FWIW, in Metaphysics of Morals Kant makes clear that developing a specific categorical imperative (CI) is (my words) an art and not a science, and, that if CIs are found to compete/conflict, then one drops away entirely and the other governs. I wasn't a good enough reader to ask if this latter is after-the-fact pragmatism or part of the logic of the thing. My guess is part of the logic - two or more mutually exclusive alternatives cannot be all equally correct.shares hallmarks with the works of Kant .... offering a pragmatic lens for navigating complex moral decisions. — ZisKnow
Actions alone can be judged as moral or immoral, morality is tied to what we do, not necessarily what we think or feel.
Thoughts, on their own, are rarely if ever, actions, what we imagine or consider isn’t inherently moral or immoral without action to give it weight. — ZisKnow
Immoral actions are not always invalid choices, sometimes, circumstances leave us with only immoral options, and we must navigate these moments as best we can. — ZisKnow
Intent and circumstance matter after an immoral action, they help determine whether internal punishment (e.g., guilt or shame) or societal punishment (e.g., consequences or judgments from others) is warranted. — ZisKnow
Being in a position where telling the truth likely leads to someone's death
Looking solely at the action, telling the truth is moral, we need not concern ourselves further
Lying, is immoral, but does not need punishment, you believe that the outcome may result in someone's death, so your intent is to avoid harm. — ZisKnow
I don't understand, if something is the right thing to do, how it can be immoral?
I don't think an action can be considered immoral if it is not done with intent. In those cases it's just a bad idea or negligent. You're still responsible for your actions, but that's not the same as immoral.
Being in a position where telling the truth likely leads to someone's death — ZisKnow
How could telling the truth be moral if it causes unnecessary harm. — T Clark
Why?Looking solely at the action, telling the truth is moral, — ZisKnow
Actions alone can be judged as moral or immoral, morality is tied to what we do, not necessarily what we think or feel.
Thoughts, on their own, are rarely if ever, actions, what we imagine or consider isn’t inherently moral or immoral without action to give it weight.
Immoral actions are not always invalid choices, sometimes, circumstances leave us with only immoral options, and we must navigate these moments as best we can.
Why?
I see no particular virtue in telling what one believes to be true in all situations to all people, nor any great fault in withholding, bending, embellishing or fictionalizing it for various purposes. Nor do I consider flat-out lying in itself immoral. Who is lying to whom, in what circumstances, with what motive, for what purpose? — Vera Mont
I asked specifically why it's moral to tell the truth, in your system. On what you base that particular classification.Fundamentally, my 'why' is to avoid the uncertainty and doubt that surround moral relativism. I separate the judgment of morality (moral/immoral) from the assessment of outcomes (right/wrong) to provide myself with a clear and consistent decision-making framework. — ZisKnow
That would make for some very slow conversations. Most decisions are made in a split second, and most of what we say is unpremeditated - half the time, we don't even know what will fall out when we open our mouth. Sometimes it's embarrassingly frank and sometimes it's a face-saving fib.At the end, both our systems and approaches result in the same practical result that you can tell lies. I just feel you should always consider that choice in detail before you make it, and reflect afterwards. — ZisKnow
That is a laudable ambition. We all did something in the way of working out a personal philosophy, world-view and ethical framework between 16 and 21. Thereafter, we mostly followed one of our organs - brain, heart, gut or gonads.By putting a moral weight on the action, I work towards being a better person. — ZisKnow
It's a fascinating quandary isn't it? Why aren't moral or immoral the same as right or wrong?
Perhaps they don’t have to mean the same thing. It might feel like linguistic sophistry to separate them, but I see it this way: right and wrong are judgments about what action you should take, while moral and immoral are judgments about the nature of the action itself. — ZisKnow
For me, labelling an act as immoral means I have a responsibility to reflect on it—to examine my intent, the consequences, and what led me to act that way. It’s a tool for accountability and growth. I resist the idea that labelling an act as moral gives me a free pass. That’s why I approach actions from a deontological perspective: they must be judged consistently, or I risk simply doing whatever I want and rationalizing it afterward. — ZisKnow
An action can still be immoral based on its nature, its consequences or violation of principles, regardless of intent. — ZisKnow
What this gives me is a consistency, whenever I do something wrong, and indeed whenever possible *before* I do something wrong, I stop and think "is this the best approach?, will I feel guilty?, should I expect punishment from the wider society? It's a way of allowing a degree of moral relativism within a framework of moral absolutism, without having to endlessly debate specific acts and building a myriad of scenarios. — ZisKnow
I asked specifically why it's moral to tell the truth, in your system. On what you base that particular classification. — Vera Mont
Thoughts, on their own, are rarely if ever, actions, what we imagine or consider isn’t inherently moral or immoral without action to give it weight.
Actions alone can be judged as moral or immoral, morality is tied to what we do, not necessarily what we think or feel.
Lastly, I am not sure of this. Can't desires be good or bad? Isn't the desire to rape or steal evil? Isn't an important part of freedom and "becoming a better person" about identifying which desires are truly choice worthy and fostering those, while working to uproot the others? — Count Timothy von Icarus
I’d be curious to hear your thoughts on how we might reconcile the importance of the actor with the need for clear moral standards in evaluating actions.
For me, a thought or desire becomes harmful only when it is acted upon, or when resisting it causes harm to the individual. For example, in the case of a desire to rape, it sounds callous, but what goes on inside someone's head is simply a reflection of their internal processes—it’s not inherently moral or immoral
The key, in my view, is how we manage our desires, not their mere existence
Let us suppose for a moment that the harder virtues could really be theoretically justified with no
appeal to objective value. It still remains true that no justification of virtue will enable a man to be virtuous. Without the aid of trained emotions the intellect is powerless against the animal organism. I had sooner play cards against a man who was quite sceptical about ethics, but bred to believe that 'a gentleman does not cheat', than against an irreproachable moral philosopher who had been brought up
among sharpers. In battle it is not syllogisms that will keep the reluctant nerves and muscles to their post in the third hour of the bombardment. The crudest sentimentalism (such as Gaius and Titius would wince at) about a flag or a country or a regiment will be of more use.
We were told it all long ago by Plato. As the king governs by his executive, so Reason in man must rule the mere appetites by means of the 'spirited element'.20 The head rules the belly through the chest—the seat, as Alanus tells us, of Magnanimity,21 of emotions organized by trained habit into stable sentiments. The Chest-Magnanimity-Sentiment—these are the indispensable liaison officers between cerebral man and visceral man. It may even be said that it is by this middle element that man is man: for by his intellect he is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal.
The operation of The Green Book and its kind is to produce what may be called Men without Chests. It is an outrage that they should be commonly spoken of as Intellectuals. This gives them the chance to say that he who attacks them attacks Intelligence. It is not so. They are not distinguished from other men by any unusual skill in finding truth nor any virginal ardour to pursue her. Indeed it would be strange if they were: a persevering devotion to truth, a nice sense of intellectual honour, cannot be long maintained without the aid of a sentiment which Gaius and Titius could debunk as easily as any other. It is not excess of thought but defect of fertile and generous emotion that marks them out. Their heads are no bigger than the ordinary: it is the atrophy of the chest beneath that makes them seem so.
Okay. Visceral belief.Ultimately, I fall back on the conviction that some acts are simply moral or immoral by their nature. It’s a deeply held belief that truth-telling is moral, while lying is immoral. I admit it’s not a logically airtight answer, but for me, it’s foundational to my moral framework, it just is. — ZisKnow
For me, morality isn’t about labelling people as good or bad it’s about evaluating specific actions based on their inherent nature, intent, and consequences. This avoids the subjectivity that can arise from judging an actor’s character alone. — ZisKnow
I also believe that to fairly judge an action, one must set aside the circumstances and intent and evaluate the act itself. — ZisKnow
morality is tied to what we do, not necessarily what we think or feel — ZisKnow
I suspect that no one here has any capacity to influence the world's moral behaviour, just our own. Do you not find that acting from intuition is not enough? Can you provide examples of where your moral theorising has made a significant difference in your actions or assessments? — Tom Storm
I also believe that to fairly judge an action, one must set aside the circumstances and intent and evaluate the act itself. — ZisKnow
I think this misses a gap between 'acting on knowledge' and 'result'. Lets say that I know that if I donate to a charity that the money will be spent to save kids lives. I donate a large sum to the charity. The director who had been honest with the money up until now, sees the large sum and instead of donating most of us, gives into greed and finds a way to funnel it to their bank account. If I had not donated such a large sum, the director never would have given into greed and the charity would have continued uncorrupted. Did I do wrong? — Philosophim
It all depends on how causally linked things are in what you can see in the moment, not with hindsight — ZisKnow
It's good when one has an idea of what morality is. But I notice that, there is much less in the way of explaining the reason for contrasting the practical morality/consequentialism against the universal moral principles. Because to me, they are not in the same realm of deliberation. For example, the 'will' does not point to a concrete object that we can use when making an argument in favor of the harm principle.For me, this system of morality is less about metaphysical constructs or universal truths and more about guiding decisions to become the best version of yourself. While I hold personal beliefs that the judgment of actions is universal—shared across humanity—I also believe that to fairly judge an action, one must set aside the circumstances and intent and evaluate the act itself. — ZisKnow
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