My take on Wittgenstein and his "forms of life" is that absolutely everything bottoms out in behavior. Any interpretation of behavior is inherently indeterminate and interpretations we give rely on arbitrary, inscrutable foundations characterized by circular regresses in definition and ostensive pointing. From my view the point is that this indeterminacy and underdetermination has no consequence for people's behavior which can still seem totally coherent. It comes from latent, hidden kinds of blind processes; i.e. in the modern perspective, from the physical dynamics of neuronal behavior. Knowing some kind of determinate rules and forms of life people use is beside the point because people don't need that to interact. People interact successfully despite inherent underdetermination and indeterminacy.
I don't believe that saying "meaning is use" is intended to determine what meaning is. But in lieu of determinate objective meaning structure, all there is to what we call "meaning" is use. And obviously not all meaning is use since something like "History is spelled H-I-S-T-O-R-Y" is a use of "History" that isn't necessarily related to its meaning. Obviously our use of "meaning" and similar synonyms as well as our own reflections on it don't have more to them than behavior that bottom out in neural processes. But the trying to characterize that behavior just brings us back to the issues of indeterminacy. I don't believe "meaning as use" or "forms of life" are meant to be rigorous, comprehensive theories of meaning. They just point to the fact that seemingly coherent behavior co-exists with inherent indeterminacy. The idea of nested forms of life I think is quite appropriate in the sense that behavior has regularities on various different scales, and this is a general feature of complex systems in biology and physics.
I can't use the word 'to' properly if I don't know it brings about a directional relationship between two objects. — Lionino
The problem is, as they don't know what the word actually means, and only learn how to use it from examples/contexts — Lionino
As soon as we know the German word is a "perfect" translation of the English word, we are able to use productively. — Lionino
I think the answer to these issues is that there is nothing more to knowledge than use either. It is driven by underlying neural processes we are not privy to and cannot be interpeted semantically but physically.
I like this quote from developmental paychologists Esther Thelen and Linda Smith:
"We believe this answer is wrong. Knowing is the process of dynamic assembly across multileveled systems in the service of a task. We do not need to invoke represented constructs such as “object” or “extended in space and time” outside the moment of knowing. Knowing, just like action, is the momentary product of a dynamic system, not a dissociable cause of action."
"We think to act. Thus, knowing may begin as and always be an inherently sensorimotor act."
(Paper: Dynamic Systems Theories;
direct pdf download when clicking link https://cogdev.sitehost.iu.edu/labwork/handbook.pdf )
We then have dynamic neural systems that can observe their environment, causing complex physical interactions in the system which we think of as learning and encompass all our complicated intellectual abilities. But we cannot cash out this stuff as "knowledge" until we see it's behavior in real time which even then is indeterminate in interpretatio . This is how we would think of "meaning as use" too so "knowledge as use" is basically a generalization.
We then have to account for the fact that we can make an observation and somehow miraculously aquire the ability to coherently use a word in a certain way that we could not before (e.g. learning what the german word for village means and miraculously being able to use it) because we have a complicated internal neural system. But that doesn't contradict the idea that there can be nothing more to what that word means than how we use it. Sure you could point to the internal neural system but we cannot interpret that semantically and we can only cash that out once we observe the behavior even if that behavior is kind of meta- such as when you just define a word... metacognitively stating the definition of a word is behavior, or saying that you
could state the definition if you wanted to (without actually stating it) is also behavior, generated by internal neural processes which are capably of generating all of our behaviors. At the same time being able to use a word does not always mean we are using it in a way which seems coherent with the consensus use or that we won't "get it wrong" simply because our understanding isn't deep enough. Nonetheless when we do get it "right", there is nothing more to it than use, generated by the underlying neural systems (at the same time there is no fixed, rigid criterion of "getting it right". Again, all behavior or "use" has indeterminate interpretation; nonetheless our behavior can be coherent.
signifier to the English speaker but devoid of its meaning and use. But it is precisely to the extent that "hola" has become unrooted from its context that it is possible for its context to be learned: the English speaker learns the use and meaning of "hola" from its own context. Only then is communication possible: To the extent that the sign refers beyond the given context and usage. Significance, the most proper of language, exceeds use but does not exclude it. — JuanZu
Signifiers and significance is also nothing more than use as knowledge is - we observe symbols and physical interactions from the outside world causally affect our internal neural systems. They then can spit out future behaviour that reflects the causal interaction with the symbol in the context of the outside world... a symbol is nothing more than the associations we observe it connected to. And out understanding of the symbol is nothing more than the behaviors our internal neural systems spit out, effectively the use of the symbol, the predictions or anticipations and reactions of symbol associations which itself is cashed out in behavior, whether verbal, attentional or otherwise. Those abilities may rely on how our internal neural systems are parameterized but you cannot interpret that semantically. You can only interpret mechanistically. One physical event causes another and then another which results in eventual states and outcomes. You can also formulate this kind of thing in terms of experiences too imo... what we know, how we think is nothing more than sequences of experiences. And I think that is actually a central part of the sections in Wittgenstein's PI when he is talking about mental acts like reading, the point being that just as with language,
all our capabilities are characterized by indeterminacy and that ultimately none of these things are more than the sequences of experiences when we perform mental acts like reading... analogous to meaning as use... language is nothing more than the placement of words in the context of other words and other events in our experiences and out in the world. Characterizing that is inherently indeterminate, yet the behavior occurs seemingly coherently anyway.
So on the contrary, I think nothing we do exceeds use. My interpretation is Wittgenstein I don't thing was creating a theory of meaning. But saying that what we think of as meaning is nothing above use and behavior.
Interpreted in modern terms, I believe Wittgenstein is just perhaps an early pioneer of enactive cognition:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enactivism
And so meaning, knowledge, language is enactivism. Most acutely perhaps, situated cognition as alluded in the Thelen quote earlier:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Situated_cognition