Matter is not what we experience. Rather, matter is our explanation of what we experience. — Art48
When we see a tree, we experience visual sensations. These visual sensations are experiences of a tree. — hypericin
The point of the original post is we can be 100% certain of the sensations we experience but we can not be 100% certain of the cause of the sensations. — Art48
The point of the original post is we can be 100% certain of the sensations we experience but we can not be 100% certain of the cause of the sensations. — Art48
We do not directly experience matter. Matter might be the cause of our sensations, but we don't know that it is. We know we experience sensations. Matter is one explanation for the cause of those sensations. Other explanations of what we experience include Descartes' Evil Demon, Brain in a Vat (the thought underlying the movie The Matrix), the Simulation Hypothesis, and Hard Solipsism. Didn't Kant make the point that we experience phenomena but cannot know the noumena, the cause of the phenomena?Your original claim was that we experience sensations, not matter. — hypericin
We experience only sensations: physical sensations, emotional sensations, and mental sensations. — Art48
Matter is a very good explanation of what we experience.
Newtonian Mechanics is a very good explanation of what we experience.
Newtonian Mechanics is not true. Perhaps, the matter explanation is also not true.
Thoughts? — Art48
We see and hear what we believe is occurring on, say, a loading dock. But we are not allowed to leave the monitoring room, so we have no way of verifying the sights and sounds are coming from an actual, real, existing loading dock. — Art48
The point of the original post is we can be 100% certain of the sensations we experience — Art48
So, in addition to the senses of sight, sound, touch, taste and smell, we have other senses?To say that we only experience sensations is plainly false. The cat is not a sensation. — jkop
Exactly.If matter is not what the mind directly experiences then it is something else, let's call it X. X has to exist objectively though otherwise the experiencing is not possible. X however has properties that cause our experiences to have features, so-called Qualia. — MoK
This is a good point which shows the inadequacy of monitoring room analogy. See first response above about cat-sensing sense. My senses tell me I'm picking up a cat, petting it, etc. but everything I experience still all sensation, is it not? Cannot someone who is a brain in a vat or hallucinating, have the sensor experience of doing experiments and experiencing the results?This is why we do scientific experiments. We poke and prod the thing and see how it responds. But this raises the following question. If it is true that "we are not allowed to leave the monitoring room", then what gives us the capacity to poke and prod the thing? — Metaphysician Undercover
This is a good point which shows the inadequacy of monitoring room analogy. See first response above about cat-sensing sense. My senses tell me I'm picking up a cat, petting it, etc. but everything I experience still all sensation, is it not? Cannot someone who is a brain in a vat or hallucinating, have the sensor experience of doing experiments and experiencing the results? — Art48
Unfettered skepticism that leads to questioning how, or even if, we experience an external world would create all sorts of problems for the brain in a vat idea. Brains and vats are material objects that are experienced, so if you're questioning the reality of your experience then that would include the ontological existence of brains and vats. It makes no sense to question the existence of the material world using a thought experiment involving material objects. By invoking the idea of the existence of the material objects of brains and vats, you're automatically implying that material objects exist and we can perceive them as they are - as brains and vats.The "brain in a vat", or other explanations appear like alternative explanations, but they all involve problems. — Metaphysician Undercover
A material cat may exist which is causes us to experience the bundle of sensations which we call a cat. — Art48
Didn't Kant make the point that we experience phenomena but cannot know the noumena, the cause of the phenomena? — Art48
Unfettered skepticism that leads to questioning how, or even if, we experience an external world would create all sorts of problems for the brain in a vat idea. Brains and vats are material objects that are experienced, so if you're questioning the reality of your experience then that would include the ontological existence of brains and vats. It makes no sense to question the existence of the material world using a thought experiment involving material objects. By invoking the idea of the existence of the material objects of brains and vats, you're automatically implying that material objects exist and we can perceive them as they are - as brains and vats. — Harry Hindu
Matter is not what we experience. Rather, matter is our explanation of what we experience.
We experience only sensations: physical sensations, emotional sensations, and mental sensations.
Other explanations of experience include Descartes' Evil Demon, hard solipsism, brain in a vat, etc.
Matter is a very good explanation of what we experience.
Newtonian Mechanics is a very good explanation of what we experience.
Newtonian Mechanics is not true. Perhaps, the matter explanation is also not true.
Thoughts? — Art48
It only seems to question whether we can trust our senses in a material world of brains in vats. The thought experiment still implies that brains requires sensory input from outside of itself. The brain in a vat needs to receive input through its sensory interfaces and would still be connect to the outside world in some way.That's true, but I think the issue of skepticism is better represented as questioning whether things are as they seem to be. The conception of "matter" involves specific spatiotemporal references in relation to our perceptions. The "brain in a vat" scenario is just an example of how reality could be radically different from the way that we perceive it. So the example serves its purpose regardless of whether we conceive the "brain in a vat" as material, it still demonstrates that this entire conception of "material world", along with the brain in a vat aspect, could be completely wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.