• Leontiskos
    3.8k
    He is specifically advocating not becoming involved in the sort of discussion now occurring here, that the parties 'should not seek sheer “winning” in a debate'.Banno

    Rather, Klima thinks debating and argument is crucially important, particularly with respect to fine and concrete points. This is what we are doing right now.

    Eristic is always a problem, but if you look at your early posts in this thread I think you will find no other posts exhibiting more eristic than those. One of them does nothing more than accuse Klima's argument of being "ugly."

    Without taking some time to wrestle with Anselm's proof one has no sense of the problems and intricacies involved. We have a whole forum of threads full of 30,000 foot pontifications, typed out in a Twitter-esque flurry of keyboard strokes. Let's do something different in this thread. Besides, the "free for all" will come in due time. Is working through a paper really such an undue burden? Do we always have to take a position on a paper before we read it carefully?

    (This thread is also meant to have a low barrier to entry, in the sense that right now anyone could read a handful of pages and jump into the thread. They don't have to read a book or know a whole tradition before contributing meaningfully. They don't even have to read an entire article. That low barrier to entry is crucially important if different traditions are going to engage each other rather than merely talk past one another.)
  • Banno
    26.2k
    Similarly Banno offers the following, a worthy candidate:Leontiskos

    But Leon, this is not a candidate for the greatest number. That's the point. It's the first (defined by "min") of a whole new sequence of numbers greater than any natural number.

    Similarly, no sooner do you think of a being greater than any other, than you can think of a being greater than that individual. The series need have no end.

    The ampliation is found in this:
    As he says: “what if someone were to say that there is something greater than everything there is [...] and [that] something greater than it, although does not exist, can still be thought of?” Evidently, we can think of something greater than the thing greater than everything, unless the thing that is greater than everything is the same as that than which nothing greater can be thought of. But Anselm’s point here is precisely that although, of course, there is nothing greater than the thing greater than everything, which is supposed to exist, something greater than what is greater than everything still can be thought of,if the thing greater than everything is not the same as that than which nothing greater can be thought of. So if the thing greater than everything is not the same as that than which nothing greater can be thought of, then something greater still can be thought of; therefore, that than which nothing greater can be thought of can be thought of, even if it is not supposed to exist.

    See the bolded bit? Notice that in the definition of the lowest transfinite number, ω is defined as an ordinal using natural numbers? That's an example of ampliation, where we use natural numbers to reach beyond themselves. That's what Klima wants to do with Anselm, to get beyond being. He seems to see this but does not reflect it in his definition of god, g:=ix¬(∃y)M(y,x), were M is "... can be thought to be greater than...". He defines god as the greatest thing that can be thought of, and there is no guarantee that there is any such thing.

    g:=ix¬(∃y)M(y,x) does not work becasue there might simply always be some y such that y is greater than x.

    Now he may well address this at some point, and we may find it as we work through the paper, but since this is the fourth or fifth time I have made this point, and you still resist it, refusing to see what is before you, I'm thinking it will not be worth my continuing with this discussion.

    Your animosity towards me leads you to simply gainsay my every point. See where you deny something that Klima says quite explicitly and which I quoted.

    And you misrepresent my saying that the parsing of his argument, the formatting, was ugly as my saying that the argument was ugly.

    Is it worth my while to be here? Do you want an honest criticism, or are you only after comments by those who agree with you?

    I suggest you do some reflection on why you put this thread here in the first place, and get back to us.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    That's an example of ampliation, where we use natural numbers to reach beyond themselves.Banno

    What is your idea here? Is it that ampliation has to do with "reaching beyond themselves," and so that if something is reaching beyond it is ampliating? I am not following why you think this is ampliation.

    He defines god as the greatest thing that can be thought of, and there is no guarantee that there is any such thing.Banno

    Again, if we needed a guarantee that something actually exists before conceptualizing it, then every being of reason would be a being. Then we could in no way think about what does not exist.

    g:=ix¬(∃y)M(y,x) does not work becasue there might simply always be some y such that y is greater than x.Banno

    I think Klima and Anselm would say, "Yes, of course there might always be some y such that y is greater than x."
    (That is, the thing-being-thought need not be greater than everything that in fact exists. This even seems like a theistic truism.)

    But Leon, this is not a candidate for the greatest number. That's the point. It's the first (defined by "min") of a whole new sequence of numbers greater than any natural number.

    Similarly, no sooner do you think of a being greater than any other, than you can think of a being greater than that individual. The series need have no end.
    Banno

    Okay, then I misunderstood what you were saying. But I still don't see that you have an argument against the concept. Read my last paragraph <here>, where I grant the idea of a proof against a greatest number (even though you haven't provided such a proof). That is: even if one has a bona fide proof that the concept does not exist in reality (i.e. is not a being), it does not therefore follow that the concept itself does not exist (i.e. that there is no being of reason/entia rationis).

    The discussion of whether the concept "the greatest number" can be a real concept even without existing in reality is directly parallel to the points that Klima makes in the first section of the paper. This is not irrelevant.

    And you misrepresent my saying that the parsing of his argument, the formatting, was ugly as my saying that the argument was ugly.Banno

    Not at all. You went out of your way to call Klima's argument ugly, which is eristic. And when I pointed out that you mis-quoted Klima and included all sorts of symbols that do not occur in his argument at all, you refused to correct your misrepresentation (a number of times). If you don't want to be here, that's your call. I would rather interact with people who accurately represent their interlocutor's arguments and correct blatant errors of misrepresentation when they are made aware of them. (For the umpteenth time, why the hell does your quote of Klima contain dollar signs, quotation marks, and the "registered trademark" symbol? No such symbols are present in his formulation of Anselm's proof.)
  • tim wood
    9.4k
    Well, I have avoided the thread on your assurance it was about Klima's paper, in part because I thought his conclusions uncontroversial - as I read them in his section called "Conclusions" that I quoted above. But as it seems the thread was also about Anselm's proof, I opted in.
    Anselm's proof is for the conclusion that God "has to exist also in reality."Leontiskos
    God, it appears, is by Anselm reckoned as that than which & etc. And that seems a matter of definition and presupposition - thus not proved. And there are problems with "greater" - I think Banno got that covered. In any case, I do not see how greater than can be a specific value. Further, assuming you make an honest effort to understand Anselm, perhaps you can say what he means, what you think he means, by "exist" and "reality."

    What I think he means is exactly what he believes. That is, a massive begging-the-question. But Anselm is clear that is exactly what he is doing. "I believe in God. My belief in God entails his existence. Therefore (I believe) God exists." And readers ever since have neglected the "I believe." Klima (as I read him) restores the "I believe," and observes that for real understanding and communication, people with different views must take-on in some sense the views of the other. If there is more to this, I shall await its clear presentation.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    But as it seems the thread was also about Anselm's proof, I opted in.tim wood

    Fair enough. Anselm's proof is definitely a big part of the paper. I tried to highlight that in the OP:

    Its focal point is St. Anselm’s famous proof for God’s existence, although that proof is not what the paper is ultimately centered on.Leontiskos

    -

    God, it appears, is by Anselm reckoned as that than which & etc. And that seems a matter of definition and presupposition - thus not proved.tim wood

    As I said earlier, in section 2 Klima gives his formulation of Anselm's proof "in a natural language argument, and then in quantification theory" (). Banno has been focusing on the latter, but presumably a lot of people would rather talk about the former. Here it is:

    By the meaning of the term,

    (1) God is the thought object than which no thought object can be thought to be greater

    Now suppose that

    (2) God is only in the intellect (i.e. God is thought of, but does not exist)

    But certainly

    (3) any thought object that can be thought to exist in reality can be thought to be greater than any thought object that is only in the intellect

    And it cannot be doubted that

    (4) God can be thought to exist in reality

    Therefore,

    (5) Some thought object can be thought to be greater than the thought object than which no thought object can be thought to be greater [1,2,3,4]

    which is a contradiction, whence we have to abandon our supposition that God is only in the intellect, so he has to exist in reality, too.
    Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 2

    (A link to Anselm's original work was given <here>.)

    So do you find any problems in Klima's natural language formulation of Anselm's proof?
  • Banno
    26.2k
    What a prat.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    What a prat.Banno

    :roll:

    Your animosity towards me leads you to simply gainsay my every point.Banno

    You are here projecting your own difficulties. For example, when I asked you a question we both knew the answer to, you decided to lie instead of tell the truth. And when I asked you to remove the misrepresentative dollar signs etc. from your "quotation" of "Klima's proof," you simply refused to do so, even though you know that one should not insert random symbols into quotations of others (regardless of how they got there).

    And that shit gets old, Banno. The desire to accurately quote one's interlocutors seems like a sine qua non for engagement on a philosophy forum.
  • Wayfarer
    23.6k
    (A general point to note: within the premodern metaphysical vision, particularly in Neoplatonism and Christian theology, being was understood as a form of plenitude—what the ancients called the Pleroma, the 'fullness of being'. From this perspective, being is not a neutral or arbitrary descriptor, but an expression of fullness, goodness, and actuality, compared to which non-existence or non-being is a privation or deficiency. The ontological argument, then, is not simply about correct use of language but is grounded in this intuition of the inherent meaning of Being.

    Also worth noting that for the medievals, arguments for God’s existence were devotional as much as polemical —they were edifying ideas intended to elevate the mind toward the Divine. The ontological argument, in this context, is not merely a logical proof but an intellectual prayer, grounded in the awareness of the fullness of being (Pleroma) as identical with the absolute Good.)
  • tim wood
    9.4k
    So do you find any problems in Klima's natural language formulation of Anselm's proof?Leontiskos
    Sure do! But it's a tedious exercise. But before starting, am I to understand you have no problems with it?
    A hint of what's to come:
    (1) God is the thought object than which no thought object can be thought to be greaterGyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 2
    Then this thought object cannot be quantified in any way, for to be quantified entails that another, greater, can be thought. And this here is fatal. Need we go on?
  • Banno
    26.2k
    So I'll set aside Leon's endless requests to repeat myself and take the criticism of (1) as read.

    (2) is the assumption that god, as defined in (1), is a thought, or can be though, or some such. Since it uses (1) it brings with it the difficulties of (1). So it assumes that god is a consistent concept. It also depends on the somewhat strained idea that a thought exists, which will need to be filled out elsewhere. I'm reasonably happy to set that aside, since as mentioned we might be able to use a free logic talk about things that "do not exist", in the sense of being empty names. But if the thought of god is not coherent, then (2) collapses.

    So to
    (3). ∀x∀y(I(x)∧R(y)→M(y,x))
    This says that for any x and any y, where x is in the intellect but y is real, y can be thought greater than x. This requires some attention, because it is mainly here that the presumption that god exists slips in. It's sitting there in plain sight, in that we have it that from (1) that there is a greatest thing, and here the presumption that that greatest thing is real.

    Even if we admit (1), why shouldn't we just suppose that the greatest thing can be conceived of, but not be real? Why could it not be the case that the greatest thing can be imagined, and yet might not exist?

    That is, why must we accept this assumption? But moreover, in accepting this assumption, we are accepting what the argument claims to show, that the greatest conceivable thing exists.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    But before starting, am I to understand you have no problems with it?tim wood

    Klima claims that the proof is valid, and it looks to me that he is correct.

    Then this thought object cannot be quantified in any way, for to be quantified entails that another, greater, can be thought. And this here is fatal. Need we go on?tim wood

    I see you saying, "This thought object can't be quantified, and that's fatal." I'm not sure I understand the objection.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    So I'll set aside Leon's endless requests to repeat myself and take the criticism of (1) as read.Banno

    And moving on is fine, but I want to highlight that this objection of yours is precisely the sort of Quinian question-begging that Klima wanted to offer an alternative to in the first section of his paper:

    He defines god as the greatest thing that can be thought of, and there is no guarantee that there is any such thing.Banno

    ("If there is no guarantee of existence, then conceptualization is not possible.")

    But if the thought of god is not coherent, then (2) collapses.Banno

    This is a repetition of your objection to (1).

    (3). ∀x∀y(I(x)∧R(y)→M(y,x))
    This says that for any x and any y, where x is in the intellect but y is real, y can be thought greater than x. This requires some attention, because it is mainly here that the presumption that god exists slips in. It's sitting there in plain sight, in that we have it that from (1) that there is a greatest thing, and here the presumption that that greatest thing is real.
    Banno

    If one wants to object to (3), they need to provide an objection to (3). They can't say, "If we allow this, then God exists. But I am an atheist so we can't allow it." That's begging the question.

    Beyond that, remember Klima's point in section 1 where Gaunilo mistakenly takes Anselm to be saying that "we have it that from (1) that there is a greatest thing."

    Even if we admit (1), why shouldn't we just suppose that the greatest thing can be conceived of, but not be real? Why could it not be the case that the greatest thing can be imagined, and yet might not exist?Banno

    That is precisely what the argument does. (2) supposes that the greatest thing can be conceived of but is not real.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    A general point to note: within the premodern metaphysical vision, particularly in Neoplatonism and Christian theology, being was understood as a form of plenitude—what the ancients called the Pleroma, the 'fullness of being'. From this perspective, being is not a neutral or arbitrary descriptor, but an expression of fullness, goodness, and actuality, compared to which non-existence or non-being is a privation or deficiency.Wayfarer

    Yes, and this bears on premise (3):

    (3) any thought object that can be thought to exist in reality can be thought to be greater than any thought object that is only in the intellectGyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 2

    To contradict this is to say that a thought object is not thought to be greater in virtue of its being thought to exist. Or simplified: fiction is as good as the real thing - a fiction that is in fact realized is no greater than an unrealized fiction (where both are thought objects).

    Also worth noting that for the medievals, arguments for God’s existence were devotional as much as polemicalWayfarer

    This is true. But I would add that they are philosophical as much as they are devotional or polemical. Moreso, I would say. That is, Anselm is trying to engage in rigorous thinking, and this comes out when one reads him.

    The ontological argument, in this context, is not merely a logical proof but an intellectual prayerWayfarer

    Yes, it is a way in which one approaches God, and in that sense there is a measure of reverence involved. Anselm does not take it to be inconsequential or unimportant, as mere "logic chopping" might be.
  • tim wood
    9.4k
    Klima claims that the proof is valid, and it looks to me that he is correct.Leontiskos
    I'm pretty sure you know enough logic to know that truth and validity are not the same thing. As to whether his proof is even valid depends on definitions he has not given.

    I see you saying, "This thought object can't be quantified, and that's fatal." I'm not sure I understand the objection.Leontiskos
    Anselm, and I assume Klima, hold that God "exists in reality." "Exists" and "reality" do not appear to be defined - are you going going to define them? Still though, I take that for anything that exists in reality there are accidents; e.g., as big/small, tall/short, whatever/whatever else. And once quantified/qualified, a greater can be conceived. Thus this God can have, on this construction, no fixed aspect at all, and since everything that exists in reality has some fixed aspect, it must be that God does not exist in reality.

    Further, it is adduced without proof that objects in reality are greater than objects of thought. Yet lots of things are clearly greater as objects of thought than as instantiated in reality. E.g., two, justice, love, The American Way, and even God himself.

    And finally, as a being conceived - in any way whatever - He must be conceived by a conceiver. And who might that be? It cannot be God. Me? You? Banno? We will all have different conceptions; does that mean different Gods? And some folks say God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent. Others that to be both is a contradiction. And I asked above, if God is absolutely good, what even does that mean?

    Or in short, all Anselm has is just what he claimed to have all along, a belief.

    If you or anyone wants to make it real, then make it real.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    Thus this God can have, on this construction, no fixed aspect at all, and since everything that exists in reality has some fixed aspect, it must be that God does not exist in reality.tim wood

    Well this looks like an argument against God, and I'm struggling to see how it derives from "this construction" (namely Klima/Anselm's definition of God). In any case, most theists would agree that God does not have fixed aspects. To use your descriptors, he is not tall, short, big, or small. So that seems fine.

    Further, it is adduced without proof that objects in reality are greater than objects of thought. Yet lots of things are clearly greater as objects of thought than as instantiated in reality. E.g., two, justice, love, The American Way, and even God himself.tim wood

    Okay, so here you are disputing premise (3). Let's take one of your examples: justice. Suppose I have a thought of <justice in Massachusetts>. This thought is in my intellect but it is not in reality. But now suppose that the thought of <justice in Massachusetts> is both in my intellect and in reality (i.e. there is truly justice in Massachusetts). Is not this second thought greater than the first?

    (A little different from the paper since we are flubbing "can be thought to exist," but that's probably fine for our purposes.)

    And finally, as a being conceived - in any way whatever - He must be conceived by a conceiver. And who might that be? It cannot be God. Me? You? Banno? We will all have different conceptions; does that mean different Gods?tim wood

    Yes, this is an interesting objection, although it does not critique any particular premise of Klima's argument.

    I guess I don't see why the definition in (1) must be exhaustive, as if our conception exhausts that than which nothing greater can be thought (indeed, were it exhausted it presumably could not be what it purports to be). Nevertheless, there could be conceptions which are not only different but also contradictory. Presumably the theist would here reply that the conception is not infallible. For example, if my argument about justice succeeds then an existing thought object is greater than a non-existing thought object. But other predicates may not be so easy.

    The other question is this: how much would we disagree on what is greater? If contradiction and not mere difference is required, then there must be substantial disagreement on what is greater in order for the premise of the objection to succeed.
  • tim wood
    9.4k
    Well this looks like an argument against God,Leontiskos
    How can that be, as God is not defined in any way except as a being than which & etc.? My argument is against - or at least questioning - another argument. And that argument, which is not really Anselm's and not really Klima's, but that may be yours, is that God, because of the presumed dual efficacy of being a thought object that is always better and because to exist in reality is always better than being a thought object, necessarily exists in reality. And these dual principles are simply assumed when they need to be proved.

    But we can plod. How are "exist" and "reality" defined for Anselm's argument? I assume he means like cats and dogs and tables and chairs, what they are and in the most general terms, where they are. That is, this here cat, that dog, this table, those chairs, where they happen to be. And I think it's pretty clear that Anselm's God cannot meet these criteria. Nor, for that matter, do (I think) any of the original Christian thinkers think that He could or did.
  • Janus
    16.8k
    And I think it's pretty clear that Anselm's God cannot meet these criteria. Nor, for that matter, do (I think) any of the original Christian thinkers think that He could or did.tim wood

    If God is "that than which nothing greater can be thought" then he is necessarily omnipotent, from which it would seem to follow that he can meet any criteria he likes.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    - Haha :grin:

    -

    - I like Janus' answer. I know you think the early Christians did not believe that God exists, but luckily we don't have to discuss that theory in this thread.

    You can just assume basic, colloquial dictionary definitions for any words we are using.
  • Banno
    26.2k
    And so to (4) R(g) - god can be thought to exist in reality.

    Well, given the criticism of (1), this is unsound - if god is perhaps contradictory as discussed above then (4) is false.

    But also "to exist in reality" remains obtuse. makes this point. Using a free logic might have made this clearer, but this would have exhibited the flaw in the argument by clarifying how "exists in reality" might be understood.

    (a) M(g,g) God can be thought to be greater than god. This is a valid deduction - it follows from the premises. There is the obvious problem of god being thought to be greater than himself. If you are happy with that, then all is fine, but if this strikes you as a bit rich, then this might well be treated as a reductio, showing that at least one of the premises is on the nose. But we already have it that none of the premises is unproblematic. So it's not a surprise that the conclusion is odd.

    Again, the argument is valid, but unsound. Validity is not an issue here.

    Then Klima uses existential generalisation to move from M(g,g) to (b) ∃y M(y,g) - from god is greater than god to something is greater than god. Again, this is valid, but it is in effect a generalisation from a contradiction. And anything can be validly proven from a contradiction.

    The final numbered step, (5), is a substitution, putting the definition from (1) in to (b). This is a valid step, provided substitution is valid, and substitution is valid only in an extensional context. It may be worth keeping this in mind. One place in which substitution is famously not valid is in the context of thoughts, and that is precisely the context with which this argument deals. SO the argument again potentially fails, at step (5).

    For some reason Klima stops numbering his steps here, at the point were he presents his reductio. In particular, he says: "But then, since (1), (3) and (4) have to be accepted as true, (2) has to be rejected as false". Klima want us to agree to all the premises except the one that says god is only in the intellect - and so conclude that god must not exist only in the intellect.

    But there are good - excellent - reason to doubt (3), and (4), as well as the definition in (1).

    Overall, the argument is valid but a long way from sound.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    I'm pretty sure you know enough logic to know that truth and validity are not the same thing.tim wood

    The wonder of Anselm's proof is that it does something that we think it should not be able to do, and it is very hard to say why it is wrong, or at least to say why rigorously. At this point the argument looks to be sound. It is valid and there are no premises that are clearly or demonstrably false.

    At this point in the thread I want to limit myself to what I call "close arguments," (or close objections), namely objections which stay close to the proof itself. These are basically arguments that attack a premise or an inference, or that try to stay very close to the interlocutor's paradigm. I don't find any of the close arguments convincing. So far, Banno's "close objection" is the one that stands out in the thread, but at the end of the day it looks to me like he is doing little more than gesturing towards the idea that the definition itself might be contradictory.

    (I see that just now managed to read the argument more carefully, thus for the first time recognizing that it is a reductio.)

    I'm sure that later on there will be opportunity to talk about objections that do not stay close to the proof, such as Aquinas', Kant's, or Frege's.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    (a) M(g,g) God can be thought to be greater than god. This is a valid deduction - it follows from the premises. There is the obvious problem of god being thought to be greater than himself. If you are happy with that, then all is fine, but if this strikes you as a bit rich, then this might well be treated as a reductio, showing that at least one of the premises is on the nose.Banno

    You are going to embarrass yourself again by going so fast and not taking enough care. (a) is the root of the reductio itself, for (b) contradicts (1), and yet (5) is what in fact maps to Anselm's argument, not (b). Klima explicitly tells us that, "(the intermediate steps (a) and (b) are inserted here only to facilitate recognizing how an actual derivation might proceed)." What he is doing is presenting the same argument twice, once in natural language and once in standard quantification theory. (a) and (b) are meant to help explicate the space between (4) and (5) in the quantification theory rendering.

    Or more simply: you imply that Klima wants to reject (2) and keep (a). That is entirely wrong. In fact he wants to reject (2) because of (a).

    I will have to respond to the rest later.
  • Banno
    26.2k
    :wink:

    That is why sensible people who have faith in god or gods don't bother with such paltry arguments and the time-wasting talking-past-the-other that this thread so amply exemplifies.Janus

    But here we are...
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    - Pulling in quotes from a different thread in order to make it appear as if something was said here? To make it look like the "this thread" from Janus' post in a different thread is a reference to this thread we are in? You're a straight up liar, aren't you Banno? You're literally willing to go around lying through your teeth to make yourself look good. That's pretty psychotic, man. :down:
  • Banno
    26.2k
    Then there is this odd paragraph.

    Evidently, this piece of reasoning cannot be torpedoed on the basis that it presupposes that there is something than which nothing greater can be thought of, as it only requires that something is thought of than which nothing greater can be thought of. But Anselm makes it clear that anyone who claims to understand the phrase “that than which nothing greater can be thought of” has to think of something than which nothing greater can be thought of, which, therefore, being thought of, is in the intellect, as its object. By the above argument we can see, however, that it cannot be only in the intellect, whence we concluded that it has to be in reality, too.

    It is apparently an attempt to foreclose on the criticism that the argument begs the question, that it "presupposes" its conclusion, that the argument does not assume "that than which nothing greater can be thought" exists in reality, but that "that than which nothing greater can be thought" exists in thought. That instead of assuming "that than which nothing greater can be thought" exists, it assumes "that than which nothing greater can be thought" is conceivable in a non-trivial way. But that is exactly the issue raised with (1), that it is not clear that one can coherently conceive of "that than which nothing greater can be thought". It also ignores the issue of whether conceivability can entail real existence.
  • sime
    1.1k
    Anselm's ontological argument presents a few riddles for cognitive science, and presents a problem for Realism in general.

    Suppose you are a self avowed Realist who is currently in America, and you want to justify making a conceptual distinction between your thoughts about Paris on the one hand, and the actual place called Paris on the other, that you like to think of as 'transcending' your personal experiences. How can you justify your a priori distinction to yourself without appealing to Anselm-like ontological arguments?

    Similarly, when anxious we often like to remind ourselves that our feared imagined future isn't the same thing as the actual future. One way we might convince ourselves of this distinction is by imaging the 'actual future' more vividly and 'realistically' than our feared future. This cognitive therapy, which essentially involves replacing one delusion with another, is the same as the 'step' as in Anselm's ontological argument.

    I would hazard a guess that although people neither need nor use 'reality' in the sense of an all-encompassing and absolute concept in their everyday lives, when pushed into a corner to provide a definition of 'reality' they will offer a circular definition of "reality" very much like the average philosopher, that more or less amounts to the most realistic thing they can conceive, that must 'exist' because nothing greater can be conceived.
  • tim wood
    9.4k
    I know you think the early Christians did not believe that God exists, but luckily we don't have to discuss that theory in this thread.Leontiskos
    Then you know something that is not so.
    If God is "that than which nothing greater can be thought" then he is necessarily omnipotent, from which it would seem to follow that he can meet any criteria he likes.Janus
    Just like Zeus, eh? Btw, do you stop to think about what omnipotent means and implies? Is omnipotence the greater thing?

    Then there is the question of what, exactly, a thought object is, and if it is of a being than which & etc., then what do we know about the idea? And in particular how that idea, or any idea about the idea, becomes constitutive of anything "existing in reality"?

    Anselm's ontological argument presents a few riddlessime
    Presents no riddles once understood. And understanding can be got from Anselm himself in his opening to his discourse, reference to which the OP generously supplied above. He believes, and his proof is a paean to his belief and through his belief to what he believes. That is, it's about belief - it's that simple.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    Part 3. The Atheist, Who is Not a Fool

    I want to open up the third section for anyone who wants to move on. Those who want to keep looking at earlier sections are of course welcome to do so.

    In this section Klima takes a step back from Anselm's proof and catalogues some of the different ways that the theist and the atheist might argue for or against Anselm's proof (indeed we have seen in this thread some of the very approaches he outlines). Following Anselm, he tries to zero in on "those basic requirements of rationality that the Fool seems to fail to meet." My impression is that this section of the paper is an intermediate link that doesn't do a great deal of work in itself. It seems to be setting up the problematic that section 4 will address. Further, it is perhaps easing us into a meta-analysis in which the tools provided by section 1 can be brought to bear.

    Note that when Klima speaks of "the next argument," he is referring to chapters 3 and 4 of Anselm's Proslogion, which follow upon the argument that Klima formulated in section 2 of the paper. Anselm is there using the conclusion of the proof as a premise in a second argument which reinforces the conclusion that God indeed exists. It seems that this second argument doesn't add much to the first, and more than anything is meant to clarify the outcome.

    Again quoting the first words of the section:

    It seems, therefore, that all that Anselm’s proof requires is that modicum of rationality which is needed to understand a simple descriptive phrase, to reflect on what the description implies, and to conclude to these implications concerning the thought object one has in mind as a result of understanding the description.Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 3

    Note: This thread has attracted some fervent atheists who are strongly predisposed to opposing Anselm’s proof. These atheists should be forewarned that when Klima uses words like “Saint” and “Fool” in this chapter, he is trying to stay close to Anselm’s language in the Proslogion. At this point in the paper he is still engaged a close commentary on the historical proof itself.
  • Count Timothy von Icarus
    3.2k


    On the argument, there seems to be a few issues. The first is "greater than." A critic can equivocate on this and argue that it properly applies only to number (or more properly, magnitude) and that there is no "perfect" or maximal magnitude. This is in part why Norman Malcom switches to an "unlimited entity," (which he shows must exist in all worlds if it exists in any possible one).

    This brings us to the second problem, people are frequently confused by what is meant by "unlimited," "infinite," "transcendent," etc. This is why Hegel, in the Greater Logic, feels he must distinguish between the "good infinity" (viz. true transcendence, being without limit) and the "bad infinity" (viz. an unending series as supposed through mathematical induction, i.e., "just keep adding +1 ad infinitum").

    You see this sort of confusion all the time. In the Moral Landscape, Sam Harris opines that a transcendent or Platonic good must be irrelevant to conscious creatures, since it is always beyond the world of sensation. But this is simply confusion, a vision of transcendence where the transcendent is somehow absent from what it transcends. In the classical tradition all finite good, even what merely appears good, participates in the Good. As St. Augustine says, God is "within everything, yet contained in nothing." This is because such a good is actually transcendent, not limited by the borders of the world.

    What can we say to this confusion? Well, for one, it is worth noting that just because some people fail to grasp a concept does not mean it is problematic or cannot be used in valid proofs. I've seen people stubbornly resist the conclusion of the Monte Hall Problem, or claim that infinite multitudes or magnitudes are "unthinkable," and thus "unintelligible." Does the failure of some to "get it" or the recalcitrance of some finitists somehow impune something like Cantor's diagonal argument?

    Nor is the idea of unlimited being somehow a Christian dogma absent from the rest of philosophy. It is in Pagan thought prior to Christianity, in Jewish thought, in Islamic thought, in Hindu thought, etc. One finds appeals to it in contemporary thought that makes no appeal to any particular religious tradition, or in New Age syncretism. Many disparate philosophies have come, seemingly independently, to the concept of unlimited being (a being that is no thing) and the distinction between nihil per infinitatem (nothing on account of infiniteness) and nihil per privationem (nothing on account if privation).Therefore, the atheist rejection of the first premise on the grounds that the concept is "incoherent" or "unthinkable" seems weak. Folks as diverse as Plotinus, Hegel, Rumi, and Shankara have had no more of a problem with it than (orthodox) Christians. Atheist scholars of mysticism, esoterica, or religion also seem to have no issue thinking of it.

    But we might suppose that such a concept is hard to fully take in. Whole books are dedicated to explaining what the truly limitless entails. In which case, we might suppose that the argument could suffer from a premise that is not as well known as its conclusion. For the person of abiding faith, or who had received revelation, God's existence is obvious. Even for those who struggle in faith, other arguments (e.g. from teleology) might be more convincing. So, the conclusion is well known to some. Yet the premise involves our conception of an aspect of God's essence, which is generally thought to be unknowable (e.g. St. John Chrysostom, St. Gregory Palamas, etc.), even if "being without limit" is something approachable through the via negativa. To be sure, some will argue that since we can know "that God is," (existence) we must grasp essence in a muddled and confused way (perhaps through God's energies, and either natural or divine illumination), but this still leaves the premise not particularly well known. By contrast, the faithful certainly hope to know the conclusion in a way that is more solid than the premise.

    Finally, atheist opponents who are in favor of "brute fact" explanations of the existence and quiddity of, ultimately, everything, really don't have a leg to stand on in calling out opponents on account of "unintelligiblity." This is a far more obvious (and quite common) instance of what is virtually always a very ad hoc appeal to the entirely conceptually vacuous to decide an issue. "Why? It just is."

    This is relevant in that infinite, unlimited being is often called upon to ground metaphysics. The claim that this is "unintelligible" while putting forth "it just is, for no reason at all" as the root explanation for everything is more than a little ironic, particularly when the ad hoc appeal to brute fact is paired with eliminativism or deflationism re causes, such that everything "just is" and explanation seems to be little more than a hallucination resulting from inexplicable constant conjunction in the first place (isn't this just epistemic nihilism with extra steps?)
  • Banno
    26.2k
    Summarising my comments on section 2, here are four problems with the argument as it is present.

    1. There is a problem in defining a maximum element in a domain that may have no limits.
    2. There is a sleight of hand from ens rationis to ens reale, somewhat hidden here but brought out in Free Logic by the invalidity of a move from Ti to E!i.
    3. There are four premises to the reductio, any or each of which may be false. That the second assumption is the one that must be rejected is not established, especially as the other three are shown to be questionable.
    4. The argument relies on a substitution within an intensional context, at line (5), that is not justified.

    And finally, (1) and (3) in combination make the assumption that god exists. This explains why the argument is valid, since it amounts to "god exists, therefore god exists". It also makes the argument circular.
  • Banno
    26.2k
    Yep. It's pretty hard to work with an empty domain, so we do tend to suppose that something exists. That something exists rather than nothing can be seen as somewhat puzzling, a bemusement the ontological proof plays on - what has been called "ontological shock". It tries to show the necessity of something beyond the stuff of the world. But it fails in the detail.

    One can take it as given that something exists, ontological shock and all, and admit that this is a puzzle without demanding an answer.

    Which gives me another chance to quote a favourite from Dave Allen:

    The Pope and an atheist are having a discussion...

    and it slowly gets more and more heated until eventually the Pope can't take it anymore and he says to the atheist - "You are like a man who is blindfolded, in a dark room who is looking for a black cat that isn't there."

    The atheist laughs and says - "With all due respect, we sound awfully similar. You are like a man who is blindfolded, in a dark room who is looking for a black cat that isn't there but the difference is you think you've found it.

    Edit: This is also a reply to . The non-theist need not maintain that the various notions of "unlimited being" are unintelligible, but can agree that it may be intelligible to some degree while maintain that it has not been demonstrated that this "unlimited being" is the same as say the Christian god, or indeed any god. That there is stuff may be a mystery, but there is no need to prefer the answer supposedly given by the ontological argument, especially since that argument is fraught with problems.

    One can simply admit "I don't know". This at the least has the appeal of honesty.
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