system that assumes a level playing field, such as Rawls’s veil of ignorance. Marginalized groups often end up being excluded from the terms of that ‘level playing field’, and more reform just perpetuates this exclusionary state of affairs. But what if all the wealthy power brokers in places like New York bought into Lyotard’s value system rather than old-style liberalism?

And by that I don’t mean simply pay it lip service, because if you understand how a value system operates, to be ensconced within it is to rely on it to make your world intelligible from both a rational and a moral perspective. I don’t think such an overthrow would solve the wealth inequality or racial segregation issue although it would make some progress in that direction. It would more likely shift the bounds of the issue from one of racial identity and class differences to one of philosophical value system. Adherents of different value systems speak different languages and belong to different cultures. Highly educated BLM activists, while aiming their rhetoric at residents of poor black communities, were really speaking to other academics, and the practical consequences of their ideas could be located in the context of the academic and skilled workplace environments in which they could apply these ideas to improve interactions with their colleagues.

Meanwhile, little by little residents of poor back communities, being mostly socially conservative rather than the BLM progressives who advocate in their name, are moving into the Republican party.

The question is whether and how you can tie such facts to a liberal-progressive social value system.

Sure, that's exactly what al-Gharbi and others have done. I don't think it is just some "unavoidable problem of urbanization," that the oh-so-progressive residents of the Upper West Side balked at unused hotels in their neighborhoods being used as shelters for Manhattan's homeless during the pandemic. It was the recurrent theme of "yes, progressivism... but not in my backyard — Count Timothy von Icarus

I want to thank you for pointing me to Al-Ghabi’s work. His thinking intersects some of my recent research, particularly the tension between personal and social autonomy and structural injustice. I want to offer a critique of his approach based on the relation between what I see as two main strands in his thinking. the first is the structural injustice theme.

Shaun Gallagher characterizes it this way:

“Standard accounts of action and interaction abstract away from the specifics of everyday life; they ignore the circumstances that are framed by social and instituted practices that often lead to structural distortions and injustices.” “Structural features of the specific practices or institutions within which individuals interact can distort human relations in ways that subtract from total autonomy and reduce the overall interactive affordance space.” “When structural features of cognitive institutional practices are exclusionary, closing off possibilities, or when such practices are designed so that whoever uses them comes to be dominated by them, with the result that their thinking is narrowed and determined, then again autonomy, not just of the individual, but of social interaction is compromised.”

“To the extent that the instituted narrative, even if formed over time by many individuals, transcends those individuals and may persist beyond them, it may loop around to constrain or dominate the group members or the group as a whole...Collective (institutional, corporate) narratives often take on a life (an autonomy) of their own and may come to oppose or undermine the intentions of the individual members. Narrative practices in both extended institutional and collective structures and practices can be positive in allowing us to see certain possibilities, but at the same time, they can carry our cognitive processes and social interactions in specific directions and blind us to other possibilities."

Notice that for Gallagher structural injustice takes place in spite of the best intentions of individuals participating within institutional practices. Is Al-Ghabi not saying the same thing when he states that even when a person’s heart and mind are in the right place, they can still be contributing to injustice? I don’t think so, and this is where the second strand of his thinking comes into play. Al-Gharbi, unlike Gallagher, relies on the moralistic concept of hypocrisy to explain what he sees as a failure to practice what one preaches. He relies on the ‘Gotcha’ moment when he asks the liberal do-gooder who contributes to all the rights causes, votes for all the right people, use all the politically correct vocabulary why they don’t pay their housekeeper or Uber driver a higher tip , or why they take a NIMBY attitude toward the proposed mixed income development planned for their street. They want to look that person in the eye , see them squirm and hem and haw as they realize they’ve been found out as morally culpable for choosing self-interest over altruism and, even worse, using their liberalism as a cover for it. What Al-Gharbi seems to have done is observe that, in spite of urban America being dominated by liberals, income inequality and racial segregation are as bad as ever. In searching for an explanation, he lands on good old fashioned selfishness and hypocrisy, and he dresses this up in the trendy vernacular of structural practices This mix of moralism and practice theory is a central feature of wokism, which after all has its origin in a religious context of spiritual enlightenment. Let me now critique this Sartrean ‘bad faith’ notion from the vantage of practice-based accounts that I prefer. These accounts don’t begin from an autonomous subject who choose their moral values and then attaches themselves to a community based on shared interests. Rather, subjectivities are constituted in their moral values as well as epistemic rationality through their interactions within an already existing community.

The bottom line is that the liberal who is also a NIMBY, and who is a meager tipper, and commits all the atrocities Al-Gharbi iterates, does practice what they preach. There is no hypocrisy involved. If you ask them and are willing or listen carefully to their reply , they will justify, on the basis of the discursive practices which they partially share with their community, the logic and morality of their position. Instead of looking for a moral ‘Gotcha’ moment, what is needed is to offer the person whose actions one disagrees with an opportunity to understand an alternative set of practices, a new interpretive rationality.
But one has to appreciate what one is asking here. Changing a deeply enmeshed perspective is akin to changing religious doctrine. It is easy for Al-Gharbi, because he has decided in advance what the ‘correct’ moral stance is (elimination of racial segregation and income inequality) and why people fail to live up to his ‘correct’ standards (they are hypocrites who fail to practice what they preach because they choose self-interest over altruism).

Al-Ghabi’s ‘selfishness vs giving’ binary misses the fact that the self is not a fortress originally walled off from the world , the moral task being to break down the wall. The self is a social construct, a product of discursive and material
practices and interactions. Our limits of compassion and altruism are not a function of Al-Ghabi’s fortress self but our inability to make intelligible and relatable the practices of those who are too ‘Other’. Either they must find a way to bridge the gap between their ways and those of our group, or we must find a way re-configure our own system of practices to make those Others recognizable to us. You’ll notice that NIMBYism doesnt exist in a normal family. Their backyard, if they have one, is filled with their children’s toys and swingset. Is this because of a moral choice on the part of the parent to be giving rather than selfish toward their children? If it is in our self-interest to be giving toward our children, our spouse, our friends, this is certainly not hypocrisy. Practice theories show that it is not an act of moral will that determines our generosity, or lack thereof, toward those different than ourselves, as though it were as obvious as Al-Gharbi wants us to think it is what constitutes racism , social injustice, unfair inequality, and who is to blame for it.

By making moral choice the kingpin of his approach, he marginalizes the role of discursive practices in its shaping of ethical and rational action to a peripheral status. As a result, he takes the cause of the injustices he rails against out of the historical contexts of the worldviews which are needed to make sense of them. So rather than seeing differences in how Otherness is perceived between social conservatives like J.D. Vance (whose focus is on individual character and personal responsibility due to his allegiance to the Enlightnement thinking of the autonomous self) and liberals who understand that it ‘takes a village’ as decisive for their actions, Al-Ghabi personalizes the issue. There just happen happen to be a large number of selfish hypocrites concentrated in big cities who won’t share. their toys. Meanwhile, one can find many social conservatives in small towns who are generous and who do all kinds of wonderful
things for ‘Others’.

I should point out that within the urban blue camp there is a whole spectrum of political philosophies , which I tend to see in developmental terms, ranging from old-style MLK or Obama-type liberalism, to Marxism , Critical theory , critical race theory and intersectionality, to postmodernism. The wealthy liberal lawyers and businessmen of the Upper West Side are overwhelmingly of the MLKObama type, which means they are only supportive of a limited degree of wealth redistribution. I see Al-Ghabi’s approach as a bit to the left of old-school liberalism within this spectrum. It seems to me the main way in which his thinking distinguishes itself from the old left is that he is more comfortable with considerable wealth redistribution.

And yet, the way things are in places like New York City or Los Angeles— this is not how things are in many other parts of the country.

Pointing out that super-wealthy residents of New York are predominately of certain ethnic persuasions while their servants are of another, and that social mobility among immigrants is greater in South Dakota in the midst of an economic boom doesn’t explain very much. The question is whether and how you can tie such facts to a liberal-progressive social value system. Yes, big cities have problems. New flash: they are noisy, dirty, congested, it’s expensive and tough to find parking, there are big rats. None of this reveals anything about why many like myself are passionate about the attitudes and ways of thinking (the philosophically informed strains of liberalism and progressivism) we find concentrated in urban centers, and why, in spite of the economic hardships imposed on many sub-communities that are a part of the urban fabric, we believe that these ways of thinking produce an approach to social relations, to caring about and supporting each other , that is more satisfying than the alternative we see being put into practice in places with more conservative values.

What I’m saying is that the negatives you’ve been pointing out are not the direct result of the value systems I and other liberal urbanities embrace, but exist in spite of them, and are tangential to them. These problems may be a reason for a particular individual to decide to move to South Dakota or Maine, in spite of their fondness for what urban. liberalism stands for. I’d liberal values are impetus r enough to them, they will find a way to remain connected to them by sacrificing certain comforts, or finding an affordable suburb or university town. You said you lived in New York, but I’m getting the impression you didn’t grow up in or near a big city. You write about it like a tourist rather than someone who is familiar with its social dynamics from the inside.

And yet, strangely, whenever these segments of the population see their incomes rise the crisis of "llabor shortage!" is proclaimed. These folks are superfluous to the economy of the future, nonetheless, millions more must come lest we face a "labor shortage." Curious. — Count Timothy von Icarus

They’ll keep coming until they are replaced by automation.

Yet surely offering living conditions marginally preferable to being in the middle of a civil war doesn't amount to much. No? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think the threat of actual civil war is more wishful thinking than a likely possibility. What is it you want? Who is it you are primarily pointing the finger of blame at? What are you proposing as a solution and which political entity or platform do you see as prepared to accomplish it?

↪Joshs

Depends on what you mean by "make an economy thrive." Liberal urban enclaves in the US certainly thrive in terms of aggregate GDP figures. In terms of inequality they are the worst places in the US or Europe. In terms of social mobility they are matched only by the abysmal showing of the Old South. In terms of having a "racial caste system," they are in many ways even worse than the Old South. In Alabama or Kentucky, one might at least find white citizens driving an Uber, selling shoes, etc., and the largest inequality tends to be between the marginally employed and the small town dentist or car dealership owner, not between the similarly poor and billionaires — Count Timothy von Icarus

The urban-based economic engine of the 21st century will mainly benefit those with enough education and the right skills, which leaves out much of the urban poor, regardless of race, and most of those with the right skills and education still struggle with college costs, childcare and housing prices. I suspect most of the reason for the huge disparity in income in the cities is because, as the source of our economic engine, they just happen to be the places with the highest concentration of super-rich.

I don’t think either the left or the right has a fix for this. There may be only patchwork, temporary forms of assistance. The left can offer a safety net and support for education, and some on the far left would offer policies like a sweeping redistribution of wealth and a guaranteed living income. But the right , given its focus on personal autonomy and character, would be reluctant to interfere with the wheels of capitalism.

, the urban elite simultaneously like positioning themselves as saviors of the world's poor while ruthlessly exploiting them. For a long time I pushed back on conservative claims that urban elites favored foreigners to the native poor, but I'm starting to think it's absolutely true. They constantly draw flattering parallels between the "hard working," (i.e., appropriately desperate and pliable) new arrivals versus those pesky natives who refuse to "get with the 21st century" (the century where their wages and life expectancy have stagnated, or as often declined, for half a century straight.) — Count Timothy von Icarus

Now there’s a nice unbiased view for ya. I especially like the phrase “ruthlessly exploiting them”. That’s a nice touch. My 102 year old father has 24 hour caregivers , who tend to be Nigerian, Philippine or from a Slavic country. Are they naive souls being “ruthlessly exploited”? Most of his helpers have been in this country for decades, are savvy about their options in the economy and what they can do to improve their career situation. If they are willing to take jobs that native-born residents reject, who is being exploited? When did your ancestors arrive in the U.S. and what jobs did they take that others didn’t want? Was Ellis Island a plot to exploit naive foreigners?

Of course, the people who see migration as something of a black and white "human rights issue," are also never going to house said migrants in their communities or schools in meaningful numbers. "Not in my backyard — Count Timothy von Icarus

My neighborhood in Chicago was deluged with Venezuelan refugees that the governor of Texas kindly bussed our way. The local police station and Armory were used to house them temporarily. They immediately began trying to find work , selling flowers and candy at intersections with their children in tow. It was a lot for our neighborhood to handle , but we’ve been here many times before. A substantial part of our community consists of Bosnian immigrants from that war, and Vietnamese boat people. We have seen them establish themselves over time and are now an integral part of our home, as our new Venezuelan arrivals will soon be. As the neighborhood becomes wealthier, we do see a slow reduction in transient hotels and homeless shelters, but we are still a supportive community who appreciates the need to continually open our arms to such persons. In fact I would say it’s one of the main reasons many of us choose to live here rather than in a suburb.

I am left thinking the "economy of the future," is more a sort of globalized neo-fedualism, although lacking religious checks on elite behavior, rather than anything admirable — Count Timothy von Icarus

I noticed you said nothing about values systems and their relation to urban culture. Instead you focused on wealth disparity and defense. A simplistic calculus based on who has money and who doesn’t isnt going to tell you anything useful about the social and political dynamics at play today in the era of Trumpism. This has much less to do with where the money is than it does with social values rooted in philosophical schemes. My concern is to see the range of related philosophical value systems concentrated in high density urban areas and universities thrive. I see the result of this election as demonstrating that a majority of Americans don’t identify with these ways of thinking, which doesn’t surprise me. It suggests to me that the cities need to form alliances to support each other in the absence of political support coming from the rest of the country. People like myself who derive great value from this urban culture will continue to be loyal to its ways regardless of the economic challenges.

Is there a connection between the philosophical value systems that have become dominant in universities and urban society and the great divide in wealth? Perhaps, in that the kinds of skills that the new social and bio-material-digital technologies brought into existence shut out the workers who in the past could make a living with a minimal skillset.

Anyhow, I can't help but think that feelings on these issues are sometimes extremely self-serving. Migration can only ever directly benefit a vanishingly small percentage of the population in the developing world — Count Timothy von Icarus

There’s a fairly clearly articulated position right there. Now, let’s see if we can figure out where you get your view of migration from in a philosophical sense. You see, I’m not interested so much in determining a correct approach to migration as I am placing the views of someone like yourself in the context of the appropriate family of discourse on the subject. To be more specific, would you say that you tend to view political analyses of immigration put forth by conservative think tanks like the Hoover institute to be more persuasive than those of left-leaning think tanks? I’ve read nuanced discussion on the subject from both sides, and some overlap too, but overall conservative tend to be less enthusiastic about the overall social benefits of immigration.

The majority of Americans, including in conservative states, support same sex marriage. Electorates in Missouri, Ohio, Kentucky, Kansas - conservative states - voted to remove abortion restrictions or prevent changes in current law. The Republican party is not driven from the bottom up. It has been taken over by a relatively small group of rabid ideologues whose policies don't match those of their constituents…social conservatism is an important aspect of the Republican electorate, but we don't need all Republican voters. A large percentage of Republicans don't support Trump because of traditional values — T Clark

We’re talking about Trump, not anti-gay, anti-abortion zealots. Trump is neither of those. But his policy views are to the right of old line Conservatives in the mold of Bush, who were not isolationists, did not support Putin, did not support high tariffs, etc. Is Trump and Trumpism (isolationist hyper-nationalism, xenophobia, a zest for tariffs instead of economic globalism, a tendency toward authoritarian rule and a love of authoritarians like Putin) the product of “a relatively small group of rabid ideologues whose policies don't match those of their constituents”? If you believe that, do you realize you’re making the same claim about the basis of MAGA that they make about the basis of your support for liberal candidates? Trump supporters like to argue that a small cabal of progressive zealots (Hillary Clinton, George Soros, Bill Gates) and the liberal press under their control manipulate Democratic voters for their own ends, that support for Trumpism is vastly wider than the liberal press claims it to be because of tampering with the vote by Democratic operatives.

Would the Democrats win back workers if they became America-first isolationists, went for high tariffs, anti-immigrationism and the gutting of Obamacare? Maybe. But would you vote for such a Democrat? And isnt that just MAGA by another name? The Democrats can reinvent themselves in whatever direction they want.Both parties have done so in dramatic fashion over the years. But the question is how they can do so now without turning into another version of Trumpism.

In your assessment, is Trump sincere or simply harnessing the available populism? — Tom Storm

Trump thinks like his supporters, so in that sense he is sincere. That doesn’t mean that he isn’t an opportunist, but he’s an opportunist who sees the world the way they do.

There used to be moderately liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats. Not anymore. The Democrats in Congress couldn't even work with moderates like Manchin and Sinema, so they're gone now. So, I think your idea is pie in the sky — T Clark

Which is what I said: “But that could never happen , for a few reasons. First, the party would never support an old line conservative.”

For me, Biden was exactly the right candidate. As far as I'm concerned, he is the best president in my adult lifetime. My first election was in 1972. I voted for McGovern. What I'm looking for is a strategy so that candidates like him or Harris can win. — T Clark

Of course Biden was exactly the right candidate for you. You’re a liberal. I’m saying a liberal like you or Biden or Harris can’t win unless they move far enough to the right that they become an old line conservative in the mold of G.W.Bush or Mitt Romney.

I think on economic issues, Democratic policies are better for working class people, no matter where they live. That's the point of my post - we have to back off on primarily social policies that drive these voters away — T Clark

I also think on economic issue Democratic policies are better for working people, but you will never convince them of that. It’s not just a question of which issues the party focuses on, but of the approach taken to those issues. The Democrats could cease talking about every contentious social issue (gender rights, gun control) and concentrate strictly on bread and butter issues affecting people’s pocketbooks, and they would still lose unless they moved far enough to the right to be indistinguishable from old line libertarian free-market Conservatives.

. I think the values represented in the Republican party these days are those of a fairly small group of exceedingly ideological politicians supported by corporate business. — T Clark

I think you’re making a colossal mistake in judgement. American right wing populism isnt driven from the top down, but from the bottom up. It’s a grass roots movement driven by your neighbors outside of your urban bubble. Talk to them and you’ll see what I mean. Talk to Bob Ross about the platform you think would bring voters back to the Democrats and see how far you get.

I think the right description of what you call "less educated workers" is just working people. They're the people who the Democratic party needs to bring back. They belong with us — T Clark

I focused on working people, but the heart of the issue isn’t workers, it’s a socially traditionalist value system shared by workers and wealthy people, those without college educations as well as those with advanced degrees, who are mostly from lower population density regions, with occasional exceptions like Trump. The main issue is what I call social I.Q. One can have a PhD and still rank low on social I.Q. What is social I.Q.? It is the sophisticated understanding of the complex systemic relations between individual and social behavior, and the best living laboratory for learning about it is residence in a diverse, cosmopolitan high population density urban center. The only way to bring back Trump-supporting workers, business owners and scholars is either to abandon economic and social policies based on social I.Q. (which is what most liberal-pprogressive economic policy is based on), or change Trump-supporters’ value systems, which cannot be done externally. They have to evolve on their own terms , at their own pace, incrementally over a long period of time.

For a foreigner like me, it is complicated to understand America's core values — javi2541997

The split in values in America between Trump supporters and those who reject him correlates precisely with population density. I think you’ll find the typical values of those in New York City, San Francisco, Boston and Seattle overlap your own fairly well. You are Iberian, no? Isnt there a split of values in your country, as well as the rest of Europe and the U.K. between rural traditionalists and urban residents? Isnt it this split which contributed to Brexit , anti-immigrant sentiment, support for Le Pen and Italy’s socially conservative leader? America is a much less urban country than Europe , Britain or Australia, so there is a large ground for Trump support.

I voted for Trump, because I am afraid of what Kamala would have done to our country. My policy is to vote for the lesser of the two evils, and not to abstain in principle — Bob Ross

Yep, you are definitely to the right of what used to be considered establishment Conservatism. I would say that the majority of the U.S. shares your view ( and always did), and that the outlook of educated urbanites is so far removed from your worldview that there is little room for compromise, which is fine with me. Trump supporters should work to strengthen the America that they believe in and urbanites need to do likewise. Neither side can be allowed to shove their values down the throats of the other side , so in order to protect the Union we need to devolve as much power to the states as possible, and the big cities need to think about coordinating with and supporting each other in more useful ways. I love my city and its values, and look forward to contributing to pushing it even farther away from Trump conservativism as it is now. I also love short visits to Trump’s America, but I can’t live there. I want both Americas to thrive, protected from each other’s values. (I know, you’ll say “ But my values are the morally correct ones, and the liberal cities are on the path to hell”)

Are they not presupposed in all scientific observations? Reiterating those sounds like just stating the obvious. No scientific observations would be done without all that predetermined and pre-equipped unless they are bunch of bird watchers, trainspotters, or sports spectators. — Corvus

Presuppositions are conceptual in nature. And the kinds of presuppositions necessary to do what I outlined are specific to the particular task. Science isnt monolithic in its methods or presuppositions. Different empirical endeavors develop their own methodological practices, their own criteria for what constitutes data and how to collect and organize it.

I am a strong leaning conservative and you seem to be a strong leaning Democrat, so this should be an interesting conversation :smile: . IMHO, the reason the democrats lost is because they have lost the common sense constitutional values. They have been advocating for censorship, prosecution for differing beliefs, essentially the revocation of the 2nd amendment, child mutilation, the disbandment of basic gender distinction in society (like bathrooms), etc. I think America woke up and realized that this is getting out-of-hand; and wants to go back to America’s core values — Bob Ross

I’m curious. Did you vote for Trump or abstain from voting?
I’m asking because all of the principled old-style National Review-style conservatives that I know of (David Brooks, George Will, Charles Krauthammer, Liz and Dick Cheney, David Frum, Ross Douthat, David French, Brett Stephens and many others) have consistency refused to vote for Trump. I have concluded that one must be to the right of these people in one’s social and religious views in order for a vote for Trump to be seen as better than not voting.

You need to explain it further how and why observation is conceptual apparatuses of interpretation. Why do you need concept and interpretation when you are looking for and collecting data? — Corvus

What motivates and guides the search for and organization of data? How do we determine what is actually data and what is irrelevant?

What reason do you have or holding progressive values if you do not consider them in some sense superior than a range of alternatives you could hold? — Tom Storm

They’re superior for me, given my needs, the way I live my life and rhe community I identify with. They’re not for everybody.

Keep our focus on working class issues, e.g. support for unions, job creation through industrial policy. Biden actually has done a pretty good job on this, but people don’t give us credit — T Clark

You know how I think the Democrats could have won this election? If they had nominated an old-style National Review-type Republican in the tradition of George H. Bush, Eisenhower, David Brooks, George Will , Charles Krauthammer, Liz Cheney and David Frum (strong on national defense, supportive of an anti-Russia policy, economically libertarian and socially moderate). Progressives would have held their noses and voted for such a candidate over Trump, while enough potential Trump voters would have changed sides to put the Democrats over the top. But that could never happen , for a few reasons. First, the party would never support an old line conservative. Second, and most important: what the large densely-populated urban centers (which is where most democrats are concentrated) need is very different from what rural voters and social conservatives need. 70% of economic productivity and wealth generation is located in Democrat-dominated urban centers, and Democrat views on everything from energy policy to healthcare and education are direct expressions of their understanding of what it takes to make that economic engine thrive.

Trump supporters know exactly how to make an economy of the 1950’s thrive, but that’s a recipe for failure in the 21st century. The urban dwellers are speaking a foreign language to the ears of Trump supporters, not just on social issues but also economic ones, so we progressives can’t expect the majority of the country who supports Trump, and a return to the economic thinking of a previous century, to fork over their money to support our causes. We need to find a way to use our own plentiful resources to further our way of life in the cities, which will only pull us father away from traditional America but is necessary for us to thrive on our own terms. The Democratic coalition between intellectuals and blue collar workers which was successful for 50 years worked because the great majority of people in both the cities and small towns were less educated workers. That coalition can’t be put back together in an era when the thinking of educated urbanities has moved so far away from that of the rest of the country. There is no language in common anymore, not on science, ethics, faith or economics.

I'm saying that individualism and neoliberalism is not so much an ideological stance but a form of values and ideals which have replaced a more balanced and collectively inclusive perspective on life. This, in turn produces polarized groups when the inflated expectations of life clash with reality and thus produce a reaction in the form of blame that these groups gather around — Christoffer

Unlike you , I make no moral judgements of individualism or neoliberalism as an ‘unrealistic’, ‘unbalanced’ , ‘regressive’ value system. I think all such value systems work for their adherents, but each works in a different way , and it’s the clashes between incommensurate systems that causes the problems we’re seeing today with political polarization. I suggest that it is not cognitive dissonance that is causing the anger among social conservatives, but the justified sense that they are being talked down to by people like you who believe they have some superior moral or objective vantage and try to shove it down their throats. I am a progressive , but I dont claim that my perspective is morally or objectively superior to other ways of thinking.

But don't simulation or modelling at the end of the day need observation to be meaningful? Simulation and modelling unobserved by humans don't exist, therefore meaningless? — Corvus

Observation takes place through an apparatus of perception, which includes not just telescopes and microscopes, but conceptual apparatuses of interpretation.

We can't ignore how individualism and neoliberalism combined disconnected people from each other. The formation of individuals who were brought up into believing they were the protagonists in contemporary history, that they, if they want, could be whatever they chose to be; a movie star? A successful business owner? The next president?

The cognitive dissonance facing adult life or older people realizing they never became anything they thought they would be transforms into anger and disappointment towards the narrative they were programmed to believe. This anger and disappointment therefor gets aimed at whatever is available to be blamed. Clustering in radicalized gatherings around a similar aim; "that group is to blame", "this ideology is to blame — Christoffer

I have a slightly different take. I agree that the idea of the autonomous individual, and the values of freedom and utilitarianism that surrounded it, characterized much of American society from the days of its founding until recently. And I think that the vast majority of those who voted for Trump still hold onto that worldview. But I don’t believe that their anger is directed at the “ narrative they were programmed to believe” if by this you are referring to that traditionalist worldview and its associated values. In the first place, there are many wealthy Trump supporters who voted for him precisely in to protect those values. Secondly, one has to appreciate how disconnected urban progressive thinking has become from the traditionalist worldview shared by Trump supporters.

Those of us who identify with a progressive worldview are the interlopers, the ‘aliens’, from the perspective of less densely populated and more traditionalist parts of the country. Our thinking has changed rapidly over the last 40 years and the rest of the country hasn’t had a chance to catch up.We speak an indecipherable language to them. But they can’t just ignore us because when we’re in power we try to shove down their throats values which are utterly alien to them. Plus we dominate institutions of higher learning education and other cultural domains , and produce 70 percent of GDP. So they feel that their way of is threatened by us in myriad ways.

↪Joshs If you'd have read and understood what I've posted, you'd know that my use of the descriptor "Post Truth era" doesn't reference "ideological combatants". — LuckyR

You make a distinction between objectively sifting the evidence in order to arrive at truths undistorted by existing prejudices , and allowing oneself to be biased by presuppositions shared by a group based on ideological considerations, and then go on to claim that what defines the ‘Post Truth era’ is a propensity to do the latter.
I argue instead that all formations of empirical truth are and always have been socially constructed according to forms of meaning and value which change from era to era. This doesn’t mean that truth is ‘fake’, but that what you would call bias, distortion and prejudice are necessarily built into what it means to produce truth., that its meaning is contextually and social situated

What is different about the contemporary era compared with previous periods of history is not that it is Post Truth, but that a growing number of people are only now recognizing in our highly polarized times what has always been the case, but was until recently denied in favor of a ‘God’s eye’ view of truth, the inextricable relation between socially formed practices and the determination of truth. But they arrive at the wrong conclusion from the fact that two sides of a polarized political community interpret truth differently, insisting that only one side has arrived at the properly objective God’s eye truth , while the other side is succumbing to ideologically driven prejudice.

Agreed. And the polarization is due to economic pressures, not ideology — baker

Across the world we’re seeing the same pattern of a split between social traditionalists living mainly in low density rural areas and social progressives concentrated in densely populated urban centers. This split isn’t caused by economic pressures, since what those pressures are is subject to different interpretations depending on whether one is a traditionalist or a progressive, and the economy is only one of many issues that divide the two groups. For many on the right , social values are more important than the economy.

↪Joshs I'm not an American, but do you think there has been an increase in deceptive behavior from politicians in recent times? — Tom Storm

No, just an increase in polarization.

what distinguishes the Post Truth era is which entities qualify as "what should be trusted". — LuckyR

There is no such thing as a ‘Post Truth’ era, except as a fabrication of the media based on partisan politics. Ideological combatants throughout history have accused each other of falsification.

Moore made the claim that "Here is a hand". On a forum such as this, we might instead point out that you are now reading this post. Now if you find it difficult to doubt that you are now reading this sentence, then you might also grant things such as that there is a language in which it is written, that someone wrote it, that there are screens and devices and networks linking you to that writer, and so on. — Banno

I’m not sure whether or not you are making the same mistake Wittgenstein argued Moore did, by confusing a grammatical proposition with an empirical assertion. Let’s see if you are. The ‘certainty’ of ‘here is a hand’ is not the certainty of an empirical fact, but the relative certainty that a stable system of practices (language game , form of life) provides. If an alien species from another planet saw Moore with his raised hand, they might be just as certain as Moore that something with a specific meaning was taking place, but within their alien language game the sense of the event would be entirely different that it is for Moore. It would not be a question of doubting Moore’s assertion, but of his assertion being irrelevant to their perspective.

When you take your coffee cup and put it in the dishwasher, does it still exist? A realist might say that it either exists or it doesn't, and since we have no reason to think it has ceased to exist, then we can reasonably maintain that it still exists. On this view, there are at least two things in the world, the cup and the dishwasher.

On the other hand, the anti-realist might suppose that since the cup is in the dishwasher we cannot perceive it, and so cannot say for sure if it exists or not. They might conclude that at best we can say that it is neither true nor false that the cup exists. They would conclude that there is at least only one thing, the dishwasher — Banno

Someone who rejects both realism and anti-realism, as I believe Wittgenstein did, would say that a scheme of interconnected practices of meaning provides the intelligibility of the realist’s assumptions, that the cup’s persisting ‘reality’ only makes sense within this scheme, and that such schemes are potentially infinite.

If the philosopher believes he's on firm ground demanding to know how the psychologist knows what he claims to know, the psychologist believes himself to be on ground just as firm in examining the philosopher's motives for demanding justification. — Srap Tasmaner

Hmm, this drive to examine motives for justification. Who do you suppose was among the earliest, and perhaps still most radical, thinkers to situate the meaning of philosophical knowledge by way of values, and values by way of motives, and motives by way of drives? I’ll give you a hint. He had a very large mustache. And he would have critiqued Freud’s drive model on philosophical grounds, by demolishing the philosophical presuppositions undergirding Freud’s approach.

Supposedly Einstein said that if you can't explain it to a six year old, you don't really understand it. II know that if I can't put an idea in my own words, I don't understand it. Now that I think about it, I don't think the ideas we bounce around in philosophy need to be all that nuanced and subtle. Clearly you don't agree with that — T Clark

He also said that he chose physics over biology because of the complexity of the subject matter the latter deals with.
The ‘explain it to me like I’m a six year old’ line reminds me of the corporate mentality that argues anything worth saying should be sayable in one sentence. Of course they think this. It’s in the very nature of for-profit business that there exists a direct relation between demand for a product and the size of the population who recognize that product as useful and valuable. In other words, that product must tap into widely shared conventions of meaning and use. This is precisely the kind of thing that can be described in a sentence. What can’t be described in a sentence is a product which requires the initiation into a new way of life, and a new set of conventions.

In my view, philosophy in its most general sense refers to a mode of discourse melding comprehensiveness, unity, and explicitness.
— Joshs

I like the sound of this, but I have to ask for more clarity. A great novel can be shown to meld all three of these qualities, but does that make it philosophy? What about a beautiful prayer? Perhaps you would say that the missing element in both examples is explicitness. What, then, are the discursive tools by which explicitness comes to be? I'm nudging you toward taking the "rational inquiry" idea a bit more seriously. And let's remember that rationality is not univocal. Two of the philosophers I've gotten the most from, Gadamer and Habermas, spent their lives trying to formulate better versions of what it means to be rational, versions that would provide an escape from the crushing scientific rationalism of the 19th century — J

Habermas grounded rationality in a Kantian a priori, whereas Gadamer located the basis of reason in contingent discursive hemeneutical practices. I think leaving Habermas’s essentialism behind, and taking Gadamer’s practice-based approach further can help us to see why the attempt to separate philosophy from other disciplines on the basis of any formal properties or logics is ill-conceived. I think this attempt to fix a sovereign standpoint for philosophy is the flip-side of the equally ill-conceived attempt to locate a sovereign ground for empirical truth in the ‘facts of nature’. In fact, the two tend to imply each other. The manifest image of philosophical conceptualization and the scientific image of nature, the ideal and the real, belong to a Kantian-type idealism. After all, modern realism was Kant’s invention.

Practice-based accounts can allow us to avoid turning the rational tools of philosophy into a spinning in the void, divorced from the empirical nature it conceptualizes in language. Philosophical inquiry, like all modes of linguistic expression, is practical engagement with a world that is already organized as discursive cultural systems or patterns. We don’t first concoct linguistic concepts and then impose them on the world. Our use of language is already embedded in and formed on the basis of the system of real, material interactions that it belongs to. Any formal system of rationality or logic one wants to associate uniquely with philosophy will have no more claim to universality or primordiality than other contingent cultural practices. There is no way we can climb above these contextual practices, no way to locate a method of thinking that surveys or organizes them from sideways on.

I don’t believe there is any domain philosophy tackles that science can’t venture into. I think we agree it’s just a matter of style of expression.
— Joshs

Really? Unless you include both math and metaphysics within science, I don't see how this could be true — J

What do you mean by metaphysics? You dont consider a scientific paradigm to be a metaphysical stance? And given that logic and mathematics have been developed by both philosophers and scientists, I would say that their status can’t easily be placed with respect to the latter disciplines.

By high-fallutin do you mean technically complicated language, such as that used by educated professionals? Or do you mean bullshit masquerading as insight?
— Tom Storm

There's no reason it can't be both. In this particular case I think "bullshit masquerading as insight" is probably a bit strong. How about gilding the lily — T Clark

It would help if you could give some concrete examples of highfalutin language in philosophy. I’ll give some for you and you tell me if I’m off base. Many of my favorite philosophers (Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida) have been accused of writing in an obscurantist style. It has been suggested that this is a deliberate strategy to attract a cult-like following of initiates into what appears to outsiders as a secret society. Since I know the work of these writers very well, I will say that there isn’t a single word chosen by them that isnt preceded by an enormous amount of careful thought, becuase the aim is to capture the meaning of their their thoughts in words in a manner that is as faithful and precise as possible. I would go further and claim that in a deep sense, their concepts are more precise than the engineering vocabulary associated with your profession. Why do these philosophers tend to be accused of bullshit, obfuscation and obscurity? It’s pretty simple They are culture’s crystal ball, venturing into virgin territory of ideas, for which there is no established vocabulary. So they have to invent a new language, or use familiar language in strange ways, stretching and pulling it to say new things. Readers struggling to catch up with the difficult new ideas become discouraged and lapse into blaming the messenger’s style of expression rather than the novelty of the message.

It seems to me that the confusion of primordial underpinnings with science mostly come about by philosophers, including us, who come up with philosophical positions which aren't consistent with what we know from observation, including science. One prime example of this is the whole hard problem of consciousness. Some say that it is a problem that will never, can never, be resolved by a scientific approach. When I describe to them the kind of work psychologists, including cognitive scientists, are doing, they dismiss it out of hand — T Clark

Yes, I don’t believe there is any domain philosophy tackles
that science can’t venture into. I think we agree it’s just a matter of style of expression. The move from philosophical to scientific language is toward a thinner, more conventionalized and less synthetic account of the same or similar phenomena (Nietzsche vs Freud, Merleau-Ponty vs embodied cogntivism).

Also, you point out that some say "psychological concepts like ‘mental’ , ‘physical’ , ‘value’ and belief’ are confused derivatives of more fundamental truths." I would put it differently. I think I can make the case that philosophical concepts like "truth," "ontology," "objective reality," and "morality," are high-falutin, often confusing, ways of talking about human thinking and experience. — T Clark

I would add that empirical concepts are in their own way ‘high-fallutin’. But what does this mean? To me it means using terminology which doesn’t overtly take into account its linkage to meanings from other aspects of culture. The more richly and explicitly we reveal these interconnections, the less high-fallutin the language becomes.

Where I think I'd disagree -- I'm not sure how to differentiate, but I feel that both philosophy and science articulate their presuppositions in a rich and comprehensive manner. This is part of why they look similar. — Moliere

Give me any scientific theory, and I’ll show you how philosophical questions can reveal the metaphysical presuppositions making its assertions intelligible. This job of uncovering metaphysical commitments is not something that the sciences normally engage in , since by their nature they take for granted such presuppositions in order to do their work. This is what I mean by richness and comprehensiveness. Science by its nature stops short of exposing its underground plumbing.

And what you're inclined to say about what goes on down there, and about what people are doing who study what's on the ground, it's more and more likely to be bullshit, something that sounds good to you, all alone, a thousand feet above them, when you can no longer see what's down there in any detail — Srap Tasmaner

I could point out the danger of not seeing the forest for the trees by spending all one’s time on the ground. You could point out the opposite danger of losing sight of the grounding facts by seeing them from too great a distance. But does the philosophical-empirical distinction have to be understood in terms of breadth vs detail metaphors?
Dont the best philosophers through history also have a comprehensive knowledge of the sciences? For them, isn’t it less a question of sacrificing detail for the sake of breadth than of enriching the understanding of the details by supplying what is hidden from their gaze, the underground plumbing so to speak? Let’s take Husserl’s method of bracketing, for instance. By putting out of commission our knowledge of the detailed facts of science, he stays as close as possible to those details, while burrowing beneath them to reveal the presuppositions animating their sense.

You describe philosophical thought as united by a "mode of discourse," that features certain attributes, whereas psychology is characterized by "a set of presuppositions." This is quite similar to an idea Leontiskos was talking about earlier, that the lack of presuppositions may be what makes phil. unique. Are you also trying to make this distinction? — J

No, I don’t believe there can be philosophy without presuppositions. Philosophers arise out of a contingent culture which shapes the sense of the questions they ask and how they interpret the answers. For me the distinction between philosophy and psychology has only to do with the how richly and comprehensively those presuppositions are articulated.

I think it is reasonable to say that philosophy is the study of thought, beliefs, knowledge, value, which are mental phenomena - the structure and process of the conscious mind. As such, it is a branch of psychology.
— T Clark

Also, are you arguing that there is not a philosophy of mind and a psychology of mind? Given my position, why would that be a contradiction — T Clark

In my view, philosophy in its most general sense refers to a mode of discourse melding comprehensiveness, unity, and explicitness. One can make any kind of thinking in any disciple more or less philosophical by moving in one direction or another along this spectrum. So a psychologist can become more philosophical, more ‘meta’, by moving from cognitive psychology to philosophy of mind. Does this mean that philosophy is a branch of psychology? No, because there are many philosophers who define psychology as an empirical discipline, the scientific study of mental phenomena in all its guises and levels of focus ( cognition, emotion, sociality, biological ecology, neuroscience, genetics, etc).

What binds all these domains of study together as psychological is a shared acceptance of a set of presuppositions concerning what it means to be empirical, scientific, objective , natural and real. Those philosophers who don’t consider their mode of inquiry as belonging to psychology, who believe that disciplines like philosophy of mind (and writers like Daniel Dennett) ‘psychologize’ philosophy, argue that psychology forces us to confuse the primordial underpinnings of being and existence with the contingent results of a science. They may argue psychological concepts like ‘mental’ , ‘physical’ , ‘value’ and belief’ are confused derivatives of more fundamental truths that no longer belong to psychology, but are instead ontologically prior to it.

What you describe could also be taken as showing that philosophy is a trap: inquiry is in danger of getting stuck there, no longer producing knowledge. (Which, let's be honest ... — Srap Tasmaner

You feel that philosophy is longer producing knowledge? How long has this state of affairs been the case?

There are many other important and useful discourses besides the rational/philosophical. They may even lead to vital truths. — J

Even more to the point, there are many other useful
discourses WITHIN philosophy besides that of rationally generated consensus and the primacy of rationality itself.

Eventually, the chemist himself will have to reach for physics, because while reduction is a myth, and the laws of physics are not enough to do biochemistry, biochemistry is constrained by physics and you can eventually reach a level where the explanation for what happens and what doesn't comes not from chemistry but from physics. — Srap Tasmaner

It’s easy to say that in theory the higher order sciences reduce to an order below them, and all reduce to physics, but the reason this does not work out in practice is that the complexity of the phenomena which make the higher order sciences ‘higher’ in the first place tend to lead to innovations in theory which then eventually lead to an adjustment of the basic concept of the lower level science. For instance, until recently physics notoriously ignored the central importance of time for understanding the nature of physical phenomena. It took the influence of the ideas of evolutionary biology to trigger a transformation in thinking within physics.

I'm sure there are more versions. Add on if you like.
— frank
Neat topic.

Better to stop at Anscombe — Banno

Have you read Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self?

↪tim wood I feel your pain, like half of America and about 90% of Australia, I'm vastly dissappointed by the re-election of DJT — Wayfarer

You may want to think twice about that percentage.

https://this.deakin.edu.au/culture/trumps-australia-why-are-more-australians-supporting-trump

philosophers have no business offering opinions within a scientific discourse
—

Dope. — Srap Tasmaner

How about opinions that directly challenge the presuppositions of a science? Heidegger’s ideas about emotion, and Merleau-Ponty and Husserl’s models of perception were decades ahead of the psychological sciences. Have you ever read Phenomenology of Perception?

agree that philosophy begins with a problem or with questions that need to be asked. I suppose amongst the problematics of Platonism was the nature of knowledge, the good, the true, the beautiful, the just, and such large and difficult-to-define questions. But also notice the significance of aporia in those dialogues - questions which can't be answered and for which no easy solution presents itself — Wayfarer

Notice further that framing the essential questions of philosophy in terms of the nature of knowledge, the good, the true, the beautiful and the just already poses the questions by way of a pre-understanding of what these concepts mean and constrains the direction of their answer, such as whether and in what sense they lead to aporia, and how to interpret the meaning of the aporia.