To grasp religion, one has to do this. For religion is a metaphysical question of our existence. One has to ask seriously about metaphysics, and what it is. THEN the value dimension looms large. The easing of human suffering is an issue in ethics (it should be eased). And in religion ,it is about metaethics. Why is it metaethics? Because the world is a meta-world at this level of inquiry. — Astrophel

I am not sure if religion would have its ground for its existential justification without the concepts of afterlife, promise of savior from human sufferings, good fortunes, good health, possibility of the miracles and protection from God against the uncertain world. Like it or not, those are the elements of the attractions offered to the followers of religion in the mundane world, whatever religion it might be.

The OP title seems to be implying religion has close connection with human sufferings. No one would have taken the implication for intensifying, but wouldn't it be easing?

If it were not, then what would be the point of religion? For understanding the universe, we have metaphysics, epistemology, logic and semantics. Could religion offer better in understanding the universe? I am not sure.

I don't see that. I think Gautama's discovery overflowed the bounds of what can be spoken. Hence the famous 'Flower Sermon' which is the apocryphal origin of Ch'an and Zen Buddhism. In the story, the Buddha gives a wordless sermon to the sangha by silently holding up a white flower. No one in the audience responds bar Mahākāśyapa, who's smile indicates his comprehension. It is said to embody the ineffable nature of tathātā, the direct transmission of wisdom without words. The Buddha affirms this by uttering: — Wayfarer

They say in Tibet there is a dialog among masters of concepts those on the outside cannot even imagine. Ineffability is meaningful only relative to effability. If the ineffable (the extraordinary discoveries you mention) were a common experience in a culture, then THAT would be the standard of the effable. Language and reason care not.

Because language and reason is entirely open. God could actually appear to me and I would witness the depths of eternity, and then the next day I tell you and you think I am mad. Then you experience the same divine event of impossible dimensions, and now there is nothing at all preventing us from putting a language together, reappropriating the old through metaphorical and descriptive familiarities and similarities and differences, intensoties, possiblities for ironic play, and the communicative possiblities about it would be exactly the same as what exists now between us regarding chicken soup or a roller coaster ride. The original non-linguistic content never was "contained" in the words, just assumed because of this historical matrix of meanings and references that we share. This non linguistic dimension has always been, conceived in and of itself, transcendental. The world right now is always already transcendental, but we do not live in a culture that certifies this kind of thing.

There is more. I hold, and I think those you mention hold though they don't talk like this, that there is a point where simple familiar understanding turns to phenomenological understanding. One "sees" the phenomenon as a phenomenon such that the manifest and the manifested are one. A turning point.

I am not sure if religion would have its ground for its existential justification without the concepts of afterlife, promise of savior from human sufferings, good fortunes, good health, possibility of the miracles and protection from God against the uncertain world. Like it or not, those are the elements of the attractions offered to the followers of religion in the mundane world, whatever religion it might be. — Corvus

Let's call those promises part of the culture of religion. And sure, I know what people believe. But this is philosophically uninteresting. Such things have their grounding in something else. One has to bracket the culture and its institutions and language, to see what lies beneath, perhaps something that is unassailable.

The OP title seems to be implying religion has close connection with human sufferings. No one would have taken the implication for intensifying, but wouldn't it be easing? — Corvus

If it were not, then what would be the point of religion? For understanding the universe, we have metaphysics, epistemology, logic and semantics. Could religion offer better in understanding the universe? I am not sure. — Corvus

Tempting, but there is so much that needs saying, and this is a post. Ethics is the most salient feature of the universe. In religion, ethics becomes metaethics, the justification of suffering at the level of the pure phenomenon, the meta "what is it?" question and here we are supposed to find redemption, you know, meta-redemption, redemption that is built into the phenomenon of suffering itself. How? I argue, take flame and put your finger in it. What does this experience "tell" you? It issues forth an injuction NOT to do this, and injunction that is beyond law and duty conceived in a language to govern the consenting, or somethign like that. It is something as certain as logic itself.

Moral of the story: ethics is metaethics, and metaethics is where all of our ethical prohibitions have their genesis. This kind of analysis goes to foundations. So easing pain is a "principle" the world "tells" us we must follow. As good as any stone tablet, Better, because real, and not full of nonsense.

They say in Tibet there is a dialog among masters of concepts those on the outside cannot even imagine — Astrophel

There is also an understanding of non-conceptual wisdom. In yogic terminology concepts are ‘vikalpa’, mental constructions. They are not necessarily erroneous, but there are domains of understanding, or so it is said, beyond the conceptual. In the same way that other skilled pursuits like acrobats or skiing might be, neither of which rely on or can be conveyed by concept.

I dare say within the Tibetan context, these types of non-discursive understandings can be shared amongst those who are similarly skilled in that sense.

There is also an understanding of non-conceptual wisdom. In yogic terminology concepts are ‘vikalpa’, mental constructions. They are not necessarily erroneous, but there are domains of understanding, or so it is said, beyond the conceptual. In the same way that other skilled pursuits like acrobats or skiing might be, neither of which rely on or can be conveyed by concept.

I dare say within the Tibetan context, these types of non-discursive understandings can be shared amongst those who are similarly skilled in that sense. — Wayfarer

But in the same way the thrill of a roller coaster ride is non discursive. See, I just think talk "beyond the conceptual" says too much. Nothing is beyond the conceptual because nothing is contained IN the conceptual.

I just think talk "beyond the conceptual" says too much. — Astrophel

And saying that the Buddha’s enlightenment is a ‘language phenomenon’ doesn’t?

And saying that the Buddha’s enlightenment is a ‘language phenomenon’ doesn’t? — Wayfarer

I say a full bodied language "attends" enlightenment, allows the event to take place against what is not enlightenment, referring to everything one knows about the world prior. imagine if enlightenment were to appear in the mind of an infant. Could an infant be enlightened? No, I would argue.

You're some variety of a naturalist or a physicalist, right? — Astrophel

Yes.

So, brain here, tree there: how does the latter get into the former as a knowledge claim?

:sweat: It doesn't.

But what if no certainties can be assumed?

Well, then that would be a certainty.

Because this is a structural feature of our existence.

Thus, a certainty ...

When any and all standards of certainty are of no avail, we face metaphysics, ...

i.e. another certainty, no?

...real metaphysics.

In contrast to 'unreal' (fake) metaphysics?

It is an absolute, inviolable.

Ergo a certainty – a conclusion which contradicts (invalidates) the premise of your 'argument'. Another wtf are you talking about post, Astro?! :shade:

So what is your actual line of inquiry here? You are explicitly asking about the use of metaphysics or its reality? The latter seems like a contrary question.

We are certainly concerned with our position in the universe. If such a concern is wholly a 'religious' one then the question has to be what you mean by religion? I am not trying to corner you here as I think we might share a similar view here. The problem is using mere words to convey what is meant.

But what if no certainties can be assumed?
Well, then that would be a certainty.

Because this is a structural feature of our existence.
Thus, a certainty ...

When any and all standards of certainty are of no avail, we face metaphysics, ...
i.e. another certainty, no?

...real metaphysics.
In contrast to 'unreal' (fake) metaphysics?

It is an absolute, inviolable.
Ergo a certainty – a conclusion which contradicts (invalidates) the premise of your 'argument'. Another wtf are you talking about post, Astro?! :shade: — 180 Proof

Let's see if we can flesh out a little the thinking of those who are truth relativists. I’m not saying that Astrophel is a ‘radical’ relativist, but I am. Let me throw out a hypothetical approach in this vein. Let's say that in my experience of the world and myself, I've discovered that anything I observe or imagine or think or see other people observe has a curious habit of constantly changing its meaning in subtle ways every moment . If i read or repeat the word 'cat' over and over, each time, each moment it has a slightly different semantic sense than the previous. And the same effect occurs when I perceive an object in my environment. I conclude form this that I have discovered something that others haven't noticed, but is there for them also. they just don't see it because it is a subtle effect.

So I then form an explanation of objective truth that goes like this:people believe that there is such a thing as an object that has a certain permanence to it, that can be pointed to or referred back to as the same over time. People believe that self-identity, self-persistence, self-permanence are features of our world. We can find such attributes in the physical world, in our language concepts, in our memory, etc.
But I believe that we only think that such attributes as self-persistence, self-identity over time and permanence are what we are experiencing. I surmise that what we are really experiencing is phenomena that , as I said before, are subtly shifting their semantic meaning every moment of time. So we just assume meaning permanence, self-identity,etc where there is instead very tiny shifts and transformations in the semantic sense of object, percepts, concepts. In practical terms this isn't a big deal. We can understand each other, point to what for the most part is the same reality, and agree on our empirical descriptions and physical laws.

So would I then be able to say that objective truth does not exist? Well, first of all, I could agree with Heidegger and say that truth for me is just the way that each new moment of time unveils a slightly new semantic meaning for me. Truth is just the unveiling of new experience, not its matching up to a standard. So there is truth, but what about objectivity? So does objectivity exist? AlI I can say is that every moment I have to test myself, ask myself the question again. Do I this moment experience a thing that persists identically, be it a concept, a percept, a law of nature, a norm of any kind? IF each time I ask the question the answer is still no, then I can say that as far as I can tell, this moment, for me and apparently for everyone else that I've observed or thought about, reality doesn't sit still even for a moment, such as to allow persisting semantic self-identity or the self-persistence of any object.

I can say that when someone claim's that objective truth exist, they are absolutely right. Every moment there is a truth about the meaning of an object. And every moment that meaning changes very slightly, for everyone that I've observed. So I would want to rephrase that question to: 'does the objective truth about anything stay exactly the same for more than a single moment? What about my claim that objective truth never stays the same for more than a moment? Is this an objective claim? Well, it is me saying, at this moment and from my recollection, I do not now nor ever remember having an experience of self-identity or self-persistence of anything, physical , conceptual or otherwise. But others are welcome to keep asking me the question. I can tell them that I have a theory about why others believe they are seeing objective truth as stable, and that it is possible to miss the instability of reality without it in any way jeopardizing one's ability to do formal logic or science.

So , based on this argument, the relativist isn't really stating a negative claim(objecivity does NOT exist) so much as a positive one, that they are seeing something beyond, within, underneath, overflowing what those who believe in the semantic stability of objects(logical, perceptual, conceptual) arew seeing. Their claim should be: 'objectivty exists, but does a lot more interesting things than the objectivist is able to see). They are seeing dynamism where others are seeing only stasis. Is this dynamism 'objective'? Is it a theory, a principle? It is certainly a general claim. But , and here's the most important point, its not an objective claim as long as it doesn't turn 'radical dynamism ' into a stable object. It has to be modest in its claim. It has to say simply that each moment the question must be asked anew, because the very nature of radical dynamism is that there is no horizon beyond the current moment for any assertion. I can say that I anticipate that the next moment I will generally believe something very similar to what I am now asserting, because in my experience so far the world not only changes every moment but preserves a certain overall stability in its ongoing transformations. Each new moment is not a profound semantic break with the previous but only a very subtle one.This is a post-objective claim, requiring a different method of test.

To test the claim of radical changeability in all objects of experience for everyone is to do two things:
1) it is to try to teach a believer in stable objectivity to see the underlying movement in supposedly static experience. How do you convince someone to see more than they see? Either they see it or they don't. Meanwhile, as relativist, you can leave them to their objectivism, knowing that it works for them, and isn't 'wrong' or 'untrue', just incomplete.
2)The believer in radical relativism must every moment of experience test their own perception(make it contestable) to see if this dynamism continues to appear very moment, everywhere for them.

If one sticks to the view of language as representative symbol this is true, but in the approaches to language we find in such figures as Merleau-Ponty , Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Derrida language isn’t separate from the affective enacting of world, it is that enacting. — Joshs

But my thoughts run like this: There is in this sprained ankle attending thought, and this may be equiprimordial with the pain, but to conceive of the pain as a thoughtful event doesn't make sense. I understand that the basic distinctions drawn are our own analytical impositions, but the ontology of pain needs to be liberated from the presumption of knowing in order to stand apart from it and be acknowledged in its pure phenomenality, and this is not to say that human existence is a foundational body of divisions.

You're some variety of a naturalist or a physicalist, right?
— Astrophel
Yes.

So, brain here, tree there: how does the latter get into the former as a knowledge claim?
:sweat: It doesn't.

But what if no certainties can be assumed?
Well, then that would be a certainty.

Because this is a structural feature of our existence.
Thus, a certainty ...

When any and all standards of certainty are of no avail, we face metaphysics, ...
i.e. another certainty, no?

...real metaphysics.
In contrast to 'unreal' (fake) metaphysics?

It is an absolute, inviolable.
Ergo a certainty – a conclusion which contradicts (invalidates) the premise of your 'argument'. Another wtf are you talking about post, Astro?! :shade: — 180 Proof

Sorry 180 Proof, but it is all just too glib and without argument or thought. I am not criticizing. It just doesn't appear you have anything to say.

We are certainly concerned with our position in the universe. If such a concern is wholly a 'religious' one then the question has to be what you mean by religion? I am not trying to corner you here as I think we might share a similar view here. The problem is using mere words to convey what is meant. — I like sushi

I think my position here deserves to be cornered. The whole matter requires a sea change, if you will, in philosophical perspective, and a post is such a short thing. So I'll ask you if you agree: It it the case that all that is affirmed about the self or the world in which it finds itself, presupposes the conscious act that affirms its existence? If so, then this conscious act is antecedent to any talk about a universe, that is, at the basic (philosophical) level of analysis, we FIRST encounter the self in determining anything at all. After all, ontology cannot be conceived apart from epistemology, is one way to say it, as if what IS can be posited apart from the positing itself. The question begging is glaringly obvious.

This miniscule step puts the analysis of all that is on the perceptual act.

Does this sit well with you?

How? I argue, take flame and put your finger in it. What does this experience "tell" you? It issues forth an injuction NOT to do this, and injunction that is beyond law and duty conceived in a language to govern the consenting, or somethign like that. It is something as certain as logic itself. — Astrophel

That doesn't sound like the work of Ethics. It would more sound like the work of inductive reasoning. You try something, if it hurts, you learn not to do it i.e. trial and error.

Ethics don't tell about these things. Ethics are the code of conducts between human beings while living on the earth i.e. Ethics will tell you what is morally good things to do, and what are not. If you do moral wrongs, then you will be judged as a morally corrupted by the other folks. If you do morally good things to others, then they will judge you a morally good guy.

If you lived in a desert by yourself with no one around you, Ethics wouldn't apply to you. Because you have no one to interact with. Ethics emerges when you do things to others, and others do things to you. It is a value judgements on the actions of folks to other folks in folks mind. Good and bad in Ethics don't exist in the universe.

In other words, if you tortured a bowlful of sands for no reason, or if you strangled a scabby cactus, there is no morality arising in these actions. Morality only matters when you are dealing with people on the way how you treated them, and how they treated you.

I agree religion has some sayings on Ethics and Morality such as in the form of the 10 commandment in the Bible, which still forms the underlying foundation of morality in modern times. But I am still not convinced if it could tell much about the world around us. Well they do, but all in their own terms and doctrines, which are not logical and not rational way.

I'm just pointing out that it appears you have plenty of nothing – nonsense – to say yourself, sir.

Relativism (radical or otherwise), like nihilism, refutes itself insofar as it is self-subsuming; to wit: all contrary truth-claims are valid including that 'relativism is not true' (e.g. the meaning of deconstruction defers / is deferred).

I'm a 'radical pluralist' for whom it is logically possible (N. Goodman) that there is more than one way to express, or make explicit (R. Brandom), the world – with metaphors, maps, models (which presuppose it is ontologically necessary that there is more than one way the world could have been (re: actualism conta possibilism)) – and that different expressions convey different degrees, or approximations, of epistemic fidelity to – 'truth about' – the objective (i.e. subject / pov / language / gauge-invariant) world (Spinoza).

In other words, to my mind, relativism says 'in a maze there are only non-critical paths' whereas pluralism says in a maze there are critical and non-critical paths and that critical paths vary in length; ergo the latter rewards discernment and the former does not. IMO, the relativist sees 'many paths to many mountains and therefore arbitrarily choses between them' whereas the pluralist sees many paths up the mountain s/he (we) cannot escape from and seeks the shortest to the summit (C.S. Peirce ... D. Deutsch).

IMO, the relativist sees 'many paths to many mountains and therefore arbitrarily choses between them' whereas the pluralist sees many paths up the mountain s/he (we) cannot escape from and seeks the shortest to the summit (C.S. Peirce ... D. Deutsch). — 180 Proof

The choice can never be arbitrary, precisely because our attitudes, values and actions must always conditioned from within a specific system of discursive practices which legitimate and make intelligible our ethical choices. The consequences of our decisions matter deeply to us in ways that we recognize as profoundly relevant in our lives as interpreted from the vantage of our involvement within partially shared ways of life. Nothing could be more arbitrary than this. It would be a mistake to separate our discursive practices from the ‘way the things really are’. Our practices are directly plugged into the world; they are the way that world shows itself to us, and there is no way to get beyond or above these practices to a non-discursive reality.

Most accused of radical relativism agree that it is self-refuting, and for that reason it is a straw man argument. Joseph Rouse puts forth a good explanation of the difference between ‘anything goes’ relativism and the non-sovereign, ‘normativity all the way down’ positions writers like Foucault actually espouse.

Relativism is an assertion of epistemic sovereignty, which proclaims the epistemic "rights" of all knowers or knowledges. The most fashionable forms of epistemic relativism today, which are also those frequently and mistakenly associated with Foucault, are those which dismiss all claims to objectivity or truth as merely masks for power. But such claims are the exact epistemological parallel to the radical critique of law as itself a form of violence, which Foucault insisted always "assumes that power must be exercised in accordance with a fundamental lawfulness." To make this assumption, whether about power or knowledge, is to remain committed to a conception of sovereignty, from which such fundamental lawfulness can be rightly assessed.

What, then, does a post-sovereign epistemology have to say about the legitimation of knowledge? The crucial point is not that there is no legitimacy, but rather that questions about legitimation are on the same "level" as any other epistemic conflict, and are part of a struggle for truth. In the circulation of contested, heterogeneous knowledges, disputes about legitimacy, and the criteria for legitimacy, are part and parcel of the dynamics of that circulation. Understanding knowledge as "a strategical situation" rather than as a definitive outcome places epistemological reflection in the midst of ongoing struggles to legitimate (and delegitimate) various skills, practices, and assertions. Recognizing that the boundaries of science (or of knowledge) are what is being contested, epistemology is within those contested boundaries.”

To test the claim of radical changeability in all objects of experience for everyone is to do two things:
1) it is to try to teach a believer in stable objectivity to see the underlying movement in supposedly static experience. How do you convince someone to see more than they see? Either they see it or they don't. Meanwhile, as relativist, you can leave them to their objectivism, knowing that it works for them, and isn't 'wrong' or 'untrue', just incomplete.
2)The believer in radical relativism must every moment of experience test their own perception(make it contestable) to see if this dynamism continues to appear very moment, everywhere for them. — Joshs

That sounds complicated and a lot like hard work. Is this exhausting to live by?

As a non-philosopher I find this hard to grasp or at least accept. Is it making too much out of too little change?

Even if meanings subtly shift from moment to moment, we can still reliably communicate, build technology, and make predictions about the world. This suggests that there’s a shared, stable structure to reality (note I am not sayign objective or certain) that doesn’t depend on momentary subjective fluctuations. For example, the laws of physics or the meaning of basic concepts like “cat” remain consistent enough for people across cultures and times to understand each other and cooperate. If everything were as fluid as this seems to suggest, such stability and shared understanding would seem not to be possible. What am I missing?

:up: Nicely explained! There is all too much ado about what amounts to nothing of any importance. When it is claimed that say 'cat' never means the same between two instances of thinking it, all that I can see is being pointed out is that different people may entertain different associations with the concept, or the same people entertain different associations at each different instant of thought.

Thank you but @Joshs is a serious player in this space and I am sure he has a response.

@Joshs is well read and articulate to be sure. It doesn't follow that he has hold of the right end of the stick. I have no doubt he has a response, of course.

I edited my above post as you were responding. Note there "same' people and "different" people. Use of these expressions, where we all know what we are talking about, does not imply that any of us are exactly the same from one moment to the next.

a serious player — Tom Storm

Does that mean that he doesn't have fun playing?

The thread is about religion and suffering, so it is relevant to re-state the implicit claim of religious philosophies variously designated as salvation, deliverance, or liberation, depending on the context, meaning the ending of suffering. As mentioned in an earlier comment, there is an unspoken convention that this is not something that can be considered in the secular context, as by definition, secular culture can't accomodate it.

I do not now nor ever remember having an experience of self-identity or self-persistence of anything, physical , conceptual or otherwise. But others are welcome to keep asking me the question. I can tell them that I have a theory about why others believe they are seeing objective truth as stable, and that it is possible to miss the instability of reality without it in any way jeopardizing one's ability to do formal logic or science. — Joshs

If there are these micro deviations from moment to moment, and I think this right, then why does this indeterminacy not topple the very notion of objectivity altogether? After all, the macro level agreements only align in the agreements themselves (Quine and his indeterminacy of Translation). This reduces objectivity to a pragmatic notion, for agreement works, and micro disagreements work as long as they don't matter. But Quine stabilized the world with his naturalism, ridding the equation of pesky semantics. You affirm the pesky semantics, but deny naturalism. Your idea of objectivity is certainly different from his. Or is it? When you affirm the

No doubt, the "slightly different semantic sense" occurs from moment to moment, but does this really undo self persistence? How is it that I am the same person that I was a moment ago? Technically, you would say, I am not. But on the other hand, this belies the very concrete "sense" of my existence, whichi is not analytically reducible.

'Objectivity' can mean different things. In the pragmatic context it just amounts to intersubjective agreement. In the realist context it is an acknowledgement of things having an existence of their own, independently of the human. If objectivity is independent of the human, and everything we experience and know is not, then we cannot fully know a purportedly independent existence even though our experience has obviously induced the idea of it in us.

The absolute idealist conception that objective existence just is what we experience seems inadequate. It certainly seems to be true that our experience itself is objectively real, meaning that we experience just what we experience, but even here we don't seem to have full access to just what it is that we experience. Unknowing seems to be as important as knowing in human life. That doesn't satisfy those who are addicted to finding certainty.

As mentioned in an earlier comment, there is an unspoken convention that this is not something that can be considered in the secular context, as by definition, secular culture can't accomodate it. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure about that. What do you mean by 'accommodate'. David Bentley Hart has said (and recently at great length) that the problem of suffering (the inherent cruelty of this world) is atheism's best argument and that there is no answer to it in religion which he finds plausible. And isn't death the end of suffering for secular types? In the mean time, I have worked in palliative care a lot over time and I can say that theists seem way more disturbed and distressed by suffering than secular people I've met. Anecdotal I know but there it is.

isn't death the end of suffering for secular types? — Tom Storm

Secular philosophies certainly believe it is. Religious philosophies, on various grounds, do not. Maybe the religious patients you have tended are tormented by that possibility, whereas those who don't believe in an afterlife won't believe there's anything to dread.

David Bentley Hart has said (and recently at great length) that the problem of suffering (the inherent cruelty of this world) is atheism's best argument and that there is no answer to it in religion which he finds plausible. — Tom Storm

That couldn't be right, because if he didn't believe that his religion has a plausible attitude to suffering, surely he'd abandon the faith, which he hasn't. While Hart often says that the problem of suffering is a formidable challenge and "atheism's best argument," it doesn't mean he accepts atheism's perspective on suffering. He addresses the problem of suffering in this interview , conducted shortly after the 2004 tsunami catastrophe, which ends:

(Referring to a photograph seen in the Baltimore Sun.) The story concerned the Akhdam, the lowest social caste in Yemen, supposedly descended from Ethiopians left behind when the ancient Ethiopian empire was driven out of Arabia in the sixth century, who live in the most unimaginable squalor. In the background of the photo was a scattering of huts constructed from crates and shreds of canvas, and on all sides barren earth; but in the foreground was a little girl, extremely pretty, dressed in tatters, but with her arms outspread, a look of delight upon her face, dancing. To me that was a heartbreaking picture, of course, but it was also an image of something amazing and glorious: the sheer ecstasy of innocence, the happiness of a child who can dance amid despair and desolation because her joy came with her into the world and prompts her to dance as if she were in the midst of paradise.

She became for me the perfect image of the deep indwelling truth of creation, the divine Wisdom or Sophia who resides in the very heart of the world, the stainless image of God, the unfallen. I’m waxing quite Eastern here, I know, But that, I would say, is the nature of God’s presence in the fallen world: his image, his bride, the deep joy and longing of creation, called from nothingness to be joined to him. That child’s dance is nothing less than the eternal dance of divine Wisdom before God’s throne, the dance of David and the angels and saints before his glory; it is the true face of creation, which God came to restore and which he will not suffer to see corruption.

That couldn't be right, because if he didn't believe that his religion has a plausible attitude to suffering, surely he'd abandon the faith, which he hasn't. — Wayfarer

Have a look at Hart's recent interview on Youtube with Curt Jaimungal. He's pretty clear. It's a pretty staggering interview - perhaps because he is, these days, less cocky and self-regarding owing to his own sickness and pain. He has faith that there must be some kind of explanation for evil but he doesn't pretend to know what it is. I don't think it follows that people leave their faith just because it doesn't have all the answers. If that were the case most theists would be atheists by the morning. People generally believe that on balance secularism or theism makes more sense of the world they understand. The issue of suffering has nagged at Hart for decades. And he has certainly discussed that his faith is sometimes impacted by doubt. Isn't that how faith works?

I think Hart's views tell us that it's not so simple as theism having better responses or answers. If a theist and religious scholar as sophisticated as Hart comes to this conclusion, then the problem of suffering and evil can't be put down as an obtuse physicalist response.

I might take that in. I bought his last book All Things are Full of Gods, and didn't much like the format, and it spends a lot of time rehearsing arguments I'm very familiar with.

I don't think he trivialises suffering or says 'have faith that it'll be OK in the end!' He deplores any kind of triteness, and he also takes a dim view of Calvin and Calvinism. It's obviously a problem he wrestles with. But I think he must believe that the 'life eternal' is free of suffering. ('There's no sickness, toil or danger in that bright land to which I go.')

Something that I've been mulling over is this. When I first became interested in Eastern religions, it is because they seemed to appeal to something other than belief. They seemed to promise something like a direct insight or an experience or realisation - the key word - which was superior to the stuffy Churchianity that was how I saw religion. But then life taught me that such realisations may be elusive - they can come and go without much apparent cause. There is also a lot of capacity for self-delusion in their pursuit. And the cultural context in which they were practiced and understood is vastly different to our own. So at this stage in life, 'belief' is no longer looking like the shibboleth that I once thought it was.

I don't think he trivialises suffering or says 'have faith that it'll be OK in the end!' — Wayfarer

I'm not sayign that he does this. And nor would I. Suffering is serious. Probably the most serious and formative matter I can think of.

But then life taught me that such realisations may be elusive - they can come and go without much apparent cause. There is also a lot of capacity for self-delusion in their pursuit. And the cultural context in which they were practiced and understood is vastly different to our own. — Wayfarer

Indeed, very interesting. You strike me as a sincere seeker of truth. I spent the first 18 years of my life among the extended Baptist community in inner Melbourne. Over the years, I’ve also spent time with Theosophists, mystics, Jesuits, Buddhists, and others. Additionally, I’ve engaged with secular humanists and the atheist community.

What I’ve observed is that people are largely the same - the fears, behaviors, and relationships don’t vary much, regardless of belief systems. However, some individuals are rare; they seem to possess an authenticity and integrity that transcend labels. These are the people I find interesting. Anyone can claim to be a theist or an atheist, but I don’t think labels mean all that much.

What I’ve observed is that people are largely the same - the fears, behaviors, and relationships don’t vary much, regardless of belief systems. However, some individuals are rare; they seem to possess an authenticity and integrity that transcend labels. These are the people I find interesting. Anyone can claim to be a theist or an atheist, but I don’t think labels mean all that much. — Tom Storm

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