Saint Anselm’s proof for God’s existence in his Proslogion, as the label “ontological” retrospectively hung on it indicates, is usually treated as involving some sophisticated problem of, or a much less sophisticated tampering with, the concept of existence. In this paper I intend to approach Saint Anselm’s reasoning from a somewhat different angle.
First, I will point out that what makes many of our contemporaries think it involves a problem with the concept of existence is our modern conception of reference, intimately tied up with the concept of existence. On the other hand, I also wish to show that the conception of reference that is at work in Saint Anselm’s argument, indeed, that is generally at work in medieval thought, is radically different, not so tied up with the concept of existence, while it is at least as justifiable as the modern conception. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding, 69
At this point, however, anyone having qualms about “multiplying entities”, indeed, “obscure entities”, should be reminded that the distinction between objects, or beings (entia) simpliciter, and objects of thought, or beings of reason (entia rationis) is not a division of a given class (say the class of objects, or beings, or entities) into two mutually exclusive subclasses. The class of beings or objects is just the class of beings or objects simpliciter, that is, beings without any qualification, of which beings of reason or objects of thought do not form a subclass. Mere beings of reason, therefore, are not beings, and mere objects of thought are not a kind of objects, indeed, not any more than fictitious detectives are a kind of detectives, or fake diamonds are a kind of diamonds.
Qualifications of this kind are what medieval logicians called determinatio diminuens, which cannot be removed from their determinabile on pain of fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.11 Accordingly, admitting objects of thought, or beings of reason, as possible objects of reference, does not imply admitting any new objects, or any new kind of beings, so this does not enlarge our ontology.
So on this conception Quine’s answer to “the ontological problem”: “What is there?”, namely, “Everything” is true. For on this conception the claim: “Everything exists” (or its stylistic variants: “Everything is” or “Everything is a being” or “Everything is an existent” or “There is/exists everything”) is true.12 Still, “Something that does not exist can be thought of” is also true, where, the subject being ampliated in the context of the intentional predicate, “Something” binds a variable that ranges over mere objects of thought that do not exist.13
I'll just stick to the opening section for now. — Count Timothy von Icarus
First, I will point out that the distinction... — Count Timothy von Icarus
[On signification]
A twelfth-century commentary on the Perihermeneias reports Porphyry as saying that at the time of Aristotle, there was a great debate over the principal signification of utterances: was it ‘res’ (things) or incorporeal natures (Plato) or sensus (sensations) or imaginationes (representations) or intellectus (concepts)?[9] In fact, medieval philosophers of language were heir to two conflicting semantic theories. According to Aristotle, the greatest authority from the ancient world, words name things by signifying concepts in the mind (Boethius translated Aristotle’s term as passiones animae – affections of the soul) which are likenesses abstracted from them. But Augustine, the greatest of the Church fathers, had held that words signify things by means of those concepts.[10] This led the medievals to the question: do words signify concepts or things? The question had already been asked by Alexander of Aphrodisias and his answer was transmitted to the medievals in Boethius’ second commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias (De Interpretatione): “Alexander asks, if they are the names of things, why has Aristotle said that spoken sounds are in the first place signs of thoughts … But perhaps, he says, he puts it this way because although spoken sounds are the names of things we do not use spoken sounds to signify things, but [to signify] affections of the soul that are produced in us by the things. Then in view of what spoken sounds themselves are used to signify he was right to say they are primarily signs of them” (tr. Smith, pp. 36–37).[11] So words primarily signify concepts.
But the matter was not settled, other than that whatever view a medieval philosopher took, it had to be made to accord with the authority of Aristotle, perhaps in extremis by reinterpreting Aristotle’s words. Abelard refers to a distinction between significatio intellectuum (signification of concepts) and significatio rei (signification of the thing), more properly called nomination or appellation (see De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, vol. II(1), pp. 192–5). Similarly, the Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum asks whether words signify concepts or things, and responds: both (intellectum et rem), but primarily a thing via a concept as medium (op.cit . II (2), p. 707)...
...Just as signification corresponds most closely – though not exactly – to contemporary ideas of meaning or sense, so supposition corresponds in some ways to modern notions of reference, denotation and extension. The comparison is far from exact, however. One major difference is that the medievals distinguished many different modes (modi) of supposition. Despite the difference between different authors’ semantic theories, particularly as they developed over the centuries, there is a remarkable consistency in the terminology and interrelation of the different modes.
[For example:]
Man is the worthiest of creatures
Socrates is a man
So Socrates is the worthiest of creatures
The premises are true and the conclusion false, so wherein lies the fallacy? It is one of equivocation or “four terms”: ‘homo’ (‘man’) has simple supposition in the first premise and personal supposition in the second, so there is no unambiguous middle term to unite the premises.
"All that is can be thought," does not imply "all that is thought is." — Count Timothy von Icarus
At this point, however, anyone having qualms about “multiplying entities”, indeed, “obscure entities”, should be reminded that the distinction between objects, or beings (entia) simpliciter, and objects of thought, or beings of reason (entia rationis) is not a division of a given class (say the class of objects, or beings, or entities) into two mutually exclusive subclasses. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 1
A few notes on treating existence as a predicate. We can of course do this, with some cost. The result is a logic that ranges over things that exist and things that do not exist. That is, it in effect has two domains, one of things that exist and one of things that... do not exist. — A Response to Mario Bunge
...Mere beings of reason, therefore, are not beings, and mere objects of thought are not a kind of objects, indeed, not any more than fictitious detectives are a kind of detectives, or fake diamonds are a kind of diamonds.
Qualifications of this kind are what medieval logicians called determinatio diminuens, which cannot be removed from their determinabile on pain of fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.[11] Accordingly, admitting objects of thought, or beings of reason, as possible objects of reference, does not imply admitting any new objects, or any new kind of beings, so this does not enlarge our ontology. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 1
Modern thought sometimes has more difficulty with this to the extent that it has eliminated a solid understanding of, or ground for, the distinction between act and potency... — Count Timothy von Icarus
I received a PM from someone essentially asking, "What's the fuss?" — Leontiskos
§ 53. By properties which are asserted of a concept I naturally do not mean the characteristics which make up the concept. These latter ate properties of the things which fall under the concept, not of the concept. Thus “rectangular” is not a property of the concept “rectangular triangle’; but the proposition that there exists no rectangular equilateral rectilinear triangle does state a property of the concept “rectangular equilateral rectilinear triangle”; it assigns to it the number nought.
In this respect existence is analogous to number. Affirmation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of the number nought. Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for the existence of God breaks down. But oneness* is not a component characteristic of the concept “God” any more than existence is. Oneness cannot be used in the definition of this concept any more than the solidity of a house, or its commodiousness or desirability, can be used in building it along with the beams, bricks and mortar...
* [I.e. the character of being single or unique, called by theologians “unity”.] — Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, tr. Austin (1960)
According to this conception, in an appropriate ampliative context we can successfully refer to what we can think of according to the proper meaning of the terms involved. But thinking of something does not imply the existence of what is thought of. Thus, in the same way, referring to something does not imply the existence of what is referred to, or, as the medievals put it, significare (‘to signify’) and supponere (‘to refer’) ampliate their object-terms to nonexistents in the same way as intelligere (‘to think’, ‘to understand’) and other verbs signifying mental acts do.[14] — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 1
(1) Bucephalus is dead
(2) What is dead does not exist
Therefore,
(3) Bucephalus does not exist
Therefore,
(4) something does not exist
In my opinion, this is a conclusive argument for the thesis that something does not exist. As is well-known, however, many philosophers regard this thesis as paradoxical in a way, and, consequently, they would raise several objections to the simple reasoning that led to it above... — Klima | Existence, Quantification and the Medieval Theory of Ampliation
On the paradigmatic account of reference in contemporary philosophical semantics, owing in large part to Russell’s Theory of Descriptions, the burden of reference is taken to be carried basically by the bound variables of quantification theory, which supposedly reflects all there is to the universal logical features, or “deep structure” of natural languages.
This account, coupled with the Kantian-Fregean idea of existence as a second-order predicate, i.e., a quantifier, quite naturally leads to Quine’s slogan: “to be is to be a value of a bound variable”.2 — Klima
I also am puzzled about the utility and motivation of a second special doctrine which [Geach] puts forward, namely, that quantification is a second-level predicate. He elucidates this doctrine as follows :
" A first-level predicate can be attached to a name, in order to make an assertion about that which the name stands for ; a second-level predicate can be attached to such a first-level predicate in order to make an assertion about that which it stands for. Quine's misunderstanding of second-level pre-dicates arises from his unwillingness to admit that first-level predicates do stand for anything."
This doctrine is, as Mr. Geach remarks, to be found in Frege. It is also espoused in my own first book (1934). But neither of these circumstances counts in favour of the doctrine, and Mr. Geach also says nothing to raise the doctrine above the level of a bare pronunciamento. Surely we can understand quantifiers perfectly well with or without classifying them as predicates which make assertions about that which first-level predicates stand for. Nothing is achieved by this move except the creation of an opportunity to talk of first-level predicates as standing for something. — Quine reply to Geach
Try to make it past the first sentence before finding an offending whole two words that "render the paper obsolete." — Count Timothy von Icarus
I will make a thread that includes the topic of intentional reference/identity sometime in at least the next month. It will be a reading group, so trolling will not be tolerated. — Leontiskos
First, even if one supposes that Klima, being a medieval specialist, absolutely cannot be well acquainted with modern philosophy of language (dubious) — Count Timothy von Icarus
The relentless grind of progress, eh. Philosophical ideas certainly have short use-by dates in our day and age. — Wayfarer
Try to make it past the first sentence before finding an offending whole two words that "render the paper obsolete." — Count Timothy von Icarus
With this understanding of Anselm’s conception of the relationship between existence and reference we can see that his argument constitutes a valid proof of God’s existence without committing him either to an ontology overpopulated with entities of dubious status or to the question-begging assumption that the referent of his description exists. In fact, we can see this even within the framework of standard quantification theory, provided we keep in mind that in the context of Anselm’s argument, this context being an ampliative context, we should interpret our variables as ranging over objects of thought, only some of which are objects simpliciter. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 2
Is Quine here abandoning his idea that, "to be is to be a value of a bound variable"? — Leontiskos
Quine, as a nominalist, would rather not encourage any similar assumption about a predicate. — bongo fury
Consider now Quine's insight, on which the quantifier account is based, that it is bound variables rather than singular terms that carry ontological commitment. To implement this insight, Quine simply eliminated singular terms from the language. — Ontological Commitment | SEP
[Russell's] account, coupled with the Kantian-Fregean idea of existence as a second-order predicate, i.e., a quantifier, quite naturally leads to Quine’s slogan: “to be is to be a value of a bound variable”.[2] — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 1
My understanding is that you are saying Quine rejects the idea that existence is a second-order predicate, — Leontiskos
and therefore Klima is mistaken in his claim, "[this] quite naturally leads to Quine's slogan..." — Leontiskos
Regardless, it makes sense to me that Quine would not want to call the quantifier a second-order predicate per se, but that he would nevertheless admit that it does bear on existence in a second-order manner. — Leontiskos
In what way? — bongo fury
Not necessarily, but the claim wants explaining. What is meant to be wrong with the slogan, and what has the doctrine of quantifiers being second order predicates got to do with it? — bongo fury
6 W.V.O. Quine: “On What There Is”, in: Quine, W.V.O. 1971. p. 3. By the way, it is interesting that Quine apparently never asked himself: to whom does the name “Wyman” refer? — nobody? — then how do I know that Wyman is not the same as McX? For despite the fact that nothing in the world “wymanizes”, let alone “mcxizes”, Wyman and McX are quite distinguishable imaginary characters in Quine’s paper: Wyman, e.g., is introduced to us as a “subtler mind”, than McX. As we shall see, these questions are easily answerable on the basis of the theory of reference advanced in this paper. Not so on the basis of Quine’s. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 1
Damn, that's ugly. — Banno
followed the guidelines — Banno
As he says: “what if someone were to say that there is something greater than everything there is [...] and [that] something greater than it, although does not exist, can still be thought of?” Evidently, we can think of something greater than the thing greater than everything, unless the thing that is greater than everything is the same as that than which nothing greater can be thought of. But Anselm’s point here is precisely that although, of course, there is nothing greater than the thing greater than everything, which is supposed to exist, something greater than what is greater than everything still can be thought of, if the thing greater than everything is not the same as that than which nothing greater can be thought of. So if the thing greater than everything is not the same as that than which nothing greater can be thought of, then something greater still can be thought of; therefore, that than which nothing greater can be thought of can be thought of, even if it is not supposed to exist.
($y) — Banno
Consider an analogous argument defining the highest number as that number which is higher than any other number. The definition is fine, except that there is no such highest number. — Banno
Good. This is what I mean by "engaging the paper." — Leontiskos
What? Those are the symbols in the HTML text you linked.In fact, much of your quote is a misrepresentation of what Klima writes in the paper. You were presumably copy/pasting without checking to see if the output was accurate. A bit more care would be welcome, given how much people struggle with formal logic even before you start incorporating symbols like $, ", ®. — Leontiskos
No. Kids will ask wha the highest number is. Takes them a while to see that there isn't one. Theists similarly ask what the greatest being is. Since they already think they know the answer, the question is disingenuous.You are saying the number does not exist, but you also require that the thought object of the number does not exist. — Leontiskos
What? Those are the symbols in the HTML text you linked. — Banno
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