Hello, kind folk, do you mind if I jump in?

I'll cut straight to the point: I believe in good common sense. Is it perfect? No. But other than science, it's the best we got so far. That, and perhaps some forms of entertainment.

Can I kindly request that you put me up to speed on the state of this Thread? Where is the discussion at, currently? What is the "Main Thing" (so to speak) that you are currently discussing, and how could I possibly contribute, either constructively or destructively? Forgive my mannerisms and figures of speech, I'm "simple folk", if you want to call it that.

To your point though, it is worth asking: "have there been any peaceful and ethical movements that progresses just as rapidly and richly as the many barbaric ones that came before (or after) it?". Very few; in fact, I would say the only ones are the ones that are barbaric anti-barbarism: the violence of peace. E.g., Ghandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., etc. — Bob Ross

How about international cooperation?

As usually we are obsessed in our focus on Superpowers and Great Powers and conflicts, we miss a lot that has been truly dramatic and peaceful, movements that have been a success by cooperation by independent states. European integration has pacified the union members (which don't look at each other as potential military threats and adversaries). The idea of EU came strong after the Continent had suffered two World Wars, something that anti-EU populist will totally ignore.

Or Nordic cooperation, where as early as 1952 Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland abolish the requirement for passports for travel between them. Or what the UN has also achieved, even if the organization is very bureaucratic and inefficient. In every Continent there is a desire for cooperation and for trade. The idea of shutting the country out of the World isn't popular anymore, as Japan tried to do earlier (and actually places like Oman, where one sultan was a very conservative guy who banned the use of bicycles in the 20th Century.) The wide assortment of international organizations that sovereign states participate has to be in it's entirety a noteworthy development.

It also begs the question just what values and agendas are shared in such way we could speak of Global or Universal values, not just Western values.

Didn't Gandhi and King endure the violence of the British and the southern cops / mobs respectively?

Yes, in the most violent of displays of peace—viz., in the most radical and extreme methods of peaceful protest ever concocted. I was merely pointing out that even the rare occurrences where peace has the same swift and monumental effect of aristocratic elites, it still has that aristocratic shadow….it is perfectly plausible that if Ghandhi were not so radically peaceful—but rather peaceful in a more moderate and reasonable sense—then his whole project wouldn’t have made a single dent in human history. It was the “uno-reverse card” of showing people how barbaric someone could be in the face of absolute kindness that had a bone-chilling affect.

What about the Dutch, one might ask.

I don’t remember much about Dutch history, but I would guess that they haven’t done anything monumental towards the course of history. We are not talking about countries that merely survived but, rather, plummeted humanity into a new age or significantly expedited the development process. I am not sure if the Dutch count here…

American Indian tribes are fairly often suggested as peaceful and unwarlike

I’ve heard otherwise—e.g., cannibals—but even if this is true it is obvious that they are weak and only exist still because sympathy and tolerance of all human life has been thoroughly cultivated into humanity’s conscience. In fact, if they are examples of the product of anti-aristocratic values, then it only serves my point….

Humans can display a great deal of solidarity, cooperation, loyalty and trust when either a sufficiently dangerous threat or an irresistible opportunity presents itself

Yes, and they have tended, throughout history, to come together at the expense of a weak out-group...no?

We have entered an unprecedented age, where we now find aristocratic values itself disgusting; and it has had its strengths and weaknesses.

I think this is why so many people do not like Israel and Russia for their conquests: it is very aristocratic.

Let's revisit both A and B conceptions of Justice — Bob Ross

I don't see much merit in either of these conceptions. Are you pulling them out of thin air? Or is there some thinker or tradition that you are getting these from?

Here's what I am thinking. Justice is about, fundamentally, respecting other members of the community (or social structure in which one is a member, such as a family for example) such that each member is getting what they rightly deserve and not getting what they do not deserve. — Bob Ross

I would have the same concern about this. Where is it coming from? If we look at <a dictionary> I don't really see your conception. Or if we do, it is only there in a vague way.

We need a better starting point for a definition.

if the community has the resources to suffice the basic needs of each member than it should — Bob Ross

This is probably the kernel of the strangeness in your thought. This conception of justice finds no basis anywhere in the Merriam Webster definitions above. "If you can do X then you are required to do so in justice." That is a very strange claim to my ears.

In terms of my example of the self-sufficient man, I think you are right: it would be a matter of beneficence and benevolence and not justice. — Bob Ross

Yes, I agree.

Same thing, I think, with things like animal cruelty. Beyond the injustice which would arise from violating a person's property by torturing or killing their pet, it is not something, even outside the purview of justice, that a virtuous person would do because they need to be benevolent and beneficent. — Bob Ross

Sure, but commissions tend to be more unjust than omissions, and this is why justice was classically concerned primarily with "negative rights."

Are you pulling them out of thin air? Or is there some thinker or tradition that you are getting these from?

I got those from After Virtue by MacIntyre:

For A aspires to ground the notion of justice in some account of what and how a given person is entitled to in virtue of what he has acquired and earned; B aspires to ground the notion of justice in some account of the equality of the claims of each person in respect of basic needs and of the means to meet such needs. Confronted by a given piece of property or resource, A will be apt to claim that it is justly his because he owns it – he acquired it legitimately, he earned it; B will be apt to claim that it justly ought to be someone else’s, because they need it much more, and if they do not have it, their basic needs will not be met. But our pluralist culture possesses no method of weighing, no rational criterion for deciding between claims based on legitimate entitlement against claims based on need. Thus these two types of claim are indeed, as I suggested, incommensurable, and the metaphor of ‘weighing’ moral claims is not just inappropriate but misleading...

– (After Virtue, Ch. 17 “Justice as Virtue: Changing Conceptions”, p. 246)

I find it plausible that justice requires a balance between A and B types of justice because they are the two extremes in a community: the one, to wit, the proper assessment of individual merit and the other, to wit, the proper assessment of natures (of members). One focuses only on the individual in terms of agency, and the other solely on the needs of each member.

I don't see much merit in either of these conceptions

How would you define justice, then?

I would have the same concern about this. Where is it coming from? If we look at <a dictionary> I don't really see your conception. Or if we do, it is only there in a vague way.

Well, dictionaries are notoriously inadequate for formal discussions. Nothing about the definitions in the Webster dictionary for justice suffice in telling us what exactly justice is getting at.

We need a better starting point for a definition.

My definition of justice is the study and practice of properly treating other persons; my initial description of justice is what you quoted:

Here's what I am thinking. Justice is about, fundamentally, respecting other members of the community (or social structure in which one is a member, such as a family for example) such that each member is getting what they rightly deserve and not getting what they do not deserve.

I am describing justice fundamentally in terms of the relation between community and individual exactly because the Aristotelian conception of justice arises only exactly due to us being social organisms. Justice can’t be, i.e., if Aristotle is right that justice is a virtue only because we must facilitate it to fulfill the social aspect(s) of our nature, fundamentally about merely respecting individuals (such as is the case in libertarian notions of justice) because it makes no reference to the community or over-arching structure which one’s goods are interdependent upon.

This conception of justice finds no basis anywhere in the Merriam Webster definitions above.

Why doesn’t it fit? Here’s one definition from your link:

the quality of being just, impartial, or fair

"If you can do X then you are required to do so in justice." That is a very strange claim to my ears.

Justice has an element to it that is relative to the resources and circumstances of the community. E.g., it is unjust to arbitrarily or unduly prevent someone from driving on roads, but depending on the conditions of the roads what is considered unduly here may change; it is currently unjust to force people, where I live, to not use as much water in their homes, but if there is a drought then it may no longer be unjust; food rationing is unjust right now, but not necessarily if we start running low; etc.

Do you deny any circumstantial aspects to justice?

Sure, but commissions tend to be more unjust than omissions, and this is why justice was classically concerned primarily with "negative rights."

I guess, to a certain extent. However, there are multiple levels to laws (e.g., local, state, federal, etc.) and policies that come into play which are circumstantial to some extent. We have this negative right to, e.g., make this policy for our private business; but might not have it in, e.g., in martial law.

I got those from After Virtue by MacIntyre — Bob Ross

Okay, so Nozick vs. Rawls (and probably capitalism vs. communism in MacIntyre's thought - property rights vs. redistribution of wealth).

I find it plausible that justice requires a balance between A and B types of justice because they are the two extremes in a community: the one, to wit, the proper assessment of individual merit and the other, to wit, the proper assessment of natures (of members). One focuses only on the individual in terms of agency, and the other solely on the needs of each member. — Bob Ross

MacIntyre's point of departure is that the two conceptions are incompatible, no? Even if there is some common ground between them?

How would you define justice, then? — Bob Ross

I would follow Aristotle, Cicero, or Aquinas. As quoted above:

But of justice as a part of virtue, and of that which is just in the corresponding sense, one kind is that which has to do with the distribution of honour, wealth, and the other things that are divided among the members of the body politic (for in these circumstances it is possible for one man’s share to be unfair or fair as compared with another’s); and another kind is that which has to give redress in private transactions. — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V.2

if the community has the resources to suffice the basic needs of each member than it should — Bob Ross

This is probably the kernel of the strangeness in your thought. This conception of justice finds no basis anywhere in the Merriam Webster definitions above. "If you can do X then you are required to do so in justice." That is a very strange claim to my ears. — Leontiskos

My first objection is to this, "If you can provide the basic needs of X then you are required to do so in justice." (Where in this case X = members of the community.) I'm not sure what legitimate conception of justice could ever support such a claim.

The second objection, to Rawls, is that cosmic justice is not justice. There is no duty to enforce cosmic justice. If someone on the other side of the world needs $100 from me, I have no duty to provide it, because cosmic justice isn't real. That someone is born shorter and therefore is not as good at basketball is not "unfair" in any realistic sense. There is no cosmic court of redress to which that person can bring their suit of unfairness. Distributive justice pertains to communities, and the cosmos is not a community. What Rawls and post-Christians want is a court of cosmic justice that we are in charge of running.

Of course, there are theological possibilities that could introduce cosmic duties, but I don't see this coming from natural reason.

Do you deny any circumstantial aspects to justice? — Bob Ross

I'm not sure. Consider your drought example. Does the community owe the members water or not? If the community owes the members water, then the drought is immaterial to this fact, and the community which has made itself an arm of cosmic justice has a duty to sort out the cosmic factors (and perhaps get water from elsewhere).

The confusion lies in the idea that distributive justice functions in the same way that commutative justice does. Distributive justice has to do with an impartial and fair distribution of things among the community ("honour, wealth, etc."). The only legitimate claim is therefore something like, "I did not get a fair share in relation to the rest of the community." Absolute claims are excluded, such as, "I did not get healthcare, and you have a duty to provide me with healthcare."

...and this is why justice was classically concerned primarily with "negative rights." — Leontiskos

So compare a negative right, "You have a right not to be stolen from," to a positive right, "You have a right to a free ice cream cone every day." The first right is not so difficult to create - it only requires us to prosecute thieves. So we need to maintain a justice system that prosecutes thieves. What about the second right? It is a bit more difficult to create, as we need to manufacture 330 million ice cream cones every day. This should be taken as a kind of reductio ad absurdum. Something which requires a promise is not a right, and we do not have a distributive right to any absolute positive quantity whatsoever, be it ice cream cones or healthcare or social security (Social Security is on point given that the U.S. fund will be insolvent by 2033, at which point we will literally have people claiming a right to non-existent money. Hopefully cosmic Santa Claus refills that fund!).

(MacIntyre's A and B are both precritical notions of justice or fairness. They need to be submitted to criticism before they pass muster.)

MacIntyre's point of departure is that the two conceptions are incompatible, no? Even if there is some common ground between them?

Yes, and I agree.

I would follow Aristotle, Cicero, or Aquinas. As quoted above:
But of justice as a part of virtue, and of that which is just in the corresponding sense, one kind is that which has to do with the distribution of honour, wealth, and the other things that are divided among the members of the body politic (for in these circumstances it is possible for one man’s share to be unfair or fair as compared with another’s); and another kind is that which has to give redress in private transactions.

I don’t have a problem with this view, but I am surprised you don’t. This definition is also not found in the Webster dictionary, which you used as a critique of mine.

Also, Aristotle’s description, like mine, has an interdependency on the community and the individual such that there is a need for “redress in private transactions” and “the distribution of honor, wealth, etc.” which was my point before:

Here's what I am thinking. Justice is about, fundamentally, respecting other members of the community (or social structure in which one is a member, such as a family for example) such that each member is getting what they rightly deserve and not getting what they do not deserve.

The confusion lies in the idea that distributive justice functions in the same way that commutative justice does. Distributive justice has to do with an impartial and fair distribution of things among the community ("honour, wealth, etc."). The only legitimate claim is therefore something like, "I did not get a fair share in relation to the rest of the community." Absolute claims are excluded, such as, "I did not get healthcare, and you have a duty to provide me with healthcare."

Well, that’s what I am getting at; and you referenced it here as a type of justice; so I am a bit confused: that seems to agree with me.

I'm not sure. Consider your drought example. Does the community owe the members water or not?

Yes, in terms of what you would call “commutative justice”, I see your point: they either must have a positive right to water or not…

However, in terms of what you would call “distributive justice”, it seems like if the community, e.g., has an abundance of water then they shouldn’t hoard it for the ruling elite—that would be unjust.

Moreover, this “distributive justice” seems connected still to what one is ‘owed’. Viz., it is only unjust for the community to hoard the abundance of water because they have duties, as the community, which include properly distributing resources—so that is owed to the individual in a sense.

So compare a negative right

That’s fair: negative rights a lot easier to uphold than positive ones; but I think we both agree we have positive rights. Take the water example: if you were denied any water simply because the government didn’t want to give it to you (perhaps they want to use that water for a water slide party for the ruling elites) even though you are doing your duly fair share of work in society—which we could think of it in terms of you having the money to pay for the water bill—then that is unjust because you have a positive right to the water.

I think the trouble comes in, as you rightly pointed out, when we think of positive rights just like negative ones. E.g., when we think of our right life like our right to have water when it isn’t being distributed fairly. This ends up conflating the right which can never be breached with a straw man version of the “water right” such that one thinks that the government is required to give them water simpliciter. That’s not what we are saying here.

I don’t have a problem with this view, but I am surprised you don’t...

Also, Aristotle’s description, like mine, has an interdependency on the community and the individual such that there is a need for “redress in private transactions” and “the distribution of honor, wealth, etc.” — Bob Ross

I have been following Aristotle (or Aquinas, who follows Aristotle) from the very beginning of this discussion. The problem then as now is that your conception is not Aristotelian, so I am wondering what it is. Is it Christian? Marxist? Rawlsian?

For example you want to say:

• It is unjust not to help someone on the other side of the world.
• It is unjust when the rich do not help the poor.
• It is unjust for the community not to fulfill members' needs when it can.

None of this is true for Aristotle. Distributive/communal justice does not entail any of this.

...which was my point before: — Bob Ross

Here's what I am thinking. Justice is about, fundamentally, respecting other members of the community (or social structure in which one is a member, such as a family for example) such that each member is getting what they rightly deserve and not getting what they do not deserve. — Bob Ross

I think this is too vague to do any work. "Justice is about respecting other members of the community with respect to desert." Fine, but what questions does that answer? You think the guy on the other side of the world deserves $100 and I don't. We haven't gotten anywhere.

This definition is also not found in the Webster dictionary, which you used as a critique of mine. — Bob Ross

Finding no philosophical or political antecedent, I looked to the dictionary. In my case the philosophical antecedent is clear: Aristotle.

However, in terms of what you would call “distributive justice”, it seems like if the community, e.g., has an abundance of water then they shouldn’t hoard it for the ruling elite—that would be unjust.

Moreover, this “distributive justice” seems connected still to what one is ‘owed’. Viz., it is only unjust for the community to hoard the abundance of water because they have duties, as the community, which include properly distributing resources—so that is owed to the individual in a sense. — Bob Ross

Sure, so for example, the community has a duty to properly distribute the revenue it receives via taxation, and the individual is owed a proper distribution. But he is not owed water qua water, but rather water insofar as it comes under the heading of proper distribution of communal resources. And the community is not something over and against the individual; but rather the whole of which he is a part.

But from this we do not get your ideas about duties to people on the other side of the world, or duties of the wealthy to the poor, etc.

That’s fair: negative rights a lot easier to uphold than positive ones; but I think we both agree we have positive rights. Take the water example: if you were denied any water simply because the government didn’t want to give it to you (perhaps they want to use that water for a water slide party for the ruling elites) even though you are doing your duly fair share of work in society—which we could think of it in terms of you having the money to pay for the water bill—then that is unjust because you have a positive right to the water. — Bob Ross

Well I would say we do not have a positive right to water insofar as it is an "absolute positive quantity" or insofar as it is a good or service simpliciter. We only have a right to water insofar as we have a right to proper distribution and proper distribution happens to include water in our governmental setup. Think of it this way: the only reason I have a right to half a pizza is because you and I bought it together. If we hadn't bought it together I wouldn't have a right to half of it.

I think the trouble comes in, as you rightly pointed out, when we think of positive rights just like negative ones. E.g., when we think of our right life like our right to have water when it isn’t being distributed fairly. This ends up conflating the right which can never be breached with a straw man version of the “water right” such that one thinks that the government is required to give them water simpliciter. That’s not what we are saying here. — Bob Ross

That's right, but when you say that the poor have a right to the wealthy's wealth, it looks like you are saying they have a right simpliciter. I see no private-commutative right between the wealthy person and the poor person. In fact I don't really think there are positive commutative rights at all, although everything I am saying is simplified a bit. Aristotle's "redress in private transactions" obviously does not function apart from redress (and this does not include cosmic redress!). Probably the only (positive) right to goods and services that one has is a qualified right to goods and services, insofar as those goods and services come under distributive justice. The right to half a pizza only exists insofar as the purchase or production of pizza is a joint venture.

This is good: you are making me think about this more.

The problem then as now is that your conception is not Aristotelian, so I am wondering what it is. Is it Christian? Marxist? Rawlsian?

I would like to think it is Aristotelian; but let’s find out.

I think I agree that Justice—like you—is about distribution and commutation. So let’s size this up to what I’ve said before.

It is unjust not to help someone on the other side of the world.

I agree, this isn’t true; because justice would be relative to the community, and the nation would be the highest community. EDIT: An interesting question is, though, why would we note hope to unite all people under one law in order to bring about this sort of justice (which would apply)? It seems like a loophole to your critique here.

It is unjust when the rich do not help the poor.

This isn’t true as well if we are talking about how citizens should treat each other and not what goods the government should be providing. More on that later.

It is unjust for the community not to fulfill members' needs when it can.

I would say “it is unjust for the community not to fulfill members’ needs when it can sustainably”; and it would be unjust in the sense of distributive justice—not commutative justice.

Think about it: if there’s a starving orphan child, then it is a part of the community’s job to take care of that child—at least until it can grow up to be an adult for themselves; and if the community could no longer afford (through perhaps taxation or whatever resource streams they have) to take care of orphans, then there is no injustice—in any sense—if they starved to death (because other families have duties to their own children—not random children—and no citizen is obliged—morally or legally—to take care of some random child (even if it is a good thing to do).

Here’s the interesting part: distributive justice seems to require the community to take care of that child—if the resources are available in a sustainable and reasonable sense: do you agree?

This gets interesting though, as most people would disagree with this, prima facie, because most people would say one has a duty to keep an orphan baby, which was dropped off anonymously at their house, as long as required until the authorities arrive or despite any authority ever being on their way.

Sure, so for example, the community has a duty to properly distribute the revenue it receives via taxation, and the individual is owed a proper distribution. But he is not owed water qua water,

Agreed; but how do we decipher what distributive justice entails? I started re-reading Aristotle to try and get some clues. It seems like the community’s distribution of goods based off of trying to promote the human good (e.g., institutionalized marriage [in the sense of giving tax breaks and incentives], foster care system, CPD, etc.); so why wouldn’t it be obligated to give a base income, e.g., for each citizen if that were feasible (given the abundance of resources)?

It seems like why you and I wouldn’t go for universal base income, is because it, in fact, doesn’t work and is not sustainable; but what if it were? In principle, would that be distributatively just?

The rest of what you said I agree with; so I do not feel the need to comment on those.

EDIT: I forgot to mention another thing: although it is not unjust to choose to not help a person who is not of your nation; I do still find it potentially lacking in beneficence, which could result in it being immoral albeit not unjust. Of course, this is relative to whether the given case is making them inbeneficent or not; but assuming it is, then we would have a reason to say they shouldn't be doing that.