And so "there are unwritten true equations" is true in the non-platonic sense that someone could write a true equation that doesn't exist in the present, — Michael

But are you denying that it's already true?

The only tenable attitude toward quantifiers and other notations of modern logic is to construe them always, in all contexts, as timeless. — Quine: Mr Strawson

I don't think you're bothering to look very deeply into this. I was just saying you should look into the consequences so you don't end up contradicting yourself.

But are you denying that it's already true? — bongo fury

I’ve been over this so many times.

The word “it” in the phrase “is it true?” refers to either an utterance or an utterance-dependent proposition, and so asking if an utterance or proposition is true before it is uttered is a nonsensical question, like asking if a painting is accurate before it is painted.

I don't think you're bothering to look very deeply into this. — frank

I think I’m looking into it only as deeply as it needs to be. Platonism is a result of being bewitched by language, misinterpreting the grammar as entailing something it doesn’t.

Surely Quine suggests we refer timelessly (non-modally) to the sentence inscribed or uttered in a future region of space-time? And we describe it (rightly by your hypothesis) as true? Is that non-sensical?

I think I’m looking into it only as deeply as it needs to be. Platonism is a result of being bewitched by language, misinterpreting the grammar as entailing something it doesn’t. — Michael

You're basically saying Quine was an idiot.

You're basically saying Quine was an idiot. — frank

No, I'm saying he's wrong, just as every other conceptualist and immanent realist and nominalists says.

Surely Quine suggests we refer timelessly (non-modally) to the sentence inscribed or uttered in a future region of space-time? And we describe it (rightly by your hypothesis) as true? Is that non-sensical? — bongo fury

Yes. I think that Wittgenstein provides a much more sensible approach to language. There's no mystical connection between utterances and mind-independent, non-spatial, non-temportal abstract objects; there's just actual language-use and the resulting psychological and behavioural responses.

There's no mystical connection between utterances and mind-independent, non-spatial, non-temportal abstract objects;. — Michael

Where (on earth) do you find that Quine accepts that kind of mystical connection?

In his supposing some future inscription to exemplify the word "true"?

Or where?

There's no mystical connection between utterances and mind-independent, non-spatial, non-temportal abstract objects; there's just actual language-use and the resulting psychological and behavioural responses. — Michael

Yeah, Quine is the inscrutability of reference guy, in the neighborhood of behaviorism.

Indeed!

The word “it” in the phrase “is it true?” refers to either an utterance or an utterance-dependent proposition, and so asking if an utterance or proposition is true before it is uttered is a nonsensical question, like asking if a painting is accurate before it is painted. — Michael

The word “it” in “Is it accurate?” in reference to a painting must, on this argument, refer to either a particular painting (“utterance”) or some other possible pictorialization of the “same thing” (p) that is “pictorialization-dependent”. Are you sure this makes sense as an analogy? I think the difference lies in the fact that utterances can have propositional content whereas paintings cannot. What we refer to, in the case of a possible utterance, is the propositional content. Thus, “utterance- (or pictorialization-) dependent” has two different meanings or implications, in the two cases. This makes the analogy appear more persuasive than it is.

utterances can have propositional content whereas paintings cannot. — J

If utterances can have propositional content (whatever that means) then surely pictures can have pictorial content?

So with paintings there is the landscape being painted and the painting. We say that the painting is accurate if it resembles the landscape being painted and inaccurate if it doesn't.

With language there is the landscape being described and the utterance. We say that the utterance is true if its propositional content "resembles" (for want of a better word) the landscape being described and false if it doesn't.

But according to platonists, in most situations there is the landscape being described, the propositional content, but no utterance, and that this propositional content is true if it "resembles" the landscape being described and false if it doesn't.

I don't think the notion that there is false propositional content without an utterance makes any sense, and so I also don't think the notion that there is true propositional content without an utterance makes any sense.

Even if we want to distinguish an utterance from its propositional content, an utterance is required for there to be propositional content. Propositional content, whether true or false, doesn't "exist" as some mind-independent abstract entity that somehow becomes the propositional content of a particular utterance.

So when you ask if the propositional content of an utterance was true before the utterance was made, I literally don't understand you. The propositional content only "came into being" when a meaningful utterance was uttered, which is just to say that we understand an utterance (e.g. conceptualism), and which is perhaps best explained by Wittgenstein.

FYI, @bongo fury and @frank

Quine

Quine does not accept the existence of any abstract objects apart from sets. His ontology thus excludes other alleged abstracta, such as properties, propositions (as distinct from sentences), and merely possible entities.

We know.

But the point about predicating truth of future utterances now?

It's not clear what you're asking.

Are you asking me if the sentence "we will say true things in the future" is true?

The indispensability argument is about mathematical realism. I just wanted you to look at what Quine was saying, which is that if you deny platonism of any kind, you're rejecting science in general. You can do that, I was just encouraging you to be aware that you're doing that.

which is that if you deny platonism of any kind, you're rejecting science in general — frank

You don't need to believe in mind-independent abstract objects to believe in mind-independent physical objects, and you don't need to believe in mind-independent abstract objects to believe that these mind-independent physical objects move and interact with one another.

You don't need to believe in mind-independent abstract objects to believe in mind-independent physical objects, and you don't need to believe in mind-independent abstract objects to believe that these mind-independent physical objects move and interact with one another. — Michael

Yes. Neither of these sentences has anything to do with Quine's argument, which has shaped the prevailing view in phil of math and phil of science. Just check it out, that's all I'm saying.

I think we can recognize precision and explicitness as thresholds that are negotiated, without idealizing them into unreachable and thus useless perfection. We say enough to be understood, counting on the audience to fill in as much as they need to to get it, and even that can be negotiated.

But that just kills off an unrealistic picture of how conversation works. Even if your speech doesn't have to carry the burden of truth entirely on its own, it has to do its part.

I keep finding myself thinking that the great value of saying something true to someone else is helping them see it ― like when you point out to someone that a photo of the faculty of your department has no women in it. And it's not just a matter of your words being understood and even credited; if I lie to you convincingly, my words hide the world from you, obstruct and undermine your relationship with it, divert your attention into a shadowy fantasy land. But when I tell you the truth, and you see it, my words fall away. — Srap Tasmaner

:100: :up:

You're referring to this argument?

(P1) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only the entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
(P2) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
(C) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities.

Firstly, "having ontological commitment to mathematical entities" does not entail platonism. Immanent realists and conceptualists also have ontological commitment to mathematical entities.

Secondly, P2 appears to presuppose that nominalism is false. The nominalist might agree that mathematics is indispensable to our scientific theories but won't agree that mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories, because they believe that no mathematical entities exist.

We say that the utterance is true if its propositional content "resembles" (for want of a better word) the landscape being described and false if it doesn't. — Michael

This helps point out the question I was asking. It's the matter of resemblance. I understand you're using that word because there isn't a more perfect one, and you're not claiming some literal resemblance between propositional content and a landscape. But that's the rub. We know what we mean when we say that the picture resembles the landscape, but the whole debate about propositions, utterances, and truth can only occur because we don't know what this resemblance is supposed to consist of, precisely. That's why I'm dubious about picture analogies -- they confer "borrowed certainty," if you will.

Even if we want to distinguish an utterance from its propositional content, an utterance is required for there to be propositional content. Propositional content, whether true or false, doesn't "exist" as some mind-independent abstract entity that somehow becomes the propositional content of a particular utterance. — Michael

Agreed, prop. content doesn't exist as a mind-independent entity. But I think we should be careful in saying that "an utterance" is required. Does my thought of p qualify as an utterance? It's tempting to say that I am simply thinking p, the prop. content itself -- utterance-free.

But I think we should be careful in saying that "an utterance" is required. — J

I mentioned elsewhere that terms like "utterance" are being used as a catch-all for speech, writing, signing, believing, thinking, etc.

Some linguistic activity by a suitably intelligent mind is required for there to be propositional content, and so for there to be a true proposition, and so for there to be a truth.

Firstly, "having ontological commitment to mathematical entities" does not entail platonism. Immanent realists and conceptualists also have ontological commitment to mathematical entities. — Michael

I wouldn't say accepting mathematical entities entails platonism. I would say that platonism best reflects the way we generally think about things like the set of natural numbers N.

An immanent realist is stuck saying that N is a property of something in the world. I don't think anybody knows what exactly that object is, which has N as a property, but the immanent realist is asserting its existence anyway. Immanent realism is more of a gesture toward avoiding platonism rather than a full bodied alternative.

The conceptualist is saying that numbers are mental objects, which means their only existence is in specific acts of thinking about numbers. Do I really need to explain why nobody believes this?

Instead of those, look at the SEP article on philosophy of math. It shows the alternatives to platonism are logicism, intuitionism, formalism, and predicativism.

Do you want to go through those?

I would say that platonism best reflects the way we generally think about things like the set of natural numbers N. — frank

That doesn't make it true. As I said earlier, it's us being uncritically bewitched by grammar into thinking that a sentence such are "there are numbers" is saying something it's not.

Instead of those, look at the SEP article on philosophy of math. It shows the alternatives to platonism are logicism, intuitionism, formalism, and predicativism.

Do you want to go through those? — frank

No, because it's not relevant to what I am arguing, which concerns whether or not there are mind-independent true propositions. Whether these propositions are about mathematics or physics makes no difference. To repeat what I said above:

Some linguistic activity by a suitably intelligent mind is required for there to be propositional content, and so for there to be a true proposition, and so for there to be a truth.

This is all I am arguing.

Okey dokey. :cool:

Seems, from my perspective, that part of Michael's idiosyncratic views is the idea that the word "truth" cannot be about something in the same way that a word like "gold" is about something. To me, "truth" is about "what is the case", regardless of your broader metaphysics, ontologies or inclinations toward realism or anti-realism. The same way "gold" is about something regardless of metaphysics, ontologies or inclinations toward realism or anti-realism. "Truth" is an abstract word, but so is "gold" and every other word we use to refer or point out things. No concepts come without abstraction. Nothing we talk about is completely devoid of abstract conceptual baggage that makes it meaningful. If a concept like a "proposition" requires some kind of mind-independent abstract ontology, I don't see why that isn't the case for concepts like "rock". Sure, it's harder to point at a "proposition" but our uses of a word "proposition" is induced by statistical structures of events that actually happen or we at least experience; no doubt, from reflecting upon our own word-use inextricably related to non-word events. Similarly can be said for "economies" or "money". From a neuroscientific or cognitive perspective do these concepts need mind-independent abstract objects to explain their use? No, ofcourse not. Is the use of these concepts that much different from pointing out rocks or chairs? No. Fundamentally both reflect our cognitive and neurobiological ability to pick out statistical structures in the world, in our sensory inputs, in our experiences; some are just much more complicated than others.

The use of words like "truth" or "propositions" or "numbers" as about things in the same sense as "gold" is about things is absolutely coherent imo. Abstraction is by degree, without a determinate or discrete dividing line.

And again, this is just the story of how we use words in relation to the world, and navigate the world - veridically or not, whether or not there are big caveats like: indeterminacy; underdetermination; inherent fuzzyness; perspectival aspects or even isolation due to our biology; vicious or strange circularities in our ability to articulate information about the world, etc. Nothing, "concrete" or "abstract" is exempt. We can have a Quinean jungle where "gavagai" is fundamentally indeterminate and we practise linguistic and epistemic behaviors "blindly", but the scientific story about what is going on is a story about brains bi-directionally interacting with the wider world, responding to it and the world responding back. You can argue about what exactly it means for words to be about something or whether their effectiveness requires or even is "veridicality" - or simply pragmatism by blind Darwin-esque selectionism. I would say this is fundamentally indeterminate - you can plausibly gerrymander or redefine either side in various different ways and the differences may be ones of degree - and all words, all concepts, share a core of this fundamental indeterminacy, fuzzyness, abstraction in the same sense when they are used and related to - or occur in relation to - other parts of experience, including the word about itself ( a word that seems to be about or related to the mappings we make that pick things out in experience). But again, at the same time they all played out in this bi-directional interaction between brains - and the underlying states that cause their dynamics - and what brains cannot see beyond their sensory inputs. At least, that is what makes sense in the idealized scientific story. There must be some statistical coupling in some sense (not excluding the general messyness that might come with talking about it: e.g. indeterminacy, fuzzyness, pluralistic models) to what you might call "events" or "things" in the objective world, regardless of deeper examinations about what that "objectivity" actually means, cannot mean or simply alludes to (also statistical coupling between events in ones own brain). And statistical coupling can be scale-free, with many levels of abstraction. Coupling doesn't have to be unique in some sense either.

[Or maybe our seemings about statistical couplings. Models we want to assert in terms of seeming pragmatic effectiveness. And that could be wrong. But what do we mean when they assert they are true? ... Not strictly determinate.]

So there is at least a fuzzy aboutness; we may debate about veridicality, etc. But nonetheless we can also agree amongst ourselves about the aboutness of words and concepts in a practical sense as we sample the world in real-time.

Part of the paradox is that trivial and non-trivial indeterminacies coexists with a sense in which our lives cannot be made coherent without a world that is actually out there. Another part is that there are no inherent foundations; there is no ultimate story that all others sit on infallibly, just as the scientific one isn't infallible - you can just argue about its virtues based on what people agree or disagree about. But then its our nature as epistemic beings to have stories to make the world we live in coherent, stories that seem to acceptably reflect or communicate what we see.

And I think we can coherently distinguish talk about "truth" and how we coherently use the word, from "meta-truth" - questioning whether that has some objective meaning, analyzing and deconstructing it where the illusions of essentialism are removed. In the same sense you can debate about how to use a certain word in everyday life and then question whether what it actually means for that word to have meaning. Similar to how in ethics, you can have a moral anti-realist say "murder is bad" and really means it, but then you can separate this from the meta-ethical stance of deconstructing "murder is bad" in a kind of anti-realist sense in terms of indeterminacy or other things. You can say the same for the realist though; their claims that "murder is bad" is also different from their claim that "murder is objectively bad" because ethics and meta-ethics are two different topics talking about normative statements in different ways or frameworks, different levels of abstraction or analysis, different assumptions that are added or forgotten. But again, for me, all concepts stand on a similar foundation, whether truth, everyday words, science, ethics, normativity, belief or justification.

Are you arguing for mathematical platonism, or are you arguing for a non-platonic interpretation of "there are an infinite number of true additions and false additions that we could write out"? — Michael

Neither.

So please clarify your position on this. Is it sensible to write out red and blue mathematical equations inside the World B circle? — Michael

One of your mistakes here is to think that one can only write in the circles.

Given that the crux of the recent debate is over whether or not there are truths (true propositions) without minds, it's an appropriate juxtaposition.

If there are truths without minds then propositions are mind-independent (platonism).
If propositions are mind-dependent (conceptualism) then there are no truths without minds. — Michael

I've been attempting to show you how this misconstrues the issues it attempts to address. That hasn't worked.

There are abstractions. These are constructed by us, doing things using words. The are not the mysterious Platonic forms you fear, but ways of doing stuff with words and with things.

In what I've quoted you suppose that propositions much either be mind-dependent or not mind-dependent. That's like insisting that you have either stoped beating your wife or you have not stoped beating your wife.

Propositions bridge, or rather, transcend or supersede, the supposed gap between world and word. That gap is a figment of philosophy done wrong, a result of cartesian dualism, a mistake. Your repeated unconsidered use of the picture metaphor reinforces this error.

In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but reestablish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false. — Davidson

Going back to where this line started, there is gold in the hills of Boorara. If all life disappeared from the world, but everything else stayed the same, there would still be gold in the hills of Boorara, but no one around to say so. There is gold in those hills. "There is gold in those hills" is true. "There is gold in those hills" is true even if there is no one around to say "There is gold in those hills".

There are abstractions. These are constructed by us, doing things using words. — Banno

And this is where you're not making sense.

You say that propositions are constructed by us doing things using words but then say that there are true propositions even if we're not doing things using words. Make up your mind.