• Moliere
    5.1k
    Do you believe that we are successfully communicating with each other right now?Leontiskos

    In quick response to the yes/no question, yes.

    Will follow up w/ your link tho
  • Moliere
    5.1k


    With respect to @Arcane Sandwich, I see lots of cool places to talk.

    Is there a particular bit you want me to discuss?

    I erased a lot of thinking-out-loud in forming that question :D -- decided it was better to just ask.

    If Quine is right, then how could we be confident? If we can be confident, then how could Quine be right?

    If it doesn't have an exciting result when applied to rabbits, then why did Quine apply it to rabbits?

    No one here is taking Quine seriously. It makes no sense to say, "Quine's argument is sound, but we can still communicate our references anyways."

    I would submit that just as for Hume we cannot know causes, so for Quine we cannot know references. The presuppositions of the systems ensure the validity of these inferences, and if we want to deny the conclusions we must deny the presuppositions of the systems. We can't just say, "Oh well. We can be pretty damn confident." To do that is to beg the question. If we can be confident about causes or references, then Hume or Quine must be wrong.

    @Count Timothy von Icarus is simply avoiding the question-begging. He sees that if "we can be pretty damn confident/justified" then Quine must be wrong. He also sees that if philosophy of language is first philosophy, then Quine is not wrong.
    8 days ago
    Leontiskos

    Do you believe that we are successfully communicating with each other right now? Because it seems to me that if reference were inscrutable, then this would be impossible. And if a foreign word were inscrutable, then we would never be able to learn foreign languages. But we are successfully communicating with each other, and it is not impossible to learn foreign languages, therefore reference is not inscrutable.Leontiskos

    Lots of thick thoughts....


    here are 2 of them I'm thinking now: First, the inscrutability of reference applies even to our own language. "Reference", as a philosophical concept, is the target, though -- the example draws from the experience of trying to learn a foreign language when you have no knowledge.

    Eventually, through trial and error, you can learn it! Even if you knew nothing of it!

    Which is kind of the puzzle.... in a way.

    EDIT: Heh, with thick thoughts comes lots of confusion. I want to clarify my expression above.

    "Reference", as a philosophical concept, is the target of the "gavagai" criticism -- as well as various metaphysical theses people might have drawn from various notions of reference.

    It's not so much that we can't communicate or learn. It's that there's no fact of the matter, in the sense of a true sentence which refers to the world in the same way that "gavagai' refers to the world, which will decide how "gavagai" refers.

    Therefore, you cannot draw metaphysical or ontological conclusions from philosophical beliefs about reference.

    The end.
     ********************************
    ^
    |
    added a breaker to notate where I put my edit. The following was part of the original post:

    Second: I'd take it that since we're talking to one another we can't ever deny that we're communicating, unless we're communicating about when we're not communicating to correct communication. So if we can connect a philosophical belief that we're not communicating that'd be damning for it -- not that'd it be false, but it'd indicate we're not communicating and thereby, in spite of all of our efforts, we're linguistically solipsistic.
  • Leontiskos
    3.7k
    Most people want to avoid the thesis that existence is a property, and that it can be represented with a first-order predicate, such as "E", instead of the existential quantifier, "∃".

    And why do most people want to avoid that thesis? Because they somehow believe that to treat existence as a property is naive...
    Arcane Sandwich

    If we just step back and for a moment forget all of the philosophy we've read, how would we view existence? In a pre-critical sense it would seem that existence is a property or predicate of concepts. That's how we speak, after all: "Horses exist. Unicorns do not exist." "Johnson died: he no longer exists." The basic insight of this starting point is that the domain for existence predications must be existence-neutral in some sense. If it were not then existence predications would make no sense.

    I don't think that's a bad starting point, and in fact it looks to be more reasonable than Quine's approach. Of course Quine's approach is motivated by different considerations, but if his considerations are more idiosyncratic than the motivations of a comprehensive theory, then his theory is eo ipso going to be less plausible. That's perhaps what is happening: Quine is talking about some specialized thing called "existence," which is different from existence. A kind of equivocation is occurring. Beyond that, existence is a difficult thing to reckon with, and therefore the way that Quine just hides it away under the quantificational rug is appealing to systematizers, who don't want to be bothered by the complexity of difficult realities. "When you bind variables you are involved in the assumption that they exist, and that's all we should say about it. Natural language is confused and refuge is found in our system which doesn't even try to reckon with natural language."

    20th Century thinkers like Mario BungeArcane Sandwich

    What is the birds-eye account of Bunge's view, and what sort of philosophical considerations and background are informing such a view?
  • Arcane Sandwich
    2.2k
    What is the birds-eye account of Bunge's view, and what sort of philosophical considerations and background are informing such a view?Leontiskos

    It's scientism at the end of the day, and Bunge uses that word in a positive sense, despite the fact that most people use it as a negative or pejorative term. For example, in an article of his, tiled In Defense of Realism and Scientism.

    The four pillars of Bunge's philosophy are: Semantics, Ontology, Epistemology, and Ethics. This reflected in his magnum opus, the eight volumes of his Treatise on Basic Philosophy. For people that don't have the time to read those eight volumes, I would recommend his book Matter and Mind, or perhaps his autobiography, Between Two Worlds: Memoirs of a Philosopher-Scientist.

    His fame has nothing to do with his own philosophy, though. He became relatively famous for being critical of psychoanalysis, phenomenology, existentialism, and Analytic philosophy in general, among other schools and traditions. He criticizes all of the aformentioned for not being scientific enough, or for being pseudoscientific, which is even worse (that is precisely the case of psychoanalysis, in his view). Quine himself thought very highly of Bunge:

    His international debut was at the 1956 Inter-American Philosophical Congress in Santiago, Chile. He was particularly noticed there by Willard Van Orman Quine, who called Bunge the star of the congress. He was, until his retirement at age 90, the Frothingham Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at McGill University in Montreal, where he had been since 1966.

    In a review of Bunge's 2016 memoirs, Between Two Worlds: Memoirs of a Philosopher-Scientist, James Alcock saw in Bunge "a man of exceedingly high confidence who has lived his life guided by strong principles about truth, science, and justice" and one who is "[impatient] with muddy thinking".

    He became a centenarian in September 2019. A Festschrift was published to mark the occasion, with essays by an international collection of scholars. He died in Montreal, Canada, on February 24, 2020, at the age of 100.
    Wikipedia

    I'll post some of his thoughts on existence and quantification in a moment.
  • Leontiskos
    3.7k
    Eventually, through trial and error, you can learn it! Even if you knew nothing of it!

    Which is kind of the puzzle.... in a way.
    Moliere

    Yes, thank you. You're the first "inscrutabilist" who has owned up to the "puzzle." :grin: :party:

    1. If reference is inscrutable, then we cannot communicate (or learn new languages).
    2. But we can communicate (and learn new languages).
    3. Therefore, Reference is not inscrutable.

    The "inscrutabilist" does not want to double-down on the modus ponens, as he knows it to be false:

    4. If reference is inscrutable, then we cannot communicate (or learn new languages).
    5. Reference is inscrutable
    6. Therefore, We cannot communicate (or learn new languages).

    Note that for someone like myself who does not think reference is inscrutable, there is no puzzle. In fact (3) proves that reference is not inscrutable. But again, one must take care to properly identify Quine's conclusion. I don't doubt that it was not sheer inscrutability of reference. Still, if we take the conclusion to be inscrutability of reference, then anyone who accepts (1) and (2) must admit that the argument fails, at least if (1) and (2) are more certain than the counter-premises in an argument for inscrutability.

    First, the inscrutability of reference applies even to our own language.Moliere

    I agree.

    Second: I'd take it that since we're talking to one another we can't ever deny that we're communicating, unless we're communicating about when we're not communicating to correct communication. So if we can connect a philosophical belief that we're not communicating that'd be damning for it -- not that'd it be false, but it'd indicate we're not communicating and thereby, in spite of all of our efforts, we're linguistically solipsistic.Moliere

    Right: you can affirm that reference is inscrutable and therefore we are not communicating, but then what are you doing here on TPF? Probably you would have to abandon the forum (among other things) if you believed that.

    "Reference", as a philosophical concept, is the target of the "gavagai" criticism -- as well as various metaphysical theses people might have drawn from various notions of reference.

    It's not so much that we can't communicate or learn. It's that there's no fact of the matter, in the sense of a true sentence which refers to the world in the same way that "gavagai' refers to the world, which will decide how "gavagai" refers.
    Moliere

    But isn't is possible to learn the Native's language? And if I do learn the language, then haven't I learned the "fact of the matter"--which is of course conventional--about how 'gavagai' refers?

    Is there a particular bit you want me to discuss?Moliere

    Not necessarily. I was just trying to cross-reference some similar ideas.

    (The problem with this thread is similar to the problem of 'gavagai'. There is no common, public text that we can all look at to figure out what we are talking about. There's only two sentences and a link to a Wikipedia article, which naturally makes for a widely diverging thread.)
  • Arcane Sandwich
    2.2k
    Ontology should precede epistemology. And yet modern philosophy started rejecting metaphysics. It did so just because the ruling metaphysics around 1600 was obsolete. The price paid for this antimetaphysical turn was subjectivism, outspoken as in Berkeley’s case, or shame-faced as in Kant’s. — Bunge (2010: 201)

    "Our definition of "reality" cannot be other than this:
    DEFINITION 3.30 Let Θ be the set of all things and [Θ] its aggregation. Then
    Reality = df [Θ] = ▯ = the world.
    The reality of an object consists in its being a part of the world."
    — Bunge (1977: 161)

    We have tacitly regarded all substantial properties as real, though not as autonomously real, or real in themselves, i.e. apart from the individuals possessing them. More precisely, we have implicitly employed

    DEFINITION 2.17 A property P is real = df There is at least one individual x ∈ S, other than the null individual, that possesses P (equivalently: (P) ≠ ∅).
    — Bunge (1977: 99)

    This definition applies not only to intrinsic properties (represented by unary predicates) but also to mutual properties (represented by n-ary predicates). Thus to say that a certain relation R is real amounts to saying that there are R-related entities or substantial individuals. — Bunge (1977: 99)

    Mathematical objects are then ontologically on a par with artistic and mythological creations: they are all fictions. The real number system and the triangle inequality axiom do not exist really any more than Don Quijote or Donald Duck." — Bunge (1985: 38-39)

    Surely most contemporary philosophers hold that ∃ formalizes both the logical concept "some" and the ontological concept of existence. I shall argue that this is a mistake. Consider the statement "Some sirens are beautiful", which can be symbolized "(∃x)(Sx & Bx)". So far so good. The trouble starts when the formula is read "There are beautiful sirens". The existential interpretation is misleading because it suggests belief in the real existence of sirens, while all we intended to say was "Some of the sirens existing in Greek mythology are beautiful". — Bunge (1977: 155)

    We need then an exact concept of existence different from ∃. Much to the dismay of most logicians we shall introduce one in the sequel. In fact we shall introduce an existence predicate, thus vindicating the age-old intuition that existence is the most important property anything can possess. — Bunge (1977: 155)

    DEFINITION 3.29
    (i) x exists conceptually = df For some set C of constructs, ECx;
    (ii) x exists really = df For some set Θ of things, EΘx.
    For example the Pythagorean theorem exists in the sense that it belongs in Euclidean geometry. Surely it did not come into existence before someone in the Pythagorean school invented it. But it has been in conceptual existence, i.e. in geometry, ever since. Not that geometry has an autonomous existence, i.e. that it subsists independently of being thought about. It is just that we make the indispensable pretence that constructs exist provided they belong in some body of ideas - which is a roundabout fashion of saying that constructs exist as long as there are rational beings capable of thinking them up. Surely this mode of existence is neither ideal existence (or existence in the Realm of Ideas) nor real or physical existence. To invert Plato's cave metaphor we may say that ideas are but the shadows of things - and shadows, as is well known, have no autonomous existence.
    — Bunge (1977: 157)

    Let us now use the existential predicate introduced above to revisit the most famous of all the arguments for God’s existence. Anselm of Canterbury argued that God exists because He is perfect, and existence is a property of perfection. Some mathematical logicians have claimed that Anselm was wrong because existence is not a predicate but the ∃ quantifier. I suggest that this objection is sophistic because in all the fields of knowledge we tacitly use an existential predicate that has nothing to do with the “existential” quantifier, as when it is asserted or denied that there are living beings in Mars or perpetual motion machines. — Bunge (2012: 174-175)

    Using the existence predicate defined a while ago, we may reformulate Anselm’s argument as follows.

    God is perfect ______________________ Pg
    Everything perfect exists in R [really]_____∀x(Px → ERx)
    God exists in R.______________________ ERg

    Both premises are controversial, particularly the first one since it presupposes the existence of God. Hence the atheist will have to propose serious arguments against it instead of the sophistry of the logical imperialist. An alternative is to admit the existence of God for the sake of argument, and add the ontological postulate that everything real is imperfect: that if something is perfect then it is ideal, like Pythagoras’ theorem or a Beethoven sonata. But the conjunction of both postulates implies the unreality of God. In short, Anselm was far less wrong than his modern critics would have it.
    — Bunge (2012: 175)

    Note: The "R" in "ERx" is meant to be a subscript, but this forum doesn't seem to have the option for subscripts.

    EDIT: I have fixed the subscripts thanks to
  • Moliere
    5.1k
    But isn't is possible to learn the Native's language? And if I do learn the language, then haven't I learned the "fact of the matter"--which is of course conventional--about how 'gavagai' refers?Leontiskos

    It is -- though I'd rather take the example towards the Rossetta stone than the natives:

    With natives it's easy because we can communicate in other ways that are not linguistic, in the sense that we usually mean "linguistic" at least.

    But that was the key which enabled us to understand a truly foreign language. We needed some kind of "foothold", which I'm now tempted to call "reference" -- and then we could work from there.

    But until you have that it's a nothing, right? If we don't even recognize something as a language, for instance...
  • Leontiskos
    3.7k
    We needed some kind of "foothold",Moliere

    Yes, I agree. This is what was talking about earlier with "empathy" (though I don't think that is the right word for it).

    But until you have that it's a nothing, right? If we don't even recognize something as a language, for instance...Moliere

    Yes, but if something is not linguistic then it does not constitute a reference of any kind, scrutable or inscrutable, no? Or rather, if we do not recognize something as a linguistic sign, then it cannot be inscrutable, for we would never say, "That non-reference is an inscrutable reference," or, "We will never figure out what that thing is referring to, namely that thing which we do not believe to be referring to anything."

    In fact I want to say that in order to identify something as referential one must already have a foothold of one kind or another. Without such a foothold there is insufficient reason to posit a referential reality (i.e. an intentional sign).
  • Leontiskos
    3.7k


    Thank you. Very interesting. Great quotes, and I especially liked the first one, but his points on the existential quantifier also seem very good. At some point you will have to write up a thread on your view of Scientism, because it is largely a pejorative term here. <This thread> was the closest thing we've had, of late.

    Note: The "R" in "ERx" is meant to be a subscript, but this forum doesn't seem to have the option for subscripts.Arcane Sandwich

    That did confuse me a bit. ERx

    E[sub]R[/sub]x

    Surely most contemporary philosophers hold that ∃ formalizes both the logical concept "some" and the ontological concept of existence. I shall argue that this is a mistake. — Bunge (1977: 155)

    Just for fun and on the topic of existential quantifiers, since Aquinas came up earlier:

    ...However, as I have argued in detail elsewhere,[3] Kenny’s objection fails on several counts.

    In the first place, Aquinas simply does not have a notion equivalent to the Fregean notion of an existential quantifier. In fact, a notion that would come closest to this notion in Aquinas’s conceptual arsenal would be regarded by him not as a concept of existence, but as a signum quantitatis, namely, a signum particulare, the syncategorematic concept expressed by the Latin terms ‘quidam’, ‘aliquid’ or their equivalents, which render a proposition to which they are prefixed a particular, as opposed to a universal, singular or indefinite proposition (as in, ‘Quidam homo est animal’ = ‘Some man is an animal’, as opposed to ‘Every man is an animal’, ‘Socrates is an animal’ or ‘A man is an animal’, respectively). In any case, Kenny’s reason for holding that Aquinas would have to use in his argument the notion of specific existence, and, correspondingly, the notion of nominal as opposed to real essence,[4] is his unjustified assumption that Aquinas would take a phoenix by definition to be a fictitious bird as we do...
    Gyula Klima, Aquinas' Real Distinction and Its Role in a Causal Proof of God's Existence
  • Arcane Sandwich
    2.2k
    That did confuse me a bit. ERxLeontiskos

    Thanks! I fixed all of the subscripts in my post.

    On Aquinas: he's right about the example of the phoenix. Ever since Kant, philosophers in general have been reluctant to grant Aquinas that point. But why wouldn't one grant him that point? My suspicion is that modern philosophers just don't want to agree with Aquinas on anything. There is this sort of unstated aversion to anything that has to do with Medieval philosophy in general, and with Aquinas in particular. It sounds as if one agrees with anything that Aquinas said, then one has magically converted to Catholicism. But this makes no sense to me. If Aquinas says "2 + 2 = 4", are we going to deny that basic mathematical statement, just because Aquinas said it? No, of course not. So why can't we say that he's right when he says that existence is a property? That doesn't necessarily commit one to every other thing that Aquinas said.

    Shorter: I can distinguish Pegasus from a phoenix. They're not the same fictional creature. Neither of them exists, so how is it even possible for me to distinguish them? Most of the time, reference is far from being inscrutable. And even in those cases in which it is, it can cease to be inscrutable. Unknown references are not the same thing as unknowable references.
  • AmadeusD
    2.7k
    Ari's "golden mean" is something of a fallacy when taken out of context -- the middle between extremes isn't going to be true or false just cuz it's in the middle.Moliere

    No, of course. BUt Ari's mean is to do with extremes of behaviour, for the most part. Not the truth or falsity of something. The whole "your story, my story, and then the truth" is clearly bogus for your reasons though!
  • Leontiskos
    3.7k
    Shorter: I can distinguish Pegasus from a phoenix. They're not the same fictional creature. Neither of them exists, so how is it even possible for me to distinguish them? Most of the time, reference is far from being inscrutable. And even in those cases in which it is, it can cease to be inscrutable. Unknown references are not the same thing as unknowable references.Arcane Sandwich

    Yep, good points. :up:

    It sounds as if one agrees with anything that Aquinas said, then one has magically converted to Catholicism. But this makes no sense to me.Arcane Sandwich

    Oddly enough, many years ago there was a group in the UK called something like, "Atheists for Aquinas." It was a bunch of philosophically-inclined atheists who really enjoyed reading Aquinas. There is a syllogistic density to his prose that some people find very attractive (and others abhor!).

    But I think it's good for a philosophy forum to mix in thinkers like Harman, Bunge, or Aquinas. It helps resist an overly homogenous and narrow philosophical canon, and it helps move us towards thought-based assessments rather than authority-based assessments. And to be fair, there are a lot of members here who are open to other ways of thinking. This thread isn't a great representative of TPF on that score. Still, I would never casually drop the "E" word on TPF, as fascist Tim did earlier. :lol:

    Edit: I also want to add that earlier, when I pointed out someone who is devoted to a very narrow tradition in a very narrow slice of history, I was accused of doing the same thing in terms of the medieval period. The difference is the difference between two decades of a narrow tradition and two millennia of a broad tradition. Medievals engaged and incorporated everyone, including Christian, Jewish, Islamic, and pagan thinkers. The continuity beginning with Plato and ending in the 15th century is quite remarkable. "Antiquated" was not a slur that had much power. Everything was fair game, and this led to an increasingly robust tradition. What we now find in the English-speaking world is the opposite: the yellow "do not cross" line is erected behind Descartes if not Russell, and you end up with a lot of relatively isolated thinkers who simply cannot cope with the perennial questions of philosophy, such as the perennial task of doing more than simply ignoring common language use.
  • Leontiskos
    3.7k
    (i) x exists conceptually = df For some set C of constructs, ECx;
    (ii) x exists really = df For some set Θ of things, EΘx.
    — Bunge (1977: 157)

    I want to preempt an objection that I find quite tired, and it is related to the pre-critical story I told above. Someone will inevitably come along and object to conceptual existence on the grounds of parsimony, behaviorism, "reification," or something else like this. The point will be as follows:

    • "I found a weakness in your theory, therefore your theory is wrong or unacceptable."

    Granting for the sake of argument that a weakness was truly found, the conclusion simply does not follow. We are engaged in abductive reasoning: inference to the best explanation. Given this fact, "Imperfect, therefore untenable," is not a valid argument. Gyula Klima illustrates this idea by telling a story about someone who, sitting at the poker table with a straight flush, yells out, "Checkmate!"

    Despite the latest fad in "the cool kids'" clothing, is conceptual existence really that bad, if there is indeed anything wrong with it at all? Given the choice between conceptual existence and a quantificational theory that brings with it very strange and unintuitive ontological concomitants, it would seem that conceptual existence is much to be favored. It also saves predicate logic from an unnecessary and awkward burden.
  • Apustimelogist
    676
    1. If reference is inscrutable, then we cannot communicate (or learn new languages).
    2. But we can communicate (and learn new languages).
    3. Therefore, Reference is not inscrutable.
    Leontiskos

    So where is Quine going wrong?
  • Banno
    26.1k
    I'll repeat this link for folk that may have missed it:

    Thought Experiment 1: Gavagai

    Those wanting more might look to the SEP section on the topic in the Quine biography.

    Cheers.
  • Leontiskos
    3.7k
    So where is Quine going wrong?Apustimelogist

    Good question. Only paraphrases of Quine have been offered, based on the gavagai example (which Quine himself claims is not the ground of his doctrine).

    Still, if we take the conclusion to be inscrutability of reference, then anyone who accepts (1) and (2) must admit that the argument fails, at least if (1) and (2) are more certain than the counter-premises in an argument for inscrutability.Leontiskos

    ...but if someone thinks they can reconstruct an argument for the inscrutability of reference that overcomes the facts that we can communicate and learn new languages, they are certainly welcome to try.
  • Count Timothy von Icarus
    3.2k


    When you say that my modest proposal entails "kicking existence out to predication," that doesn't capture the emphasis I'm placing on language. I'm not saying that the word "existence" be used to cover one sense of existence but not another; I'm recommending we drop the word entirely. (And as I've probably said before, I know this will never happen; but a fellow can dream!). The various grounding and entailment relations that legitimately exist among the various types of being will remain unchanged. A traditional, metaphysically conservative philosopher has nothing to fear here.

    They don't? This sounds like the anti-metaphysical movement redux.

    Unless the notion is that existence/being should just mean "every possible thing that has or can ever be quantified, for all philosophers, everywhere," which now looking back seems to be how you are both using this?

    But I think that is decidedly not how Quine intended it or how the idea has been used at all. It's not: "all thinkers should be uncontroversially committed to the idea that 'existence' is just 'whatever anyone can quantify over.'"

    This would either be a barely supported sort of question begging on an extremely broad notion of existence, one with a scope to match Meinongians (who were instead critics of Quine), or it would be merely saying: "whatever anyone can or does quantify over can be quantified over," which makes the thesis look trivial and vacuous. Of course we can speak of whatever we have spoken of or will potentially speak of.

    The idea of existence as quantification is rather, wherever I have seen it presented, that people come with their ontologies, and we can now examine them in terms of quantification (rather than say entailment) in order to determine what their ontological commitments are—not "all philosophers should accept the same set of universal ontological commitments, which include anything we can possibly speak of (but don't worry about this being too broad because ontological commitments now carry no weight at all)". This makes the whole notion of Quine's approach as a "test" between theories meaningless.

    And this is why I was baffled about how this could be a response to Arcane Sandwich's post on Korman's argument:

    (DK1) There is no explanatory connection between how we believe the world to be divided up into objects the how the world actually is divided up into objects.

    (DK2) If so, then it would be a coincidence if our object beliefs turned out to be correct.

    (DK3) If it would be a coincidence if our object beliefs turned out to be correct, then we shouldn’t believe that there are trees.

    (DK4) So, we shouldn’t believe that there are trees

    Quantification might do some work here (all the standing criticisms of it versus entailment notwithstanding) if one comes with their ontology and shows how one is not committed to some sort of bizarre pleroma of arbitrary objects, or the idea that there are no objects at all. But on the idea that what is meant by "existence" is just "whatever anyone can ever quantify," I don't see how it answers such questions except as a sort of confused equivocation or dodge.

    This goes back to "no one denies tigers exist." But they do, or they make them ens rationis, somehow the creations of language, or their being tigers is "co-constituted" by language. Coastlines do not exist before they are mapped, etc.

    This seems like a counterintuitive thesis or implication, but counterintuitive doesn't mean wrong. However, it's unclear to me how existence as quantification responds to this at all, unless the intent is to dismiss "did ants exist before humans knew them" as some sort of pseudoproblem.

    The terminological problem raises its head again, in different guise. Let's say we answer, Yes, they should include such a commitment. What, then, are we committed to? How are we using "being" in a way that clarifies, rather than merely reveals our preferred usage?

    I think this difference/critique is not much of a mystery if the context is the way quantification is usually employed in metaontology. Not all philosophers have the same ontological commitments. The approach locates and defines such commitments in a manner that seems biased in favor of nominalism, in such a way that using it to adjudicate claims of commitment "impartially" is compromised (or so the critique says).



    Quine's idea that we have independent access to the meta-language and the object-language is absurd, and it underlies all of this. There is no objective-quantification apart from subjective-quantification. We do not possess the language of God, which would overcome all individual disagreements and force existence into our personal, solipsistic horizon

    Well, at least for Quine there is only one logic (justifying that is another thing.) "When a pluralist challenges the law of noncontradiction they simply change the subject" (or something like that). It's even less clear how this idea is supposed to work given commitments to an extremely permissive sort of logical pluralism or logical nihilism. "Existence is quantification, and quantification varies according to an innumerable number of different logics which we should select based on 'what is useful.''

    I think the approach makes more sense within the context of a narrow sort of philosophy, particularly given the view of scientific theories dominant at the time, and ideas about how their commitments could be tested. Of course, that view of theories has since been essentially abandoned.
  • J
    1k
    Again, thanks for the interesting response.

    This sounds like the anti-metaphysical movement redux.Count Timothy von Icarus

    I think I understand exactly what you mean here. If we link the word "existence" with some particular feature of metaphysics, and then deny that this feature has an application, we would indeed be banishing a central point of metaphysics, at least of the traditional variety. But that's not what I'm suggesting. Again, it comes down to the difficulty I think you're having with severing the link between word and concept.

    Try to imagine your metaphysics, whatever they may be, laid out as a series of groundings. Some level grounds another, is thus more essential than another; there may be a level that can be shown by transcendental argument to be necessary for human cognition; etc. etc. Now -- and this is the hard part -- go ahead and put words to it, but don't use the terms "existence" or "being". It can be done, and the doing is quite revealing, I believe. What it shows is that structure -- which is what we care about, you and me*, what we want to understand about the world -- remains intact no matter what words we use for our labels. And that is all I'm saying. It's not the least bit anti-metaphysical. In fact, the whole reason I urge this way of looking at it is to help metaphysics, to get us free from a terminology that, however time-honored, hinders us talking about the important things.

    Unless the notion is that existence/being should just mean "every possible thing that has or can ever be quantified, for all philosophers, everywhere,Count Timothy von Icarus

    Yes and no. What I would rather is that "existence/being" should be declared meaningless, dead by the thousand cuts of equivocation and ambiguity. (And remember, I'm talking about the word, not any of the various metaphysical carvings of the world that have been given the name "existence.") But if we must use the term, it has a pretty good use within quantificational logic. You're wanting to say that this reduces the idea of existence to something trivial. It would if I were linking word and concept. But I'm not. It's the word "existence" which is trivial in this context, though important for doing logic. This is what I meant when I wrote:

    "Now I completely agree that this [Quine's motto] tells us next to nothing. [i.e. it is trivial.] (In particular, it is neutral about some of the uses of "exist" that traditional metaphysics wants to privilege as "real existence" or "what being means" or some such.). But nor should it be controversial."

    "all thinkers should be uncontroversially committed to the idea that 'existence' is just 'whatever anyone can or does quantify over.'"Count Timothy von Icarus

    So, just to say it one more time, my idea is most decidedly not this. Maybe by using scare-quotes for "existence" you're leaving it open whether you're referring to the word, or to one of the many concepts of what it means to exist that metaphysicians have proposed. But I think you're saying -- and tell me if I've got this wrong -- that the problem for you here is that existence itself is being reduced to something about quantification, and that doesn't remotely do it justice. And thus would begin the endless wrangles about existence itself. It's those wrangles that I'm proposing (vainly, I know; it's too entrenched) that we stop.

    *Reading this over, I see I've assumed that structure is indeed central to your concerns as a metaphysician. But even if you want to understand the world in some other way -- perhaps more phenomenologically, by focusing on individual items of experience rather than the way they relate together -- I think the "existence" terminology is a hindrance. We can find a paraphrase for all questions about being, from Aristotle to Husserl. Same point here: What counts is the thing itself, not how we label it.
  • Apustimelogist
    676


    Quine clearly thinks that inscrutability of reference is not a barrier to communication, so I am just curious as to what you think Quine was saying in his ideas, considering that he believes communication is possible in spite of indeterminacy. Or do you think Quine was just completely obtuse or in denial regarding this very simple argument you give?
  • Leontiskos
    3.7k
    Quine clearly thinks that inscrutability of reference is not a barrier to communicationApustimelogist

    Why do you think that?
  • Leontiskos
    3.7k
    The idea of existence as quantification is rather, wherever I have seen it presented, that people come with their ontologies, and we can now examine them in terms of quantification (rather than say entailment) in order to determine what their ontological commitments are—not "all philosophers should accept the same set of universal ontological commitments, which include anything we can possibly speak of (but don't worry about this being too broad because ontological commitments now carry no weight at all)". This makes the whole notion of Quine's approach as a "test" between theories meaningless.Count Timothy von Icarus

    This is a key point in my opinion. If a logical system is to be able to accommodate various different ontologies, which can then be compared to one another, then it cannot have existence- or ontology-commitments. And of course there is an important sense in which Quine's system aspires to have this character, but a system which has this character cannot define existence into its implicit formal semantics. One cannot test two competing theories if one cannot recognize that one of the theories is quantifying over non-existents. And if one cannot test two competing theories then one cannot argue, and if one cannot argue then one cannot do what logic was invented to do.

    More simply, when Quine says that "to be is to be the value of a bound variable," he is not talking about existence, but rather about putative existence. "When you bind a variable you take the referent(s) to exist," not, "When you bind a variable the referent(s) exist(s)."

    Well, at least for Quine there is only one logic (justifying that is another thing.)Count Timothy von Icarus

    Well, the idea is that when Quine runs up against an interlocutor who is quantifying over what Quine holds to not exist, Quine will appeal to the meta-language (instead of running the risk of begging the question by appealing to his own domain). In doing this Quine is inevitably "quantifying over" possibilia in the meta language. That's how you talk to another human being you disagree with, after all.

    Then the deeper point is that whether you appeal to the meta language or an object language (that can handle the disagreement), what you've got to do is give arguments for your position. The only reason Quine would appeal to the meta language is because his object language lacks the resources to adjudicate the dispute. If Quine stuck to his guns and refused to quantify over possibilia then he would not be allowed the move of telling his opponents that entities in their domain do not exist. That is, a logically consistent Quine cannot argue with anyone, because argument involves showing your interlocutor that something they believe to exist, does not.

    In other words:

    ...for what is central to Quine's criterion is that one cannot quantify over entities without incurring ontological commitment to those entities. To use quantifiers to refer to entities while denying that one is ontologically committed is to fail to own up to one's commitments, and thereby engage in a sort of intellectual doublethink. Quantification is the basic mode of reference to objects, and reference to objects is always ontologically committing.Ontological Commitment | SEP

    If one cannot refer to an entity that one is not ontologically committed to, then one cannot engage an interlocutor who believes differently than oneself. The pluralists should be especially wary of such a scheme.

    This sounds like the anti-metaphysical movement redux.Count Timothy von Icarus

    It is, but at least in this case, "They know not what they do."

    ---

    Yes and no. What I would rather is that "existence/being" should be declared meaningless, dead by the thousand cuts of equivocation and ambiguity.J

    Then what are Sider and his opponent disagreeing on when they posit two different ontological structures? Existence is what people argue over, @J. Get rid of 'existence' and you've gotten rid of every possible disagreement. For example, when we disagree over an interpretation of Quine we are disagreeing over the existence of evidence for an interpretation. Then we can go to his texts (which is something we have not at all done in this thread) and adjudicate the question of what exists in those texts. Get rid of existence and you've gotten rid of every disagreement. I don't know that you have the slightest conception of what you are talking about.

    "Now I completely agree that this [Quine's motto] tells us next to nothing. [i.e. it is trivial.] (In particular, it is neutral about some of the uses of "exist" that traditional metaphysics wants to privilege as "real existence" or "what being means" or some such.). But nor should it be controversial."J

    The possibilism debate isn't resolved with a quip. Seriously, go read a paper on the possibilism debate. Inform yourself a bit before you offer an opinion. You don't even seem to understand the stakes or the motivation behind Quine's quip.

    no matter what words we use for our labelsJ

    Clearly you are the one who struggles with metaphysical superglue. No one is fretting over the token e-x-i-s-t-e-n-c-e.

    What it shows is that structure -- which is what we care aboutJ

    "Is what" => <the existing feature>. If we care about the structure of the world, then we care about how the world exists. Structure1 represents one way in which the world exists, and Structure2 represents another way in which the world exists. When you say, "The world's structure is Structure2," you have made an existence claim. You have said, "Structure2 exists as a feature of the world and Structure1 does not." And when you say, "The world's structure is not Structure1," you have quantified over something that is non-existent-but-possible.
  • Leontiskos
    3.7k


    Although I have only skimmed it, I think Klima's, "St. Anselm's Proof," (formal citation) (original chapter) would be an excellent paper for a reading group. It covers most everything we are talking about here (intentional identity, reference, interlocutors' possibilia, Quine, systemic impasse...). It would also be engaging given how interested people are in Anselm's proof.

    Eventually I want to either do a reading group on this, essences, or else universals. Universals would be the most accessible, but any of them would contribute to mitigating the ignorance and prejudice surrounding these topics.
  • Fire Ologist
    775
    This conversation is the heart of philosophy.

    Or the inscrutable meaning of “philosophy.”

    The object of thought here that prompts us to communicate with words such as “essence” and “thing” and “existence” and “universal” and “referent”, to balance carving up the world against the lines the world has despite any carving (if any), all in the context of language and meaning and use and logic itself, as well as phenomenological experience itself - it is my position that we are standing on a precipice in this conversation (with everyone from Heraclitus and Parmenides to Aristotle and Kant and Russell and Wittgenstein and Quine standing next to us) attempting to explain, at once: the ground we stand on, the plateau of ground we walked to get here, the abyss in front of us, we the explainers of these things, and the language we all are subject too (by subjecting ourselves to it) standing here explaining.

    We need to do too much at once to make the smallest move with any validity.

    All philosophers have failed to lock this down in any kind of linear argument that impresses the rest of us.

    So this conversation is difficult.

    And for those coming from opposite sides (perhaps focused on the metaphysical or physical ground, or instead abandoning metaphysics and focused on our language use/meanings/logic, or focused on the abyss that separates all these concepts) this difficult conversation is very difficult. It is difficult for two people who fervently agree with Aristotle to say what a substance, a thing, an essence, knowledge of these and the act of knowing is. It is likely they will face significant disagreement on what is best to say next, or say first.

    I have come to the conclusion that until we figure out a language that allows us to address the physical, metaphysical, ontological, epistemological and logical/linguistic aspects of this topic all at once, interlocutors will forever undercut any ground any philosopher attempts to cover in one of these areas. Epistemological issues will always undercut physics; metaphysics will always undercut ontology or vice versa; linguistics will always undercut metaphysics or vice versa, etc.

    My solution is to rule out any conclusions that shrug off metaphysics - I know what not to say.

    But what can be said?

    I think the best language to speak standing on this precipice is mystical, sort of pre-logical. We both know and don’t know the object of inquiry. This object is both most immediate to us as it is utterly cut off from us. We can speak about it clearly, but never say enough to capture it.

    What is so simple and easy about “there is a tiger and here is not a tiger” is also so deeply complex and puzzling.

    The solution will not be one that saves the complex but ignores the simple, nor one that keeps it simple while ignoring the complex. Each, and both together, must be addressed at once. If there is a tiger.
  • Banno
    26.1k
    Nice summation.

    Quine himself thought very highly of BungeArcane Sandwich
    There views are very, very similar. Quine was also critical of "psychoanalysis, phenomenology, existentialism", and was overtly scientistic.

    DEFINITION 3.30 Let Θ be the set of all things and [Θ] its aggregation. — Bunge (1977: 161)
    There's obvious and well-known problems with the set of all sets, so presumably Bung had a way to deal with this. He says the set of all things, so does he explicitly disallow sets of sets?

    A property P is real = df There is at least one individual x ∈ S, other than the null individual, that possesses P (equivalently: (P) ≠ ∅). — Bunge (1977: 99)
    And here he sensible removes empty sets. Can I point out that this is very close (perhaps identical?) to a set-theoretical version of Quine's "to be is to be the value of a bound variable"?

    ((P) ≠ ∅) ≡ ∃(x) (Px)

    Surely most contemporary philosophers hold that ∃ formalizes both the logical concept "some" and the ontological concept of existence. I shall argue that this is a mistake. Consider the statement "Some sirens are beautiful", which can be symbolized "(∃x)(Sx & Bx)". So far so good. The trouble starts when the formula is read "There are beautiful sirens". The existential interpretation is misleading because it suggests belief in the real existence of sirens, while all we intended to say was "Some of the sirens existing in Greek mythology are beautiful". — Bunge (1977: 155)
    This is excellent. The trouble Bunge draws attention to starts when "Some sirens are beautiful" is treated as a non-empty set; and the conclusion is reached that there are beautiful sirens". A good example for us to work with. And the answer given is much the same as that offered by first-order logic. If our domain is the set of physical things, there are not sirens. But if our domain is Greek myths, we are welcome to say that "There are beautiful sirens", on the condition that we do not thereby expect them to be physical - we won't mee them on the street.

    Bung and Quine have a lot in common.

    (How is "Bunge" pronounced? )
  • Leontiskos
    3.7k
    The trouble starts when "Some sirens are beautiful" is treated as a non-empty set;Banno

    's post anticipates this objection if you continue reading the quotes in sequential order, eventually arriving at:

    (i) x exists conceptually = df For some set C of constructs, ECx;
    (ii) x exists really = df For some set Θ of things, EΘx.
    For example the Pythagorean theorem exists in the sense that it belongs in Euclidean geometry. Surely it did not come into existence before someone in the Pythagorean school invented it. But it has been in conceptual existence, i.e. in geometry, ever since. Not that geometry has an autonomous existence, i.e. that it subsists independently of being thought about. It is just that we make the indispensable pretence that constructs exist provided they belong in some body of ideas - which is a roundabout fashion of saying that constructs exist as long as there are rational beings capable of thinking them up. Surely this mode of existence is neither ideal existence (or existence in the Realm of Ideas) nor real or physical existence. To invert Plato's cave metaphor we may say that ideas are but the shadows of things - and shadows, as is well known, have no autonomous existence.
    — Bunge (1977: 157)

    -

    But if our domain is Greek myths, we are welcome to say that "There are beautiful sirens"Banno

    If we want to depart from Quine then we are welcome to say that. And we should depart from Quine, so I agree that we are welcome to say that.

    One could retort that in "quantifying over" myth-concepts we are rightly committing to their existence, but for Quine there are no existing myth-concepts, and therefore it is incorrect to "quantify over" them. The disagreement itself is a substantial existence-dispute over the existence of myth-concepts like Pegasus, and if one cannot "quantify over" myth-concepts then one cannot have the disagreement over their existence.
  • Banno
    26.1k
    ...this objection...Leontiskos
    It wasn't an objection. Minutes after I posted I re-wrote that as:
    The trouble Bunge draws attention to starts when...Banno
    I am agreeing with what Bunge says here, becasue it seems to me to be much the same as what Quine says, but in set-theoretical language. That would explain why Quine was so impressed.
  • Leontiskos
    3.7k
    becasue it seems to me to be much the same as what Quine says, but in set-theoretical languageBanno

    Then I'm not sure you appreciate what a living, breathing position opposed to Quine's would look like. If that is right then it makes sense that you couldn't conceive of anyone objecting to Quine.

    Bunge offers an existence predicate where Quine refuses the very idea of an existence predicate. That's the central difference with regard to the issue we have been discussing.

    And here he sensible removes empty sets. Can I point out that this is very close (perhaps identical?) to a set-theoretical version of Quine's "to be is to be the value of a bound variable"?

    ((P) ≠ ∅) ≡ ∃(x) (Px)
    Banno

    If we want to compare Quine and Bunge on existence, shouldn't we compare what Quine says on existence to what Bunge says on existence? You are comparing what Bunge says on the reality of a property to what Quine says on the the existence of individuals. That seems misdirected.

    But even here, Bunge says that a property is real when there is at least one individual that possesses it; whereas Quine says that quantification brings with it ontological commitment (which Bunge in fact explicitly rejects).

    Still, what to think about your "removal of empty sets"? Note that for Quine an empty domain is disallowed simpliciter. There is no formal stricture because there is no existence predicate that would need to incorporate it. Contrariwise, Bunge is giving a definition of a property's being real. For any property, if there is at least one individual that possess it, then it is real, and if there is not at least one individual possessing it, then it is not real. So even if we compare properties to individuals and "real" to "exists," even then there remains the fundamental difference, namely that Bunge provides for himself the ability to say, "Property P is not real," whereas Quine refuses to provide for himself the ability to say, "X does not exist."

    (The standard move of appealing to the empty set in order to characterize existence is precisely what Quine objected to, because that appeal inevitably presupposes some kind of existence predication.)

    And the answer given is much the same as that offered by first-order logic.Banno

    If this is true, then it's only because first-order logic has abandoned Quine's understanding of quantification. For Quine nothing "Pegasizes."

    (Hopefully @Arcane Sandwich will clarify the issue as well as any mistakes I've made.)
  • Apustimelogist
    676


    That just seems to be implied when you read him or about him. We generally don't have huge problems communicating either, so it would be strange for him to uphold this inscrutability if he thought it affected our abilities to communicate.

    From Word and Object, page 26, he says:

    Two men could be just alike in all their dispositions to verbal behavior under all possible sensory stimulations, and yet the meanings or ideas expressed in their identically triggered and identically sounded utterances could diverge radically, for the two men, in a wide range of classes

    If all of their dispositions to verbal behavior under all possible sensory stimulations were the same, then what would happen if they started talking to each other? If you looked at their behavior, surely it would just look like they understood each other perfectly well despite the possibility of different meanings. Because, if they have identical dispositions, then the behaviors each one expects of the other based on their own dispositions would be fulfilled in general. It would be quite difficult for them to misunderstand each other since I think misunderstanding generally happens when people use words in ways you don't expect, or you have no experience (and therefore [no] expectations [or ability to predict]) of how certain words should be used. Its hard to envision that in the example passage assuming that each man is cognizant of their own dispositions for using words.

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