Well, finitism doesn't automatically reject set theory. Arguing in terms of 'isms' will not get us as far as setting out the detail. some might see ZFC or other set theories from a finitist perspective, treating infinite sets as symbolic devices or potentialities, without committing to their actual existence. Finitism rejects the Platonist reading of infinite sets, but I think I've shown that there is at least one alternative. — Banno
Well, again, that needs some finesse: — Banno
This is well worth working through, as well as was he right? — Banno
W. didn't reject set theory - indeed, he uses it in his writing. What he rejected was both the platonic and psychological interpretations of set theory, — Banno
I agree. Wittgenstein understood set theory is platonism — Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, because the student doesn't understand basic math. If resistance is infinite then you can't tell what voltage is being applied - unless, of course, you have another piece of information available, such as a place on the diagram where it clearly tells you what it is! — SophistiCat
Can you set this out clearly, so we can see what you are claiming? — Banno
When we say, e.g., that “there are an infinite number of even numbers” we mean that we have a mathematical technique or rule for generating even numbers which is limitless, which is markedly different from a limited technique or rule for generating a finite number of numbers, such as 1–100,000,000. “We learn an endless technique,” says Wittgenstein (RFM V, §19), “but what is in question here is not some gigantic extension.” — SEP
A second strong indication that the later Wittgenstein maintains his finitism is his continued and consistent treatment of ‘propositions’ of the type “There are three consecutive 7s in the decimal expansion of π” (hereafter ‘PIC’).[4] In the middle period, PIC (and its putative negation, ¬PIC, namely, “It is not the case that there are three consecutive 7s in the decimal expansion of π”) is not a meaningful mathematical “statement at all” (WVC 81–82: Footnote #1). On Wittgenstein's intermediate view, PIC—like FLT, GC, and the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra—is not a mathematical proposition because we do not have in hand an applicable decision procedure by which we can decide it in a particular calculus. For this reason, we can only meaningfully state finitistic propositions regarding the expansion of π, such as “There exist three consecutive 7s in the first 10,000 places of the expansion of π” (WVC 71; 81–82, Footnote #1). — SEP
What has not been shown is that something goes wrong, concretely, in classical practice if sequences are treated as completed totalities. — Banno
Philosophy of mathematics as an academic subject is certainly alive and well, practiced by those familiar with foundations and at least something of the branches of math. — jgill
I feel your pain, but it is the result of applying a philosophical approach to mathematics. Philosophers love to dwell in the past and compare one master with another, one ancient idea with another. Mathematics is a social agreement and looks forward, not backward. I've taught engineering calculus, although its been quite a while ago, and the notion of the convergence of, say a power series, is fundamental. An analytic function is defined by convergent power series. — jgill
You're mostly just playing sillybuggers as it stands. — Banno
Why? As in, where does it fit? — Banno
You're aware that the issues of the century before last were solved using an axiomatisation of the continuum - along the lines started earlier in this thread - and then nonstandard analysis showed they weren't such a problem, anyway...?
So...? — Banno
If representation is just the function of neural states, your philosophical view stops being indirect and becomes more of scientific direct realism. — Richard B
And you suppose that to be an end to it? — Banno
The history of mathematics is a worthy subject in itself, but that is not the topic here. — SophistiCat
But the point I made is that "point particle" is a conception of convenience, designed for the purpose of representing interactions. It does not represent how the electron is actually conceived as existing. The electron is modeled as a "point particle", but it does not exist that way, the probability cloud is a better representation (though still very inadequate) of how electrons exist. — Metaphysician Undercover
But an electron is conceived as a point.
— frank
I don't think so — Metaphysician Undercover
Ok. Details? — Banno
It's also an answer to this, I think. — Srap Tasmaner
Tell me where I’m wrong if you can. — Banno
When the values successively attributed to the same variable approach indefinitely a fixed value, eventually differing from it by as little as one could wish, that fixed value is called the limit of all the others. — Cauchy
Wait, what? — AmadeusD
That is to say, none of this discussion is responsive to the metaphysical question of what the fundamental constitution of reality is. As in, what is the apple in the noumena? — Hanover
For a convergent series the sum is defined as the limit. There is no residual “infinitely small difference” between the sum and the limit. The sum is the limit. Partial sums are less than the limit, but their difference goes to zero in the standard real number system. — Banno
