The reason for the fable is we are misled by being able to refer in our language into thinking that there is some fixed reference. — Moliere
A fact is a set of true sentences. — Moliere
So when I say Truman is dead that is a true sentence about Truman. That Truman is dead, however, does not affix the reference of "Truman" -- nor do any other true sentences. — Moliere
You ever read about feral and dramatically maltreated children? — Moliere
My solution is that if I check in with you and ask "Oh, do you mean this Truman or that Truman" we can refer in a given conversation, rather than that "Truman" always refers to Truman because of this or that theory of reference. — Moliere
Okay, so now you are saying that reference is inscrutable even to fellow language-speakers. Or more precisely, that there are no fixed referents amongst fellow language-speakers.
But that doesn't seem right. If you and I are sitting in a room together there will be any number of fixed referents available, e.g. "table," "chair," "dog," "television," "photograph," etc. So how does that work? Do you mean something very specialized by "fixed reference"? — Leontiskos
"Moliere understands 'chair' to signify <chair-concept>."
"Leontiskos understands 'chair' to signify <chair-concept>."
"Therefore, Moliere and Leontiskos understand 'chair' to refer to the same kind of object." — Leontiskos
Those are three propositions, and if they are a set of three true sentences then on your view they would be called a "fact." If this is a fact, then it looks like there are facts of the matter with respect to reference.
Right: the (conventional) association between Truman and 'Truman' is already "affixed" before the true sentence is uttered. If it were not then the true sentence would not be true. — Leontiskos
I think what you and some others are trying to say is this: "Reference cannot be fully and exhaustively explained." I would say that it depends what tools we have to hand and what we mean by "fully and exhaustively explained." — Leontiskos
reference is a social act whereby we make a judgment call that could be wrong, some of the time — Moliere
I'm not convinced that <chair-concept> is the object being referred to in using 'chair' -- I'd say that it's the chair being referred to, rather than the <chair-concept> — Moliere
But that there's a fact to the matter doesn't affix the reference, is what I'm contending. — Moliere
It's just not a metaphysical or ontological connection -- only a collective effort, or social dance. — Moliere
If you and I are sitting in an empty room with a dog, and I say, "The dog," there is a fixed referent. You know exactly what I am referring to. — Leontiskos
"Moliere understands 'chair' to signify <chair-concept>."
"Leontiskos understands 'chair' to signify <chair-concept>."
"Therefore, Moliere and Leontiskos understand 'chair' to refer to the same kind of object." — Leontiskos
Perhaps your landlord? — Banno
And in that I would hope we can still use the concept of reference but in this context of fuzzyness, indeterminacy, vagueness. Reference isn't about look-up table or translation manual in your head. — Apustimelogist
I will say that Moliere and I are referring to the same thing with 'chair' or 'rabbit'. — Leontiskos
Someone else will come along and tell me that there is a 0.1% chance that we might disagree on what is a chair or a rabbit. And then we can argue about whether that 0.1% chance secures some particular thesis of "inscrutability of reference." — Leontiskos
Yep.The consequence of the indeterminacy I think is not that we may sometimes disagree but that there is nothing intrinsic to words. — Apustimelogist
Though supposing we were in this room and there were three dogs — Moliere
"There are no fixed referents," vs, "We could be wrong some of the time." Do you see how the latter does not justify the former? — Leontiskos
Presumably we all agree that words signify by convention ("nomina significant ad placitum").
So then a token like J-o-h-n will be indeterminate if there is more than one person named John (or if our interlocutor knows more than one person named John).
If that is all that is meant by inscrutability of reference then it strikes me as trivial. — Leontiskos
But you've changed the scenario. There is one dog, not three. — Leontiskos
The consequence of the indeterminacy I think is not that we may sometimes disagree but that there is nothing intrinsic to words
What I take from this is that it doesn't need to be one or the other, verbal communication can contain information about and reference both things and the speaker's intentions about things. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But if the alignment of determinate intentions is possible, then I think there is a strong sense in which reference must be. — Count Timothy von Icarus
To even make the inscrutability argument, one has to assume that determinate intentions exist, so that one is given, but then it obviously seems possible to communicate them as well. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Hell, even poorly trained dogs can communicate well enough to direct our attention to what they view as a threat. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The three dogs are you, me, and the pooch. — Moliere
I'd call you a sly dog in order to demonstrate that "dog"'s referrent isn't fixed by convention — Moliere
Right: the (conventional) association between Truman and 'Truman' is already "affixed" before the true sentence is uttered. — Leontiskos
but it's not like conventions make reference factual — Moliere
Does "pooch" refer to the three of us equally? Do you see how if I adopt your methodology we will be unable to communicate? — Leontiskos
I think this gets at a few things. One is Aristotle's idea that we must use universals to have the possibility of our claims being false. If we just predicate unique terms of unique things, terms that only apply to those things, we can never be wrong. Second, language and reference must always be more general and less determinate than perception to be useful. — Count Timothy von Icarus
What this doesn't rely upon is a fact about what we are referring to, or whether or not "dog", or any other sign, has some pre-assigned meaning wrapped up in it.
The focus on convention is because we live in a society which prizes being able to say who does something better than another person, and with language that indicates the need for standards to judge others' in order to give a grade.
Perhaps personal identity outlasts biological life? After terrorist attacks we still speak of dead Christians, dead communists, etc. One can still refer to "George Washington" or to "medieval Muslims," yet surely they are not still around. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I'm not so sure we must have universals for a claim to be false. If Truman's hair were black then "Truman's hair is blonde" would be false, for instance, even though we're only talking about that Truman right there and not any other Truman.
I'm not sure I'd separate language from perception, either. Seems to me that language has too much of an effect on perception to think that language even could be more general than perception
"Blonde" and "black" are universals. If either we're unique terms that are only predicable of Truman's hair then they certainly couldn't fail to apply. — Count Timothy von Icarus
However, if reference wasn't fixed by convention at all there would be no need for languages in the first place. The sound of "dog" could be arbitrarily assigned to some referent in each instance. — Count Timothy von Icarus
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