• Janus
    16.8k
    I would have thought that the force/ content distinction reinforces the role of the "first person"—when judgements are believed we have the subject in action, that is force. What is the logical status of a judgement or proposition apart from its being made or believed by anyone? If anything, it would be merely content, no?
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    I do see the problem Rodl (and Kimhi) see. How can there be objective content that is also thought?J

    Is it any less pressing to ask, "How can there be non-objective content that is also thought?"

    it's an ancient epistemological puzzleJ

    Where do you find it before Descartes?

    Either way, what is the teaser for how self-consciousness solves the problem of the objectivity of thought?
  • Banno
    26.2k
    what do you think p is meant to signifyJ

    A range of things from utterances through to propositions.

    What's important here is that we pull those out of their intensional context so that they can be treated extensional. Not "I think that Superman can fly" but "Superman can fly". Then we can substitute Clark Kent for Superman without losing truth values.

    That's the point of the Begriffsschrift, "⊢".
  • J
    1.1k
    What is the logical status of a judgement or proposition apart from its being made or beleived by anyone? If anything, it would be merely content, no?Janus

    That's a great way of putting one of Rodl's puzzles. He challenges us, "What is 'merely content'? What can that mean?"

    I would have thought that the force/ content distinction reinforces the role of the "first person"Janus

    Yes, in the way you describe, but look what happens when the proposition itself -- p is "I think q". How do we accommodate this?
  • J
    1.1k
    @Banno @Janus Have to leave now -- rats. I'll look forward to seeing where y'all take this.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    I think you've noted before that we need to do some tinkering within Fregean logic to accommodate the 1st person. Would you agree with Rodl that, without such tinkering, there is indeed a difficulty presented for the "doctrine of propositions"?J

    Think about it this way: if we zoom out then force represents subject/subjectivity and content represents object/objectivity. Now with Kimhi you were searching for "Monism," and I assume that the same sort of thing is at play with Rodl?

    Because if the critique of the force/content distinction is ultimately that it is dualistic, then I'm not sure where else there is to go. "Monism"? I would have to know what that means, but if there is more than one thinking subject in the world, and there is at least one common object of thought, then the dualism of subject and object is both inevitable and true.

    That is, if we don't know what it is about the force/content distinction that is disagreeable but we just keep shooting at it anyway, then what is it we are aiming at? The duality of subject and object? Because as long as that duality exists I don't see how force/content will go away.
  • Janus
    16.8k
    Yes, in the way you describe, but look what happens when the proposition itself -- p is "I think q". How do we accommodate this?J

    Could we not think of that as just the general form of a particular kind of proposition, really no different than 'it is q'. Both the "I" and the "it" do not refer to anything in particular.
  • J
    1.1k
    Both the "I" and the "it" do not refer to anything in particular.Janus

    Could you say more? The "I" refers to the thinker/speaker, and I'm not sure which "it" you mean. Sorry, I'm probably missing your point.

    q = "Grass is green"
    p = "I think q" = "I think 'grass is green'"

    This is the problematic structure I was referring to. How should we talk about the force and the content of p? Is "I" the subject (or "argument," in Frege's terms) of p? We need a workaround, and (at least) one is available, but before we consider how this problem is usually resolved, I was trying to get clear about what's wrong.
  • Janus
    16.8k
    Could you say more? The "I" refers to the thinker/speaker, and I'm not sure which "it" you mean. Sorry, I'm probably missing your point.J

    If taken as merely general examples of sentences that could refer to actual states of affairs, but in merely being considered as such do not refer to any state of affairs, then in "I believe q" and "it is raining" both the "I" and the "it" has no particular referent.
  • Banno
    26.2k
    q = "Grass is green"
    p = "I think q" = "I think 'grass is green'"
    J

    Supose the grass is the lawn. The it follows from q by substituting lawn/grass that the lawn is green. And this is correct. But if we substitute lawn/grass into "I think 'grass is green'" we get "I think 'lawn is green'". But this may not be so, since the individual concerned may have no such belief.

    That is, putting "I think..." in front of each proposition buggers extensionality.

    So, to display a small part of what is at stake, one may proceed by deduction from "Grass is green" to "Something is green". But one cannot by deduction proceed from "I think 'Grass is green'" to "Something is green.

    Frege's response is set out . It was, speaking crudely, to keep the whole argument within the one Begriffsschrift, "⊢".
  • Wayfarer
    23.6k
    Here's something I've summarised from Chapter 3, in simple terms. Judgment, as self-conscious, is universal and foundational. To make a judgement is implicitly to state 'I think that <p>' or 'I believe that <p>' In this sense, judgement is itself not one perspective among many but the condition for the possibility any perspective.

    To deny that judgment is self-conscious would involve making a judgment—and thus reaffirming what you are trying to deny. This makes the self-consciousness of judgment something that cannot be opposed or rejected. To put it another way, to say judgement is not self-conscious, would be to agree, when challenged, ‘no, I really don’t believe that judgement’. So it’s self-refuting. To claim that judgment is not self-conscious would involve a self-conscious act of judgment, thereby refuting the claim itself. This is because the very act of making such a claim requires one to be aware of the validity of their judgment, which is a form of self-consciousness.

    Below, a recapitulation of the summary of Frege's essay The Thought, for those interested.

    Reveal
    Objectivity: Frege argues that thoughts are objective, meaning they exist independently of any individual thinker. They belong to a “third realm,” distinct from the physical world and the subjective mental states of individuals. For example, the thought expressed by the sentence “2 + 2 = 4” is the same for everyone and does not depend on any particular person thinking it; it would be true even if nobody ever grasped it.

    Truth: For Frege, thoughts are bearers of truth or falsity. A thought is true iff it corresponds to reality, and false if it does not. Importantly, the truth of a thought is independent of whether anyone believes it or thinks it—it remains true or false regardless of subjective opinion.

    Language: Frege emphasizes the role of language in expressing thoughts. He distinguishes between the sense (Sinn) of an expression (the thought it conveys) and its reference (Bedeutung) (the object it refers to). Sentences are crucial because they express complete thoughts that can be evaluated as true or false. This is where the distinction between force and content is made.

    Thinking: While thoughts exist objectively, Frege acknowledges that they can only be “grasped” by a thinker. Thinking is the act by which a subject apprehends a thought, but this act does not create the thought. Instead, the thought is something that exists independently of the thinker.

    Why Rödl singles out Frege and this essay, in particular, is because of the significance of Frege's logic in analytic philosophy.


    Quentin said that Pat thought the Oak was shedding, but it was actually the Elm next to it that was dropping leaves. But if the thought cannot be isolated from the act of thinking, then in thinking that Pat thought the Oak was shedding Quentin would be thinking that the Oak was shedding. But here Quentin thinks the elm is shedding, not the oak.

    It might be supposed that one can object that what Quentin thought was not that the oak was shedding, but that Pat thought the oak was shedding. But if we cannot isolate the thought from the act of thinking it, then in thinking that pat thought the oak was shading, Quentin thought the oak was shedding.
    Banno

    When Quentin judges that "Pat thinks the oak is shedding its leaves," the content of Quentin’s judgment is not the tree’s state (e.g., "the oak is shedding its leaves") but rather the fact that Pat believes this to be true. Quentin does not need to believe "the oak is shedding its leaves" to make this judgment, because his act of judgment is about Pat’s thought, not about the tree.

    This makes it unnecessary to isolate the act of judgment (force) from its content. In Rödl’s framework, judgment is unified: the act of judging and the content judged are inseparable. When Quentin judges that "Pat thinks the oak is shedding its leaves," his act of judgment includes the "I think"—his self-conscious affirmation of the validity of his own judgment about Pat’s belief. There is no division between the act of judgment and the content; they form a single, self-conscious whole.

    For Pat, the object of judgment is the tree shedding its leaves: Pat believes "the oak is shedding its leaves." For Quentin, however, the object of judgment is Pat’s belief: Quentin judges "Pat thinks the oak is shedding its leaves." By recognizing this shift, it becomes clear that there is no need to posit a force-content distinction. Each judgment is self-conscious and unified, with its own distinct object.

    Even if Pat is wrong about the oak, and Quentin is right about the elm, the form of their judgments remains the same: each involves the self-conscious affirmation of a proposition directed toward its specific object. The truth or falsity of the content doesn’t alter the fact that judgment is always a unified, self-conscious act. The point at issue is not the truth or falsehood of the judgement but the self-conscious nature of judgement.
  • J
    1.1k
    That is, putting "I think..." in front of each proposition buggers extensionality.Banno

    Yes! And well explained. I think I understand the Fregean fix as well -- "the scope of the "⊢" is the whole argument." If you don't mind, could you fit the terms "I think 'grass is green'" into the Fregean a/b/a schematic you gave us? I want to be sure.

    We can entertain a proposition without thereby accepting, believing, or assenting to it. — banno

    OK, don't hate me, but Rodl would ask, "What is this activity you are calling 'to entertain'? Is it the same thing as 'to think'? Not 'to think' in the sense of 'judge', presumably; that's the very point you want to deny. So it must be 'to think' in the sense of 'to have a thought' -- but what is that? Everyone believes it must be obvious what 'to have a thought' means, but I find myself perplexed when I try to say more about it."
  • Banno
    26.2k
    But if the thought cannot be isolated from the act of thinking, then in thinking that Pat thought the Oak was shedding Quentin would be thinking that the Oak was shedding.Banno


    If the thought cannot be isolated from the act of thinking, then

    Quentin thinks that Pat thought the Oak was shedding. But the thought cannot be isolated from the content. Therefore we cannot write:

    Pat thought the Oak was shedding
    And even if we did, the thought cannot be isolated from the content and so we could not then write:

    The Oak was shedding

    The very argument that is dependent on our being able to look at the content apart from the force. Wayfarer is making use of the extensionality that Rödl would remove.
  • J
    1.1k
    Now take it a step further and substitute "Pat" for "Quentin" in "Quentin judges that 'Pat thinks the oak is shedding its leaves.'" This would give us "Pat judges that he himself thinks the oak is shedding its leaves." So, is it still the case that the truth or falsity of the content ("the oak is shedding its leaves") is immaterial to the form of judgment? I believe so. It's a sort of ugly recursion, but the form does seem the same. Pat could in theory keep himself neutral on the accuracy of his own thought about the tree.
  • Paine
    2.7k
    Rödl says that the I think accompanies all my thoughts, or at the very least he wants to place a very strong emphasis on self-consciousness in thinking and judging. It seems overboard. What is the context that would account for this sort of emphasis? Thanks.Leontiskos

    What is a self in the thesis is not a given. The critique of the Fregean sets of references moves away from the self who affirms stuff (or not) in all situations. Rödl's beginning point of rejecting mind versus not-mind as the ground of possible experience in the Kant fashion is either a benefit or not. I am trying to hear him out on that basis.

    I decided to follow this question at least as far as of how Aristotle is read by Rödl.
  • Banno
    26.2k
    If you don't mind, could you fit the terms "I think 'grass is green'" into the Fregean a/b/a schematic you gave us?J
    As I understand it,

    ⊢ grass is green

    OK, don't hate me, but Rodl would ask, "What is this activity you are calling 'to entertain'? Is it the same thing as 'to think'? Not 'to think' in the sense of 'judge', presumably; that's the very point you want to deny. So it must be 'to think' in the sense of 'to have a thought' -- but what is that? Everyone believes it must be obvious what 'to have a thought' means, but I find myself perplexed when I try to say more about it."J

    I think this is the mouth of your rabbit hole. You do entertain propositions without judging them. You can think about what might be true without deciding if it is true. You do not really need to go further.

    "To have a thought" does not have one meaning. And to have thought is not always to make a judgement. Sometimes it is to have a suspicion, to have a doubt, to consider a possibility, to fancy that it is so.
  • Banno
    26.2k
    Have you not settled all possible readings to be useless?Paine

    No. If I had, I would not be participating.
  • Wayfarer
    23.6k
    If you’re disputing Rödl, how do you see the distinction of force and content playing out in Quentin’s belief about what Pat thinks? Specifically, where do you locate the force of Quentin’s judgment, and how do you see it as separable from the content of his belief? I’m curious to understand how this applies.
  • Banno
    26.2k


    Perhaps the most useful way to see it is Davidson's,

    Pat believes the tree is an oak. Quintin believes that.

    But of course this is not without its own difficulties.
  • Wayfarer
    23.6k
    You'll need to explicate that for those without knowledge of Davidson.
  • Banno
    26.2k



    But I won't be defending this at any length as an alternative. I don't need to present a detailed alternative in order to address the issues with the account from Rödle. That there are alternatives will suffice.
  • Wayfarer
    23.6k
    reasonable. I'll try and find the time for it.
  • Banno
    26.2k
    I don't wish j's thread to turn into a discussion of Davidson.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    But I won't be defending this at any length as an alternative.Banno

    Odd to continually bring up things that you aren't willing to support or defend. It's almost like you're just a bored old man who wants to stir up controversy and is uninterested in doing actual philosophy. You just snipe from the bushes and then flee into the woods.
  • Paine
    2.7k
    Because if the critique of the force/content distinction is ultimately that it is dualistic, then I'm not sure where else there is to go.Leontiskos

    From what I have gathered so far, that is not Rödl's interest. It is in 2.7 that the objection to the force/content distinction comes to a head:

    The force-content distinction enables us to describe and understand all these phenomena. Thus it has great explanatory power. Giving it up is costly. Unless we are being given assurance that we will be able to understand all this without that distinction, we do well to keep it.

    This would make sense if the force-content distinction did. But it does not. What is confused in itself does not provide understanding. As the force-content distinction makes no sense, it has no explanatory power. There is no cost to abandoning it. On the contrary. It costs to retain it. Using the distinction, we will be certain not to understand what we seek to understand; we will be certain to distort it and impede its comprehension.
    — ibid. 2.7, page 37

    Whether one follows this reasoning or not, the argument is not collapsing a duality but asking for a different kind of distinction unobserved by the force/content advocates:

    Thus it may seem that c-propositions are the main topic; they are what the semantic theory is about. Yet, the concept of a c-proposition can claim to be a semantic concept only if c-propositions can be shown to inform the use of language. And they can inform this use only by figuring in the thoughts of those who use the language, as these think how to use it and how it is correct to use it. Thus the soundness of the concept of a c-proposition depends on there being this structure to the thought of someone who uses a sentence to make an assertion: thinking it correct to use the sentence in the way that she does, she thinks that a c-proposition is true at the context in which she uses it. — ibid. page 30

    The question becomes, on what basis does that "structure of thought" involve verification from what is presumed to exist outside of it. At that point, I do not see it as a matter of how "Pat" or "Quenton" choose what is happening.
  • Banno
    26.2k
    Misrepresenting what was said, again.

    ↪Wayfarer I don't wish j's thread to turn into a discussion of Davidson.Banno

    If you want to start a thread on Davidson's "On Saying that", go ahead. I might join in.
  • Wayfarer
    23.6k
    3.3 Second Order Judgements.

    Rödl starts this section by examining the idea that when we judge "things are so," additional reflection on the judgment’s validity (e.g., "it is right to judge that things are so") is a second-order act—a separate judgment added to the first-order judgment. But this again relies on the force-content distinction: that the act of affirming a judgment (its "force") is separable from the content of the judgment.

    If accept that the thought of validity is a separate, second-order judgment, then the first-order judgment ("things are so") becomes unmoored from any inherent awareness of its own validity. In this case, nothing within the act of first-order judgment prevents it from being conjoined with its contrary (e.g., simultaneously judging "things are so" and "things are not so").

    Suppose we add a second-order judgment, such as "it is wrong to judge that things are not so." Rödl argues that this second-order judgment itself would require its own validity judgment (a third-order judgment) to avoid contradiction.

    The problem cascades: each judgment would require a higher-order judgment to affirm its validity, creating an infinite regress or an endless chain of 'second guessing'.

    Rödl shows that treating the validity of a judgement as a separate, reflective act is basically incoherent. If the recognition of validity isn’t assumed in the original judgment, there’s no way to prevent judgments from contradicting each other. ('I thought I thought that, but did I'?)
  • Patterner
    1.2k
    "Quentin, I think the oak is shedding," said Pat.

    Possible Quentin thoughts:
    "Pat thinks the oak is shedding."
    "I think Pat thinks the oak is shedding."
    "Pat said that Pat thinks the oak is shedding."
    "I think Pat said that Pat thinks the oak is shedding."
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